


The background of the cover is a photograph of classical Greek architecture, featuring white marble columns and a decorative balustrade. The image is slightly blurred, creating a sense of depth and focus on the text.

Antisthenes of Athens

TEXTS,
TRANSLATIONS,
AND
COMMENTARY

Susan Prince

VISIT...

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Antisthenes of Athens

Antisthenes of Athens
Texts, Translations, and Commentary



Susan Prince

University of Michigan Press

Ann Arbor

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Abbreviations

- APF *Athenian Propertied Families*, by J. K. Davies (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971).
- CAG *Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1882–1909).
- CP *Classical Philology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1906–).
- CPF *Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini*, ed. F. Adorno (Florence: Olschki, 1989–).
- CronErc *Cronache Ercolanesi* (Naples: G. Macchiaroli, 1971–).
- DC *Antisthenis Fragmenta*, ed. F. Decleva Caizzi (Milan: Istituto editoriale cisalpino, 1966).
- DK *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, ed. H. Diels and W. Kranz, 6th ed. 3 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1952).
- FGrHist *Die Fragmente der Griechischen Historiker*, ed. F. Jacoby (Berlin and Leiden: Weidmann, 1923–58).
- GP *The Greek Particles*, by J. D. Denniston (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1954).
- GRBS *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies* (Cambridge, MA: Eaton Press, 1959–2009).
- IG *Inscriptiones Graecae* (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1873–).
- LGPN *Lexicon of Greek Personal Names*, ed. M. J. Osborne and S. G. Byrne (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987–).
- LSJ *A Greek-English Lexicon*, ed. H. G. Liddell, R. Scott, H. S. Jones, and R. Mckenzie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968).
- ML *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions*, ed. R. Meiggs and D. Lewis (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969).
- PAA *Persons of Ancient Athens*, ed. J. Traill (Toronto: Athenians, 1994–2012).
- PCG *Poetae comici Graeci*, ed. R. Kassel and C. Austin (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1983–2001).
- PHerc *Catalogo dei Papiri ercolanesi* (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1979).
- POxy *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, ed. B. P. Grenfell and A. S. Hunt (London: Egypt Exploration Fund, 1896–).

- PMG* *Poetae melici Graeci*, ed. D. L. Page (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).
- RE* *Paulys Real-Encyclopädie der Klassischen Altertumswissenschaft* (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1894–1963; ser. 2, 1914–72).
- RM* *Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, Geschichte und griechische Philosophie* (Frankfurt am Main: J. D. Sauerländer, 1842–).
- SSR* *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae*, ed. G. Giannantoni. 4 vols. (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1990).
- SVF* *Stoicorum veterum fragmenta*, ed. H. von Arnim. 4 vols. (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–24).
- TrGF* *Tragicorum Graecorum fragmenta*, ed. B. Snell, S. Radt, R. Kannicht et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1971–2004).

Introduction

Any attempt to reconstruct [this fragmentary writer's] thought requires fantasy and imagination. But fantasy must be responsible to the evidence, and imagination must acknowledge one sobering fact: we do not know much about [him].

Jonathan Barnes, on Antiochus of Ascalon, in *Philosophia Togata* (1989:52)

All Barnes is doing here, though, is reminding us of the sad fact . . . that we are dealing with hints and scraps of evidence. If one is not inclined to make the most of these, then one should probably leave the field alone.

John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* 2nd ed. (1996:432)

This book is primarily a commentary on the edition of the surviving textual passages by and about Antisthenes of Athens, the famed disciple of Socrates (c. 445–360 BCE), published by Gabriele Giannantoni in 1983 in his *Socraticorum Reliquiae* and republished in 1990, with no changes to the relevant material, in his *Socratis et Socraticorum Reliquiae* (hereafter called SSR). Adaptations have been made in some textual readings, length of excerpts, and, in a few cases, the selection of passages; the numerous typographical errors that not only once but twice slipped through the publication process of Giannantoni's collection have been corrected.¹ The overall structure of Giannantoni's edition, ordered roughly according to titles in the book catalog preserved by Diogenes Laertius, is hard to improve, and the small disadvantages presented by the ordering of SSR are not enough to introduce a whole new reference system.

Little or nothing that can be called "fragments" of Antisthenes' own writing remains, although he reportedly wrote much: what we have are several dozen testimonia, including synthetic portraits by Xenophon and Diogenes Laertius, and two short fictional speeches attributed to Antisthenes that survive in full. The authors of these testimonia range in date from Antisthenes' contemporaries to his fans eight centuries later and also include hostile critics,

1. Giannantoni's 1983 *Socraticorum Reliquiae* included numerous typographical errors, all repeated in 1990. In some cases, his constitutions of the texts failed to take account of the most recent scholarship available. The review of SSR by S. R. Slings (1996) attacks Giannantoni for depending on H. S. Long's Diogenes Laertius and overlooking Patzer 1970 on t. 41A. The work's great merit is the collection and intelligent organization of a very large portion of the surviving testimonia on the minor Socratics.

epitomizers, and fabricators. For those who stand by careful use of authentic “fragments” in Hermann Diels’ sense, Antisthenes has seemed of almost no value or interest. Certainty is possible on few topics. But the testimonia, one could wager, do carry a story; and Antisthenes was rarely so prestigious that his thoughts or authorship were forged fantastically, as might be true for figures such as Pythagoras, Socrates, or Diogenes of Sinope.

It is worth making the most we can of the hints and scraps of evidence about Antisthenes that survived antiquity, because he was one of, if not the most important among, Plato’s intellectual contemporaries in the world of post-Socratic Athens. However great Plato was and however great and powerful his philosophy became (particularly in comparison to that of his contemporaries) over the decades of his life and the phases of his literary production, Plato did not become great by himself. Nor is it likely that his star pupil Aristotle was the only person who stimulated Plato to become ever greater or that the materialist physicist Democritus was the only contemporary rival who was refuted, unnamed, behind the scenes and between the lines of Plato’s dialogues. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle do not form a linear and self-contained tradition in early Greek philosophy: rather, they lived in the well-populated intellectual world of classical Athens, where dozens of serious thinkers influenced each other every day through rivalry and mutual inspiration. Antisthenes must have been important among these.

The methodological principles of this edition follow from the beginning laid out by Giannantoni and the nature of the material he collected. First, given that almost everything we have from Antisthenes is testimonia, understanding the purposes of the preserving authors is fundamental to understanding everything said about Antisthenes. Simple excerpts can be read as such only when the proximate author was someone like Stobaeus (who, as it happens, probably did not read Antisthenes directly), and even then, Antisthenes’ position in a range of passages can illuminate the importance recognized in him. The boundaries of citation are rarely to be defined exactly, and the overall program of each text that cites Antisthenes must be considered. There are probably words and phrases in many testimonia that Antisthenes generated himself: these can be recognized by their oddity or emphasis, their consistency among themselves, and their difference from the normal practices of the citing authors. But it is rarely certain that any particular word or phrase can be attributed to Antisthenes, and discussion is required most of the time. This is the major reason that a commentary is the best form for basic treatment of Antisthenes’ literary remains.

Second, a holistic approach to Antisthenes is critical to making progress with this author and thinker. All the testimonia and both speeches must be accounted for in any convincing overview of Antisthenes. Real explanations must

be made for the discounting of any evidence, beyond its post-contemporary date. Of course, the surviving evidence is partial, representing perhaps a few percentage points of what Antisthenes produced. But the set of evidence for Antisthenes is larger than it is for most of the other ancient thinkers known foremost by reputation, including many of the Pre-Socratics. It is unsound to reconstruct Antisthenes' views on any topic by selecting a small set of passages that are considered the most genuine or most contemporary and omitting the rest. Every text that preserves information, from the contemporary fictions of Xenophon and the contemporary polemics of Aristotle to the traditional Stoicizing doxography in Diogenes Laertius and the Cynicizing novella of the pseudo-epistles, contains its prejudices, and these must be considered in the course of both counting and discounting any bit of the evidence. There might be compartments of thought for Antisthenes that he himself did not reconcile and that, in the end, justify the isolation of some evidence from other; but such segregations must be carefully considered, not assumed too quickly from our own academic traditions or prejudices. There might also be fallacious, unintended inconsistencies in Antisthenes' thinking, insofar as Antisthenes was primitive or deficient. Finally, because the available evidence is so poor, there might be contradictions apparent particularly to us that we should not try to reconcile, because we have no access to any full or explicit account of Antisthenes' views that could verify the kind of conjectural reconstruction necessary. But I propose that the declaration of deficiencies and inconsistencies should be the last resort, after we have made dedicated attempts to find the consistent strands in Antisthenes' approach to the topics of his day. A richer modern discussion might compensate, to some extent, for the impossibility of real verification, as it has done for so many of the Pre-Socratics, Sophists, and Hellenistic philosophers.

Third, the selection and ordering of the testimonia is not the original contribution of this edition. The collection of "fragments" of Antisthenes has accumulated over time—from Winckelmann's *Antisthenis Fragmenta* of 1842 (reprinted by Mullach in his broader *Fragmenta Philosophorum Graecorum* of 1867) to Humblé's "Antisthenes' Fragmenten" of 1932² to Decleva Caizzi's *Antisthenis Fragmenta* of 1966³ to Giannantonio's *Socraticorum Fragmenta* of 1983 and *Socratis et Socraticorum Fragmenta* of 1990, each with the order rear-

2. This was Humblé's 1932 dissertation, only partially published in Humblé 1934.

3. As the best scholarly edition of Antisthenes, Decleva Caizzi's edition was not surpassed by SSR, because her text is free from error. Moreover, Decleva Caizzi offers commentary on each passage individually, in contrast to the bibliographical essays on broader topics offered in SSR. But she minimizes Xenophon, as well as the late antique commentators on Aristotle and the Homeric scholia, and most of her commentary is very brief, rarely addressing the context in which a passage survives. SSR adds a bulk of textual material (some albeit speculative), which is the major reason that collection was the obvious basis for the next step I take here. Similarly, Suvák 2010 chose SSR as the basis for his translation, with brief commentary, of Antisthenes' testimonia into Slovak.

ranged and new numbers assigned—to the extent that the collection has now exceeded, by a small margin, the passages where Antisthenes is cited by name. There remain some unresolved questions about which Antisthenes is meant in some passages (esp. t. 72B, 159D). I have added a few passages to SSR (t. 38B, 51B, 52C, 72B, 84C, 136B, 136F, 159D, 179B, 185B, 192B), moved some into the Antisthenes corpus from elsewhere in SSR (t. 20B, 22B–C, 33A–B, 34A–H, 35B, 37B–C, 43B, 84B, 94B, 117B, 138B), moved some from different subpositions within the Antisthenes corpus (t. 90B, 136E, 163B), printed some to which only SSR refers (t. 52A–B, 57B, 70B–C, 71B, 77B, 92B, 122GH, 149B–2, 149C–E, 152C–D, 153C, 173B, 181C, 207A–C), expanded many to give more of the context (t. 13A, 14B, 18, 44B–C, 48, 51A, 69, 49, 82, 115, 149A, 149B–1, 149F, 150A–B, 151B, 152A–B, 152C, 153A–B, 156, 157B–C, 170, 191, 194, 196, 197), changed the order or made important distinctions within some clusters (t. 1, 11, 87, 103, 112, 122, 131, 149, 188, 189), deleted two testimonia (t. 130, 144), and left in place about a dozen that are conjectural because they do not name Antisthenes. These could arguably be replaced by a dozen others that are equally conjectural but are discussed instead in the notes. Although I believe that Antisthenes is also in the background of further texts and passages where he is not named, argument on these points must depend on the testimonia securely accepted and is appropriate to a different setting. The conjectural passages retained from SSR are the Isocrates texts (t. 55, 66, 156, 170), several from Aristotle (t. 118A–B, 119, 157A–C, 158), two from Xenophon (t. 67, 103C), one from Plutarch on Aspasia (t. 143B) and another on Alcibiades (t. 202), and several from the Cynico-Stoic ethical tradition (t. 136, 140); t. 206–8 in Section 17, like all extracts from the Cynic epistles (also t. 20B, 84C, 94B, 136B), are somewhat different and must be labeled as imitations. Among my additions, about half (t. 38B, 72B, 84C, 136F, 159D, 192B) are also conjectural. Appropriate cautions and references are included. It seems futile, in fact, to attempt to set out definitively all the evidence that can be used to understand Antisthenes or reconstruct his lost texts, not only because conjecture is required, but because the boundaries of relevance can probably never be defined. The whole corpus of Plato, all of Xenophon, and all of Dio Chrysostom (to give the three most important examples) are potentially fruitful for understanding Antisthenes, and the boundaries move outward from there to contemporary authors such as Isocrates and Aristotle and later ones such as Plutarch and Themistius. As for ordering, there are disadvantages to retaining the order of SSR, including the uneven sizes of the sections; the separation of, for example, Alcibiades into two different sections and the clustering of Aspasia with one of these Alcibiades groupings in distinction from Cyrus and Heracles, with whom she is listed in the book catalog; the segmentation of Diogenes Laertius' biography (which has parallels on the small scale of individual sentences but not on the large scale);

and the waste of some testimonium numbers (31, 97, 114, 145, 146, 205) versus the necessity for three-level subdivision of others (t. 34, 149 and 189). Many passages seem hardly important enough to stand alone but could be clustered with others (e.g., t. 4, 6, 24, 25, 39, 40, 115). Whereas most of the *apophthegmata* and anecdotes reported by Diogenes Laertius are separately listed, sometimes even twice (t. 85 = 97, t. 114 = 172, t. 58 is really part of t. 134), t. 27 and 172 are compounds and t. 22, 134, and 135 are long accounts or doxographies. But this is a reference work, full of cross-references and supplied with indices, and the numbers are only markers. Readers will be able to devise the order of reading useful to them. Moreover, computerized searching tools make an editor's ordering decisions less determining than they used to be. Foremost, I resisted the introduction of yet another new numbering system.

Changes to the text, beyond their length, are noted in the *apparatus criticus* for each text and sometimes discussed in the notes. The range of this collection entails that it cannot be considered an independent scholarly edition in all senses. I have consulted no manuscripts myself for this project but have used previous publications to establish each text, often beyond the edition cited for reference in each case. I have tried to standardize the style of my own *apparatus criticus*, as conventions vary widely. Where there is either a significant divergence in the manuscripts or variation in published texts, as well as in the few cases where I have conjectured a new reading or a lacuna myself (t. 44C, 92B-C, 122B, 141B, 152B.2), I have first reported the authority for the option I have chosen, whether it is a manuscript reading or a conjecture. I have then listed the alternatives in the order of manuscript authority, placing last any conjectures I have rejected but consider worth reporting because they have been influential. In some cases, standardizing and completing the *apparatus criticus* meant that I designated "codd. plur." (most manuscripts) as authority where I have no information about exactly where a majority reading is attested. In general, the *apparatus criticus* is meant to be minimal, but for the most important texts, such as the speeches (t. 53–54), and for the Homeric scholia (esp. t. 187), which are least well known and understood, I thought it was important to include more than the minimal information about variant readings and conjectures. For details about all manuscript sigla, readers should consult the cited edition. In presenting papyri, I have eliminated the conventional underdot for conjectural readings: for this information also, readers should consult the cited edition.

Significant changes from SSR, beyond correction of the typographical errors, include the following: For Philodemus, the new editions sometimes differ radically from what SSR printed (t. 179B is added, and t. 184 is now quite different); the papyrus fragment in t. 175 is taken from a newer edition; t. 182, from Marcovich's newer edition of Clement's *Protrepticus*, now shows that Antisthenes is quite probably quoted in verse. I have also used Marcovich's 1999 edi-

tion of Diogenes Laertius, together with Patzer's edition of Antisthenes' book catalog; the newer edition by Dorandi (2013) was published after this book went to press, but I have checked it at all relevant points during the copy editing process and cited it as a monograph. My own important decisions about the text include the retention of the proper name "Kyrzas" transmitted in a letter of Cicero (t. 84A), omission of the parentheses inserted by twentieth-century editors directly before the reference to Antisthenes in each of the passages in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* where he is discussed (t. 150A, 152A), and the removal of some nineteenth- and twentieth-century conjectures from the two major texts on Odysseus (t. 54, 187).

Translations are intended both to reflect the Greek accurately, so that readers with little knowledge of Greek can by and large follow the passages and commentary, and to capture the thought of each passage in natural English. Favor has been given to literal, Greek-based translation. However, I have not tried to translate every Greek word in the same way every time: even though I do think Antisthenes had a view of language that would resist translation or paraphrase and would treat items of vocabulary as unique terms, most of the language translated here was crafted not by Antisthenes or any other single writer but by more than a hundred writers. A few words in the English text, such as *logos*, *eros*, *tomos*, and *apophthegma*, are transliterations rather than translations, because of their terminological status. Proper names are spelled in the Latinized form, like what is familiar in modern English, even when the Greek names are unfamiliar.

In the introductory comments and more detailed notes on each passage, the major goals are to explain the context in which various bits of evidence about Antisthenes are preserved; to identify, tentatively in most cases, what is likely to be the actual wording or voice of Antisthenes; to associate each testimonium with the others that are most comparable and to discuss overlaps and differences among the evidence; to identify, discuss, and contribute new insights to major topics that have emerged in the scholarship on Antisthenes over time, pinning these to the passages or words that serve as evidence for each scholarly discussion; and to bring out some topics that have not so far been discussed in the scholarship, for example, Antisthenes' interest in being a human (which is used as an example of a name or definiendum in t. 149 and 150A and elsewhere, but has not, to my knowledge, been considered as anything more) or his apparently distinctive approach to lexical ambiguity in a text (t. 189: see esp. 189A-1.4 notes). I have often reported or generated multiple possible answers to a single problem in the Antisthenes testimonia, and sometimes I have declined to take a clear stand myself. Although some readers will find my presentations of these alternatives irritating in their failure to reach a definitive conclusion, I write in awareness of the controversies at stake and the possibility that there might

yet be major progress to be made with Antisthenes. I have tried not to alienate those readers who will hold firm preconceptions about Antisthenes that I do not believe the evidence supports, and I allow that modern reconstruction from a basis of spotty ancient evidence will never be perfect or systematically efficient and will always need space for alternatives.

The number of cross-references I identify among passages, while ample, is incomplete; readers will find plenty that I have missed. References to passages outside Antisthenes' testimonia, especially to texts of Plato and Xenophon, are all the more to be understood as only some, not all, of the possibilities worth considering. I have tried to cite the important bibliography at all points, but readers should not assume that omissions are significant: I have absorbed the bibliography on Antisthenes over a long period of time, and it is difficult to retrace the source of every idea without rereading the scholarship, which I have done in many cases, but not all. I have favored citation of scholarship that deals particularly with Antisthenes or with a given text of a preserving author, minimizing citation of more synthetic recent scholarship on the major issues with which Antisthenes intersects, for example, Homer, erotics, and all too many topics in Socratic ethics and dialectic. This solution is not ideal but mostly practical (the limits are hard to see) and reflects the fact that much modern scholarship on these topics has developed without considering Antisthenes: it seems sounder to work from Antisthenes' testimonia outward to the big questions than to apply frameworks from the big questions to Antisthenes. There is more work to be done in this area. At some points, I have also discussed my textual decisions in the notes, but I tried to reserve such discussion to points that are significant for the meaning of the passage or for its contribution to what we can understand about Antisthenes.

A final point about conjectural interpretations is in order. There is a tendency in classical scholarship, as in other modes of thought and argument, to accept the most efficient possible explanation for a given phenomenon. One result in the history of interpreting Antisthenes is that he is written out of (almost) every story that can be told coherently without him. The lack of evidence for a given claim is regularly confused with the falsity of the claim itself. For two recent examples, see Slings 1999:96, on Hans von Arnim's thesis that Antisthenes is a common source for the Platonic *Clitophon* and the "ancient discourse of some Socrates" told by Dio Chrysostom in *Oration* 13 (t. 208); and Huss 1999 (Xenophons Symposium):364, in his evaluation of Karl Joël's thesis that a lost work by Antisthenes is a common source for both surviving *Symposium* texts, those of Plato and Xenophon. In each case, it is said, the thesis must be false because there is too little evidence in its favor. (After explaining that expansions on *Clitophon* could account for all of Dio's text, Slings concludes, "Von Arnim's thesis cannot be falsified any more and should therefore be aban-

done.”) But the truth value of a historical hypothesis is not affected by the quantity of evidence now surviving in its favor (or opposed) or by the existence of a successful modern argument in its favor. Either there was or there was not a literary relationship between Xenophon and Antisthenes that a contemporary reader could see reflected in, for example, t. 14A, and the answer would matter if we knew it. The loss of evidence or inadequacy of proof cannot change the events of the fourth century BCE. Obviously, our account of the Greeks must be driven by the evidence, not every conjectural thesis is true, and we cannot assume we know something that is only plausible. But one reason to draw conclusions from obscure evidence, rather than trying to fit obscure evidence into the received story (or, all too often, ignoring such evidence), is that we might be able to enrich and improve the received story. The boundaries of this book do not allow for extensive inquiry into many such questions, but conjectural hypotheses must be entertained openly, not thrown out too fast, if we are going to make progress with Antisthenes. Sometimes we will not have an answer, but a question can stay on the table.

Modern Reception of Antisthenes

Modern knowledge of Antisthenes began from the images transmitted by Diogenes Laertius in his *Lives and Opinions of Those Eminent in Philosophy* (composed c. 200–230 CE) and by Xenophon in his *Memorabilia* and *Symposium* (composed probably in the late 360s BCE, near the time of Antisthenes’ death), both authors whose works were published in Europe in the early decades of the printing press.⁴ Through the career of Hegel, the serious history of philosophy took no note of Antisthenes, and early publications were mainly antiquarian embellishments on Diogenes Laertius.⁵ The German novelist Christoph Wieland, in his epistolary novel *Aristipp* (1800–1802), promulgated the image of a surly, somewhat misanthropic Antisthenes, interpreted from Xenophon’s *Symposium* together with later stereotypes of the Cynics, that has persisted in scholarship to the present day.⁶ This is not unlike the ancient image preserved in the Roman copies of the Pergamum sculpture, created around 200 BCE and

4. On Diogenes Laertius, see Marcovich 1999: xiii–xix. The first editions (in Latin translation) appeared in 1472 (Rome) and 1475 (Venice), the Greek in 1533 (Basel) and 1570 (Geneva, bilingual). A published edition of the complete works of Xenophon appeared in 1516 (Venice).

5. More detail on this history can be found in Patzer 1970: 16–44.

6. Wieland’s *Aristipp* was published in four parts, now in volumes 36–39 of his *Collected Works* (edited by J. G. Gruber, published by G. J. Göschen in 1824–28, and still circulating in a reprint of this edition). Although Antisthenes is there presented as Socrates’ friend, he is variously called, for example, “runzlig” (shriveled) (p. 72 in Wieland 2011), “sauertöpfisch” (surly) (p. 118), “finster” (stern) (p. 139), and “wasserscheu” (afraid of bathing) (p. 360), and his manner is described as “einseitig” (one-sided) (p. 363). Bruns 1896 brought this portrait of Antisthenes into academic scholarship.

first unearthed at Tivoli in 1772, in which Antisthenes seems to be fashioned after the Giants (see von den Hoff 1994:140–45). But in ancient literature more broadly, Antisthenes appears also as a funny and agreeable character (see esp. t. 22A.14, 110), and his “sayings,” or *apophthegmata*, are often wry (see, e.g., t. 8, 72A, 87). The interpretation of innuendo in Xenophon’s *Symposium* can be controversial, but Kurt von Fritz, at least, thought Antisthenes was sometimes colluding in Socrates’ jokes (t. 103B, 14A).

Antisthenes entered the history of philosophy in W. G. Tennemann’s *Geschichte der Philosophie* of 1799 and Friedrich Schleiermacher’s series of introductions to his translations of Plato’s individual works, published between 1804 and 1834. Tennemann proposed, on the basis of t. 152A, that Antisthenes was a Sophist; Schleiermacher, using Tennemann’s interpretation of Antisthenes’ views on language and adding the premise that in physics he was a Heraclitean (on the understanding that t. 159D refers to our Antisthenes), proposed that Antisthenes was meant behind the “mask” of Plato’s character Cratylus and that various of his theses were held up for examination or ridicule also in *Theaetetus*, *Meno*, *Euthydemus*, and the *Sophist*.⁷ Eduard Zeller, in his classic and comprehensive *Die Philosophie der Griechen in ihrer Geschichtlichen Entwicklung* of eventually five editions,⁸ portrayed Antisthenes as an innovative thinker in logic, a predecessor for the Stoics, and a banal moralist in ethics. Ferdinand Dümmler, in his 1882 dissertation and assorted short writings published in his *Akademika* of 1889, sharpened many of the questions in circulation by positing more precise theses about Plato’s relationship to Antisthenes, especially in the *Republic* and *Theaetetus* and especially with reference to the importance of Homer and poetry. Dümmler influenced Zeller’s fourth edition, which in turn had an enduring effect in the twentieth century. Karl Jöel, in his ambitious and often reckless three-volume work *Der echte und der xenophontische Sokrates* of 1893–1901, proposed that Antisthenes had had a profound effect on Xenophon, as well as all literature of the late fifth and early fourth centuries, and that Xenophon’s Socrates was in fact a “Cynic” Socrates and, for that reason, histori-

7. The “mask” proposal is introduced explicitly for Aristippus (see p. 201 in Dobson’s 1836 English translation of Schleiermacher’s introductions to Plato) but is implied in the comments about Antisthenes. In Dobson’s translation, claims about Antisthenes in the respective dialogues appear on p. 202 (*Theaetetus*), 210 (*Meno*), 224–25 (*Euthydemus*), 239–46 (*Cratylus*), and 250 (the *Sophist*). See also Patzer 1970:18 n.8, reporting an additional reference in the introduction to *Philebus*; but this reference appears neither in the 1861 German printing of Schleiermacher’s translations of Plato available to me nor in Dobson’s translation. Schleiermacher also wrote a four-page synthetic account of Antisthenes’ views under the headings “Ethics,” “Physics,” and “Dialectic” in his posthumously published “History of Philosophy” (in *Gesammelte Werke*, ed. H. Ritter [Berlin, 1839], part 3, vol. 4:90–93).

8. The five editions were published, respectively, in 1844–52, 1865, 1869, 1888, and 1903. Parts of the work were translated into English and other languages, under different titles, beginning in 1868 (*Socrates and the Socratic Schools*, trans. O. J. Reichel). Reprints are sometimes identified as further editions, but Zeller died in 1908. The fourth edition of 1888 is widely used, from reprints of the 1920s.

cally false. Although many in the German-speaking world were sympathetic to the basic insights of Tennemann and Schleiermacher and also to the promising agenda of Dümmler, who died of exhaustion in 1896 at age thirty-six,⁹ the excesses of Joël brought the trend in speculative inquiries on Antisthenes to a turning point. By the second decade of the twentieth century, scholars such as Eduard Schwarz (1902) and Ulrich von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf (1912, 1919) were declaring that academic energies should be spent on the texts that survive, not those that have been lost, and speculation on Antisthenes and his possible influences on Plato and the Cynics fell into bad repute.

The major landmarks in the history of Antisthenes' reception since Zeller's fourth edition of 1888 can be classified by ethics, logic, his relationship to Diogenes of Sinope and the Cynics, and his Socratic loyalty. Opinions on his ethics have varied little from Zeller's impression of banality and simplistic reduction of Socraticism (see further discussion below). His logic, however, has been reconstructed into a seriously intended, positive philosophical position, of various kinds, by such scholars as Gillespie (1913–14), von Fritz (1927), Festugière (1932), Caizzi (1964), and Brancacci (1990), whereas Guthrie (1969) and Rankin (1986), among others, have classified him as a "sophist" or an "Eleatic." Others still, such as Levi (1930) and Grube (1950), have minimized the intellectual ambitions of his statements and aligned his logic to the traditional view of his ethics, placing him in the ranks of "dolt." His connections to Diogenes of Sinope and relationship to ancient Cynicism were fundamentally challenged by Donald Dudley in 1937, whose arguments remained persuasive through the twentieth century. The currently accepted explanation for the line of succession traced by Diogenes Laertius (argued by Mansfeld in 1986) postulates that Stoics of the second and first centuries BCE reinvented their lineage in order to attach it to Socrates and that Crates of Thebes, Diogenes of Sinope, and Antisthenes provided a convenient route back to Socrates. Although Dudley's arguments are not compelling (see t. 22A and further bibliography cited there) and although Socraticism is evident in Diogenes and Crates as well as Antisthenes, new work on this question has yet to make impact. As for Antisthenes' own Socraticism, Geffcken posited long ago (1934 v.2:29) that "sophistry" and Socraticism need not be mutually exclusive. Among recent scholars, C. W. Müller

9. Dozens of scholars, many still well known (including Diels, Gercke, Gomperz, Heinze, Hense, Hirzel, Kaibel, Robert, Usener, Wackernagel, Wissowa, and Zeller), signed on as subscribers and financial sponsors of the posthumous publication of Dümmler's collected works in 1901. See also C. W. Müller, *Wilamowitz und Ferdinand Dümmler: Ein schlimme Gechichte* (Stuttgart: Steiner, 2005). In *RE* s.v. "Antisthenes" 2543, Natorp lists the passages in Plato that, by time of publication in 1894, had been seriously proposed as references to Antisthenes. In recent scholarship, this list (along with several older parallels) is cited as evidence for nineteenth-century recklessness. But Natorp's own work appears in the list, and it is not obvious that the list is foolish. Rather, it seems less sound to focus the debate on too few passages, since Plato is a parodist and since a broader view is likely to lead to better conclusions.

(1975, 1995, 1998) has been inclined to allow for such a combination; but most recent serious Antisthenes scholars, including Patzer (1970), Decleva Caizzi (1966), Brancacci (1990), and Giannantoni (1990, in SSR), even while they cite Geffcken's comment, have insisted that Antisthenes was primarily a Socratic, and by equating this with an earnest and sober mission for truth and goodness, they have neutralized or minimized the importance of his mode of paradox and the claims in his paradoxes. More detailed synthetic discussions of the history of the Cynicized Antisthenes and the Socratic Antisthenes can be found, respectively, in Höistad 1948:5–12 and Patzer 1970:16–44. Giannantoni's twenty long notes on Antisthenes (notes 21–40 in Giannantoni 1990 v.4:195–411) are largely historical bibliographies on their respective topics, somewhat uneven in the level of detail.

In light of the very odd history of this modern reception, which ran so hot in the nineteenth century and so cold in the twentieth, the present work has taken a skeptical attitude toward some of the inherited truths about Antisthenes and has entertained others that have been discarded long ago. Various interpretations, some still alive and some not, are discussed in connection with the passages on which they have been based. Future debates must be based not on isolated sentences but on all the information transmitted about Antisthenes.

The Life of Antisthenes and the Limits of Biographical Scholarship

If we are to believe the Hellenistic anecdotes, Antisthenes was the son of an Athenian father and a Thracian (non-citizen) mother (t. 1–2); and it is often said in modern discussion that his low birth was a liability for his whole life and the cause of his countercultural ideology. But the contemporary portrait of Antisthenes by Xenophon transmits no sign that Antisthenes is anything but a normal Athenian: in at least some scenes of the *Symposium*, he keeps seamless company with the gentlemen assembled at the home of Callias (t. 103A); and in the *Memorabilia*, he holds forth on the value of friendship, comparing its “price” to the price of slaves (t. 110). He allegedly studied with Gorgias (t. 11) and fought for Athens (t. 3), neither the marked activity of a bastard (*nothos*). For anecdotes preserved about his life, see t. 1–34; for his life span, see t. 35; and for his death, see t. 37.

In most areas of classical studies, biographical scholarship has long been discarded. Mary Lefkowitz, in her 1981 book *The Lives of the Greek Poets*, showed that biographical information about classical poets surviving in Hellenistic sources is largely fabricated from the works of the poets themselves and has little claim on historical truth. Janet Fairweather previously did the same

for the ancient philosophers in her 1974 article “Fiction in the Biographies of Ancient Writers,” and one formative inspiration for this insight might go back to Kurt von Fritz’s 1926 dissertation on Diogenes of Sinope. But scholarship on Antisthenes and on the Cynics as well has churned so slowly that Antisthenes’ alleged origin as the son of a Thracian mother is still cited in explanation for his whole ideology, hostile as it is (at points) to Athens and its systems of ethics, politics, and education. In fact, we know little or nothing about Antisthenes’ parentage or his real material wealth, and it is unclear how much these issues mattered in the Socratic circle. (See discussion at t. 1 and 82.)

At the same time, we should be confident that a living human body called Antisthenes existed in Athens c. 445–360 BCE: this human being consorted with Socrates and others and wrote numerous texts that were received by contemporaries and transmitted to posterity. In other words, we cannot treat him only as the fiction of, for example, Xenophon or Diogenes; rather, in reading the fictions and polemics, at least the contemporary ones, we must remain aware that these were written about a person who really lived and who really wrote texts that had been and could be read by the authors of these fictions as well as by their own intended readers. This historical assumption implies that various events during the period of Antisthenes’ life in Athens must have shaped his ideology, his topics of interest, and the themes of his texts. Whoever Antisthenes’ mother and father were and whatever his official social status was, Antisthenes was educated in the major topics of the day, perhaps by the leading figures of the day. Socrates himself was countercultural, and Antisthenes might have been drawn to him for that reason; alternatively, Antisthenes’ countercultural tendencies might have been learned from Socrates. We do not know why he was attracted to Socrates or why he opposed Athens on many fronts, and neither question probably matters much for the importance of what he said. The Peloponnesian Wars of 431–404 and the oligarchic coups of 411 and 404 were a watershed for many residents of Athens who became intellectuals in the fourth century, and it is plausible that living through these events, as well as the execution of Socrates by the Athenians in 399, caused Antisthenes to reject various aspects of conventional Athenian culture or sharpened his hostility to it. That his response would be different from those of Thucydides, Plato, Lysias, Isocrates, Xenophon, or Aristophanes is hardly a problem, since the responses of those men are already so different from each other.

Antisthenes’ Intellectual Position among His Contemporaries

The Socratic movement was part of the Sophistic movement, differentiated to the extent that Socrates taught a special brand of wisdom marked out from

what was taught by others.¹⁰ The precise nature of this difference is hard to define, in light of the poor evidence that survives to us and the fact that Plato, often polemical, is our source on Socraticism to such a high degree. Plato believed ardently that Socrates was different from the rest, and he located the difference in Socrates' ethical certainty and ethical mission. Xenophon, for his part, emphasizes that Socrates associated with his pupils for reasons related to their potential virtue, not for the purpose of making money (*Mem.* 1.6; *Sym.* 4.44, in a speech attributed to Antisthenes, t. 82). It seems that Antisthenes, too, believed that Socrates was different from the others (see the conversion story in t. 12). But ancient evidence also associates Antisthenes with other figures in the intellectual enlightenment of the late fifth century, if not without antagonism or opposition. Insofar as he retained these influences in his intellectual profile, this probably does not match with Plato's own inevitable appropriation of many non-Socratic intellectual influences. Possibly, then, through a kind of triangulation, Antisthenes can be useful for seeing how Socratic teaching was compatible or incompatible with other aspects of the Athenian enlightenment. Such a project is, of course, complicated by the problem that not everything anti-Platonic in Antisthenes is also non-Socratic: the value of reading Homer is the clearest case where it is likely that Antisthenes is more the Socratic than Plato. But progress can be made only once we explore Antisthenes seriously. We have particular references to Antisthenes' studies with Gorgias and his first career as a rhetoric teacher, before his conversion to Socraticism (see t. 11; see also t. 203, 151A note on δηλών, 53–54, 67). He is reported to have rejected at least some teachings of Gorgias (t. 203), but insofar as he preferred a rhetorical or action-based notion of *logos* over a representational notion (see t. 53.7 note), this could be a Gorgianic influence or allegiance. As for other "Sophists," Xenophon's Socrates credits Antisthenes with having introduced the wealthy Callias to the many Sophists who taught him (t. 13A.62): Prodicus and Hippias are mentioned by name. This is likely to be a joke, and it is unclear that Antisthenes followed or respected these thinkers from all angles. (On Hippias, see t. 187.1; on Prodicus, t. 207C.) But he is also addressed by ὦ σοφιστά (Oh, Sophist) in Xenophon's *Symposium* (t. 83A.5), which might be a polemical exaggeration of underlying facts. On Protagoras, finally, see t. 154, 41A title 6.1, and 38B.

For Xenophon, Antisthenes is overall a hero, to judge from his place at the center of the *Symposium*, where he delivers an ethical speech on values that Xenophon elsewhere endorses (t. 82). Xenophon also portrays Antisthenes as Socrates' successor as teacher in Athens (t. 13A), his close companion (t. 14B), and, in a joke, his lover (t. 14A). In the *Memorabilia*, where Antisthenes is less present as a character (t. 110, 14B), he might be important as a source (see, e.g., t. 112 versus *Mem.* 2.1.31); this old question, contaminated by its associations

10. A related but different synthetic overview of the following issues is in Prince 2006.

with Joël, deserves a modern approach. Xenophon's attention to Antisthenes, at least as a character, stands in contrast to his attention to Plato, whom he mentions only once in passing (*Mem.* 3.6.2), as well as all the other Socratics. His neglect of Plato's theory of Forms, normally assumed as his own intellectual deficiency, could be deliberate (see t. 51B.10, 83), in which case Antisthenes could have earned his place as the Socratic hero. Aristippus appears only as a hostile interlocutor for Socrates (*Mem.* 2.1, 3.8); Aeschines, for all his possible influence on Xenophon's style of Socratic writing (see Kahn 1996), is never mentioned by name, and the same goes for Phaedo and Euclides; Simmias and Cebes are mentioned in passing (*Mem.* 3.11.17 = t. 14B) and named also in Xenophon's clearest list of Socratic disciples (*Mem.* 1.2.48), in the company of Chaerephon, Hermogenes, and Chaerecrates, all minor figures attributed no place in Socratic literature or the Socratic succession by Diogenes Laertius (2.60–125). Antisthenes' prominence in Xenophon is, then, outstanding, and the explanation must lie either in some special sympathy that Xenophon had for Antisthenes' account of Socraticism or in some timely coincidence between Antisthenes' death and Xenophon's entry into the field of Socratic literature. (This is plausible if Xenophon wrote his Socratic works in the late 360s, as argued in Huss 1999 (*Xenophons Symposion*):15–18, citing older scholarship.) For all his tribute to Antisthenes, however, Xenophon's portrait in the *Symposium* is no panegyric: see especially his interactions with Socrates in t. 14A, 83A, and 186. Very likely for the *Symposium* and also perhaps for the *Memorabilia*, Antisthenes' writings might have been less a source than an intertext, which contemporary readers were supposed to know when they weighed Xenophon's considerable irony (in the *Symposium*) about Socrates' benefactions to Athens and the challenges that Athens faced in the fourth century. On one kind of irony in Xenophon's picture of the "good old days," see Huss 1999 ("The Dancing Socrates") and my introductory comments on t. 82 (see also Wohl 2004); and on Athens' quest for good teachers in the fourth century, see t. 13A and notes.

The most important question about Antisthenes' relations with his contemporaries, how he intersected with Plato, deserves further study than can be possible in this book. An intellectual opposition between Antisthenes and Plato—over Plato's theory of Forms, the nature of definition, and the value of reading Homer—seems clear from the surviving evidence on Antisthenes' views about *logos*, names, and thought (t. 149–60) and on his studies of Homer (t. 185–94, 41A titles 8.3–9.11) and other poets (t. 195–96, 41A titles 2.5 and 8.1–2; see also t. 137A). Anecdotes suggest also that there was personal hostility between these two heirs to the Socratic mission (t. 27–30, 148, 41A title 6.3). One could possibly add a disagreement or even hostility over the nature of *eros* or Socratic *eros*, although the surviving evidence is slight (t. 14A, 13A, 148, 41A title 2.2). For a

study of Antisthenes' "anti-Platonic polemic" as such, which is the earliest on record and seems to have given rise to a long tradition of anti-Platonism among the Cynics, see Brancacci 1990:173–97. The most fervent and optimistic period of research on Antisthenes, from Winckelmann's first edition of the fragments in 1842 through Dümmler's *Antisthenica* of 1882 to Maier's *Sokrates* of 1913, was inspired by the proposition that Antisthenes was a thinker as interesting and productive as Plato, whose intellectual influence was suppressed through the success of that younger rival. This remains an intriguing proposition, and if it is true, the relationship must have been richer than mere opposition. Dümmler suggested that Antisthenes and Plato were on the same page regarding many ethical and political topics, even as their opposition on the theory of Forms and the value of reading Homer was far reaching. It seems plausible in many cases (not least the great *Symposium*, *Republic*, and *Theaetetus*) that Plato might have borrowed from and been positively inspired by Antisthenes, even if his main motivation was to beat him. See the allegation of plagiarism in t. 42. Kesters' thesis (1935) that *Phaedrus* was written against Antisthenes, from a text partly preserved in Themistius, has been shunned in modern scholarship and will not be addressed in this book; but it should be revisited under a more modern understanding of intertextuality. The unmistakable intertextuality between Antisthenes' t. 187 and Plato's *Hippias Minor* (see discussion at t.187) might show that Plato, in the kind of ornery style attributable to a younger sibling, recycled Antisthenes' own material to bring it to a more sophisticated or complex point, sometimes for the purpose of refuting or attacking Antisthenes himself and sometimes because it offered an irresistible opportunity to show off. Such speculation cannot be taken too far, but it is important to recognize that the relationship between the rival Socratics, as between their texts, was not necessarily simple. Above all, Plato's talents in parody prevent us from ever trying to reconstruct Antisthenes' views directly from Plato's texts.

Antisthenes' Literary and Intellectual Production

The book catalog preserved by Diogenes Laertius (6.17–19 = t. 41A) is the best surviving evidence for the overall range and structure of Antisthenes' thought and literary production. This long catalog is outstanding not only amid the surviving evidence for Antisthenes but among the catalogs preserved by Diogenes: only those of Democritus, Aristotle, Heraclides of Pontus, and Chrysippus can compete. Although Winckelmann and Decleva Caizzi had organized their collections of Antisthenes' literary remains around the likely attributions of testimonia and "fragments" to individual titles preserved in the record (on the model, perhaps, of editions of fragmentary tragedians and comic poets),

Andreas Patzer was the first to recognize fully the importance of this catalog and analyze it in its own right. Details can be tracked in the notes to t. 41A and the bibliography for that passage.

Not only was Antisthenes admired in antiquity for his style (t. 45–52), but it seems likely that he was a literary innovator on the order of Plato and Xenophon and that he gave some impetus, through Diogenes of Sinope and Crates of Thebes, to the eventual flowering of Cynic literature in the third and second centuries BCE in the hands of Bion, Menippus, and others (see Dudley 1937:110–16). The texts listed in the fourth and fifth volumes of his catalog were probably very long, and they might have borne comparison to episodic novels, on the one hand, and ethical or philosophical fiction, on the other (see notes on those titles, and see t. 85–99 on the Cyrus and Heracles fictions). Julian's statements (t. 44) imply that he had a special brand of “story” or “myth.” The Ajax and Odysseus speeches (t. 53–54), with their embedded rhythms not unlike trimeters, might show a conversion of tragedy into prose, and this might have had literary or philosophical purpose in a more sophisticated sense than just the theft of material. The parodies of verses from Homer and tragedy (exemplified or suggested in t. 6, 22B, 182, 195) might, likewise, have been delivered in a mixture of prose with poetry that eventually gave rise to what is called Menippean Satire. The odd report of Aelius Aristides (t. 197), if it is not hugely distorted, suggests literary devices such as framing dialogues and subtitles. Antisthenes' readings of Homer seem to show recognition of complexity of voices (esp. t. 189), metaphor or allegory (t. 191), and lexical play (t. 187, 189).

Antisthenes' Positions on Ethics

Either Antisthenes did not argue or theorize about ethics, or later writers in the ancient traditions were unimpressed by his arguments and theories, for we receive little information about an ethical “philosophy” of Antisthenes, only dogma and jokes. His most famous ethical statement in antiquity was apparently the same one for which he is most famous today, “I would rather go mad than have pleasure” (t. 122); but this cannot be the whole story, since he also advocates for pleasure (t. 124, 126, 127, 82.39–44). It seems likely, too, that his ethics were embedded in the stories of characters for which he was most famous: the first ethical principle that Diogenes Laertius attributes to him is cited from *Heracles* and *Cyrus*, where it was reportedly “established” or shown, not said (t. 85 = 97).

Despite this absence of theoretical treatment and despite difficult or missing evidence, it seems that several central ethical concepts can be attributed to Antisthenes, all important and some possibly original. That they have be-

come mainstream—through, roughly speaking, Socraticism, Stoicism, and Humanism—should not disguise their importance or the fact that they were once original contributions to mainstream discourse. (See also Long 1996 [“The Socratic Tradition”]:32.) One is the opposition between resources useful to a human, such as wealth or knowledge, and their use, which is the location of ethical value. See t. 187.4 for the consolidated discussion of this idea, which is not unique to Antisthenes but appears in Plato’s *Euthydemus* and in evidence related to Prodicus, in addition to less formal references in tragedy and older texts. This could be a background to the later Cynic and Stoic dispute about value and indifferents (see t. 110 notes). A second is the equation between aesthetic good and ethical good, whether this is to be considered an elevation or a reduction of the aesthetic (see t. 134s–t and further references). A third is the concept of moral or ethical strength, which might be a concept of will, and its related concept of ethical freedom (t. 134c, 106, 82). Related to ethical strength is the importance of toil or work for the realization of virtue (t. 113, 134f, 163). The positive reason for building strength seems never to be addressed, but this is implied to be a defensive process, achieving immunity against unknown future trouble (t. 106, 109, 113, 134u–v). Building strength is possibly also a normal process of human maturation. The rejection of pleasure as an ethical end might be related to the status of pleasure as an appearance only, nothing real. (See t. 82.38 notes, and compare t. 120.) Finally, the sublimation of *eros* might be related to the equation between aesthetic and ethical good or might better be considered an important concept all of its own. We do not have enough evidence to say whether this sublimation allowed Antisthenes to connect *eros* with all desire for achievement, including work and the development of ethical strength, but this is not impossible.

As in all other areas of thought about Antisthenes, simplifying his opposition to bodily *eros* in such a way that one can conclude a priori that he must have hated Aspasia and Alcibiades is probably unsound. See notes on t. 41A titles 5.2 and 10.6, with further references to t. 141–43 and 198–202. Alcibiades bears some comparison to Odysseus, who was, at least in many senses, a hero for Antisthenes (t. 187, 188, 190). Aspasia might have instantiated the virtue of a woman (t. 134r), not least in her escape from the normal passivity or objectification of the beautiful wife (t. 57–58; compare t. 123).

Antisthenes’ views on erotics were important enough for Xenophon to make fun of them (see esp. t. 14A), but their details remain unclear to us. In particular, we do not know whether Antisthenes wrote a proto-*Symposium* to which both Plato’s *Symposium* and Xenophon’s *Symposium* refer as a subtext, which would make a major difference to the interpretation of Antisthenes’ image, especially in Xenophon’s version. The most striking texts (t. 14A–B) seem to turn on the opposition between love for the body and love for the soul. In

the evidence overall, love for the soul so far exceeds love for the body that it can apparently take hold even in the absence of the body, before acquaintance with the body: in two anecdotes, one about Heracles (t. 92A) and one about a would-be Socratic disciple Kyrsas (t. 84C; this testimonium's attribution to Antisthenes is not fully certain, but its parallel in this regard with t. 92A is compelling), a young man conceives *eros* for a teacher he has never met but only heard of through words, possibly the master's own words, to supplement from one story about Antisthenes' conversion to Socrates (t. 12B, 17): the same motif might be seen in Zeno of Citium's first love (literally "pleasure") for Socrates from Xenophon's books (Diog. Laert. 7.3) and in the Cynic Hipparchia's love for Crates, presumably from reports about him or perhaps his own texts (Diog. Laert. 6.96). When it comes to love of the body, Antisthenes' views might differ from the dominant ideology of his time by distinguishing between homoeroticism and heterosexual eroticism, rather than activity and passivity. At least, he speaks of his own sexual partners as women only (t. 82.38, 56), and he connects mating with producing children (t. 41A title 2.2). He opposes the homosexual behavior of Pericles' son, but not for passivity (t. 142). One anecdote presents him courting a boy (t. 175), and this could be either hostile or compatible with sublimated philosophical pederasty, pursuit of a beautiful soul for the purpose of educating it. (Admittedly the discussion does not seem sublimated, but it is a tiny fragment, and the parallel with Socrates and Alcibiades suggests this sense. I see no evidence for Antisthenes' framing of a choice between women and boys, as cited in Ogden 1996:203 with reference to Buffière 1980:459–60, unless this anecdote is supposed to be reconstructed into a story incorporating other evidence.) Heterosexual "love," if it was favored because it was necessary for procreation, would not seem to be continuous with a real love of the soul. But Antisthenes does award the designation "erotic" to his text on marriage with procreation (t. 41A title 2.2), by contrast with "aphrodisia" elsewhere (t. 82.38, 123), and his recognition of equal virtue between women and men might have allowed him to assimilate a heterosexual marriage to the kind of relationship between men that is celebrated in Plato, in Stoicism, and throughout the Greek philosophical tradition. There is no evidence that Antisthenes married or had a long-term girlfriend, and his main object of love, if the surviving evidence gives any insight into his real life, must have been Socrates (t. 14A).

Antisthenes' Positions on Language, Rhetoric, Logic, and Knowledge

We can be sure that Antisthenes was sincerely interested in language, speaking, debate, thought, knowledge, and truth (that he was neither just a sophist nor

just a dolt), because a long section of his book catalog consists in a series of at least nine texts, some with multiple parts, dedicated to such topics (t. 41A titles 6.1–5 and 7.1–4 and possibly 7.9–11). Depending on how long and complex these texts were, they could have been a match for Plato's series *Euthydemus*, *Cratylus*, *Theaetetus*, and the *Sophist*, with which they share subtitles and terminology. Because the surviving evidence for what Antisthenes said in these texts is very poor, modern scholars have not reached consensus on his core insights or positions.

The commentary form of the present book is meant to address the sometimes intractable disagreements that run through the ancient evidence (t. 148–59) and the modern interpretations of this evidence. Rather than defending one position or another and rereading or emending the texts in support of said position, it seems better to show the ways in which the evidence has been read in modern times and further ways in which it could be read, should one decide to consider or give privilege to any particular testimonium. Traditional scholarly conclusions about some passages, notably t. 151A and 152A, need to be reconsidered in light of all the evidence. Most obviously, the late antique commentaries on Antisthenes' famous οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν thesis have been commonly dismissed in recent scholarship as non-illuminating—for example, Decleva Caizzi (1966:104) prints t. 152B but dismisses 152C–D and 153B—even though Aristotle gives absolutely no explication of the thesis he twice reports and despite the work of Richard Sorabji and others that has established, in most areas of the history of ancient philosophy, that thinkers such as Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ammonius, and Simplicius had access to classical texts and also contributed to the intelligent interpretation of the texts from classical antiquity that they received. The speeches of Ajax and Odysseus, which are manifestly about language, truth, and rhetoric and use (or misuse) some of Antisthenes' key terms and phrases, are rarely considered in reconstructions of Antisthenes' views.

My own conclusion about Antisthenes' thinking in the field of language, knowledge, and truth is that the evidence leads us to attribute to him three central positions. First, technical definition of the essence of the real beings at the base or center of our interests—namely, natural beings such as human beings—is impossible. True *logos* about them and about an array of other things is possible, and producing this is the compelling task of the wise person; however, Antisthenes did not develop a criterion of truth for *logos* to a philosophically serious level but merely asserted that true *logos* reveals being. See t. 150A.4, with its cross-references, and t. 151A. If definition, which is not identical to true *logos*, is impossible, then the practice of philosophy on a scientific model, as developed by Aristotle, is essentially closed off at its most basic level (see discussion under t. 150A.4). This conclusion runs counter to the central thesis

of Brancacci 1990, that Antisthenes' concept *oikeios logos* is precisely a unique definition for each thing, where a "thing" seems to be a general moral concept. (That said, Brancacci's excellent work on Antisthenes has been fundamental for my own.) The denial of biological definitions is possibly compatible with the acceptance of moral definitions. The evidence for and against the possibility of definition is in t. 150A, 151A, and 152A, and various proposals for reconciling these three passages are discussed in the notes.

Second, the distinction between substance and accidental quality, which stands near the core of Aristotle's own views about the intersection between language and being—that is, at the site of technical definition—is also impossible or irrelevant. See t. 152A, with its cross-references, and t. 149B. A plausible addendum is that in Antisthenes' view, certain qualities that Aristotle considered accidental to human beings, such as being musical or being grammatical, were essential to particular humans, as essential as anything ever is. Such a view might go hand in hand with emphasis on the individual particular as the site of being and with the view that any universal concept, whether a substantial or a qualitative predicate on Aristotle's terms, is, in some sense, a mental construction, whether constructed by a society and carried in its public language or constructed by an individual and carried in his or her personal vocabulary. See t. 149A.

Third, in cases of utterance in language by a sincere speaker, every utterance has three parts, including two objects: the linguistic string itself, whether in sound or script; a general object that can be aligned with the meaning of the utterance and that is carried by the semantic power of the linguistic medium to carry general meaning; and a particular object of extensional reference, that is, the object about which the speaker is speaking in the precise situation where he or she utters the meaningful words. When there is failure of communication or potential for misunderstanding of this utterance, the rupture occurs with the second object, the particular referent, which somehow goes missing from the scenario; the first object, the general meaning of the utterance, then takes precedence and operates. This seems to be the best overall interpretation of the views behind the οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν paradox attributed to Antisthenes. Clearest evidence for the three-part view of the speaker's activity is in t. 153B.1. Discussion of possible motives for a thinker to take such a view of the priorities of object in a situation of speaking, which is not in agreement with the views of Plato, Aristotle, and their tradition, is in the notes to t. 152B.3. Attributing such a view to Antisthenes suggests that he makes a distinction between sense and reference, such as scholars tend not to see in Greek philosophers but tend to attribute to modern philosophy.

In addition to these three positions, which may be independent of one another and should not be reduced to one single "Antisthenes" thesis, it seems

that Antisthenes might have been a scholar or exegete of Heraclitus, through reading his text, and that he believed change is real and that position in time is part of the particular identity of any particular thing. There is no evidence that he was a radical Heraclitean of the kind Plato describes or parodies in *Theaetetus*, and so he cannot be simply swapped in for any character in Plato's dialogues, but it seems plausible that he considered time seriously and that, for him, being was always in time. For discussion, independent of the conjectural t. 159D, see t. 151A and 157. For attention to time elsewhere in the testimonia, see t. 18, 53, 54, and 208 and the discussions there. For apparent textual resonances with Heraclitus, see t. 164, 171, and 174; further study of this topic could yield more cases.

These positive conclusions depend generally on several negative conclusions I have reached concerning older interpretations of the evidence. First, Aristotle's discussion of Antisthenes' view that account and its object exist in a one-to-one relationship (t. 152A), where one item is *logos* (account) and the other is *pragma* (thing), is evasive about the exact nature of not only *logos* (this is an older insight) but also *pragma*: Aristotle neglects to fix either term, and in his discussion, he does not even use the term *pragma* but uses only pronouns and adjectives. Without an independent, prior status for the *pragma* relative to the *logos*, it is hard to count Antisthenes' *logos* as either "objective" or "subjective" or to count his theory of language as either "realist" or "nominalist," on the terms descending from Plato and Aristotle. This is not to dismiss the importance of Plato's and Aristotle's terms but to propose that they could be either anachronistic or inappropriate for Antisthenes and that Antisthenes' interests in fiction and literature and possibly memory might have been integrated with his views at the core level. See the discussion at t. 152A and 187.11–12.

Second, Diogenes Laertius' citation of Antisthenes' definition of definition (t. 151A) need not presuppose ontological identity over time, as scholars have assumed since the arguments of Pierre Aubenque in 1962. It might even situate ontology in time and recognize the possibility of change, even as endurance of being across some amount of time also seems to be implied. See the discussion at t. 151A.

Finally, Antisthenes' rejection of Plato's theory of Forms need not be equated with some view by which only material being is real while items of the noetic realm do not exist. Plato's theory of Forms is not a general theory of the universal or the noetic but a special theory positing the priority of a set of beings with three qualities: separability, changelessness, and immateriality. There is no reason to assume that Antisthenes tied these same three attributes into a bundle, and there is some (difficult) evidence, in t. 187.11–12, suggesting that Antisthenes recognized noetic as well as aesthetic particulars, that is, particular instants of thought or conception in the minds of particular persons. The

temporal stability of these “things” is not clear from the evidence, nor is it clear what kind of substrate they require. But taken individually, the thoughts that the good rhetor communicates to the members of his audience are not likely to be material beings, especially since both t. 187 and Antisthenes’ statement about the wealth of his soul (t. 82) question the economy of the generation of thoughts: Socrates, who produces things that cannot be weighed or measured, loads Antisthenes down with as much as he can carry, having created something out of nothing. If the individual thoughts in t. 187.11–12 were really discerned by Antisthenes, they might count as examples of the noetic beings Aristotle could be attributing to the Antistheneans in t. 150A.5. See also the intuitions of Michael of Ephesus in t. 150B.6–8, whereby Aristotle is accommodating the Antisthenean views in that passage. Despite the difficulties in the evidence and the hypothetical status of Antisthenes’ recognition of noetic being, we cannot simply assume that Antisthenes’ rejection of the Forms amounts to pure materialism.

Ancient Reception of Antisthenes

Because Antisthenes’ works are lost to us, tracking his reception in his own time and in later periods of antiquity is a complicated task. But it is certain that there was a reception. Epictetus (t. 160, 34E, 46), Dio Chrysostom (t. 34A, 194, maybe 208), Julian (t. 44A–C), and Themistius (t. 96) read him and cited him, five to eight centuries after his lifetime; Plutarch mentioned him in at least fourteen texts (t. 2B, 10, 13B, 34D–1, 77A, 81B, 94A, 100B, 102, 105, 109, 128, 195, 201); his Homeric criticism was important to Porphyry and became extremely prominent in the *Odyssey* scholia, where, amid mostly anonymous exegesis, it is attributed by name (t. 187–90); his speeches *Ajax* and *Odysseus* were included in a later imperial or Byzantine curriculum (t. 53–54); his *apophthegmata* might have been used in everyday education, although the evidence we have (t. 163B) does not use his name, and he is quite absent from the mainstream of the tradition in this kind of thing (see t. 7).

Beyond the near-contemporary receptions of Antisthenes in Xenophon and Aristotle and the intertextuality between his writings and Plato’s (t. 187, 150A), we know that Antisthenes was read by Theopompus (t. 22A, 42) and probably Isocrates (t. 55, 66, 156, 170). Antisthenes might have been a character in other Socratic literature beyond Xenophon, especially Aeschines (see t. 16 and comments on 13A and 14A), and in fourth-century comedy or other fiction, such as stories about the Sicilian tyrants (see t. 117, 128, 133). Timon of Phlius probably contributed to the generation of early anecdotes about Antisthenes (t. 41B notes; see t. 159A), whose statements about pleasure were apparently picked up

by Pyrrho or other early skeptics (t. 122B, 122D–E). Antisthenes might have been a character in Cynic literature: t. 22B, as well as t. 6 and t. 133 might be counted as evidence for this, as well as his rare appearance on stage in Lucian (e.g., t. 52C), although it has been often noted that in this role, already for Teles, he is far overshadowed by both Diogenes of Sinope and Socrates. The Peripatetics Hermippus and Satyrus and other Hellenistic biographers covered him (t. 9, 12C), and he was read also by the Stoics, for ethical and literary critical points, from Zeno in the early third century BCE to Apollodorus in the mid-second (t. 135–37, 193–94; see also t. 59, 105) and possibly Posidonius (t. 137B); possibly his view of definition was also formative for them (t. 151B). One enticing papyrus scrap suggests that Epicurus read him (t. 184). Cicero certainly did (t. 84A).

In the tradition of *apophthegmata* and gnostic utterance, Antisthenes rates high for the compiler of the *Gnomologium Vaticanum* (see t. 5). In Stobaeus' *Anthology*, especially his fourth book on politics, he is mentioned frequently, especially among the Socratics. His prominence in Diogenes Laertius has rarely been examined critically, familiar as this book has always been in every inquiry into Antisthenes, but the Socratic and Cynic tradition generally receive more emphasis than they might. Wilamowitz's objection that Antisthenes is hardly noticed in antiquity (1912:131, cited in Höistad 1948:6) might be true if we judge from certain vantage points, such as Cicero's ethical works (see t. 121), but evidence for both lasting importance and prominence within a synthetic conception of classical philosophy or thought is not lacking.

A portrait statue of Antisthenes, now in the Vatican (inv. no. 288), has been known since 1772. This is one of six surviving copies (the others without attribution) from a Hellenistic original, probably to be dated to c. 200–190 BCE and probably made for the library at Pergamum. See von den Hoff 1994:140–45; Zanker 1995:174–76; Döring 1998:268; t. 197.

Long as this book is, it is not intended as the final word on Antisthenes. To the contrary, I hope it can be the beginning of a more informed modern discussion in English-language scholarship about Antisthenes' importance in the traditions of Socraticism and as a figure of his time. Should the reader find contradictions or unfinished business in various parts of the commentary when it comes to adding up the big picture, this might be an impetus toward further study of this important figure in the history of Greek thought.

Texts, Translations, and Commentary



SECTION 1

Antisthenes' Biography

Homeland, Parents, and Social Status

testimonia 1–11

1A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.1 (Marcovich)

= 122A DC

[=Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 106.21–107.1 Walz]

Ἀντισθένης Ἀντισθένους Ἀθηναῖος. ἐλέγετο δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἰθαγενής·
ὅθεν καὶ πρὸς τὸν ὀνειδίζοντα εἰπεῖν· “Καὶ ἡ μήτηρ τῶν θεῶν Φρυγία
ἐστίν.” Ἐδόκει γὰρ εἶναι Θράττης μητρός.

καὶ primum F et Arsen. : om. B P | θράττης codd. plur. : θράτης F

Antisthenes son of Antisthenes, an Athenian. He was said to be not legitimately born. And this is also why he said to someone who reproached him, “Also the mother of the gods is Phrygian.” For he was believed to be from a Thracian mother.

1B. Epiphanius, *Abbreviated True Creed* 9.30 (Dummer)

= 122D DC

Ἀντισθένης ὁ ἐκ Θράττης μητρός αὐτὸς δὲ Ἀθηναῖος. . . .

Antisthenes, who had a Thracian mother but was Athenian himself. . . .

1C. *Suda*, no. A.2723 “Antisthenes” (Adler)

= 122B DC

[= Hesychius of Miletus, *Onomatologium* no. 61 “Antisthenes” p. 16.14–15 Flach]

Ἀντισθένης Ἀθηναῖος. . . . υἱὸς δὲ ὦν ὁμωνύμου πατρός, μητρός δὲ τὸ
γένος Θράσσης.

μητρός δὲ M : om. A G I T S

Antisthenes, an Athenian. . . and he was the son of a father by the same name but from a mother Thracian by birth.

1D. ps.-Eudocia, *Violarium* no. 96 “Antisthenes” p. 95.1 (Flach)

Ἀντισθένης ὁ φιλόσοφος, τὸ γένος Ἀθηναῖος. . . .

Antisthenes the philosopher, Athenian by birth. . . .

Context of Preservation

The opening words in Diogenes Laertius’ life of Antisthenes have been repeated and compressed in the *Suda* (ninth century CE), the fifteenth-century *Violetum* attributed to Arsenius, and the *Violarium* (Garden of violets) attributed to the Byzantine empress Eudocia (eleventh century) but probably composed by the later Greek writer Konstantinos Palaiokappa, who flourished c. 1539–51. (See Cohn *RE* 6.1 [1894]: 912–13.) In most cases, Arsenius and the Eudocian forgery cannot be rated as sources separate from Diogenes Laertius, but there are a few points at which they differ in detail of phrasing or information transmitted and so demonstrate either the author’s access to sources now lost or interesting assumptions about what the ancient sources say. Here, ps.-Eudocia has elided all doubt about Antisthenes’ Athenian status and suppressed the mother. (See also t. 35A, 185B.) On Epiphanius (c. 320–403 CE), who might have a source independent from Diogenes Laertius, see t. 107.

Importance of the Testimonia

Antisthenes’ heredity and legal status at Athens are often considered a primary explanation for his rejection of Athenian custom and authority and his bent for personal independence (e.g., Joël 1893; Grube 1950; Rankin 1986:7–9; Navia 1999:19). Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that evidence for his Thracian mother, who is sometimes said to be Phrygian (t. 2B–C), is anecdotal, parallel with a set of anecdotes portraying his retort to those who slandered him (t. 2A–B, 3A) and consistent with his views on true “good birth,” which is based on virtue, not heredity (t. 5, 7, 134b). The information about his mother could, then, be a product of the anecdotal tradition rather than historically true. Alternatively, if it is historically true that Antisthenes was not “legitimately born,” the caution in Diogenes Laertius’ report suggests that his ethnic status was ambiguous, and the status of his mother might have been officially unknown. Further, Antisthenes’ illegitimate status is noticed in no contemporary source, neither Plato’s *Phaedo* (t. 20; see Giannantoni 1990 v.4:197–98) nor Xenophon’s Socratic writings (t. 13A, 14A–B, 82); on the unimportance of heritage in the Socratic circle, see Nails 2002:162.

Throughout the biographical testimonia, Antisthenes is consistently called “Athenian,” a term normally used for citizenship, not place of residence; and he allegedly fought as a soldier for Athens (t. 3, 10; this story, too, could be a fiction: see t. 200). See also von der Mühl 1966.

Notes

Ἀντισθένης Ἀντισθένου: Antisthenes' father, also named “Antisthenes,” cannot be identified definitely. Common practice among Athenian elites was to name sons for their grandfathers; naming after the father is less common. Approximately twenty-one individuals named “Antisthenes” are attested in the surviving record of Athens between the late fifth and mid-fourth centuries (PAA 1994 v.1:273–78), but chronological considerations eliminate most of them from identification with the father of the Socratic Antisthenes. (On the various famous persons called Antisthenes, see t. 38A.) Among these is one Antisthenes recorded as father of another Antisthenes, from the mid-fourth century (PAA 136890). Either the father of Antisthenes the Socratic is known only from this passage in Diogenes and the *Suda* (PAA 136795), or he is also the Antisthenes on which is based the fictional character in Xen. *Mem.* 3.4 (PAA 136760; see Nails 2002:34–36 and t. 110B). It has also been proposed that “Antisthenes son of Antisthenes” is an expression of self-determination and might not refer to the real father (Centre de Recherche Philologique, Lille 1986:143).

Ἀθηναῖος: The ethnic adjective “Athenian,” if used technically, should indicate that Antisthenes was a citizen of Athens, not just that he lived there. (Compare the adjectives “Attic” as used in t. 5 and 7 and “native” as used of a large group in t. 20.) Yet Diogenes Laertius says immediately that he was not “legitimate” and explains his birth from a foreign mother, which should have denied a child citizenship after the introduction of Pericles' citizenship law of 451/50. Either Antisthenes was an accepted citizen despite having a Thracian mother (a well-represented ethnic identity in classical Athens), or one of Diogenes' conflicting statements is incorrect. If Antisthenes was a citizen and had a Thracian mother, two scenarios are possible: his birth in the mid-440s might not have been affected by the new law, or he might have earned citizenship through outstanding military service in a battle of the Peloponnesian Wars. His status was possibly first questioned in 403, when the law was newly reinforced at the restoration of the democracy. See also Rankin 1986:3–6.

ἐλέγετο δ' οὐκ εἶναι ἰθαγενής: Diogenes' phrasing (ἐλέγετο, ἐδόκει) suggests rumor and then inference (Giannantoni 1990 v.4:196–97). Because disputes in Athenian law courts could include examination of a mother's legal standing as wife of an Athenian (e.g., Isaeus, *Oration* 8.18–20), it is clear that citizen

status could be controversial. The phrase οὐκ εἶναι ἰθαγενής might be a circumlocution for the Attic term νόθος (bastard), but it might have an older nuance: it is attested (rarely) in Archilochus, Herodotus, Hellanicus, and the Hippocratic corpus, but otherwise in late sources and glossaries; Diogenes Laertius uses it once otherwise, in the positive, for Thales (1.22). No ancient source calls Antisthenes a νόθος.

ᾧθεν: Diogenes (or the tradition behind him) derives an anecdote from his biographical “fact,” but it is not impossible that he has reversed the logic and that the fact was derived from the anecdote, which was devised as the setting for a famous utterance, or *apophthegma*, in this case, on the topic of “good birth” (εὐγένεια) in distinction from literal heredity (a topic of concern in Athens since at least Sophocles’ *Ajax*; on the broader discussion in late fifth-century Athens see also Irwin 2014). Normal Hellenistic practice takes both forms: apocryphal *apophthegmata* are created to illustrate a factual framework, usually an ideological or philosophical identity; and apocryphal anecdotes are created as settings for *apophthegmata*, some cases of which have been extracted and paraphrased from an original setting in non-historicizing literature (Wehrli 1973).

πρὸς τὸν ὀνειδίζοντα: The anonymous interlocutor is a figure often generated by the tradition. See, e.g., t. 29, 70A–B, 74–75, 101B.

μήτηρ τῶν θεῶν: The Phrygian “mother of the gods” is Cybele, familiar to the Greeks since the dawn of literature (from Hesiod’s *Theogony* and the Homeric *Hymn to Aphrodite*). The cult was known in Athens by the late fifth century, where there was probably a temple by c. 410: see Shear 1995:171–78. In t. 182, Antisthenes refuses to “nurture” this goddess.

Θράττης μητρός: A papyrus from Herculaneum (PHerc 558) seems to preserve, amid a set of “sayings of Socrates,” a reference to a “Thracian” versus “Attic” identity. If this constitutes a parallel to the anecdotes about Antisthenes’ mother (as proposed by Crönert in *RM* 57 [1902] 297 n.2 and endorsed by Baldassarri in *CronErc* 6 [1976] 80), Socrates would have been the speaker of some statement about Antisthenes’ parentage. Compare t. 3B, where Socrates also speaks about Antisthenes. The author of the papyrus fragment cannot be identified (it seems not to be Philodemus), but it would be earlier than any other evidence.

2A. Seneca, *On the Firmness of the Wise Man* 18.6 (Reynolds)

= 122C DC

Antistheni mater barbara et Thraessa obiciebatur: respondit et deorum matrem Idaeam esse.

Someone challenged Antisthenes over his barbarian and Thracian mother: he responded that also the mother of the gods was from Ida.

Context of Preservation

In Seneca's short dialogue arguing that the wise man cannot be harmed, Antisthenes appears as a commendable example of the wise man who endured insult. Seneca implies that he will give a catalog of such behavior, but Socrates and Antisthenes are the only examples mentioned.

Notes

barbara et Thraessa: In equating “Thracian” with “barbarian,” Seneca's version of the anecdote tips Antisthenes' heritage in a more foreign direction than the likely original (t. 1A): Thracians spoke Greek and shared more ethnic continuity with the Athenians than a “barbarian” would; Athenians had commercial interests in Thrace, and some Thracian Greeks probably had Athenian heritage. Seneca, like Plutarch in t. 2B, seems to draw the two mothers of the anecdote toward symmetry. This could be a natural evolution in the generations of the story, or it could reflect Seneca's special ignorance of ethnic issues in fourth-century Athens. Seneca's version is the oldest that survives, and hence it has also been proposed that this version is closest to the original.

et deorum matrem Idaeam: Seneca (or his source) uniquely replaces the “Phrygian” of other versions with “Idaeian.” Mount Ida, in the region of Troy, was Phrygian; but the mother of the gods is associated traditionally (in Hesiod's *Theogony* and the Homeric *Hymn to Aphrodite*) with regions closer to Cyprus. Homer, who made Mount Ida famous, never mentions the mother of the gods, except to describe Tethys through a similar phrase (*Il.* 14.201, 302).

2B. Plutarch, *On Exile* 17 607b (Sieveking)

τὸ δὲ τοῦ Ἀντισθένης οὐκ ἐπαινεῖς πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα ὅτι “Φρυγία σοῦ ἐστὶν ἢ μήτηρ,” “καὶ γὰρ ἢ τῶν θεῶν”;

And do you not like the retort of Antisthenes to the one who said, “Your mother is Phrygian”? [He said,] “For so is the mother of the gods.”

Context of Preservation

Plutarch offers consolation on exile. In the final section, he refutes commonplace views that exile is bad. In the section where he cites Antisthenes, he shows that change of city is ubiquitous and often results in progress.

Importance of the Testimonium

This version, like that of Seneca (t. 2A) and unlike that of Diogenes Laertius (t. 1A), presents a symmetry between the taunt made to Antisthenes and his reply: here both are Phrygian. Clement (t. 2C) probably depends on Plutarch or a common source.

Notes

Φρυγία σου ἔστιν ἡ μήτηρ: Hense (*RM* 45 [1890] 545 n.1) proposes that Plutarch adapts the anecdote himself here, changing Antisthenes' mother from a Thracian to a Phrygian under inspiration from his reference to the mother of the gods, and "blackens" the heredity of Antisthenes, presumably in order to make his indifference to his foreign heritage appear more dramatic. But there is no reason to think that Plutarch would tamper with the tradition or that he intends slander against Antisthenes for its own sake. Plutarch implicitly commends Antisthenes in general (t. 13B, 94, 100B, 102, 109; criticism in t. 81B).

2C. Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies* 1.15.66.1 (Stählin-Früchtel-Treu)

οἶδε μὲν οἱ χρόνοι τῶν παρ' Ἑλλήσι πρεσβυτάτων σοφῶν τε καὶ φιλοσόφων. ὥς δὲ οἱ πλείστοι αὐτῶν βάρβαροι τὸ γένος καὶ παρὰ βαρβάροις παιδευθέντες, τί δεῖ καὶ λέγειν, εἴ γε Τυρρηνὸς ἢ Τύριος ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἐδείκνυτο, Ἀντισθένης δὲ Φρυγὴν ἦν καὶ Ὀρφεὺς Ὀδρύσης ἢ Θρᾷξ; Ὅμηρον γὰρ οἱ πλείστοι Αἰγύπτιον φαίνουσιν.

And these were the times of the most important wise men and philosophers among the Greeks. But that most of them were barbarian in race and educated by barbarians, what need is there to say, that is, if Pythagoras was shown to be Tyrrhenian or Tyrian, and Antisthenes was Phrygian, and Orpheus, Odrysian or Thracian? For the majority show that Homer was Egyptian.

Context of Preservation

Near the beginning of the *Miscellanies*, Clement prepares to argue that Hebrew philosophy is older than Greek by stating that individual Greek philosophers were not really Greek.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes is listed among distinguished company. Since he has not been considered important so far in the text, Clement must select him here because his foreign ethnicity was famous.

Notes

Τυρρηνὸς ἢ Τύριος ὁ Πυθαγόρας ἐδείκνυτο: A dispute over the ethnic origin of Pythagoras was indicated previously in Clement's text (62.1), and Neanthes was named as the authority for a "Syrian or Tyrian" origin, although the majority view, that he was Samian, was mentioned first. The other three figures in this list have not yet been discussed in the work, although each has been mentioned.

Ὅμηρον γὰρ οἱ πλεῖστοι Αἰγύπτιον φαίνουσιν: This claim is attested also in Gellius, *Attic Nights* 3.11.6, where it is cited at the end of a range of possibilities. The ancient Lives of Homer and biographical epigrams (*Anth. Pal.* 16.292–99) include Egyptian cities. Writing in Alexandria himself, Clement might know a tradition that claimed Homer locally. See, further, Raddatz in *RE* 8 (1913):2197–98; Kim 2010:166–67.

3A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 2.31 (Marcovich)

= 124 DC

εἰπόντος γοῦν τινος αὐτῷ ὡς εἶη Ἀντισθένης μητρὸς Θράττης, "σύ δ' ᾧου," ἔφη, "οὕτως ἂν γενναῖον ἐκ δυοῖν Ἀθηναίων γενέσθαι;"

When someone said to him that Antisthenes was from a Thracian mother, he [Socrates] said, "And did you believe that anyone so noble could be born from two Athenians?"

3B. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.1 (Marcovich)

= 123 DC

[= Arsenius p. 106 Walz]

ὅθεν καὶ ἐν Τανάγρα κατὰ τὴν μάχην εὐδοκμήσας ἔδωκε λέγειν Σωκράτει ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἐκ δυοῖν Ἀθηναίων οὕτως γεγόνοι γενναῖος.

δυοῖν codd. plur. : δυεῖν P | οὕτως codd. plur. : οὗτος F | γεγόνοι B
P : γέγονε F : ἐγεγόνει Arsenius

Whence also, when he distinguished himself in the battle at Tanagra, he gave Socrates the occasion to say that from two Athenians such a noble man would not be born.

3C. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.4 (Marcovich)

= 145 DC

ὀνειδιζόμενός ποτε ὡς οὐκ εἶη ἐκ δύο ἐλευθέρων, "οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐκ δύο," ἔφη, "παλαιστικῶν, ἀλλὰ παλαιστικός εἰμι."

παλαιστικός codd. plur. : παλλιστικός B

When once chided that he was not born from two free parents, he said,
 “But neither am I born from two wrestlers, yet I am a wrestler.”

Context of Preservation

These *apophthegmata* are from Diogenes’ life of Socrates (3A), from his biographical introduction to the life of Antisthenes (3B), and from his series of unadorned *apophthegmata* (3C) listed between the narratives of Antisthenes’ conversion to Socraticism and the anecdotes illustrating his interactions with Plato and the Athenians (6.3–6). There, it is listed eighth amid twenty-seven items, separated from the similar “biographical” material of t. 1A and 3B. Diogenes’ life of Antisthenes can be divided into the following sections: biographical information, 6.1–2 (= t. 1A, 3B, 8, 11, 145, 9, 12A, 85); twenty-seven unadorned doctrines and *apophthegmata*, largely on topics of ethics and education (of which some are in clusters under Giannantoni’s analysis), 6.3–7 (= t. 151A, 122A, 56, 171, 57A, 28, 178, 3C, 169, 60, 131, 177, 168, 129, 176, 71, 88, 108, 167, 73, 100–101, 34F, 87, 90); eleven longer anecdotes framing similar *apophthegmata*, largely set in Athens, 6.7–10 (= t. 27, 72A, 89, 15A, 172, 21, 61); a doxography in two parts, of which the first is attributed to the Stoic Diocles, 6.10–13 (= t. 134, 58); general comments on Antisthenes’ importance, 6.14–15 (= t. 22A); a book catalog, 6.15–18 (= t. 41A–B); a death anecdote (= t. 37A); and an epitaph and list of homonymous figures, 6.19 (= t. 38A). On the structure and sources of Diogenes’ sixth book and his life of Antisthenes, see Goulet-Cazé 1992 and Giannantoni 1990 v.4:195–96.

Importance of the Testimonia

The military anecdote (3B) is the best information available for setting the birth date of Antisthenes. He must have been at least eighteen years old in 424 BCE and hence must have been born in or before 442 BCE. See von der Mühl 1966; Giannantoni 1990 v.4:199–201; Döring 1998:269. On the anecdotal setting of the information about Antisthenes’ parentage, see t. 1.

Notes

ἐν Τανάγρα (B): This might be a reference to the battle at Delium of 424 BCE, not the battle at Tanagra of 426 (von der Mühl 1966). Recognizing the later battle, of 424, reconciles the episode with other anecdotes about Socrates’ military service; but it is also possible that the military exploits of Socrates were fictionalized. (See t. 4, 200.)

ἔδωκε λέγειν Σωκράτει (B): This formulation might imply that Socrates was a speaking character in a dialogue that represented the event at Tanagra. Antisthenes would have had to be a character also. See t. 200.

παιλαιστικός (C): In Plato's dialogues, wrestling is a frequent metaphor for philosophical argument (e.g., *Phaedo* 84c6, 87a6, 88d4): the sense is competitive, strategic, and eristic. Protagoras seems to have labeled his rhetorical tactics after wrestling; he is credited with a work titled "On Wrestling" (Περὶ Πάλης, Diog. Laert. 9.55), which might be the same work Sextus Empiricus calls the "Knockdown [Arguments]" (Καταβάλλοντες <Λόγοι>, through a metaphor certainly circulating in fifth-century Athens. (See Lee 2005:22–29; Dodds 1960:95.) The Hippocratic *Nature of Man* and passages in Euripides use the wrestling metaphor for sophistic and dialectical wrangling. See also t. 106.

4. Lucian, *On the Parasite* 43 (Macleod)

ΣΙΜΩΝ· οὗτοι πάλιν, ὦ Τυχιάδῃ, οἱ περὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας ὁσημέραι διαλεγόμενοι κατατρίβοντες τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὄνομα πολλῶ μάλλον τῶν ῥητόρων φανοῦνται δειλότεροι καὶ μαλακώτεροι. σκόπει δὴ οὕτως. πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις εἰπεῖν ἔχῃ φιλόσοφον ἐν πολέμῳ τετελευτηκότα· ἦτοι γὰρ οὐδὲ ὅλως ἐστρατεύσαντο, ἢ εἴπερ ἐστρατεύσαντο, πάντες ἔφυγον. Ἀντισθένης μὲν οὖν καὶ Διογένης καὶ Κράτης καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ πᾶς οὗτος ὁ ὄμιλος οὐδὲ εἶδον παράταξιν, μόνος δὲ τολμήσας ἐξελθεῖν εἰς τὴν ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει μάχην ὁ σοφὸς αὐτῶν Σωκράτης φεύγων ἐκείθεν [ἀπὸ τῆς Πάρνηθος] εἰς τὴν Ταυρέου παλαιστράν κατέφυγεν. πολὺ γὰρ αὐτῷ ἀστειότερον ἐδόκει μετὰ τῶν μειρακυλλίων καθεζόμενον ὀαρίζειν καὶ σοφισμάτια προβάλλειν τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν ἢ ἀνδρὶ Σπαρτιάτῃ μάχεσθαι.

ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει Gesner (vid. Nesselrath 1985:430–31) : ἐν τῇ πόλει codd. : ἐπὶ Δηλῷ Palmer et Macleod: ἐν τῇ Ποτιδαίᾳ Heindorf ad Pl. *Charm.* 153a | ἀπὸ τῆς Πάρνηθος delere velit Nesselrath

Simon: These [philosophers], Tychiades, who spend day after day holding discussion about bravery, and wearing out the name of virtue, will appear far more timid and soft than the rhetors. Consider it this way. First, there is no one who would be able to say that a philosopher has died in warfare. For in fact they have either abstained entirely from military service, or, if they have served, they have all fled. Indeed Antisthenes and Diogenes and Crates and Zeno and Plato and Aeschines and Aristotle, and this whole throng, have not even seen a battle line. The wise Socrates alone of these men dared to enter battle, at Amphipolis, but he ran away from there and fled into refuge at the wrestling school of Taureas. For it seemed to him far more noble to sit chatting with the adolescents and throw out wise remarks to everyone he met than to fight a Spartan.

Context of Preservation

Lucian's *On the Parasite* stages a dialogue between Simon and Tychiades on the question whether being a parasite is a "craft" (τέχνη). In this section, the speakers compare the parasite's services in war with those of the philosophers.

Importance of the Testimonium

This shows that Lucian (or ps.-Lucian: authorship of this text has been disputed) probably knows the tradition descended from Herodicus (reported by Athenaeus: see t. 200 and Düring 1941:41–46) that alleges incompatibility with Thucydides to attack the authority of accounts of Socrates' bravery in battle that are presented in Socratic literature. Here Lucian misrepresents the accounts of Socrates' military valor known from Plato (*Apol.* 28e; *Lach.* 181b; *Sym.* 219e–220e). All accounts of Socrates in battle portray him in conversation with one of his disciples, and stories about the valor of Plato and Antisthenes also were known to Diogenes Laertius (Plato at 3.8; for Antisthenes, see t. 3B). In omitting Antisthenes from activity in battle, Lucian might be getting humor out of Simon's ignorance of famous anecdotes, just as he revises or omits Plato's accounts of Socrates in *Laches*, *Charmides*, and the *Symposium*; it is possible, but less likely, that Lucian does not know the tradition. Apart from Antisthenes, the philosophers in the list are too young to have fought in the 420s and never appeared in this tradition of anecdotes. On the anecdotes generally, see Düring 1941:41–46 and Gigon 1947:152–58; on this passage, see Nesselrath 1985:419.

Notes

πᾶς οὗτος ὁ ὄμιλος: The list begins with the standard Cynic tradition (through four generations), turns back to two of the younger Socratics (who were small boys in the 420s), and then goes forward to Aristotle, in Plato's succession. Lucian's source might be a late fourth-century writer such as Demochares, who was a source for Herodicus (see Nesselrath 1985:419). Elsewhere in the dialogue, the figure of the philosopher is represented by mostly fourth-century figures (including Aristippus and Epicurus). The topic of the parasite is itself connected with the Cynics, especially through the anecdotes about fawning to Dionysius of Syracuse (see t. 33B), and so Timon or Menippus might have been among Lucian's influences. Aristoxenus is also named in the text (§35).

εἰς τὴν ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει μάχην: Lucian's whole sentence might be consistent with *Charm.* 153a, in which case the manuscripts should be emended to ἐν τῇ Ποτιδαίᾳ (so Nesselrath) rather than ἐν Ἀμφιπόλει, which is closer to the transmitted ἐν τῇ πόλει. But Lucian might also be mixing his accounts. Socrates' service at Amphipolis is the most thinly attested of his three battles

(Düring 1941:45), and so Lucian might have taken the liberty to fill out this story. The fullest accounts of his valor are from Potidaea.

εἰς τὴν Ταυρέου παλαιστράν κατέφυγεν: The wrestling school of Taureas is the setting for Plato's dialogue *Charmides*, where Socrates has arrived directly from Potidaea. He is evasive on the question whether he saw action in battle (153c3–4), and Lucian (or his source) pretends to bring out the truth.

ἀνδρὶ Σπαρτιάτῃ μάχεσθαι: There were no Spartans at Potidaea or Delium but plenty at Amphipolis, especially in the second battle of 423.

5. *Gnomologium Vaticanum* no. 10 (Sternbach)

= 146 DC

ὁ αὐτὸς λοιδοροῦντος αὐτὸν τινος ὡς οὐκ Ἀθηναῖον, “καὶ μὴν,” εἶπεν,
 “οὐδεὶς ἑώρακε λέοντα Κορίνθιον οὐδ’ Ἀττικόν, ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ἦττον
 γενναῖον ἐστὶ τὸ ζῶον.”

The same man [Antisthenes], when someone was reviling him as non-Athenian, he said, “And in fact no one has seen a Corinthian lion, or an Attic one, but no less noble is the animal.”

Context of Preservation

It is remarkable that Antisthenes is the first wise man cited in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, preserved in the Vatican manuscript Graecus 743, written in the fourteenth century CE, which apparently collects selections from an archetype (hypothetical) compiled as early as the first century BCE, a common source for Diogenes Laertius, Stobaeus, and much of the gnomological tradition (Sternbach 1963:1–4). Sayings 1–13 (of 577 total) are attributed to Antisthenes. Like many such texts, the *Gnomologium Vaticanum* observes a roughly alphabetical order, but the Alpha section includes many figures far more famous than Antisthenes (twenty-eight, including two repetitions). The Delta section begins, similarly, with Diogenes of Sinope, and the Cynic figures Bion and Crates (under Kappa) are prominent, as are Alexander the Great and the Scythian king Anacharsis in the Alpha section. The very form of apophthegmatic wisdom is possibly associated with Cynic figures, in the opinion of this compiler. Theophrastus' *Collection of the [Sayings] of Diogenes* (Τῶν Διογένηος συναγωγή, Diog. Laert. 5.43) might be close to the origin of Hellenistic collections of *apophthegmata*.

Importance of the Testimonium

This *apophthegma* contains detail unparalleled elsewhere, and it might lack sound connection to Antisthenes: Sternbach refers it to Diogenes of Sinope. When original texts of the authorities cited in the gnomological literature are

extant (as in the case of, e.g., Aristotle), it is clear that utterances have been paraphrased liberally from the texts. Some items might have been invented more freely in oral tradition. See Kindstrand 1986:240; but contrast t. 124, which must have a written source.

Notes

ὥς οὐκ Ἀθηναῖον: This full denial of Athenian status seems to be a false extension from the allegation that Antisthenes was not “legitimately born” (t. 1A). Giannantoni 1990 v.4:198 and Sternbach *ad loc.* reject the authenticity of the statement.

οὐδεὶς ἐώρακε λέοντα Κορίνθιον οὐδ’ Ἀττικόν: There is no other evidence for Antisthenes’ attention to Corinth. In t. 9, he attempts to praise and blame the Athenians, Spartans, and Thebans. In t. 68, he uses lions and hares as a metaphor for the citizens of democratic Athens.

6. Eustathius, *Commentary on Homer’s “Iliad”* 6.211 p. 637.35–39 (van der Valk)

ἐντεῦθεν καὶ ὁ κυνικός Ἀντισθένης χρησάμενος πρὸς τὸν ἀνακρίνοντα τὸ γένος αὐτοῦ εἰπών, ὥς “ἐμοὶ πατὴρ μὲν ἦν τῷ ἀγκῶνι ἀπομυσσόμενος,” ἦγους ταριχέμπορος καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς, ἐπάγει τὸ “ταύτης τοι γενεῆς τε καὶ αἵματος εὐχομαι εἶναι.”

Also from this text Antisthenes the Cynic made his reply to someone inquiring into his birth. After saying “My father wiped his nose on his elbow,” that is to say, he was a merchant of salt-fish, and so on, he tagged on “From such a stock and blood I claim to be.”

Context of Preservation

Eustathius’ commentary on the *Iliad* (from the mid-twelfth century CE) is based on wide reading in older Greek literature. The Homeric text, *Il.* 6.211, is the last verse in the reply of Glaucus the Lycian to Diomedes the Greek, who has asked about Glaucus’ heritage; at 20.241, Aeneas uses the same line, amid a speech to Achilles, to sum up his own genealogy. Eustathius or his source has apparently transferred to Antisthenes an anecdote told of Bion of Borysthenes, when addressing Antigonus Gonatas (Diog. Laert. 4.46–47 = F1A Kindstrand). Bion might be the author of the anecdote as well as a character in it (Kindstrand 1976:176).

Importance of the Testimonium

The testimonium shows that Eustathius counted Antisthenes among the Cynics and might have received a tradition by which Antisthenes inspired

Bion of Borysthenes. Parodic use of Homeric verses was a typical Cynic tactic, as shown in Crates' *Pera* poem (Diog. Laert. 6.85) and the quotation of one Homeric verse in response to another by Cynic characters in Athenaeus 10.438 and Epictetus 3.22.92. Omitted from Eustathius, but included in Diogenes Laertius' fuller version (4.46–47), is Antigonus' question, also from Homer (*Od.* 1.170 and elsewhere), τίς πόθεν εἰς ἀνδρῶν; πόθι τοι πόλις ἡδὲ τοκῆς; (Who of men are you, and from where? Where is your city and the home of your parents?). Since Antisthenes' *apophthegmata* often address the difference between heritage and virtue (t. 1–3, 5, 8) and since he was a Homeric critic (t. 185–95), the reassignment of the anecdote to him might be loyal to its inspiration.

Notes

ταριχέμπορος: Other references to salt-fish are in t. 100B and 172.

7. Theon, *On the Chreia* (*Progymnasmata* 3) p. 104.15–105.6 (Patillon)

= 195 DC

ἀνασκευαστέον δὲ ἔτι τὰς χρείας . . . ἐκ τοῦ ἀπιθάνου. . . ἐκ δὲ τοῦ ἀπιθάνου, ὅτι μὴ εἰκός ἐστιν, Ἀντισθένην Ἀττικόν γε ὄντα παραγενόμενον Ἀθήνηθεν εἰς Λακεδαίμονα ἐκ τῆς γυναικωνίδος λέγειν εἰς τὴν ἀνδρωνίτιν ἐπιέναι.

In addition, *chreiai* should be constructed . . . from what is incredible. . . . To illustrate the *chreia* from what is incredible: it is not likely for Antisthenes, being of course Attic, when he arrived from Athens at Lakedaimon to say that he was going from the women's quarters into the men's.

Context of Preservation

Theon's *Progymnasmata* (probably from the first or second century CE) are instructions for the construction of rhetorical pieces. The section *On the Chreia* concludes with an appendix that gives a nine-point scheme for the psychological force of an effective *chreia*, each illustrated with one example. Three cases seem to be based in rhetoric, three in logic, and three in ethics (Patillon ad loc.). The *chreia* "from what is incredible" appears fifth, as one of the cases from logic.

Importance of the Testimonium

The testimonium is important for its negative information, the general absence of Antisthenes from the traditional *chreiai*, such as Theon represents. Socrates and Diogenes of Sinope appear frequently.

Notes

Ἀττικόν γε ὄντα: This text is distinctive for calling Antisthenes “Attic” rather than “Athenian.”

ἐκ τῆς γυναικωνίτιδος . . . εἰς τὴν ἀνδρωνίτιν ἐπιέναι: The idea that real men were Spartans, whereas the Athenians were effeminate, was a commonplace in the wake of the Peloponnesian Wars. It is sometimes associated with the Socratic movement or Antisthenes in particular, partly on the strength of present evidence (Rankin 1986:114–18, also associating Antisthenes’ ethical *apophthegmata*; see also t. 10); but Aristophanes implies that similar sentiment was commonplace among the elite and among critics of recent developments in Athenian education, politics, and styles of luxury and consumption (Rawson 1969:25–25). According to tradition, Antisthenes could also rebuke the Spartans (t. 9). His work *On Law or On the Constitution* (t. 41A title 3.3), if it had a relationship to Aristophanes’ *Assemblywomen*, Plato’s *Republic*, and Zeno of Citium’s *Republic*, or to any of these, might have used the Spartan constitution as a partial model.

8. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.1 (Marcovich)

= 123 DC

καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἐπὶ τῷ γηγενεῖς εἶναι σεμνυνομένους
ἐκφραυλίζων ἔλεγε μηδὲν εἶναι κοχλιῶν καὶ ἀττελέβων εὐγενεστέρους.
κοχλιῶν codd. plur. : κοχλαιων B : κοχλύων F | ἀττελέβων codd.
plur. : ἀττεβέλων F : γρ. ἀττελάβων F² in mg.

And he, pouring contempt on the Athenians because they were proud of their birth from the earth, said that they were no more well born than snails and locusts.

Context of Preservation

This comes at the beginning of the biography and concludes the most directly anti-Athenian topic.

Importance of the Testimonium

The anecdote illustrates Antisthenes’ interest in reevaluating traditional myths, as he does also in reading Homer (t. 187–93). Its hostility to the Athenians might not be unique: Antisthenes might have been able to criticize everyone. (See t. 9.)

Notes

ἐπὶ τῷ γηγενεῖς εἶναι σεμννομένους: The Athenians boasted of their “autochthony,” or birth from their own soil, as part of their rhetoric for excluding foreigners.

κοχλιῶν: These are snails that have spiral-shaped shells. They are cowards lacking in self-confidence, according to the fourth-century comic poet Anaxilas (fr. 33 *PCG*).

ἄττελέβων: These are one of many types of grasshopper and locust. The spelling of this word in most manuscripts is the Ionic, not Attic, form. (The Attic spelling is supplied by the corrector in F.) If this is original to Antisthenes, it could make the sly point that the Athenians were Ionian immigrants, not aboriginals. The first three letters of the word for “locust” are also shared with “Attic,” possibly an intentional pun. Aristotle (*HA* 550b33) makes a point of explaining that locusts are born from locusts, not spontaneously from the soil.

9. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.2 (Marcovich)

= 127 DC

φησὶ δ' Ἑρμιππος ὅτι προεῖλετο ἐν τῇ τῶν Ἰσθμίων πανηγύρει ψέξαι
τε καὶ ἐπαινεῖσαι Ἀθηναίους, Θηβαίους, Λακεδαιμονίους. εἶτα μέντοι
παραιτήσασθαι ἰδόντα πλείους ἐκ <τούτων> τῶν πόλεων ἀφιγμένους.
Θηβαίους om. F | τούτων add. Marcovich

And Hermippus says that he decided in his oration at the Isthmian games to both blame and praise the Athenians, Thebans, and Lakedaimonians. But then, when he saw many people arriving from these cities, he begged off.

Context of Preservation

This is the single anecdote Diogenes reports to illustrate Antisthenes' life as a rhetor, before he became a Socratic.

Importance of the Testimonium

Speaking at the Panhellenic games was a job for an orator: Gorgias and Lysias are both credited with speeches from the Olympics, Hippias is represented by Plato as having done so (*Hipp. Min.* 363c; compare also *Menex.* 235d), and Isocrates' *Panegyricus* is a fictional speech in the same genre. If Antisthenes' early career as a rhetor was invented by a Hellenistic tradition that believed philosophy and rhetoric incompatible (see t. 12), this sort of anecdote would have suited the early phase (Patzner 1970:247–48; Bollansée 1999). If fictive,

the stages of his career must have been distinguished before the time of Hermippus of Smyrna (an Alexandrian “Peripatetic” of the mid-third century BCE), who reports this anecdote to illustrate the rhetorical stage. If the anecdote is true, however, the setting at the games suggests that Antisthenes should have been famous as a rhetor. An early Byzantine tradition classified him with Gorgias, Alcidamas, and the rhetors (see introduction to t. 53–54), but other evidence beyond the anecdotes is lacking. Regardless of its truth, the anecdote is hostile to Antisthenes, showing both cowardice to face opponents and incompatibility between his beliefs and his life. It also shows Antisthenes’ non-partisan attitude toward the various important city-states of his time, on two levels: none of them is good or bad, and none is different from the others. Yet the Isthmian occasion was one for praising the Greeks. That Antisthenes was invited to speak only at the Isthmian games and not at the Olympics might be a third strike against him. See also t. 7.

Notes

ψέξει τε καὶ ἐπαινέσαι: Compare t. 187.1, where a scholiast summarizes Antisthenes’ assessment of Homer’s attitude to Odysseus as “neither praise nor blame.”

Ἀθηναίους, Θηβαίους, Λακεδαιμονίους: These are the major political forces in the 390s, 380s, and 370s BCE.

10. Plutarch, *Life of Lycurgus* 58f–59a (Ziegler)

= 171 DC

καὶ τοῦτο μὲν εἶρηται χάριν τοῦ γελοίου. Ἀντισθένης δ’ ὁ Σωκρατικός ἀπὸ τῆς ἐν Λεύκτροις μάχης ὁρῶν τοὺς Θηβαίους μέγα φρονοῦντας, οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἔφη διαφέρειν παιδαρίων ἐπὶ τῷ συγκόψει τὸν παιδαγωγὸν γαυριῶντων.

And this was said for humor. But Antisthenes the Socratic, on seeing the Thebans acting very proud after the battle at Leuktra, said they were no different from children exulting in beating their tutor.

Context of Preservation

After describing Lycurgus’ constitution for the Spartans, Plutarch defends it against its detractors, who claim that it taught Spartans to obey but not to lead. To the contrary, he says, other Greek cities looked to Sparta “like a tutor and teacher of well-ordered life and government” (ὥσπερ παιδαγωγὸν ἢ διδάσκαλον εὐσχήμονος βίου καὶ τεταγμένης πολιτείας, 58f). Antisthenes’ statement, which follows on a joking application of this comparison, is meant

to underscore its serious sense. Imitators of the Spartan constitution are listed as Plato, Diogenes, and Zeno (59a), which implies either that Plutarch did not place Antisthenes' *On Law or On the Constitution* (t. 41A title 3.3) in this tradition or that he did not know it. Antisthenes, in Plutarch's view, saw Sparta as an ethical teacher, a παιδαγωγὸν εὐσχήμονος βίου.

Importance of the Testimonium

The battle of Leuktra (371 BCE) resulted in a devastating defeat of the Spartans by the Thebans. If the anecdote is historical, this is the latest evidence for an act of Antisthenes. His death is normally dated to 365 on the basis of t. 35B.

Notes

ἐπὶ τῷ συγκόψει τὸν παιδαγωγόν: The story that Heracles beat (and killed) his tutor Linus is attested in early fifth-century vase painting (Gantz 1993:379). On the possibility that Antisthenes wrote episodes involving confrontation between teacher and pupil, see t. 95 and Luz 1996, on versions of the story of Heracles and Prometheus. On the possibility that his relationships with pupils involved confrontation, see t. 34C–1–3.

11A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.1 (Marcovich)

= 125 DC

[= ps.-Eudocia, *Violarium* no. 96 "Antisthenes" p. 95.24 Flach]

οὗτος κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν ἤκουσε Γοργίου τοῦ ῥήτορος ὅθεν τὸ ῥητορικὸν εἶδος ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις ἐπιφέρει καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τῇ Ἀληθείᾳ καὶ τοῖς Προτρεπτικοῖς.

προτρεπτικοῖς codd. plur. : προπετικοῖς B

He was originally a pupil of Gorgias the rhetor, and from him he adopted the rhetorical style in his dialogues, especially in the *Truth* and the *Protreptics*.

11B. *Suda*, no. A.2723 "Antisthenes" (Adler)

= 126 DC

[= Hesychius of Miletus, *Onomatologium* no. 61 "Antisthenes" p. 16.15–16 Flach]

Ἀντισθένης Ἀθηναῖος ἀπὸ ῥητόρων φιλόσοφος Σωκρατικός.

Antisthenes the Athenian, a Socratic philosopher [converted] from the rhetors.

Context of Preservation

This information follows immediately after Antisthenes' name.

Importance of the Testimonium

It is clear from other evidence (t. 123, 203, 67), as well as the style of the declamations *Ajax* and *Odysseus* (t. 53–54), that Antisthenes was influenced by Gorgias and expressed this influence both positively and negatively. If he was ever literally a paying pupil of Gorgias, this indicates a wealthy father and high social ambitions, contrary to his image elsewhere in Diogenes' biography. The conversion story itself, however, could be a fabrication: see t. 12 and Patzer 1970:246–55. The association between Gorgias and “rhetorical form” within dialogues is plausible whether or not Antisthenes' career had a sophistic phase, and this could be evidence for innovation of literary form in Antisthenes' own work.

Notes

ἡκουσε: This normally indicates a formal relationship of teacher and pupil.
τὸ ρητορικὸν εἶδος: This is probably a “style” inherent to the texts, not a “genre” or external classification. It might indicate merely long speeches in single voices, rather than dialogue.

ἐν τοῖς διαλόγοις ἐπιφέρει: This shows that Antisthenes wrote dialogues and that the “rhetorical form” was foreign to them, by some (possibly later) standard. It might suggest that Antisthenes' use of “rhetorical form” in his dialogues exceeded that of Plato (whose *Symposium* and *Apology* could be said to use rhetorical form) and Xenophon (whose *Symposium* and *Mem.* 2.1 might use rhetorical form).

τῇ Ἀληθείᾳ: See t. 41A title 6.3.

τοῖς Προτρεπτικοῖς: See t. 41A titles 2.4 and 2.5. The reference to the work under the title *Protreptics*, which is an alternative title in the catalog, shows that this was sufficient to identify the text. (See also *Physiognomicus* in t. 62 and *Politicus* in t. 204.) It implies that Diogenes had different sources for this statement and for the catalog.

SECTION 2

Antisthenes as Follower of Socrates

testimonia 12–21

12A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.2 (Marcovich)

= 128A DC

[= ps.-Eudocia, *Violarium* no. 96 p. 95.4–11 Flach]

ὕστερον δὲ παρέβαλε Σωκράτει, καὶ τοσοῦτον ὄνατο αὐτοῦ ὥστε
παρήνει τοῖς μαθηταῖς γενέσθαι αὐτῷ πρὸς Σωκράτην συμμαθητάς.
οἰκῶν τ' ἐν Πειραιεῖ καθ' ἑκάστην ἡμέραν τοὺς τετταράκοντα σταδίου
ἀνίων ἤκουε Σωκράτους, παρ' οὗ καὶ τὸ καρτερικὸν λαβὼν καὶ τὸ
ἀπαθὲς ζηλώσας κατήρξε πρῶτος τοῦ Κυνισμοῦ.

αὐτοῦ F Φ : ἑαυτοῦ B P¹ (corr. P²) | γενέσθαι αὐτῷ συμμαθητάς
codd. plur. : συμμαθητάς αὐτοῦ γενέσθαι F | σταδίου in mg. F² | ἤκουε
P Φ : ἤκουσε B F

But later he became a pupil of Socrates, and he profited so much from him that he advised his disciples to become co-disciples with him of Socrates. He lived in the Piraeus but walked up the forty stades [five miles] every day to learn with Socrates, from whom he adopted sturdiness and emulated resilience to hardship and so first founded Cynicism.

Notes

ὕστερον δὲ παρέβαλε: The conversion story could be a Hellenistic fiction, invented to distinguish Antisthenes' putatively incompatible identities as “sophist” and “philosopher.” See Patzer 1970:247–55; Declava Caizzi 1966:119. Alternatively, the story could be true, in which case Antisthenes made a decision to reject Gorgias. (For references to Gorgias, see t. 67, 123, 203; notes on t. 53–54.) If the story is an invention, this preceded the career of Hermippus (a Peripatetic of the mid-third century BCE), the source for the single surviving anecdote from Antisthenes' “rhetorical” career (t. 9).
οἰκῶν τ' ἐν Πειραιεῖ: The Piraeus, port of Athens, was the home of many merchants and metics: for example, the metic Cephalus, father of Lysias,

whose house provides the setting for Plato's *Republic*, ran a profitable armaments factory and lived there. It was also the military base for the democratic resistance to the oligarchic revolution of 404–403, an important background to the condemnation of Socrates in 399. A home in the Piraeus could imply that Antisthenes, too, was from a merchant family (whether as metic or citizen). Disillusionment with mercenary goals, especially after the Peloponnesian Wars and oligarchic revolutions, could have inspired Antisthenes' harsh rejection of money and the social competition associated with money. See, further, t. 74, 82.

τὸ καρτερικὸν λαβὼν . . . τὸ ἀπαθὲς ζηλώσας: See t. 22A, another list of proto-Cynic and proto-Stoic virtues Antisthenes is said to have founded, from the conclusion of Diogenes' biography.

κατήρξε πρώτος: Peripatetic historians strove to identify the “first founder” of intellectual traditions (Kleingünther 1934): see also t. 151A. The term for a strictly intellectual pioneer would be *πρῶτος εὐρετής*, “first discoverer”: here, the achievement is, rather, the “foundation” of a standard way of life. Cynicism was never an institution with a fixed location, fixed curriculum, or fixed membership, and so it was never “founded” in this sense, but it had a fixed identity of some kind throughout antiquity. See t. 22–26, 135–40.

12B. *Gnomologium Vaticanum* no. 4 (Sternbach)

= 128C DC

ὁ αὐτὸς πρότερον ῥητορικὴν ἐδίδασκεν· ἔπειτα Σωκράτους εἰπόντος μετεβάλετο· ἐντυχὼν δὲ τοῖς ἐταίροις “Πρότερον,” ἔφη, “ἦτε μου μαθηταί· νῦν δ' ἂν νοῦν ἔχητε, ἔσεσθε συμμαθηταί.”

The same man [Antisthenes] earlier taught rhetoric: then, when Socrates spoke, he made a conversion. When he met his companions, he said, “Previously you were my disciples. But now, if you have a mind, you shall be my co-disciples.”

Context of Preservation

On Antisthenes' prominence in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, see t. 5.

Notes

Σωκράτους εἰπόντος: Socrates allegedly won Antisthenes over by his speaking: see also t. 12C; compare t. 34A. It is unclear whether this is a reference to a public appearance, to a kind of “protreptic” discourse such as the one reported in the Platonic *Clitophon* (407b2–e2; see also t. 208), or to more private interactions with individuals or small groups, such as Socrates describes in Pl. *Apol.* 29d7–e2 (and compare t. 69). The topics on which

Socrates spoke are not stated but were plausibly “protreptic” topics, urging pursuit of wisdom and virtue rather than wealth. If Socrates made such an impact on Antisthenes through this kind of speaking, one (or both) of two scenarios is likely: either Antisthenes pursued money and prestige himself before he heard Socrates, or, well acquainted with the culture that did this, he had already rejected it or was excluded from it, perhaps by “illegitimate” status (t. 1A). In the second scenario, Socrates’ speech would offer confirmation of Antisthenes’ own prior views. But the first scenario squares with the report that Antisthenes taught rhetoric and respected Gorgias, and it seems plausible as explanation for a grand conversion (which need not be incompatible with “illegitimate” status). The structure of the anecdote might imply a contrast between the speech of Socrates and the ῥητορικὴ <τέχνη> that Antisthenes was originally teaching.

ἄν νοῦν ἔχητε: In the *apophthegmata*, Antisthenes often exhorts people to acquire or use their minds. See t. 105, 132, 171. Heraclitus offers precedent (DK 22B40; see also comments on t. 171).

συμμαθηταί: Antisthenes erases the previous hierarchy between himself and his disciples, and they become equal colleagues under Socrates. After the death of Socrates, Antisthenes might have resumed his superior stance by setting himself up as teacher, but his rigor in accepting disciples (t. 34C, 37B, 169) implies that some might have been colleagues rather than subordinates. In other anecdotes, he figures himself as a doctor, superior in knowledge (t. 122, 167, 169). The term συμμαθηταί could have a markedly democratic resonance. Compare Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.20, where the democrats’ herald Cleocritus scolds the oligarchs for betraying their community: καὶ συγχορευταὶ καὶ συμφοιτηταὶ γεγενήμεθα καὶ συστρατιῶται (we have been fellow dancers in the chorus, and fellow pupils and fellow soldiers). See also t. 197 note on στεφανοῦσθαι ἢ συστεφανοῦσθαι.

12C. Jerome, *Against Jovinian* 2.14 (Bickel)

= 128B DC

Hic certe est Antisthenes qui cum gloriose docuisset rhetoricam, audissetque Socratem, dixisse fertur ad discipulos suos “abite et magistrum quaerite; ego iam repperi.” statimque venditis quae habebat, et publice distributis, nihil sibi amplius quam palliolum reservavit. pauperitatisque eius et laboris et Xenophon testis est in *Symposio* et innumerabiles libri eius: quorum alios philosophico, alios rhetorico genere conscripsit.

Socratem *codd.* : Socratem de paupertate
disputantem *Victorius et Bernays*

This certainly is the Antisthenes who, after he had taught rhetoric with renown, and had [next] heard Socrates, is traditionally reported to have said to his disciples, “Go away and seek your master: I have now found mine.” And at once he sold what he had and distributed it to the public, and he kept for himself nothing more than a cloak. For his poverty and his work ethic Xenophon is a witness in the *Symposium*, and also his innumerable books, of which some he composed in the philosophical style, others in the rhetorical style.

Context of Preservation

Jerome’s treatise (written in 393 CE) defends asceticism against the Christian opponent Jovinian. In defense of asceticism, Jerome cites widely from Porphyry’s *De abstinence*: in a section of that text now lost, Porphyry listed Orpheus, Pythagoras, Socrates, and Antisthenes as famous men who either abstained from eating meat completely or practiced “frugality” (Bernays 1866:159–63). Jerome then gives an expanded identification of Antisthenes, which continues into a narration of his relations with Diogenes of Sinope (t. 34C-3) and then a biography of Diogenes, for which Satyrus is cited as the source (Leo 1901:120–21). Whether this supplement was also in Porphyry (who used Satyrus, as Leo holds) or whether Jerome adds directly from Satyrus, whom he cites also elsewhere, is unclear.

Importance of the Testimonium

The testimonium is important for its illumination of the reception of Antisthenes’ biography. Porphyry mentions Antisthenes nowhere else in his extant philosophical works, but he preserves much of Antisthenes’ surviving Homeric criticism (t. 187, 191; probably t. 188, 189). Because the testimony from Satyrus is closely parallel to Diogenes’ version (t. 12A), Satyrus can be assumed as Diogenes’ source. Diogenes Laertius and Jerome (or Porphyry) have paraphrased Satyrus differently, but in a parallel “texture” (Leo 101:122). See Patzer 1970:93.

Notes

venditis quae habebat, et publice distributis: This step in the conversion is common to the story of Crates of Thebes (Diog. Laert. 6.87). Because it appears elsewhere in Jerome (t. 83B) but not otherwise in the testimonia for Antisthenes, this might be Jerome’s fabrication.

palliolum: Diminutive in form, this is a standard translation for Greek ἱμάτιον. *alios philosophico, alios rhetorico genere*: The second category corresponds to the rhetorical style (τὸ ῥητορικὸν εἶδος) reported by Diogenes Laertius (t. 11A). The opposed “philosophical style,” which Diogenes does not mention, could have been omitted by Diogenes or added by Jerome.

13A. Xenophon, *Symposium* 4.56–64 (Marchant)

= 107 DC

(56) “Ομολογησώμεθα πρῶτον ποῖά ἐστιν ἔργα τοῦ μαστροποῦ· καὶ ὅσα ἂν ἐρωτῶ, μὴ ὀκνεῖτε ἀποκρίνεσθαι, ἵνα εἰδῶμεν ὅσα ἂν συνομολογῶμεν. καὶ ὑμῖν οὕτω δοκεῖ;” ἔφη. “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν,” ἔφασαν. ὡς δ’ ἅπαξ εἶπαν “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν,” τοῦτο πάντες ἐκ τοῦ λοιποῦ ἀπεκρίναντο. (57) “Οὐκοῦν ἀγαθοῦ μέν,” ἔφη, “ὑμῖν δοκεῖ μαστροποῦ ἔργον εἶναι ἦν ἂν ἦ ὃν ἂν μαστροπεύῃ ἀρέσκοντα τοῦτον ἀποδεικνύναι οἷς ἂν συνῇ;” “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν,” ἔφασαν. “Οὐκοῦν ἔν μὲν τί ἐστιν εἰς τὸ ἀρέσκειν ἐκ τοῦ πρέπουσαν ἔχειν σχέσιν καὶ τριχῶν καὶ ἐσθῆτος;” “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν,” ἔφασαν. (58) “Οὐκοῦν καὶ τόδε ἐπιστάμεθα, ὅτι ἐστιν ἀνθρώπῳ τοῖς αὐτοῖς ὄμμασι καὶ φιλικῶς καὶ ἐχθρῶς πρὸς τινὰς βλέπειν;” “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” “Τί δέ, τῇ αὐτῇ φωνῇ ἔστι καὶ αἰδημόνως καὶ θρασέως φθέγγεσθαι;” “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” “Τί δέ, λόγοι οὐκ εἰσὶ μὲν τινες ἀπεχθανόμενοι, εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἱ πρὸς φιλίαν ἄγουσι;” “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” (59) “Οὐκοῦν τούτων ὁ ἀγαθὸς μαστροπὸς τὰ συμφέροντα εἰς τὸ ἀρέσκειν διδάσκει ἄν;” “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” “Ἀμείνων δ’ ἂν εἴη,” ἔφη, “ὁ ἐνὶ δυνάμενος ἀρεστοὺς ποιεῖν ἢ ὅστις καὶ πολλοῖς;” ἐνταῦθα μέντοι ἐσχίσθησαν, καὶ οἱ μὲν εἶπον “Δῆλον ὅτι ὅστις πλείστοις,” οἱ δὲ “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν.” (60) ὁ δ’ εἰπὼν ὅτι καὶ τοῦτο ὁμολογεῖται ἔφη. “Εἰ δέ τις καὶ ὅλη τῇ πόλει ἀρέσκοντας δύναται ἀποδεικνύναι, οὐχ οὗτος παντελῶς ἂν ἤδη ἀγαθὸς μαστροπὸς εἴη;” “Σαφῶς γε νῆ Δία,” πάντες εἶπον. “Οὐκοῦν εἴ τις τοιούτους δύναται ἐξεργάζεσθαι ὧν προστατοίη, δικαίως ἂν μέγα φρονοῖ ἐπὶ τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ δικαίως ἂν πολὺν μισθὸν λαμβάνοι;” (61) ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ταῦτα πάντες συνωμολόγουν, “Τοιούτος μέντοι,” ἔφη, “μοι δοκεῖ Ἀντισθένης εἶναι οὗτος.” καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης, “Ἐμοί,” ἔφη, “παραδίδως, ὦ Σώκρατες, τὴν τέχνην;” “Ναὶ μὰ Δί,” ἔφη. “Ὅρῳ γάρ σε καὶ τὴν ἀκόλουθον ταύτης πάνυ ἐξεργασμένον.” “Τίνα ταύτην;” “Τὴν προαγωγείαν,” ἔφη. (62) καὶ ὃς μάλα ἀχθεσθεὶς ἐπήρετο. “Καὶ τί μοι σύνοισθα, ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιούτον εἰργασμένω;” “Οἶδα μέν,” ἔφη, “σε Καλλίαν τουτονὶ προαγωγεύσαντα τῷ σοφῷ Προδίκῳ, ὅτε ἑώρας τοῦτον μὲν φιλοσοφίας ἐρῶντα, ἐκείνον δὲ χρημάτων δεόμενον· οἶδα δὲ σε Ἰππία τῷ Ἡλείῳ, παρ’ οὗ οὗτος καὶ τὸ μνημονικὸν ἔμαθεν· ἀφ’ οὗ δὴ καὶ ἐρωτικώτερος γεγένηται διὰ τὸ ὅ τι ἂν καλὸν ἴδῃ μηδέποτε ἐπιλανθάνεσθαι. (63) ἔναγχος δὲ δήπου καὶ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἐπαινῶν τὸν Ἡρακλεώτην ξένον ἐπεὶ με ἐποίησας ἐπιθυμεῖν αὐτοῦ, συνέστησάς μοι αὐτόν. καὶ χάριν μέντοι σοι ἔχω· πάνυ γὰρ καλὸς κάγαθός δοκεῖ μοι εἶναι. Αἰσχύλον δὲ τὸν Φλειάσιον πρὸς ἐμὲ ἐπαινῶν καὶ ἐμὲ πρὸς ἐκείνον οὐχ οὕτω διέθηκας ὥστε διὰ τοὺς σοὺς λόγους ἐρῶντες ἐκυνοδρομοῦμεν ἀλλήλους ζητοῦντες; (64) ταῦτα οὖν ὁρῶν δυνάμενόν σε ποιεῖν ἀγαθὸν νομίζω προαγωγὸν εἶναι. ὁ γὰρ οἷός τε ὧν

γιγνώσκειν τε τοὺς ὠφελίμους αὐτοῖς καὶ τούτους δυνάμενος ποιεῖν ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀλλήλων, οὗτος ἂν μοι δοκεῖ καὶ πόλεις δύνασθαι φίλας ποιεῖν καὶ γάμους ἐπιτηδεῖους συνάγειν, καὶ πολλοῦ ἂν ἄξιος εἶναι καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ιδιώταις φίλος καὶ συμμάχος κεκτηῖσθαι. σὺ δὲ ὡς κακῶς ἀκούσας ὅτι ἀγαθόν σε ἔφην προαγωγὸν εἶναι, ὠργίσθης.” “Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί,” ἔφη, “οὐ νῦν. ἐὰν γὰρ ταῦτα δύνωμαι, σεσαγμένος δὴ παντάπασι πλούτου τὴν ψυχὴν ἔσομαι.” καὶ αὕτη μὲν δὴ ἡ περίοδος τῶν λόγων ἀπετελέσθη.

(56) ἔστιν ἔργα codd. : ἔστιν τᾶργα Mehler : ἔστιν ἔργ’ ἀγαθοῦ μαστροποῦ Stephanus in mg. | ὀκνεῖτε codd. plur. : ὀκνήτε D F H² | εἶπαν codd. plur. : εἶπον D F H² | τοῦτο om. G (57) ἀρέσκειν ἐκ τοῦ πρέπουσαν codd. : ἀρέσκειν ἄγον τὸ πρέπουσαν cit. Schneider (58) ὅτι ἔστιν Castalio : τί ἔστιν codd. (59) ἀρεστοὺς Brodaeus : ἀρίστους codd. : ἀρέσκοντας A in mg. (60) ὁμολογεῖται ἔφη : ὠμολόγηται, εἰ δέ τις, ἔφη Mehler (62) καλὸν A s.v. : κακὸν cet. (63) ζητοῦντες del. Richards (64) τε secundum om. B | αὐτοῖς Leonclavius : αὐτῶ codd. | φίλας codd. plur. : φιλίας A | καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ιδιώταις φίλος καὶ συμμάχος Finckh : καὶ πόλεσι καὶ φίλοις καὶ συμμάχοις codd. : καὶ πόλει καὶ φίλοις σύμμαχος Cobet : καὶ συμμάχοις del. Sauppe

(56) “Let us agree first what sorts of things the functions of the matchmaker are. So whatever I ask, do not hesitate to answer, so that we might know how far we are in agreement. Does this seem like a fair procedure to you?” he [Socrates] said. “Definitely so,” they [the symposiasts] said. And after they had said “Definitely so” one time, everyone gave this response for the rest of the argument. (57) “So do you not think that the function of the good matchmaker is to display whichever person he is matchmaking, whether female or male, as pleasing to whomever he is with?” “Definitely so,” they said. “So is not one quality for pleasing derived from having a becoming disposition of hairstyle and dress?” “Definitely so,” they said. (58) “And do we not know also this, that it is possible for a person to look at people in both a friendly and a hostile manner with the same eyes?” “Definitely so,” they said. “And what about this, that it is possible to speak both respectfully and harshly with the same voice?” “Definitely so,” they said. “And this, are there not some hateful speeches, but others that lead toward friendship?” “Definitely so,” they said. (59) “So would not the good matchmaker teach the qualities among these that are expedient for pleasing?” “Definitely so,” they said. “Would he be the better matchmaker who is able to make his clients pleasing to one person, or also to many?” Here, however, the symposiasts were divided,

and some said, “It is clearly the one who can make his clients pleasing to the most,” and others said, “Definitely so.” (60) And Socrates, declaring that also this had been agreed, said, “And if someone could display his clients as pleasing to the whole city, would he not be, just in that, an utterly good matchmaker?” “Clearly, by Zeus,” everyone said. “So if someone were able to produce such pleasing people from the clients of whom he is in charge, then he would justly feel proud of his craft, and he would justly earn a large wage?” (61) When everyone had agreed also to this, Socrates said, “Such a man, then, in my view is Antisthenes here.” And Antisthenes said, “Are you handing over your craft to me, Socrates?” “Yes, by Zeus,” he said, “for I see that you have fully achieved also what follows on this craft.” “What is that?” “Procuring,” he said. (62) And he, greatly irritated, asked further, “And what, Socrates, are you aware that I have done along this line?” “First,” he said, “I know that you introduced Callias here to the wise man Prodicus, when you saw that Callias was in love with philosophy and Prodicus was needing money. And I know that you introduced him to Hippias of Elis, from whom he also learned the art of memory. So from that he has become even more erotic, because whatever fine thing he sees, he never forgets it. (63) And just now, indeed, after you made me desire the visitor from Heraclea by praising him to me, you introduced him to me. Indeed I am grateful to you, for he seems to me to be entirely fine and good. And by praising Aeschylus of Phlius to me and me to him, did you not arrange it such that we fell in love through the device of your words and we chased down each other with dogs in our search? (64) So because I see that you are able to do these things, I believe that you are a good procurer. For someone who is able to recognize people who are useful to each other and has the power to make them desire each other, this person, in my view, would also be able to make cities friendly and to arrange suitable marriages, and he would be worth quite a bit for cities and individuals to have acquired as a friend and ally. But you became angry, as if you have been insulted because I said you are a good procurer.” “But now not, by Zeus,” he said. “For if I can do these things, I will be entirely laden with wealth in my soul.” And so that round of speeches came to an end.

Context of Preservation

Xenophon's *Symposium*, like Plato's, is structured around a cycle of speech making by the guests. (The three-part analysis in Körte 1927 divides the text into a query on the teachability of virtue [ch. 1–2], a cycle of riddles and solutions concerning virtue [ch. 3–5], and Socrates' final speech on virtuous

love [ch. 6–9]: see Patzer 1970:60–61; Huss *Xeonphons Symposion*:30–37.) In an initial round of short speeches (ch. 3), each diner states what among his resources is “worth the most,” and in a second round (ch. 4), he explains. In the preparation for this passage, Socrates has identified his craft (τέχνη) of matchmaking (μαστροπεία) as the possession he values most (3.10). This term was a euphemistic name for the panderer of prostitutes (the πορνοβόσκος; see von Fritz 1935:26–27; compare t. 62), and Socrates’ statement is understood by the internal audience as a joke (ὕμεις μὲν γελᾶτε . . . , 3.10). Here Socrates goes on to give the demonstrative proof (ἀποδεικνύναι, 4.1) for his answer. See also Huss 1999 (*Xeonphons Symposion*):304–18.

Importance of the Testimonium

This passage shows Socrates bestowing and Antisthenes accepting the office of successor to Socrates in his most valued craft, matchmaking, which turns out to be a metaphor for the production of fruitful partnerships for generating virtue, as a service to the city. With t. 83A and 14A, this passage has been a focus of attempts to assess Xenophon’s portrait of Antisthenes’ personality (Körte 1927; von Fritz 1935:24–27). Von Fritz argues (1935:33–40) that Xenophon is inspired by Aeschines, whose Aspasia was a matchmaker. The present notes emphasize instead the resonances with other evidence about Antisthenes. The speech is intended as both humorous and serious, as Socrates intimated when he announced his topic at *Sym.* 3.10. The humor lies in the metaphor, which is paralleled for Socrates in Xen. *Mem.* 3.11 and Pl. *Theaet.* 149d5–150a6, amid a longer passage on the midwife, 149a1–151d2. (The craft is also attributed to Aspasia in Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.36, in Aeschines’ *Aspasia* [SSR VIA 70 = Cic. *De inv.* 1.51–53], and allusively in Xen. *Oec.* 3.14 and possibly *Mem.* 3.11.16–17 [= t. 14B].) It seems especially jarring when applied to Antisthenes, who renounces bodily *eros* (t. 122, 123). The serious quality lies in the way philosophy is characterized as useful, general, and interpersonal. Antisthenes is portrayed as both insulted and pleased by Socrates’ choice of himself as successor, in correspondence with the literal versus metaphorical (and serious) meaning of “pandering.” Xenophon’s main point, if it is beyond merely portraying a boorish Antisthenes, might have to do with the success of Antisthenes’ teaching mission in Athens.

Notes

(56) ποῖά ἐστιν ἔργα τοῦ μαστροποῦ: Socrates takes a technical approach to his joke, that he is a procurer or panderer (see note above). It is typical of Socrates to define a term before saying more about it (e.g., *Meno* 71a3–7, 86d3–e1; *Phaedr.* 237b7–d3). The present identification of the μαστροπός is not a definition of essence, or “what it is,” which Xenophon does recognize as

the distinctive Socratic type of definition (see *Sym.* 6.1, where Hermogenes says, “If you are asking what it [drunken behavior] is, I do not know; but what it seems to me [to be], I could say,” Εἰ μὲν ὃ τι ἐστὶν ἐρωτᾷς, οὐκ οἶδα· τὸ μὲντοι μοι δοκοῦν εἵπομι’ ἄν). Here two features differ from a definition of essence: first, the μαστροπός is defined by functions, not by “what he is”; second, Socrates seeks agreement not about what the functions precisely are but about “what sorts of things” they are, and a list of four examples follows. The second feature, if it is deliberate, is reminiscent of Aristotle’s testimony about the Antistheneans’ stance on definition (t. 150A.4). The first feature seems to be the form of Socratic definition appropriate to the definition of a craft. Socrates conducts a definition by ἔργον also in *Mem.* 3.4.7 (= t. 72B) and 4.6.14 and in *Oec.* 1.2; and in ps.-Pl. *On Justice* 372a4–9, the definition sought is supposed to state how we use the just. (Müller 1972:159, amid a longer argument for associations of the whole text of *On Justice* with Antisthenes, argues that this passage is a definition by ἔργον.) See also Pl. *Rep.* 1 332e3–5. Antisthenes’ definition of λόγος (t. 151A) seems also to specify its function. καὶ ὅσα ἂν ἐρωτῶ, μὴ ὀκνεῖτε ἀποκρίνεσθαι: Antisthenes wrote a text entitled Περὶ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως (t. 41A title 7.3). “Question and answer” is terminology for Socratic method throughout Plato’s dialogues (see comments on t. 41A title 7.3). Xenophon, too, seems to acknowledge this pair of terms as a reference to Socratic method (*Mem.* 1.2.36, 1.4.8, and three times in book 4; once in the *Oeconomicus*; three times in the *Symposium*).

ἵνα εἰδῶμεν ὅσα ἂν συνομολογῶμεν: Socrates is claiming not to change anyone’s beliefs but to find the common ground. This is possibly the preparation for his controversial thesis that Antisthenes is the best procurer. ὥς δ’ ἅπαξ εἶπαν “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν” . . . : Here Xenophon discloses his parody of Socratic conversation, and the whole passage has possibly already been a parody. This may be Xenophon’s device for keeping the depicted conversation light, in the mood of a banquet. Alternatively, the parody of the Socratic respondent, not paralleled elsewhere in Xenophon (unless more subtly in *Mem.* 3.4.7–9: see t. 72B), could be directed against a particular literary version of Socratic teaching or against Socratic teaching generally (which seems unlikely). Plausibly the parody is not hostile but a happy account of Socrates’ successful teaching. Against the easy agreement Socrates produces, real dialectical tensions dominate Antisthenes’ debates with Callias and Niceratus (t. 78, 83, 185A, 186).

(57) ἀρέσκοντα: This euphemism for attraction is absent from Antisthenes’ discussion of his own sexual affairs (t. 82.38), where he speaks of those who “suffice” (οὕτω μοι τὸ παρὸν ἀρκεῖ) rather than those who “please.” When it comes to Socrates’ choice of disciples, however, the chosen ones “please” him (οἱ ἂν αὐτῷ ἀρέσκωσι τούτοις συνὼν διατελεῖ, t. 82.44).

ἀποδεικνύναι: To “demonstrate” is to fortify the truth of a proposition: this has a role close to proof. It might be a term important to Antisthenes, and if so, it might carry a difference from the Sophistic term “display” (without backing), ἐπιδεικνύναι. See t. 22B, 157A–C, 159A.

οἷς ἂν συνῇ: The verb συνεῖναι has both a sexual and a philosophical sense. See t. 141A.

δικαίως ἂν μέγα φρονοίη ἐπὶ τῇ τέχνῃ καὶ δικαίως ἂν πολὺν μισθὸν λαμβάνοι: Although Antisthenes has not yet been named, this could be a joke against his unpopularity as a teacher or his difficulty attracting pupils (see t. 34C).

(61) “Ἐμοί . . . παραδίδως . . . τὴν τέχνην;”: Socrates has consistently called his capacity as matchmaker a “craft,” which is associated in Socratic literature with knowledge and constitutes a superior, philosophical practice, in opposition to a “knack” or ability gained through experience (ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή, Pl. *Gorg.* 463b4): see t. 78. In Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.30, the interlocutors refer to the “knowledge” or “science” (ἐπιστήμη) of friendship, and the previous episode has featured Antisthenes as an expert (t. 110). Because, in the *Symposium*, Xenophon generally seems to contrast Antisthenes’ abrupt manner with the smoother manner of Socrates (t. 185A, 78), possibly Antisthenes was known for a failure to practice a τέχνη of human interactions even though he claimed to teach one. There is surely irony in the passage, at Antisthenes’ expense (Morrison 1994:198–203). Xenophon might doubt that Socrates’ talents in teaching really could be passed down to another person. **προαγωγείαν:** Whereas the discussion so far has been about the skill of the “matchmaker” (μαστροπός), Socrates here changes his term to the more aggressive field of “procuring” (προαγωγή). The matchmaker fashions a mutually beneficial relationship, whereas the panderer promotes a client toward a customer. Considering the image of Socratic teaching Antisthenes presents in t. 82 and the image of Sophistic teaching he presents in t. 62–63, it is unlikely that he favored a relationship between teacher and pupil that fulfilled the interests of the teacher but not the pupil. Pl. *Prot.* 310e and *Theaet.* 151b1–6 depict or mention Socratic introductions, where a pupil unsuitable for Socrates is matched with a teacher who can offer the instruction that is sought. The distinction between “matchmaker” and “procurer” is made also in *Theaetetus*, where its function seems gratuitous. See also Epictetus 3.23.22; Maximus of Tyre 38.4b.

(62) καὶ ὃς μάλα ἀχθεσθεῖς: Antisthenes is offended by the literal sense of Socrates’ term and demands evidence for its assignment to him. Socrates’ next speech aims to mollify him, by applying the “procuring” term to intellectual partnerships, which are said to become productive of good for the city. Whether the four cases of partnership listed by Socrates are ones Antisthenes

really aspired to create and whether they were truly productive of good for Athens are not clear, but Antisthenes is depicted as a philanthropist. Yet it is plausible that Antisthenes would have rejected the teaching missions of Hippias (see t. 187) and Prodicus (see next note); he probably would have thought Socrates needed no teachers (see t. 12A).

σε Καλλίαν τουτονὶ προαγωγεύσαντα τῷ σοφῷ Προδίκῳ: This phrase is widely understood as evidence that Antisthenes had a special relationship with Prodicus and possibly with his theory of names. (See Prantl 1927 v.1:16; Momigliano 1930:105–7; Brancacci 1990:61 n.31.) Beyond a shared interest in names, Antisthenes and Prodicus shared an interest in the Heracles story (t. 92–99, 207C) and possibly in a theory about use (or *χρήσις*) as fundamental to ethics (see t. 187.4 note on τὴν τοῦ λόγου χρήσιν; compare ps-Pl. *Eryxias* 397e). As for language, Antisthenes' one-to-one principle (ἐν ἑφ' ἑνός, t. 152A–D) and his οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν thesis (t. 152A–D, 153A–B) could depend on a theory of synonyms like that of Prodicus, that is, the view that there are no true synonyms and that each word has its own distinct meaning or intelligible object of reference. Such a view would stand in opposition to that of, for example, Democritus, who accepted synonyms as a fact about language that proved its conventionality (DK 68B26), and Plato and Aristotle, who seem to have considered synonyms to be of little interest and some terms to be roughly interchangeable. There is no direct evidence for Antisthenes' views on synonyms beyond what can be inferred from his one-to-one principle and his paradox. In t. 187.4, he distinguishes the various senses of one word, a project close to the analysis of homonyms, and his wordplay (see t. 8, 57, 131, 143, 148, 171; t. 41A titles 1.5 and 6.3; t. 150A.1 notes) also depends on the conflation of homophones (not the same as homonyms, but related). But Socrates' speech could be ironic and depend on a recognized aversion between Prodicus and Antisthenes. It is plausible that Xenophon used the *Callias* of Aeschines as a source for his *Symposium* as a whole and also for this part (see Dittmar 1912:186–212; Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposion*]:303–5). In Aeschines' *Callias*, Prodicus and Anaxagoras represented the worthless Sophists on whom Callias mindlessly spent his money (Dittmar 1912:189; Herodicus in Athenaeus 220c). Because Prodicus famously charged high rates for his teaching and might have had a high-maintenance lifestyle, Antisthenes was probably his opponent when it came to evaluating the worth of association (see also t. 94B, 207C). Earlier in the *Symposium*, Antisthenes showed himself to be skeptical about the real value of Callias' financial expenditures (see t. 78, 83). Possibly the first two teachers, Prodicus and Hippias, were matched with Callias because they deserved a depraved pupil, whereas the second two, the Heracleian stranger and Aeschylus of Phlius, were matched with Socrates because they deserved a fine pupil. The very idea that Socrates was enlisted by Antisthenes as a pupil is odd, and the

goal of the whole passage could be to imply that the future of education in Athens is insecure (except insofar as Xenophon gets his point across and Athens fixes its shortcomings).

οἶδα δέ σε Ἰππία τῷ Ἡλείῳ: Hippias of Elis, the pompous interlocutor of Socrates in Plato's *Hippias Minor* and *Hippias Major*, might be also the inspiration for the "accuser" of Odysseus in t. 187. If so, Antisthenes was his opponent rather than his ally.

(63) καὶ πρὸς ἐμὲ ἐπαινῶν τὸν Ἡρακλεώτην ξένον: This stranger from Heraclea is sometimes suspected to be Bryson (who is featured elsewhere in Socratic literature and was apparently a dialectician: SSR IIS 1–11; see t. 42) or his father Herodorus, who also wrote a version of the labors of Heracles. The painters Zeuxippus and Zeuxis have also been proposed. See Huss 1999 (*Xenophons Symposium*):314. Körte 1927:38 proposed that all four figures named here were characters in Antisthenes' writings.

Αἰσχύλον δὲ τὸν Φλειάσιον πρὸς ἐμὲ ἐπαινῶν: Körte 1927 and Breitenbach 1967:1882 propose that Aeschylus of Phlius was the same Aeschylus known in the fifth century as an astronomer (*RE* s.v. "Aischylus" 16); surely there would be irony in matching Socrates with an astronomy teacher. See Patzer 1970:82 n.52.

(64) πολλοῦ ἂν ἄξιος εἶναι καὶ πόλεσι καὶ ιδιώταις φίλος καὶ συμμάχος κεκτῆσθαι: The emendation of Finckh should be accepted, for the sense of the passage. φίλος has a relational sense and so makes sense as a predicate in parallel with συμμάχος, not as a name for the party who should seek the services of a good procurer. Individuals seek to become friends through the procurer. Compare the expression in Xen. *Mem.* 2.5.3 (t. 110), where Antisthenes would "purchase someone at any cost to be a friend for me" (τὸν δὲ πρὸ πάντων . . . πριαίμην ἂν φίλον μοι εἶναι). The parties who stand to benefit from the procurer's expertise are surely cities and individuals (a third class of larger groups such as interstate alliances is not impossible, but there has been no mention of interstate alliances in the whole *Symposium*), and Xenophon's standard term for the individual in opposition to the city is ιδιώτης.

ὥς κακῶς ἀκούσας: Antisthenes finds beneficial "toil" in being insulted or having a bad reputation (t. 86, 113), but this view depends on the moral inferiority of the audience. Here Socrates gives the insult, and Antisthenes is being teased for his reaction.

13B. Plutarch, *Table Talk* II.1.6 632d–e (Hubert)

ἀντίστροφον οὖν ἔοικε γένος εἰρωνείας εἶναι τὸ περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους·
ὧ καὶ Σωκράτης ἐχρήσατο, τοῦ Ἀντισθένους τὸ φιλοποιοῦν καὶ

συναγωγὸν ἀνθρώπων εἰς εὖνοιαν μαστροπείαν [καὶ συναγωγίαν] καὶ
 προαγωγείαν ὀνομάσας.
 καὶ συναγωγίαν del. Wyttenbach | προαγωγείαν Wyttenbach e Xen.
 Sym. : ἀγωγείαν codd.

Now for praise there seems to be a counterpart kind of irony.
 Socrates used it when he referred to Antisthenes' capacity for
 making people friends and enticing them into goodwill by the names
 "matchmaking" and "procuring."

Context of Preservation

Xenophon's view of topics appropriate for questions and jokes at dinner
 is Plutarch's first question in the second book of *Table Talk*. Just after this
 passage recast from the *Symposium*, Plutarch cites Diogenes of Sinope, who
 also used scoffing words to praise the benefits Antisthenes has given him (t.
 34D-1).

Importance of the Testimonium

Plutarch's note shows that ancient critics, like modern, saw irony in Socrates'
 words to Antisthenes. The irony is understood in Antisthenes' favor, in reverse
 from modern critics. See Huss 1999 (*Xenophons Symposium*):311.

Notes

ἀντίστροφον . . . γένος εἰρωνείας . . . τὸ περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους: Irony can
 disguise insult (as Plutarch has already said in the preceding context), but it
 also disguises praise. This might be a strategy for distinguishing praise from
 flattery.

14A. Xenophon, *Symposium* 8.4–6 (Marchant)

(4) "Σὺ δὲ μόνος, ὦ Ἀντισθένης, οὐδενὸς ἐράς;" "Ναὶ μὰ τοὺς θεούς,"
 εἶπεν ἐκεῖνος, "καὶ σφόδρα γε σοῦ." καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπισκώψας ὡς
 δὴ θρυπτόμενος εἶπε· "Μὴ νῦν μοι ἐν τῷ παρόντι ὄχλον παρέχε· ὡς
 γὰρ ὀρᾷς, ἄλλα πράττω." (5) καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης ἔλεξεν· "Ὡς σαφῶς
 μέντοι σὺ μαστροπὲ σαυτοῦ ἀεὶ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖς· τοτὲ μὲν τὸ δαιμόνιον
 προφασιζόμενος οὐ διαλέγῃ μοι, τοτὲ δ' ἄλλου του ἐφιέμενος." (6) καὶ
 ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· "Πρὸς τῶν θεῶν, ὦ Ἀντισθένης, μόνον μὴ συγκόψῃς
 με· τὴν δ' ἄλλην χαλεπότητα ἐγὼ σου καὶ φέρω καὶ οἶσω φιλικῶς. ἄλλα
 γάρ," ἔφη, "τὸν μὲν σὸν ἔρωτα κρύπτωμεν, ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἔστιν οὐ ψυχῆς
 ἀλλ' εὐμορφίας τῆς ἐμῆς."

(4) παρέχε codd. plur. : πάρασχε Vat. Urbin. 95 (6) κρύπτωμεν R L :
 κρύπτω μὲν codd. plur. :]ρύπτωμεν P. Lit. Lond. 152

(4) “Are you the only one, Antisthenes, who is in love with nobody?” [Socrates asked]. “Yes I am in love, by the gods,” he [Antisthenes] said, “actually very much with you.” And Socrates, making fun of him as if he were being coy, said, “Now don’t be giving me trouble in the present situation. As you can see, I am doing other things.” (5) And Antisthenes said, “How transparently you, the matchmaker of yourself, always put me off like this. Sometimes you make the excuse of your *daimonion* and won’t talk with me, other times because you desire someone else.” (6) And Socrates said, “In the name of the gods, Antisthenes, please don’t beat me up. The rest of your difficult demeanor I both tolerate and shall tolerate, with affection. But your love,” he said, “let us hide, because it is actually not for my soul but for my beauty.”

Context of Preservation

Socrates has introduced a commemoration of the god *Eros* as a new activity at the party (8.1), and his long speech is the last section of Xenophon’s *Symposium*. On the three parts of the *Symposium* distinguished in Körte 1927, see t. 13A.

Importance of the Testimonium

The meaning of this passage depends foremost on what Antisthenes might have done or written to inspire this treatment, which we do not know. Patzer 1970:185–86 and Huss 1999 (*Xenophons Symposium*):355 read the passage as a statement that in the upcoming climactic speech on *eros* (8.7–41), Xenophon’s Socrates will make no reference at all to Antisthenes’ views on the topic, for Antisthenes loves the body, whereas Socrates speaks on love of the soul; the text says farewell here to Antisthenes. This precisely reverses an older interpretation, whereby Xenophon essentially borrows the whole speech, with its distinction between Aphrodite Πάνδημος and Aprodite Οὐρανία, from a text by Antisthenes (Joël 1893; Maier 1913:17–19 n.1). The teasing between Antisthenes and Socrates, which is readily compared to parts of the scene between Alcibiades and Socrates in Plato’s *Symposium* (213–22), is most often read as a joke against Antisthenes, the enemy of Aphrodite (t. 123), who really is in love with Socrates but either denies this or misunderstands Socrates’ “erotic” tactics in education. (See Lampe 2010.) Alternatively, Antisthenes could be extending the joke, especially since Hermogenes’ love object, just mentioned in *Sym.* 8.3, might already have captured the correct Socratic answer, ὃ τι ποτ’ ἐστὶν ἡ καλοκάγαθία, “the good and fine, whatever it is” (see also von Fritz 1935:30): on the term καλοκάγαθία, see t. 78, 134s, 172a, 41A titles 3.1 and 3.4; compare t. 208.28.

Since Dittmar, whose 1912 account displaced Joël 1893–1901 in dominating scholarly opinion on the question, it has been assumed that Aeschines' *Callicles* (and sometimes *Aspasia* also) was the major subtext for Xenophon's portrait of Antisthenes in the *Symposium* and that episodes hostile to Antisthenes reflect Aeschines' hostility. But Antisthenes did write a sympotic text, which is active elsewhere in Xenophon's *Symposium* (see t. 41A title 2.4 notes). Because the *Symposium* of Xenophon has an elusive and still unexplained relationship to Plato's text by the same name (see Danzig 2005), it remains plausible that both Plato and Xenophon are responding to Antisthenes, possibly taking the opportunity to joke on his unlikely sublimation of *eros* or his total vilification of bodily *eros*. It is also plausible that Xenophon is reactivating Antisthenes' clear view of Socratic *eros* against the ambiguous implications by Plato that the sublimation Socrates professed was not always practiced. In the second case, Xenophon could be alerting his reader in advance of Socrates' speech on homoerotic chastity that these views are filtered through Antisthenes; Xenophon does recognize homoerotic love affairs elsewhere (Hindley 1999). Maier 1913:17–19 n.1, integrating older studies, argues that the main point in Socrates' long speech on the god Eros, especially *Sym.* 8.32–40, depends on a lost text of Antisthenes, which is also the source for the speech of Pausanias in Plato's *Symposium* (182b). Whereas Plato "corrects" the sensual love promoted by the original Pausanias figure (who would have been a sordid character), as part of his complex correction and nuancing of Antisthenes' views on love, Xenophon's Socrates cites the views of the original Pausanias more faithfully and corrects them in his own voice.

Notes

(4) *σὺ δὲ μόνος, ὃ Ἀντισθένης, οὐδενὸς ἐρᾷς*: This question is a challenge to one who allegedly claimed he would shoot Aphrodite if he could catch her (t. 123) and who spoke, within Xenophon's *Symposium*, of the sexual "need" of his body in an alienating way (t. 82.38). Socrates is proving that everyone present is a follower of the god Eros (8.1), and Antisthenes presumably knows that Socrates will show that even he is a lover, if he does not explain this himself. His aggressive attitude toward Socrates, as the active ἐραστής to the passive ἐρώμενος (Dover 1980:85), could be a humorous escape from an awkward question, which Socrates unexpectedly develops. Antisthenes keeps up with the joke throughout the passage, but Xenophon's purpose in playing this out (at greater length than he does for the other characters: see *Sym.* 8.1–3) is not clear.

καὶ σφόδρα γε σοῦ: The evidence suggests that Antisthenes did love the human being Socrates on the psychological level (t. 12, 14B, 82.44). By contrast with Apollodorus, who is paired with Antisthenes as lover of

Socrates in t. 14B (see notes there), Antisthenes seems to have both loved and understood the meaning of loving Socrates' *logos* in addition to loving Socrates: Socrates' *logos* survived his death and became the essence of Socraticism as philosophy. (Apollodorus is represented in the opening section of Plato's *Symposium* as failing to grasp what loving and reproducing the Socratic *logos* really means. For the injunction to follow the *logos* not the man, see Pl. *Phaed.* 90d9–91c5.) Socrates the man is remarkably absent as a character in mimesis in Antisthenes' literary remains: see t. 3B, 200. For the possibility that someone can love the dead Socrates, or love him by reputation without having met the person, see t. 84C. Since the question of succession to Socrates is at stake in Xenophon's *Symposium* (see t. 13A), it is plausible that Xenophon was commenting more seriously on Antisthenes' love for Socrates, suggesting that it was inadequate to the task of reproducing Socrates in Athens.

ἐπισκῶψας ὡς δὴ θρυπτόμενος: This is language for flirtation. Socrates plays out the role of the ἐρώμενος (Dover 1980:85). Plato's Alcibiades also could be said to take the active role toward Socrates (Pl. *Sym.* 217c8). But on the surface, he plays the ἐρώμενος (*Sym.* 218c7–d1); he accuses Socrates of habitually deceiving his younger disciples, who should be like his ἐρώμενοι, by becoming the παιδικά instead of the ἐραστής (*Sym.* 222b3–4). See Huss 1999 (*Xenophons Symposium*):366. Antisthenes' concept of *eros* might be highly reciprocal: see t. 58.

(5) **σὺ μαστροπὲ σαυτοῦ:** See t. 13A, where the matchmaker joins two other parties. Here Socrates serves himself. In t. 13A, Antisthenes also served as matchmaker for Socrates. Here Socrates needs him in this third-party role no more than he wants him as a lover.

ἀεὶ τοιαῦτα ποιεῖς: Socrates evades not only reciprocating but even accepting Antisthenes' love. This could be a consistent aspect of Socrates' teaching technique. (See Lampe 2010.)

τὸ δαιμόνιον προφασιζόμενος: Socrates' private divine voice tells him with whom he should associate (see, e.g., Pl. *Theaet.* 151a3–5 and the possibly spurious *Alc.* 1 103a5–b1 and *Theag.* 128e5). This voice was like an inarticulate noise, capable of signaling “yes” or “no” but not informative further. The verb προφασιζόμενος implies incredulity by Antisthenes, as though Socrates is claiming a pretext. This might imply, humorously, a serious rejection by Socrates, who notes in *Theaet.* 151a3–5, amid the explanation of his role as a midwife, that some potential pupils are unsuited to himself, as he can tell from his *daimonion*, and that he passes these on to teachers who can help them, such as Prodicus (151b5). Presumably this *daimonion* of spiritual association was not fickle but gave constantly reliable advice, and presumably the historical Antisthenes was in good favor with this *daimonion*.

Since Socrates cites his *daimonion* for approaching Alcibiades (in the Platonic *Alc.* 1 103a5–b1; this is possibly also implied in Aeschines’ account, SSR VIA 50), Antisthenes might have written something about Alcibiades and the *daimonion* on which Xenophon is playing. (See Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposion*]:366–67 for more literature on the Socratic *daimonion*; see also Long 2006 [“How Does Socrates’ Divine Sign Communicate”].)

οὐ διαλέγη μοι: Conversation, or a special kind of conversation, διαλέγεσθαι, might be Antisthenes’ way of enacting *eros* with Socrates: compare the double entendre in συνεῖναι (t. 141A, 92). On the importance of the term διαλέγεσθαι, see t. 41A titles 6.2 and 6.5.

ἄλλον του ἐφιέμενος: Plato’s Alcibiades is also jealous of others (Pl. *Sym.* 213c2–d6).

(6) μόνον μὴ συγκόψης με: The verb συγκόπτω is strong and odd, and this could be an allusion to lost literature. Compare the reports that Antisthenes tried to swat his potential pupils (t. 34C, cited in Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposion*]:368).

τὴν δ’ ἄλλην χαλεπότητα . . . σου: The “difficulty” in Antisthenes’ person is shared, in name at least, with Xanthippe, the “most difficult of all women” (see t. 18, where Antisthenes is Socrates’ interrogator). “Difficulty” in character is assigned to Xanthippe again by Xenophon in *Mem.* 2.2.79 and to bad character more generally (together with ὕβρις and ἀμέλεια) in *Oec.* 4.8. Yet “difficult” character in a horse is preferable to the trainer over sluggishness (t. 34A.3), because its natural energy can be redirected through training. There seems to be no particular connection between “difficulty” and the Cynic “strength” (καρτερία, t. 22A) or “harshness” (σκληρότης, t. 34C-1 and 2 [adjectival form]; στρυφνότης, t. 33A), although t. 34A from the Cynic lore uses the horse analogy to describe Diogenes.

φιλικῶς: A truly “friendly” relationship is the highest level of affection for a Socratic, roughly equivalent with eroticism, but on the level of soul not body. In t. 110, Antisthenes is portrayed (by Xenophon) as an expert in φιλία. Patzer 1970:86 reads this sentence as the closure and resolution of the whole relationship between Socrates and Antisthenes as portrayed in Xenophon’s *Symposium*.

κρύπτωμεν: Manuscript variants here might imply that Socrates used a singular verb instead of a plural one. A surviving papyrus fragment that includes this passage implies another syllable before]ρύπτωμεν: see Huss 1999 (*Xenophons Symposion*):368, who notes (367) that papyrological evidence throws doubt overall on the accuracy of the medieval manuscripts of Xenophon.

οὐ ψυχῆς ἀλλ’ εὐμορφίας τῆς ἐμῆς: The immediate joke is, of course, that Socrates is considered ugly in body (Pl. *Sym.* 215a6–b4; Xen. *Sym.* 5.8–10). In

teasing Antisthenes, Socrates reverses what is presumably Antisthenes' own position, that Socratic love is properly for the soul and is not sexual: this is also the position Socrates expounds in his own voice in the speech on *eros* to follow (8.9–41). This teasing, since it is against Antisthenes and not against his position on *eros*, must have a complicated explanation that was more evident to the contemporary reader than it can be to us. Perhaps it is an indication that Antisthenes, in his adamance in denying corporeal love or in denying that Socrates had a corporeal love affair with any of his disciples (if Xenophon is playing off a scene between Socrates and Alcibiades that Antisthenes wrote), was insincere. But the message against corporeal pederasty is consistent throughout the *Symposium* (see 4.24–26, 8.12–40: on the broader range of views expressed in Xenophon's corpus overall, see Hindley 1999). It could, alternatively, be Xenophon's statement to the reader that although Xenophon's Socrates is about to restate Antisthenes' analysis and explanation of *eros*, this is not because Xenophon's Socrates is depending on Antisthenes but because Xenophon wishes, in his own right, to write the same message that Antisthenes did. The phrasing of the opposition does not pose “body” (σῶμα) against “soul” (ψυχή), such as we see in Socrates' upcoming distinction between Aphrodite Πάνδημος and Aprodite Οὐρανία (*Sym.* 8.10): “You would guess that also they send on their loves [separately], Public [Aphrodite] for bodies, and Heavenly [Aphrodite] for the soul and friendship and fine deeds” (εἰκάσαις δ' ἂν καὶ τοὺς ἔρωτας τὴν μὲν Πάνδημον τῶν σωμάτων ἐπιτέμπειν, τὴν δ' Οὐρανίαν τῆς ψυχῆς τε καὶ τῆς φιλίας καὶ τῶν καλῶν ἔργων). If this is significant, it could imply that Antisthenes rejected a simple way of separating body and soul, such as it appears in Plato (e.g., *Sym.* 181b4, 210b2; *Phaed.* 64c4–8): here the opposition is not between parts of the human but between the body's highest functioning capacity and its fine shape. Compare Socrates' beauty contest with Critobulus in *Xen. Sym.* 5.3–7, where body and soul are not opposed, but the beauty of various body parts is reduced to their functionality. In *Pl. Sym.* 218e3, Socrates, in diagnosing Alcibiades' obsession with himself, distinguishes between his own beauty (κάλλος) and the beautiful outward form (εὐμορφία) of Alcibiades. The term εὐμορφία is used by Plato only there and twice in the *Laws*.

14B. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.11.16–17 (Marchant)

(16) καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἐπισκώπτων τὴν αὐτοῦ ἀπραγμοσύνην, “Ἄλλ, ὦ Θεοδότῃ,” ἔφη, “οὐ πάνυ μοι ῥαδίον ἐστί σχολάσαι· καὶ γὰρ ἴδια πράγματα πολλὰ καὶ δημόσια παρέχει μοι ἀσχολίαν· εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ φίλοι μοι, αἱ οὔτε ἡμέρας οὔτε νυκτὸς ἀφ' αὐτῶν ἐάσουσί με ἀπιέναι, φίλτρα τε μανθάνουσαι παρ' ἐμοῦ καὶ ἐπωδάς.” (17) “Ἐπίστασαι γάρ,” ἔφη, “καὶ

ταῦτα, ὦ Σώκρατες;” “ἀλλὰ διὰ τί οἶει,” ἔφη, “Ἀπολλόδωρόν τε τόνδε καὶ Ἀντισθένη οὐδέποτε μου ἀπολείπεσθαι; διὰ τί δὲ καὶ Κέβητα καὶ Σιμμίαν Θήβηθεν παραγίγνεσθαι; εὖ ἴσθι ὅτι ταῦτα οὐκ ἄνευ πολλῶν φίλτρων τε καὶ ἐπωδῶν καὶ ὑγγων ἐστί.”

(16) And Socrates, making a joke of his own lack of business, said, “But, Theodote, it is not at all easy for me to get free time. I have a large amount of business, both private and public, that keeps me occupied. And I also have my girlfriends, who will let me be apart from them neither by day nor by night, and they are learning from me about love charms and songs of enchantment.” (17) “Then you are knowledgeable also in these things?” she said. “But why, do you think,” he said, “Apollodorus here and Antisthenes never leave my side? And why are Cebes and Simmias here from Thebes? Be assured that these situations do not occur without many love charms and songs of enchantment and binding spells.”

Context of Preservation

This is nearly the end of Xenophon’s episode staging Socrates’ encounter with the beautiful prostitute Theodote. On the tension between the “friendship” offered by Theodote and that between Socrates and his disciples, see Delatte 1933:148–61; Patzer 1970:55–56; Goldhill 1998.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes is paired with Apollodorus (known as narrator of Plato’s *Symposium* and the most expressive mourner at his death scene in *Phaedo*, as well as at Xen. *Apol.* 28 and elsewhere: see Nails 2002:39–40) as one of Socrates’ most persistent companions and his apprentice in the craft of friendship, which has erotic undertones.

Notes

(16) εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ φίλοι μοι: The feminine form of “friends,” which must refer to the four named males (see Goldhill 1998:121), shows that Socrates’ relationships to his disciples are comparable to his potential relationship with Theodote.

(17) Ἀπολλόδωρόν τε τόνδε καὶ Ἀντισθένη: Apollodorus is at Socrates’ side in the episode, whereas Antisthenes may not be present. Antisthenes possibly represents a different kind of close Socratic companion than Apollodorus, whose roles in Plato’s texts are not positive.

οὐκ ἄνευ πολλῶν φίλτρων τε καὶ ἐπωδῶν καὶ ὑγγων: These tools that the apprentices are learning are the same ones that captured them. On Antisthenes’ succumbing to Socrates’ discourse, see t. 12B, 12C, 17, 34A.

15A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.8 (Marcovich)

στρέψαντος αὐτοῦ τὸ διερρωγὸς τοῦ τρίβωνος εἰς τὸ προφανές,
 Σωκράτης ἰδὼν φησιν, “Ὅρῳ σου διὰ τοῦ τρίβωνος τὴν φιλοδοξίαν.”
 ante στρέψαντος add. μὴ in mg. P⁵ γρ

When he [Antisthenes] had turned the torn part of his outer garment into view, Socrates saw it and said, “I see your love of reputation through your outer garment.”

15B. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 2.36 (Marcovich)

= 148B DC

στρέψαντος δὲ Ἀντισθένης τὸ διερρωγὸς τοῦ τρίβωνος εἰς
 τοῦμφανές, “Ὅρῳ σου,” ἔφη, “διὰ τοῦ τρίβωνος τὴν κενοδοξίαν.”
 δὲ F : om. B P | διὰ τοῦ τρίβωνος τὴν φιλοδοξίαν codd. plur. : τὴν
 φιλοδοξίαν διὰ τοῦ τρίβωνος F

When Antisthenes had turned the torn part of his outer garment into view, he [Socrates] said, “I see your vainglory through your outer garment.”

15C. Aelian, *Historical Miscellany* 9.35 (Dilts)

= 148A DC

ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἰδὼν τὸν Ἀντισθένην τὸ διερρωγὸς τοῦ ἱματίου μέρος
 αἰεὶ ποιοῦντα φανερόν, “Οὐ παύσῃ,” ἔφη, “ἐγκαλλωπιζόμενος ἡμῖν;”

And Socrates, seeing that Antisthenes was always making the torn part of his cloak visible, said, “Won’t you stop showing off your pride for us?”

Context of Preservation

Diogenes preserves the anecdote twice, once in the biography of Socrates and once in the biography of Antisthenes, in a section covering his life in Athens (6.7–8). In Aelian, this is one of three scattered anecdotes featuring Antisthenes (see also t. 16, 34C-2), of which only t. 16 is friendly.

Importance of the Testimonium

The anecdote was fashioned by someone hostile to Cynicism, perhaps in the Peripatos or perhaps within the Socratic circle, by Aeschines. The Socratic possibility is based on Aelian’s general use of Aeschines: see t. 16.

Notes

τὸ διεργωγὸς τοῦ τρίβωνος (A-B)/τοῦ ἱματίου (C): On the terms τρίβων and ἱμάτιον for the philosopher's garment, see t. 22A. Not only does Antisthenes make do with the garment he has, but he flaunts the fact that he does so.
 φιλοδοξίαν (A)/κενοδοξίαν (B): This is a standard charge against the Cynics. (See t. 37C, 139B.)

16. Aelian, *Historical Miscellany* 2.11 (Dilts)

= 167 DC

Σωκράτης ἰδὼν κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν τριάκοντα τοὺς ἐνδόξους ἀναιρουμένους καὶ τοὺς βαθύτατα πλουτοῦντας ὑπὸ τῶν τυράννων ἐπιβουλευομένους, Ἀντισθένης φασὶ περιτυχόντα εἰπεῖν· “Μὴ τί σοι μεταμέλει ὅτι μέγα καὶ σεμνὸν οὐδὲν ἐγενόμεθα ἐν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τοιοῦτοι οἴους ἐν τῇ τραγῳδίᾳ τοὺς μονάρχους ὁρῶμεν, Ἀτρεάς τε ἐκείνους καὶ Θυέστας καὶ Ἀγαμέμνονας καὶ Αἰγίσθους; οὗτοι μὲν γὰρ ἀποσφαττόμενοι καὶ ἐκτραγωδούμενοι καὶ πονηρὰ δειπνα δειπνοῦντες ἐκάστοτε ἐκκαλύπτονται· οὐδεὶς δὲ οὕτως ἐγένετο τολμηρὸς οὐδὲ ἀναισχυντος τραγῳδίας ποιητῆς, ὥστε εἰσαγαγεῖν εἰς δρᾶμα ἀποσφαττόμενον χορόν.”

βαρύτατα τοὺς V x : βαθύτατα T. Smith : τοὺς del. Stephanus |
 δειπνοῦντες καὶ ἐσθιοντες codd. : δειπνίζοντες Albini : ἐστιῶντες
 Grasberger : καὶ ἐσθιοντες del. Hercher | ἐκκαλύπτονται V x Φ
 : ἐκκυκλοῦνται Casaubon | χορόν Holstenius : χοῖρον V x Φ :
 χειρώνακτα Casaubon : τὸν Ἴπρον Faber

They say that Socrates, when he saw that men of reputation were being destroyed under the rule of the Thirty and that those with the deepest wealth were being plotted against by the tyrants, happened to see Antisthenes and said, “Do you regret at all that in our lives we did not become grand and majestic, or the type of person such as the monarchs we see in tragedy, those figures of Atreus and Thyestes and Agamemnon and Aegisthus? For they are portrayed every time being slaughtered and given the tragic treatment and eating their wretched meals. But no poet of tragedy has been so bold and shameless as to bring into his drama a chorus being slaughtered.”

Context of Preservation

Aelian's anecdotes have no obvious ordering system. This is a complete anecdote. On the consistently favorable image of Socrates in Aelian, see Taylor 2008:336–39.

Importance of the Testimonium

If the anecdote has a basis in early Socratic literature, it is evidence that the metaphor of the world as a stage was developed already in the Socratic circle. The idea that social positions—and possibly the more essential aspects of the “self” as well—are performances on a metaphorical stage appears in many anecdotes of Diogenes of Sinope, in statements attributed to Bion of Borysthenes (fr. 16A Kindstrand) and Aristo of Chios (Diog. Laer. 7.160), and in the so-called four-personae theory apparently developed by Panaetius and attested in Cicero (*De off.* 1.107–21) and Epictetus (e.g., *Dis.* 3.2.4, 2.22.27; the many passages adduced in De Lacy 1979:171 and Sorabji 2006:161–63). Dümmler 1889:3 associated this cluster of evidence in support of Antisthenes’ authorship of the world-as-stage metaphor. Brancacci 2002:71–78 places Antisthenes centrally in the history of the metaphor. See also t. 208.20.

Notes

κατὰ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῶν τριάκοντα: This specification of setting under the Thirty (404–403 BCE) seems to indicate that Aelian has a fourth-century source for his anecdote. A plausible source would be a work of Aeschines, Aelian’s main source for Socratic anecdotes. (See t. 15C and 34C-2, the other two cases where Aelian mentions Antisthenes, both in hostile anecdotes.) If so, this is the clearest example, after Xenophon’s texts, of such a use of Antisthenes as character in Socratic literature by others. Xenophon also might use an image of Antisthenes shaped by Aeschines (see notes on t. 13A, 14A). Dümmler (followed by Declava Caizzi ad loc.) thinks Aelian takes the anecdote directly from a text by Antisthenes. An ultimate origin of this material in Antisthenes’ writing, however Aelian received it, is supported by the recurrence of the idea in Dio’s *Oration* 13 (see t. 208.20) and in Epictetus, who integrates thoroughly the Cynic tradition (see t. 34E) but never mentions Aeschines.

17. Philostratus, *Life of Apollonius of Tyana* 4.25.1 (Kayser)

παθὼν δὲ πρὸς τὸν Ἀπολλώνιον, ὅπερ φασὶ τὸν Ἀντισθένην πρὸς τὴν τοῦ Σωκράτους σοφίαν παθεῖν, εἶπετο αὐτῷ.

And when he [Demetrius the Cynic] experienced before Apollonius what they say Antisthenes experienced before the wisdom of Socrates, he followed him.

Context of Preservation

Apollonius is amid his travels through Greece, collecting converts. He meets Demetrius in Corinth. On the likely fictionality of the episodes, see Billerbeck 1979:52–53.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes seems to be remembered as the most passionate convert to Socrates. Philostratus has another Antisthenes in his novel, a youth from Paros who is prevented from becoming the pupil of Apollonius, on advice from the Homeric Achilles, whom Apollonius has just met at Ilium (4.11–12). The mixing of “Antisthenes” with Homeric heroes might suggest that this character is his invention; if so, it could show that Philostratus associated Antisthenes very closely with lore about teachers and pupils. On Achilles’ role as a pupil in Antisthenes, see t. 95.

Notes

ὅπερ φασι τὸν Ἀντισθένην . . . παθεῖν: This tradition seems more dramatic than the account in Diogenes Laertius (t. 12A) but might be related to Antisthenes’ ἔρως for Socrates (t. 14A).

18. Xenophon, *Symposium* 2.9–10 (Marchant)

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης εἶπεν· “Ἐν πολλοῖς μὲν, ὦ ἄνδρες, καὶ ἄλλοις δῆλον καὶ ἐν οἷς δ’ ἡ παῖς ποιεῖ ὅτι ἡ γυναικεία φύσις οὐδὲν χείρων τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρὸς οὕσα τυγχάνει, ῥώμης δὲ καὶ ἰσχύος δεῖται. ὥστε εἴ τις ὑμῶν γυναικα ἔχει, θαρρῶν διδασκέτω ὅ τι βούλοιτ’ ἂν αὐτῇ ἐπισταμένη χρῆσθαι.” καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης, “Πῶς οὖν,” ἔφη, “ὦ Σώκρατες, οὕτω γινώσκων οὐ καὶ σὺ παιδεύεις Ξανθίππην, ἀλλὰ χρῆ γυναικὶ τῶν οὐσῶν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τῶν γεγεννημένων καὶ τῶν ἐσομένων χαλεπωτάτῃ;”
 δ’ codd. : δὴ Schenk | χείρων F Q R :
 χεῖρον cet. | ῥώμης Lange : γνώμης codd.

And Socrates said, “It is clear both in many other situations and in what the young lady is doing here that the female nature turns out to be in no way worse than that of the man, but lacks power and strength. So if any of you has a wife, let him take courage and teach her whatever he would like to treat her as knowing.” And Antisthenes said, “How is it, then, Socrates, if you know this, that for your own part you do not educate Xanthippe, but you deal with a woman who is the most difficult of all who exist, and, I think, of all who have existed or will exist?”

Context of Preservation

In ch. 2 of the *Symposium*, preliminary to the central speeches of the diners, Xenophon draws a distinction between Socratic pleasures and virtues and those offered by the professional entertainers. Socrates and Antisthenes watch the hired dancer juggle twelve spinning hoops while she dances, and Socrates

notes her skill in calculating how high to throw each hoop so that she can catch it in the rhythm of her dance. A serious discussion of theses about virtue is stimulated by the performance of the popular entertainers: this is the Socratic enhancement. See t. 103A–B.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes apparently followed Socrates in claiming that the virtue of a man and a woman are the same, a thesis that was reconsidered by the Stoic Cleanthes (Diog. Laert. 7.175) and debated in Roman times, according to the evidence of Musonius Rufus. (See t. 134r.) The passage might also suggest that Antisthenes helped to transmit the image of Xanthippe as a shrewish consort, but the evidence is divided.

Notes

ἡ γυναικεία φύσις: The force of φύσις probably lies in the natural or perhaps bodily based capacity of the female before education or other enculturation. Compare the phrase εὖφυστάταις γυναιξί (women best in nature), whom Antisthenes recommends as mating partners (t. 58). Whereas Diogenes Laertius (t. 134r) attributes to Antisthenes the identity of virtue of a man and a woman, which is probably the result of education, this passage claims the equivalence of nature, before education. We might assume that the full argument was that the same nature, given the same education, acquires the same virtue. A Socratic debate on the likeness in nature or φύσις between males and females is evident from Pl. *Rep.* 5 453a–455a, where an analogy with animals secures the equality of female and male natures, apart from the fact that the female gives birth (τίκτειν) and the male copulates (ὀχεύειν). **οὐδὲν χείρων τῆς τοῦ ἀνδρός:** When Aristotle takes up this debate against the Socratics, he reasserts the traditional view that the male and female are different in mental as well as physical nature: in *Pol.* 1.13 1260a20–23, Aristotle attributes the view that the male and the female are equal in virtue—which is analyzed as σωφροσύνη, ἀνδρεία, and δικαιοσύνη (temperance, courage, and justice)—to “Socrates,” presumably citing from Plato’s *Meno* (72d4–73c8), and rejects it. In *NE* 8.7 1158b11–19, he says that friendship between unequal persons has many kinds, depending on the kind of virtue held by the parties, such as a man versus a woman. In explicating the debate, the Aristotelian commentator Aspasius (second century CE: see t. 120) summarizes an argument of “the Socratics” that might be traceable to Antisthenes (as proposed by Barnes 1999:29). According to Aspasius’ commentary (177.3–7), ἐρωτώσι δὲ τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον καὶ μάλιστα οἱ Σωκρατικοί. “Ἄρα τὸν μὲν ἄνδρα χρὴ δίκαιον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ γυναῖκα ἄδικον;” “Οὐ δῆτα.” “Τί δέ; τὸν μὲν ἄνδρα σώφρονα, τὴν δὲ γυναῖκα ἀκόλαστον;” “Οὐδὲ τοῦτο.” οὕτω δὲ καθ’ ἐκάστην ἐπιόντες ἀρετὴν καὶ λαβόντες ὅτι δεῖ καὶ τὸν

ἄνδρα καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα πάσας ἔχειν τὰς ἀρετάς, συμπεραίνονται ὅτι ἡ αὐτὴ ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἀρετή. (And they inquire in this way, and foremost the Socratics: “Is it right that the man is just, but the woman unjust?” “Surely not.” “What then? Is the man self-controlled but the woman undisciplined?” “Nor this.” And going through each virtue in this way and assuming that both the man and the woman must have all the virtues, they draw the conclusion that the virtue of a man and a woman is the same.) The hypothetical argument is abridged, and there are no secure grounds for the attribution to Antisthenes (Barnes claims a diatribe style), but there are also none to reject it. (That it is Cynic might be supposed from the argument attributed to Hipparchia in Diog. Laert. 6.97.) Its strategy, to judge from this report, is an indifference argument put in deontological terms: if it is “right” for a man to be just, it is equally “right” for a woman, presumably since both are in the same ethical situation. (On the ubiquity of indifference arguments in the classical period, see Makin 1993, who treats mostly “epistemological” or reason-based arguments, but the form seems common to this one.) Aristotle and the Socratics agree that both women and men have the individual virtues, and the disagreement is over the degree of the individual virtues and how they constitute general virtue. The “Socratics” cited here seem to think that since women need to meet the same ethical requirements as men, their sum of virtue is the same.

οὔσα τυγχάνει: This circumlocution might be intended to reject a divine or other explanation for the equality. Observations are evidence for the equality, which turns out to exist, even though it need not.

ῥώμης δὲ καὶ ἰσχύος δέεται: The term γνώμης (judgment), unanimous in the manuscripts, should probably be replaced with Lange’s conjecture ῥώμης (physical strength), because (1) the dancer has just been praised through a specifically intellectual term, συνεκμαιρομένη (“having conjectured at the same time,” while she dances, how high to throw the hoops so that she can catch them in rhythm); (2) Socrates’ next comment shows that he is optimistic about the teachability of women’s minds (ἐπισταμένη is also strongly intellectual); and (3) a near parallel in Pl. *Rep.* 5 455e1 and 456a11 appeals only to the physical inferiority of the woman (she is ἀσθενεστέρα than the man; one woman can be ἰσχυροτέρα over another). ἰσχύς implies mental strength sooner than physical in Antisthenes (t. 134c, 54.13) and so possibly throughout Socratic literature: but if mental strength is implied in *Rep.* 5 456a11, the metaphor is not unfolded. Also in Xen. *Oec.* 7.23, the female has the “lesser body” (ἥττον τὸ σῶμα) but is presumed to be mentally able to match the man.

αὐτῇ ἐπισταμένη χρῆσθαι: The verb χρῆσθαι as used here is synonymous with σύνειναι and ὁμιλεῖν (see t. 22A, 100A, 187.6), in which both Socrates and Antisthenes are said to be experts; and like these other verbs, it can have

a sexual connotation. The word must also be related to the ethical χρήσις mentioned repeatedly in Antisthenes' literary remains and Socratic literature. (See t. 187.4 note.) In this phrase might be buried the idea that an educated wife is both a resource or instrument for the husband and also a knower in her own right, who becomes an ethical partner through her knowledge. (Penelope could have been Antisthenes' model for this: see t. 188.) Xenophon might have held less egalitarian views on the subject than Antisthenes did: his *Oeconomicus* portrays a wife whose independent virtue remains subordinate to that of her husband.

οὐ καὶ σὺ παιδεύεις Ξανθίππην: Antisthenes possibly had a special hostility toward Xanthippe, who, according to later Peripatetic lore, was not the legal wife of Socrates but a permanent female companion and might have lived with Socrates while he was married to his legal wife, Myrto. (See Diog. Laert. 2.26 and SSR IB 48, from Aristoxenus.) If so, this might be parallel to his opposition to Pericles' companion Aspasia, which is based on sexual distraction (t. 141–44); compare also his discussion of Calypso and Penelope (t. 188). But another version of the Xanthippe story (Gellius, *Attic Nights* 1.17.1–3; Diog. Laert. 2.36–37) casts Alcibiades in the role of Antisthenes, and this must be an episode with a literary history. For Xenophon's replacement of Alcibiades with Antisthenes, compare t. 14A; possibly Xenophon assigns to Antisthenes roles that Alcibiades held in Antisthenes' own background text. τῶν οὐσῶν, οἶμαι δὲ καὶ τῶν γεγενημένων καὶ τῶν ἐσομένων χαλεπωτάτη: This phrasing might suggest that Antisthenes was attentive to comparisons of individuals across time. The three-part expression is common in archaic poetry for the events knowable to a Muse or prophet. These participles indicate not a series of events but a collection of individual women (all women, for all time) who constitute the field for comparison and evaluation of Xanthippe. Antisthenes is not claiming to know them, as a Muse would, but he uses the expression rhetorically to frame his statement about Xanthippe. On Antisthenes' possible attention to distribution of individual cases across time, compare t. 151A, 194 notes.

19. Maximus of Tyre, *Lectures* 1.9.275–80 (Trapp)

= 131 DC

ἡγεῖτο γάρ, οἶμαι, ὁ Σωκράτης Αἰσχίνου μὲν φιλοσοφῆσαντος καὶ Ἀντισθένους ὄνασθαι ἂν ὀλίγα τὴν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν· μᾶλλον δὲ μηδένα τῶν τότε, πλὴν ἡμᾶς τοὺς ἔπειτα, κατὰ τὴν μνήμην τῶν λόγων· εἰ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐφιλοσόφει, ἢ Κριτίας ἢ Κριτόβουλος ἢ Καλλίας, οὐδὲν ἂν τῶν δεινῶν τοῖς τότε Ἀθηναίοις ξυνέπεσεν.

μᾶλλον . . . λόγων del. Markland

For I believe Socrates thought that the city of the Athenians would benefit little from the philosophizing of Aeschines and Antisthenes: or, rather, nobody from those times [would benefit], but only we of a later age, from the preservation of their words. But if Alcibiades had practiced philosophy, or Critias or Critobulus or Callias, none of the terrible things would have befallen the Athenians of his time.

Context of Preservation

This passage comes in the final sections (9–10) of the oration placed first in modern editions of Maximus and probably intended as his protreptic exhortation to philosophy and promotion of himself as philosophical teacher. (See Trapp 1997:3–4.) Maximus combats the notion that the philosopher should be poor: even Socrates had wealthy pupils and probably favored them, since they had power.

Importance of the Testimonium

Maximus believes that Aeschines and Antisthenes made no practical impact on their times, whereas the Socratic associates who made a practical impact failed to use philosophy. Maximus cites or alludes to Aeschines repeatedly (Trapp 1997:13 n.33), whereas Antisthenes is not otherwise mentioned.

Notes

εἰ δὲ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐφιλοσόφει: This is the major question of the Socratic literature on Alcibiades, to which Aeschines and Antisthenes contributed. (See t. 41A title 10.6.) Maximus seems to consider Aeschines and Antisthenes as Socratic disciples on a level with Alcibiades, not as authors of his story. Κριτίας ἢ Κριτόβουλος ἢ Καλλίας: This list is not matched in extant literature and might have been constructed for its alliteration, to balance the three names beginning with alpha. Maximus seems to have found his characters in Xenophon (Alcibiades in *Mem.* 1.2.39–48, Critias in *Mem.* 1.2.29–38, Callias in *Sym.* 8.37–41, Critobulus in *Mem.* 1.3.8–15 and *Sym.* 4.10–28), although lost Socratic literature might be in the background.

20A. Plato, *Phaedo* 59b5–c6 (Strachan)

= 132A DC

ΕΧ. Ἐτυχον δέ, ὦ Φαίδων, τίνες παραγενόμενοι;
 ΦΑΙΔ. Οὗτός τε δὴ ὁ Ἀπολλόδωρος τῶν ἐπιχωρίων παρῆν καὶ
 Κριτόβουλος καὶ ὁ πατὴρ αὐτοῦ καὶ ἔτι Ἑρμογένης καὶ Ἐπιγένης
 καὶ Αἰσχίνης καὶ Ἀντισθένης· ἦν δὲ καὶ Κτήσιππος ὁ Παιανιεὺς καὶ
 Μενέξενος καὶ ἄλλοι τινὲς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων. Πλάτων δὲ οἶμαι ἡσθένει.

EX. Ξένοι δέ τινες παρήσαν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Ναί, Σιμμίας γε ὁ Θηβαῖος καὶ Κέβης καὶ Φαιδώνδης καὶ
Μεγαρόθεν Εὐκλείδης τε καὶ Τερψίων.

EX. Τί δέ; Ἀρίστιππος καὶ Κλεόμβροτος παρεγένοντο;

ΦΑΙΔ. Οὐ δῆτα· ἐν Αἰγίνῃ γὰρ ἐλέγοντο εἶναι.

EX. Ἄλλος δέ τις παρῆν;

ΦΑΙΔ. Σχεδόν τι οἶμαι τούτους παραγενέσθαι.

Κριτόβουλος T V : ὁ Κριτόβουλος β W P Q S | αὐτοῦ β T : αὐτοῦ
Κρίτων δ | Σιμμίας γε β W P V : Σιμμίας τε Q : Σιμμίας τέ γε T : om. S |
Φαιδώνδης T Q Λ B² : Φαιδωνίδης β W P S V Λ^h

Echecrates: And who happened to be there, Phaedo?

Phaedo: Of the natives, this Apollodorus was there, and Critobulus and his father, and also Hermogenes and Epigenes and Aeschines and Antisthenes. And there was also Ctesippus the Paionian and Menexenus and some others of the natives. But I think Plato was sick.

Echecrates: And were any foreigners present?

Phaedo: Yes, Simmias the Theban, of course, and Cebes, and Phaedondas, and Euclides and Terpsion from Megara.

Echecrates: What about Aristippus and Cleombrotus? Were they there?

Phaedo: Actually they were not. Someone said they were in Aegina.

Echecrates: Was anyone else there?

Phaedo: I think these are the ones, more or less, who were there.

Context of Preservation

The friends present for Socrates' death, according to the speaker Phaedo near the opening of Plato's text, can be divided into the natives and the foreigners. There were also notable absences, Plato himself and Aristippus along with a friend, who were "said to be" in nearby Aegina (a hostile note, according to later tradition: Diog. Laert. 3.36, also reflected in Demetrius, *On Style* 288). Aristippus is remembered in later tradition as Socrates' hedonist successor in opposition to the ascetic Antisthenes (see t. 33A–B, 206–7).

Importance of the Testimonium

This is the only explicit reference to Antisthenes in the corpus of Plato, although it is likely that Plato was mindful of Antisthenes' role in contemporary Athenian intellectual life throughout his dialogues. Beyond the acknowledgment that Antisthenes was a member of Socrates' inner circle, his presence implies that Antisthenes "heard" the upcoming accounts of immortality, the philosophical life, the Forms, and the dualist world directly

from Socrates, according to Plato's presentation, without indicating that they were problematic (unless the unnamed interlocutor who intervenes at 103a4 is supposed to be recognizable as Antisthenes). Burnet (1911:xliv), proposes that the acquiescence of the companions is endorsement of the historicity of Socrates' views as reported here: "Men of such divergent views as Antisthenes and Euclides of Megara are present, but no one asks for a proof of it (the theory of Forms) or even for an explanation." These doctrines are now more commonly understood as products of Plato's thought as it developed after the death of Socrates (e.g., Vlastos 1991:66–80); if this is true, there must be heavy irony in Antisthenes' silent presence.

Notes

τῶν ἐπιχωρίων: Plato distinguishes "locals" from the "guests" (Ξένοι), rather than calling them, for example, "Athenians." This possibly means that the locals included non-citizens, in which case Antisthenes' status might determine this choice of description. But Hermogenes is a candidate for non-citizen sooner than Antisthenes (Nails 2002:162–64); moreover, Plato might avoid using the term "Athenians" for Socrates' circle, since it was the "Athenians" who condemned him.

20B. Letters of the Socratics, no. 14.9 (Köhler)

(SSR IH 1, VA 207)

Αἰσχίνης Ξενοφῶντι. . . . (9) τῶν δὲ φίλων παρήμεν αὐτῷ τελευτῶντι ἐγὼ καὶ Τερψίων καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος καὶ Φαίδων καὶ Ἀντισθένης καὶ Ἑρμογένης καὶ Κτήσιππος, Πλάτων δὲ καὶ Κλέομβροτος καὶ Ἀρίστιππος ὑστέρουν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλάτων ἐνόσει, τῷ δὲ ἑτέρῳ περὶ Αἴγινα ἦσθην. ὡς δ' ἔπει το φάρμακον, ἐπέστελλεν ἡμῖν τῷ Ἀσκληπιῷ θῦσαι ἀλεκτρυόνα· ὀφείλειν γὰρ αὐτῷ κατ' εὐχὴν τινα, ὁπότε ἡσθένει ἀφικόμενος ἀπὸ τῆς ἐπὶ Δηλῷ μάχης. δακρύσαντες οὖν μετὰ τινος θαυμασμοῦ ἐκκομίζοντες αὐτὸν κατεθάπτομεν, ὡς τότε ὁ καιρὸς ἐδίδου καὶ αὐτὸς ἐβούλετο.

δὲ ἑτέρῳ von Fritz : ἑτέρῳ δὲ P G

Aeschines to Xenophon: . . . (9) When he was dying, we among his friends were there: I and Terpsion and Apollodorus and Phaedo and Antisthenes and Hermogenes and Ctesippus; but Plato and Cleombrotus and Aristippus missed it. For Plato was sick, and the other two were in Aegina. And when he drank the drug, he told us to sacrifice a cock to Asclepius. For he said he owed it according to a vow, when he was ill after returning from the battle at Delium. So we cried, with a certain amazement, and we carried him out and buried him, as the occasion then granted and as he himself wished.

Context of Preservation

On the Socratic letters, see t. 206.

Importance of the Testimonium

This is included because lore about the battle of Delium was transmitted by the minor Socratics and perhaps Antisthenes. (See Gigon 1947:173–78 and t. 200.) The majority of this text compresses Plato’s *Phaedo*, but the interpretation of the cock for Asclepius is added.

Notes

ἐκκομίζοντες αὐτὸν κατεθάπτομεν: In *Phaed.* 115c3–116a1, Plato plays down Socrates’ burial. See t. 84C.

21. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.9–10 (Marcovich)

= 133 DC

αὐτὸς δὲ καὶ Ἀνύτῳ τῆς φυγῆς αἴτιος γενέσθαι δοκεῖ καὶ Μελήτῳ τοῦ θανάτου. Ποντικοῖς γὰρ νεανίσκοις κατὰ κλέος τοῦ Σωκράτους ἀφιγμένοις περιτυχὼν ἀπήγαγεν αὐτοὺς πρὸς τὸν Ἄνυτον, εἰπὼν ἐν ᾗθει σοφώτερον εἶναι τοῦ Σωκράτους. ἐφ’ ᾧ διαγανακτήσαντας τοὺς περιεστῶτας ἐκδιῶξαι αὐτόν.

δὲ F : om. B P | γενέσθαι B P : εἶναι F | μελήτῳ B P¹ : μελίτῳ F P²
Q | τοῦ Σωκράτους F : τοῦ om. cet. | αὐτοὺς om. F | τὸν Ἄνυτον codd.
plur. : τὸν om. F | εἰπὼν om. F | ἐκδιῶξαι codd. plur. : διῶξαι F

And he seems to have been responsible for the exile of Anytus and the execution of Meletus. For he once met some young men from Pontos who had come [to Athens] because of the fame of Socrates, and he led them to Anytus, saying, tongue-in-cheek, that he was wiser than Socrates. The bystanders became agitated by this and drove him out.

Context of Preservation

This anecdote comes late in Diogenes’ biography of Antisthenes.

Importance of the Testimonium

The episode is probably fictional, but the anecdote might be modeled on a text Antisthenes wrote or one in which he was a character. Anytus was apparently an interlocutor in a lost Socratic dialogue titled “On Cobblers and Shoemakers” (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 55.22). Such a dialogue, concerning education in virtue, might be reflected in Xenophon’s *Apology* and Plato’s *Meno* as well as later texts. See Dittmar 1912:91–97; Gigon 1947:74–93; Brancacci 2000:248.

If Antisthenes was author, Dio knew the text under a title not in the catalog (t. 41A). The titles on virtues in the third *tomos* have seemed the most likely candidates.

Notes

Ἀνύτῳ τῆς φυγῆς αἴτιος: The exile of Anytus probably never occurred: one Anytus, apparently the same man, is still active in Athenian politics in 396 (*Hell. Oxy.* 6.2).

Μελήτω τοῦ θανάτου: The execution of Meletus by stoning is reported in the *Suda*. This shows that such a story was told in Socratic lore.

Ποντικοῖς γὰρ νεανίσκοις: The young men from Sinope surely include or are modeled on stories of Diogenes of Sinope. The main tradition about Diogenes is that he was driven into exile from Sinope and arrived in Athens alone. In the letters of ps.-Diogenes, Diogenes comes to Athens with a group of friends and encounters Antisthenes (t. 136B). A related story (t. 84B–C) speaks of a single Spartan who came to Athens seeking Socrates.

σοφώτερον . . . τοῦ Σωκράτους: The character Anytus in Plato's *Meno* is skeptical that there could be any professional “Sophist” worth paying to teach virtue. Just as Plato ironically portrays Anytus taking a superior stance to Socrates, so might have Antisthenes.

διαγανακτήσαντας τοὺς περιστώτας: In the fiction, Antisthenes acts not directly but by staging a debate that affects the bystanders. This is a Socratic tactic reported by Xenophon (e.g., *Mem.* 2.5 = t. 110; compare *Mem.* 4.2.3–6), and it is plausible that it appeared in works of the minor Socratics.

Antisthenes after Socrates

testimonia 22–40

22A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.13–15 (Marcovich)

= 136A, 3, 135A, 135B DC

[= ps.-Eudocia, *Violarium* no. 96 “Antisthenes” p. 95.13–96.5 Flach]

(13.) διελέγετο δ' ἐν τῷ Κυνοσάργει γυμνασίῳ μικρὸν ἄπωθεν τῶν πυλῶν· ὅθεν τινὲς καὶ τὴν κυνικὴν ἐντεῦθεν ὀνομασθῆναι. αὐτὸς τ' ἐπεκαλεῖτο Ἀπλοκύν. καὶ πρῶτος ἐδίπλωσε τὸν τρίβωνα, καθά φησι Διοκλῆς, καὶ μόνῳ αὐτῷ ἐχρήτο· βάκτρον τ' ἀνέλαβε καὶ πήραν. πρῶτον δὲ καὶ Νεάνθης φησὶ ἀπλῶσαι θοίματιον (Σωσικράτης δ' ἐν τρίτῃ Διαδοχῶν Διόδωρον τὸν Ἀσπένδιον) καὶ πῶγωνα καθεῖναι καὶ βάκτρῳ καὶ πήρᾳ χρῆσθαι. (14.) Τοῦτον μόνον ἐκ πάντων <τῶν> Σωκρατικῶν Θεόπομπος ἐπαινεῖ καὶ φησι δεινόν τ' εἶναι καὶ δι' ὁμιλίας ἐμμελοῦς ὑπαγαγέσθαι πάνθ' ὄντινον. δῆλον δ' ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων κακ τοῦ Ξενοφώντος Συμποσίου. δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τῆς ἀνδρωδεστάτης Στωικῆς κατάρξαι· ὅθεν καὶ Ἀθηναῖος ὁ ἐπιγραμματοποιὸς περὶ αὐτῶν φησιν οὕτως·

ὦ Στοικῶν μύθων εἰδήμονες, ὦ πανάριστα
δόγματα ταῖς ἱεραῖς ἐνθέμενοι σελίσιν,
τὰν ἀρετὰν ψυχᾶς ἀγαθὸν μόνον· ἅδε γὰρ ἀνδρῶν
μούνα καὶ βιοτὰν ῥύσατο καὶ πόλιας.
σαρκὸς δ' ἡδυπάθημα φίλον τέλος ἀνδράσιν ἄλλοις,
ἢ μία τῶν Μνήμης ἦνυσε θυγατέρων.

(15.) Οὗτος ἡγήσατο καὶ τῆς Διογένους ἀπαθείας καὶ τῆς Κράττους ἐγκρατείας καὶ τῆς Ζήνωνος καρτερίας, αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενος τῇ πόλει τὰ θεμέλια. ὁ δὲ Ξενοφὼν ἥδιστον μὲν εἶναι περὶ τὰς ὁμιλίας φησὶν αὐτόν, ἐγκρατέστατον δὲ περὶ τᾶλλα.

(13) πρῶτον Frobenius : πρῶτος B P F | ἀπλῶσαι B P F : διπλῶσαι Salmasius | καὶ βάκτρῳ καὶ πήρᾳ B P et Suda : καὶ πείρα καὶ βάκτρῳ F | χρῆσθαι B P F : χρήσασθαι Suda (14) τῶν Eudocia : om. B P

F | ὑπαγαγέσθαι B P : ὑπάγεσθαι F | πάνθ' P F : παρ' B | Στοικῶν
 Marcovich e *Pal. Anth.* : Στωικῶν B P F | πανάριστα B P² Q πανάριστοι
 P¹ F | ἡδυπάθημα B P F : ἀδυπάθημα Brunck | ἡ B P F : ἄ Brunck (15)
 πόλει B P F : πολιτεία Reiske

(13) He used to hold conversations in the Cynosarges gymnasium, a small distance from the city gates. For this reason some [believe] also that the Cynic movement was named from that location. And he himself was called “*Haplokuon*” [Simple Dog]. He was the first to double his under garment, according to what Diocles says, and he used this only. And he took up the staff and the wallet. Neanthes also says he was the first to use his outer garment only (but Sosikrates in the third book of his *Successions* says that Diodorus of Aspendus was the first) and to grow a long beard and to use a staff and wallet. (14) Theopompus praises him alone of all the Socratics and says he was clever [at speaking] and able to lead on anyone at all by means of his harmonious company. This is clear from his writings and from the *Symposium* of Xenophon. He seems to have founded the most manly tradition of the Stoic school. For this reason also Athenaeus the writer of epigrams says the following about them:

Oh experts in the Stoic stories, oh you who set down
 The finest principles on your holy pages,
 The virtue of the soul is the only good. For this alone
 Supports the life of men and their cities.
 But one of the daughters of Memory has made
 Luxury of the body the chosen aim for other men.

(15) He was the predecessor also of the indifference of Diogenes and the self-control of Crates and the strength of Zeno, setting down himself the foundations for the city. Xenophon says that he was most pleasant in his personal associations, and most self-controlled in other things.

Context of Preservation

The sayings and anecdotes of Antisthenes end in section 13 of Diogenes' sixth book (see t. 134), and he appends this discussion of Antisthenes' position in the history of the Cynics, Socratics, and Stoics before concluding the biography with the catalog of writings (t. 41A) and necrology with epigram (t. 37 and 38A). Compare t. 135A, from the end of the sixth book. There is no explicit notice of any “students” (μαθηταί) of Antisthenes, as there is for other figures (Diogenes at 6.76, Crates at 6.93, Zeno of Citium at 7.36–38): these were possibly accounted for in the earlier conversion anecdote (t. 12A).

Importance of the Testimonium

This is the oldest source for most of the information transmitted, apart from the Cynic epistles. Diogenes' citation of his sources allows us to trace some of the Hellenistic debate on the origin of the Cynics and their relationship to the Stoics. Dudley's thesis (1937:1–15) that Antisthenes was fully distinct from the Cynics takes support from the criteria disputed in this passage. On Dudley, his reasoning, and the scholarly background to his thesis (esp. Delatte 1922), see Döring 1995 and Kalouche 1999:13. On the larger question of Antisthenes' Cynicism see Giannantoni 1993 and Long 1996 ("The Socratic Tradition").

Notes

(13) διελέγετο δ' ἐν τῷ Κυνοσάργει γυμνασίῳ: The Cynosarges gymnasium was allegedly a site open to "illegitimate" Athenians (νόθοι) and other metics, in a sanctuary sacred to Heracles. Hence it has seemed appropriate to Antisthenes' traditional profile, and a coherent account of the origins of the Cynic school from this location of Antisthenes' alleged school was standard in the nineteenth century. (See Decleva Caizzi 1966:120–22.) But skepticism now prevails, especially under doubts that Antisthenes was the first "Cynic" to claim that name. (See SSR v.4:222–26; Billot 1993; Branham and Goulet-Cazé 1996:4–5.) In late antiquity, one explanation for the name "Cynic" derived it from the Cynosarges gymnasium, but its source in the nickname "Dog" was highly preferred (t. 22B). Socrates held philosophical conversation in gymnasiums according to Plato's depictions (*Lysis*, *Charmides*), and a similar location can be imagined for Antisthenes on occasion, even if there was no fixed location for a school. The Cynosarges is featured as a destination for Socrates in the ps.-Platonic *Axiochus* (364a1 and 372a15, the first and last sentences), although the discussion takes place while he is on his way. αὐτός τ' ἐπεκαλεῖτο Ἄπλοκύνων: Antisthenes liked to assign nicknames (see t. 41A titles 1.5 and 6.3 comments, 143A, 147) and might have attracted nicknames to himself: two possibilities are in t. 115 and 38B. Thus it is plausible that he received this nickname, which might have been hostile. Diogenes Laertius implies that the name was given during his life. It is also plausible that it was given after his death, in reference to the nickname Diogenes of Sinope had definitely acquired, ὁ Κύων. On the possibility that Aristotle refers to Antisthenes as "the dog," see Goulet-Cazé 1996 and t. 51A notes; but in t. 150A, Aristotle refers to "the Antisthenians," not "the Cynics." On the connections between the prefix Ἄπλο- (simple) and Antisthenes' theory of language, see Porter 1996. On the possibility that references to "dogs" in the Platonic corpus, specifically in *Euthydemus*, might have special connections with Antisthenes, see Rappe 2000.

πρῶτος ἐδίπλωσε τὸν τρίβωνα: The origin of the Cynic costume—which consisted in (1) a single, doubled garment (rather than the traditional dress with two separate pieces) for warmth and modesty, (2) a staff as symbol of authority to speak, and (3) a wallet as symbol for itinerancy and self-sufficiency—had been disputed since at least the second century BCE, according to Diogenes here. Two Hellenistic historians of philosophy, Diocles of Magnesia (first or second century BCE) and Neanthes of Cyzicus (third century BCE), credit Antisthenes with inventing the folding of the single garment, although they name the garment differently and probably describe the innovation differently (depending whether the manuscripts’ reading ἀπλῶσαι or the traditional conjecture διπλῶσαι is read in the clause for Neanthes). Diocles calls it a τρίβων, a term used originally of Spartan clothing and otherwise mostly in reference to philosophers who were apparently accustomed to wear out their clothes (etymology τρίβω, “rub”). It must have replaced the fancier, originally Ionian, linen tunic, the χιτῶν, such as Antisthenes implies (in a speech attributed to him by Xenophon, t. 82.38) he does not need. Neanthes, who might have written the earliest treatment of this question, calls the garment a ἱμάτιον, an outer cloak such as an Athenian might have worn over the χιτῶν, and this squares with the instruction Antisthenes reportedly gave to Diogenes (t. 34F). Whether Neanthes said Antisthenes was the first to use only the cloak or the first to double the cloak, the point is the same, denial of the need for two garments. Both writers apparently add that Antisthenes invented also the use of the staff and wallet. (Such is the sense of Marcovich’s text. It is possible to repunctuate such that Sosicrates attributed these accoutrements to Diodorus, not Neanthes to Antisthenes: this is the reading of Dudley 1937:6.) In an anecdote reported twice by Diogenes, Socrates chides Antisthenes for always turning the torn part of his τρίβων toward view, hence making a show of his frugality (t. 15A–B); Aelian’s variant refers to the ἱμάτιον (t. 15C). Antisthenes has at least two rivals for the claim of inventing the doubled or single garment: in the present passage, Diogenes cites Sosicrates of Rhodes (second century BCE) for attributing the innovation to Diodorus of Aspendus, the Pythagorean figure from the fourth century BCE, and this attribution is confirmed by references in Middle Comedy (Delatte 1922; Dudley 1937:6–7; Burkert 1972:202–4). Diogenes Laertius credits also Diogenes of Sinope in 6.22, where he cites his sources vaguely at first (κατά τινας) and then specifies them as three little-known figures who might have been characters in a dialogue by the Peripatetic Theophrastus (as argued in von Fritz 1926 and endorsed in Dudley 1937:6–7). The assumption that the Cynic costume had one definite inventor might be Hellenistic or Peripatetic. Socrates himself was well known for the simple dress made necessary by his neglect of the pursuit of wealth,

as we know from Plato's *Symposium* (174b3–4). In a climactic scene in that text (219b5–c1) Alcibiades throws his own ἱμάτιον around Socrates' body because Socrates has none, and then Alcibiades puts his hands under Socrates' τρίβων. Given the possibility that a text by Antisthenes stands behind the *Symposium* texts of both Plato and Xenophon and accounts for some of the correspondences that have been hard to explain (see t. 41A title 2.4), it is not impossible that Antisthenes did first thematize the cloak and tunic and the sufficiency of the tunic alone, taking his impetus from the life of Socrates.

(14) Θεόπομπος . . . δεινόν τ' εἶναι: (*FGrHist* 115 F 295) The quality of being clever at speaking (δεινός λέγειν) is denied by Plato's Socrates (*Ap.* 17a4–b6), in reference to speeches before a large audience. Socrates, with Antisthenes, was recognized for his persuasive powers over individuals and not groups (t. 69), and the same should probably be attributed to Antisthenes here because the addressee mentioned in the following phrase is singular: although Antisthenes' range of addressee is total, he deals with them one at a time. (Compare also Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.15, where Socrates calls Homer's Odysseus an "infallible rhetor.")

δι' ὁμιλίας ἐμμελοῦς ὑπαγαγέσθαι πάνθ' ὄντινούν: The vocabulary has associations with rhetorical power: on ὁμιλία see t. 100A notes; for μέλος see t. 187.5. It also has sexual undertones: ὁμιλία can indicate sexual as well as conversational "intercourse"; ὑπαγαγέσθαι has the sense of subjection, if not also seduction. The word is repeated in Xenophon's testimony below, §15.

δῆλον δ' ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων κακ τοῦ Ξενοφώντος Συμποσίου: Diogenes compares Theopompus' statement to Xenophon's text about Antisthenes' art of procuring, μαστροπεία (t. 13A), and presumably Theopompus, too, is referring to this passage. Alternatively, Antisthenes' speech on his wealth (t. 82) could be what charmed Theopompus (so Caizzi 1964:95). Whether it was Theopompus or Diogenes who found Antisthenes to be portrayed as harmonious company in Xenophon's *Symposium*, this is exactly counter to the virtually unanimous judgment in the modern tradition (e.g., Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposium*]:310; Patzer 1970:87–88) descending from Bruns 1896 and possibly Wieland 1800–1802. Either Theopompus was drawn into a polemic that revised Antisthenes and occluded part of Xenophon's meaning, which Diogenes also missed, or ancient readers looked to different aspects of Xenophon's text than modern readers. On Theopompus' hostility toward Plato, which could have caused him to favor Antisthenes, see Brancacci 1993. τῆς ἀνδρωδεσάτης Στωικῆς: The word for "manly" is etymologically related to "bravery" but might have militaristic associations: see t. 198, where it is used of Alcibiades.

Ἀθήναιος ὁ ἐπιγραμματοποιός: Athenaeus the epigrammatist, who uses a Doric dialect, is known only from Diogenes Laertius. The same epigram

is cited at 7.30, for the death of Zeno of Citium, and another on Epicurus is cited at 10.12. (Both are also in the *Palatine Anthology*, at 9.496 and 4.43 respectively.) Diogenes says that this epigram is about the Stoics (περὶ αὐτῶν), not about Antisthenes himself, but it must use language that Diogenes or his tradition associates with Antisthenes, that is, Stoic conceptions that he “founded” (κατάρξαι). The main point that Antisthenes established for the Stoics is presumably that virtue of the soul is the only good (τὸν ἀρετὴν ψυχᾶς ἀγαθὸν μόνον). For other ancient accounts of the Stoic and Cynic succession from Antisthenes, see t. 137A–B, 138A–B.

(15) καὶ τῆς Διογένους ἀπαθείας καὶ τῆς Κράτητος ἐγκρατείας καὶ τῆς Ζήνωνος καρτερίας: These three nouns for the moral virtue of Diogenes, Crates, and Zeno are closely related, and Diogenes Laertius or his source might provide a merely rhetorical variation: the three phrases share a rhythm. On their collective connection to ἰσχύς, the virtue of “strength” that Antisthenes privileged (t. 134c), see Goulet-Cazé 1986:146–47. Compare the Socratic qualities Antisthenes first admired, τὸ καρτερικόν and τὸ ἀπαθές (t. 12A). Compare also Cicero’s apparent translation of these terms in t. 138B, where they refer to qualities of dialecticians, not general moral agents. ἀπάθεια must describe Diogenes of Sinope’s emotional indifference to, for example, the hot and cold extremes of the weather (Diog. Laert. 6.23); more seriously, Julian (*To the Uneducated Cynics* 192A: see t. 37C), speaking of Diogenes’ purpose in eating raw meat, states that ἀπάθεια is the ethical goal or τέλος for the Cynic school. (This is one of several goals he attributes to them in the text: see Goulet-Cazé 1986:35.) In Stoicism, ἀπάθεια becomes the standard term for the sage’s resistance to improper emotions (πάθη): the Stoic ideal of ἀπάθεια does not eliminate all emotion but allows for “pre-emotions” (προπάθειαι) and “good emotions” (εὐπάθειαι) (Graver 2007:35–60). ἐγκράτεια is the foremost virtue attributed by Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.5) to Socrates, who can both restrict his desires for bodily satisfaction and resist his valid desires, when circumstances do not allow them to be filled. (Joël 1893 opened the inquiry into Antisthenes’ role in supplying this image of Socrates to Xenophon.) καρτερία is synonymous with the second aspect of ἐγκράτεια: whereas intemperance (or ἀκρασία) is the vice of unbridled desire, καρτερία is the ability to resist valid desire (e.g., hunger, thirst, and need of sleep) in the service of a higher good: see Xen. *Sym.* 4.5.9–10; see also Brancacci 1993:41–43 (Brancacci wants to associate this passage with Antisthenes).

αὐτὸς ὑποθέμενος τῇ πόλει τὰ θεμέλια: This statement suggests that the *Republic* of Zeno and therefore probably that of Diogenes also were based on Antisthenes’ foundations. See t. 41A title 3.3, 138A. Since the passage is otherwise about ethical virtue and since politics is mentioned only in the epigram, editors (reported fully in Marcovich) have emended πόλει to σχολῇ (“leisure”: see t. 82) or πραγματεία (“practicality”: see t. 134d).

22B. Elias, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Categories"* CAG 18.1 p. 111.17–24 (Busse)

= 136n. DC (SSR IH 9)

τρίτη αἰτία, ὅτι φρουρητικὸν ζῷον ὁ κύων· ἐφρούρουν δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ
τὰ δόγματα τῆς φιλοσοφίας διὰ τῶν ἀποδείξεων καὶ μέγα ἐφρόνουν
ἐπὶ τούτῳ· φαίη γὰρ ἂν ἡ τύχη πρὸς Ἀντισθένην τὸν προστάτην τῆς
αἵρέσεως ταύτης οὕτως·

ἐννέα δὴ προέηκα τανυγλώχινας οἰστούς,
τοῦτον δ' οὐ δύναμαι βαλέειν κύνα λυσσητήρα,

ὅτι, φησί, “τοσαύτας αὐτῷ συμφορὰς ἐπήγαγον, καὶ οὐκ ἡδυνήθην
αὐτοῦ καταβαλεῖν τὸ φρόνημα.” αὕτη καὶ ἡ τρίτη αἰτία.

προστάτην codd. plur. : προστάντα H | ἐννέα codd. : ὀκτώ : Homer
© 297 | καταβαλεῖν K : καταβάλει H P b | ἡ τρίτη codd. plur. : ἡ om. K

The third reason is that the dog is an animal for guarding, and
also they guarded the doctrines of philosophy through their
demonstrations, and they took great pride in this. For Fortune might
speak to Antisthenes, the founder of this sect, like this:

I have thrown out nine long-pointed arrows,
But I cannot hit this mad raging dog.

[*Il.* 8.297, 299]

That is, she says, “I drove so many misfortunes on him, and I could not
strike down his purpose.” And this is the third reason.

Context of Preservation

Elias (the name assigned to the author of this Neo-Platonic commentary from the later sixth century CE, about whom nothing is known) gives seven styles for the naming of a philosophical sect. (See also t. 153C.) The Cynics illustrate the fifth style, a sect named from a way of life. He then gives four reasons for the name “Cynic,” of which this is the third. The first is their indifference to custom and manners in their pursuit of what is good or bad by nature. The second is their shamelessness, which attacks those hostile to philosophy. The fourth is their ability to recognize a friend and a foe. Elias’ fuller text is printed in SSR as IH 9, in an assembly with parallels from Simplicius, Ammonius, Olympiodorus, and John Philoponus. Only Elias and Philoponus (t. 22C) mention Antisthenes by name.

Importance of the Testimonium

This passage sets Antisthenes as founder of the Cynics (but see t. 153C for a conflicting statement by Elias). More important, it preserves a fragment from a literary passage in which Antisthenes and Fortune were characters and in which verses from Homer were reused in a Cynic setting. Stobaeus (2.8.21) preserves nearly the same passage, quoting only *Il.* 8.299 and attributing it to Diogenes of Sinope, who appears to speak of a battle between Fortune and himself: Διογένους. Διογένης ἔφη νομίζειν ὁρᾶν τὴν Τύχην ἐνορούουσιν αὐτῷ καὶ λέγουσαν . . . (From Diogenes. Diogenes said he thought he saw Fortune assaulting him and saying . . .). Plausibly Diogenes was the author, and plausibly he wrote about Antisthenes: the pronoun αὐτῷ could be either a third-person anaphoric pronoun or reflexive, depending on the original context. Other candidates for author, if both Diogenes and Antisthenes were characters in the text, would be Timon of Phlius, Bion of Borysthenes (see t. 6), Crates of Thebes, or Menippus of Gadara. It is possible that the attribution to Antisthenes is fallacious and that only Diogenes battled Fortune in this story.

Notes

τὰ δόγματα τῆς φιλοσοφίας: Antisthenes appears dogmatic in the doxographic tradition (e.g., t. 134), and some have argued or assumed that he is essentially dogmatic (e.g., Brancacci 1990:221).

διὰ τῶν ἀποδείξεων: Elias might refer to performative demonstrations (as in t. 159, for which he is a source) or demonstrations in speech (see t. 13A, 157C).

A special tie between the Cynics and demonstration might be implied here.

φαίη γὰρ ἂν ἡ τύχη: A personified or more lightly reified Fortune (or chance or fate) has several functions in classical Greek discourse. On a human level, it indicates absence of knowledge and technique, often expressed in the opposition τέχνη versus τύχη. (See Schiefsky 2005:5–13, commenting on *On Ancient Medicine* 1.1–2.) On a supernatural or metaphysical level, it indicates absence of divine purpose (e.g., Pl. *Tim.* 25e4). In the Hellenistic period, Fortune was worshiped as a positive divine power in its own right (Goulet-Cazé 1993:127–28). Philosophy, especially for the Cynics and Stoics, was supposed to fortify the wise man against suffering from the waves of fortune, whatever its ontology. Some, perhaps the Epicureans, seem to have thought *fortune* was the name popularly given to random or mechanical positive powers that were real in so far as they had to be reckoned with emotionally; the Stoics probably thought fortune was negative, the absence of knowledge, and hence an illusion. (For this opposition, see, e.g., *fors* versus *ratio* as the cause of happiness in Horace, *Serm.* 1.1.1–3.) In this story, the

personified Fortune, whether it is a power or a deficiency, cannot get the best of Antisthenes. Antisthenes' lifestyle as described in t. 82 could be compatible with a battle or defense against Fortune, but the term does not appear.

ἐννέα δὴ προέηκα: The speaker in the *Iliad* is Teucer, who refers to his efforts to hit Hector. The Cynic text has changed the number of blows from eight to nine: unless this is a mindless error, it might have significance for the trials of the Cynic hero. In the *Iliad*, there are eight victims Teucer has struck down in his attempt to hit Hector.

οὐκ ἡδυνήθην αὐτοῦ καταβαλεῖν τὸ φρόνημα: Strength of the intelligence is a trait of Antisthenes' Heracles (see t. 41A title 4.2). The term φρόνημα, by contrast with φρόνησις, suggests will and stubbornness, not just intellectual capacity.

22C. John Philoponus, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Categories"* CAG 13.1 p. 1.19–2.29 (Busse)

= 136C DC (SSR IH 9)

(ἐπειδὴ τοίνυν αἱ τῶν φιλοσόφων αἵρέσεις λέγονται ἑπταχῶς) . . . ἢ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἶδους τῆς ζωῆς ὡς οἱ κυνικοί, ὧν ἡγήσατο Ἀντισθένης.

(Since indeed the sects of the philosophers are named in seven ways) . . . or from their form of life, as the Cynics, whose leader was Antisthenes.

Context of Preservation

Like t. 22B, the text lists the styles of name for philosophical schools.

23. *Suda*, no. A.2723 "Antisthenes" (Adler)

= 136B, 183E DC

[= Hesychius of Miletus, *Onomatologium* no. 61 "Antisthenes" p. 16.12–21 Flach]

Ἀντισθένης Ἀθηναῖος ἀπὸ ρητόρων φιλόσοφος Σωκρατικός. ὅστις Περιπατητικὸς ἐκλήθη πρῶτον, εἶτα ἐκύνισεν. . . . οὗτος οὖν καὶ τῆς Κυνικῆς κατήρξατο φιλοσοφίας, ἥτις οὕτως ἐκλήθη διὰ τὸ ἐν Κυνοσάργει τῷ γυμνασίῳ διδάξαι αὐτόν. καὶ Διογένους δὲ καθηγητῆς γέγονε τοῦ Κυνὸς καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν.

ἐκλήθη . . . ἐκύνισεν om. S | Διογένους ed. Chalcondylis 1499 :
Διογένης codd.

Antisthenes of Athens, from the rhetors [became] a Socratic philosopher. He was called a Peripatetic at first, and then he became a Cynic. . . . This man, then, also founded the Cynic philosophy, which

is so named because he taught in the Cynosarges gymnasium. And he became the teacher of Diogenes the Dog and the rest.

Context of Preservation

This is the end of Hesychius' entry for Antisthenes. The *Suda* adds his death anecdote (t. 37D).

Importance of the Testimonium

This testimonium shows that the *Suda's* sources confused Antisthenes the Socratic with the later Peripatetic Antisthenes of Rhodes. It thus explains the false attribution of the title *Magikos* to Antisthenes the Socratic (t. 41D).

Notes

Κυνοσάργει τῷ γυμνασίῳ: See t. 22A.

Διογένης: The manuscript tradition makes a unanimous error, nominative Διογένης for genitive Διογένους ("And also Diogenes became the leader of the Dog and of the rest"). The effect is to distinguish Diogenes from Antisthenes, rather than making Antisthenes his teacher.

καὶ τῶν λοιπῶν: This probably refers to the serial succession of the Cynics, Diogenes' pupils and so on, not other disciples of Antisthenes.

24. Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies* 1 14.63.3 (Stählin-Früchtel-Treu)

= 130A DC

Σωκράτους δὲ ἀκούσας Ἀντισθένης μὲν ἐκύνισε, Πλάτων δὲ εἰς τὴν Ἀκαδημίαν ἀνεχώρησε.

And after following Socrates, Antisthenes became a Cynic, and Plato withdrew to the Academy.

Context of Preservation

Clement outlines the history of Greek philosophy.

Importance of the Testimonium

For discussion of the Socratic succession that traces Antisthenes' line to the Cynics and Stoics, see t. 138A–B, 139A.

25. Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 14.1.29 (Marache)

... cur non aliquando possint omnia quoque paria usu venire, ut exsistant per huiusmodi stellarum concursiones et similitudines,

Socratae simul et Antisthenae et Platones multi genere, forma, ingenio, moribus, vita omni et morte pari?

Platones F O X Π N X : Platone G Q : om. V

Why could not all things [in the skies] sometimes also run equal, so that because of these kinds of encounters and likenesses of the stars there would come into being at the same time many Socrateses and Antistheneses and Platos, with equal birth, appearance, intelligence, traits of character, complete course of life and death?

Context of Preservation

Gellius recalls a lecture by Favorinus refuting the astrological wisdom of the Chaldeans.

Importance of the Testimonium

The “genius” of each Socrates and Plato was presumably unique, and it is striking that Antisthenes is placed with them. The passage has rough parallels in Cicero’s *On Divination*: at the relevant point in the argument (2.47.97), Cicero appeals to the unique “genius” of Homer. There is little evidence that Favorinus noticed Antisthenes, although he refers often to Diogenes of Sinope. Antisthenes and Diogenes appear together in a citation from Favorinus in t. 52C.

26. Julian, *Against the Uneducated Cynics* (Oration 9) 187c (Prato-Micalella)

= 137 DC

ἡγεμόνα μὲν οὐ ῥάδιον εὐρεῖν, ἐφ’ ὃν ἀνενέγκαι χρῆ πρῶτον αὐτό, εἰ καὶ τινες ὑπολαμβάνουσιν Ἀντισθένην τοῦτο καὶ Διογένην προσήκειν. τοῦτο γοῦν ἔοικεν Οἰνόμαος οὐκ ἀτόπως λέγειν· “Ὁ κυνισμὸς οὔτε ἀντισθενισμὸς ἐστὶν οὔτε διογενισμὸς.” λέγουσι μὲν γὰρ οἱ γενναιότεροι τῶν κυνῶν ὅτι καὶ ὁ μέγας Ἡρακλῆς, ὥσπερ οὖν τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν αἴτιος κατέστη, οὕτω δὲ καὶ τούτου τοῦ βίου παράδειγμα τὸ μέγιστον κατέλιπεν ἀνθρώποις.

αὐτό U: αὐτόν Klimek | ἀγαθῶν ἡμῖν τις αἴτιος U : τις del. Cobet | οὔτος κατέλιπεν U : οὔτος del. Cobet

It is not easy to identify the leader [of the Cynics], to whom one should attribute Cynicism first, even if some assume this role fits Antisthenes and Diogenes. For this statement by Oenomaus seems not out of place: “Cynicism is neither Antistheneanism nor Diogeneanism.” In fact, the nobler of the Cynics say that also the great Heracles, just as he was responsible for our other goods, so also he left to humans the greatest example of this way of life.

Context of Preservation

Julian's oration rehabilitates old Cynicism and Diogenes of Sinope against contemporary attacks on the austerity of the old Cynics. This passage comes after Julian's discussion of philosophy in general, as he turns his focus to Cynicism.

Importance of the Testimonium

This shows that the identity of the “original Cynic” was already an ancient problem in the second century CE, the time of Oenomaus.

Notes

Οἰνόμαος: Oenomaus was a Cynic from Gadara, of the second century CE, two centuries before Julian. Elsewhere Julian attacks him, for general “shamelessness” and irreverence for oracles.

οὔτε ἀντισθενισμός . . . οὔτε διογενισμός: Some philosophical identities took their ancient name from a single founder, such as Platonism or Epicureanism. Oenomaus points out that Cynicism is not among these. This discussion must have contributed to the full and systematic treatment by Elias in t. 22B (see also the parallels in SSR IH 9).

καὶ ὁ μέγας Ἡρακλῆς: Antisthenes' character Heracles (or his book title) seems to have been known as “the great Heracles” (t. 85) or “the greater Heracles” (t. 41A title 4.2). The adjective might here designate the scale of Antisthenes' book, in distinction from his shorter treatments listed in the tenth *tomos*, or it might designate the way Heracles is represented in the longer story. See t. 92–99.

27. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.7 (Marcovich)

= 151, 152 DC

[= Arsenius p. 108.5–11 Walz]

Ἔσχωπτέ τε Πλάτωνα ὡς τετυφωμένον. πομπῆς γοῦν γινομένης ἵππον θεασάμενος φρυακτὴν φησι πρὸς τὸν Πλάτωνα· “Ἐδόκεις μοι καὶ σὺ ἵππος ἂν εἶναι λαμπρυντής.” τοῦτο δὲ ἐπεὶ καὶ συνεχὲς ὁ Πλάτων ἵππον ἐπήνει. καὶ ποτ' ἐλθὼν πρὸς αὐτὸν νοσοῦντα καὶ θεασάμενος λεκάνην ἔνθα ὁ Πλάτων ἐμημέκει ἔφη· “Χολὴν μὲν ὀρῶ ἐνταῦθα, τῦφον δὲ οὐχ ὀρῶ.”

τε F : om. B P Φ et Arsen. | γοῦν F : οὖν B P Φ et Arsen. |
 γινομένης B P Φ : γενομένης F et Arsen. | ἐδόκεις B P F Φ et Arsen. :
 δοκεῖς Richards | εἶπεν ἐπεὶ B P F : ἐπεὶ Φ et Arsen. : B P F : | καὶ del.
 Marcovich | συνεχὲς B P F : συνεχῶς Φ et Arsen.

And he chided Plato that he was inflated with arrogance. For when a parade was underway, he saw a hot-tempered horse and said to Plato, “I should think you, too, would be a proud horse.” He said this because Plato was constantly praising the horse. And once he [Antisthenes] went to him [Plato] when he was ill and, after seeing the basin where Plato had vomited, he said, “I see the bile there, but the arrogance I do not see.”

Context of Preservation

This pair of anecdotes initiates a section in Diogenes’ life of Antisthenes (6.7–10) illustrating his life in Athens, rather than his opinions in the abstract.

Importance of the Testimonium

This is the only direct evidence for Antisthenes’ share in the mission of deflating “bloated arrogance,” τῦφος, a core mission of the Cynics and, probably through them, Timon of Phlius and the Skeptics. (See also t. 111.) It attests to hostility between Antisthenes and Plato: compare t. 148–49, 41A title 6.3, 28–30. See also Riginos 1976:99–100 (anecdotes 46–47) and anecdotes 71, 111; Kindstrand 1976:195; Long 1978:74–75; Decleva Caizzi 1980.

Notes

τετυφωμένον: The fight against inflated moral arrogance, τῦφος, is more prominent in later Cynicism than in Antisthenes’ fragments, but see Decleva Caizzi 1980 on the possibility that the anecdote has historical basis: Decleva Caizzi notes that τῦφος in Pl. *Phaedr.* 230a3–6 seems to be an etymological allegorical understanding of the beast Typhon, and so the passage could allude to Antisthenes’ contemporary activities in the criticism of divine beings in myth and poetry. A similar anecdote about Cynic attacks on Plato’s τῦφος occurs in Diogenes Laertius’ life of Diogenes of Sinope (6.26): there Plato is allowed to reply that the attack on τῦφος is itself a form of τῦφος.

λαμπρυντής: This is a grammatical noun, derived from the causative verb λαμπρύνω (make bright), rather than the adjective λαμπρός (bright), and attested only here. It is possibly Antisthenes’ coinage and joke or a coinage and joke of the Cynicizing anecdote. The adjectival form λαμπρυντικός, “bright” or “making bright,” is attested later. The suffix is ambiguous. The nominal suffix –τής is for a noun of agent, so Plato could be “a horse, a performer of glamour.” But the nominal suffix –της (with different accent and gender) was Plato’s marker for the hypostasis or reification of a quality (τὸ ποῖον) into an entity (ἡ ποιότης) (*Theaet.* 182a: see t. 149B–1, 151B). By this interpretation, Plato could be “a horse, the essence of glamour itself.” “Horseness” cannot be seen and so might not exist, according to Antisthenes’ criticism of the theory

of Forms (t. 149), but he might be joking that “glamorous-ness itself” is a candidate for what is real with the same degree of likelihood that “horseness” is real and that if it were real, it would be instantiated in (or identical to) Plato. *συνεχὲς ὁ Πλάτων ἵππον ἐπῆνει*: On the importance of horses and “horseness” in Antisthenes’ ontology and in dispute with Plato, see t. 149 and 72A. A further anecdote (Diog. Laert. 3.39) presents Plato as wary of incurring “horse pride” (ἵπποτυφία): this must be the Platonists’ response to the Cynics’ charge.

χολὴν μὲν ὁρῶ ἐνταῦθα, τύφον δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ: The formulation of the sentence must be a reference to Antisthenes’ dispute with Plato over the reality of Forms. See the parallel verbs in the quotation repeated in t. 149, and compare the parallel anecdote between Plato and Diogenes of Sinope in Diog. Laert. 6.53. There is no play here on the language or suffix Plato uses for Forms, only the opposition between sense perception and intellectual perception. Bile is visible in the basin, but the moral quality for which it is the sign cannot be seen. Diogenes of Sinope is also on record for noting the *χολή*, or bilious character, of the Socratic Euclides (Diog. Laert. 6.24), presented as a better name for Euclides’ teaching style, or *σχολή*.

28. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.3 (Marcovich)

= 150 DC

ἀκούσας ποτὲ ὅτι Πλάτων αὐτὸν κακῶς λέγει, “Βασιλικόν,” ἔφη,
“καλῶς ποιοῦντα κακῶς ἀκούειν.”

Πλάτων B P Φ : ὁ Πλάτων F | αὐτὸν κακῶς B P Φ : κακῶς αὐτὸν F

Hearing once that Plato was speaking badly of him, “It is kingly,” he said, “to act well and receive a bad reputation.”

Context of Preservation

This anecdote appears prominently, near the beginning of Diogenes Laertius’ account of Antisthenes’ wisdom through his sayings: see t. 3.

Importance of the Testimonium

This quotation of Antisthenes probably comes from his *Cyrus* (t. 86). A setting was apparently created from a likely antagonist in Antisthenes’ own life, and the product is a plausible anecdote. On the fabrication of anecdotes, see Wehrli 1973.

29. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.2.40 (Hense)

= 154 DC

Σωκρατικοῦ. Σωκρατικὸς ὁ κυνικὸς ἀκούσας ποτὲ πονηροῦ τὸν τρόπον κακῶς λέγοντος Πλάτωνα, “Παῦσαι,” ἔφη· “οὔτε γὰρ κακῶς λέγων ἐκεῖνον πιστευθήσῃ οὔτε ἐκεῖνος σὲ ἐπαινῶν.”

lemm. habet M A : sine lemm. *rosetum Macarii Chrysocephali*:
Κράτης ὁ κυνικὸς conī. Gaiford : vel <Ἀντισθένης> ὁ Σωκρατικὸς
Hense | post γὰρ add. σὺ A m. rec.

From a Socratic. The Socratic Cynic, when he once heard a man wretched in his character speaking badly of Plato, he said, “Stop. You will not be trusted when you speak badly of him, nor will he be trusted when he praises you.”

Context of Preservation

Stobaeus’ chapter is “On Vice” (Περὶ Κακίας), a relatively brief collection of forty-seven passages that complements ch. 3.1, “On Virtue,” which has 210 entries.

Importance of the Testimonium

Understanding the joke requires an understanding of philosophical (Cynic) rejection of flattery.

Notes

Σωκρατικὸς ὁ κυνικὸς: Stob. 2.31.33 (t. 162) refers to Antisthenes as “Antisthenes the Socratic philosopher,” but Stobaeus elsewhere uses only Antisthenes’ name. Contrast Epiphanius’ “τὸ πρῶτον Σωκρατικὸς, ἔπειτα Κυνικὸς” (t. 107).

πονηροῦ τὸν τρόπον κακῶς λέγοντος: The credibility of what is said depends on the moral value of the person who says it. This principle might be embedded in Antisthenes’ criticism of Homer (see esp. t. 186, 189); compare t. 41A title 1.1.

Παῦσαι: This connotes “firm but friendly remonstrance” in its common use in Attic tragedy (Finglass 2011:510). Possibly the original form of Antisthenes’ *apophthegma* did scan as trimeters, in parody of tragedy.

ἐκεῖνος σὲ ἐπαινῶν: Plato might respond as a Cynic, welcoming misplaced abuse from base enemies (see t. 109 with further refs.). But his praise of the base person would be itself an error, perhaps one Plato would make through his own willingness to flatter.

30A. *Gnomologium Vaticanum* no. 13 (Sternberg)

= 153 DC

ὁ αὐτὸς Πλάτωνός ποτε ἐν τῇ σχολῇ μακρολογήσαντος εἶπεν· “οὐχ ὁ λέγων μέτρον ἐστὶ τοῦ ἀκούοντος, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἀκούων τοῦ λέγοντος.”

The same man [Antisthenes], when Plato had once discoursed at length in his school, said, “The speaker is not the measure of the audience, but the audience of the speaker.”

30B. *Gnomologium Vaticanum* no. 437 (Sternberg)

[= Cod. Vat. Gr. 1144 f. 231v.]

Πλάτων θεασάμενος Ἀντισθένην ἐν τινι διατριβῇ μακρολογοῦντα σιγᾶν ἐκέλευεν· τοῦ δὲ τὴν αἰτίαν ἐπιζητοῦντος ἔφη· “μέτρον ἀριστόν ἐστιν οὐχ ὁ λέγων ἀλλ’ ὁ ἀκούων.”

Plato, upon seeing Antisthenes discoursing at length in a diatribe, asked him to be quiet. And when he [Antisthenes] asked for the reason, he said, “The best measure is not the speaker, but the audience.”

30C. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.36.22 (Hense)

[= ps.-Maximus Confessor 40.27/35 Ihm; Arsenius p. 422.15–17 Walz]

Πλάτων Ἀντισθένους ἐν τῇ διατριβῇ ποτε μακρολογήσαντος, “ἀγνοεῖς,” εἶπεν, “ὅτι τοῦ λόγου μέτρον ἐστίν, οὐχ ὁ λέγων, ἀλλ’ ὁ ἀκούων;”

ἐν τῇ Stob. : ἐν τινι ps.-Max. | μακρολογήσαντος Stob. et ps.-Max. : μικρολογήσαντος Arsen.

Plato, when Antisthenes had once discoursed at length in his diatribe, said, “Are you unaware that the measure of the speech is not the speaker, but the audience?”

Context of Preservation

On the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, see t. 5. This *apophthegma* appears twice there, once attributed to Antisthenes and, in the section on Plato, reversed and used by Plato against him. The second version is the one repeated in the other *gnomologia*. The parallel with t. 104A (listed just before in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*) and the similarity to an anecdote involving Diogenes of Sinope (Diog. Laert. 6.26) suggest that an attribution to Antisthenes originally is plausible, and a hostile tradition reversed it. Stobaeus’ chapter is “On Idle

Rambling” (Περὶ ἀδολεσχίας), and Maximus’ is “On Talking at Painful Length” (Περὶ γλωσσαλγίας).

Importance of the Testimonium

As in other cases (compare t. 27, 148, 149), the tension between Antisthenes and Plato preserved in anecdote runs both ways. If Antisthenes performed or wrote long harangues (see t. 53, 54, 208; compare t. 41B), this would explain attribution of the complaint to Plato. But Antisthenes is also presented as being curt to Plato (t. 148) and concise in many quips (e.g., t. 100A–B, 101B, 102, 116).

Notes

ἐν τῇ σχολῇ μακρολογήσαντος (A): Plato had accused the Sophists of extended speaking, which was less didactic and more prone to deception than Socrates’ dialectical method of question and answer (*Prot.* 328e ff., 334c ff.; *Gorgias* 449b; *Hip. Min.* 373a). But the Cynics might have lodged the same charge against all dogmatists, which include Plato when he speaks “in his school”: that their statements exceed their own credibility. (See Sternbach ad loc.)

ἐν τινι διατριβῇ μακρολογοῦντα (B)/ ἐν τῇ διατριβῇ ποτε μακρολογήσαντος (C): The charge against Antisthenes is put when he holds forth in monologue, perhaps to an indeterminate audience in a public performance. The anecdote might assume that Antisthenes delivered stereotypical Cynic “diatribe.” Given the thought expressed in t. 104A–B, however, as well as Antisthenes’ apparent attention to Socrates’ method of question and answer (t. 41A title 7.3) and his interrogating tactics as portrayed by Xenophon (t. 78, 83, 185A, 186), it seems that Antisthenes put high value on engagement with his audience and his pupils (t. 34A.4). Plausibly he was sometimes unsuccessful at this (t. 34C), and when engagement failed, the next best tactic was long-winded preaching. Arsenius’ reading, μικρολογήσαντος, might imply that Antisthenes’ subject matter was trivial. (Compare t. 41B.)

μέτρον ἀριστόν (B): On the term μέτρον, compare t. 160, 82.43. On the scale and unity of a particular λόγος, compare t. 54.11, 150A.4.

31. This number in SSR is a reference to Antisthenes’ quarrels with Plato in t. 147–59.

32. *Gnomologium Vaticanum* n. 5 (Sternberg)

= 156 DC

ὁ αὐτὸς Διονυσίου λυπούμενου, ὅτι θνητός ἐστιν, “ἀλλὰ σύ γε,” ἔφη, “προελθόντος τοῦ χρόνου λυπηθήσῃ, ὅτι μηδέπω ἀποθνήσκεις.”

μηδέπω ἀποθνήσκεις Sternberg | μηδέπω ἀποθνήσκης cod. :
μηδέπω ἀποθνήσκων V

The same man [Antisthenes], when Dionysius was lamenting that he was mortal, said, “But in your case, as time goes by you will lament that you are not yet dying.”

Context of Preservation

On the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, see t. 5.

Importance of the Testimonium

This could be evidence for older anecdotes about interaction between Antisthenes and Dionysius of Syracuse, whose court gives the setting for many episodes in the Cynic epistles. (See t. 206, 207.) Surely Antisthenes never went to Sicily, and probably he never met Dionysius. Aeschines is a more likely player in this anecdote, if it has a historical basis. See also t. 33B, 128. The age of the anecdotes in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum* is unknown, but its composition is placed in the early empire: see t. 5.

Notes

σύ γε . . . λυπηθήσῃ: This implies that Dionysius had never acquired a mind and, in Antisthenes’ opinion, never would. See t. 105.

33A. Suda, no. A.3909 Aristippus (Adler)

= 155 DC
(SSR IVA 19)

ἐπέσκωπτε δ’ Ἀντισθένην αἰεὶ διὰ τὴν στρυφνότητα.

And he [Aristippus] was always mocking Antisthenes because of his harshness.

Context of Preservation

This sentence appears in the *Suda*’s second biography of Aristippus, which devotes most of its space to an anecdote in the Sicilian court involving Plato. It may share a source with the Cynic epistles.

Importance of the Testimonium

There is scant direct ancient evidence for antagonism between Antisthenes and Aristippus (Giannantoni 1990 v.4:150), and the Cynics and Cyrenaics share some traits, such as satisfaction with present resources. (Compare t. 82 with Diog. Laert. 2.66 and SSR IVA 51.) But it is likely that the two Socratics

had their conflicts over ethical and aesthetic issues, especially the role of pleasure. Xenophon's two portrayals of Aristippus (*Mem.* 2.1, 3.6) put him in opposition to Socrates. A probably Peripatetic writer preserved on papyrus polarizes Antisthenes' and Aristippus' views on pleasure (t. 122B). The Socratic epistles 8 and 9 are fictional letters from Antisthenes to Aristippus and in reply, with tension (t. 206). See also t. 117B. In Diogenes Laertius and most later anecdotes, it is Diogenes of Sinope, rather Antisthenes, who criticizes Aristippus' fondness for luxury (Diog. Laert. 2.68).

Notes

στρυφνότης: This term seems to refer primarily to “sourness” or “bitterness” of taste in food and then to be applied to “harshness” in personal and literary style (Dionys. Hal. *De comp. verb.* 22). Its cognates are attested only twice in the works of Plato and twice in Xenophon, and it is not attested elsewhere in reference to Antisthenes, although the more common adjectival form *στρυφνός* is associated by Galen with *ἀσθηρός* (“harsh” or “bitter”), whose modern cognate is not seldom applied to Antisthenes but which also appears nowhere in the direct ancient evidence. (See t. 140.) Xenophon's Socrates refers to Antisthenes' “difficulty” (*χαλεπότης*) in personality (t. 14A), and there could be a pattern in attributing Antisthenes with a nominalized ethical quality as a joke against his ontology, which seems to resist hypostasis. (See t. 149, 27.) Isidore (t. 115) implies that Antisthenes was *ἀχμηρός* (sordid), but this is different from both “bitter” and “harsh.”

33B. ps.-Caesius Bassus, *On the Chreia* in *Grammatici Latini* VI.273 (Keil)

= 194 DC

(SSR IVA 46)

Antisthenes, cynicus philosophus, cum oluscula lavaret et animadvertisset Aristippum Cyrenaeum philosophum cum Dionysio, tyranno Siculorum, ingredientem, dixit: “Aristippe, si his contentus esses, non regis pedes sequeris,” cui respondit Aristippus: “at tu si posses commode cum rege loqui, non his contentus esses.”

Antisthenes, the Cynic philosopher, when he was washing his vegetables and noticed Aristippus, the Cyrenaic philosopher, walking with Dionysius, the tyrant of the Sicilians, said, “Aristippus, if you were content with these, you would not be subservient to the king.” To him Aristippus replied, “But you, if you could speak appropriately with a king, would not be content with these.”

Context of Preservation

This work falsely attributed to the Neronian poet Caesius Bassus was written in later antiquity.

Importance of the Testimonium

The anecdote appears frequently with Diogenes Sinope in the role here given to Antisthenes (versions collected in SSR IVA 44–48); the sympathy can be with Aristippus against the Cynics (IVA 47–48), as here, but Diogenes sometimes gets the last word (IVA 44–46). Plato can also take Aristippus' role and be bested by Diogenes (Diog. Laert. 6.58), and the full tradition is even more complicated. (See Giannantoni 1990 v.4:151.) All versions must be fiction, since it is unlikely that the Cynics went to Syracuse. For related episodes in the imperial epistles, see t. 206. For a comment attributed to Antisthenes on the relationship between the wise man and the king that shows more sympathy to Aristippus' position in this anecdote, see t. 166.

34A. Dio Chrysostom, *Oration 1, On Virtue* (de Budé)

= 139 DC (SSR VB 584)

[= Stob. 3.13.38, reduced from sections 2–3]

(T. 34A–H appear in SSR as VB 584 and 17–24, under Diogenes of Sinope.)

(1) Διογένης ὁ Σινωπεὺς ἐκπεσὼν ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος, οὐδενὸς διαφέρων τῶν πάντων φαύλων Ἀθήναζε ἀφίκετο, καὶ καταλαμβάνει συχνοὺς ἔτι τῶν Σωκράτους ἐταίρων· καὶ γὰρ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀριστιππον καὶ Αἰσχίνην καὶ Ἀντισθένην καὶ τὸν Μεγαρέα Εὐκλείδην· Ξενοφῶν δὲ ἔφευγε διὰ τὴν μετὰ Κύρου στρατείαν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων ταχὺ κατεφρόνησεν, Ἀντισθένης δὲ ἐχρήτο, οὐκ αὐτὸν οὕτως ἐπαινῶν ὥς τοὺς λόγους οὓς ἔλεγεν, ἡγούμενος μόνους εἶναι ἀληθεῖς καὶ μάλιστα δυναμένους ἄνθρωπον ὠφελῆσαι. (2) ἐπεὶ αὐτὸν γε τὸν Ἀντισθένην παραβάλλων πρὸς τοὺς λόγους ἐνίστε ἤλεγχεν ὥς πολὺ μαλακώτερον, καὶ ἔφη αὐτὸν εἶναι σάλπιγγα λοιδορῶν· αὐτοῦ γὰρ οὐκ ἀκούειν φθεγγομένου μέγιστον. καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης ὑπέμενεν αὐτὸν ταῦτα ἀκούων· πάνν γὰρ ἐθαύμαζε τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν φύσιν. (3) ἔλεγεν οὖν ἀμυνόμενος ἀντὶ τῆς σάλπιγγος τοῖς σφηξιν αὐτὸν ὁμοιον εἶναι· καὶ γὰρ τῶν σφηκῶν εἶναι τὸν μὲν ψόφον τῶν πτερῶν μικρόν, τὸ δὲ κέντρον δριμύτατον. ἔχαιρεν οὖν τῇ παρρησίᾳ τοῦ Διογένης, ὥσπερ οἱ ἵππικοί, ὅταν ἵππον θυμοειδῆ λάβωσιν, ἄλλως δὲ ἀνδρεῖον καὶ φιλόπονον, οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀποδέχονται τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦ ἵππου· τοὺς δὲ νωθροὺς καὶ βραδεῖς μισοῦσι καὶ ἀποδοκιμάζουσιν. (4) ἐνίστε μὲν οὖν ἐπέτεινεν αὐτόν, ἐνίστε δὲ ἐπειράτο ἀνιέναι, ὥσπερ οἱ χορδοστροφοί

τὰ νεῦρα [τείνουσι], προσέχοντες μὴ ῥαγῇ. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἀπέθανεν ὁ Ἀντισθένης καὶ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδένα ἡγεῖτο συνουσίας ἄξιον, μετέβη εἰς Κόρινθον.

(1) Ξενοφῶν codd. plur. : οὗτος Ξενοφῶν U B | ἔφευγε codd. plur. : ἔφυγε U B (2) Ἀντισθένην : Ἀντισθένη U B P | αὐτὸν codd. plur. : αὐτοὺς U B | ἀκούειν codd. plur. : ἤκουε U B V | φθεγγομένου codd. : φθεγγόμενον mavult Cobet (4) τείνουσι secl. Wilamowitz

(1) Diogenes of Sinope, when he had been expelled from his country, arrived in Athens in a state no different from the very poor, and he coincided with several of the companions of Socrates who were still living, Plato, Aristippus, Aeschines, Antisthenes, and the Megarian Euclides. Xenophon had gone into exile because of his military campaign with Cyrus. He quickly learned to disparage most of them, but he kept company with Antisthenes, because he praised not so much the man, but the words that he spoke, and Diogenes considered them alone to be true and most able to benefit the human being. (2) For in comparing Antisthenes himself against his words, he would sometimes prove that he was far softer, and he said by way of rebuke that he was a war trumpet: for he did not hear himself, since he spoke the loudest. And Antisthenes put up with him when he said these things, for he was fully amazed at the nature of the man. (3) So, defending himself against the comparison to the war trumpet, he said Diogenes was like the wasps: for also of wasps there is a small sound, of the wings, but a very bitter sting. So he took joy in the outspokenness of Diogenes, just as horse trainers, when they take on a spirited horse that is otherwise brave and fond of work, they accept the difficult quality of the horse no less. But the sluggish and slow ones they hate and reject as unworthy. (4) So sometimes he incited him, and other times he tried to make him relax, just as tuners of instruments do for the strings, taking care lest they snap. And when Antisthenes died, and he thought none of the others worthy of his company, he moved to Corinth.

Context of Preservation

Dio's eighth oration, *On Virtue*, uses Diogenes of Sinope as an opening exemplum for the virtuous man.

Importance of the Testimonium

This is the most colorful surviving story of the relationship between Diogenes and Antisthenes and is plausibly the oldest. (The Cynic epistles could be older; anecdotes preserved in Diogenes Laertius could be older.) Von Fritz 1926

argued that Dio's stories about Diogenes are highly fictionalized, whereas the shorter anecdotes and bare *apophthegmata* in Diogenes of Laertius' life of Diogenes of Sinope represent the kind of information really transmitted about the historical Diogenes of Sinope. Brancacci 2000:256–57 argues, further, that Dio here betrays the fictionality through a number of details. This is a possible, but not inevitable, account.

Notes

(1) *ἐκπεσὼν ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος*: This account of Diogenes' departure from Sinope implies a political expulsion (*ἐκπεσὼν*) but omits the story of defacing the currency, which Diogenes Laertius cites, in multiple versions, as the reason for his exile (6.20–21).

οὐδενὸς διαφέρων τῶν πάνυ φαύλων: The explicit comparison between Diogenes and the lowly, which seems gratuitous, might imply that in his original homeland Diogenes identified himself with the wealthy.

Ἀθήναζε ἀφίκετο: Compare the phrase Ἦκον, ὦ πάτερ, Ἀθήναζε, which opens ps.-Diogenes' *Letter* 30 (t. 136B). A set of letters of Diogenes of Sinope, which circulated as early as 200 BCE (different from the spurious letters still extant) and which could have been written by the historical Diogenes of Sinope (Diog. Laert. 6.80, citing Sotion; see also Malherbe 1977:14 on the scholarly arguments), should not be overlooked as a possible source for certain uniquely surviving details in Dio's anecdotes about Diogenes of Sinope. Dio could have set out to give new life to the Diogenes story by recycling from his own letters, which have been otherwise transmitted only in a different and less attractive recycling, the surviving letters.

καὶ γὰρ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀρίστιππον καὶ Αἰσχίνην καὶ Ἀντισθένην καὶ τὸν Μεγαρέα Εὐκλείδην: This list of Socratic disciples and candidates for teacher whom Diogenes allegedly meets is unparalleled in the tradition about Diogenes (Brancacci 2000:256–57) and might show that Dio has supplemented from a traditional list. The only extant parallel for a list containing Aristippus, Aeschines, and Euclides is Diog. Laert. 2.47. Neither Aristippus nor Euclides ever makes the lists of Socratic stylists, as in t. 43B or 48; compare also Diodorus' list of teachers active at Athens in t. 35B. Possibly Dio has assembled the characters of the Socratic epistolary tradition, where all these names appear. (See previous note.)

τοὺς λόγους οὓς ἔλεγεν: Brancacci 2000:257 posits that τοὺς λόγους here refers to literary production and indicates that Diogenes knew Antisthenes through reading his works. But the verb ἔλεγεν seems to suggest exactly the opposite, a live encounter. Surely Dio has fashioned his own version of the story. But he does not intimate a purely literary encounter between these figures. Antisthenes, too, is attracted to Socrates through his words (t. 12B).

(2) ὡς πολὺ μαλακώτερον: Compare t. 37A.

τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὴν φύσιν: On Antisthenes' view of φύσις, see t. 41A introduction to second *tomos*. Compare t. 18.

(3) τοῖς σφηξίν: Aristophanes' *Wasps* of 422 BCE used this metaphor for the old men of the Athenian juries.

τὸν μὲν ψόφον τῶν πτερῶν μικρόν, τὸ δὲ κέντρον δριμύτατον: Diogenes' rhetorical force is his power of understatement.

τῇ παρρησίᾳ: This Cynic trait is nowhere explicitly attributed to Antisthenes, although *apophthegmata* such as t. 178 imply it.

ὥσπερ οἱ ἵππικοί: This is a standard comparison in Sophistic and Socratic discussions of education. It is applied also to wives in Xenophon's *Symposium* (2.10, in the context of t. 18).

τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦ ἵππου: See t. 14A on the "difficulty" of Antisthenes' character.

(4) ἐνίστε μὲν οὖν ἐπέτεινεν αὐτόν: The grammatical subject seems to be still Antisthenes, since the action seems to be a teacher over a pupil. But Diogenes, the subject of the main story, could be the subject of this sentence, after a digression about the trumpet and the wasps.

προσέχοντες μὴ ῥαγῇ: Antisthenes (or Diogenes) seems to be wary of a psychological breakdown and to know how to avoid it. Diogenes might have met modern criteria for a neurotic or psychotic disorder. (He is called "mad" by the end of Dio's text.)

34B. Eusebius, *Preparation for Demonstration of the Gospel* 15.13.8 (Mras)

= 138D DC (SSR VB 18)

τοῦτου δὲ ἀκουστῆς γέγονε Διογένης ὁ Κύν, ὃς καὶ αὐτὸς
θηριωδέστατα φρονεῖν δόξας πολλοὺς ἐπηγάγετο.

And Diogenes the Dog became the pupil of him [Antisthenes], and he himself, seeming to think most savagely, was leader of many.

Context of Preservation

See t. 139A.

34C-1. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.21 (Marcovich)

= 138A DC (SSR VB 19)

γενόμενος δὲ Ἀθήνησιν Ἀντισθένηι παρέβαλε. τοῦ δὲ διωθουμένου
διὰ τὸ μηδένα προσίεσθαι, ἐξεβιάζετο τῇ προσεδρία. καὶ ποτε τὴν

βακτηρίαν ἐπανατειναμένου αὐτῷ τὴν κεφαλὴν ὑποσχών, “παῖε,” εἶπεν, “οὐ γὰρ εὐρήσεις οὕτω σκληρὸν ξύλον ὃ με ἀπείρξεις ἕως ἄν τι φαίνη λέγων.” τοῦντεῦθεν διήκουσεν αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄτε φυγὰς ὧν ὥρμησεν ἐπὶ τὸν εὐτελεῖ βίον.

Ἀντισθένης codd. plur. : Ἀντισθένη B

And when he [Diogenes of Sinope] got to Athens, he joined in with Antisthenes. And when Antisthenes was repelling him, because he was accepting no one, Diogenes tried to force him from his position by staying close by. And once, when Antisthenes was brandishing his staff over his head, he held out his head and said, “Strike me. For you will not find wood so hard that you will keep me away, as long as it is clear that you have something to say.” And from that time he was his pupil, and because he was in exile, he started his frugal lifestyle.

Context of Preservation

This is part of Diogenes’ opening narrative of the life of Diogenes of Sinope.

Notes

ὥρμησεν ἐπὶ τὸν εὐτελεῖ βίον: For the opposition εὐτελής/πολυτελής said of lifestyle, see t. 82.41–42, 206. Diogenes Laertius attributes this decision by Diogenes to his status in exile and might suggest that Antisthenes did not also practice such a stringently frugal lifestyle. (See t. 34A, 37A, 82.38–39.)

34C-2. Aelian, *Historical Miscellany* 10.16 (Dilts)

= 138B DC (SSR VB 19)

Ἐπεὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης πολλοὺς προύτρεπεν ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν, οἱ δὲ οὐδὲν αὐτῷ προσεῖχον, τέλος ἀγανακτήσας οὐδένα προσίετο. καὶ Διογένην οὖν ἤλυνεν ἀπὸ τῆς συνουσίας αὐτοῦ. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἦν λιπαρέστερος ὁ Διογένης καὶ ἐνέκειτο, ἐνταῦθα ἤδη καὶ τῇ βακτηρίᾳ καθίζεσθαι αὐτοῦ ἠπειλεῖ· καὶ ποτε καὶ ἔπαισε κατὰ τῆς κεφαλῆς. ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἀπηλλάττετο, ἀλλ’ ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐνέκειτο φιλοπόνως, ἀκούειν αὐτοῦ διψών, καὶ ἔλεγε· “σὺ μὲν παῖε, εἰ βούλει, ἐγὼ δὲ ὑποθήσω τὴν κεφαλὴν· καὶ οὐκ ἂν οὕτως ἐξεύροις βακτηρίαν σκληράν, ὥστε με ἀπελάσαι τῶν διατριβῶν τῶν σῶν.” ὁ δὲ ὑπερησπάσατο αὐτόν.

οὐδὲν Korais : οὐδεις V x | αὐτῷ del. Koen | προσεῖχον V : προσεῖχε x
| καὶ ποτε καὶ V : καὶ secundum om. x | ἀπηλλάττετο V : ἀπηλάσσετο x

When Antisthenes was trying to convert a lot of people to philosophy, but they paid no attention to him, finally he got angry and received nobody. So even Diogenes he drove away from his company. But when

Diogenes was being rather obstinate and was insisting, then he went so far as to threaten to put him in his place with his staff. And once he actually struck him on the head. But Diogenes did not go away, but all the more he insisted, with a fondness for the toil, thirsting to learn from him. And he said, “You can strike me, if you want to, and I will offer you my head. But you could not find a staff hard enough to drive me away from your conversations.” And he [Antisthenes] embraced him [Diogenes] beyond measure.

Context of Preservation

This is a complete anecdote, amid a series (10.11–17) on Diogenes, Socrates, and Critias, along with two others (Archytas and Aristides).

Notes

ὑπερησπάσατο αὐτόν: The same rare verb is used in t. 82.38, for the behavior of Antisthenes’ unusual girlfriends. Compare also t. 84C, 143A.

34C-3. Jerome, *Against Jovinian* 2.14 (Bickel)

= 138C DC (SSR VB 19)

nam cum discipulorum Antisthenes nullum reciperet, et perseverantem Diogenem remove non posset, novissima clava minatus est, nisi abiret. Cui ille subiecisse dicitur caput, atque dixisse: “nullus tam durus baculus erit qui me a tuo possit obsequio separare.”

For when Antisthenes was accepting none of his [potential] disciples, and he could not get rid of Diogenes, who was persisting, he threatened him with a brand new club, unless he would go away. Diogenes is said to have lowered his head for him and said: “No staff will be so hard that it can divide me from deference to you.”

34D-1. Plutarch, *Table Talk* II.1.7 632e (Hubert)

(SSR VB 20)

ποιεῖ δ’ εὖχαρι σκῶμμα καὶ μέμψις ἐμφαίνουσα χάριν· ὥς Διογένης περὶ Ἀντισθένους ἔλεγεν·

“ὅς με ῥάκη τ’ ἤμπισχε κἀξηνάγκασεν

πτωχὸν γενέσθαι κακὰ δόμων ἀνάστατον”·

οὐ γὰρ ἂν ὁμοίως πιθανὸς ἦν λέγων· “ὅς με σοφὸν καὶ αὐτάρκη καὶ μακάριον ἐποίησεν”.

ῥάκη Stephanus : κάρη T

Also blame showing gratitude makes a charming jibe, just as Diogenes said about Antisthenes:

who dressed me in rags and forced me
to become a beggar and separated from my house.

For he would not have been so persuasive if he had said, “who made me wise and self-sufficient and happy.”

Context of Preservation

See t. 13B, which directly precedes this passage.

Notes

ὥς Διογένης: This pair of unattributed iambic trimeters (= fr. 88 F 5 TrGrF Snell) could be from a tragedy Diogenes wrote or a tragedy in which he appeared as a speaker. Plausibly the trimeters were from a famous tragedy, such as Euripides’ *Bellerophon* (suggested by R. Janko per litt.).

ὅς με ῥάκη τ’ ἤμπισχε . . . : The spurious letters of Diogenes explain, also, that Antisthenes was responsible for Diogenes’ choice of lifestyle (context following t. 136B from epistle 30). See also t. 34C-1.

34D-2. Macrobius, *Saturnalia* 7.3.21 (Willis)

(SSR VB 21)

sic et Diogenes Antisthenem cynicum, magistrum suum, solebat velut vituperando laudare: “ipse me,” aiebat, “mendicum fecit ex divite et pro ampla domo in dolio fecit habitare.” Melius autem ista dicebat quam si diceret: “gratus illi sum quia ipse me philosophum et consummatae virtutis virum fecit.”

In the same way also Diogenes used to praise Antisthenes the Cynic, his teacher, in a manner like blame: “This very man,” he used to say, “made me a beggar from a rich man and in place of a splendid house caused me to live in a canister.” For better he said this than if he had said, “I am grateful to him because he made me a philosopher and a man of perfect virtue.”

Context of Preservation

Macrobius follows and loosely translates Plutarch’s *Table Talk* II.1.7 632e (t. 34D-1).

Notes

me . . . mendicum fecit ex divite et pro ampla domo in dolio fecit habitare: In paraphrasing the trimeters Plutarch attributes to Diogenes, Macrobius adds information from the Diogenes legend beyond what Plutarch transmits.

34E. Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.24.67–69 (Schenkl)

= 118 DC (SSR VB 22)

διὰ τοῦτο ἔλεγεν ὅτι “ἐξ οὗ μ’ Ἀντισθένης ἡλευθέρωσεν, οὐκέτι ἐδούλευσα.” πῶς ἡλευθέρωσεν; ἄκουε, τί λέγει· “ἐδίδαξέν με τὰ ἐμὰ καὶ τὰ οὐκ ἐμὰ. κτῆσις οὐκ ἐμή· συγγενεῖς, οἰκεῖοι, φίλοι, φήμη, συνήθεις τόποι, διατριβή, πάντα ταῦτα [ὅτι] ἀλλότρια. ‘σὸν οὖν τί; χρήσις φαντασιῶν.’ ταύτην ἔδειξέν μοι ὅτι ἀκώλυτον ἔχω, ἀνανάγκαστον· οὐδεὶς ἐμποδίσαι δύναται, οὐδεὶς βιάσασθαι ἄλλως χρῆσασθαι ἢ ὥς θέλω.”

τὰ ante οὐκ del. s | κτῆσις <ὅτι> C. Schenkl (pater) | ὅτι delevi : fort. ὅτι (ταῦτά) ἐστιν ἀλλότρια Schenkl | <ὅτι> οὐδεὶς C. Schenkl

This is why he [Diogenes] said, “From the time Antisthenes freed me, I have no longer been a slave.” How did he free him? Listen to what he says: “He taught me what is mine and what is not mine. Possession is not mine. Relatives, members of the household, friends, reputation, customary places, conversation, all these are of another. ‘So what is yours? [Antisthenes asked.] The use of [your] mental impressions.’ He showed me that I have this [as a possession] unhindered and unconstrained. Nobody can block it; nobody can force me to use it otherwise than as I wish.”

Context of Preservation

Epictetus’ discourse is a lengthy one, on how to separate oneself from what is not up to us (τοῖς οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν). What is up to us is the topic of his first discourse and the center of his teaching. Diogenes serves as an example of the man who has achieved this virtue.

Importance of the Testimonium

This anecdote attributes to Antisthenes the very basis of Stoic and Cynic ethics, such as Epictetus teaches. Like the Platonic *Alcibiades* I (and other Socratic texts), it separates the self from externals. The body and soul are not differentiated here, however, as they are in *Alcibiades*, and the χρήσις φαντασιῶν that constitutes the core of the self might identify the fundamental interface of body and soul.

Notes

ἡλευθέρωσεν: This concept of freedom from externals and from delusion about the importance of externals is close to that which Antisthenes celebrates in t. 82.

κτηῖς / συγγενεῖς, οἰκεῖοι, φίλοι / φήμη / συνήθεις τόποι / διατριβή:

These items deemed to be goods “of another” have some correspondence to Antisthenes’ discussion of his “wealth” and the true needs of his soul in t. 82 and elsewhere. He rejects property first (t. 81A). The three classes of persons listed here (not considered in t. 82) may be ordered from remote to close according to Antisthenes’ thought generally: see t. 134l–q, 110; t. 188 might offer evidence for οἰκεῖοι who have a draw on Odysseus, but without comparison to kin; kin and members of the household would lack the qualifications and emotional bonds of φίλοι. The last three goods are apparently aspects of the individual. Reputation, which arises from enemies as much as friends, is appropriated to the individual self in certain ways (t. 112), but it can also remain more like a πόνος than a part of oneself (t. 134f; see also t. 86). Habitual places and discourse might represent space and time where the individual is located; for Antisthenes, they come close to his prized companionship with Socrates (t. 82.44: ὁ πλείστου ἐγὼ τιμῶμαι, Σωκράτῳ σχολάζων συνδιημερεύειν). It is striking, however, that there is no statement of a separation between body and soul, as in Pl. *Alc.* 129e9–130c7.

πάντα ταῦτα [ᾗτι] ἀλλότρια: τὰ ἀλλότρια is almost a technical term in Plato’s Socratic works (e.g., *Lys.* 222c4; *Sym.* 205e7–8; *Rep.* 463b12), but its usual opposite term, τὰ οἰκεῖα, does not appear in this passage. (The full opposition here is τὰ ἐμὰ versus τὰ οὐκ ἐμὰ.) οἰκεῖοι are instead one member of the class of the ἀλλότρια.

χρήσις φαντασιῶν: If any part of this anecdote is phrased in the original words of Antisthenes, this core message would be the first candidate.

However, the correct “use of appearances” is Epictetus’ core ideal, and the expression occurs throughout his *Discourses*. This does not mean that Epictetus did not adapt the phrase from older ethical discussion. Höistad (1948:39–40) defends the Antisthenian origin of this phrase against von Fritz (1926) and Dudley (1937), who hold that φαντασία, both in this passage and in the fuller discussion in Diog. Laert. 6.70–71, can only be a Stoic term. Höistad argues that the present usage fits into a middle position between the uses in Plato and Aristotle and the fully theorized Stoic sense. Its connection to Antisthenes is here supported by the phrase built from χρήσις, paralleled in the book title *Περὶ οἴνου χρήσεως* (t. 41A title 9.7) and in the phrases τὴν τοῦ λόγου χρήσιν and χρήσις ποικίλη λόγου in his discussion of Odysseus (t. 187.4, 11). Such phrases feature also in Socrates’ discussions of goods in other

texts (Pl. *Meno* 88a5; Xen. *Sym.* 8.15, 8.28; Xen. *Oec.* 3.10). φαντασῖαι are basically sensations of the body, not events in the soul, in Plato (*Theaet.* 152c, 161e) and Aristotle (*De anima* 3.2), although they cross the boundary into the soul, where they must be apprehended or interpreted by a strictly mental sense. This would be Antisthenes' χρήσις, which might count as the same interface of consciousness and moral choice over inanimate, indifferent matter or other substrate (whether wine, as in t. 41A title 9.7, or language, as in t. 187) that is evident in the other attested phrases built on this term.

34F. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.6 (Marcovich)

= 149 DC (SSR VB 23)

Διογένει χιτῶνα αἰτοῦντι πτύξαι προσέταξε θοίματιον.

When Diogenes asked for a cloak, he [Antisthenes] told him to double his outer garment.

Notes

πτύξαι . . . θοίματιον: See t. 22A note on πρῶτος ἐδίπλωσε τὸν τρίβωνα.

35A. ps.-Eudocia, *Violarium* p. 96.6–7 (Flach)

= 141 DC

ἐτελεύτησε δὲ Ἀθήνησιν ἑβδομηκοντούτης γενόμενος.

And he [Antisthenes] died at Athens when he was seventy years old.

Importance of the Testimonium

Apart from this sentence, ps.-Eudocia's biography of Antisthenes is produced directly from Diogenes Laertius. Whatever good source the author Konstantinos Palaiokephala could have had in the sixteenth century CE for Antisthenes' age at death is obscure to us. (On Palaiokephala, see t. 1D.) This testimony is normally dismissed in favor of Diodorus Siculus (t. 35B), who says that Antisthenes was active in Athens in 366 and thus that he probably lived to be older than seventy. If we believe ps.-Eudocia, Antisthenes lived from c. 445 to only c. 375 BCE. If he lived until 370, long enough to comment on the battle of Leuktra of 371 (t. 10), his birth date would need to be as late as 440. The anecdotes about his military campaigns with Socrates from the mid-420s (t. 3B) would then be chronologically impossible. If we dismiss ps.-Eudocia in favor of the plausibility, if not the historicity, of t. 3B and 10, Antisthenes lived to be at least seventy-five. If we accept the historicity of t. 35B also, he lived to be at least eighty.

35B. Diodorus, *Library of History* 15.76.4 (Vogel)

= 140 DC (SSR IH 3)

Ἵπῃρξαν δὲ κατὰ τούτους τοὺς χρόνους ἄνδρες κατὰ παιδείαν ἄξιοι μνήμης Ἴσοκράτης τε ὁ ῥήτωρ καὶ οἱ τούτου γενόμενοι μαθηταὶ καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης ὁ φιλόσοφος, ἔτι δὲ Ἀναξιμένης ὁ Λαμψακηνὸς καὶ Πλάτων ὁ Ἀθηναῖος, ἔτι δὲ τῶν Πυθαγορικῶν φιλοσόφων οἱ τελευταῖοι, Ξενοφῶν τε ὁ τὰς ἱστορίας συγγραψάμενος ἐσχατογῆρος ὢν· μέμνηται γὰρ τῆς Ἐπαμεινώνδου τελευτῆς μετ' ὀλίγον χρόνον γεγεννημένης· Ἀρίστιππος τε καὶ Ἀντισθένης, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Αἰσχίνης ὁ Σφήττιος ὁ Σωκρατικός.

Σφήττιος codd. plur. : σφητιος P

In these years the foremost men worthy of memory in the field of education were Isocrates the rhetor and his pupils, and Aristotle the philosopher, and further Anaximenes of Lampsacus and Plato of Athens, and also the last of the Pythagorean philosophers, and Xenophon, who composed histories when he was in his final years: for he mentions the death of Epaminondas, which took place a short while later. And Aristippus and Antisthenes [were then active], and in addition to these Aeschines of Sphettus the Socratic.

Context of Preservation

This is the end of Diodorus' entry for the year 366/65 BCE.

Importance of the Testimonium

This text is used to set Antisthenes' date of death after 366. See discussion at t. 35A, the alternative account of ps.-Eudocia. The field of five Socratics, with Plato distinguished in the more detailed opening section and Xenophon considered a historian, is close to the field that appears in the lists from Augustan and early imperial periods. (See t. 43B, 48–50.)

36. Scholiast on Lucian, *On the Parasite* 57 (Rabe)

= 144 DC

φιλοσόφους μὲν γὰρ ἴσμεν ἅπαντας ἢ τοὺς πλείστους κακοὺς κακῶς ἀποθανόντας, τοὺς μὲν ἐκ καταδίκης, ἐαλωκότας ἐπὶ τοῖς μεγίστοις ἀδικήμασι, φαρμάκῳ, τοὺς δὲ καταπρησθέντας τὸ σῶμα ἅπαν, τοὺς δὲ ἀπὸ δυσουρίας φθινήσαντας, τοὺς δὲ φυγόντας.

καταπρησθέντας κτλ.] “φαρμάκῳ” ὡς Σωκράτης, “καταπρησθέντας τὸ σῶμα” ὡς Ἡράκλειτος ὁ Ἐφέσιος, “φθινήσαντας” ὡς Ἀντισθένης, “φυγόντας” ὡς **.

φυγόντας ὡς U Ω : om. φ : ὡς om. V : excidisse Ξενοφῶν proponit

Rabe e Dio Chrys. 64.18

For we know that all philosophers, or most of them, have died wretchedly as wretched men, some by poison resulting from condemnation in court, when they have been convicted for the greatest crimes, some by incineration of their whole body, some having wasted away from difficulty in urination, and some by exile.

[Lucian, *On the Parasite* 57]

Burned up etc.: “By poison” like Socrates, “burned up in the whole body” like Heraclitus of Ephesus, “wasting away” like Antisthenes, “sent into exile” like <Xenophon?>.

Context of Preservation

This scholion is preserved in four manuscripts on Lucian’s *On the Parasite* (which mentions Antisthenes: see t. 4). Its distribution in the manuscripts points to authorship by the early tenth-century archbishop Arethas (or, otherwise, an older, unknown scholar) (Rabe ad loc.). Lucian’s character Simon is arguing that the death of the parasite is preferable to the death of the philosopher.

Importance of the Testimonium

For this scholiast, Antisthenes came to mind as the most famous philosopher who died by wasting away. (Possibly he knew the saying of t. 37E.) The scholiast is probably incorrect in his interpretation of Lucian, who was probably referring to Epicurus.

Notes

ἀπὸ δυσουρίας φθινήσαντας: Antisthenes’ reportedly long, slow death (t. 37) might be considered “wasting away.” For his notice of someone else’s wasting away (with different vocabulary), see t. 51A. The association with urination has no clear resonance in the testimonia, although Antisthenes is said to have used the designation “urine receptacle” as the name of a drinking vessel (t. 65).

37A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.18–19
(Marcovich)

= 142 DC

ἐτελεύτησε δὲ ἄρρωστίᾳ· ὅτε καὶ Διογένης εἰσιὼν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἔφη·
“Μήτι χρεία φίλου;” καὶ ποτε παρ’ αὐτὸν ξιφίδιον ἔχων εἰσῆλθε. τοῦ
δ’ εἰπόντος· “Τίς ἂν ἀπολύσειέ με τῶν πόνων;” δείξας τὸ ξιφίδιον, ἔφη·
“Τοῦτο.” καὶ ὅς, “Τῶν πόνων,” ἔφη, “εἶπον, οὐ τοῦ ζῆν.” ἐδόκει γάρ πως
μαλακώτερον φέρειν τὴν νόσον ὑπὸ φιλοζωίας.

εἰσῆλθε B P Φ : εἰσῆι F | ἀπολύσειε Cobet : ἀπολύση B P F Φ | ἔφη
εἶπον Φ : εἶπεν B P : εἶπεν F

He died of a lingering infirmity. It was during this time that Diogenes went into his room and said, “You don’t have need of a friend, do you?” And once he went to him holding a dagger. When he [Antisthenes] said, “Who could release me from my toils?” he showed the dagger and said, “This.” And he said, “I said from my toils, not from my life.” For he seemed somehow to bear his illness rather feebly, because of his love of life.

Context of Preservation

This anecdote, the only extended anecdote in Diogenes Laertius’ condensed biography, follows the account of Antisthenes’ writings (t. 41A–B) and precedes the epigram (t. 38A).

Importance of the Testimonium

The set of anecdotes about Antisthenes’ final illness presents Antisthenes as unwilling to die. The overall message seems to be positive, that he was willing to endure his pain; but this is never directly praised. Diogenes Laertius’ version highlights ethical deficiency in Antisthenes’ lust for life (37A) when escape was available, whereas the other versions (37C–E) highlight Diogenes’ bravery in offering the dagger. Lucian might offer a caricature of Antisthenes’ lust for life in *Dialogues of the Dead* 22.9. Aelian (VH 10.11, in the context of t. 34C-2) tells an anecdote that praises Diogenes’ endurance of pain.

Notes

ἄρρωστίᾳ: This is, literally, “lack of strength.” Generally in Diogenes it indicates an illness from which one recovers through medical treatment (3.85, 7.115). The Academic Polemon also died of it, as an old man (Diog. Laert. 4.20); the Peripatetic Lyco suggests in his will that a lingering ἄρρωστίᾳ might lead him to end his own life (Diog. Laert. 5.69). The anecdote seems to

be hostile to Antisthenes, and the name “lack of strength” for his last illness might be a play on his use of a term meaning “strength” for moral quality (t. 41A title 10.2, 34).

χρεία φίλου: A “friend” for Antisthenes probably had to meet a very high standard: see t. 110, 37B, 14B, 134. Diogenes might be inquiring whether he himself qualifies. (See t. 34C.) There might be a joke, too, on the term *χρεία*, which accounts in many contexts for the ethical content of an act: basic materials such as “names” or “wine” might be morally neutral, but their use makes them good or bad. (See comment on t. 187.4.) Diogenes might be asking Antisthenes for an ethical act, in using his “friend” well. This suggestion is stronger in t. 37C–D.

ξιφίδιον ἔχων εἰσηλθε: In the other versions of the anecdote (37C–D), Diogenes visits only once, and the dagger itself is the friend. Diogenes’ offer of a death-inflicting weapon might indicate trust in Antisthenes’ moral condition and Antisthenes’ true state of “friendship” in the eyes of Diogenes, as well as vice versa. This confidence that a wise man knows how to use for good an object that could also be used for evil might, in turn, reflect the debate in Plato’s *Gorgias* and *Rep.* 1 and the pseudo-Platonic *On Justice*. See t. 76.

τῶν πόνων: Antisthenes normally exalted toil as beneficial exercise. Here his toils are bad, which could suggest a hostile origin for the anecdote.

μαλακώτερον: Diogenes of Sinope uses the same term to dismiss the ethical rigor of Antisthenes in t. 34A.

φιλοζωίας: This is a vice, a fear of death.

37B. Epictetus, *Discourses* 3.22.62–64 (Schenkl)

= SSR VB 24

(62) Πυθομένου δὲ τοῦ νεανίσκου, εἰ νοσήσας ἀξιούντος φίλου πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν ὥστε νοσοκομηθῆναι ὑπακούσει, “Ποῦ δὲ φίλον μοι δώσεις Κυνικοῦ;” ἔφη. (63) “δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸν ἄλλον εἶναι τοιοῦτον, ἵν’ ἄξιος ᾗ φίλος αὐτοῦ ἀριθμεῖσθαι. κοινωνὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι δεῖ τοῦ σκῆπτρου καὶ τῆς βασιλείας καὶ διάκονον ἄξιον, εἰ μέλλει φιλίας ἀξιοθήσεσθαι, ὡς Διογένης Ἀντισθένης ἐγένετο, ὡς Κράτης Διογένης. (64) ἢ δοκεῖ σοι, ὅτι, ἂν χαίρειν αὐτῷ λέγῃ προσερχόμενος, φίλος ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ, κάκεῖνος αὐτὸν ἄξιον ἡγήσεται τοῦ πρὸς αὐτὸν εἰσελθεῖν;”

(62) Κυνικοῦ Meibom : κυνικόν S | ἔφη ins. S m. pr. (ut vid. Schenkl) (63) ἢ φίλος αὐτοῦ S : fort. ἤς . . . σαυτοῦ Reiske (64) ἢ ed.

Basiliensis : ἢ S | ὅτι <ὅστις> Reiske : ὅτι <ὅς>

Korais | ἐστὶν S : εἶναι Salmassius

(62) When the young man [aspiring to become a Cynic] asked whether he should consent if, when he was sick, a friend should ask him to come to his house to be cared for, he [Epictetus] said, “Where will you find me a friend of a Cynic? (63) For he needs to be another man of like kind, to be counted as a friend worthy of the first. He needs to be a partner in the scepter and in kingship, and a worthy servant, if he is going to be valued worthy of friendship, such as Diogenes became for Antisthenes, and as Crates for Diogenes. (64) Or do you think that, if [someone] greets him when he meets him, this man is his friend, and the Cynic will consider him worthy of going to his house?”

Context of Preservation

This is from Epictetus’ so-called Cynic discourse. After the speaker (Epictetus) has described the requirements for being a Cynic, the interlocutor poses a series of “skeptical questions” (as they are described in Schofield 2007:86) testing the social capacities of the Cynic. This question opens the series, which proceeds from the minimal social level, friendship, to marriage and then broader social activities. This seems to be a Stoic checklist: see also t. 134.

Notes

εἰ νοσήσας ἀξιοῦντος φίλου πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν: The scenario seems to count as a test for friendship in the background tradition (Seneca, *Ep.* 9): see Billerbeck 1978:127. The anecdote of Antisthenes’ death does not quite fit the scenario: the visiting is reversed.

ἄξιος . . . φίλος . . . ἀριθμεῖσθαι: For the terms of valuing and counting, compare t. 110.

κοινωνὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι δεῖ τοῦ σκῆπτρου καὶ τῆς βασιλείας καὶ διάκονον ἄξιον: The first two qualities of the potential friend are aspects of kingship and imply full collegiality between the Cynic and his friend (compare t. 197.31 συστεφανοῦσθαι), whereas the third quality indicates a subordinate position. The servitude might be reciprocal, or it might imply deference to a third party outside the friendship, such as virtue or the divine.

ὥς Διογένης Ἀντισθένης ἐγένετο: See the anecdote in t. 34C.

37C. Julian, *Against the Uneducated Cynics* (Oration 9) 181b (Prato-Micalella)

= 143 DC; SSR VB 94

ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ἐδωδὴν τοῦ πολὺποδος κωμῶδει καὶ φησι τὸν Διογένη
τῆς ἀνοίας καὶ κενοδοξίας ἐκτετικέναι δίκας ὥσπερ ὑπὸ κωνείου
τῆς τροφῆς διαφθαρέντα. οὕτω πόρρω που σοφίας ἐλαύνει ὥστε

ἐπίσταται σαφῶς ὅτι κακὸν ὁ θάνατος. τοῦτο δὲ ἀγνοεῖν ὑπελάμβανεν ὁ σοφὸς Σωκράτης, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετ’ ἐκείνον [Ἀντισθένη καὶ] Διογένης. ἄρρωστοῦντι γοῦν, φασίν, Ἀντισθένη μακρὰν καὶ δυσανάληπτον ἄρρωστίαν ξιφίδιον ἐπέδωκεν ὁ Διογένης εἰπών· “εἰ φίλου χρήξεις ὑπουργίας”. οὕτως οὐθὲν ᾤετο δεινὸν ἐκείνος οὐδὲ ἀλγεινὸν τὸν θάνατον.

ἐλαύνει : hinc deest V usque ad 202b2 | Ἀντισθένη καὶ Διογένης sed
 ε rasum vid. U : Ἀντισθένη καὶ del. Petavius

But he [my opponent on the topic of the Cynics] even ridicules the eating of the octopus and says that Diogenes paid the penalty for ignorance and vanity, in being destroyed by his food as if by hemlock. So far, I suppose, in wisdom he [my opponent] advances that he knows clearly that death is an evil. But the wise Socrates assumed he did not know this, and also after him, Diogenes. For they say that when Antisthenes was ill with a long illness, hard to recover from, Diogenes gave him a dagger and said, “In case you need the help of a friend.” To such a degree this man believed that death was nothing terrible or painful.

Context of Preservation

This is near the opening of Julian’s oration against a contemporary Cynic who attacked Diogenes for pretension and stupidity. According to one tradition (Diog. Laert. 6.76), Diogenes died from eating raw octopus. The attacker seized on this as evidence of stupidity, and Julian defends Diogenes.

Importance of the Testimonium

Julian uses the anecdote to defend Diogenes’ attitude toward death, not to illuminate Antisthenes’ attitude, which is implied elsewhere (t. 37A, 37C) to be cowardly. Perhaps, then, it was preserved in a tradition that distinguished Diogenes from Antisthenes, who could not be counted as a true Cynic because he was πολὺ μαλακώτερον (much more soft) than Diogenes (t. 34A). The same adjective, μαλακώτερον, is in the version of this death anecdote in t. 37A.

Notes

κενοδοξίας: Socrates made the same accusation against Antisthenes, according to Diogenes Laertius (t. 15B). See also t. 139B.

οὕτω πόρρω πον σοφίας ἐλαύνει: This is a near quotation of Pl. *Euthyphr.* 4b1–2.

κακὸν ὁ θάνατος: Diogenes is credited with knowing that death is no evil in Epictetus 1.24.6, Diog. Laert. 6.68, and Stob. 4.29.19. In Plato’s *Apology*

and *Phaedo*, Socrates denies that death is an evil. There is no such record for Antisthenes, and evidence generally suggests that he would not have said this. See t. 178 and, for the quest for immortality or escape from death, 176 and (perhaps) 170.

[Ἀντισθένη καὶ] Διογένης: The deletion of “Antisthenes” (which seems to be in the wrong case) is probably correct, for the reason given in the preceding note. However, Julian’s report of the anecdote omits the normal allegation that Antisthenes fears death, and it is possible that he wished to imply a three-generational tradition, descending from Socrates, to reinforce his claim, central to his whole speech, that Diogenes’ self-inflicted death was not evil and, therefore, not stupid.

εἰ φίλου χρήζεις ὑπουργίας: Here and in t. 37D–E, it is clear that the weapon is itself the friend, because suicide is good. This notion is as old as Sophocles’ *Ajax* (v. 822). (See Finglass 2011:381 with further discussion.) Since it seems also, from t. 37A, that Antisthenes rejected this option (contrast t. 37E), the whole anecdote must have been crafted as an attack on or joke about Antisthenes’ integrity.

37D. *Suda*, no. A.2723 “Antisthenes” (Adler)

ὅτι ἄρρωστοῦντι Ἀντισθένηι μακρὰν καὶ δυσανάκλητον ἄρρωστίαν ὁ Διογένης ξιφίδιον ἐπιδέδωκεν εἰπών· “εἰ φίλου χρήζεις ὑπουργίας.” οὕτως ᾤετο ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν ἀλγεινὸν τὸν θάνατον, ὥστε γίνεσθαι τὴν ἄρρωστίαν τρυφὴν αὐτόχρημα.

Because when Antisthenes was ill with a long illness, hard to be called back from, Diogenes gave him a dagger and said, “In case you need the help of a friend.” To such a degree this man [Diogenes] believed that death was nothing painful, that the illness came to be a luxury in itself.

Context of Preservation

This is the conclusion of the *Suda*’s entry for Antisthenes, filling about a quarter of the text.

Notes

μακρὰν καὶ δυσανάκλητον ἄρρωστίαν: The *Suda*’s version makes a small change in the adjective, from δυσανάληπτον (hard to recover from) to δυσανάκλητον (hard to be called back from). If this is deliberate, not a manuscript error, the *Suda*’s version injects the sense that the illness is somehow voluntary.

37E. *Suda*, no. EI 340, “If you need the help of a friend” (Adler)

Εἰ φίλου χρήξεις ὑπουργίας: ἐπὶ τῶν γενναίαν ψυχὴν ἔχόντων.
 ἄρρωστοῦντι γὰρ Ἀντισθένει ξιφίδιον δέδωκε Διογένης εἰπὼν τοιοῦτον
 λόγιον.

ἄρρωστοῦντι codd. plur. : ἀσθενοῦντι I | τοιοῦτον codd. plur. : τό
 τοιοῦτον F | λόγιον codd. plur. : λόγον I V

“If you need the help of a friend”: [said] of those having a noble soul. For when Antisthenes was ill, Diogenes gave him a dagger after speaking such a line.

Context of Preservation

Diogenes’ utterance stands as a separate entry in the lexicon, as if it is a proverb.

Importance of the Testimonium

The utterance seems to have gained a life of its own in early Byzantium. This version of the anecdote seems to imply that Antisthenes used the dagger.

Notes

ἐπὶ τῶν γενναίαν ψυχὴν ἔχόντων: It is unclear who is implied to have the noble soul in this anecdote, whether Diogenes, Antisthenes, or both. Maximus of Tyre (lecture 7.5) advises that the noble soul is not unwilling to depart at the destruction of the body, which suggests that Antisthenes should be the referent. But other versions of the anecdote make Antisthenes reluctant (t. 37A) and present Diogenes as the hero (t. 37B–D). It is possible that Diogenes is the hero here also and that his possession of a noble soul is related to facing death, but not his own death.

38A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.19 (Marcovich)

καὶ ἔστιν ἡμῶν εἰς αὐτὸν οὕτως ἔχον·

τὸν βίον ἥσθα κύων, Ἀντίσθενης, ὥδε πεφυκώς
 ὥστε δακεῖν κραδίην ῥήμασιν οὐ στόμασιν·
 ἀλλ’ ἔθανες φθισκός, τάχ’ ἐρεῖ τις ἴσως. “τί δὲ τοῦτο;
 πάντως εἰς Αἶδην δεῖ τιν’ ὁδηγὸν ἔχειν.”

γεγόνασι δὲ καὶ ἄλλοι Ἀντισθένεις τρεῖς· Ἡρακλείτειος εἷς, καὶ ἕτερος
 Ἐφέσιος, καὶ Ῥοδῖός τις ἱστορικός· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοὺς ἀπ’ Ἀριστίππου
 διεληλύθαμεν καὶ Φαίδωνος, νῦν ἐλκύσωμεν τοὺς ἀπ’ Ἀντισθένους
 κυνικούς τε καὶ Στωικούς. καὶ ἐχέτω ὥδε.

ἔχον οὕτως F | κύον A. Pal. | ὥδε πεφυκώς . . . στόμασιν'
 Marcovich | κραδείην F | φθισικῶς B¹ (corr. B²) | δειν F : δῆι P¹ (corr.
 P² Q) | ἔχει A. Pal. | τρεῖς om. F | ἡρακλείτιος F | εἷς P : οἷς B : om. F |
 ἔτερος om. F

And I have composed the following for him:

In life you were a dog, Antisthenes, so created by nature

As to bite the heart with words, not with the mouth:

But you died by wasting away, someone perhaps might say. “And so what?

It is fully necessary to have some guide to Hades.”

There have been also three other Antisthenes: one a Heraclitean, and a second from Ephesus, and a certain Rhodian historian. Since I have narrated the successions from Aristippus and Phaedo, now let me show the derivations of the Cynics and Stoics from Antisthenes. And here it is.

Context of Preservation

This is the end of Diogenes’ life of Antisthenes.

Importance of the Testimonium

The epigram reflects Diogenes Laertius’ own impression of Antisthenes, which is clearly as a Cynic. The listing of other known thinkers by the same name is standard in Diogenes, who often cites Demetrius of Magnesia’s *On Poets and Writers of the Same Name* as his source. On this list, see also t. 159D. Numerous other individuals named “Antisthenes” are attested but not included by Diogenes Laertius: for the Athenians, see PAA 136760–995 (including twenty-one individuals dated to fifth- and fourth-century Athens and many known from epigraphical evidence only). On the men named “Antisthenes” in Athenian literature of the decades 430–370, see Giannantoni 1990 v. 4:196–97, discussing earlier scholarship.

Notes

κύων: On the name “Cynic” and the nickname “dog,” see t. 22–26.

πεφυκώς: “Nature” is an important term for Antisthenes: see t. 41A titles 2.1 and 8.8–9, 18, 123, 179.

δακεῖν κραδίην ῥήμασιν: Many of Antisthenes’ *apophthegmata* could be said to use “biting” words: his techniques include profanity (t. 148) and direct insult (e.g., t. 32). Toils also “bite” those who are not used to them (t. 113). Speech with “biting words” is a standard description of the Cynics (see, e.g., Demetrius, *On Style* 260–61).

ἀλλ' ἔθανες φθισκός: According to Hesychius of Miletus (fr. 7.141 Jacoby), Diogenes is accusing him in this epigram also of “love of life” or cowardice in death. (Compare t. 37A.)

πάντως εἰς Αἴδην δεῖ τιν' ὁδηγὸν ἔχειν: The traditional guide to Hades would have been the god Hermes, not a dog. The dog of Hades, Cerberus, was a guard sooner than a guide.

τάχ' ἔρεϊ τις ἴσως: An interlocutor who sees the tombstone is imagined.

Ἡρακλείτειος εἷς, καὶ ἕτερος Ἐφέσιος: We have no other record of either figure, and a few scholars have proposed that the “Antisthenes, interpreter of Heraclitus” mentioned in Diog. Laert. 9.6 is the Socratic Antisthenes, whereas the individuals listed here could be fictions generated to disguise that fact. (See t. 159D.) Patzer (1970:162 and n. 54) endorses the account generally accepted since 1840 (when A. B. Krische responded to F. Schleiermacher), that an otherwise unknown Antisthenes educated himself from the writings of Heraclitus, then became his disciple. Diels' fragments of the pre-Socratics identifies this Antisthenes the Heraclitean as an individual thinker (DK 66). Since Heraclitus was from Ephesus, the “second [Antisthenes] from Ephesus” might be a second name for the same follower (and ms. F seems to combine these two names into one). Plato mentions an Ephesian school of interpreters of Heraclitus that could be either real or the source for later fiction: at *Theaet.* 179d6-e180a1, the character Theodorus reports on a movement of neo-Heracliteans “around Ionia” and “around Ephesus” who derive their beliefs from “craftless” exegesis of Heraclitus' writings. If these two names are doublets, we have a more satisfying identity for the unknown Antisthenes, but also a more plausible fiction.

καὶ Ῥοδῖός τις ἱστορικός: The historian Antisthenes of Rhodes is known separately (*FGrHist* 508) and is conflated by the *Suda* with Antisthenes the Socratic (see t. 23, 41D).

38B. *IG* editio minor 10348

(not in *SSR*)

Προταγόρας
Ἀντισθένης
Σινοπεύς

Protagoras of Sinope, son of Antisthenes

Context of Preservation

This is an inscription on a plain marble tombstone, once painted blue on the cornice, found in the Piraeus in 1860 (*IG* editio minor 10348 = Conze 459 *T*

302 = Traill PAA 136995) and now in the Piraeus museum, dated to the mid-fourth century (360–340 BCE: the margin of error is about twenty years).

Importance of the Testimonium

This evidence is included for the possibility that it is related to Antisthenes the Socratic. Quite possibly it is not. All published details about it (the date, location, and three proper names) would be consistent with a memorial to Antisthenes the Socratic, if it were possible to imagine that a tombstone could deliver a joke. The total coincidence of data from this tombstone with information independently associated with Antisthenes is the reason for entertaining the possibility of a straight-faced joke, such as the Cynics so often deliver in other modes (e.g., t. 32).

If identification of this Protagoras of Sinope with Antisthenes the Socratic is, in the end, implausible, it is hardly more implausible than the story of the desecrated coin minted by Hikesias of Sinope, allegedly the father of Diogenes, which is supposed to disqualify Diogenes of Sinope from having met Antisthenes (Selten 1929, endorsed by Dudley 1937:54–55, questioned by Höistad 1948:10–12 and Döring 1995 but still generally accepted). If this were Antisthenes' tombstone, it would settle two central questions about Antisthenes: his relationship to Plato's "Sophists," especially the Protagoras of *Theaetetus*, and his relationship to Diogenes of Sinope. The case for the humorous tombstone cannot be proved. It can be disproved, should a fact be discovered about this tombstone, in itself and not from statistics or *comparanda*, that renders identification with Antisthenes through joke impossible.

Notes

Πρωταγόρας: Sinope has more attested persons named "Protagoras" (five of them) than any other Greek city, including Abdera, the home of the famous Sophist (*LGPN* v.5A:383 for Sinope, v.4:292 for Abdera). If this is the tombstone for a real Protagoras of Sinope, son of Antisthenes, Protagoras would have emigrated from Sinope to Attica and lived and died in the Piraeus, where his tombstone was erected. This is plausible: Sinope, a colony of Miletus, which was, according to legend, a colony of Athens, was an important commercial and artistic center in the classical period and seems to have received a settlement of several hundred Athenians in the mid-fifth century (Stoyanov 2012:411). We have record of 102 individuals from Sinope who lived as foreigners in Attica (Osborne and Byrne 1996:289–93), of whom about twelve can be dated as early as the fourth century. (This number includes the present Protagoras and Antisthenes, both bearing unique names amid this set.) The argument to be made in support of a fictional

Protagoras is that the name “Protagoras” was firmly known in Athens from the Peloponnesian War period through the mid-fourth century as the name of a Sophist from Abdera: Eupolis mentions him on the comic stage; Plato features him in two dialogues and mentions him in several others; and apart from the present case, the name is entirely unattested in documentary evidence from Attica before the late third century (Traill PAA v.15:12–14: of the ten individuals recorded, seven are dated to 212–139 BCE, one is dated to the third century BCE, one is the Sophist, and one is the present subject; LGPN v.2:383 records five individuals named “Protagoras” known in Athens, of which two are from the second century BCE and three from centuries CE). All other extant uses of the name “Protagoras” from Athens of this period refer to the Sophist. If it is possible to imagine that a funerary inscription could make a joke, perhaps this inscription contains a joke of naming, in the style of Antisthenes himself (see t. 41A titles 1.6 and 6.3, 143A, 147, 148). Like Protagoras of Abdera, Antisthenes published a book called *Truth* (t. 41A title 6.1), and Plato cites by title from the *Truth* of Protagoras repeatedly in his *Theaetetus* (161c4, 162a1, 171c6, and further likely puns); the character Protagoras, meanwhile, behaves very oddly in *Theaetetus*, once rising from the dead to defend an interpretation of a key sentence from his book *Truth* (171c11–d3). If Antisthenes was recognizable as the new Protagoras, in line with Plato’s discussions of Protagoras in *Theaetetus*, it is not impossible that Antisthenes’ heir, who would have to be Diogenes of Sinope in this case, could have played on this association. If *Theaetetus* was written before Antisthenes died (c. 365: see t. 35B), the tombstone might have noted the fact that “Protagoras” was dead again; conversely, if Antisthenes died and the tombstone was made before Plato wrote *Theaetetus*, it is Plato who would have extended the joke. A grave memorial for Diogenes himself was notably splendid: Pausanias mentions it first among the shrines outside the city of Corinth in his *Guide to Greece* 2.4, and this memorial must have been funded by sponsors beyond his heir, since Diogenes would have left no estate. (The city of Sinope, too, seems to have constructed unusually monumental tombs in its cemeteries in the fourth century BCE: see Stoyanov 2012:411.) Antisthenes probably had some property (see t. 81A, 82), for which he had no known heir. If the property fell to Diogenes, it is plausible that Diogenes would have seen no better option than to spend it on a silly tombstone.

Ἀντισθένης: The name “Antisthenes” is typically Attic, like many names built on the unit Ἀντι- (see LGPN v.2:233–40, where sixty-five personal names are listed with this first unit). Such names are attested throughout Greece, and two prominent characters in the *Odyssey* have such names. But names built from this unit are rarely attested in Sinope or in Pontus overall (LGPN v. 5A:34–40). If the inscription is a joke, it marks its real reference through both

the patronymic and the ethnic adjective. The real patronymic of Antisthenes the Socratic was “son of Antisthenes” (t. 1A).

Σινωπεύς: The ethnic *Sinopeus* would connote a reassignment of fatherland, from the Athens Antisthenes had symbolically fled (t. 8, 72A) to the Sinope Diogenes had really fled, before he became symbolically Athenian; and so it would give another clue to the real identity of the deceased individual and his symbolic, or adopted, next of kin. For Antisthenes’ home in the Piraeus, see t. 12.

39. Ausonius, *Epigram 46* (Prete)

ANTISTHENIS CYNICI IMAGINI SUBDITI:

inventor primus Cynices ego. “quae ratio istaec?

Alcides multo dicitur esse prior.”

Alcida quondam fueram doctore secundus:

nunc ego sum Cynices primus, et ille deus.

titulum om. F T 1 *cynices* codd. plur. : *cinices*

M L T 4 *cynices* T² : *cinices* T

To the image of Antisthenes the Cynic beneath:

I am the first inventor of Cynic wisdom. “What is this reasoning?

Heracles is said to be much older.”

I was once second to Heracles, my teacher:

But now I am First Cynic, and he is a god.

Context of Preservation

Ausonius (c. 310–394 CE) wrote about 120 epigrams, amid other work. He addresses philosophical topics occasionally, probably representing their occurrence among the Greek epigrams he is imitating rather than a special interest of his own. On Cynics in imperial epigram generally, see Follet 1993.

Importance of the Testimonium

This offers a parallel to t. 26, where the founder of Cynicism is disputed.

Notes

ANTISTHENIS CYNICI IMAGINI SUBDITI: The heading implies that it is the caption above a portrait. Giannantoni’s classification of these epigrams with Antisthenes’ necrology is motivated by the traditional association between epigrams and tombstones.

Cynices: This Greek first-declension genitive adjective stands for *cynices sophiae* (compare κυνικήν σοφίην in the next epigram) or *cynices philosophiae*. See Kay 2001:138–40.

Alcides multo . . . prior: See Oenomaus' opinion on the founder of Cynicism, cited by Julian (t. 26).

Alcida . . . doctore: On Heracles in Cynic tradition, see Höistad 1948:47–73. The tradition that Heracles was the original Cynic teacher appears in the Cynic epistles, which predate Ausonius and probably Oenomaus.

et ille deus: Whatever the importance of apotheosis as a goal in Antisthenes' thought (see t. 176), this divinized Heracles has gone beyond the realm of Cynicism. Perhaps (proto-)Cynic wisdom was useful only in the world of humans.

40. Ausonius, *Epigram 47 (Prete)*

<de eodem>

discipulus melior nulli meliorve magister
 εἰς ἀρετὴν συνέβη καὶ κυνικὴν σοφίην.
 dicere me novit verum, qui novit utrumque
 καὶ θεὸν Ἀλκείδην, καὶ Κῦνα Διογένην.

non separ. a praec. codd. : disiunxit Scaliger 1 *melior nulli* codd. plur. :
molior K : *nulli melior* T 3 *novit verum* A : *verum novit* cett. 4 κύνα
 codd. plur. : κύν δὲ E

<On the same man [Antisthenes]>

No one had a better pupil, no one a better teacher
 On the path to virtue and Cynic wisdom.
 He knows that I say the truth, who knows them both,
 both the divine Heracles and Diogenes the Dog.

Context of Preservation

These verses are transmitted in combination with t. 39, as one eight-verse poem. But the alternation between Latin and Greek in these verses, together with the form of riddle and solution, shows that this is a separate poem. Any original heading was lost through this combination.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes' situation between Heracles and Diogenes is similar to that defended in the previous epigram. Ausonius' alternation between Latin and Greek language is common to other epigrams, where it is sometimes a clue that puns are relevant to the meaning of the whole. Here it seems only to mark the theme of philosophy and possibly the double identity of the Cynic, who is not only a human and between the levels of animal and god (see the

discussion of φύσις in t. 41A title 2.1) but a being who shares in both levels. See Kay 2001:140–42.

Notes

discipulus melior nulli meliorve magister: This is a kind of riddle, situating Antisthenes as good or fortunate by reference to his pupil Diogenes and his teacher Heracles. The answer to the riddle is revealed in the last verse.

εἰς ἀρετὴν συνέβη καὶ κυνικὴν σοφίην: The Greek verb συνέβη governs the dative Latin object *nulli* in the previous line: this is not only an alternation of Latin and Greek verses but a tight syntactical combination. The verb is impersonal, standard for “it pertained” or “it happened.” But the directional phrase εἰς ἀρετὴν . . . καὶ κυνικὴν σοφίην implies an educational journey, as does the image of pupil and teacher. This suggests that a more etymological sense of συμβαίνω, “walk together,” might resonate. Such a sense is not normal Greek: συμβαίνω in the personal use normally means “come to agreement.” But Ausonius was a foreign speaker.

SECTION 4

Antisthenes' Writings

testimonia 41–52

41A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.15–18 (Marcovich)

= 1 DC

- Φέρονται δ' αὐτοῦ συγγράμματα τόμοι δέκα· πρῶτος, ἐν ᾧ
Περὶ λέξεως ἢ Περὶ χαρακτήρων,
Αἴας ἢ Αἴαντος λόγος,
Ὀδυσσεὺς ἢ [Περὶ] Ὀδυσσέως <λόγος>,
5 Ὀρέστου ἀπολογία,
Περὶ τῶν δικογράφων <ἢ> Ἰσογράφη<ς> καὶ Δεσίας
[ἢ Ἰσοκράτης],
Πρὸς τὸν Ἰσοκράτους Ἀμάρτυρον.
4 περὶ del. et λόγος add. Casaubon | 5 Ὀρέστου ἀπολογία <ἢ> περὶ τῶν
δικογράφων Kuehn | 6–7 δικογράφων B P : δικογραφίων F | <ἢ>
Decleva Caizzi | Ἰσογράφη<ς> corr. et [ἢ Ἰσοκράτης] secl. Pohlenz :
ἰσογράφη B F P | καὶ Decleva Caizzi e cod. B : ἢ PF : ἢ B | δεσίας P F
: ἡδεσίας B : Λυσίας Wytttenbach

- Τόμος δεύτερος, ἐν ᾧ
10 Περὶ ζώων φύσεως,
Περὶ παιδοποιίας ἢ Περὶ γάμου ἐρωτικός,
Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν φυσιογνωμονικός,
Περὶ δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας προτρεπτικός πρῶτος,
δεύτερος, τρίτος,
15 Περὶ Θεόγνιδος δ' ε'.
11 ἢ om. F | γάμου· ἐρωτικός ἢ (unus tit. cum 12) B | 12 σοφιστικῶν F |
φυσιογνωμονικός F | 13–14 πρῶτος δεύτερος τρίτος B P : γ F | 15 unus
tit. cum 13–14 Decleva Caizzi : α' β' γ' ad. Marcovich | δ' om. F

Τόμος τρίτος, ἐν ᾧ
Περὶ ἀγαθοῦ,

- Περὶ ἀνδρείας,
 Περὶ νόμου ἢ Περὶ πολιτείας,
 20 Περὶ νόμου ἢ Περὶ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου,
 Περὶ ἐλευθερίας καὶ δουλείας,
 Περὶ πίστεως,
 Περὶ ἐπιτρόπου ἢ Περὶ τοῦ πείθεσθαι,
 Περὶ νίκης οἰκονομικός.
 18 ἀνδρίας P | 19 ἢ om. F | 20 om. F | 22 post πίστεως addit ἢ B (unus
 tit. cum 23) 23 περι² om. F
- 25 Τόμος τέταρτος, ἐν ᾧ
 Κύρος,
 Ἡρακλῆς ὁ μείζων ἢ Περὶ ἰσχύος.
 27 ἢ περὶ ἰσχύος om. F
- Τόμος πέμπτος, ἐν ᾧ
 Κύρος ἢ Περὶ βασιλείας,
 30 Ἀσπασία.
- Τόμος ἕκτος, ἐν ᾧ
 Ἀλήθεια,
 Περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἀντιλογικός,
 Σάθων,
 35 Περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν α' β' γ',
 Περὶ διαλέκτου.
 32–33 unus tit. in B P : ἢ (unus tit. 32–33) add. Hirzel | 34–35 ἢ (unus
 tit. 34–35) add. Kuehn | 35 ἀντιλέγειν B P : διαλέγειν F | α' β' om. F
- Τόμος ἑβδομος, ἐν ᾧ
 Περὶ παιδείας ἢ Περὶ ὀνομάτων α' β' γ' δ' ε',
 Περὶ ὀνομάτων χρήσεως ἢ Ἐριστικός,
 40 Περὶ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως,
 Περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης α' β' γ' δ',
 Περὶ τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν,
 Περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου,
 Περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾧδου,
 45 Περὶ φύσεως α' β',
 Ἑρώτημα Περὶ φύσεως α', Ἑρώτημα Περὶ φύσεως β',
 Δόξαι ἢ Ἐριστικός,
 Περὶ τοῦ μανθάνειν προβλήματα.
 38 α' β' γ' δ' om. F | post 38 repetunt 42–43 B P F, del. Menagius | 39 ἢ
 B P, om. F, del. Cobet | ἢ ἐριστικός om. F | 41 α' β' γ' om. F | 45 α' β'
 om. F | 46 B P : ἐρώτημα περὶ φύσεως β' Huebner | 46–47 om. F 47 ἢ
 BP : del. Susemihl

- Τόμος ὄγδοος, ἐν ᾧ
 50 Περὶ μουσικῆς,
 Περὶ ἐξηγητῶν,
 Περὶ Ὁμήρου,
 Περὶ ἀδικίας καὶ ἀσεβείας,
 Περὶ Κάλχαντος,
 55 Περὶ κατασκόπου,
 Περὶ ἡδονῆς.
 51 Περὶ <τῶν Ὁμήρου> ἐξηγητῶν Marcovich | 54–55 Περὶ Κάλχαντος
 ἢ περὶ τερατοσκόπου (unus tit.) Winckelmann | 56 Περὶ Ἑλένης A.
 Müller

- Τόμος ἔνατος, ἐν ᾧ
 Περὶ Ὀδυσσεΐας,
 Περὶ τῆς ράβδου,
 60 Ἀθηνᾶ ἢ Περὶ Τηλεμάχου,
 Περὶ Ἑλένης καὶ Πηνελόπης,
 Περὶ Πρωτέως,
 Κύκλωψ ἢ Περὶ Ὀδυσσέως,
 Περὶ οἴνου χρήσεως ἢ Περὶ μέθης ἢ Περὶ τοῦ Κύκλωπος,
 65 Περὶ Κίρκης,
 Περὶ Ἀμφιαράου,
 Περὶ [τοῦ] Ὀδυσσέως καὶ Πηνελόπης,
 Περὶ τοῦ κυνός.
 59 Περὶ τῆς ράβδου < Ἀθηνᾶς > Ambros. | 60 om. F | ἢ B | τηλεμάχου
 P : τῆς cum spatio litt. 7–8 B | 63 περὶ—Πηνελόπης in mg. F² | περὶ
 F² : περὶ τοῦ B P | 67 om. F | τοῦ del. Declava Caizzi | 67–68 Περὶ
 τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως καὶ Πηνελόπης καὶ περὶ τοῦ κυνός (unus tit.) P :
 Πηνελόπης καὶ περὶ τοῦ κυνός (unus tit.) Cobet

- Τόμος δέκατος, ἐν ᾧ
 70 Ἡρακλῆς καὶ Μίδας,
 Ἡρακλῆς ἢ Περὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἰσχύος,
 Κυρσᾶς ἢ Ἐρώμενος,
 Κύριος ἢ Κατάσκοποι,
 Μενέξενος ἢ Περὶ τοῦ ἄρχειν,
 75 Ἀλκιβιάδης,
 Ἀρχέλαος ἢ Περὶ βασιλείας.
 70 καὶ Declava Caizzi et olim Welcker : ἢ P F : om. B spatio litt. 6
 relicto | 71 om. F | καὶ Declava Caizzi : ἢ B P | 72 Κυρσᾶς Patzer :
 Κύρνος Winckelmann : κύριος B P : κύρος F | 73 κύριος B P : κύρος
 F : κύριοι Winckelmann

καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἔστιν ἃ συνέγραψεν.

His writings are transmitted in ten volumes:

The first, in which [are]

On Diction or On Characters

Ajax or The Speech of Ajax

Odysseus or The Speech of Odysseus

The Apology of Orestes

On the Writers for Lawcourts or Balanced-writer and Binder

In Reply to the “Without Witnesses” of Isocrates

The second volume, in which [are]

On the Nature of Animals

On Child-making or On Marriage, [an] erotic [work]

On the Sophists, [a] physiognomic [work]

On Justice and Courage, the first, second, third protreptic

On Theognis, the fourth, fifth [protreptic]

The third volume, in which [are]

On Good

On Courage

On Law or On the Constitution

On Law or On Fine and Just

On Freedom and Slavery

On Trust

On Entrustment or On Persuasion

On Victory, [a work] on household management

The fourth volume, in which [are]

Cyrus

Heracles the Greater or On Strength

The fifth volume, in which [are]

Cyrus or On Kingship

Aspasia

The sixth volume, in which [are]

Truth

On Discussing, [an] antilogical [work]

Sathon

On Gainsaying, books 1, 2, 3

On Dialectic

The seventh volume, in which [are]

On Education or On Names, books 1, 2, 3, 4, 5

On the Use of Names or [The] Eristic [Man]

On Question and Answer

On Belief and Knowledge, books 1, 2, 3, 4

On Dying

On Life and Death

On Things in the Underworld

On Nature, books 1, 2

Inquiry on Nature, book 1, Inquiry on Nature, book 2

Beliefs or [The] Eristic [Man]

On Learning, problems

The eighth volume, in which [are]

On Music

On Interpreters

On Homer

On Injustice and Impiety

On Calchas

On [the] Scout

On Pleasure

The ninth volume, in which [are]

On [the] *Odyssey*

On the Wand

Athena or On Telemachus

On Helen and Penelope

On Proteus

Cyclops or On Odysseus

On Use of Wine or On Drunkenness or On the Cyclops

On Circe

On Amphiaraus

On Odysseus and Penelope

On the Dog

The tenth volume, in which [are]

Heracles and Midas

Heracles or On Intelligence and Strength

Kyrnas or Beloved

Lord or Scouts

Menexenus or On Ruling

Alcibiades

Archelaus or On Kingship

And this is what he wrote.

Importance of the Testimonium

Among the dozens of catalogs preserved by Diogenes Laertius, this list of titles is outstanding for its length, structure, detail, and range of topic. The most nearly comparable lists are those for Democritus, Aristotle, Theophrastus, Heraclides of Pontus, and Chrysippus, which are also long, detailed, wide ranging, and systematic, and these comparanda might indicate the value attributed to Antisthenes' works by at least some part of ancient tradition. Since almost all of the works listed are lost, the catalog itself is the best surviving evidence for Antisthenes' range of thought, presented here in a structure probably imposed by an editor, but without the stonger mediation of a text with a true author. A mediating party in the time period between Antisthenes and Diogenes Laertius would have been interested, most likely, in asserting what school Antisthenes belonged to and what kind of thinker—rhetorical or philosophical, Socratic or sophistic, Cynic or Stoic—he was; but this catalog betrays little of this kind of agenda, and its arrangement, while structured, is hard to describe under these categories. Whereas Diogenes Laertius' biography and doxography of Antisthenes (6.1–16) do depend on such Hellenistic traditions, this book list represents Antisthenes' literary output in a more direct way. This catalog also documents Antisthenes' substantial body of writing on logical topics (*tomoi* 6–7) and ethical topics (*tomoi* 2–3 and presumably *passim*), well beyond what the surviving testimonia would suggest. Although he might have said the same trivial things in many texts at great length, this is only one possibility, and it is more likely that his large output indicates a major contribution to the Socratic discourse of the 390s, 380s, 370s, and 360s. The catalog is also remarkably complete by reference to the Antisthenean titles documented separately: although some titles of works that do not appear here are mentioned, there is no clear case that cannot be identified with one of the works listed (Decleva Caizzi 1966:77–78; Patzer 1970:150–63; see also t. 41D, 84A, 137A, 159D, 197). Patzer (1970, following suggestions in Decleva Caizzi's 1966 edition) organized his treatment of Antisthenes around this book catalog, and the ordering of fragments in SSR also follows it. See Decleva Caizzi 1966:77–78; Patzer 1970:91–255; Giannantoni 1990 v.4:235–56. Brancacci 1990:17–41 discusses the sixth and seventh *tomoi*. Susemihl 1887 is basic for disputes about authenticity in the tenth *tomos*.

Composition of the Catalog

The arrangement of titles must be that of a later scholar, not Antisthenes, but one who was using some method more deliberate than reproducing the *pinakes* (πίνακες), or lists, of a library's holdings. (See Regenbogen 1950: esp.

col. 1428–34, 1438–45; Blum 1991:199–202; Patzer 1970:118–27.) Most of the book lists preserved by Diogenes Laertius are from the *pinakes*: these tend to be organized alphabetically, by literary genre, or in no apparent way at all. This list is, instead, a systematic catalog by topic and thus seems to have been transcribed from an edition of Antisthenes’ writings, probably assembled for educational or scholarly use. (See Mansfeld 1994:10–57.) That it is structured as ten *tomoi*, using a term (τόμοι, “volumes”) with physical connotations, suggests an edition (see the discussion of τόμος below). The date of the catalog is unknown, but the complexity of the titles, which sometimes include three different styles bound together, makes it likely that the author came relatively late in the tradition and was a late Hellenistic or early Roman scholar. The writings of Aristotle, Plato, and others seem to have been collected, edited, and organized as the foundation of school curricula in the last century of the Roman Republic and first century of the Roman Empire. No editorial names are transmitted in association with Antisthenes’ writings, as they are for Aristotle and Plato, but a Stoic of the late republic or early empire is a plausible guess: Decleva Caizzi 1966:77 mentions Panaetius (see t. 43B); also plausible is a contemporary of Thrasyllus, who probably organized Plato’s writings in the time of Tiberius (Diog. Laert. 3.56–61): the three styles of title are nearly parallel to those in the Thrasyllan catalog of Plato. (See details on the individual titles.) Also plausible is an origin in Pergamum, where Antisthenes’ writings were surely held in the great library: Herodicus of Babylon had them available to compare with the writings of Plato (t. 147), and Antisthenes’ portrait was also there (see t. 197).

Systematic Arrangement

A basic systematic arrangement is clear on a naive reading, although some sections offer special problems. Basically, we find one volume on rhetoric; two volumes on ethics and politics; two volumes containing Antisthenes’ most famous fictions about Cyrus and Heracles, with Aspasia also; two volumes on language, dialectic, and epistemology, with eschatology also; two volumes on Homer; and one final volume of shorter pieces named after both mythical and historical characters. The symmetry across the sections is remarkable, as well the round number of ten volumes. Although we have little secure knowledge about the content of most of the texts named, the position of a title within the catalog is often suggestive. The meaning of the overall structure of the catalog remains controversial, but in the second through seventh *tomoi*, a sequence of human maturation and education is plausible: the second *tomos* offers titles on the “nature of animals” and procreation, followed by a lengthy “protreptic” text and then a sequence of ethical titles, first directly under Antisthenes’ name and then under the names of his most famous ethical characters; next

comes dialectic, beginning perhaps with negative attacks on rival accounts (namely, Plato's) and apparently advancing to Antisthenes' positive doctrines based in correct use of names; eschatology concludes (nearly) the seventh *tomos*. If this is the core sequence, the position of the rhetorical first *tomos*, the eighth and ninth *tomoi* on Homer, and the tenth *tomos* must be explained as external: it is most likely that the compiler of the catalog saw the style, genre, or methods in these texts either outside of "philosophy" or outside the scheme of birth to death. The first, eighth, and ninth *tomoi*, on rhetoric and Homer, have sometimes been considered products of Antisthenes' pre-Socratic career, when he was under the influence of the Sophists (see, e.g., Rankin 1986:151–78). Whether such a period existed can be debated (see t. 9). Giannantoni 1990 v.4:235 appeals to the volume of Antisthenes' texts in itself as evidence that his writing career was longer than his Socratic career. The tenth *tomos* might contain titles considered spurious in antiquity (as Susemihl 1887 argues), although many are referred to elsewhere as though they are genuine. The philosophically useful order for reading the works of an author in antiquity was the *schema isagogicum*, that is, the order in which a beginning student ought to approach the texts so as to appreciate, eventually, the author's greatest truths in their fullest complexity (Mansfeld 1994:10–57). On the order of the texts or some of the sequences, see also Decleva Caizzi 1966:77–87; Patzer 1970:127–43; Brancacci 1990:17–41.

Titles and Alternative Titles

The irregular structure of the titles and subtitles in the Antisthenean catalog suggests that these were given at a time previous to the assembly of the catalog, probably at various times. At least some titles must have been given by Antisthenes, *Sathon* and *Aletheia* in the sixth *tomos* and the puns on the names of Lysias and Isocrates in the first (see Brancacci 1990:19 n.10). The Stoic Persaeus, a pupil of Zeno, apparently referred to three of Antisthenes' texts in the mid-third century BCE under the titles *Small Cyrus*, *Lesser Heracles*, and probably *Alcibiades* (t. 43A, a difficult passage). The titles have three basic forms, the same three forms found in the Thrasyllan catalog of Plato. The first is a prepositional phrase, consisting usually of περί ("about" or "concerning") with either a noun, an adjective with no article, or an infinitive verb with an article, used as the substantive. This is apparently the oldest form of title for Greek treatises, dating from the Pre-Socratic inquiries into nature, περί φύσεως (see, e.g., Obbink 1996:82–83, citing older scholarship); but it is also used for Plato's dialogues. This form is dominant in Antisthenes' catalog: of the sixty-four texts, fifty-two have at least one title in this form, and there are sixty such titles overall (including six double titles with two περί forms and one triple title, *On the Use of Wine or On Drunkenness or On the*

Cyclops, 9.7). Abstract nouns without a preposition occur twice (Ἰσογραφία, 1.5; Ἀλήθεια, 6.1), and these must be more polemical versions of the first title form or perhaps implied proper names. The second form is a proper name. Titles in this form have parallels in the titles for most of Plato's dialogues in the Thrasyllan catalog, which is reason to conjecture that such titles in Antisthenes' catalog also designate dialogues named for the main speaker or monologues in the voice of a character, as they do in the cases of the extant speeches *Ajax* and *Odysseus*. This form occurs in seventeen titles, which are listed mostly in the fourth, fifth, and tenth *tomoi* (with the addition of Plato in the sixth and Isocrates and Lysias in the first, under punning versions). The third form is a descriptive adjective, which normally implies the noun "discourse" (λόγος) but in some cases implies "man" (άνήρ or άνθρωπος). The titles in this form have been considered the most mysterious, since it is unclear whether they describe the subject matter of the text or its rhetorical style, as they do in the Thrasyllan catalog. (See Brancacci 1990:20–34.) The titles έρωτικός (2.2), φυσιογνωμονικός (2.3), and οικονομικός (3.8) certainly indicate subject matter, not style; possible anachronism of the terminology remains a problem. (See notes on 2.3 and 3.8.) However, the titles προτρεπτικός (2.4), αντιλογικός (6.2), and έριστικός (7.2 and 7.10) could mean either that the texts are, respectively, about exhortation to philosophy, about constructively spirited philosophical debate, and about antagonistic or competitive discussion, or that the texts are written in styles or with goals thought by later arbiters to be protreptic, antilogical, or eristic. In cases where the conjunction ή occurs before titles of this form (7.2 and 7.10: some editors would omit the conjunctions), the noun to be understood could be "man" rather than "discourse": for possible parallels to "man," see also t. 179A and 204, where titles are given in forms not in the catalog. On the rhetorical styles of philosophical texts, identified in scholarship largely from Epictetus' *Discourses* (3.23), see t. 46 and Slings 1995. Like the titles built from περί, this third form of title is attested in the fourth century BCE: Aristotle refers to Plato's *Symposium* as οί έρωτικοί λόγοι (*Pol.* 1262b11). Beyond the titles of this form occurring in the catalog are external attestations of the titles πολιτικός (t. 204), φυσικός (t. 179, 180), and (in a clear reference to a person's character rather than the character of the text) φιλοστέφανος (t. 197). Brancacci (1990:27–28) argues that most titles in the sixth and seventh *tomoi* are designations for *skopos* or topic, not *character* or style. Beyond the puzzles concerning the meaning of the individual titles are puzzles concerning how they are combined and whether a double or triple title indicates alternative labels assigned in different traditions that have converged in this catalog or whether it indicates some sort of double perspective assigned by a single author of titles, as it might have in the case of Thrasyllus, cataloger of Plato. It

is plausible that all the alternatives are titles clearly implied by the text, in its opening lines. See t. 197 for the possibility of a genuinely double title, given by one person.

Notes

τόμοι δέκα: Diogenes Laertius calls the ten sections of his list the τόμοι, a rare use of this term and unique in the *Lives of the Philosophers*. It seems to designate physical units (“volumes”) defined partly by common thematic content and partly by a uniform length, presumably a papyrus scroll larger than average. The term τόμος might imply symmetrical sections, as it seems to for Porphyry, who refers (in *Life of Plotinus* 24) to the ten τόμοι in Apollodorus of Athens’ edition of Epicharmus, which he aims to imitate for Plotinus’ writings, through a symmetrical ordering he then describes. Birt (1882:450) found the number ten reminiscent of “the ten solid columns of the Stoa.” If the term τόμος was assigned with any reference to the proto-Cynic identity of Antisthenes, it could have been crafted in opposition to σύντομος ὁδός, the Cynic “shortcut” (see t. 136): reading the complete works of Antisthenes could constitute the full route in education, not the shortcut, and emphasizing this could have been an interest of a Stoic editor (see t. 135B). (This connection was suggested by John Moles, in conversation.) Because some thematically unified sections of the catalog overlap the boundaries of the τόμοι (3–5, 6–7, 8–9), it seems likely that each τόμος had a roughly fixed length. At the same time, parts of the catalog, especially the seventh τόμος on language and discourse, seem to demand more than the amount of space implied as standard elsewhere. Thus Patzer (1970:127–43), through a survey of theories posed about the nature of these τόμοι, proposes that the τόμος was a bundle or set of scrolls, each unfixed in size, ranging from two to seventeen papyrus rolls and averaging five to six rolls, for a total corpus of about fifty to sixty rolls, perhaps five thousand modern printed pages, written over fifty or sixty years of continuous output (Patzer 1970:92). However, Johnson (2004) has shown that the textual capacity of papyrus rolls can vary radically, to judge from the sample preserved from Oxyrhynchus (Johnson 2004:217–30 = table 3.7): Plato’s *Gorgias*, about 120 modern printed pages, would fill a scroll of 8 meters in the hand of one scribe (POxy 0454) or a scroll of 26.4 meters in the hand of another (POxy 3156), a difference more than three-fold. Further, it is unclear that the papyrus scroll had a standard length, and Johnson’s estimates vary by more than 2,000 percent, from 1.2 to 29.1 meters. A single “edition” of one author’s works written in a single hand would probably not vary so widely. From the testimonies of Jerome (t. 12C) and Timon (t. 41B), there can be little doubt about the overall magnitude of Antisthenes’ literary production; and Epictetus, Fronto, Cassius Longinus, and Julian name him together with Plato and Xenophon as though his corpus

is comparable (t. 46–48, 44). Regarding the size of Antisthenes' corpus, then, little depends on the precise nature of the τόμος. The question of the τόμος is important, however, for our assumptions about the magnitude of Antisthenes' individual works, both the famous *Cyrus* and *Heracles* that occupied half a τόμος each (as well as the unlabeled *Aspasia* that was apparently equal in scale) and those that have several parts (the *Protreptics*, *On Gainsaying*, *On the Use of Names*, *On Knowledge and Opinion*, *On Nature*) designated with signs otherwise used only for book-length divisions (see discussion under title 2.4); there is a large difference between imagining these parts as equivalent to book divisions in Plato or Xenophon and imagining them as much shorter sections in the range of three to five modern pages, similar to the only extant texts from Antisthenes, *Ajax* and *Odysseus*. The τόμος is important also for the thematic unity of the sections and the sequence of the arrangement, especially in the second and seventh τόμοι, where the most troublesome breaks occur. In the absence of evidence, we can only conjecture. Just as the size of the scrolls was standardized but also probably quite flexible, so the thematic unity of each *tomos* was probably reasoned but also, when necessary, arbitrary. *Aspasia*, like *Cyrus* and *Heracles*, might have been on the scale of a longer Platonic dialogue such as *Gorgias*, and ancient indications of book divisions could have been lost in transmission (Patzner 1970:143). The multi-sectioned *Protreptics*, *On Gainsaying*, *On the Use of Names*, *On Knowledge and Opinion*, and *On Nature* might have been in the range of forty modern pages, one-third the length of Plato's *Gorgias*, to keep their length proportional to their positions within their τόμοι containing many works.

First τόμος: This *tomos*, containing probably six works (assuming the combination of titles in 1.5), consisted of forensic speeches in the voices of mythical characters and texts about forensic speeches and speech writers. This section of the catalog was believed by earlier scholars (as reflected in Rankin 1986:151–73) to represent a pre-Socratic, “sophistic” phase in Antisthenes' career, but close reading of the extant *Ajax* and *Odysseus* speeches shows how fully Socratic these texts are (see commentary on t. 53–54), and there is no clear sign that any of Antisthenes' writing is from a pre-Socratic period. (See t. 9, 12A; Patzner 1970:246–55.) Possibly the author of the catalog thought these texts should be separated as “rhetoric.”

1. Περὶ λέξεως ἢ Περὶ χαρακτήρων

This first title in the *tomos*, like several others (especially in the sixth through ninth *tomoi*), seems to introduce the topic of the set. Unlike most of the others, however, this is a double title, which associates either two aspects of rhetoric or one aspect of rhetoric and one aspect of ethics. The term λέξις

(diction) is plausibly Antisthenean: it is cognate with λέγειν and λόγος, which were critically important to Antisthenes and his contemporaries (t. 150–59), and it is common in Plato and Aristotle as a technical term for the vocabulary, diction, or style of a text, author, or speaker. The term χαρακτήρων, plural from χαρακτήρ (character), is more problematic. In the later terminology of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, χαρακτήρ refers to a level of rhetorical style: the canonical three levels of style recognized in the late Roman Republic and early Roman Empire, which scholars have tried to trace back to Theophrastus, are the “characters of diction” (χαρακτήρες τῆς λέξεως). Nineteenth-century scholars hence proposed that Antisthenes first developed such a theory. (For a survey, see Luzzatto 1996:277–81.) But no fourth-century rhetorical text, either by Theophrastus or by Aristotle or Anaximenes, uses the term χαρακτήρ as Dionysius later uses it. The sense of ethical “type,” however, was in use in Antisthenes’ time. Derived from the verb χαράσσω, “I stamp,” the noun χαρακτήρ designated the product of this stamping, as in the stamp or type of coined currency. In late fifth-century drama, it had common metaphorical usage for “types” of person, with reference to outer, perceptible traits of persons, such as their appearance or—in, for example, Aristophanes’ *Peace* (217 ff.; 421 BCE)—style of speech. In Theophrastus’ *Ethical Characters* (ἠθικαὶ χαρακτήρες) of a century later, the term referred instead to types of inner subjectivity (to be distinguished from the subjectivity of individual persons). Given the Socratic interest in the inner, ethical person who is supposed to be trained through discussion, as well as the explicit connections drawn in Socratic texts between knowing oneself and understanding how to use words (e.g., Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.1), it is plausible that Antisthenes used this term in his own work to designate personal types that are the same as or discernible from styles of speech, with some view also to types of subjectivity. In Antisthenes’ interpretation of Odysseus πολύτροπος (t. 187), a double conception of the term τρόπος in the meanings “ethical character” (ἦθος), on the one hand, and “use of verbal account” (χρήσις τοῦ λόγου), on the other, is an important step in the argument: this passage supports the possibility that the present title poses a close relationship between the ethical and linguistic aspects of types of persons. (See also Patzer 1970:164–90; Patzer wishes to assign t. 187 to this title.) Moreover, if the extant *Ajax* and *Odysseus* were assigned their positions in the catalog because they illustrate general points presented in this opening text, this makes the ethical meaning of χαρακτήρ quite likely: Ajax and Odysseus debate the nature and measures of virtue while also instantiating different types of virtue and using language and names in markedly different ways. (See t. 53–54.) For the term elsewhere in Antisthenes’ testimonia, see t. 44C, 46. The term “cross-stamp the currency” (παραχάραξαι τὸ νόμισμα), with reference to ethical norms, is an imperative

in Cynicism from Diogenes of Sinope (e.g., Diog. Laert. 6.20), and the shared use of this term might be more than a coincidence. In this opening text, Antisthenes might have asserted a positive statement or program about the connection between personal rhetoric and ethics. Whether it was a systematic doctrine of “something like *ethopoia*” (Kennedy 1963:172) or just proclamation cannot be judged.

2. Αἴας ἢ Αἴαντος λόγος

This text survives: see t. 53 and the comment on the following title. It seems plausible from the position of these titles in the catalog, as well as their content, that these were pieces designed to attract pupils for Antisthenes.

3. Ὀδυσσεὺς ἢ [Περὶ] Ὀδυσσέως <λόγος>

This text survives: see t. 54. Casaubon (sixteenth century) edited the title of Odysseus’ speech to parallel that of Ajax’ speech. The asymmetry of the transmitted titles, if it is not a crude error or confusion with the famous Περὶ Ὀδυσσεΐας (title 9.1, t. 50), suggests that the speeches were not considered exactly parallel by the author of the catalog. Indeed, the speeches are quite different in tone, and their pairing has been doubted. (See Focardi 1987.) Dorandi 2013:415 is the first modern editor to doubt Casaubon’s emendation, although he, too, prints the emended text.

4. Ὅρεστων ἀπολογία

The *Defense Speech of Orestes*, which does not survive, was presumably similar in form to *Ajax* and *Odysseus*, although without a partner text. Orestes’ speech probably responded to the charge of matricide traditional in the myth, as in the versions in Aeschylus’ *Eumenides* and Euripides’ *Orestes*. If Antisthenes’ speech was like *Ajax* and *Odysseus*, it might have been a depiction and implied psychological examination of the ethical character who would commit matricide, just as *Ajax* is, on one level, a depiction of the character who would commit suicide. Joël (1903 II.655–704) proposed that this text was a response to Antiphon’s speech *Against the Step-Mother*, in which the accused is compared briefly to Clytemnestra. Radermacher (1951:126) saw all three of Antisthenes’ speeches—*Orestes*, *Ajax*, and *Odysseus*—as exercises in speech writing according to rules of oratory, pointing to Aristotle’s reference to an apology of Orestes by Theodectes (*Rhet.* 2.24 1401a35). Chroust (1957:129, 285–86 n.886–87) proposed that Antisthenes was responding to an apology of Clytemnestra by Polycrates, mentioned by Quintilian (2.17.4). It is plausible that all three of Antisthenes’ speeches had meta-rhetorical elements, that is, indications that they not only are paradigmatic speeches but also deliver parodies of speeches or commentary about contemporary

speech making or the construction of personae. The two extant speeches have ethical dimensions, implications for epistemology, and teasing play with the ontological status of previous mythical “facts” as presented in older poetry, all of which is equally plausible for Orestes’ defense speech.

5. Περὶ τῶν δικογράφων <ἢ> Ἰσογράφῃ <ς> καὶ Δεσίας [ἢ Ἰσοκράτης]

This title (or pair of titles, according to the manuscripts) points to polemic against the contemporary speech writers Isocrates and Lysias, whose names are presented through puns. (The reading here follows Declava Caizzi, whose text is also the basis for Marcovich. Pohlenz 1907 first accepted and interpreted the puns transmitted in the manuscript readings. See Giannantonio 1990 v.4:265–70 for a history of the alternatives, most of which restore the real names of the orators.) If this is one text with a double title, it was possibly a dialogue or a parody of a dialogue, with indication of the topic of discussion and the main speakers, as in the Thrasyllan titles for Plato; but on the Thrasyllan model, the order should be reversed. The puns carry jokes on the rhetorical capacities of each orator, in a game Antisthenes played also against Plato (title 6.3; see also t. 147–48) and possibly Aspasia (t. 143A). Isocrates—here renamed “Isographes,” or “Even Writer,” by a change of two Greek letters—was known for writing in parallel syntactical segments having equal prosodic rhythm. (Plato himself is said to be ἰσογράφος by Timon of Phlius [fr. 30 Di Marco].) Lysias—here renamed “Desias,” or “Binder,” also by a change of two letters—was known for enchanting lovers and presumably, by extension, other audiences, at least according to Plato’s parody of his erotic discourse in *Phaedrus* (227c4–6, 231a–234c). In addition, Lysias’ actual name, meaning “one who frees or releases,” has just the opposite meaning to “Binder,” which might then refer to his failures in court, where his clients became bound to penalties (ἐδέθη, as in, e.g., Demos. *On the Crown* 107), rather than released from the charges. Finally, a special sort of freedom of the person was of central importance to Antisthenes and the Cynics (see t. 82, 34F) and also discussed as a goal of action by Lysias and Isocrates, possibly in a different sense: if Antisthenes addressed ethical as well as rhetorical issues here, the name “Binder” might imply failure to deliver real freedom. The appearance of Lysias and Isocrates also elsewhere in the Socratic discourse suggests that they were the contemporaries closest to the boundaries of the actual Socratic movement, perhaps its closest external rivals: Plato refers to both in *Phaedrus*, and Lysias is also mentioned in *Clitophon* (406a) as someone with whom the title character has discussed his meetings with Socrates; the *Republic* is set in his father’s house. (*Clitophon*, in turn, might have associations with Antisthenes: see t. 208.) Lysias was said to have written a defense speech for Socrates’ trial, which Socrates rejected (Diog. Laert. 2.40–

41); he is also reported to have written an *On Sycophancy* against the Socratic Aeschines (Diog. Laert. 2.63). Isocrates, for his part, attacked the Socratics for useless educational methods and goals, especially in *Against the Sophists* and *Helen*, and pairing this title with the next supports the possibility that some of his attack was against Antisthenes in particular. (See t. 66, 156, 170.)

6. Πρὸς τὸν Ἰσοκράτους Ἀμάρτυρον

Isocrates' *Without Witnesses* is an extant forensic speech now known under the title *Against Euthynus*, probably delivered soon after the restoration of the democracy in 403 BCE, to which Lysias wrote the opposing *Against Nicias concerning the Deposit*, known by title only. Isocrates' speaker uses arguments from "evidence" and probability that do not depend on the testimony of eyewitnesses, who are lacking for the key incident. See t. 55. The form of this title suggests a text in a monologic authorial voice, addressed to the historical Isocrates, but parody is a possibility. If the text was a forensic speech, like titles 1.2–4, it might have been separated from the others because title 1.5 stands as an introduction.

Second τόμος: This *tomos*, containing probably five texts (assuming one double title), that is, three one-part texts and two titles consisting in five shorter parts described as "protreptics," introduces a sequence of ethical texts that continues into the third *tomos*. The three titles before the "protreptics" stand outside this ethical sequence and call for separate explanation. Nineteenth-century scholars assigned these three titles to the domain of natural science (physics), allegedly a separate catalog section that, some thought, was resumed in the second half of the seventh *tomos*, where eschatology and theology were added: the separation of these sequences was considered an error in the tradition. (See Patzer 1970:127–35; Giannantoni 1990 v.4:250–53.) Under this understanding, these writings would have addressed what would become the Peripatetic and Stoic field of physics, and behind the arrangement in *tomoi* 2–7 of the catalog would stand the tripartite division of Stoic philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic, possibly in the order ethics, logic, and physics. However, the titles on marriage and childbearing and the "physiognomic" work on the Sophists have immediate ethical and political associations, and it is more likely that all three of these texts were ethical, not part of natural science. The three titles together are united by an interest in human nature as defined by comparison to animals, whereas the titles on nature and eschatology at the end of the seventh *tomos* might consider human nature by comparison to gods: this understanding yields both a birth-to-death sequence and a sequence in the order of being.

1. Περὶ ζώων φύσεως

The terms in the first title, *On the Nature of Animals*, suggest two oppositions that were important in Pre-Socratic Greek thought: nature or φύσις was opposed to culture or νόμος, according to many versions of this claim being made in the latter half of the fifth century (Heinimann 1945), and animals were opposed to humans, according to a standard conception of Greek identity (Diog. Laert. 1.33). Both Antisthenes and the Cynics continued to oppose φύσις against νόμος, and they drove this opposition to various radical extremes, sometimes for reasons different from those of the Sophists. Since the term νόμος occurs in two titles in the third τόμος of Antisthenes' catalog, it is plausible that this opposition is important in the sequence, which might, then, proceed from nature to culture. Although Antisthenes prefers φύσις over νόμος in his theology (t. 179A), and the Cynics and Stoics, too, promoted nature over custom in their call to live according to nature (κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν, Diog. Laert. 6.71, 6.94, 7.4), one should not assume that his views were simple. It might be that some aspects of nature—that is, the nature that humans share with the animals—need education or enculturation in order to become good. (See t. 123 for a negative sense of φύσις.) A double conception of nature, in which a primitive nature needs culture and in which a higher inborn nature is served or even liberated by the right culture, could explain the divided positions of the φύσις titles in the catalog. Regarding animals, the positions of Antisthenes and the Cynics were also different from traditional Greek ideology. Traditional Greek thought cast animals as an important category of the “other,” polarized so completely to the ideal, male, Greek-speaking self that there was no blurring of boundaries between human and beast but were only reversals or monstrous combinations of body parts, as they occur in myths and polemic such as Semonides' poem on the races of women. Thales (and also Socrates) was credited with the statement that he thanked fortune that he was born a human and not a beast, a man and not a woman, a Greek and not a barbarian (Diog. Laert. 1.33). By contrast, the view of humanity developed by both Antisthenes and the Cynics rejected an a priori opposition between humans and beasts, together with these other oppositions. (Continuity between humans and animals was clear also for Aristotle, as it had been for Empedocles and other Pre-Socratics.) In Antisthenes' texts and testimonia, animals remain largely negative models, but they reside on a continuum with human beings, not in polar opposition: humans who are like animals seem to be deficient in virtue (t. 54.14, 96, 189A-2). Antisthenes might have emphasized that, ideology aside, humans *are* animals, and every human risks being no more than an animal when he or she does not cultivate virtue. Animals are also metaphors for humans in Antisthenes' testimonia,

where they seem to be meant as funny when the issue is not an individual's personal virtue but social relationships and hierarchies (t. 5, 68). For Diogenes of Sinope, dogs became positive models for lifestyle, because they lacked the noxious aspects of culture: the name of the Cynic sect is famously "the Dogs" (see t. 22B). If humans and animals were similar as well as different for Antisthenes in the way described, then *On the Nature of Animals* might stand first in the ethical sequence because it laid out what the human, as an animal, essentially is. The basic facts that humans are born, they move, they eat, they grow, they seek protection from the elements, and they die might have been discussed in a way that set foundations for ethics. Reflections of such a basis for ethics are in t. 82.

2. Περὶ παιδοποιίας ἢ Περὶ γάμου ἐρωτικός

This text might have been the source for the report that Antisthenes advocated marriage (or mating) for the sake of reproduction (t. 58). This statement conflicts with the lifestyle Antisthenes claims for himself (see t. 82; compare t. 57). But the main topic in this text could have been not the partners in marriage but their children, whose foundations might have been tracked to the marriage that produced them. There is little attested interest in childhood in classical Athens, but passages in books 8 and 9 of Plato's *Republic* give colorful treatments of the origins of men's political views in the natal family. The term ἐρωτικός indicates that the text also treated the erotic attraction between the partners in marriage. This could seem at odds with the picture of philosophical love of the soul that dominates the extant testimonia (see t. 14A, 84C, 92A–C, 134k; contrast also 123, 175), but Antisthenes, like the character Socrates in the *Symposium* of Xenophon, might have recognized two kinds of love, a sublime form consummated through philosophy and a bodily form intended for reproduction and therefore always heterosexual. (See t. 14A, 123.) Possibly some marriages, like that of Odysseus and Penelope, had both.

3. Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν φυσιογνωμονικός

T. 62 (from Athenaeus' *Wise Men at Dinner*) is said to come from "the physiognomic discourse," and historical interpretations of this title are based on that evidence. (See discussion in Giannantoni 1990 v. 4:281–83.) It seems that the Sophists and their pupils are assimilated to animals (pigs in t. 62). Most interpretations of this title assume that Antisthenes used a kind of physiognomic system in a positive way (if with humor), to show the nature of the Sophists' souls through their external animal forms. It has also been proposed that this text by Antisthenes parodied and thus rejected the art of physiognomics. Possibly the label "physiognomonic" was applied at a later date to Antisthenes' text but did not occur in it; but a craft of physiognomics,

in which inner character was inferred from external appearances, was featured in Socratic literature, most famously in the *Zopyrus* of Phaedo (SSR IIIA 11: see Döring 1997; Rosetti 1973, 1980). This text portrayed the traveling physiognomist Zopyrus in an encounter with Socrates: he misread Socrates' character from his face (declaring him stupid and excessively inclined to sex with women) and was shown up as a fool. Socrates emphasized in his rebuttal that his basic nature might have been as Zopyrus read it but that his character had been reformed through philosophy. This yields a negative view of physiognomics for Phaedo, but this could have been a topic for polemic among the Socratics. Despite the famous disparity between Socrates' ugly external form and his beautiful soul (Pl. *Sym.* 215a6–b4; Xen. *Sym.* 5.8–10), the idea that a person's external form represents his or her inner nature seems consistent with some evidence for Antisthenes (t. 193) and with Xen. *Mem.* 3.10.1–5, where Socrates interviews the painter Parrhesias about the way a beautiful (ethical) face is portrayed. Antisthenes' ability to recognize a horse at sight (t. 149) and presumably to distinguish it from the similarly appearing ass (see t. 72A) could imply that he thought essential traits are accessible to sense perception. Possibly physiognomics could be used to “read” souls only in pre-philosophical beings, as Socrates' retort to Zopyrus suggests and as the current title might uphold, or possibly Antisthenes meant his comparisons of the Sophists and their pupils to animals as a telling metaphor rather than a serious claim.

4. Περί δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀνδρείας προτρεπτικὸς πρῶτος, δεύτερος, τρίτος

This is the catalog's first title built from terms central to Socratic ethics as they are known from Plato and Xenophon. Because the text is also called “protreptic,” it seems to be preliminary to the further Socratic-sounding titles in the third τόμος. For Diogenes Laertius (t. 11B), Pollux (t. 64C–D), and Athenaeus (t. 63), *Protreptics* or *Protreptic* is the primary title of the work or set of works. This is also the catalog's first title to have enumerated parts, here signified in the fully written words “first, second, third” rather than with the letters used normally for ordinal numbers. Surviving testimonia (t. 63–66) indicate that the *Protreptics* were set at least partly as a symposium, at which Socrates appeared as a speaker (t. 64A). Possibly these were Socratic dialogues with multiple interlocutors, as one would find at a symposium and finds in Plato's *Symposium* and Xenophon's *Symposium*. Diogenes Laertius cites the *Protreptics* as an example of dialogue into which Antisthenes inserted the rhetorical form (t. 11B): so longer speeches must have been included. Possibly the subtitle “protreptic” refers instead to extended, protreptic speeches included within the text at the setting of the symposium: the number three, then, might have indicated three speeches rather than three books. But the

numbering of the next title in the catalog, *On Theognis*, with the more normal signs for “fourth” and “fifth,” shows that the cataloger understood the numbers to refer to three books of protreptic content, to which he understood the two books *On Theognis* as a sequel: the cataloger seems to have inherited the labels “first, second, third” and continued the series in the more common idiom, which is also used elsewhere in the catalog. This more normal enumeration system designates book-length parts in all known cases (Wilamowitz 1919 II:26). (For further proposals about the forms of these titles, see Giannantoni 1990 v.4:285–86.) It is hard to doubt that at least some of these five texts, the three pieces *On Justice and Courage* and the two pieces *On Theognis*, were among Xenophon’s sources for his Socratic *Symposium*. Justice and courage are topics of discussion for Xenophon’s symposiasts, in both the unstructured discussion of chapter 2 and the cycle of speeches in chapters 3 and 4; and Antisthenes is featured centrally in discussion of both virtues (justice in t. 78, 83; courage in t. 78, 103A). There are also detailed correspondences. At 2.4 is quoted a passage from *Theognis* (verses 35–36) that can otherwise be associated with Antisthenes: it is quoted again at *Mem.* 1.2.20, in a context where Xenophon disputes the permanence of moral virtue in relationship to Alcibiades, a topic Antisthenes probably handled (see t. 99, 103C, 198–9). Most passages explicitly attributed in ancient sources to Antisthenes’ *Protreptics* are discussions of drinking cups (t. 64–65), a topic also evoked in Xenophon’s *Symposium* (2.26 = t. 67). The thesis that the *Protreptics* were the main source for Xenophon’s *Symposium* was argued in detail in Joël 1893–1901 v.2.2:708–949: see the summary and assessment in SSR v.4:290–94. Joël’s lengthy treatment is marred by unmethodical and cumulative speculation, but its basic thesis on this topic seems impossible to doubt. Whether all other material about Antisthenes in Xenophon’s *Symposium*—that is, the debate with Callias about making men just (t. 78, 83), the debate with Niceratus about knowing Homer (t. 185A, 186), the discourse on the wealth of the soul (t. 82), and the joking about Socratic love and procurement (t. 14A, 13A)—should be attributed also to the *Protreptics*, as Joël believed, cannot be proved. Dittmar’s counter-thesis of 1912, that Aeschines’ *Callias* and *Aspasia* were the major sources for some of these passages (which also cannot be proved), has dominated subsequent scholarship: allegedly Aeschines presented a hostile portrait of Antisthenes in these texts. The fact that evidence for Joël’s thesis is scarce cannot be confused (as it is in Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposium*]:364) with the proposition that either there was or there was not a literary relationship between Xenophon and Antisthenes, which a contemporary reader could see. The answer would matter if we knew it.

5. Περὶ Θεόγνιδος δ' ε'

The cataloger understands the two-part text *On Theognis* as a sequel to the text just before: see notes there. *On Theognis* must have been a discussion about the elegiac poetry attributed to Theognis and its moral themes of justice, wealth, and so on, which seems to have been recited and interpreted at Athenian drinking parties, to judge from Xen. *Sym.* 2.4. When Socrates quotes Theognis (verses 35–36) at the symposium, the purpose is to provide a jokingly authoritative answer to the question at hand, how boys become educated in virtue (although the literal question on the table is how the father of the boy can assume the smell of virtue when he is too old for the gym). The same verses are quoted by Plato's Socrates in *Meno* 95d4–e1 to support the positive answer to a dilemma embedded in Theognis' corpus, whether or not teaching virtue is possible. It is impossible to know from Xenophon's and Plato's use of this quotation how Antisthenes would have used Theognis. Possibly Theognis' verses provided a provocative springboard from which discussion continued, whether in support or opposition, in the same way Homer's text functions for Antisthenes (t. 187–92). Theognis recommended a ποικίλον ἦθος (“varied character,” verses 213–18, 1071–74: see Thimme 1935:16–18), in a positive, political sense that could have been an inspiration for Antisthenes' own analysis of Odysseus πολύτροπος (t. 54, 187). Stobaeus (4.29c.53), in a section called “On Good Birth,” preserves an excerpt from a text he calls *On Theognis* by Xenophon, and some have proposed that this is an error for Antisthenes: a summary of this discussion is in Giannantoni 1990 v.4:286–89.

Third τόμος: After the *Protreptics*, the eight titles in the third *tomos* offer a series of ethical and political terms familiar from Socratic literature. By contrast with most of the other *tomoi*, the third contains no proper names. The contrast to the fourth, fifth, and tenth *tomoi*, where the primary titles are almost all proper names, is sharp. Those other texts, moreover, are cited in the doxographical tradition for Antisthenes' positions on ethical topics (see esp. t. 85, 98, 99), whereas no explicit attribution survives to any title in the third *tomos*. This might indicate that these texts were abstract, formal, or possibly aporetic treatments of the same ethical topics treated in a more positive or demonstrative style elsewhere, embedded in the stories of heroes. Döring 1995 proposes that “definitions” of virtues might have been sought in these texts, but the conclusions were statements about what *kind* of thing the virtues were (ποῖόν τι), not *what* they were (τί), in true satisfaction of the Socratic question. (See t. 150A.4.) According to Brancacci 1990, Antisthenes did find definitions of ethical terms. Possibly the material in these texts was

absorbed or repeated by writers such as Plato, Xenophon, Aristotle, and the Stoics, but Antisthenes' contributions were not acknowledged because they appeared primitive or inconclusive. The form of the titles in this *tomos* suggests dialogues, but without characterized interlocutors. The conversations in Xen. *Mem.* 4.2, the Platonic *Clitophon* and *Theages*, and the short dialogues of the *Appendix Platonica* exemplify a simple dialogue style that Antisthenes could have used. In these, Socrates' interlocutor is minimally characterized, often has no name, and takes no real role in the discussion, except to agree with Socrates, perhaps as a model for the reader. (For coincidences that might point to Antisthenes as author of this kind of dialogue, see t. 13A.56, 72B.8.) Müller 1972 argues for a close relationship between *On Justice* in the *Appendix Platonica* and Antisthenes' work, possibly title 3.4 below. See also Müller 1995 and title 3.4 below. The only avenues for interpreting these titles are from their ordering and collective position in what seems to be a special section of the catalog, on ethics and politics; their terminology in the context of Socratic literature; and (with Brancacci 1990, but with caution) the reception and integration of these same terms by Xenophon and later authors, such as Dio Chrysostom.

1. Περὶ ἀγαθοῦ

This text presumably pursued or presented a revisionist, Socratic account of “good,” in opposition to popular accounts focused on wealth, social status, or pleasure. The absence of an article in this title might be significant, in line with Antisthenes' denial of Plato's theory of Forms. (See t. 85.) In the catalog and in all of Antisthenes' remains, there seems to be no instance of a nominalized adjective meant in the general or universal sense. T. 187.9–11 has abstract substantive adjectives, all neuter singular formulations that refer to individual items, not to universals. (They might also be Porphyry's language.) The Form of the Good was Plato's central Form and the one that Aristotle criticized in most detail.

2. Περὶ ἀνδρείας

In distinction from the protreptics on justice and courage, this text might have sought an account of courage, such as Xenophon's Socrates pursues in *Mem.* 4.6.10 and Plato's in *Laches*.

3. Περὶ νόμου ἢ Περὶ πολιτείας

This title and the following are both *On Law*, and (unless they are doublets) the distinction is in the second title. Here the actual Athenian state could have been the topic, possibly in the wake of the reign of the Thirty (whose contempt for the “established constitution,” τῆς καθεστῶσης πολιτείας, was blamed on Socrates, according to Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.9) or the restoration

of the democracy in 403 BCE, which newly distinguished between statutes (νόμοι) and the “constitution” (πολιτεία). Title 3.4, in distinction, might have treated ideal norm or custom and its relationship to the fine and just in their ideal or Socratic sense (Decleva Caizzi 1966:80). The second title here, περὶ πολιτείας, invites comparison with Plato’s work by a similar name, as well as the tradition apparently formed by Diogenes of Sinope’s *Politeia*, Zeno of Citium’s *Politeia*, and Chrysippus’ *On the Politeia*. Aristophanes’ *Ecclesiazousai* (388 BCE) seems also to parody a previously proposed communist state, and Plato’s *Politeia* (c. 378 BCE) could be rehabilitating the older philosophical proposal in the wake of this attack. (See Ussher 1973:xv–xx.) The ideas shared by Aristophanes and Plato seem to be Socratic, and one likely promulgator of such ideas in the 390s, after the Athenians undertook various real constitutional reforms and finally restored the democracy, might be Antisthenes. See t. 22A, where Diogenes Laertius seems to credit Antisthenes with the political ideas on which Zeno and Diogenes built. Antisthenes goes unnoticed, however, in important contexts where communist states are discussed: Aristotle’s discussion of communist proposals in *Pol.* 2.5–7 1262b37–67b21 never mentions him but says directly that Plato was the first to make women and children common and to institute common meals; Diogenes Laertius (7.131) lists Zeno, Chrysippus, Plato, and Diogenes as advocates of the community of wives and children. From the statements and implications about marriage in title 2.2 and t. 58, it seems that Antisthenes did not advocate for community of wives and children, although from t. 59 and 82.38, it seems that he did assume sexual relations were promiscuous. From t. 82, further, it seems that Antisthenes would have advocated for the economic self-sufficiency of each household, not for communism. On his possible discussion of the community of Homer’s Cyclopes in these terms, see t. 189. Yet the property of the household that Antisthenes imagines in t. 82 is minimal, and he might have proposed generous sharing among friends to account for the higher pleasures in life: according to Diogenes’ doxography, “the wise man is self-sufficient, for everything of others is also his” (t. 134e), and the same idea is in Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.6.10); Antisthenes is plausible as the link from Socrates to the Cynics. Antisthenes’ Socrates shares his wisdom, the most valuable ware in the city, generously without attention to weight and measure (t. 82.44). An economic communism of a certain kind—one that makes the best goods from wisdom shared or public and, through private minimalism, creates space for personal leisure to engage in true pleasures such as conversation with the wise—would fit with these ideas. If Antisthenes’ more literal pronouncements about politics favored the household and ignored or attacked the city, this could be the reason that he is not acknowledged in the tradition (unless through parody in Plato’s *Republic*).

4. Περὶ νόμου ἢ Περὶ καλοῦ καὶ δικαίου

According to the doxography (t. 134g), Antisthenes said that the wise man will be governed not by the “legislated laws” (τοὺς κειμένους νόμους) but by the law of virtue. On law, see also t. 68, 189; on behavior contrary to law, see t. 141A, 189A-1 and B-2. Müller 1975:174–87 argues that the pseudo-Platonic Περὶ δικαίου (*On Justice*) stems from this text; Müller 1995 argues, further, that both the pseudo-Platonic *Minos* and Cicero’s *De legibus* also depend on this same text by Antisthenes; in Cicero’s case, there would probably be an intermediate, Stoic source. *Minos* shows that the argument for natural law, which carries divine justice, can be attested in the fourth century in association with Socraticism, and Antisthenes, as Müller argues, is the most likely author of such a theory. Giannantoni 1990 v.4:245 rejects as “too Sophistic” Müller’s 1975 account of Antisthenes, according to which language measures justice. But this might be a prejudiced position: see Müller 1995:251 n.22; see also comments on names as the measure in t. 160.

5. Περὶ ἐλευθερίας καὶ δουλείας

The position of this title after those on law and before those on (probably) political subordination and dependence and property suggests that the “freedom” and “slavery” discussed might be literal political and legal freedom and slavery sooner than the ethical freedom from irrational desire and slavery to irrational passions or ignorance common in Socratic literature. Possibly these metaphors, or ethical revisions, were enacted in these texts. Aristotle (*Pol.* 1.3 1253b18–23) indicates that certain unnamed writers have written against the natural status of literal slavery, and Antisthenes could have been among these (so Vogt 1971). However, this argument seems to depend on the assumption that Antisthenes’ mother was a slave or that his own social position was close to slavery (t. 1–3); the only surviving evidence for Antisthenes’ thoughts about freedom and slavery is about ethics (see t. 79, 80, 82), for which slavery is used as a metaphor. Such a metaphor appears prominently as the last word of Herodotus’ *Histories* (9.122), in a statement attributed to Cyrus. Since Antisthenes wrote a fiction of Cyrus, he could have contributed to the reception of this metaphor in Socraticism, by showing, as Herodotus did, how ethical slavery usurps political freedom. See also Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.10–13, where Antisthenes must be in the background to Socrates’ instruction of Aristippus about ethical slavery. (See t. 112.) In t. 82, Antisthenes makes an explicit ethical metaphor from the literal sense of “wealth,” and “freedom” might be treated there in the same way, without the explicit notice. Breitenbach (1871:919) proposed that titles 3.5–8 form a set in a different way: detecting the vocabulary of titles 3.5–7 in Xenophon’s

Oeconomicus, he thought these were subtitles for parts of Antisthenes' own *Oeconomicus* (as named in 3.8). This plausibility deserves further study, although Xenophon's differences from Antisthenes and his capacity to revise him should not be underestimated.

6. Περὶ πίστεως

If this title and the next are in an intentional sequence with the previous, the individual's surrender of freedom in some social framework (whether in a democracy or a more elite group) might have been the main theme. In Plato's *Crito* (51b3), Socrates recites the citizen's duty to "persuade or do what it [the state] commands" (ἢ πείθειν ἢ ποιεῖν ἃ ἄν κελεύῃ), and this is the main principle by which Socrates accepts the Athenians' death sentence. This association is supported by the note on the following title.

7. Περὶ ἐπιτρόπου ἢ Περὶ τοῦ πείθεσθαι

The combination of titles implies surrender of intellectual responsibility. In t. 53.9, Ajax reluctantly surrenders (ἐπιτρέπω) authority over his future to the incompetent jurors, who, however, have official jurisdiction over his fate. The Athenians' surrender of authority, in education and politics, to experts such as the rhetoricians is lamented in t. 208.22 (ἐπιτρέψατε).

8. Περὶ νίκης οἰκονομικός

This title suggests a text about success in household management, to be measured through competition against other households. This is the only catalog title clearly about property (unless that is implied in the "guardian" named in the preceding title), a topic not normally considered Socratic, although Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* presents Socrates teaching what he has learned about managing property from Ischomachus. For the possibility that Xenophon's episode in *Mem.* 3.4 is related to this title, see t. 72B. Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, if its title can be attributed to Xenophon, might have integrated elements from this text (Pomeroy 1994:7–8, citing the traditional proposal; on p. 213, the hypothesis is rejected). Ps.-Aristotle's *Oeconomicus*, which clearly follows Xenophon, has also been seen in Antisthenes' tradition (Victor 1983:188–92, citing ps.-Aristotle's ideas that agriculture is useful for philosophy and that corporeal labor is good).

Fourth τόμος: These two texts and the two that follow in the fifth *tomos*, of unknown form but probably featuring dramatic representations of the title characters, were the most famous work of Antisthenes for Diogenes Laertius and to the time of Julian and Themistius. Their titles are cited more often than any other, and doctrines are reported from them in reduced form. (See t.

85–87, 98–99.) The texts must have been long, if two filled a *tomos*, and might have had episodic form, like a novel (Hirzel 1895).

1. Κύρος

Antisthenes wrote two texts called *Cyrus*, of which one could be called *Small Cyrus* (t. 43A) and one, possibly the same one, was “second” (t. 141A). Probably there were exactly two texts entitled *Cyrus*, titles 4.1 and 5.1, subtitled *On Kingship*. (See discussion on t. 50; see also titles 10.3–4 and t. 43A and 84A.) The surviving testimonia do not reveal the difference between the two *Cyrus* texts. It is likely that one featured Cyrus the Great (c. 600–530 BCE) and the other featured Cyrus the younger, contemporary of Alcibiades (see t. 141A), who never became king of Persia but died in his attempt. (See discussion of the many historical proposals in Giannantoni 1990 v.4:295–308; see also Höistad 1948:73–77.) *Small Cyrus* might then be an alternative for the present title, and the text might have featured Cyrus the younger who was not king. In that case, “small” could refer to the man, not the scale of the text, which, according to placement in the *tomos*, should roughly match the other. The text on Cyrus the Great (5.1) might then have been known to some as Κύρος ὁ μέγας (a title not attested), in parallel to title 4.2 on Heracles. It is plausible that Antisthenes used Cyrus the younger as a negative exemplum. If he did, this could offer a parallel to Aspasia, who has mixed or negative value in the fragments surviving from *Aspasia* (title 5.2), and it would create a balance between the fourth and fifth *tomoi*, so that each contains one quasi-divine hero from mythical times and one real human from the contemporary world. If Antisthenes is the source of the Socratic speech in t. 208, he had scorn for the Persians of the Persian War period, their system of education, and their king (§23–25), as well as little respect for any nation of his present day (§26). Plausibly Antisthenes was inspired to investigate Perisan character, culture, and virtue in the late fifth century BCE because of his prior interest in Alcibiades.

2. Ἡρακλῆς ὁ μείζων ἢ Περὶ ἰσχύος

This must have been Antisthenes’ most famous Heracles text. For all the fame that Antisthenes’ Heracles character seems to have generated (t. 43, 44C, 85, 98–99), we know little about him or the text. Beyond the extant fragments (t. 92–99 and probably 127, some of which could be from the titles in the tenth *tomos*), indirect evidence might survive in the later Stoic and Cynic traditions. (See Giannantoni 1990 v.4:309–22 for a history of speculations based on possible parallels in Xenophon, Dio Chrysostom, and others. See also Höistad 1948:22–73; Luz 1994, 1996.) Antisthenes’ Heracles might have been inspired by Athenian tragedy, especially Euripides. (See Höistad 1948:26–28; t. 106.)

Aristotle (*Poet.* 1451a20) complains that poets have composed a *Saga of Heracles* that is episodic rather than unified. This cannot refer to Antisthenes, since his work was in prose, but it seems likely, from the surviving testimonia and from other treatments of the Heracles myth, that Antisthenes' story was also episodic, featuring Heracles gaining instruction at the hands of various teachers and possibly encountering various beasts (perhaps allegories for moral and intellectual hazards) on the path to virtue and perhaps even immortality. (Such a structure is implied in the Cynicizing fourth epistle of ps.-Heraclitus.) The concept of "strength" indicated in the second title was clearly central to Antisthenes (t. 134c), and the "strength" Heracles gained or developed in this story must have been primarily mental strength. The tradition of the "double education" in mind and body (Diog. Laert. 6.70–71) might have begun with Antisthenes' Heracles (Höistad 1948:22–73; see t. 163, 122G). Heracles is never an intellectual hero in the Greek tradition, so this strength must pertain to assets such as persistence, endurance of pain, toil and indignity, and a heightened internal power to persist and endure regularly. But apprehension of "higher" objects of intelligence is exhorted in t. 96, and the governance of pain and pleasure might involve intelligence and reasoning (*mentis prudentiam calliditatemque* in t. 96, τοῖς ἀναλώτοις λογισμοῖς in t. 134v) of a sort different from the intelligence and reasoning Aristotle isolates in his own ethics. The second title of the Heracles text listed in the tenth *tomos* (which could be a duplicate for this one), associates or possibly equates "strength" with "intelligence" (Περὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἰσχύος). Antisthenes' hero Heracles was surely different from his Odysseus, the intellectual hero of rhetorical assets, but see t. 127, 188A, and 197 for possible parallels. He was probably more different from Ajax, who rejects discourse. (But see also Rankin 1986:167, who compares Ajax and Heracles.) On "strength" in Antisthenes, see, further, t. 54.13 (with LévyStone 2005:186–88), 106, 134c, 191, 198.

Fifth τόμος: This continues the series of the fourth *tomos*.

1. Κύρος ἢ Περὶ Βασιλείας

This was probably Antisthenes' text on Cyrus the Great, which bears some relationship to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* and the larger tradition of Cyrus literature. See t. 85–91, esp. t. 86. For discussion of relationships in the tradition, see Dittmar 1912:72–76; Höistad 1948:73–94; Giannantonio 1990 v.4:299–308; Mueller-Goldingen 1995:25–44. Mueller-Goldingen finds a shared optimism between these two Socratics, in distinction from Plato, for the possibility of intelligent ethical kingship; but Höistad (1948:78–82) rightly emphasizes the difference between Antisthenes' likely praise of political

slavery or countercultural values and Xenophon's strong commitment to social propriety. One can add that the exhortation to Antisthenes' Cyrus to endure bad reputation (t. 86) fits poorly with Xenophon's declarations, from the opening of the *Cyropaedia*, that Cyrus was "most loving of honor" (φιλοτιμώτατος, 1.2). Although there are signs in Antisthenes' remains that honor from the right people was a good to be sought (t. 112, which Xenophon seems to echo in *Mem.* 2.1.19 and 2.1.31, a Heracles story, as well as in *Hiero*), the idea that Cyrus must endure bad reputation (κακῶς ἀκούειν) is distant from Xenophon. Overall, it seems that Antisthenes' ideal of kingship was a fiction meant at the level of a person's kingship over himself and his life: his actual political views seem to presuppose a polis culture like that of Athens (see t. 70, 72A) or, in t. 189 and 82, a collection of households with equal and modest material resources or power over one another, where each could rule his own. Xenophon, by contrast, seems to have a vision of real enlightened kingship. (See Gray 2007:4–13.)

2. Ἀσπασία

The sparse remnants from this text are polemical and hostile against Pericles and his sons by his first marriage, who were not sons of Aspasia (t. 142–44). Dittmar (1912:1–59) laid out an interpretation that has remained dominant, that Antisthenes was hostile to Aspasia because she distracted Pericles through pleasure and that Aeschines replied by constructing a sympathetic Aspasia, who then became normal in the rest of Socratic literature, a source of wisdom on interpersonal topics such as love and rhetoric (Pl. *Menexenus*; Xen. *Mem.* 2.6 and *Oec.* 7–21; this is the paradigm understood behind Plato's Diotima in *Sym.* 201d–212a and Xenophon's Theodote in *Mem.* 3.11). By this interpretation, there was no primary positive Socratic discourse about Aspasia, but this was an apologetic fiction. (See also Ehlers 1966:30–33; Henry 1995:30–32. Jouanna 2005:65–66 is more optimistic about the Socratic reception but still assumes that Antisthenes' Aspasia was a negative figure.) Yet we have little real evidence for what Antisthenes said about Aspasia herself, in distinction from Pericles and the members of his family, and the generally positive image in Socratic literature could stand on its own and need not reflect the special achievement of Aeschines. Both the length of Antisthenes' text, which filled half a *tomos*, and its arrangement next to *Cyrus or On Kingship* and in parallel to *Heracles the Greater or On Strength* suggest that Aspasia could have been a positive figure for Antisthenes as well. Since he held that the virtue of man and of woman are the same (t. 134r), one might expect that he presented a paradigm for female virtue alongside his paradigms for male virtue, two of which formed the tidy polarized pair "one from the Greeks and one from the barbarians" (t. 85). In this way, he would cover all

the human possibilities in the Greek matrix for “self” and “other” (as reflected in Diog. Laert. 1.33: see the general comment on the second *tomos* above) by way of questioning or rejecting its boundaries.

Sixth τόμος: The catalog turns here to language, dialectic, logic, and epistemology, topics to which Antisthenes devoted at least nine texts (five here and at least four and as many as seven in the seventh *tomos*), almost double the number of Plato, if we count *Cratylus*, *Euthydemus*, the *Republic*, *Theaetetus*, the *Sophist*, and *Parmenides*: of course, Plato's texts might be longer, but this we do not know. The intensive interest distinguishes Antisthenes from Cynicism, which renounced logical technicality and the liberal arts (t. 135); but his views on these topics might have been negative, against Plato's development of Socraticism, and hence would fit a proto-Cynic profile. Brancacci 1990:34–41, developing a suggestion of Caizzi (1964:49; see also Patzer 1990:28–30), reads a chronological and thematic progression through the epistemological, logical, and linguistic titles of the sixth and seventh *tomoi*. It seems clear that the sixth *tomos* is negative and polemical, by contrast with the more positive and constructive tones of the titles in the seventh *tomos*. But an editor could have fashioned this ordering, which might then have no relationship to the order of composition. Although the order should be considered in all speculation about the differentiation of these nine titles, certainty about how each of these titles is related to the others is impossible. The order of the second through the seventh *tomoi*, whoever created it, implies a progression from ethics to logic, in agreement with the Socratic curriculum as it is announced by Xenophon (*Mem.* 4.3.1), with the development of Plato's interests as represented in his corpus, and possibly with Isocrates' assumptions about Socraticism. (See t. 156, where, however, logic precedes ethics in his discussion.) Brancacci 1990:129–38 argues that Xenophon's curriculum is inspired by Antisthenes. The thesis that, according to Socrates, ethics must be mastered before logical studies are possible is older: see Maier 1913:68–70.

1. Ἀλήθεια

This text is one of Diogenes Laertius' two examples of a dialogue that contained “the rhetorical style,” probably equivalent to embedded speeches (see t. 11A). The title *Truth* was used previously by Protagoras and Antiphon, and it is mentioned in polemical contexts by Isocrates (*Against the Sophists* §1, t. 170) and Plato (*Crat.* 391c6 and *Theaet.* 162a1, in reference to Protagoras' book; *Soph.* 246b9, in reference to “the materialists”); Aristotle refers to “those who have proclaimed about truth” (*Met.* 993b17) and equates this with “first philosophy” itself, one of his names for the subject matter of the *Metaphysics*.

It appears to be a polemical title inherently for these fourth-century writers, and the fact that Antisthenes (or his editor) also used it must connect him into this nexus in some way. There are many possibilities, which cannot be evaluated thoroughly here. A clue in favor of the Protagoras tradition might be found in the fame of Antisthenes' thesis οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν (t. 152–56). This thesis is indicated in the present series of titles (6.4), and an antithesis between “false” (ψευδής) and “true” (ἀληθής) different from the antithesis assumed in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle is explicitly part of the discussion: like Plato's Protagoras, Antisthenes seems explicitly to reject the antithesis assumed as normal by Aristotle and his tradition. More broadly, this alternative conception of “truth,” opposed not to “falsity” in Aristotle's normal sense but to something like absence of cognition, could be descended from the etymological sense of ἀλήθεια, as it is used by Pindar and other poets (Detienne 1996). See also Brancacci 1990:25–27, recording earlier discussion about the title. But response to Antiphon is also plausible, since Xenophon presents an episode of debate between Socrates and Antiphon (*Mem.* 1.6). In this case, the main interest of the text might have been ethical and political. Parmenides' poem, with its distinction between “Truth” (Ἀλήθεια) and “Opinion” (Δόξα) (DK 28B2), probably stands behind the whole later discourse. The title Περὶ ἀληθείας is attributed to the Socratic Simmias (Diog. Laert. 2.124).

2. Περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἀντιλογικός

These terms, like the previous title, recur in Plato (e.g., in *Protagoras*, esp. διαλέγεσθαι at 335a2 and ἀντιλέγων at 335a6, and in *Theaetetus*, esp. διαλέγεσθαι at 189e8 and ἀντιλογικός at 197a1), and it is possible that this was an alternative title for the *Truth*, in parallel with the case of Protagoras' *Truth* that carried the alternative title Ἀντιλογικά (Hirzel 1895 I:119 n.1). Whatever the case may be in relation to Plato, this text probably addressed a type of formal (philosophical/Sophistic/Socratic) discussion. The term διαλέγεσθαι is surely positive for Antisthenes: it is an aspect of the wise rhetor's skill in t. 187.6. Xenophon calls it a Socratic method in *Xen. Mem.* 4.5.12, although the etymology given there is not from discussion but from “sorting” (διάλεγειν) particular individuals (πράγματα) and assigning them to their classes (γένη), which are, probably, the good versus the bad. (Brancacci 1990:149–52 attributes Xenophon's account to Antisthenes; contra, see Patzer 2010:251–55, neglecting, however, to account for these titles.) But the description ἀντιλογικός would appear to be pessimistic about argumentative method, if it is to be connected with the impossibility of gainsaying (ἀντιλέγειν, t. 148, 152–56; different but still negative senses are also in t. 53.7 and 174). Moreover, the separation of this title from title 7.3, *On Question*

and *Answer*, which is also likely to have been a treatment of a Socratic form of conversation, together with the position of the current title between the *Truth* and *Sathon*, two titles likely to be polemical, raises the possibility that the kind of discussion treated in this text was non-ideal or pessimistic. On the tendency of debates associated with Antisthenes to end in failure, see the notes on t. 83A. Both Isocrates and Plato use the term ἀντιλογικός in a positive sense (Brancacci 1990:27–28); but Plato also has the negative sense (e.g., *Phaedo* 90c1), in alignment with eristic. The attested positive senses of ἀντιλογικός in the fourth century might justify Brancacci's rejection of the old allegation (Birt 1882:449 n.2) that this subtitle conflicts with the text's first title. But Antisthenes' own attested uses of this word stem should be privileged, and the ordering of the titles suggests a polemical text.

3. Σάθων

Correspondence with other evidence (t. 147–48) makes it likely that Antisthenes himself assigned the vulgar title *Sathon*, although later origins have been proposed (Decleva Caizzi 1966:99). (For the meaning of Σάθων, see t. 147B.) The nineteenth-century editor Kuehn combined the title *Sathon* with the next title transmitted in the manuscripts, *About Gainsaying* (in three books), on the basis of Diogenes' anecdote (t. 148). Modern editors follow this decision. At stake is the origin of the quarrel between Antisthenes and Plato and the intention behind Antisthenes' paradoxical thesis. If the texts are kept separate, it is possible that Antisthenes first proclaimed his thesis against gainsaying as his own provocative advertisement for his teaching, with no reference to Plato or even to any controversy over what Socrates taught (title 6.2 or 6.4); Plato attacked the thesis (e.g., in *Euthydemus* and *Cratylus*), and this led Antisthenes to attack Plato's theory of Forms, which had enabled the refutation of his thesis. (See also Brancacci 1990:34–40.) On this view, Antisthenes helps to inspire the field of post-Socratic logic, when Plato is provoked to respond to him. An alternative possibility, consistent with the combination of these titles, is that all of Antisthenes' "logical" work was response to Plato's theory of Forms, which Antisthenes found too dogmatic as a representation of Socrates. (This seems to be the basic view of Döring 1985, 1998, 2011.) This would make sense of the negative thrust evident in the surviving remains. This second account seems less satisfactory as explanation for the volume of Antisthenes' writings in this field, however, and the connections between his study of language and study of Homer (see t. 187). These seem to have an impetus independent of Plato, to which Plato is instead responding in his frequent attacks on the study of Homer.

4. Περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν α' β' γ'

The apparently lengthy text *On Gainsaying*, in three parts, must have contained Antisthenes' discussion of his famous thesis, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν (see t. 148, 152–56, esp. 152–53). It is striking that the title refers to the act of gainsaying in positive form, even though the thesis claims that this act does not or should not occur. (See t. 148, where in the anecdote the title in the anecdote is Περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν.) Presumably Antisthenes recognized the positive phenomenon of the misguided concept or notion of gainsaying (even if it could never really occur in the way its practitioners believed it could) and discussed this at length, in three books or parts. If the title should be combined with the previous one (see the note on that title), Plato might have been featured as speaker in a discussion of the thesis. Rankin 1974:318 implies that the present text presented the rejection of the theory of Forms and used the thesis οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν to do so.

5. Περὶ διαλέκτου

Without evidence, it is hard to distinguish this title from previous titles, especially 6.2. It could be significant that this title uses a noun etymologically related to the substantive verb in that title. (Compare titles 3.6–7, 7.5–6.) It is unclear whether [ἡ] διάλεκτος here is a simple nominalization of διαλέγεσθαι (as it is in Pl. *Sym.* 203a and *Theaet.* 146b) or whether it verges toward the sense of regional “dialect” or “style,” as it means for the later Stoic Diogenes of Babylon (cited in Diog. Laert. 7.56). If the sixth *tomos* has a progressive order, from refutation of Plato to positive views distinctive of Antisthenes, a sense in the range of “dialect” (whether individual and personal or proper to ethical types) might be plausible.

Seventh τόμος: This series of titles contained at least some positive doctrine, as the testimonium from Epictetus (t. 160) shows. Listed are about eleven titles (some with textual uncertainties), more than for any other *tomos*, including several with many parts. If this *tomos* really contained the equivalent of about twenty books, its size presents problems for the hypothesis that the *tomoi* were uniform. See the detailed discussion in Patzer 1970:133–43.

1. Περὶ παιδείας ἢ Περὶ ὀνομάτων α' β' γ' δ' ε'

Epictetus' testimony (t. 160) suggests that the content of this long text was a basic plank in Antisthenes' positive educational system. He seems to share the field of names basically with Prodicus, who said (according to Pl. *Euthyd.* 227e3), “First it is necessary to learn about the correctness of names” (πρῶτον . . . περὶ ὀνομάτων ὀρθότητος μαθεῖν δεῖ). Possibly Antisthenes

followed in Prodicus' tradition to the extent that he differentiated synonyms, but the evidence suggests tensions (see t. 13A.62, 207C). Democritus, also, is attributed with a title related to names, *On Homer or Correct Diction and Foreign Words* (Περὶ Ὅμηρον ἢ ὀρθοεπείης καὶ γλωσσέων, Diog. Laert. 9.48). There is no evidence for a relationship between Antisthenes and Democritus. Beyond Epictetus' passage, the surviving evidence for the doctrines Antisthenes wished to teach about names is embedded in his Homeric studies (esp. t. 187, 189, 191), in his speeches of Ajax and Odysseus (t. 53–54), and possibly in t. 179B; see the notes to t. 150A.1 for a collection of his references to syllables and sounds. The Homeric studies show special interest in compound words and in explaining what might be called homonymy, multiple meanings carried by one word. This differs from Prodicus, who, according to our evidence, investigated words of one semantic unit, not compounds, and was interested in differentiating synonyms, multiple words with the same or similar meaning. (See Mayer 1913:22–41, Mayhew 2012:xiv–xvii.) Moreover, Antisthenes might have sought essential or “natural” meanings, independent of the agreement of a speech community but based on etymology (a speculative possibility), whereas Prodicus seems to have specialized in conventional meanings, what “people call” by a certain term (see Pl. *Euthyd.* 277e3–278a5). See, further, the next title.

2. Περὶ ὀνομάτων χρήσεως ἢ ἐριστικός

This text must continue from the previous in some way. The expression χρήσις ὀνομάτων (use of names) might imply ὀρθή χρήσις ὀνομάτων (correct use of names) and so align this text with Prodicus' demand for knowledge of the “correctness” of names (ὀρθότης ὀνομάτων); Plato's *Cratylus* has a similar alternative title in the Thrasyllan catalog, Κρατύλος ἢ περὶ ὀρθότητος ὀνομάτων, λογικός (Diog. Laert. 3.58). The doctrine of οἰκεῖος λόγος (t. 152A) might seem also to imply a doctrine of correct use of names from Antisthenes; but it is nowhere clear what the οἰκεῖος λόγος doctrine implies as its object of naming, whether a particular individual or a type of thing. Probably χρήσις should not be simply equated with ὀρθότης, not least because the second title, ἐριστικός, suggests conflict or dispute: it implies either that the text was “eristic” in its tone or subject matter or that an “eristic” protagonist was featured. (Compare Plato's *Euthydemus*, which is called Εὐθύδημος ἢ ἐριστικός, ἀνατρεπτικός, at Diog. Laert. 3.59; see Brancacci 1990:31–32.) If the second title is to be retained as transmitted, this text might have illustrated the importance of education in naming by showing how clever interlocutors can exploit ambiguities and how deficiencies in understanding lead to eristic dispute: Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations* engages with these problems. The term χρήσις almost certainly has ethical overtones for

Antisthenes (see t. 34E, 187.4), but if dispute is involved in the use of names, nothing precludes Antisthenes' interest also in κατάχρησις or "incorrect use," such as might be documented, dimly, for Gorgias (κατάχρησις is listed in the *Suda* among Gorgias' hallmark topics in rhetoric, at DK 82A2). The speeches of Ajax and Odysseus (t. 53–54) illustrate differing uses of vocabulary by the two speakers, and it is plausible that neither speaker is ultimately the standard for correct usage (that the two are just different) and that their "conversation," if it occurred, would be eristic. The only mention of χρήσις ὀνομάτων extant in Antisthenes' testimonia outside the book catalog is χρήσις ποικίλη λόγου, "variegated use of discourse" (t. 187.11), which is implied to be good through comparison to a κατόρθωσις τῆς τέχνης, "successful performance of the art [of medicine]," a pluralist description, referring not to single correct pairings between names and objects but to a range of word use, as appropriate to the range of receptiveness in the audience.

3. Περὶ ἐρωτήσεως καὶ ἀποκρίσεως.

"Question and answer" is mentioned throughout the Platonic corpus as though it is a special Socratic method. The terms are used frequently in this pairing (e.g., *Crito* 50c8; *Phaedo* 75d3–4, 78d2; *Rep.* 7 534d9, where it is equated with διαλεκτική). Antisthenes is presented using this kind of method with Callias and Niceratus in Xen. *Sym.* (t. 78, 83, 185A, 186), whereas they respond to his presentation only after he has been allowed a long speech (t. 82.45). See also t. 13A.56.

4. Περὶ δόξης καὶ ἐπιστήμης α' β' γ' δ'

From the Platonic corpus (esp. *Meno*, the *Republic*, *Theaetetus*), one might surmise that the disciples of Socrates debated extensively about the criterion that distinguished mere true belief from secure or infallible knowledge. Antisthenes shows interest in this distinction (t. 53–54, 189), and his four-part text probably addressed it: the apparent length of this text, as well as the partitioning, suggests that Antisthenes' views were not simple. However, the doxographical tradition attributes to Antisthenes no doctrine on the relationship between belief and knowledge or the nature of either. Varied assumptions have governed reconstructions of Antisthenes' views. Some have assumed that Antisthenes was dogmatic and did not recognize the subtle problems in distinguishing between knowledge and true belief: therefore, only the cruder distinction, between false belief and knowledge, should be attributed to him. (This is the distinction that his character Ajax makes: see t. 53.9.) For example, Momigliano 1930:107 assumes that *doxa* must be Gorgianic *doxa* (i.e., false belief) and that Antisthenes must have

rejected it out of hand. Brancacci 1990:200–201 attributes the most important surviving testimony on Antisthenes' logical views (t. 150–52) to this title, arguing that his logical views are clear and positive and that knowledge was opposed foremost to false belief, not true. Others propose, as a more sophisticated positive view, a basic continuity between *episteme* and *doxa*, which are differentiated by the criterion *logos*, in line with the thesis that appears in Pl. *Theaet.* 202c7–8: ἀρέσκει οὖν σε καὶ τίθεσαι ταύτη, δόξαν ἀληθῆ μετὰ λόγου ἐπιστήμην εἶναι; (Are you then happy to pose it like this, that knowledge is true belief with an account?). Maier 1900 II.2:12–19 (after Zeller 1882) attributes this view of knowledge to Antisthenes, understanding *doxa* in the materialist sense developed in *Theaet.* 155e; Caizzi 1964:61–3 follows this account. See also Romeyer Dherbey 1996:252 n.3, who omits the materialist mechanisms. Indeed, it is unclear how Antisthenes could have claimed knowledge of moral terms such as justice and courage under a materialist understanding of reliable apprehension. Further, if *logos* is somehow (behind Plato's parody or appropriation) Antisthenes' criterion for knowledge, it is unclear whether Antisthenes had a conception of *logos* that can yield a satisfactory objective grounding for knowledge, rather than a circular one. It is not obvious that *logos* is the same as *horos*, “definition,” in his view. (See t. 151B.) It is important to recognize, also, that Antisthenes did not necessarily have a foundational view of knowledge, as it has been assumed on the basis of a certain interpretation of his one-to-one principle (t. 152A). He could have had a kind of global coherence theory, such as Aristotle alludes to in the opening of the *Posterior Analytics* (t. 157A). It is a matter for conjecture whether Antisthenes asserted some single criterion for the distinction between true belief and knowledge, suggested several criteria, or asserted *aporia* in the quest for a scientifically valid criterion of knowledge. Various testimonia show that Antisthenes was no skeptic: the convictions and reasonings of the wise man, which either constitute or are the product of his *nous* or his *phronesis*, are said to be secure (t. 134u–v); the wise few stand in opposition to the many ignorant fools (t. 134o); Homer is said to have said some things “in truth,” others “in opinion” (t. 194).

5. Περὶ τοῦ ἀποθανεῖν

This title and the following one appear twice in all the manuscripts, once near the opening of the *tomos* (positions 2 and 3) and again in their present position, where they form a cluster with titles 7–9 on the topics of death and eschatology. On the editorial history and its interpretive implications, see Patzer 1970:130. Brancacci 2003 speculates on the contents of these texts, connecting them to the death of Socrates and also to the grounding of ethics.

6. Περὶ ζωῆς καὶ θανάτου

This is the oldest attested Greek title to address “life” in its own right, and the opposition might ground ethics. Plausibly Antisthenes drew this opposition from Homeric ethics (on the lines of Griffin 1980), and such an insight could explain the position of the Homeric titles in the following two *tomoi*. The differentiation between a title formed from a substantive infinitive (7.5) and another formed from a cognate noun is common to titles 6.2 and 6.5.

7. Περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾧδου

This title is attested also for Protagoras (Diog. Laert. 5.87) and Demosthenes (Diog. Laert. 9.46). A similar phrase occurs in Plato (*Apol.* 29d5; *Phaedo* 85b2) and in the Derveni papyrus (col. 5). Stating that Plato used myth to speak of these topics (t. 44C), Julian implies, by omission, that Antisthenes did not, although the text might have been unknown to Julian. It could be significant that Antisthenes’ title has no substantive for the “affairs” or “goods” or “evils” or “souls” (etc.) in the underworld but leaves the possibilities open: contrast Julian (in reference to Plato) in t. 44C (τὰ ἐν ᾧδου πράγματα); Pl. *Phaedo* 85b2 (τὰ ἐν ᾧδου ἀγαθὰ). In later texts, Eusebius (*Dem. ev.* 10.8.68) assumes that they are souls, and Basil of Caesaria (*Quod Deus* 31.332.41) assumes that they are punishments or souls being punished. Brancacci 2003 proposes that this text treated Socrates’ situation after death.

8. Περὶ φύσεως α’ β’

This title was given to the major works on natural philosophy by Parmenides, Heraclitus, and Empedocles in Aristotle’s own lectures on physics and seems to be Aristotle’s invention (Schmalzriedt 1970). But this discussion of older texts “on nature” was developing in the Socratic period, and it is possible that Antisthenes’ title was his own. In that case, the title need not indicate the same kind of text as those of the older thinkers. See t. 179–80, apparently cited from this text.

9. Ἑρώτημα Περὶ φύσεως α’, ἐρώτημα Περὶ φύσεως β’

This might duplicate the previous title (see Brancacci 1990:22–23), but compare the third and sixth *tomoi* for sequences of apparently overlapping titles. The first word suggests that the format was an inquiry or discussion, not exposition.

10. Δόξαι ἢ ἐπιστικός

This title might show a retreat from knowledge to belief, when it comes to eschatological subject matter. The following title would be related.

11. Περὶ τοῦ μανθάνειν προβλήματα

This title might indicate *aporia* or skepticism, not about the existence of objective reality, but about the possibility of coming to know objective reality. Its position in the catalog is ambiguous. Possibly it is the climax of the sixth and seventh *tomoi*; alternatively, the author of the catalog might have placed it at the end of the “epistemological” section because it was difficult to fit elsewhere. It is plausible that the skepticism was directed at a particular curriculum in philosophy, rather than “understanding” in itself.

Eighth τόμος: The eighth and ninth *tomoi* include the titles on Homer, and the first two titles might indicate more general topics in poetry. Titles 8.4–7 seem to treat the *Iliad*, whereas the ninth *tomos* seems to treat the *Odyssey*. In both sets, the titles might follow the order of the episodes treated (so Müller 1860). But from t. 187, it seems clear that Antisthenes could treat many Homeric episodes in one discussion. See also Giannantoni 1990 v. 4:331–37.

1. Περὶ μουσικῆς

Since this title introduces the *tomos*, it probably treated poetry in general, not just Homer's. In Plato (*Rep.* 2 376e5–9), “music” seems to stand for only the words and thoughts in poetry, but this is no basis for deciding that Antisthenes discounted sounds, rhythms, and tones from the study of “music.” See t. 187.5, 67; Luloffs 1900:22–27. Antisthenes might have applied the predicate μουσικός to Socrates: see t. 152A and notes. There is evidence that Antisthenes was interested in poets beyond Homer, but it is unclear which titles, beyond 3.5 on Theognis, would have included such discussions. For Hesiod, see t. 189; for Aeschylus, t. 187.2 and title 9.9; for Sophocles, t. 54.6, 137A (possibly), 182; for Euripides, t. 195–96.

2. Περὶ ἐξηγητῶν

On the analogy of Περὶ τῶν δικογράφων (*On the Speechwriters*, title 1.5), Περὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν (*On the Sophists*, title 2.3), and Σάθων (*Sathon*, title 6.3), it seems that this text was a polemic against contemporary literary critics. Plato's *Ion* offers a parallel: see t. 185A, 191.

3. Περὶ Ὁμήρου

The title suggests treatment of Homer the author rather than his poems, but there is no evidence to clarify the central question, whether Antisthenes was interested in the historical person or whether he understood “Homer” as the author implied by texts circulating under this name. Antisthenes' character Odysseus refers to Homer as “the wise poet about virtue” in t. 54.14.

4. Περὶ ἀδικίας καὶ ἀσεβείας

If titles 8.4–7 treat the *Iliad* in order, this text probably addressed the opening scene (*Il.* 1.11–305), where Agamemnon might be thought to commit ἀσέβεια (impiety) against Chryses and ἀδικία (injustice) against Achilles. The terms ἀδικία and ἀσέβεια do not occur in Homer: he uses vocabulary built on αἰδώς (shame) and τιμή (honor) (e.g., αἰδεῖσθαι, 1.23; “ἡτίμησ’, 1.94). Antisthenes could have discussed the translation of Homer’s moral vocabulary into contemporary terms. He could have discussed Agamemnon’s ethical behavior, which Homer does not describe but shows. Compare t. 186.

5. Περὶ Κάλχαντος

Homer’s character Calchas the priest of Apollo appears only in *Il.* 1.68–100. Odysseus cites his prophesy in 2.300–332, and Poseidon adopts his appearance at 13.45. The Athenian tragedians present characters who cite Calchas’ prophetic powers and religious authority, sometimes with irony (Aeschylus in *Agamemnon*, Sophocles in *Ajax*, and Euripides in *Helen* and *Iphigenia in Aulis*), and Antisthenes might have done the same. Alternatively, Antisthenes might have looked back to Homer for a positive image of Calchas, as he might have done with Odysseus (t. 54, 187, 188, 190). But if Antisthenes thought that the many gods of Olympian religion were fictions (see t. 123, 179, 188, 189), he might have sought to question or rationalize the prophetic powers of Homer’s Calchas.

6. Περὶ κατασκόπου

The term κατάσκοπος (scout) does not occur in Homer, but in Cynicism, the scout is a figure for the philosopher. (See title 10.4.) The reference in this title could be to the night mission of Odysseus and Dolon in *Il.* 10, which could be related to Odysseus’ theft of the Palladium and his contribution through intelligence to the sack of Troy. (See t. 53.6, 54.3.)

7. Περὶ ἡδονῆς

The noun ἡδονή (pleasure) does not occur in Homer, but words formed on the stem are frequent in descriptions of wine, sleep, aromas, banquets, laughter, and friendship. (See t. 123–28 for Antisthenes’ sayings on such pleasures.) There is no evidence, however, that Antisthenes studied the background culture of Homer’s world, only the speeches and acts of his characters (t. 187–92). If this text was about the *Iliad*’s characters and action, it could have addressed the goal of the war, including the recovery of Helen. (See t. 54.2, 123.) Helen’s name is in title 9.4, and some have wanted to emend this title or see a wordplay between ἡδονή and Ἑλένη (Giannantoni 1990 v.4:333–34).

Ninth τόμος: These titles are mainly on the *Odyssey*. Title 9.9, if not also others, probably went beyond Homer.

1. Περὶ Ὀδυσσεΐας

Phrynicus cites this title (t. 50). It is plausibly the source of any of the passages on the *Odyssey* in the Homeric scholia (t. 187–90), as well as material in the scholia not attributed to Antisthenes. (Dindorf [1855] and Schrader [1890] both thought that Antisthenes is relevant to passages beyond those where he is cited.)

2. Περὶ τῆς ῥάβδου

Three characters in Homer have magical wands: Hermes (*Od.* 5.47–48, 24.2–4; *Il.* 24.343–34), Circe (*Od.* 10.238, 319, 389), and Athena (*Od.* 13.429, 16.172, 16.456). Antisthenes is interested in Odysseus' appearance as a beggar (t. 53.6), which Athena caused with her wand. He might have been interested in Circe's power to transform some men into pigs (see title 9.8), which she did with her wand. Hermes' wand has the more general power to rouse people or put them to sleep. On Antisthenes' own claim to use a silver wand with his pupils, see t. 169.

3. Ἀθηνᾶ ἢ Περὶ Τηλεμάχου

In *Od.* 1.156–323, Athena advises Telemachus to make a journey in search of his father. This title, together with 9.6 below, deviates in form from the other Homeric titles by naming a character in the nominative form, rather than as object of *περί*. If this is meaningful, this text might have been a dialogue in which Athena appeared as speaker, with Telemachus discussed as a topic. Schrader 1890:175 proposes that a scholium on *Od.* 1.284 (his p. 18.15–20), explaining Telemachus' need to make a journey so that he “become flexible like his father” (πολύτροπον γενέσθαι παραπλησίως τῷ πατρί), might descend from this text.

4. Περὶ Ἑλένης καὶ Πηνελόπης

T. 188, where Penelope is contrasted with Calypso, implies that Antisthenes wrote a longer discussion of Penelope's virtue. If Helen represented either a hedonist ethical subject or an object of pleasure for others, this text could have contrasted the women on these terms. (See Richardson 1975:81 for the possibility of a connection between this title and Pl. *Rep.* 9 586c, where the phantom Helen is compared to the phantom of bodily pleasure.) Isoc. *Helen* §66 implies that contemporary “philosophers” blamed her. If Antisthenes shared in this interpretation, it would be a departure from Gorgias; but t. 123 might imply that, subjectively speaking, Aphrodite, rather than Helen, was

responsible for Helen's ruin. In later writers, Penelope is posed against Helen as ethical subject: in Plut. *Marriage Precepts* 140f, she is σώφρων (of sound mind), whereas Helen is φιλόπλουτος (loving of money). For Antisthenes' views on Helen, see t. 61, 54.2. Without reference to Helen, Penelope is used to signify philosophy as the true goal, in opposition to the kind of education (τὰ ἐγκύκλια παιδεύματα) sought by the suitors: Aristippus is credited with this statement at Diog. Laert. 2.29, Gorgias in the Vatican Codex (DK 82B29). Unlike Helen, who was so widely discussed in Antisthenes' period, Penelope appears not to have been a common topic. Aeschylus is credited with a title *Penelope*, as is his relative Philocles, a tragic poet of the late fifth century. She is mentioned in Theognis (1125–26) for loyalty and by Aristophanes (*Thesm.* 546–50) as the kind of woman Euripides never portrayed. Antisthenes might have been original in reexamining Homer's character of the virtuous woman.

5. Περὶ Πρωτέως

In *Od.* 4.363–570, Menelaus narrates his encounter with Proteus and his daughter Eidotheia off the shore of Egypt during his homecoming. Antisthenes' Proteus could have been a model for the able or adaptable speaker, as he becomes in later literature and the scholia. (See Richardson 1975:80 and title 9.9; see also t. 185B.) Plato, for his part, uses Proteus as a model for an unjust interlocutor (*Ion* 541e7; *Euthyph.* 15d3; *Euthyd.* 288b8), on the assumptions that two parties in negotiation must remain constant in their basic positions if the negotiation is to proceed and that “shape changing” is an unjust usurpation of power. It is not impossible that the evocation of Proteus at the end of *Ion* is a clue pointing to Antisthenes.

6. Κύκλωψ ἢ Περὶ Ὀδυσσέως

Two titles are about “the Cyclops,” who is probably Polyphemus, although t. 189 treats all the Cyclopes and distinguishes them from Polyphemus. Possibly the first text was about Polyphemus' impiety and the second about his intemperance (Dümmler 1882:19): only impiety is discussed in t. 189. To judge only from the form of this title, the Cyclops should have appeared as a speaking character in discussion about Odysseus. (See the parallel in title 9.3.) Such a text would represent a literary novelty in its reversal of main speaker and his subject matter: Odysseus narrates the Polyphemus episode in the *Odyssey*.

7. Περὶ οἴνου χρήσεως ἢ Περὶ μέθης ἢ Περὶ τοῦ Κύκλωπος

This might be the title mentioned by Aristides (t. 197), and it could be related to t. 189, although that discussion covers issues other than drunkenness. See also t. 191, which does not fit obviously under any titles on the *Iliad*.

8. Περὶ Κίρκης

This text might have treated Odysseus' resistance to Circe (*Od.* 10.316–32) through his self-control or ἐγκράτεια (see t. 22.15), in a way similar to the Socratic interpretation Xenophon reports at *Mem.* 1.3.7. Dio Chrysostom's *Oration* 8 (20–25) might preserve resonances (see Weber 1888; Richardson 1975:79 and n. 2), as might Plutarch's *Gryllus*.

9. Περὶ Ἀμφιαράου

Amphiaraus is not a Homeric character but belongs sooner to the Theban cycle. He is mentioned twice in the *Odyssey* (15.244–47, within a genealogy, where he is said to be beloved of Zeus; 11.326–27, where he is referred to but not named). He might have illustrated the Cynic maxim that the wise are friends to the gods (Diog. Laert. 6.37: see Decleva Caizzi 1980:58–59). In the *Axiochus* of ps.-Plato, Prodicus cites these lines from the *Odyssey* in praise of death (Richardson 1975:80). If Antisthenes' text went beyond Homer, Amphiaraus might have illustrated freedom from τῦφος (pride), as he does in later appearances in Julian (*Ep.* 1.89 303b) and Plutarch (*Mor.* 32d, 88b), where Diogenes of Sinope also appears reciting one of Amphiaraus' most famous lines (from Aeschylus' *Seven against Thebes*), that he “wants not to seem but to be just.” Finally, Amphiaraus appears in a tradition of wisdom literature as a spokesman of gnomes addressed to his son (Wehrli 1973:197). Education of sons was a common topic but was also of special interest to the Socratics and to Antisthenes. (See the discussion of Anytus under t. 21; compare t. 173.) Antisthenes' Amphiaraus could have been such a teacher or advisor. It is intriguing that the advice attributed to Amphiaraus by Clearchus the Peripatetic (cited in Athen. *Deip.* 317a) includes advocacy for the same kind of “versatile” behavior that Odysseus and Proteus show: πολὺποδὸς μοι, τέκνον, ἔχων νόον, Ἀμφίλοχ' ἥρω, / τοῖσιν ἐφαρμόζου τῶν κεν <κατὰ> δῆμον ἵκηαι (Having the mind of an octopus, my child, Amphilocho my hero, match yourself to those to whose home you come). The conflict between this characterization and the “simple” one in Aeschylus, which Plato's character Glaucon cites in *Rep.* 2 361b7, could have been related to the conflict between character types in t. 187.1–2 and t. 53–54. For the Cynic, “being just” might not have amounted to simplicity. Pyrrho and the Skeptics also made use of Amphiaraus: Timon's *Python* was set at the temple of Amphiaraus. (See discussion in Chiesara 2001:126–27.)

10. Περὶ Ὀδυσσέως καὶ Πηνελόπης

This could be the source of t. 188. See also title 9.4. Plausibly Antisthenes understood the relationship between Odysseus and Penelope as a philosophical marriage.

11. Περὶ τοῦ κυνός

This text must have been about Odysseus' dog Argos (*Od.* 17.290–327), treating his ability to recognize his friend Odysseus despite appearances, his endurance of suffering (like Odysseus), or both topics. The quality of good watchdogs, to be φιλομαθεῖς, is a joke for Plato at *Rep.* 2 376b but is associated seriously with the name of the Cynic school by Elias in the context before t. 22B (where he cites a reference to the dog in *Il.* 8.299). See Weber 1887:110; Luloffs 1900:58; Richardson 1975:80.

Tenth τόμος: The form of these titles implies dialogues, in which the main speaking character forms the first title and the subject matter forms the second title (as in Thrasyllus' titles for Plato's works). By contrast with the fourth and fifth *tomoi*, also containing titles with proper names, the number of titles here implies shorter works. The order is alphabetical, apart from the last two titles. The characters in the last three titles—Menexenus, Alcibiades, and Archelaus—were contemporaries of Socrates and are familiar from Socratic literature: therefore, it seems likely that these were conversations with Socrates, perhaps all on the topic of ruling. Susemihl (1887) doubted the authenticity of this entire *tomos* on the basis of ancient disputes about the authenticity of some titles and the apparent proliferation of works titled *Cyrus* (t. 43A). It was common practice in antiquity to place spurious or doubted works at the end of a catalog. Susemihl's doubt has not prevailed in scholarship, and even if some titles here are spurious, it is not necessary that all are.

1. Ἡρακλῆς καὶ Μίδας

Welcker (1833) proposed that this text was similar to the “Choice of Heracles” attributed to Prodicus in Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.21–33. Whereas Heracles chose to follow a life of virtue, Midas took the opposite course of lust and luxury. This would make sense insofar as Antisthenes' piece on the choice of Heracles is likely to have been short, for demonstration. (See t. 94B, 44C.) Other speculations are in Decleva Caizzi 1966:85–86.

2. Ἡρακλῆς ἢ Περὶ φρονήσεως καὶ ἰσχύος

This could be a duplicate for title 4.2, but it is also plausible that Antisthenes composed two short Heracles pieces for live performance or “demonstration,” whereas the long *Heracles* was addressed to readers. The terms φρόνησις and ἰσχύς appear repeatedly in the testimonia and indicate core ethical assets. (See title 4.2.)

3. Κυρσᾶς ἢ Ἐρώμενος

The first title in both this and the following entry is transmitted in two of the major manuscripts as κύριος (lord) and in one as Κύρος (Cyrus). The disagreement in the manuscripts points to a problem, and “Cyrus” is probably wrong, because there were apparently only two Cyrus texts; the reading could have been assimilated from titles 4.1 and 5.1. (See t. 43A, 141A.) By analogy with the surrounding titles, one expects a proper name for a primary speaking character in a dialogue on the topic of the second title. “Lord” is plausible as a kind of proper name in combination with the second title in 10.4, but here it matches poorly with the subtitle ἐρώμενος (beloved). Two plausible proposals for a six-letter proper name of a beloved have circulated. Winckelmann 1842 printed Κύρνος (Cyrnus), the name of the beloved dedicatee in Theognis’ elegies. Because Theognis’ poetry was used in the Socratic circle (see title 2.5), it is plausible that Antisthenes wrote a dialogue in the voice of Cyrnus. The second option, Κυρσᾶς, is supported by more evidence: see t. 84A. The surviving anecdote (t. 84B–C) suggests that Kyras should have been the lover and Socrates the beloved, rather than vice versa, but this could be only part of the original story. Possibly love was reciprocal for Antisthenes. (See t. 14A, 58, 82.38.)

4. Κύριος ἢ Κατάσκοποι

See comment on title 10.3. Here the reading “lord” does fit with its second title, on the terms of Cynicism. The later Cynics, possibly already Diogenes of Sinope, called themselves the “scouts” of Zeus (Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.24.6), those who learned the full truth about human existence from a perspective beyond normal human cognition and had been authorized by Zeus to announce it to ordinary humans. Such a scout can also be addressed as “lord,” as in Epictetus’ Cynic discourse (3.22.38, the crowd addressing the Cynic preacher): Ἐν τίνι οὖν ἔστι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἐπειδὴ ἐν τούτοις οὐκ ἔστιν; εἰπέ ἡμῖν, κύριε ἀγγελε καὶ κατάσκοπε. (In what then is the good, since it is not in these things? Tell us, lord messenger and scout.) The same set of titles for the Cynic philosopher appears also at 3.22.70. Although this reading could be anachronistic, it is possible that Antisthenes used terms and images whose full Cynic meaning was derived later in the tradition: compare title 9.11, *On the Dog*, which has also been questioned because of the “Cynic” problem; and see t. 53.6, 54.9. On the image of the scout in Epictetus, see Schofield 2007:75–80.

5. Μενέξενος ἢ Περί τοῦ ἄρχειν

The text *Menexenus* attributed to Plato is Socrates’ conversation with the agreeable young man Menexenus, from a family of rulers, who himself

aspires to rule. It is plausible that the last three texts in this *tomos* were short dialogues about Socrates' political teaching. Possibly there is a relationship between the lost text of Antisthenes and the Platonic *Menexenus*, whose attribution to Plato is problematic. See Decleva Caizzi 1966:86; Nails 2002:202–3. See also t. 204.

6. Ἀλκιβιάδης

This text could be the source for t. 200, where Socrates' concession to Alcibides of his prize for valor after a battle in the Peloponnesian War was dramatized or discussed; it could be the “story of Antisthenes about the beauty of Alcibiades” mentioned in a marginal note to Olympiodorus (t. 199B). Antisthenes wrote about Alcibiades also in one of his *Cyrus* texts (t. 141A). It is unclear which of the several other passages about Alcibiades (t. 198–202) belong to the present title and which to *Cyrus* (Giannantoni 1990 v.4:347–48; and see t. 43A on the possibility that Antisthenes did not write an *Alcibiades*). See also t. 19. The Socratics Aeschines (Diog. Laert. 2.61), Euclides (Diog. Laert. 2.108), and Phaedo (in his *Suda* entry) are credited with works called *Alcibiades*, in addition to the two extant Alcibiades dialogues transmitted in the Platonic corpus and Plato's *Symposium* 212–23. Xenophon takes pains in the first chapters of the *Memorabilia* (1.2.39–48) to separate Socrates from responsibility for Alcibiades' outrageous behavior, which had been charged against him in the accusation of Polycrates (Isocrates, *On the Team of Horses*). The fragments from Antisthenes are ambiguous on the question whether Antisthenes admired him for his innate powers or scorned him for his failures in education and use of power: these are not incompatible; see esp. t. 198. There might be a relationship between the Alcibiades character in Thucydides and Antisthenes' Odysseus: see t. 54.2 note. Alcibiades' betrayal of Athens would probably not, in itself, be offensive to Antisthenes, and he might have blamed Athens for Alcibiades' bad traits. Scholarship since Dittmar 1912:68–91 assumes that Antisthenes' assessment was negative.

7. Ἀρχέλαος ἢ Περὶ βασιλείας

Archelaus, king of the Macedonians in 413–399, raised the cultural level of his nation through financial progress, military progress, and patronage of famous artists, including the Athenian tragedians Euripides and Agathon and the painter Zeuxis of Heraclea. The Athenians issued him honors in a public decree of 407/6 (ML 91). He allegedly invited Socrates to his court, and Socrates declined. The anecdote of Socrates' refusal survives throughout antiquity (Arist. *Rhet.* 1398a24; Epictetus fr. 11 Schenkl; Diog. Laert. 2.25; Aelian, *VH* 14.17; *Gnom. Vat.* no. 495; Dio of Prusa, *Or.* 13.30 [see t. 208]; Socr. epist. 1: see Decleva Caizzi 1966:101) and could descend

from Antisthenes' text, since it is not attested in any other primary Socratic literature. The form of the title implies that Antisthenes' text was a dialogue featuring Archelaus as a speaker, possibly with Socrates, in a discussion of kingship. T. 203 shows that the text included abuse of Gorgias. Possibly the text had an intertextual relationship with Plato's *Gorgias*, where Plato mentions Socrates' refusal of Archelaus' invitation (470d9).

41B. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.18 (Marcovich)

= 2 DC

ὃ Τίμων διὰ τὸ πλῆθος ἐπιτιμῶν “παντοφυῇ φλέδονά” φησιν αὐτόν.

Timon scolds him [Antisthenes] for the volume [of his writings] and calls him a “comprehensively productive trifler.”

Importance of the Testimonium

This implies that Antisthenes' corpus was large and varied.

Notes

Τίμων: (fr. 37 di Marco) Timon of Phlius (c. 310–220 BCE) was the main literary witness to the Skeptic philosopher Pyrrho of Elis. His poem the *Silloi* (*Lampoons*) attacks philosophers: fr. 26–28 (di Marco) attack other Socratics. Timon picks out Euclides as the eristic Socratic (fr. 28 di Marco), and his objection to Antisthenes seems to be different, that he has nothing worthwhile to say about any of his wide-ranging topics. In some respects, Timon was similar to the Cynics, especially his contemporary Crates of Thebes, and the Cynics beginning with Diogenes of Sinope are never attacked (Long 1978:74–77). See t. 22B and 159A for possible remains of Timon's works in Elias.

παντοφυῇ φλέδονα: The adjective παντοφυῆς, built from a base cognate with φύσις (nature), is rare, and Timon could be making a joke on a position Antisthenes held about φύσις in or of literature, in a semantic field related to the Hellenistic and Platonic term πολυειδής and its derivative πολυείδεια. (See Clayman 2009:148–73 and passim on Timon's influences on Hellenistic poetry; Gutzwiller 1996:131–33 on πολυείδεια as a literary term, including its likely roots in Plato.) Such a question is obscure to us, but see t. 150A.3 for the possibility that the status of verbal constructions, whether or not they had a φύσις, might have been of interest in Antisthenes' time. The *Suda* catalogs this same statement of Timon under the entry φλέδων, with the implication that it, too, is a rare word: τὸν Ἀντισθένην τὸν φιλόσοφον ἐπιτιμῶν ὁ Τίμων διὰ τὸ πλῆθος παντοφυῇ φλεδόνα καλεῖ (Trifler: Timon, in scolding the philosopher Antisthenes because of the volume [of his writings], calls him a

“comprehensively productive trifler”). In fr. 28, Timon attacks all the Socratics as “those triflers” (οὗ μοι τούτων φλεδόνων μέλει).

41C. *Suda*, no. A.2723 “Antisthenes” (Adler)

[= Hesychius of Miletus, *Onomatologium* no. 61 “Antisthenes” p. 16.15–18 Flach]

οὗτος συνέγραψε τόμους δέκα· πρῶτον μαγικόν· ἀφηγείται δὲ περὶ Ζωροάστρου τινὸς μάγου, εὐρόντος τὴν σοφίαν· τοῦτο δὲ τινες Ἀριστοτέλει, οἱ δὲ <τῷ> Ῥοδίῳ ἀνατιθέασιν.

<τῷ> R. Janko per litt. | Ῥοδίῳ Bernhardt: Ῥόδωνι edd. : Ῥόδων A

He wrote ten volumes. The first is magical, and it tells of Zoroaster, a wizard, and his discovery of wisdom. But some attribute this to Aristotle, and others to Antisthenes of Rhodes.

Importance of the Testimonium

The *Suda*’s attribution of a magical work to Antisthenes must be an error: the work on Zoroaster should be attributed to Antisthenes of Rhodes, a historian in the Peripatetic tradition (Diog. Laert. 6.19). The *Suda* says also (t. 23) that Antisthenes was a Peripatetic before he became a Cynic, and this shows the same conflation. Earlier scholars (Dümmmler 1882; Jöel 1903:II.165 ff. and 950 ff.; Dittmar 1912:167) understood this title as evidence for interest in the Persian east by Antisthenes the Socratic. This was to be connected with later Cynic recognition of the Gymnosophists as wise men and with Antisthenes’ positive interest in Cyrus (t. 41A title 5.1, 85–87). See Decleva Caizzi 1966:87. Sayre (1938, 1948) and others considered Cynicism generally an oriental movement. On the falsity of this characterization, see Kindstrand 1976:7 n.28; Bosman 2010.

42. Athenaeus, *Wise Men at Dinner* 11 508c–d (Kaibel)

= 4 DC

καὶ γὰρ Θεόπομπος ὁ Χίος ἐν τῷ κατὰ τῆς Πλάτωνος διατριβῆς τοὺς πολλοὺς, φησί, τῶν διαλόγων αὐτοῦ ἀχρεῖους καὶ ψευδεῖς ἂν τις εὔροι· ἄλλοτρίους δὲ τοὺς πλείους, ὄντας ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστίππου διατριβῶν, ἐνίους δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἀντισθένης, πολλοὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν Βρύσωνος τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου.

For also Theopompus of Chios in his *Against the Discourse of Plato* says that the majority of his dialogues one would find useless and false: most of them are the work of others, being from the discourses of

Aristippus, and some are also from those of Antisthenes, and many are from those of Bryson of Heraclea.

Context of Preservation

This is from an extended rant against Plato delivered by Athenaeus' character Pontianus, himself a philosopher. Athenaeus' source seems to be Herodicus "the Crateteian" of Babylon (Düring 1941:54–59, 63–81). See t. 147B. This section of the speech attacks Plato for his doctrines, initially those on nature (508c) and then those on humanity and *eros* (508d).

Importance of the Testimonium

The Peripatetic Aristoxenus also attacked Plato for plagiarism (Diog. Laert. 3.37, 9.40): on the issue overall in the fourth and third centuries, see Brancacci 1993. Theopompus' favorable reception of Antisthenes is attested in t. 22A.

Notes

ἐκ τῶν Ἀριστίππου διατριβῶν: The term "diatribe" is broad here, referring to Plato's corpus as well as the writings of the minor Socratics. Its use does not show that any of these figures wrote "diatribes" in the style of Epictetus or Musonius Rufus. See Kindstrand 1976:25.

τῶν Βρύσωνος τοῦ Ἡρακλεώτου: Bryson of Heraclea could be the "guest from Heraclea" of t. 13A.63.

43A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 2.61 (Marcovich)

= 6 DC

καὶ τῶν ἑπτὰ δὲ τοὺς πλείστους Περσαῖός φησι Πασιφώντος εἶναι τοῦ Ἐρετρικοῦ, εἰς τοὺς Αἰσχίνου δὲ κατατάξαι. ἄλλα καὶ τῶν Ἀντισθένης τόν τε μικρὸν Κῦρον καὶ τὸν Ἡρακλέα τὸν ἐλάσσω καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην. καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων δὲ ἐσκευώρηται.

κατατάξαι B P F : κατατετάχθαι Roeper | interpunctionem sic feci | ἄλλα καὶ Delattre : ἄλλα καὶ codd. | τῶν Ἀντισθένης B P : τοῦ Ἀντισθένης F | δὲ ἐσκευώρηται codd. : δὲ ἐσκευωρῆσθαι Kuehn : διεσκευώρηται vel διεσκευωρῆσθαι Susemihl

And of the seven [dialogues of Aeschines], Persaeus says that most are from Pasiphon the Eretrian, and that he [(Pasiphon?)] arranged them among the works of Aeschines. [He did the same with] others, and among the dialogues of Antisthenes both the *Small Cyrus* and the *Lesser Heracles* and *Alcibiades*. And those of the others he [(Pasiphon?)] has fabricated.

Context of Preservation

This is from the first half of Diogenes' brief life of Aeschines, treated among the minor Socratics between Xenophon (who is first after Socrates) and Aristippus. On the passage overall, see Goulet-Cazé 1997. The text is corrupt as transmitted and has been much debated: I adopt Delattre's emendation (on advice from R. Janko) and repunctuate slightly.

Importance of the Testimonium

The text suggests that the *Small Cyrus*, the *Lesser Heracles*, and *Alcibiades* attributed to Antisthenes were Socratic dialogues, since the discussion concerns the authenticity of Aeschines' Socratic dialogues. It might show that these three texts somehow overlapped with the corpus of Aeschines, whether as source material, false attributions, or forgeries. Even if the text is correct in its allegation that these three texts were really written by Pasiphon, the whole matter shows that Antisthenes did write Socratic dialogues. Susemihl (1887) used this passage as the basis to argue that Antisthenes' tenth *tomos*—listing the titles *Heracles* (two of them), *Alcibiades*, and, by Susemihl's reading, *Cyrus* (two of them)—contains the texts considered spurious in antiquity. But there are many open questions. See Patzer 1970:102–6; Giannantoni 1990 v. 4:236–38; Goulet-Cazé 1997:167–75.

Notes

Περσαῖός φησι: Diogenes does not say that Persaeus is correct in his charge or even that he accepts his judgment in this widespread Hellenistic debate over the authenticity of Socratic literature. (Compare the allegations of Herodicus of Babylon in the context of t. 42 and 147A–B; on this context, see Alesse 1997:284.) In Aeschines' case, Diogenes goes on to endorse the seven dialogues that represent Socrates well. One point to be extracted is that the *Small Cyrus*, the *Lesser Heracles*, and *Alcibiades* (whether they were written by Antisthenes, Pasiphon, or someone else) all contained representations of Socrates.

Πασιφώντος . . . τοῦ Ἐρετρικοῦ: Because he is identified as an Eretrian, Pasiphon might have been a direct pupil of Menedemus of Eretria (c. 339–265 BCE), as the “school” did not survive long. In that case, he would have flourished in the mid-third century, a rough contemporary of Persaeus, who might have sought to attack him for philosophical reasons and used literary allegations as his tactic. (See Patzer 1970:105.) Plutarch cites from his dialogue *Nicias*, which Pasiphon must have composed under his own name as a throwback to the late fifth century. If he composed the dialogues attributed to Aeschines (and others), they, too, would be more than a century younger than

the original Socratic dialogues. See also Diog. Laert. 6.73, where one Pasiphon is alleged as a forger of the tragedies of Diogenes of Sinope.

εἰς τοὺς Αἰσχίνου δὲ κατατάξαι: The agent of this false attribution of Pasiphon's dialogues to Aeschines is unclear. (See the extensive discussion by Goulet-Cazé, who considers all possible agents for this editorial action, including Peristratus, an editor mentioned in a previous clause.) If it is Pasiphon, there is a syntactical break in the sentence, because the subject of the infinitive should be in the accusative case.

ἄλλα καὶ τῶν Ἀντισθένους τὸν τε μικρὸν Κύρον καὶ τὸν Ἡρακλέα τὸν ἐλάσσω καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδην: In the transmitted text (with Delattre's reading of the neuter plural ἄλλα instead of the conjunction ἀλλὰ traditionally understood), this list in the accusative case is parallel to the previous reference to titles, τῶν ἐπτὰ . . . τοὺς πλείστους. This previous phrase is ambiguously both subject of one clause, Persaeus' attribution to Pasiphon, and object of another clause, what the interpolator did (unless Roeper's emendation to a passive infinitive κατατετάχθαι is adopted). The construction to be understood for Antisthenes' titles is probably the second, for reasons of word order. In that case, Pasiphon did to these texts what he also did to most of Aeschines' texts, forged them and added them to the official corpus. (See also Goulet-Cazé 1997, who reports but does not accept Delattre's conjecture.) Some editors (discussed by Giannantoni) have, alternatively, understood that Aeschines is the grammatical subject and that the verb governing the accusatives is ἐσκευώρηται: Aeschines, then, forged these texts. Others, pushing the sense of ἐσκευώρηται (usually as emended to διεσκευώρηται), have understood the point to be that Pasiphon (or Aeschines) used three texts of Antisthenes plus texts of "the others" as source material for his own composition of new dialogues. (See Giannantoni 1990:237.) It is not impossible that this reference to Antisthenes, which, under most interpretations, has nothing to do with the biography of Aeschines, was originally a marginal note, added into the text at a later stage of transmission.

καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων δὲ ἐσκευώρηται: The widely noted textual problem, pertaining to the text punctuated as one continuing sentence, is that the particle δέ cannot be used near the end of a clause but must come near the beginning: Giannantoni and others remove this problem through emendation of the simple verb ἐσκευώρηται to the compound διεσκευώρηται. One can preserve δέ as a connective at the clause level, as well as the simple verb ἐσκευώρηται in favor of the rarely attested compound, by understanding that a new clause does begin καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων δέ, just as the previous one began ἄλλα καὶ τῶν Ἀντισθένους and as the one before that began καὶ τῶν ἐπτὰ δὲ <Αἰσχίνου> τοὺς πλείστους. The combination καὶ . . . δέ has a parallel in this first clause about Aeschines.

43B. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 2.64 (Marcovich)

= 5 DC (SSR IH 17)

πάντων μέντοι τῶν Σωκρατικῶν διαλόγων Παναίτιος ἀληθεῖς εἶναι
δοκεῖ τοὺς Πλάτωνος, Ξενοφῶντος, Ἀντισθένης, Αἰσχίνου· διστάζει
δὲ περὶ τῶν Φαίδωνος καὶ Εὐκλείδου, τοὺς δὲ ἄλλους ἀναιρεῖ πάντας.

<Ἀριστίππου> add. Brandis post Αἰσχίνου

Of all the Socratic dialogues, Panaetius thinks those of Plato, Xenophon, Antisthenes, and Aeschines to be authentic. He is undecided about those of Phaedo and Euclides, and he throws out all the others.

Context of Preservation

This appears near the end of Diogenes' biography of Aeschines. (See t. 43A.)

Importance of the Testimonium

This is the clearest evidence that Antisthenes wrote Socratic dialogues, in which Socrates appeared as a speaking character. Direct literary evidence survives for Plato, Xenophon, and Aeschines, but direct evidence for Antisthenes is tenuous. For testimonial evidence, see t. 43A, 64A, 200. T. 187 is sometimes considered the remains of a Socratic dialogue. See also t. 95 and 197, possibly from dialogic frames in *Heracles* or other texts. Panaetius, whether or not his judgment was accurate or fair, probably influenced later tradition, in which the dialogues of these four Socratics remained canonical while those of the other Socratics were essentially lost. (See t. 48; Brancacci 2000:245.)

Notes

ἀληθεῖς: Debate surrounds the question whether this adjective refers to the “authentic” or “genuine” authorship of the dialogues or to the “true” or “reliable” portrayal of Socrates within them. For the former interpretation, see the discussion in Patzer 1970:107; for the latter, Alesse 1997:284.

44A. Julian, *To the Cynic Herakleios* (Oration 7) 209a (Guido)

= 8A DC

εἰ δ' Ἀντισθένης ὁ Σωκρατικὸς ὥσπερ ὁ Ξενοφῶν ἔνια διὰ τῶν μύθων
ἀπήγγελλε, μήτοι τοῦτό σε ἐξαπατάτω· καὶ γὰρ μικρὸν ὕστερον ὑπὲρ
τούτου σοι διηγῆσομαι.

μήτοι V : μήτι Cobet : lac. in U | fort. <μή> ante ἐξαπατάτω Petavius
| σοι διηγῆσομαι sub macula in V leg. Spahn : lac. in U

And if Antisthenes the Socratic, like Xenophon, related a few things through myths, let this not mislead you. For I shall explain to you about this man a little bit later.

Context of Preservation

In *To the Cynic Herakleios*, Julian attacks a contemporary Cynic for his live performance of “myths” or fictions that scorn the gods. He rejects irreverent fictions attributed to Diogenes and the later Cynic Oenomaus (second century CE) and suggests that myth is not true to Cynicism at all (t. 44A). He concedes that myth is appropriate to two divisions of philosophy (t. 44B), theology and ethics. He supports his schematic argument (t. 44C) with citation of classical writers: Plato and Orpheus, who wrote theological myths, and Antisthenes, Xenophon, Plato, and (by implication) Prodicus, who wrote ethical myths. He points to Iamblichus as an exemplary contemporary writer of philosophical myth and concludes the work with his own example (227c–234c).

Importance of the Testimonia

These passages show that Antisthenes was recognized still in the fourth century CE for the distinct style of his “myth” writing. (See also t. 96 from Julian’s contemporary Themistius.) Julian’s comments are not traditional, and so he must be reading the works himself.

Notes

Ἀντισθένης ὁ Σωκρατικός: In this oration, Julian distinguishes Antisthenes from the Cynics, by virtue of the way he used myth and presumably by virtue of his respect for the divine. In t. 26, Julian associates Antisthenes with Cynicism, by virtue of the ethical example he set through his lifestyle.

ἀπήγγελλε: This is the frequent verb for the divine mission of the Cynic “scout” in reporting to humans the news from the gods. See t. 41A title 10.4; Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.24.6, 3.22.23.

44B. Julian, *To the Cynic Herakleios* (Oration 7) 215b–c (Guido)

= 8B DC

οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ Ξενοφῶν φαίνεται καὶ Ἀντισθένης καὶ Πλάτων
προσχηρσάμενοι πολλὰ τοῖς μύθοις, ὥσθ' ἡμῖν πέφηνεν, καὶ εἰ μὴ
τῷ κυνικῷ, φιλοσόφῳ γοῦν τινι προσήκειν ἢ μυθογραφία· μικρὰ οὖν
ὕπερ τῶν τῆς φιλοσοφίας εἴτε μορίων εἴτε ὀργάνων <ρήτέον>.

<ρήτέον> Rochefort : <ρήτέον> prior Boulenger suppl. post μορίων
: <προρητέον> Reiske : lacunam pos. Hertlein

Moreover, also Xenophon and Antisthenes and Plato seem to have added myths in many places, so that it is apparent to us that myth writing is fitting, if perhaps not to a Cynic, surely to a philosopher. Some things, then, must be said about the parts, or the tools, of philosophy.

Notes

προσχησάμενοι: The verb implies that these authors attached myths, as an additional element, onto their discourses or λόγοι. Such a description is appropriate for Plato (e.g., *Gorg.* 523a; *Phaed.* 108d; *Rep.* 614b) and Xenophon (e.g., *Mem.* 2.1.21–34). For Antisthenes, there is no direct evidence. The fictional speeches of *Ajax* and *Odysseus* are homogeneous, with no distinction between λόγος and μῦθος. The works *Heracles* and *Cyrus* are generally assumed to be entirely mimetic or “mythical” too: the present passage might throw that assumption into question. See t. 197 for a possible example.

εἰ μὴ τῷ κυνικῷ, φιλοσόφῳ γούν: Julian elsewhere (*To the Uneducated Cynics* 182c–189b) goes to great length to explain that Cynicism is not only philosophy but a noble form of it.

ἡ μυθογραφία: The primary composition of new myth, not the interpretation of traditional myth.

εἶτε μορίων εἶτε ὀργάνων: Julian alludes to a dispute in post-Aristotelian philosophy, whether logic was a “part” of philosophy or a “tool” for all philosophy. He goes on to assign myth as a tool within two of the nine parts of philosophy: the part of theoretical philosophy that is theological and the part of practical philosophy that is about individualist ethics. In theology, myth provokes deeper thought about the divine without assimilating it to the human (222c–d). In ethics, myth addresses “children” or men who are intellectually like children (223a, 226c–d).

44C. Julian, *To the Cynic Herakleios* (*Oration* 7) 216d–217b (Guido)

= 8C DC

φανερῷ δὲ ἤδη γενομένου τίνι καὶ ποίῳ φιλοσοφίας εἶδει καὶ μυθογραφεῖν ἔσθ' ὅτε <προσῆκει . . >. πρὸς γὰρ τῷ λόγῳ μαρτυρεῖ τούτοις ἡ τῶν προλαβόντων ἀνδρῶν προαίρεσις, ἐπεὶ καὶ Πλάτωνι πολλὰ μεμυθολόγηται περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἄιδου πραγμάτων θεολογοῦντι καὶ πρό γε τούτου τῷ τῆς Καλλιόπης, Ἀντισθένης δὲ καὶ Ξενοφῶντι καὶ ταύτῃ Πλάτωνι πραγματευομένοις ἠθικὰς τινὰς ὑποθέσεις οὐ παρέργως ἀλλὰ μετὰ τινος ἐμμελείας ἡ τῶν μύθων ἐγκαταμέμικται γραφή, οὓς ἐχρῆν, εἴπερ ἐβούλου μιμούμενος, ἀντὶ μὲν Ἡρακλέους μεταλαμβάνειν Περσέως ἢ Θησέως τινὸς ὄνομα καὶ τὸν ἀντισθένειον

τύπον ἐγχαράττειν, ἀντὶ δὲ τῆς Προδίκου σκηνοποιίας ἀμφὶ ταῖν
ἀμφοῖν θεοῖν ἑτέραν ὁμοίαν εἰσάγειν εἰς τὸ θέατρον.

<προσῆκει> suppl. Reiske : lacunam ampliorem posui | μαρτυρεῖ
vix leg. in V : μάρτυρι U | ταὐτῷ Boulenger : αὐτῷ V : αὐτῷ <τῷ>
Guido | <σ>’ ἐχρῆν suppl. Rochefort secutus Hertlein | μιμούμενος V :
μιμούμενον Hertlein | ταῖν ἀμφοῖν θεοῖν scripsi : τοῖν ἀμφοῖν θεοῖν V :
ἀμφοῖν τούτοις θεοῖν Petavius

And now that I have made it clear to which branch and to what kind of philosophy the composition of myth can be appropriate . . . For in addition to my argument, evidence for this is found in the choice of the men who have gone before us, since many things have been told in myth also by Plato, when he divines about matters in Hades, and even before him by the son of Calliope [Orpheus]; and when Antisthenes and Xenophon and this same Plato elaborate certain ethical theses, not haphazardly but with a certain harmony, the composition of myths is mixed in. If you wanted to imitate these men, you should have taken up in place of Heracles the name of some Perseus or Theseus and stamped in the Antisthenean type, and in place of Prodicus’ setting of the scene about the two goddesses, you should have brought into the theater another similar situation.

Notes

ἡ . . . προαίρεσις: Julian implies that the writers he will mention used the mode of myth deliberately. Plato (*Gorg.* 523a; *Phaed.* 108d) and Xenophon (*Mem.* 2.1.20–21), at least, state directly how myth supplements the non-mythical λόγος. Possibly Antisthenes did so also.

περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου πραγμάτων θεολογοῦντι: Antisthenes, too, is credited with a text titled *On Matters in Hades* (t. 41A title 7.7). Either Julian does not know it, or he knows that it does not use myth.

πραγματευομένοις ἠθικάς τινας ὑποθέσεις . . . ἡ τῶν μύθων ἐγκαταμέμικται γραφή: As in t. 44B (προσχρησάμενοι), Julian’s wording implies that ethical theses were both stated in literal discourse and embellished or illustrated through myth.

μετὰ τινος ἐμμελείας: Compare Theopompus’ judgment that Antisthenes used “harmonious persuasion” (δι’ ὁμιλίας ἐμμελοῦς, t. 22A).

ἀντὶ μὲν Ἡρακλέος μεταλαμβάνειν Περσέως ἡ Θησέως τινὸς ὄνομα: The “name” of the hero constitutes his traditional identity. Presumably some events (e.g., the famous labors of these three characters) or traits were attached necessarily to this name, but apparently a “style” (τύπον) and a “scene” (σκηνοποιίαν) were contributed by the author of the new myth.

Antisthenes was famous for his Heracles character (t. 92–99), and Julian seems to say that Perseus and Theseus, who might have been comparable heroes, are still available for a new writer to use. Isocrates wrote a Theseus myth in his *Helen* (§18–44), possibly in competition with Antisthenes’ Heracles. Julian considers Isocrates a rhetorician, but not a myth writer (236b).

τὸν ἀντισθένειον τύπον ἐγγράττειν: Julian implies that there is a “type” of Antisthenes that his addressee should transfer to or “stamp out” onto a new character. Morgan 2000:114 argues that this is an ethical or philosophical message, which could be stamped onto any hero. Alternatively, this could be a performative or literary style, a style of mimesis: the addressee Herakleios performed his myth before a live audience, and Antisthenes reportedly performed an *epideixis*, or display piece, titled *Heracles* (t. 94B). Since Julian’s examples are overall literary, he might imply foremost a style of writing. Plato, too, implies for the term *τύπος* a live performance through reading aloud, or mimesis: in *Rep.* 396d2–e1, Socrates notes that the moral reader will be reluctant to “step into the patterns of his inferiors” (ἐνιστάναι εἰς τοὺς τῶν κακίωνων τύπους), that is, to imitate their characters by reading literature in which they have speaking roles. On the term *γράφειν*, see t. 46, 41A title 1.1.

ἀντὶ δὲ τῆς Προδίκου σκηνοποιίας: The reference is to the “scene” of the choice of lives invented for Heracles by Prodicus and told by Xenophon in *Mem.* 2.1.21–34. It is not clear whether Julian implies that the Antisthenean type and the Prodican setting were to be found in the same model. If so, he must know the tradition of competition between these two transmitted in the Cynic epistles (t. 207C). Possibly Antisthenes stamped his type onto Prodicus’ scene.

ἀμφὶ ταῖν ἀμφοῖν θεοῖν: The feminine form (“about the two goddesses”) in the text as emended would refer to the paired figures Virtue and Vice who appear before Heracles in Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.22. These are not said explicitly to be divine, but they are large in stature and have some kind of superhuman status. (The translation in Morgan 2000:113, “the two goddesses,” assumes a feminine phrase.) The transmitted masculine form would have to refer to the two gods who appeared not in Prodicus’ scene but in the opponent Herakleios’ production, Zeus and Pan (Guido ad loc.). These are mentioned later in the text (234c–d), but a reference here would be obscure. Possibly Heracles and Dionysus (mentioned at the opening of the text, 204b) are meant, but the feminine form makes better sense of the sentence. Feminine dual forms are attested three times in Julian’s extant work: in *Misopogon* 20, he uses the phrase ἀμφοῖν . . . ταῖν ζημίαιν ([sharing in] both punishments), and the feminine dual article is attested two additional times.

45. Demetrius, *On Style* 249 (Roberts)

= 12 DC

ποιητικὸν δὲ δεινότητος ἔστι καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τέλει τιθέναι τὸ δεινότατον
(περιλαμβανόμενον γὰρ ἐν μέσῳ ἀμβλύνεται), καθάπερ τὸ
Ἀντισθένης·

σχεδὸν γὰρ ὀδυνήσει ἄνθρωπος ἐκ φρυγάνων ἀναστάς·

εἰ γὰρ μετασυνθείη τις οὕτως αὐτό,

σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐκ φρυγάνων ἀναστάς ἄνθρωπος ὀδυνήσει,

καίτοι ταῦτόν εἰπὼν οὐ ταῦτόν ἔτι νομισθήσεται λέγειν.

ὀδυνήσει primum P in mg: ὀδυνήσειεν ἂν Radermacher | ὀδυνήσει
secundum Goeller: ὀδυνήσῃ P: <ἂν> ὀδυνήσῃ Radermacher

It is also productive of forcefulness to place the most forceful phrase
at the end (since it loses its edge when buried in the middle), as in the
line of Antisthenes:

“For generally a man will cause shock, standing up out of the dry
sticks.”

For if one should rearrange it like this,

“For generally, standing up out of the dry sticks, a man will cause
shock,”

then, although he is saying the same thing, he will no longer be
considered to say the same thing.

Context of Preservation

On Style can probably be attributed to Demetrius the Syrian, a teacher Cicero met in Athens c. 80 BCE, although dating criteria remain controversial. (For Demetrius the Syrian, see Chiron 2001:365–66; for a survey of the problems, see Innes 1995:312–21.) Demetrius shows wide, precise knowledge of Greek literature and must have had access to a good library. The reference to Antisthenes comes early amid treatment of the δεινός (forceful) style, the final of four styles treated (240–301). (The previous three are the grand style, μεγαλοπρεπής; the elegant style, γλαφυρός; and the plain style, ἰσχνός. A faulty style corresponding to each receives brief treatment.) Later in his treatment of δεινότης, Demetrius speaks of the Cynics (259–62) and the Socratics (287–91, 296–98). Antisthenes appears in neither group: the Cynics are Diogenes and Crates, and the Socratics are Aristippus, Xenophon,

Aeschines, and Plato. Contrast t. 46–49, where Antisthenes is included for his style in sets of Socratics, and t. 52B, where he is in a set of Cynics. This implies that Demetrius knows Antisthenes’ writing directly, not as part of a traditional list.

Importance of the Testimonium

This text is important for its preservation, endorsement, and analysis of a sample from Antisthenes’ own work. It is likely to be a quotation from Antisthenes.

Notes

τὸ ἐπὶ τέλει τιθέναι τὸ δεινότατον: The “most forceful” segment in the statement must be ἐκ φρυσγάνων ἀναστάς, for this is what Demetrius transposes in the hypothetical revision. This phrase, which describes the act that causes the response in the viewer, might have “forcefulness” in its surprising informational content. (Blass 1892 v.2:342 finds the same effect in several sentences in the Ajax speech, t. 53.) It also has an anapestic rhythm, which could mark closure (although elsewhere, in §189, Demetrius advises against this rhythm).

καθάπερ τὸ Ἀντισθένης: Demetrius commends the ordering of words Antisthenes produced, contrasting it to his hypothetical reordering. (Some interpretations reverse this. But Demetrius’ standard practice is to cite an exemplary sentence and then show how the same message can be said less effectively: compare §11, where he rewrites the exemplary period from Demosthenes cited in §10.)

σχεδὸν γὰρ ὀδυνήσει: The faithful quotation of Antisthenes, before rearrangement, is a marginal addition in ms. P of Demetrius, the manuscript on which all other extant copies depend. But the many corrections in P indicate that another manuscript of the text was in circulation (Radermacher 1901:v). (The present text differs from SSR and Decleva Caizzi. P’s marginal addition presents the verb ὀδυνήσει, a future indicative, but P’s main text preserves, for the rearranged version, the optative ὀδυνήσῃ, without the potential particle ἄν. These must be reconciled. Earlier editors—Goeller (1832), followed by Roberts (1902)—printed two futures, whereas Radermacher (1901), whom Decleva Caizzi and Giannantoni follow, saw in P’s marginal addition traces of the particle ἄν before ἄνθρωπος and printed the optative, while adding the particle to the revision. This also removes the hiatus from the original, which could be counted as a technical flaw. However, the future indicative seems more appropriate than a potential optative to Demetrius’ perception of rhetorical force. For hiatus as a device of forceful style, see Demetrius §299 and, further, §68–74.

ἐκ φρυγάνων ἀναστάς: The source text can only be conjectured. One possibility is a discussion on the *Odyssey* (t. 41A title 9.1; references to Homer might have appeared throughout Antisthenes' writings): at *Od.* 6.127, Odysseus rises naked from under the bushes to meet Nausicaa and her friends (ὥς εἰπὼν θάμνων ὑπεδύσετο δῖος Ὀδυσσεύς). Although he tries to make himself presentable by covering himself with leaves, he scares the girls, who run off down the beach. A second possibility is a reference to a man standing up out of his funeral pyre: τὰ φρύγανα are often kindling (Hdt. 4.62; Th. 3.111; see, further, LSJ ad loc.), and ἀνίσταμαι often refers to rising from a sickbed or from death. One of the Heracles texts might have mentioned the funeral pyre. These meanings could also have been combined: Odysseus' survival of the shipwreck could be considered miraculous, and his visit with the Phaeacians, which guarantees his homecoming, could represent a kind of new life. Dümmler (1889:170), endorsed by Giannantoni 1990 (at t. 45 and v.4:567), suggested that the fragment comes from a narrative of a human life that was developed, by the Cynic tradition and especially by Crates, into a lament on the pains of life, used in polemic against hedonist theories of virtue. But that suggestion seems groundless, not least because the interest here is in the effect caused by the man on the spectator, not in his own experience.

εἰ γὰρ μετασυνθείη τις οὕτως αὐτό: The new order puts the events in chronological order, but the main impact of the sentence is buried in the middle. The new version also ends in an irregular rhythm, three long syllables followed by three shorts and two longs. Unless ἄν is added to the text, Demetrius' rearrangement omits hiatus. But avoiding hiatus was not a goal in the forceful style.

46. Epictetus, *Discourses* 2.17.35 (Schenkl)

“θέλεις ἀναγνῶ σοι, ἀδελφέ, καὶ σὺ ἐμοί;” “Θαυμαστῶς, ἄνθρωπε, γράφεις.” “Καὶ σὺ μεγάλως εἰς τὸν Ξενοφῶντος χαρακτῆρα.” “Σὺ εἰς τὸν Πλάτωνα.” “Σὺ εἰς τὸν Ἀντισθένην.”

... ἀδελφέ;” “καὶ σὺ ἐμοί;” interpunxit Schenkl secutus Elter |
“θαυμαστῶς” R

“Do you want me to read aloud to you, brother, and you to me?”

“You write marvelously.” “And you magnificently in the character of Xenophon.” “You in the style of Plato.” “You in the style of Antisthenes.”

Context of Preservation

Epictetus' *Discourses* 2.17 promotes the elementary philosophical task of learning to match particular facts to philosophical conceptions, and he warns

the reader away from jumping too fast into advanced topics in the works of Chrysippus: a pupil without preparation is likely to resist learning anything new from the text and, instead, to see merely confirmation of what he already believes he knows. This digression is a scornful reference to unphilosophical engagement with literature, where the readers seek only mutual praise and confirmation for superficial virtues. The authors named, like the writings of Chrysippus, are probably valuable in his view: at least, they are current among philosophy students in the first century CE.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes is classified with Xenophon and Plato as writers with distinctive styles, worthy of emulation in literary games.

Notes

χαρακτήρα: The term distinguishes three individual writers in philosophy (specifically in τὰ Σωκρατικά, as he calls the literary type in 3.23.20) from one another. In *Discourses* 3.23.33, Epictetus uses the same term, χαρακτήρ, to distinguish three styles within the discourse of philosophy: the προτρεπτικός (style for “conversion” or “exhortation”), ἐλεγκτικός (style for “refuting”), and διδασκαλικός (style for “teaching”). It is possible that these three styles in philosophy correspond to the three Socratic writers named (presumably Xenophon would be διδασκαλικός, Plato would be προτρεπτικός, and Antisthenes would be ἐλεγκτικός; the last two could be reversed). But Epictetus elsewhere portrays Socrates as a mixer of these styles, and his own writing is presumably also a mixture (Long 2002:52–64). So it is unclear that he would want to reduce the Socratic writers to single “characters” from an external scheme (although Lucian might have: see t. 52B). Elsewhere, Epictetus uses the term χαρακτήρ to designate the particular style of an individual person, such as Diogenes or Nero, and this sense might be dominant when the χαρακτήρ of a single writer is in question. The distinction among these three writers is emphasized nowhere else: other evidence cites them in a list for their basic similarity (t. 42–44, 47–50; Antisthenes is distinguished by Demetrius in t. 45 and by Lucian in t. 52B). Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who uses the term χαρακτήρ in *On the Arrangement of Words* 21 to designate high, middle, and low style, also uses the term for the style of an individual writer (e.g., *On Lysias* 15–19) as well as a general style. That is most likely its sense here, as in the similar formulation of Julian, t. 44C: τὸν ἀντισθένειον τύπον ἐγχαράττειν. The term appears in Antisthenes’ book title as well, where it might also have an individualist sense: see t. 41A title 1.1.

θαυμαστώς, ἄνθρωπε: These are both terms Epictetus uses when he mimics the popular style of unphilosophical people, those who delight in epideictic display and award easy praise. (Compare 3.23.11 and 23–24.) The slang

language has proven tricky to punctuate, but in this passage (unlike 3.23), it is clear that the readers are reciting their work back and forth to each other.

47. Fronto, *Book on Eloquence to the Emperor Marcus Antoninus* 2.13 p. 141.15–16 (van den Hout)

Diodori tu et Alexini verba verbis Platonis et Xenophontis et Antisthenis anteponis.

You put the words of Diodorus and Alexinus before the words of Plato and Xenophon and Antisthenes.

Context of Preservation

Fronto's letter, written no earlier than 161 CE, when his pupil Marcus became emperor, but before his death in c. 167, scolds the emperor for his adherence to Stoic tenets in rhetoric, which were minimalist. This sentence appears early in the climactic section of the letter, where, after preparatory sections on technique in various arts, Fronto addresses Marcus' favorite, philosophy.

Importance of the Testimonium

The strong differentiation between the two groups of philosophical writers suggests that Antisthenes' texts resembled those of Plato and Xenophon in their texture and were not filled with dense logical puzzles or paradoxes, as one might infer from the testimonia for the οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν paradox, t. 152–53, or comparison to Plato's *Euthydemus*. If he was "eristic" in his living presence, as some infer from Xenophon's *Symposium* (t. 83), he did not represent this quality of speech in the texts known to Fronto. The grouping with Plato and Xenophon is common to t. 44A, 44C, 46, and 47, as well as within longer lists in t. 47 and 48.

Notes

Diodori . . . et Alexini: These are philosophers of the "dialectical" type, Diodorus Cronus of Iasus of the Megarian school, c. 300 BCE (Diog. Laert. 2.111), and Alexinus of Elis (Diog. Laert. 2.109). They use language primarily to represent and develop logical paradox. Even Chrysippus is more rhetorical than they are, as Fronto goes on to argue.

48. Cassius Longinus, *Art of Rhetoric* fr. 48.199–207 (Patillon-Brisson)

= 11 DC

ἐτι δὲ καὶ τὸ τῶν τραγωδοποιῶν φῶλον καὶ τὸ τῶν κωμῶδων,
μελοποιῶν τε καὶ τῶν τοιούτων, τό τε τῶν σοφιστῶν, ὅπου [μὴ]
μηδὲ τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν ὑπερέωραται καὶ παρημέλῃται· τῷ μὲν γὰρ

Πλάτωνι καὶ τῷ Ξενοφῶντι Αἰσχίνῃ τε καὶ Ἀντισθένει περιττῶς
 διαπεπόνηται καὶ ἱκανῶς ἡκριβῶται. τῶν δὲ ῥητόρων τῷ κορυφαίῳ
 ταύτην εἶναι συμβέβηκε τὴν ἀρετὴν, καὶ παρὰ τοῦτο κρατεῖν ἂν δοκοίη
 τῶν ἐτέρων τῶν ἐκ ταύτου γένους.

[μὴ] del. Walz | ὑπερεώραται Spengel : ὑπεώραται P : ὑπερόραται
 Walz | ante ταύτην fort. κορυφαίαν Spengel

And [consider] further the band of the tragic poets, and of the comic poets, and of the lyric poets and the like, and that of the sophists, where not even by the philosophers has [this value of artistic arrangement] been overlooked and neglected. For [style in diction] has been abundantly worked out and arranged with ample precision by Plato and Xenophon, by Aeschines and Antisthenes. For the prince among the rhetors, this turned out to be the [crowning] virtue, and by this criterion he would seem superior to the others in the same genre.

Context of Preservation

Cassius Longinus (c. 210–72 CE) was a Middle Platonist scholar and rhetorician, a pupil of Ammonius Saccas (a teacher also of Plotinus), and a teacher of Porphyry. The fragment survives as a set of folios included by accident in a text attributed to Apsines. The *Art of Rhetoric* follows in the tradition of Aristotle and the *Rhetoric to Alexander*: this passage is from the introduction to his section on style, which quotes Xenophon, Thucydides, Plato, and Demosthenes.

Importance of the Testimonium

This shows recognition of Antisthenes for exemplary style in high circles of the third century CE.

Notes

τό τε τῶν σοφιστῶν: This class includes the philosophers.

Πλάτωνι καὶ τῷ Ξενοφῶντι Αἰσχίνῃ τε καὶ Ἀντισθένει: This is the only testimony for exactly this list, which corresponds to the authors of Socratic dialogues Panaetius considered “genuine” (t. 43B). All four are included within a longer list in t. 50. Without Aeschines, the other three are listed together in t. 44B–C and 46–47.

49. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *On Thucydides* 51 p. 941 (Usener-Radermacher)

= 9 DC

πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ἐπὶ τὸν ἀρχαῖον βίον ἀναφέροντας τὴν Θουκυδίδου
 διάλεκτον ὡς δὴ τοῖς τότε ἀνθρώποις οὖσαν συνήθη, βραχὺς ἀπόχρη

μοι λόγος καὶ σαφής, ὅτι πολλῶν γενομένων Ἀθήνησι κατὰ τὸν Πελοποννησιακὸν πόλεμον ῥητόρων τε καὶ φιλοσόφων οὐδεὶς αὐτῶν κέχρηται ταύτῃ τῇ διαλέκτῳ, οὐθ' οἱ περὶ Ἀνδοκίδην καὶ Ἀντιφῶντα καὶ Λυσίαν ῥήτορες οὐθ' οἱ περὶ Κριτίαν καὶ Ἀντισθένη καὶ Ξενοφῶντα Σωκρατικοί.

In response to those who relate the dialect of Thucydides to the antiquity of his lifetime, and say that it is customary for people of that time, a short and clear reply suffices for me: that there were many rhetors and philosophers in Athens at the time of the Peloponnesian War, and none of them uses this dialect, neither the rhetors in the circles of Andocides and Antiphon and Lysias nor the Socratics in the circles of Critias and Antisthenes and Xenophon.

Importance of the Testimonium

This shows that in early Augustan Rome, Antisthenes was classified as a Socratic, in opposition to the rhetors, and was counted as a model of Socratic style. Compare t. 50, where Thucydides is classified with these Socratics.

Notes

οἱ περὶ Κριτίαν καὶ Ἀντισθένη καὶ Ξενοφῶντα Σωκρατικοί: Dionysius' inclusion of Critias and omission of Plato and Aeschines as models for Socratic style is unique amid surviving evidence. In t. 50, Phrynichus also includes Critias, among the standard four.

50. Photius, *Library* cod. 158 101b4–11 (from Phrynichus) (Henry)

= 10 DC

εἰλικρινοὺς δὲ καὶ καθαροῦ καὶ ἀττικοῦ λόγου κανόνας καὶ σταθμὰς καὶ παράδειγμά φησιν ἄριστον Πλάτωνα τε καὶ Δημοσθένην μετὰ τοῦ ῥητορικοῦ τῶν ἐννέα χοροῦ, Θουκυδίδην τε καὶ Ξενοφῶντα καὶ Αἰσχίνην τὸν Λυσανίου τὸν Σωκρατικόν, Κριτίαν τε τὸν Καλλιᾶσχρου καὶ Ἀντισθένην μετὰ τῶν γνησίων αὐτοῦ δύο λόγων [τοῦ] περὶ Κύρου καὶ τοῦ περὶ Ὀδυσσεΐας, τῶν μέντοι κωμῳδῶν Ἀριστοφάνην μετὰ τοῦ οἰκείου, ἐν οἷς ἀττικίζουσι, χοροῦ, καὶ τῶν τραγικῶν Αἰσχύλον τὸν μεγαλοφρονότατον καὶ Σοφοκλέα τὸν γλυκὺν καὶ τὸν πάνσοφον Εὐριπίδην.

Κριτίαν A : κρατίαν M | [τοῦ] del. Natorp | Ὀδυσσεΐας A : Ὀδυσσῆς M

And for pure, clean, Attic style he [Phrynichus] says the yardsticks and measuring lines and best model are Plato and Demosthenes, along with the chorus of the nine rhetoricians; Thucydides and Xenophon, and Aeschines son of Lysanias the Socratic, and Critias son of Callaeschrus and Antisthenes with his two authentic writings about Cyrus and the

one about the *Odyssey*; and of the comic poets Aristophanes with his proper chorus, in which they sing in Attic; and of the tragedians the grand-sounding Aeschylus and the sweet Sophocles and the very wise Euripides.

Context of Preservation

Photius (writing c. 850–893 CE) summarizes the recommendations for Attic diction that he found in Phrynichus' work *Preparation for Wise Speaking* (Σοφιστική Παρασκευή), composed c. 180 CE from sources datable to the Augustan and Hadrianic periods.

Importance of the Testimonium

The testimonium shows Antisthenes' recognition as a canonical author. It implies that some of Antisthenes' corpus was thought to be inauthentic, but several interpretations are possible.

Notes

ἄττικοῦ λόγου κανόνας: Phrynichus, one of the strictest arbiters of pure Attic style in the Second Sophistic, selects Plato and Demosthenes as first models, then divides prose authors into rhetoricians, historians, and a third class that appears to be writers of Socratic dialogues. The inclusion of Antisthenes implies that his “Gorgianic” style (see t. 67) either was inoffensive to Phrynichus or was not accentuated in the texts mentioned.

μετὰ τῶν γνησίων αὐτοῦ δύο λόγων: It is unclear why titles are named for Antisthenes but for no one else and why the question of authenticity is raised. Either Antisthenes is included only for the titles named, with the note about authenticity securing the value of these two titles alone; he is included especially for the titles named; or the titles are mentioned to remind the audience who he is. Natorp's deletion of one definite article (1894: col. 2541) is needed to restrict the authenticity question to the two Cyrus texts; see t. 43A for signs that the authenticity of the “smaller” Cyrus was doubted. If Phrynichus meant to deny the authenticity of Antisthenes' entire corpus apart from two texts, this would be a radical difference from the rest of ancient evidence. His implied argument would have to be that only two titles are sufficiently Attic in style to be judged authentic: style is the criterion for authenticity (Patzner 1970:106–7).

τοῦ περὶ Ὀδυσσεΐας: Exactly this title is transmitted (t. 41A title 9.1). Phrynichus' choice of this title might reflect its special popularity or importance among the many texts that Antisthenes wrote on Homer.

51A. Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 3.4 1407a8–15 (Kassel)

= 157 DC

... καὶ ὡς Δημοκράτης εἵκασεν τοὺς ῥήτορας ταῖς τίτθαις αἱ τὸ
 ψώμισμα καταπίνουσαι τῷ σιάλῳ τὰ παιδία παραλείφουσιν. καὶ
 ὡς Ἀντισθένης Κηφισόδοτον τὸν λεπτὸν λιβανωτῷ εἵκασεν, ὅτι
 ἀπολλύμενος εὐφραίνει. πάσας δὲ ταύτας καὶ ὡς εἰκόνας καὶ ὡς
 μεταφορὰς ἔξεστι λέγειν, ὥστε ὅσαι ἂν εὐδοκιμῶσιν ὡς μεταφοραὶ
 λεχθεῖσαι, δῆλον ὅτι αὗται καὶ εἰκόνες ἔσονται, καὶ αἱ εἰκόνες
 μεταφοραὶ λόγου δεόμεναι.

τὸν λεπτὸν codd. et Guillelmus de Moerbeke : τῷ λέπτῳ γρ. Θ, γρ.
 Σ | πάσας δὲ ταύτας Guillelmus de Moerbeke : πάσας γὰρ ταύτας codd.

... and as Democrates likened the rhetors to nurses who slurp up the morsel and smear the children with saliva, and as Antisthenes likened Cephisodotus the slim to frankincense, because in wasting away he cheers people up. It is possible to speak of all these both as similes and as metaphors, with the result that those which are successful when said as metaphors will clearly also succeed as similes, and similes will be metaphors lacking a ratio.

Context of Preservation

In *Rhet.* 3, Aristotle treats diction suitable for prose. He endorses metaphor as the best device for lending distinction to prose (3.2) and adds simile (3.4) as closely akin to but more poetic than metaphor. Overblown metaphor is condemned as one of four types of frigidity in 3.3, but the nine similes in prose cited in 3.4 are examples of success. Eight of the nine examples are from contemporary fourth-century Athenians, and the other is from Pericles. (See Trevett 1996 on Aristotle's habits of citation in the *Rhetoric*, usually from literary texts, not real speeches.) Soon before the example from Antisthenes, listed last, Aristotle cites three similes from Plato's *Republic* (1406b32–1407a2) that can be confirmed against the text: these use nearly the same words as Plato, in a condensed syntactical structure. Therefore, the report of Antisthenes might also be a condensed quotation. Plato's title is cited, whereas no title is cited for Antisthenes. Yet Aristotle nowhere cites a title for Antisthenes.

Importance of the Testimonium

Similes (εἰκόνες) are common in Socratic literature. Plato's *Meno* (80c–d) suggests that composing similes was a form of friendly teasing among Socrates and his friends; see also *Rep.* 6 487e4–488a2 and 509a9; 10 588b10.

Alcibiades compares Socrates to Silenus in Plato's *Symposium* (216d); see t. 51B for a parallel in Xenophon's *Symposium*. Such banter in literature of the symposium probably imitates the real institution (Aristophanes, *Wasps* 1311–14). See also t. 150A.4 and 181, where it seems that the possibility of “learning from a likeness” (ἐκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκότος) might be among Antisthenes' basic views. Von Fritz (1935:32 n.1) proposed that the simile of the bite of love (Xen. *Mem.* 1.3.12–13; Pl. *Sym.* 217e; Seneca, *Epist. mor.* 94.41 [= SSR IIIA 12, *Phaedo* of Elis]) is originally from Antisthenes.

Notes

Κηφισόδοτον τὸν λεπτόν: A few chapters later in the *Rhetoric* (1411a5, 23, 28), Aristotle mentions an Athenian politician named Cephisodotus (prominent in 371–349 BCE), who was also praised by Demosthenes (20.150) for his forceful speaking (δεινότης) in court. Since the present Cephisodotus is distinguished as ὁ λεπτός, however, he might be someone else, possibly the cithara player who attended the famous wedding of the Athenian general Iphicrates to the daughter of a Thracian king in about 380 BCE, known from the comic poet Anaxandrides (fr. 42.3 PCG). (On Anaxandrides, see also t. 115.) This earlier Cephisodotus fits better with Antisthenes' chronology. But see Goulet-Cazé 1996:414–15 for a proposal that these references in the *Rhetoric* are to the same Cephisodotus, with further implications for Antisthenes' relevance in the other passages. Another possibility might also be considered: a certain Cephisodorus (Κηφισόδωρος) is known (see Dionys. Hal. *De Isoc.* 18.4) as a pupil of Isocrates and defender of his style against Aristotle. Since Antisthenes attacked Isocrates (see t. 41A titles 1.5–6), it is plausible that he attacked his pupil also and that transmission of the name was muddled.

ὅτι ἀπολλύμενος εὐφραίνει: The citharist seems more likely than the politician, to leave Cephisodorus aside, not only for chronological reasons, but from these details: it is an entertainer's job to εὐφραίνειν, or “gladden.” Being λεπτός becomes an aesthetic virtue in Hellenistic poetry, and there could be reference here to a style of song or performance. The term ἀπολλύμενος, meanwhile, is often associated with a disease such as consumption or starvation and corresponds to λεπτός in this way. Cameron (1995:488–93) proposes that the aesthetic virtue has a connection to the thin human body and indicates its Athenian origin.

51B. Xenophon, *Symposium* 6.8–7.1 (Marchant)

(not in SSR)

(6.8) καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης εἶπε· “Σὺ μέντοι δεινὸς εἶ, ὦ Φίλιππε, εἰκάζειν· οὐ δοκεῖ σοι ὁ ἀνὴρ οὗτος λοιδορεῖσθαι βουλομένῳ εἰκέναι;” “Ναί

μὰ τὸν Δί,” ἔφη, “καὶ ἄλλοις γε πολλοῖς.” (9) “Ἄλλ’ ὅμως,” ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, “σὺ αὐτὸν μὴ εἰκάξῃς, ἵνα μὴ καὶ σὺ λοιδορουμένῳ ἐοίκῃς.” “Ἄλλ’ εἴπερ γε τοῖς πᾶσι καλοῖς καὶ τοῖς βελτίστοις εἰκάζω αὐτόν, ἐπαινοῦντι μᾶλλον ἢ λοιδορουμένῳ δικαίως ἂν εἰκάξοι μέ τις.” “Καὶ νῦν σύγε λοιδορουμένῳ ἔοικας, εἰ πάντ’ αὐτόν βελτίῳ φῆς εἶναι.” (10) “Ἄλλὰ βούλει πονηροτέροις εἰκάζω αὐτόν;” “Μηδὲ πονηροτέροις.” “Ἄλλὰ μηδενί;” “Μηδενὶ μηδὲ τούτων εἰκάξῃς.” “Ἄλλ’ οὐ μέντοι γε σιωπῶν οἶδα ὅπως ἄξια τοῦ δείπνου ἐργάσομαι.” “Καὶ ῥαδίως γ’, ἂν ἃ μὴ δεῖ λέγειν,” ἔφη, “σιωπᾶς.” αὕτη μὲν δὴ ἡ παροιμία οὕτω κατεσβέσθη. (7.1) Ἐκ τούτου δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οἱ μὲν ἐκέλευον εἰκάζειν, οἱ δὲ ἐκώλυον.

(9) πάντ’ αὐτόν βελτίῳ Cirignano : πάντ’ αὐτοῦ βελτίων codd.

And Antisthenes said, “You are clever at making likenesses, Philip. Don’t you think this man [the Syracusan entertainer] resembles someone wanting to level abuse [and be abused]?” “Yes, by Zeus,” he said, “and many other things, too.” (9) “But even so,” said Socrates, “don’t you make a likeness about him, or you, too, will look like someone leveling abuse [and being abused].” “But if I liken him to all the fine and best men, someone could more rightfully liken me to a praiser than to someone leveling abuse.” “And now you actually do resemble someone leveling abuse [and being abused], if you claim he is in all respects better.” (10) “Then do you want me to liken him to worse people?” “Not to worse, either.” “Then to no one?” “Liken him to none of these.” “But if I keep quiet, I don’t know how I can perform worthily of the dinner party.” “But that is easy,” he said, “if you are silent about what should not be said.” And in this way the wine-induced brawl was put out. (7.1) And then some of the guests were asking him to make a likeness, while others were asking him not to.

Context of Preservation

Antisthenes interrupts a quarrel about to erupt between the Syracusan entertainer and Socrates. The Syracusan entertainer has grown jealous of Socrates because the guests at Callias’ party prefer banter about the aesthetic qualities of dialectical discourse over the entertainment he has been hired to provide (6.1–6: see t. 101A), and he has begun to recite charges against Socrates from Aristophanes’ *Clouds* (6.6–8) when Antisthenes interrupts.

Importance of the Testimonium

Beyond confirming Antisthenes as likely advocate for a craft of making likenesses, this episode casts Antisthenes as Socrates’ fervent defender. Xenophon’s allusion to Aristophanes’ *Clouds* in the preceding passage can

be recognized because the text survives. There might be allusions to further texts from the literary trial of Socrates that cannot be recognized because the texts do not survive. See t. 21; and for the literary trial of Socrates—that is, the discussion surrounding Polycrates’ pamphlet—see Chroust 1957.

Notes

(8) **λοιδορεῖσθαι βουλομένῳ**: In its first instance, the infinitive is ambiguously either middle or passive (Gray 1992:68). In its three subsequent uses, it is more clearly in the middle voice, naming the kind of speaking opposite to praise. Antisthenes’ first interruption of the conversation is a harsh threat to the Syracusan. The whole episode develops the idea that praise and blame circulates in a responsive and reflexive way, where participants in the discourse implicate themselves. Compare t. 29.

(9) **πάντ’ αὐτὸν βελτίῳ**: See Huss 1997:44–45 on the emendation of Cirignano (Diss., University of Iowa, 1993).

(10) **Μηδενὶ μηδὲ τούτων εἴκαζε**: Literally, Socrates asks Phillip to liken the Syracusan to neither of these comparanda, neither better nor baser men, so that the nastiness can end. But there may be a second meaning, that the Syracusan rates as a “nobody” (Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposium*]:345).

αὕτη μὲν δὴ ἡ παροιμία: Chapter 6 began with Socrates’ question to Hermogenes, what is παροιμία? Hermogenes was unable to supply a definition (Εἰ μὲν ὅ τι ἐστὶν ἐρωτᾷς, οὐκ οἶδα) but gave his opinion, an etymology of the term. Socrates then pointed to an example, which was Hermogenes’ silence. This responding episode provides a second, opposing example of παροιμία, uncontrolled talking stopped by Socrates’ demand for silence. This could be Xenophon’s very clever response to debates about the Socratic question “What is it?” Insofar as Antisthenes related likenesses to this Socratic question (see t. 150A.4), Antisthenes’ own views on the Socratic question might have inspired Xenophon.

52A. Lucian, *Against the Uneducated Book-Collector* 27 (Macleod)

Ἦδέως δ’ ἂν καὶ ἐροίμην σε, τὰ τοσαῦτα βιβλία ἔχων τί μάλιστα ἀναγιγνώσκεις αὐτῶν; τὰ Πλάτωνος; τὰ Ἀντισθένους; τὰ Ἀρχιλόχου; τὰ Ἰππώνακτος; ἢ τούτων μὲν ὑπερφρονεῖς, ῥήτορες δὲ μάλιστα σοὶ διὰ χειρός; εἰπέ μοι, καὶ Αἰσχίνου τὸν κατὰ Τιμάρχου λόγον ἀναγιγνώσκεις; ἢ ἐκεῖνά γε πάντα οἶσθα καὶ γινώσκεις αὐτῶν ἕκαστον, τὸν δὲ Ἀριστοφάνην καὶ τὸν Εὐπολιν ὑποδέδukas;

Ἀρχιλόχου Γ^x: Ἀντιλόχου Γ¹ Ω β | μάλιστα σοὶ τούτων codd. :
τούτων del. Jacobitz

And I would gladly ask you, since you have so many books, which of them do you read the most? Those of Plato? Antisthenes? Archilochus? Hipponax? Or do you frown at these and have the rhetors mostly at hand? Tell me, do you read also Aeschines' speech against Timarchus? Or do you know all these and understand all of their points, and have you ventured into Aristophanes and Eupolis?

Context of Preservation

Lucian's text is a tirade against someone who collects books but has not read them. This passage comes near the end; the main thought appeared already in the first paragraph.

Importance of the Testimonium

The passage has been understood as an indication that Antisthenes' books were available in Athenian bookstores in the second century CE. More recently, this list has been understood to suggest unavailable books, rather than available books, perhaps as a final joke against the author's own charlatanry: all the authors named here are mentioned elsewhere in Lucian's work, but possibly this is only name-dropping. (See Hopkinson 2008:139.) A more plausible interpretation is that one strand of Lucian's audience would have recognized this set of authors as important precedents to Lucian's own text, as the ignorant addressee cannot, not having read them. Nothing in Lucian's corpus overall offers evidence convincing, to us, that he read Antisthenes firsthand. (See t. 4, 36, 52B.) But Lucian rarely does cite his "source" authors in a way that can be recognized without prior knowledge; he recasts them. It is hard to recognize recasting of Antisthenes without independent knowledge of Antisthenes' writings.

Notes

τὰ Πλάτωνος: Plato's works were readily available in the second century, and Lucian uses them closely. Plato had also been called a "new Archilochus" (Athenaeus 505e, citing Gorgias as reported by Herodicus of Babylon; see t. 147B).

τὰ Ἀντισθένης: Possibly the names in this list are paired such that one well known author is matched with one obscure author. But it seems unlikely that Lucian drops a name unless his external audience is able to recognize the relevance. The relevance of Antisthenes in this text has two possible levels. Presumably Antisthenes, like all other names on this list, is an author of abuse literature. (See t. 52B; t. 53–54 contain abusive language.) In addition, it is likely that Antisthenes, with the Cynics, would have been Lucian's ally in his main message: that books are for reading and inspiring thought, not

for collecting as objects (see t. 168 for a similar idea). Earlier in the text, Lucian has mentioned Cynics of his own day in relation to the mission to advance beyond material objects: Demetrius (§19) combats ignorant reading; Peregrinus “Proteus” (§14) was able to dupe someone into overvaluing his staff as a physical relic, after he leaped into a pyre to his death.

52B. Lucian, *The Fisherman* 23 (Macleod)

ΠΛΑΤΩΝ: Μηδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ τινα τῶν σφοδροτέρων προχειρισώμεθα, Διογένη τοῦτον ἢ Ἀντισθένη ἢ Κράτητα ἢ καὶ σέ, ὦ Χρύσιππε· οὐ γὰρ δὴ κάλλους ἐν τῷ παρόντι καὶ δεινότητος συγγραφικῆς ὁ καιρός, ἀλλὰ τινος ἐλεγκτικῆς καὶ δικανικῆς παρασκευῆς· ῥήτωρ δὲ ὁ Παρρησιάδης ἐστίν.

Plato: Not at all, but let's use one of the more vehement [speakers], Diogenes here or Antisthenes or Crates, or even you, Chrysippus: for it is not in present circumstances the moment for beauty and cleverness of prose, but for a sort of cross-examining and forensic presentation: since Parrhesiades is a rhetor.

Context of Preservation

A band of philosophers returned from the underworld puts the character Parrhesiades (Son of Outspokenness) on trial for his slander against them. Chrysippus has just proposed that Plato should represent the philosophers as spokesman in court, because of his fine style. Plato points out that the situation calls for a different style, and Diogenes is appointed. Neither Antisthenes nor Crates is mentioned elsewhere in the text, although other famous philosophers are named multiple times.

Importance of the Testimonium

As in Lucian's *Dialogues of the Dead* 22, Antisthenes is grouped with Diogenes and Crates, and even his rhetorical style is classified with theirs. Compare t. 22A, 138A, 139A–B, 183.

Notes

τινος ἐλεγκτικῆς καὶ δικανικῆς παρασκευῆς: With Diogenes and Crates, Antisthenes is an emblem of this “elenctic” style. (See t. 46.) This is the only extant passage where Antisthenes is classified with the Cynics for rhetorical style. When Diogenes volunteers to speak, he says, “Nor do I think long accounts will be at all necessary” (οὐδὲ γὰρ πάνυ μακρῶν οἶμαι τῶν λόγων δεήσεσθαι): compare t. 30, 53.8, 150A.4.

ἢ καὶ σέ, ὦ Χρύσιππε: Chrysippus is famous for bad style. The implication may be that the Cynics' style is also bad.

52C. Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 18.7.4 (Julien)

(not in SSR)

(Favorinus:) Vel ipsum hoc, quale existimatis, quod nunc de philosophis dixit? Nonne, si id Antisthenes aut Diogenes dixisset, dignum memoria visum esset?

(Favorinus:) For example, what do you think about what he just said about philosophers? If Antisthenes or Diogenes had said it, would it not have seemed worthy of memory?

Context of Preservation

Gellius tells of an encounter in Rome between Favorinus and a well known “mad” grammarian named Domitius, an expert in lexical usage. When Favorinus attempts to provoke Domitius to a performance in his art, Domitius blows up and charges that philosophers are interested only in words, whereas grammarians are superior in substantive questions. Favorinus explains later that Domitius’ madness has a certain connection to “heroism” and truth.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes is paired with Diogenes as a fitting spokesman for Domitius’ message. With t. 52B, this is the earliest surviving case of this pairing for rhetorical quality. Diogenes is far more common than Antisthenes as an exemplum for outspoken rhetorical quality.

The Judgment of the Arms

texts 53–54

53. Ajax or the Speech of Ajax (Radermacher p. 122–24)

= 14 DC

(1) ἐβουλόμην ἂν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν δικάζειν οἷπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι παρήσαν· οἶδα γὰρ ὅτι ἐμὲ μὲν ἔδει σιωπᾶν, τούτῳ δ' οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν πλέον λέγοντι· νῦν δὲ οἱ μὲν παραγενόμενοι τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῖς ἅπεισιν, ὑμεῖς δὲ οἱ οὐδὲν εἰδότες δικάζετε. καίτοι ποία τις ἂν δίκη δικαστῶν μὴ εἰδότην γένοιτο, καὶ ταῦτα διὰ λόγων; τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα ἐγίγνετο ἔργῳ. (2) τὸ μὲν οὖν σῶμα τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως ἐκόμισα ἐγὼ φέρων, τὰ δὲ ὅπλα ὅδε, ἐπιστάμενος ὅτι οὐ τῶν ὅπλων μᾶλλον ἐπεθύμουν οἱ Τρῶες ἀλλὰ τοῦ νεκροῦ κρατῆσαι. τοῦ μὲν γὰρ εἰ ἐκράτησαν, ἠκίσαντό τε ἂν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ λύτρα τοῦ Ἑκτορος ἐκομίσαντο· τὰ δὲ ὅπλα τάδε οὐκ ἂν ἀνέθεσαν τοῖς θεοῖς ἀλλ' ἀπέκρυσαν, (3) δεδιότες τόνδε τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα, ὃς καὶ πρότερον ἱεροσυλήσας αὐτῶν τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς θεοῦ νύκτωρ ὥσπερ τι καλὸν ἐργασάμενος ἐπεδείκνυτο τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς. κἀγὼ μὲν ἀξιῶ λαβεῖν ἵν' ἀποδῶ τὰ ὅπλα τοῖς φίλοις, οὗτος δὲ ἵν' ἀποδῶται, ἐπεὶ χρῆσθαι γε αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἂν τολμήσειε· δειλὸς γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπισήμοις ὅπλοις χρήσαιο, εἰδὼς ὅτι τὴν δειλίαν αὐτοῦ ἐκφαίνει τὰ ὅπλα. (4) σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἅπαντα ὅμοια. οἱ τε γὰρ διαθέντες τὸν ἀγῶνα φάσκοντες εἶναι βασιλεῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνουν ἐπέτρεψαν ἄλλοις, οἱ τε οὐδὲν εἰδότες δικάσιν ὑπισχνείσθαι περὶ ὧν οὐκ ἴστε. ἐγὼ δὲ ἐπίσταμαι τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐδεὶς ἂν βασιλεὺς ἱκανὸς ὦν περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνουν ἐπιτρέψειεν ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ ἀγαθὸς ἱατρὸς διαγνῶναι νοσήματα ἄλλῳ παρείη. (5) καὶ εἰ μὲν ἦν μοι πρὸς ἄνδρα ὁμοιότροπον, οὐδ' ἂν ἡττᾶσθαι μοι διέφερε· νῦν δ' οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ διαφέρει πλέον ἐμοῦ καὶ τοῦδε. ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ τι ἂν δράσειε φανερώς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἂν λάθρα τολμήσαιμι πράξαι. κἀγὼ μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἀνασχοίμην κακῶς ἀκούων, οὐδὲ γὰρ κακῶς πάσχων, ὁ δὲ κἂν κρεμᾶμενος, εἰ κερδαίνειν τι μέλλοι· (6) ὅστις γε μαστιγοῦν παρείχε τοῖς δούλοις καὶ τύπτειν ξύλοις τὰ νῶτα καὶ πυγμαῖς τὸ πρόσωπον, κᾶπειτα περιβαλόμενος

ράκη, τῆς νυκτὸς εἰς τὸ τεῖχος εἰσδὺς τῶν πολεμίων, ἱεροσυλήσας ἀπῆλθε. καὶ ταῦτα ὁμολογήσει ποιεῖν, ἴσως δὲ καὶ πείσει λέγων ὡς καλῶς πέπρακται. ἔπειτα τῶν Ἀχιλλέως ὅπλων ὁδε ὁ μαστιγίας καὶ ἱερόσυλος ἀξιῷ κρατῆσαι; (7) ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν λέγω τοῖς οὐδὲν εἰδόσι κριταῖς καὶ δικασταῖς, μὴ εἰς τοὺς λόγους σκοπεῖν περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνοντας, ἀλλ' εἰς τὰ ἔργα μᾶλλον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος οὐ λόγῳ κρίνεται ἀλλ' ἔργῳ· οὐδ' ἀντιλέγειν ἔξεστι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους, ἀλλ' ἢ μαχομένους κρατεῖν ἢ δουλεύειν σιωπῇ. πρὸς ταῦτα ἀθρεῖτε καὶ σκοπεῖτε· ὡς, εἰ μὴ δικάσετε καλῶς, γνώσεσθε ὅτι οὐδεμίαν ἔχει λόγος πρὸς ἔργον ἰσχύν, (8) οὐδ' ἔστιν ὑμᾶς ὅτι λέγων ἀνὴρ ὠφελήσεται, εἴσεσθε δὲ ἀκριβῶς, ὅτι δι' ἀπορίαν ἔργων πολλοὶ καὶ μακροὶ λόγοι λέγονται. ἀλλ' ἢ λέγετε ὅτι οὐ ξυνίετε τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ ἀνίστασθε, ἢ δικάζετε ὀρθῶς. καὶ ταῦτα μὴ κρύβδην φέρετε, ἀλλὰ φανερώς, ἵνα γνῶτε ὅτι καὶ αὐτοῖς τοῖς δικάζουσι δοτέα δίκη ἔστιν, ἂν μὴ δικάσωσιν ὀρθῶς. κἄπειτ' ἴσως γνώσεσθε ὅτι οὐ κριταὶ τῶν λεγομένων ἀλλὰ δοξασταὶ κάθησθε. (9) ἐγὼ δὲ διαγιγνώσκω μὲν ὑμῖν περὶ ἐμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιτρέπω, διαδοξάζειν δὲ ἅπασιν ἀπαγορεύω, καὶ ταῦτα περὶ ἀνδρὸς ὃς οὐχ ἑκὼν ἀλλ' ἄκων ἀφίκεται εἰς Τροίαν, καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ ὃς πρῶτος αἰεὶ καὶ μόνος καὶ ἄνευ τείχους τέταγμαι.

(1) τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῖς Reiske : τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔργοις codd : αὐτοῖς τοῖς ἔργοις Bekker (2) ἀλλὰ τοῦ νεκροῦ Saurpe : ἀλλ' ἢ τοῦ νεκροῦ codd. (3) αὐτῶν τὸ ἄγαλμα X² : αὐτὸν τὸ ἄγαλμα X : αὐτοῖς τὸ ἄγαλμα Reiske (4) σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἅπαντα ὅμοια codd. : emendationem desiderat Patzer | φάσκοντες εἶναι βασιλεῖς Jernstedt : οὐκ ὄντες εἶναι βασιλεῖς codd. : οὐκ ὄντες ἱκανοὶ βασιλεῖς Reiske : alia coni. alii (5) εἰ μὲν ἦν μοι codd. : subjectum desiderant Stephanus Reiske Winckelmann | οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ διαφέρει codd. : οὐκ ἔστιν ἃ διαφέρει Blass | οὐδὲ γὰρ κακῶς πάσχων codd. : οὐδὲ γ' ἂν κακῶς πάσχων Blass (7) γνώσεσθε Reiske : γνωσθήσεσε codd. (8) ἀνὴρ codd. : ἀνὴρ Blass

(1) I would wish that the same people were judging us who were present at the events. For I know that it would be right for me to keep silent, and for him who speaks more there would be no advantage. But as it is, those who were present at the events themselves are absent, and you who know nothing are judging. Indeed what kind of justice could come about from judges who do not know, and whose basis for judging comes through words? The event took place in deed. (2) The body of Achilles, then, I recovered, carrying it, and the weapons he [recovered], [he] who knew that the Trojans were most eager to get control not of the weapons but of the corpse. For, if they had gotten control of the corpse, they would have defiled the body and acquired

the ransom of Hektor. As for these weapons here, they would not have dedicated them to the gods, but they would have hidden them away, (3) fearing this fine man here, who already once before had robbed their temple of the statue of the goddess, in nightly stealth, and, as if he had accomplished something noble, made a display of it for the Achaeans. I, for my part, think I am worthy to take the weapons so that I can deliver them over to his friends, but this man wants them so that he can sell them, since he would not dare to use them. For no coward would use distinguished weapons, knowing that the weapons reveal his cowardice. (4) All things, then, are nearly alike. For those who have set up the contest, claiming to be kings, have turned the judging about virtue over to others, and you who know nothing undertake to deliver judgment on things about which you do not know. But I know this, that no king who is competent would turn over the judging about virtue to others, any more than a good doctor would concede the discernment of illnesses to another. (5) And if I were posed against a man of like character, it would make no difference to me to be beaten. But as it is, there is nothing that differs more than I and this man. For there is nothing that he would act out publicly, whereas I would not dare to do anything in secret. I would not tolerate being badly spoken of or badly treated, but he would even let himself be strung up, if he were going to make some profit from it. (6) For he is the sort who presented his back and his face to his slaves for flogging and beating, his back with clubs and his face with fists, and then, having thrown on some rags, got inside the walls of the enemies by night, robbed their temple, and went away. And he will agree that he did these things, and perhaps he will be persuasive when he says how splendidly they were done. So then does this rogue fit for whipping, this temple robber, expect to take possession of the arms of Achilles? (7) So I tell you, judges and jurors who know nothing, do not look to the words as you make your decision about excellence, but rather to the deeds. For war, also, is decided not by word but by deed: nor is it possible to refute the enemy in argument, but only to win by fighting or to serve as a slave, in silence. Consider and look to these factors: that if you do not judge well, you will find out that word has no strength against deed, (8) nor is there anything a man can say by which he will help you, and you will know quite exactly that through a lack of deeds many lengthy accounts are spoken. But either say that you do not understand what has been said, and adjourn, or judge correctly. And deliver this not secretly but openly, so that you may know that there is justice to be given also to the judges themselves, if they do not judge properly. Then

perhaps you will know that you sit here not as judges of what has been said but as opinors. (9) But I turn over to you the discernment about me and my affairs, and I forbid you all from forming conjectures: and this [business] is about a man who came to Troy not willingly but unwillingly, and about myself, who has been stationed in battle always first and alone and without fortification.

54. Odysseus or the Speech of Odysseus (Radermacher p. 124–26)

= 15 DC

(1) οὐ πρὸς σέ μοι μόνον ὁ λόγος, δι' ὃν ἀνέστην, ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας· πλείω γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πεποίηκα τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐγὼ ἢ ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες, καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ζῶντος ἂν ἔλεγον Ἀχιλλεύως, καὶ νῦν τεθνεώτος λέγω πρὸς ὑμᾶς. ὑμεῖς μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην μάχην μεμάχησθε, ἦν οὐχὶ καὶ ἐγὼ μεθ' ὑμῶν· ἐμοὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων κινδύνων οὐδεὶς ὑμῶν οὐδὲν ξύνοιδε. (2) καίτοι ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοιναῖς μάχαις, οὐδὲ εἰ καλῶς ἀγωνίζοισθε, πλέον ἐγίγνετο οὐδέν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐμοῖς κινδύνοις, οὓς ἐγὼ μόνος ἐκινδύνευον, εἰ μὲν κατορθώσοιμι, ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἐπετελεῖτο ὧν ἔνεκα δεῦρο ἀφίγμεθα, εἰ δ' ἐσφάλην, ἐμοῦ ἂν ἐνὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐστέρησθε. οὐ γὰρ ἴνα μαχοίμεθα τοῖς Τρωσὶ δεῦρ' ἀφίγμεθα, ἀλλ' ἵνα τὴν τε Ἑλένην ἀπολάβοιμεν καὶ τὴν Τροίαν ἔλοιμεν. (3) ταῦτα δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμοῖς κινδύνοις ἐνὴν ἅπαντα. ὅπου γὰρ ἦν κεκρημένον ἀνάλωτον εἶναι τὴν Τροίαν, εἰ μὴ πρότερον τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς θεοῦ λάβοιμεν τὸ κλαπὲν παρ' ἡμῶν, τίς ἐστὶν ὁ κομίσας δεῦρο τὸ ἄγαλμα ἄλλος ἢ ἐγὼ; ὃν σὺ γε ἱεροσυλίας κρίνεις. σὺ γὰρ οὐδὲν οἶσθας, ὅστις τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀνασώσαντα τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς θεοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν ὑφελόμενον παρ' ἡμῶν Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀποκαλεῖς ἱερόσυλον. (4) καὶ τὴν Τροίαν μὲν ἀλῶναι ἅπαντες εὐχέσθε, ἐμὲ δὲ τὸν ἐξευρόντα ὅπως ἔσται τοῦτο ἀποκαλεῖς ἱερόσυλον; καίτοι εἴπερ καλὸν γε ἦν ἐλεῖν τὸ Ἴλιον, καλὸν καὶ τὸ εὐρεῖν τὸ τούτου αἴτιον. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι χάριν ἔχουσι, σὺ δὲ καὶ ὄνειδίζεις ἐμοί· ὑπὸ γὰρ ἀμαθίας ὧν εὖ πέπονθας οὐδὲν οἶσθα. (5) κἀγὼ μὲν οὐκ ὄνειδίζω σοι τὴν ἀμαθίαν· ἄκων γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ σὺ καὶ <οἱ> ἄλλοι πεπόνθατε ἅπαντες· ἀλλ' ὅτι διὰ τὰ ὄνειδη τὰ ἐμὰ σωζόμενος οὐχ οἷός τε εἰ πείθεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσαπειλεῖς ὡς κακὸν δράσων τι τοῦσδε, ἐὰν ἐμοὶ τὰ ὅπλα ψηφίσωνται. καὶ πολλάκις γε ἀπειλήσεις καὶ πολλὰ, πρὶν καὶ σμικρόν τι ἐργάσασθαι· ἀλλ' εἴπερ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων τι χρή τεκμαίρεσθαι, ὑπὸ τῆς κακῆς ὀργῆς οἶομαί σε κακὸν τι σαυτὸν ἐργάσεσθαι. (6) καὶ ἐμοὶ μὲν, ὅτι τοὺς πολεμίους κακῶς ἐποίησα, δειλίαν ὄνειδίζεις· σὺ δὲ ὅτι φανερώς ἐμόχθεις καὶ μάτην ἠλίθιος ἦσθα. <ἦ> ὅτι μετὰ πάντων τοῦτο ἔδρασας, οἷε βελτίων εἶναι; ἔπειτα περὶ ἀρετῆς πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγεις; ὅς πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ οἶσθα

οὐδ' ὅπως ἔδει μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ὅς ἄγριος ὀργῇ φερόμενος τάχ' ἂν ποτε ἀποκτενεῖς σεαυτὸν κακῶ περιπεσὼν τῷ. οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθὸν οὐθ' ὑφ' αὐτοῦ χρή οὐθ' ὑφ' ἐταίρου οὐθ' ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων οὐδ' ὅτιοι ἄσχειν; (7) σὺ δὲ ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες χαίρεις ὅτι σέ φασιν οἶδε ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι· ἐγὼ δὲ δειλότατόν γε ἀπάντων τε καὶ δεδιότα τὸν θάνατον μάλιστα· ὅστις γε πρῶτον ὄπλα ἔχεις ἄρρηκτα καὶ ἄτρωτα, δι' ἅπερ σέ φασιν ἄτρωτον εἶναι. καίτοι τί ἂν δράσαις, εἴ τις σοὶ τῶν πολεμίων τοιαῦτα ὄπλα ἔχων προσέλθοι; ἢ που καλὸν τι καὶ θαυμαστὸν ἂν εἴῃ, εἰ μηδέτερος ὑμῶν μηδὲν δράσαι δύναίτο. ἔπειτα οἶε τι διαφέρειν τοιαῦτα ὄπλα ἔχειν ἢ ἐντὸς τείχους καθῆσθαι; καὶ σοὶ μόνῃ δὴ τείχος οὐκ ἔστιν, ὥς σὺ φῆς· μόνος μὲν οὖν σὺ γε ἐπταβόειον περιέρχῃ τείχος προβαλλόμενος ἑαυτοῦ· (8) ἐγὼ δὲ ἄοπλος οὐ πρὸς τὰ τείχη τῶν πολεμίων ἀλλ' εἰς αὐτὰ εἰσέρχομαι τὰ τείχη, καὶ τῶν πολεμίων τοὺς προφύλακας ἐγρηγορότας αὐτοῖς ὄπλοις αἰρῶ, καὶ εἰμὶ στρατηγὸς καὶ φύλαξ καὶ σοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων, καὶ οἶδα τὰ τε ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς πολεμίοις, οὐχὶ πέμπων κατασκευώμενον ἄλλον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὥσπερ οἱ κυβερνῆται τὴν νύκτα καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν σκοποῦσιν ὅπως σώσουσι τοὺς ναύτας, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἔγωγε καὶ σέ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας σώζω. (9) οὐδ' ἔστιν ὄντινα κίνδυνον ἔφυγον αἰσχρὸν ἡγησάμενος, ἐν ᾧ μέλλοιμι τοὺς πολεμίους κακὸν τι δράσειν· οὐδ' εἰ μὲν ὄψεσθαι μέ τινες ἔμελλον, γλιχόμενος ἂν τοῦ δοκεῖν ἐτόλμων· ἀλλ' εἴτε δοῦλος εἴτε πτωχὸς καὶ μαστιγίας ὧν μέλλοιμι τοὺς πολεμίους κακὸν τι δράσειν, ἐπεχειρουν ἂν, καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς ὀρή. οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ὁ πόλεμος ἀλλὰ δρᾶν αἰεὶ καὶ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἐν νυκτὶ φιλεῖ τι. οὐδὲ ὄπλα ἐστί μοι τεταγμένα, ἐν οἷς προκαλοῦμαι τοὺς πολεμίους μάχεσθαι, ἀλλ' ὄντινα ἐθέλει τις τρόπον, καὶ πρὸς ἓνα καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς ἐτοιμός εἰμ' αἰεὶ. (10) οὐδ' ἡνίκα κάμνω μαχόμενος, ὥσπερ σὺ, τὰ ὄπλα ἐτέροις παραδίδωμι, ἀλλ' ὁπότε ἀναπαύωνται οἱ πολέμιοι, τότε αὐτοῖς τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπιτίθεμαι, ἔχων τοιαῦτα ὄπλα ἃ ἐκείνους βλάψει μάλιστα. καὶ οὐδὲ νῦν πώποτε με ἀφείλετο, ὥσπερ σὺ πολλὰκις μαχόμενον ἄσμενον πέπαυκεν· ἀλλ' ἡνίκα ἂν ῥέγῃς σὺ, τῆνικαῦτα ἐγὼ σώζω σέ, καὶ τοὺς πολεμίους αἰεὶ κακὸν τι ποιῶ, ἔχων τὰ δουλοπρεπῆ ταῦτα ὄπλα καὶ τὰ ῥάκη καὶ τὰς μαστιγίας, δι' ἃς σὺ ἀσφαλῶς καθεύδεις. (11) σὺ δ' ὅτι φέρων ἐκόμισας τὸν νεκρὸν, ἀνδρεῖος οἶε εἶναι; ὃν εἰ μὴ ἡδύνω φέρειν, δύο ἄνδρες ἂν ἐφερέτην, κἄπειτα κἀκεῖνοι περὶ ἀρετῆς ἴσως ἂν ἡμῖν ἡμφισβήτουν. κάμοι μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἦν λόγος· σὺ δὲ τί ἂν ἔλεγες ἀμφισβητῶν πρὸς αὐτούς; ἢ δυοῖς μὲν οὐκ ἂν φροντίσαις, ἐνὸς δ' ἂν αἰσχύναιο ὁμολογῶν δειλότερος εἶναι; (12) οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐ τοῦ νεκροῦ τοῖς Τρωσὶν ἀλλὰ τῶν ὄπλων ἔμελεν ὅπως λάβοιεν; τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀποδώσειν ἔμελλον, τὰ δὲ ὄπλα ἀναθήσειν εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ τοῖς θεοῖς. τοὺς γὰρ νεκροὺς οὐ τοῖς οὐκ ἀναιρουμένοις αἰσχρὸν, ἀλλὰ

τοῖς μὴ ἀποδιδούσι θάπτειν. σὺ μὲν οὖν τὰ ἔτοιμα ἐκόμισας· ἐγὼ δὲ τὰ ὀνειδιζόμενα ἀφελόμην ἐκείνους. (13) φθόνον δὲ καὶ ἀμαθίαν νοσεῖς, κακῶν ἐναντιώτατα αὐτοῖς· καὶ ὁ μὲν σε ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ τῶν καλῶν, ἡ δὲ ἀποτρέπει. ἀνθρώπινον μὲν οὖν τι πέπονθας· διότι γὰρ ἰσχυρός, οἶει καὶ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι, καὶ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι σοφία περὶ πόλεμον καὶ ἀνδρεία οὐ ταῦτόν ἐστιν ἰσχύσαι, ἀμαθία δὲ κακὸν μέγιστον τοῖς ἔχουσιν. (14) οἶμαι δέ, ἂν ποτέ τις ἄρα σοφὸς ποιητὴς περὶ ἀρετῆς γένηται, ἐμὲ μὲν ποιήσει πολὺτλαντα καὶ πολύμητιν καὶ πολυμήχανον καὶ πτολίπορθον καὶ μόνον τὴν Τροίαν ἐλόντα, σὲ δέ, ὡς ἐγώ μαι, τὴν φύσιν ἀπεικάζων τοῖς τε νωθέσιν ὄνοις καὶ βουσί τοῖς φορβάσιν, ἄλλοις παρέχουσι δεσμεύειν καὶ ζευγνύναι αὐτούς.

(2) οὐδὲ εἰ Reiske : οὔτε εἰ codd. | ἡμῖν Reiske : ὑμῖν codd. | εἰ δ' ἐσφάλην Spengel : εἰ δὲ σφαλεῖν codd. (3) σὺ γε codd. : σὺ γὰρ Reiske (4) καλὸν γε ἦν ἐλεῖν . . . , καλὸν καὶ τὸ εὐρεῖν : num καλὸν ἐλεῖν . . . , καλὸν γε ἦν καὶ τὸ εὐρεῖν quaerit Blass (5) <οί> auct. Bekker adi. Sauppe | πεπόνθατε J : πεπόνθ^a X (i.e. πεπόνθατε vel πεπόνθασιν) : πεπόνθαται M | δράσων τι Reiske : δράσαντι codd. | ante καὶ πολλάκις γε add. ἐγὼ δ' οἶδα ὡς Bekker et Winckelmann : γε om. Winckelmann | ἐργάσεσθαι Blass : ἐργάσασθαι codd. (6) post πολέμιους adi. λάθρα Blass | σὺ δὲ ὅτι φανερώς codd. : σὺ δὲ εἴ τι φανερώς Reiske | <ἦ> Blass qui ut rogationem interpunxit : ὅτι secundum del. Sauppe | τοῦτο ἔδρασας Blass : τοῦτο δράσας X : τοῦτ' ἔδρασας C | κακῶ Aldus : κακῶς codd. | περιπεσὼν τῷ X J : περιπεσόντα C : περιπεσόντων M : περιπεσὼν τῷ ξίφει Blass | ὑφ' αὐτοῦ Reiske : ὑπ' αὐτοῦ codd. | ὑφ' ἐταίρου Radermacher : ὑφ' ἑτέρου codd. : ante οὐθ' ὑπὸ τῶν πολέμιων desiderat οὐθ' ὑπὸ τῶν φίλων Blass (7) δράσαις Blass : δράσης codd. : δράσεις Radermacher | τοιαῦτα ὅπλα ἔχειν Reiske : τοιαῦτα ὅπλα ἔχων codd. (8) πρὸς τὰ τεῖχη Blass : πρὸς τὰ τεῖχει codd. | πέμπων C : πέμπω X J M N | post ἀλλ' αὐτὸς participium desiderant Reiske et Blass (9) μαστιγίας ὦν codd. : μαστιγίας δοκῶν Reiske | τοὺς πολέμιους μάχεσθαι Reiske : τοῖς πολέμοις μάχεσθαι codd. | ὄντινα ἐθέλει codd. : ὄντινα ἐθέλοι Aldus : num ἂν ἐθέλη quaerit Blass (10) καὶ οὐδὲ Sauppe : καὶ οὔτε codd. (11) ἴσως Blass : πῶς codd. plur. : πῶς X (12) τῶν ὅπλων ἔμελεν codd. rec. : τῶν ὅπλων ἔμελλεν X | ἀναιρουμένοις codd. rec. : ἀναιρουμένους X (13) κακῶν ἐναντιώτατα codd. plur. : κακῶ ἐναντιωτάτω C | διότι C N : δότι X J M | post ἰσχυρός adi. εἰ N² | καὶ οὐκ οἶσθα C : οὐκ οἶσθα δὲ J | σοφία codd. : σοφία Giannantoni (14) ποιήσει Blass : ποιήσῃ X | πολὺτλαντα Bekker : πολὺτλαν τε X | τοῖς φορβάσιν Aldus : ταῖς φορβάσιν codd. | παρέχουσι Reiske : ὑπάρχουσι codd. | αὐτούς Reiske : αὐτοὺς codd.

(1) Not at you alone do I direct my speech, on account of which I have taken the floor, but also at everyone else. For I have done more good things for the army than all of you. And I would be saying this even if Achilles were alive, and now that he is dead I say it to you. For you battled no other battle that I did not battle with you: but of my private risks, none of you knows anything. (2) However, in the common battles, not even if you contested nobly did anything more happen. But in my risks, which I risked alone, if I succeeded, all the things for the sake of which we came here were accomplished for us, whereas if I had failed, you would have been bereft of me, one man. For we did not come here in order to fight the Trojans, but so that we could recover Helen and capture Troy. (3) And all these things were inherent in my risks. For when it was prophesied that Troy would be invincible if we did not first take back the statue of the goddess, the one stolen from us, who is the one who brought the statue back here if not myself? Whom you condemn for temple robbery. For you know nothing, if you are the sort of person who would describe as a temple robber the man who saved the statue of the goddess, and not the one who took it from us, Alexander. (4) And all of you vowed that Troy [would] be taken, but the person who figured out how this would happen, me, you describe as a temple robber? Surely, if it was a noble thing to take Troy, it was also a noble thing to find the way to do it. While the others are grateful, you actually blame me. For out of ignorance you know nothing about the things you have done well by. (5) Well, I do not blame you for your ignorance, for you and all the others have suffered this unwillingly, but because you cannot be persuaded that through these blameworthy acts of mine you were saved, but you even threaten that you will do something bad to these people if they vote the arms to me. Well, you will boast much and often before you will accomplish even a small thing. But if there is any conclusion that should be drawn from the evidence of probability, I think you are going to do something harmful to yourself under the influence of your mean-spirited anger. (6) And because I treated our enemies badly, you blame me for cowardice. Well, you, because you toiled openly, and for nothing, you were a fool. Or do you think you are better because you did what you did along with all the others? And then you speak to me about excellence? You who first of all do not even know how one should fight, but like a wild boar carried by your anger you will perhaps kill yourself one day, having met with something evil. Do you not know that the good man should suffer no evil whatsoever, neither at his own hands, nor at the hands of his friend, nor at the hands of his enemies? (7) But you

are rejoicing, just like the children, because these people say that you are brave? Well, I say that you are the biggest coward of all and that you are the most afraid of death, foremost because you have weapons that are unbreakable and invincible, on account of which they say you are invincible. Well, what would you do if some one of your enemies came up against you with the same sort of weapons? Surely it would be a brave and marvelous thing if neither of you could do anything. Or do you also think there is some difference between having these kinds of weapons and sitting inside a fortress? For you alone there is no fortress, as you claim. To the contrary, you alone walk around wearing a fortress of seven bull's hides on yourself. (8) As for me, I go unarmed not toward the fortresses of the enemies but inside the very fortresses, and I take out the waking watchmen of the enemies together with their weapons, and I am the general and the watchman, both of you and of all the others, and I know both affairs here and affairs among the enemy, not by sending another as a spy, but I myself, just as the pilots are on the watch night and day so that they will protect the sailors, so also I protect both you and all the others. (9) Nor is there any danger in which I was likely to do some harm to the enemies that I fled just because I thought it was shameful. Likewise, if people were going to see me, I would not get up my daring by striving for appearance. Rather, if as a slave or if as a beggar and a rogue I was likely to do some harm to the enemies, I would try, even if nobody was going to see. For war does not love appearing at all, but doing something, always, both in the day and in the night. Nor have any weapons been assigned to me, in which I am invited to fight the enemies, but, in whatever way someone wishes, I am always ready to face both one person and many persons. (10) And when I get exhausted in the fight, I do not hand off my weapons to other people, as you do, but whenever the enemies stop, just then I attack them by night, having the sort of weapons that will do them most harm. Nor has night ever hindered me, as it has many times made you happy to stop fighting. But while you are snoring, then I am protecting you, and I always do some harm to the enemies, since I have these weapons fit for a slave and my rags and my lash marks, because of which you sleep securely. (11) But you, because you have brought in the corpse on your back, you think you are brave? If you had not been able to carry it, two men would have carried it, and then they, too, would probably be arguing with us about their excellence. Well, my argument against them would be the same: but you, what would you say if you were arguing against them? Maybe you would not be concerned about two. But would you be ashamed to agree that you

are more cowardly than one? (12) Do you not know that the Trojans were worrying not about how they would get the corpse but about how they would get the arms? For the corpse they were going to give back, but the arms they were going to dedicate in the temples for the gods. Corpses are shameful not to those who omit to take them up but to those who do not give them back for burial. You have brought home the easy part, but I took the things away from them that we would have been blamed for. (13) You are sick with jealousy and ignorance, the evils most opposite to each other. For jealousy makes you want fine things, but ignorance turns you away from them. Well, you have been stricken with something typical of humans. Because you are strong, you think you are also brave, and you do not know that being strong is not the same thing as wisdom in war and courage, and that ignorance is the greatest evil to those who have it. (14) But I think, if some poet who is wise about excellence ever comes along, he will portray me having suffered many challenges, with many wits and many resources, a sacker of cities and the lone destroyer of Troy, and he will portray you, I think, by comparing you in your nature to dull asses and oxen that graze in the pasture, who give over to others the power of bonding and harnessing themselves.

Importance of the Texts

These are the only texts by Antisthenes that survived antiquity intact. On the question of their authenticity, see below. Whether or not they are representative of Antisthenes' writing, they are the best available basis for establishing some of its style. The other possible extended texts, beyond the plausible single words, short phrases, parodies, and reductions, include t. 197, which might incorporate a long quotation; t. 187, which probably includes quoted phrases; t. 208, from Dio Chrysostom's thirteenth oration, which could be partly quoted from Antisthenes and contains phrasing comparable to the speech of Odysseus; and Stob. 4.29c.53, which cites a passage from *On Theognis* that could be Antisthenes' text (see t. 41A title 2.5). Antisthenes' style was varied, according to t. 11A and 12C. The present texts show basic vocabulary and simple syntax, features shared with t. 208 and Stob. 4.29c.53; but this could be a deliberate style, connected with a theory of names, and need not count as the total characterization of Antisthenes' style or a criterion of Antisthenean authorship. Indeed, the word index for the speeches compiled in Goulet-Cazé 1992 ("L'Ajaj et l'Ulysse"):32–36 shows symmetries and oppositions between the characters' diction that cannot be accidental, suggesting that every word in these speeches matters and that the speeches should be read very closely at the verbal level.

The interpretation of the speeches has been elusive, on such preliminary questions as whether the speeches form a pair, who wins the internal contest, and what is at stake externally for the reader and for the author. Interpreters have generally seen either an opposition of different characters shown in “dialectic,” or propaganda for one ethical type or another. Their literary form, in a genre not unlike Gorgias’ *Palamedes*, shares features with courtroom oratory (especially the speech of Ajax) but also includes strands of implied dialogue and harangue (especially the speech of Odysseus) and might have been intended as innovative or ambiguous. Their prose is rhythmical, including sequences of iambics, the main meter of Athenian tragedy, and clause-final trochees. Odysseus seems to speak with knowledge of Homer and Sophoclean tragedy (esp. §6, 14), and it is plausible that there are allusions to lost epic and tragedy that are impossible to detect; but neither character speaks in an obviously tragic or poetic voice, such as one can find in Gorgias’ *Palamedes* character. (Compare DK 82B11a §20.) The main topic for these speakers is the relative virtue of each other: although, in some ways, Odysseus gives a defense speech to Ajax’ accusations against him and accuses Ajax in turn, both speeches are self-presentations in a positive mode. On various levels, the speeches are also about practices of naming, codes of ethics, epistemology, fictional personae, interpersonal discourse, Socrates, and the many possible combinations of these topics. A military setting is implicit in the myth, and some interpreters see that, too, as an active theme in the texts. Their date is uncertain, but they are unlikely to be remnants from a “sophistic” phase early in Antisthenes’ career, since the mission and ethics—and perhaps also the trial and death—of Socrates seem to be evoked.

It seems likely that these are epideictic and protreptic pieces intended to attract potential pupils, as some scholars (e.g., Kraus 2006:13) understand Gorgias’ *Helen* and *Palamedes* to be: compare t. 94B, a testimonium about a Heracles piece. My own most basic conclusion is that these speeches are advertisements for Antisthenes’ teaching program on the correctness of names, including how such correctness is achieved (in education, especially through critical reading of the poets) and deployed (in action). The “use of names” is what Antisthenes’ educational agenda takes as the starting point: see t. 160, 41A notes on seventh *tomos*, and 187 and 189, which are possibly exercises under this agenda; for the ethical implications, see t. 41A title 1.1 note. Further, it seems that each speech points to one key term in its closing section that captures its educational message, and the successful reader will see this. In each case, the term is withheld but implied. These key ideas are the central steps in education, in the order given. For Ajax, the term is διακρίνειν, “to discern,” and for Odysseus, it is πολύτροπος, “of many ways.” (On the details of how these terms are implied, see notes on t. 53.4 and

53.7–9 for διακρίνειν and on t. 53.5, 54.9, and 54.14 for πολύτροπος. The external audience's recognition of the missing πολύτροπος is very plausible from what is said and from Odysseus' known persona; its recognition of the missing διακρίνειν is harder to explain, but there are jarring tangles and puzzles with related words in Ajax' closing paradox, and it could be that the prefix δια- with any verb of knowing or speaking, including διαλέγεσθαι, is the important point.) This account of education is comparable to the reconstruction of Brancacci 1990, except that fixed definitions are relatively unimportant whereas flexibility aimed at the future is important: a major issue for Antisthenes resides in the nature of universals and their relationship to particular instances, which can always be new. Ajax advocates a high standard of knowledge for everyone in the world of his speech, but all fail in various ways. His view needs to accommodate language, and he needs to use analysis correctly, rather than assuming he knows what singularity is (as implied by the repeated term μόνος). Odysseus instantiates flexibility, and this, taken in the right way (the way explained in t. 187, where very particularized singularity in thoughts is also part of the account), must be added on to correct discernment to yield a successfully educated mind, one that can act ethically in new situations. This general interpretation does not preclude the many other aspects of these speeches' meaning, as addressed in the notes. For the range of opinion on the speeches, see, overall, Giannantoni 1990 v.4:257–64. On content and meaning, see, further, Blass 1892:338–44; Höistad 1948:94–102; Caizzi 1964:66–74; Decleva Caizzi 1966:89–92; Patzer 1970:194–215; Rankin 1986:152–73; Goulet-Cazé 1992 (“L’Ajax et l’Ulysse”); Sier 1996; Romeyer Dherbey 1996; Eucken 1997; Prince 1999; Morgan 2000:115–19; Romeyer Dherbey 2001, Worman 2002:185–90; Prince 2006:83–84; Montiglio 2011:24–33. On form, see Blass 1892:341–44; Radermacher 1892; Lulofs 1900; Bachmann 1907; Focardi 1987. A previous English translation with brief notes was published in Gagarin and Woodruff 1995:167–72.

Survival and authenticity of the texts: The speeches are preserved in the ninth-century codex Palatinus 88 (X, now in Heidelberg) and its several copies, according to the stemma established in Blass 1881. (For the history of editions, see Patzer 1970:193 n.81.) Lysias is the main author in this codex, and the speeches by Antisthenes, along with what survives from Alcidas and Demades, are written between the first two speeches of Lysias and the remaining twenty-nine, which are in another hand. (See Sosower 1987:3–6.) This suggests that Antisthenes was classified with the lesser orators in a Hellenistic, Roman, or Byzantine tradition, and the pairs of speeches in the manuscript could have been samples in a rhetorical curriculum (Blass 1886:71–72; Patzer 1970:192–93). The first two titles in Antisthenes' book

catalog (t. 41A) surely refer to these speeches, although the titles in the codex do not agree perfectly with the titles in the book catalog. (See Giannantoni 1990 v.4:258.) Quintilian (2.4.41) says that fictional epideictic speeches were written first in the time of Demetrius of Phalerum, and doubt was therefore cast on the authenticity of these pieces in early modern times. Doubt prevailed until the late nineteenth century, when Blass (in the first edition of *Die Attische Beredsamkeit*, published 1874), Lulofs (1900), and Bachmann (1911) used stylistic analysis to argue for authenticity (Giannantoni 1990 v.4:258–63). Geffcken (1935:248) called the argument finished, and the more recent specialists—Declava Caizzi (1966:89), Patzer (1970:194–215), Rankin (1986:152), and Giannantoni (1990 v.4:262–63)—uphold authenticity. Some treatments still aim to establish authenticity: Goulet-Cazé 1992 (“L’Ajax et l’Ulysse”):18–19 remains skeptical; Romeyer-Dherbey 2001:103–28 and Levystone 2005:184 n.5 reevaluate; Brancacci 1990 takes little note of the speeches. There is no reason to doubt authenticity.

History of the myth: Before Antisthenes, this myth was told twice in the poems of the Epic Cycle, in the *Aethiopis* and the *Little Iliad*, and it is presupposed in *Od.* 11.543–67 and, arguably, *Il.* 23.700–739; it was told by Pindar in *Nem.* 8 and by Aeschylus in the lost *Judgment of the Arms* (Ὀπλῶν Κρίσις); and it is the topic of a set of vase paintings from the early fifth century, roughly the time of Pindar and Aeschylus. It is assumed in the background to Sophocles’ *Ajax*. Around and soon after Antisthenes’ own writing career, three lost plays titled *Ajax* are known from the fourth century, by Theodectes, Carcinus (alleged to be Theodectes’ son), and Astydamus the younger; these might have had some relationship to Antisthenes’ version, whether as inspirations or responses. Latin versions were written by Livius Andronicus, Ennius, Pacuvius, Accius, and Ovid. An Oxyrhynchus papyrus narrates the theft of the Palladium in a version that might follow Antisthenes’ tradition (Parca 1991). For the mythical background and its various versions before and after Antisthenes, see Jebb 1896:ix–xlvii (introduction to Sophocles’ *Ajax*); Stanford 1954:90–101; Patzer 1970:199–203; De Sarno 1986; Huyck 1991:10–43; Goulet-Cazé 1992 (“L’Ajax et l’Ulysse”):6–15; Finglass 2011:26–41.

Genre: The speeches of Ajax and Odysseus differ from each other in style and structure. Ajax’ speech resembles a specimen of forensic oratory, arguably with discrete sections of exordium, narrative, argument, and peroration, such as those listed by Plato (*Phaedr.* 266d7–e5) and in later rhetorical manuals described in full (Focardi 1987:148–50). Odysseus’ speech lacks this form but sometimes seems like a dialogue, especially through its corrective addresses to Ajax (Blass 1892:341–44). Both speeches contain sequences of syllables,

especially at the end of κῶλα, or syntactically unified sequences, that are standard in Greek poetry, to such a degree that scholars in the nineteenth century suspected that speeches from tragedies had been rewritten in prose: they even added supplements and reordered words to produce better trimeters. (See Blass 1892; Radermacher 1896; Bachmann 1907.) But there is no rigorous metrical regularity like what Greek poets produced. Either Antisthenes wrote prose with a “musical ear” (Joël 1893; Bachmann 1907), such as Aristotle (*Rhet.* 3.8 1408b21–32) and Demetrius (*On Style* §1–6 and passim; see t. 45) seem to assume for classical prose generally, or he mixed standard verse forms into his writing in a more deliberate way, such as Aristotle might suggest for the *Sokratikos logos* when he classifies it under the unnamed mimetic form that might mix “bare language” with metrical units (*Poet.* 1447a28–b2). The speeches have no true parallels in extant literature, but they are often classified with Gorgias’ *Helen* and *Palamedes* and Alcidas’ *Odysseus*. (The manuscript Palatinus 88 includes Alcidas’ *Odysseus*, as well as Gorgias’ *Helen* as an appendix, but not *Palamedes*; Blass 1881 argues that these were all, nevertheless, considered a set in the imperial period.) The mythical first-person speakers construct themselves, however, in a more pointed way than these comparanda, and Gorgias’ *Helen* is not even a first-person speech (Prince 1999). As examples of self-praise, they can be compared with the set of apologies by historical persons, such as Socrates, Antiphon, Isocrates in the *Antidosis*, and Demosthenes in *Against the Crown*. Isocrates’ *Helen*, which seems to allude to Antisthenes at its beginning (t. 156), shares features such as extended speculation on characters’ motives for their acts (e.g., §41–45, Alexander’s reasoning; see Ajax §2–3 and *Odysseus* §12).

Evaluation of the characters: Older scholarship often assumed that Antisthenes favors the character and speech of Ajax over that of Odysseus, because Ajax seems to cite maxims about virtue that appear elsewhere in Antisthenes’ literary remains, chiefly that virtue is a matter of deeds, not words (t. 134d), and that it is not possible to gainsay (t. 153A–B) (Rankin 1986:159; Sier 1996:63–69). More recently, Höistad (1948:94–102), Stanford (1954:96–100), Caizzi (1964:67–68), Romeyer Dherbey (1996), Eucken (1997), Morgan (2000:115–19), LévyStone (2005), and Montiglio (2011:24–33) have seen that Antisthenes must be endorsing Odysseus, because Odysseus has a type of Socratic voice in his cross-examination of Ajax and is correct, on many levels, in what he says, whereas Ajax is self-refuting. Surely it is possible, too, that Antisthenes plays it both ways and presents two aspects of ethical character, each to be endorsed up to a point, even if one is self-refuting and bound to destroy himself (as Socrates might have) and the other is opportunistic. (See Romeyer Dherbey 1996:273–74.) This Odysseus does

seem to have his deceptive side, if one compares his account of mythical events with that narrated in the Homeric poems; moreover, his ultimate goal of action, recovering Helen and sacking Troy, might be questionable, if one takes into account the disputes about this goal in Sophocles' *Ajax* as well as Antisthenes' likely attitude toward Helen and the effort needed to maintain the beautiful wife (t. 61, 123). Plausibly Antisthenes wanted Odysseus to be read on two levels, a Homeric level, whereby he is suspicious and self-interested, and a modern, Socratic level, whereby he goes all out to save Ajax from his own failures but is unable to achieve this (as we are left to imagine). From the evidence of the Homeric scholia (t. 187–90), it is hard to doubt that the Homeric Odysseus was a hero for Antisthenes, if only a hero for the real circumstances of communal human life in distinction from the individualist hero, whose model was probably Heracles. On Ajax as a hero elsewhere in Socratic literature, see Pl. *Sym.* 219e2, where Alcibiades compares Socrates to him. On Odysseus as a Socratic hero, see Blondell 2002:154–64; LévyStone 2005; Montiglio 2011:57–60.

Notes (*Ajax*)

(1) ἐβουλόμην ἂν τοὺς αὐτοὺς ἡμῖν δικάζειν οἵπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι παρήσαν: The speech opens with an iambic rhythm, which dominates both speeches overall (Radermacher 1896; Dover 1997:175). Ajax seems to begin by alienating his audience rather than seeking its sympathy, as the speaker would attempt in a standard exordium. His very first words, in counterfactual form, place him in a situation different from where he actually is and seem to guarantee his failure. (Lysias' *On the Murder of Eratosthenes* opens with a similar counterfactual statement about the qualifications of the judges, and this could be a technique for establishing the speaker's authority. For parallels to other real and pseudo-forensic orations, see Focardi 1987:149–50.) The identity of the judges Ajax does now face, if they are not the eyewitnesses from the battlefield, is not transparent. Epic versions of the myth (in the *Odyssey*, the *Aethiopis*, and the *Little Iliad*) offer two alternatives, the Achaean kings or the enemy Trojan prisoners. (See Goulet-Cazé 1992 [“L'Ajax et l'Ulysse”]:10 n.29.) The Athenian versions seem to imply that a jury of peers judged the case. (See Huyck 1991:20–26; Soph. *Ajax* 1135–36.) Here, it seems, the kings have delegated their rightful responsibility to another party (§4), the members of which “know nothing.” Surely Antisthenes is not restricted to the options in the epic tradition, and, like Sophocles, he might mean to suggest the democratic jury in an Athenian court. Such jurors lack direct knowledge of the deeds and rely on words alone in several senses. First, it is part of their duty to serve as disinterested parties, uninvolved in the dispute. Second, and more playfully, because of their displacement in time and place, an Athenian jury judging Homeric deeds “knows” the exploits of the Homeric characters

only through the words of Homer. The paradox that these characters Antisthenes re-creates are both Homer's characters and also independent of Homer is activated at the end of Odysseus' speech (t. 54.14).

οἵπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι παρήσαν: The πράγματα Ajax believes should determine the outcome of the trial are the events of the Trojan War, particularly the events in which he operated as a hero. Saving Achilles' corpse and armor is the event he considers primary for the evaluation of himself (§2), in accord with the version in the *Little Iliad* (see t. 54.11). When it comes to Odysseus, a second event comes into play, the theft of the Palladium, which entailed Odysseus' disguise as a beggar (§3, 6–7). On the role of πράγμα in determining the truth of λόγος generally for Antisthenes, see t. 152A–C, 153B. πράγμα and λόγος are in a tight relationship close to identity: the πράγμα determines the truth of λόγος, and an ideal λόγος will indicate (σημαίνει) and reveal (δηλοῖ) the πράγμα. The mind that must connect any pairing of πράγμα and λόγος must be taken into account in any plausible reconstruction of Antisthenes' views, and Odysseus seems, in his speech, to be well aware of the problems of apprehension.

οἶδα γάρ: Ajax is consistently confident in his own epistemological skills as well as those he can demand of others, even though what he claims to “know” is regularly a hypothetical or future event. Statements of confident knowledge appear in §2–4 and 8. Odysseus, by contrast, usually “supposes” and posits that other minds also “suppose” (t. 54 §5–7, 11, 13–14). Blass 1892:340 notes the same difference; see the entries for οἶδα, ξύνοιδα, ἐπίσταμαι, and οἶομαι in Goulet-Cazé's index (1992 [“L'Ajaj et l'Ulysse”]:32–36). A distinction between εἰδέναι and οἶσθαι is evident in the discussion of Polyphemus in t. 189C–2 and 189D, and see also Pl. *Sym.* 173d1–3.

ὅτι ἐμὲ μὲν ἔδει σιωπᾶν, τοῦτ' οὐδὲν ἂν ἦν πλέον λέγοντι: Odysseus is the traditional hero of speaking (e.g., *Il.* 2.182–210, 3.191–224), whereas Ajax' most powerful rhetorical tool in the Homeric epics is his silent rebuff of Odysseus in the underworld (*Od.* 11.541–67). (But see Montiglio 2000:83–85 on Ajax' general rhetorical profile in Homer, which is not especially silent.) It is odd, however, that Ajax says it would be “right” or “necessary” for him to remain silent, not that he would have the option to remain silent; for it seems that the same obligation does not hold for Odysseus, who would talk anyway, just without advantage. Perhaps, as scholars have often supposed, Antisthenes wishes to evoke a maxim attributed to him in Diogenes Laertius (t. 134d): τὴν τ' ἀρετὴν τῶν ἔργων εἶναι, μήτε λόγων πλείστων δεομένην μήτε μαθημάτων. On the face of it, this maxim seems to endorse Ajax' claim for virtue superior to that of Odysseus: the rhetorical situation has nothing to do with virtue, and Ajax' refusal to participate is consistent with his superior virtue. However, whether or not Diogenes' citation preserves Antisthenes'

original vocabulary, the force of his δεομένην is different, indicating not that silence is necessary but that the presence of words and learning is unnecessary (but still permissible). Under this maxim, if Ajax were in the situation of his primary performance of virtue, not in court, he would not need to remain silent; rather, he would lack the compulsion to use words. Perhaps Ajax is, instead, referring to his loyalty to his own traditional and stable character: if there were no displacement from the deeds of the war to the judgment in a court, this Ajax would be the very same Ajax who was created by Homer, as it would be “right” for him to be, and that Ajax was a man of silence, at least in *Od.* 11.541–67.

νῦν δὲ οἱ μὲν παραγενόμενοι τοῖς ἔργοις αὐτοῖς ἄπεισιν: The manuscript reading (οἱ . . . παραγενόμενοι τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔργοις, “those present at the same deeds,” which has been emended by all editors to say “those present at the deeds themselves”) might make sense in light of Antisthenes’ apparent confidence that two different speakers speaking correctly will provide the same λόγος for the same πράγμα (t. 152B.3–4, 152C.6–7). For Ajax, the ἔργα of both heroes in the Trojan War are the objects or πράγματα in dispute, and he could demand his judges to deliver their judgment on the authority of their “presence” at the “same deeds” that he is remembering. Odysseus, by contrast, will emphasize his own individual “awareness” of his contributions to the war, which nobody else can share (t. 54.1; compare t. 54.8–10). Ajax is confident in the power of other minds to see matters as he does, if only they were present, whereas Odysseus emphasizes his unique epistemological position, as well as his unique role in events.

ὑμεῖς δὲ οἱ οὐδὲν εἰδότες δικάζετε: The characterization of the jurors as ones who know not at all about the deeds (i.e., not partially or deficiently) reappears almost as a refrain twice more in Ajax’ speech (§4, 7); in the end (§8), their quality is reversed, and they become “exact” knowers for the future, when they will encounter the consequences of their unjust verdict on Ajax. Ajax’ tendency to polarize knowledge (as well as other factors in the debate) as all or nothing and not to allow for partial knowledge that would count toward producing a fair verdict is a fundamental component in the personality created in this speech. The problem it generates for him and for his argument amounts to his performative self-refutation in this text. (See Eucken 1997:254–59.) This distinct quality of knowledge, which seems to have no continuity with belief, can be compared with Plato’s strong distinction in *Rep.* 476b4–7, 477b3–478d11. See discussion of Antisthenes’ book title *On Belief and Knowledge*, t. 41A title 7.4. It is highly plausible that epistemology is so important in this pair of speeches, especially for Ajax, because it was important theoretically for Antisthenes, as well as all of Socrates’ followers. It does not follow that Antisthenes endorsed the view he attributes to Ajax.

Since Ajax fails, on his own terms, to win his argument, this could be a sign that his view, as well, is somehow self-refuting, and Antisthenes finds this worthy of display. If the speeches are advertisement for Antisthenes' own teaching agenda, he might be aiming to present the external audience with enticing paradoxes that will cause them to desire and pursue a better understanding. It is plausible that Ajax' high criterion for knowledge, with his emphasis on the failure of ordinary words to stand for "things," is partly right and that Antisthenes would fill out these positions with more nuance in his full program. The best evidence for what this program would be is in t. 160. It seems likely that t. 187–92, readings of Homeric texts, would have a place. The οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν paradox (t. 152–56) might have a place, especially if it is relevant to the reading of Homer.

καὶ ταῦτα διὰ λόγων; τὸ δὲ πρᾶγμα ἐγίγνετο ἔργω: Ajax' initial opposition between λόγος and πρᾶγμα is here definitively replaced by the opposition between λόγος and ἔργον, which dominates the speech until its end: four additional explicit polarized expressions occur in §7–8, in nearly consecutive sentences. Whereas the first opposition appears in Antisthenes' testimonia external to the speeches and covers πράγματα of various kinds other than deeds or events (see discussion at t. 152A note on ἐκάστου), the second is more traditional in ethical contexts and appears in Athenian oratory as well as tragedy since Aeschylus. See Caizzi 1964:66–68; Focardi 1987:151–52. Parry (1981) argues that Thucydides' use of this opposition, soon before the time of Antisthenes, shows signs that it is under challenge by intellectuals. Insofar as Ajax' speech is self-refuting, Antisthenes' use of the polarity between λόγος and ἔργον might also be a challenge to its coherence. For Antisthenes, it seems, uttering λόγος is a kind of ἔργον: see §8 and t. 187.1–2 notes. Plausibly the character Odysseus embodies this alternative view of the relationship between λόγος and ἔργον.

(2) τὸ μὲν οὖν σῶμα τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως ἐκόμισα ἐγὼ φέρων: Here begins what might be called the narrative section of the speech (Focardi 1987:152), although the narrative is brief, imprecise, and mixed with speculation about motives. Ajax' reasons for evaluating the two roles he identifies in the recovery episode are murky, and Odysseus will contest this evaluation (t. 54.11–12). The facts of the episode are not disputed in this debate, although other versions of the story gave differing accounts (Decleva Caizzi 1966:90). In the *Aethiopis* (according to Proclus) and the *Little Iliad* (according to a scholiast on Aristophanes), Ajax recovered Achilles' corpse, and Odysseus fended off the attacking Trojans; in Sophocles' *Philoctetes* (372–73), Odysseus claimed to have recovered both the body and the weapons; on the pediment of the temple of Athena at Aegina, from the Persian War period, Ajax was the defender of the retreat (Jebb 1896:xviii), as he is in *Il.* 17.715–34, the battle for the body

of Patroclus, often understood as a representation of the recovery of Achilles. In the *Iliad* episode, Ajax works as a team with Locrian Ajax, while Menelaus and Meriones recover the body of Patroclus. Possibly Odysseus alludes to this teamwork in t. 54.11, where he questions the value of Ajax' individual contribution to the recovery mission.

τὰ δὲ ὄπλα ὅδε: Ajax tries to diminish the role of Odysseus in the salvage mission (Focardi 1987:153): see Odysseus' reply in t. 54.11. Even though Ajax considers recovery of the weapons as less important than the corpse, the present contest is for the prize of "these" weapons (τὰ δὲ ὄπλα τάδε, end of §2), which seem to be present at the scene of debate. Odysseus will have much to say about weapons at another level, the kind each hero typically uses to accomplish his ends (t. 54.7–8). In symbolic terms, Odysseus might win the weapons through the rhetorical "weapons" in which he excels over the course of the two speeches.

ἐπιστάμενος: The reference to knowledge raises the ethical stakes for the salvage mission. Ajax' sentence is, strictly, ambiguous about which hero held knowledge about the Trojans' likely response when he chose his role. Insofar as Ajax knew, he practiced courage with deliberation. Insofar as Odysseus knew (the more likely interpretation according to word order and the alternative taken in the translation), his bad choice becomes more culpable because it was not committed in ignorance. The nature of this "knowledge" is, however, problematic: it is "knowledge" of what another party, the Trojans, would have wanted for the future, namely, the corpse of Achilles rather than the weapons, in a circumstance that never occurred. Odysseus' successful tactics of intelligence probably do include correct predictions and correct speculations on the choices of other minds (t. 54.5, 8, 14), but in this case, Ajax attributes "knowledge" to Odysseus of a matter that is neither true nor Odysseus' belief. Odysseus specifically refutes the statement in his own §12, where the Trojans' preference for Achilles' weapons over his corpse, still hypothetical, is grounded in religious practice and norms.

κρατῆσαι . . . ἐκράτησαν: Repetitions of vocabulary in Ajax' speech follow various patterns and are possibly meant as rhetorical devices related to Gorgianic figures (Decleva Caizzi 1966:90; more broadly, see Lulofs 1900). Here he repeats the same word in the same usage but in another grammatical form, possibly just to produce emphasis. Elsewhere he repeats longer phrases or antitheses at wider intervals (esp. οἱ οὐδὲν εἰδότες, λόγος / ἔργον), uses verbal formations that are cognate but have different meanings (ἴν' ἀποδῶ . . . ἴν' ἀποδῶται, §3), and uses phrases that sound almost the same but are different (τὰ δὲ ὄπλα ὅδε . . . τὰ δὲ ὄπλα τάδε, this passage). The effect frequently given, that Ajax is chanting a song or jingle, might be related to the embedded iambic trimeters detected by nineteenth-century scholars

(esp. Radermacher 1892): this could be related to Ajax' nature as a tragic character, his simple ideology, or both. Possibly something is implied about the materiality of language, which Ajax cannot transcend, just as his "courage" and "strength" remain, under Odysseus' evaluation, factors of body rather than mind (t. 54.11–13). Without fuller knowledge of the literary background, it is difficult to understand the point of this songlike texture, which Odysseus' speech does not seem to share (although he does have trimeters).

τοῦ μὲν γὰρ εἰ ἐκράτησαν, ἠκίσαντό τε ἂν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὰ λύτρα τοῦ Ἑκτορος ἐκομίσαντο: Ajax imputes to the Trojans the same behavior Achilles performed in *Il.* 24.14–22, in desecrating the corpse of Hector (Ὡς ὁ μὲν Ἑκτορα δῖον ἀεικίζεν μενεαίνων, *Il.* 24.22), and he seems to think the Trojans, had they attained control of Achilles' body, would have made a mercenary calculation, seeking to recover the ransom Priam paid to Achilles for Hector in *Il.* 24.579. Because Hector was not featured in the *Aethiopis* or the *Little Iliad*, Ajax must be referring to the story of the *Iliad*, but to an episode beyond the *Iliad*'s ending. Moreover, since the Trojans did not recover the corpse of Achilles, this episode never happened in any poetic version: yet Ajax can say that Odysseus "knew" how it would go. Contrast Odysseus' more cautious reference to Homer—in this case, to words Homer does use in the extant *Iliad* (§14). This ransom (called ἄποινα in Homer, not λύτρα) is listed out in *Il.* 24.228–37, where the younger Trojans seem to begrudge this expenditure of wealth; at *Il.* 24.579, Achilles accepts the ransom, but the narrative takes no notice; at *Il.* 24.592–95, Achilles apologizes to the dead Patroclus for trading Hector's body for the ransom. It is clear that Achilles values the body of Hector as revenge for the loss of Patroclus but concedes to the wealth as a supplement to the more important appeal by Priam in the role of a father. Neither in desecrating the corpse nor in giving it back was Achilles maneuvering to gain wealth. It is also clear that most of the Trojans might have preferred to keep the wealth their father paid for the corpse, and so the mercenary values Ajax attributes to the Trojans may be appropriate. But his overall reading of *Il.* 24 is completely at odds with its heroic values. (On these, see Zanker 1998.) Ajax generalizes the profit motive to all parties other than himself.

τὰ δὲ ὅπλα τάδε οὐκ ἂν ἀνέθεσαν τοῖς θεοῖς ἀλλ' ἀπέκρυσαν: Ajax at first implicitly accuses the Trojans of ingratitude or sacrilege, thinking the worst of them as he does of everyone he mentions in his speech, but in the next phrase, he refers this probable behavior of the Trojans back to his main opponent, Odysseus, the ultimate depraved player in the scenario.

(3) δεδιότες τόνδε τὸν ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα: The heavy demonstrative, avoidance of the opponent's name, and ironic use of ἀγαθόν are typical tactics of abusive speech in the Athenian courtroom. ἀγαθόν (together with ἀρετή) may be

the major predicate at stake in the pair of speeches. Qualification as a “man” might also be in dispute. Ajax refers to Odysseus as a “man” three times in the speech, each time with a potent adjective: the present passage; in §5 as ἄνδρα ὁμοiotροπον, with probable allusion to his epithet πολύτροπος; and in §9 as ἀνήρ ἄκων (unwilling) in his service at Troy, with an aggressive attack on his ethical responsibility. At the end of §6, just before the peroration, Ajax’ naming of Odysseus comes to a climax without the noun ἀνὴρ, in the phrase ὅδε ὁ μαστιγίας καὶ ἱερόσυλος (this rogue fit for whipping, this temple robber). Otherwise in the speech, Odysseus is οὗτος (§1, 3), ὅδε (§2), or just ὁ μὲν (§5). There is no second-person address to Odysseus, whereas Odysseus immediately and throughout addresses Ajax in the second person.

ὃς καὶ πρότερον ἱεροσυλήσας αὐτῶν τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς θεοῦ νύκτωρ: This refers to Odysseus’ theft of the Palladium, a necessary precursor to the sack of Troy. On its importance in the tradition, see t. 54.3, where Odysseus responds to this charge. Ajax adds the description “temple robbing” to this event, which is a religious crime in situations of peace but not necessarily in situations of war (*Dissoi logoi* 3.8). Odysseus challenges this description explicitly.

ὥσπερ τι καλὸν ἐργασάμενος ἐπεδείκνυτο τοῖς Ἀχαιοῖς: The predicate καλόν is ironic, as is ἀγαθόν above. On the pairing καλός and ἀγαθός in Anthisthenes’ serious ethical views, see t. 172a with further references. In addition to the ironic evaluation of the event, Ajax also emphasizes its individuation and abstraction as a discrete thing, through the way it is reified in language (τι καλόν) and through the demonstrative action he reports for Odysseus. Whether or not Odysseus would have really displayed (ἐπιδείκνυτο) the statue of the goddess to the Achaeans, as though it were the symbol of success rather than the supernatural object potent for achieving a greater success, it seems gratuitous to mention this display; the point of this statement more likely pertains to the individuated deed and its representation. Odysseus will justify his theft by framing the deed in a broader context of purpose.

κἀγὼ μὲν ἀξιώ λαβεῖν ἴν’ ἀποδῶ τὰ ὄπλα τοῖς φίλοις, οὗτος δὲ ἴν’ ἀποδῶται: Ajax presents himself as maximally generous, Odysseus as maximally self-interested, through different uses of the same verb (Focardi 1987:153). According to mythical tradition (*Little Iliad* as cited by Proclus), Odysseus handed over the weapons to Neoptolemus, Achilles’ surviving son. This is more like the action Ajax projects for himself than what he predicts for Odysseus, and hence Ajax’ words undermine his own case, for the audience who knows the myth (Eucken 1997:255).

δειλὸς γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἂν ἐπισήμοις ὅπλοις χρῆσαιτο, εἰδὼς ὅτι τὴν δειλίαν αὐτοῦ ἐκφαίνει τὰ ὄπλα: Achilles’ armor is divine, made by Hephaestus, and so ἐπίσημα (distinguished) in this respect, beyond its association with

Achilles. The verb ἐπισημαίνω is, meanwhile, important in Antisthenes' views on language (t. 188B-2; on the base σημαίνω, see t. 152B.2, 187.4): in combination with the verb ἐκφαίνει here, it seems that the armor, not unlike the Palladium in the preceding sentence, is figured as a sign in a function close to language. It would be a paradox if "distinguished" armor signified cowardice, and the assumption seems to be that distinguished armor will be automatically used with distinction by a brave possessor and misused when the possessor is not brave. The doubled use of χρῆσθαι in the context is also striking, in consideration of the apparent importance of χρῆσις in Antisthenes' ethics (t. 187.4). Yet "use" is here imagined not in a full range of freedom but under restrictions presumed of the cowardly man. The confident statement about how the deficient man uses or does not use a resource that carries inherent value, as an automatic consequence of the value inherent in that resource, could be another faulty statement in the ethical reasoning or ideology of Ajax. Elsewhere, it seems that Antisthenes locates ethical value in the subject or agent of usage, not in the resource being used.

(4) *σχεδὸν μὲν οὖν ἔστιν ἅπαντα ὅμοια*: This is a point of transition in the speech, marking a kind of concession by Ajax. But the meaning is not obvious (hence a call for emendation in Patzer 1970:194). A closely similar phrase is used by Agamemnon in Soph. *Ajax* 1366: ἢ πάνθ' ὅμοια· πᾶς ἀνὴρ αὐτῷ πονεῖ (Well all things are alike: every man toils for himself). Either this is a proverb (so Finglass 2011:511), or Antisthenes is alluding to Sophocles (as Finglass implies on p. 513); both could be true. Either way, the expression seems to be ironic. Within Ajax' voice, the expression seems to be a protest that "all things" really should not be alike, mixed with his concession that they nearly are. Possibly it indicates that the kings' delegation about to be mentioned is typical of them and that Ajax, despite his protests, is used to living in a world where he is judged by deficient judges: this happens all the time. Not only is the jury deficient in knowledge, but the kings are deficient in competence to exercise their authority (see Eucken 1997:255). On another level, the adjective ὅμοια might have a democratic resonance, like ἴσα, and Ajax concedes that after the kings' delegation, he must perform for democratic judges. Finally, Ajax might imply that "all things" (in certain classes) are being treated as homogeneous although they are not properly alike. Substitutions of judge (jury for kings) and substitutions in medium (words for deeds) have been made: all things are rendered "nearly" alike, if not precisely so, and he is forced to concede to this. If Antisthenes is alluding to Sophocles, the allusion is ironically oblique in the voice of Ajax: unlike Odysseus, Ajax does not know his poetic tradition. Sophocles' Agamemnon speaks this verse at a point where his dispute with Odysseus over the burial of Ajax' body comes to a climax: misunderstanding Odysseus and assuming that Odysseus insists on carrying

out his intention to bury Ajax to serve himself, Agamemnon concedes a step. But whereas the Ajax in Sophocles' play, which is set after the unfavorable verdict has been given, is angry at the kings and has tried to kill them, this Ajax trusts the kings and believes that they would have delivered a good verdict, had they not abdicated. The external audience might ask whether his trust is misplaced and whether this concession is made under the influence of a misunderstanding, as in the case of Agamemnon. Finally, since the Ajax in Sophocles' play is emphatically unyielding (371 etc.: see Finglass 2011:328–29 on Ajax' feigned change of mind in 666–78), the external audience here might be glad that he has apparently decided to concede. Antisthenes' omission of the story's ending, or even the verdict in the case, might be connected with the exercise in reading he intends for his external audience.

οἱ τε γὰρ διαθέντες τὸν ἀγῶνα φάσκοντες εἶναι βασιλεῖς περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνειν ἐπέτρεψαν ἄλλοις: The delegation of the judgment is unjust and reveals that the alleged kings are not kings at all. Those who receive the delegation, the actual judges, also recede a degree lower in their authority because the delegation is questionable. ἐπιτρέπω clearly connotes renunciation of responsibility. (See also t. 41A title 3.7.) On the expression φάσκοντες εἶναι βασιλεῖς, compare the hope of Plato's Socrates (*Apol.* 41a1–2): ἀπαλλαγείς τουτωνὶ τῶν φασκόντων δικαστῶν εἶναι, εὐρήσει τοὺς ὡς ἀληθῶς δικαστάς (removed from these who claim to be judges, he will find his true judges). **βασιλεὺς ἱκανὸς ὢν:** The phrase ἱκανὸς ὢν as a marker of ethical capacity occurs frequently in Plato (e.g., *Theaet.* 169a3–5, 170b2–7; *Lach.* 186d3), Xenophon (e.g., *Mem.* 2.1.1; *Cyrop.* 1.6.15), and other contemporaries. For Antisthenes, as for the tradition represented by Dio Chrysostom, it might be a special marker of the king. (See Höistad 1948:101–2, 150–52.) Compare Socrates' statement about Odysseus' rhetorical capacity at *Mem.* 4.6.15; see t. 187.12 notes.

περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνειν: This field of the king's competence is identical to what is at stake in the contest. Odysseus will call the poet σοφός (wise) in the same realm (t. 54.14), as though implying that the poet steps into this function that the kings have abdicated.

μᾶλλον ἢ περ ἀγαθὸς ἰατρός διαγνῶναι νοσήματα ἄλλω παρείη: The doctor appears repeatedly in Antisthenes' literary remains as a positive model for expertise: see t. 124A, 167, 169, 174, 187.9; see also t. 208.18. Odysseus has other models for the expert: the general, the guardian, and the pilot (t. 54.8) and implicitly the poet (t. 54.14). Although the doctor is not mentioned, Odysseus might function as a doctor of the soul for Ajax (t. 54.13). Apart from the poet, these models are matched in Plato's *Gorgias* and *Republic*.

(5) **εἰ μὲν ἦν μοι:** Odysseus' opening words, οὐ πρὸς σέ μοι μόνον ὁ λόγος, would imply that the subject Ajax elides here is also λόγος (so Reiske; Stephanus proposed ἀγών, "contest," and Winckelmann proposed διαφορά,

“dispute”). Since Ajax disclaims λόγος in general, it is fitting that he elides this word and lets the audience infer “case,” “contest,” “dispute,” or something similar from the situation itself.

πρὸς ἄνδρα ὁμοίотροπον: This is a reference to Odysseus and so probably to Odysseus πολύτροπος, whose manifold character is made an ethical flaw by accusers in the intellectual background (t. 187.1). The adjective can be interpreted in either of two ways. On the one hand, linguistic parallels would imply that the ὁμοιο- element compares one thing to another: Ajax wishes his opponent were like himself. On the other hand, the resonance with Odysseus πολύτροπος suggests that ὁμοιο- could be internal to one thing and could refer to its internal consistency (Patzner 1970:213). Odysseus is ὁμοίотροπος by neither standard. The traditional Ajax could be presumed to take the word in its more usual sense, but the setting of the speech must activate the second also. If so, this could be a substitute for the term πολύτροπος that is omitted also at the end of Odysseus’ speech (t. 54.14).

ὁ μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ὅ τι ἂν δράσειε φανερώς, ἐγὼ δὲ οὐδὲν ἂν λάθρα τολμήσαιμι πράξει: Ajax exaggerates Odysseus’ typical strategies of deception and secrecy, making it a matter of all or nothing, as he does in the case of knowledge (§1). Compare the statement about Nestor’s rhetorical policy of full disclosure in t. 187.1, which is opposed to Odysseus’ approach to speaking. The word λάθρα activates suspicion of deception, not just privacy, and its use in Sophocles’ *Ajax* (1137) is tied to the manipulation of voting that Teucer accuses against the Atreidae in the Judgment of the Arms. The polar opposition between φανερώς and λάθρα might be related to Cynic injunction to “put all things in the middle” (Höistad 1948:98, comparing Diog. Laert. 6.69), but Ajax’ call for openness appeals to the very values Cynicism opposes—namely, respect for good manners, accepted norms, and reputation—and it is Odysseus who embodies Cynic shamelessness (Caizzi 1964:69). Odysseus will expose Ajax’ dependence on social convention in t. 54.6–7. On an ironic level, openness and deception probably also refer to rhetorical tactics: in this sense, Ajax could be correct in polarizing himself against Odysseus, as he speaks literally and bluntly, precisely conveying his message to the rational faculties of the audience, whereas Odysseus uses tactics such as literary allusion, selective reporting, and indirect implication and innuendo. The audience, if not necessarily deceived, is manipulated more subtly and irrationally in response to Odysseus than in response to Ajax.

καὶ γὰρ μὲν οὐκ ἂν ἀνασχοίμην κακῶς ἀκούων: This contradicts one of Antisthenes’ signature tenets, that a bad reputation (from a bad audience) is a good thing. See t. 28, 86.

οὐδὲ γὰρ κακῶς πάσχων: This contradicts Socratic doctrine: Plato’s Socrates claims repeatedly that it is better to suffer harm than to commit it (*Gorg.*

469c2, 473a5; see Vlastos 1991:179–99), and he performs under this principle in his own death (*Crito*). For Odysseus, it is clear that risk and discomfort are necessary means toward the final goal (t. 54.9). Ajax uses *κακῶς* in a conventional, non-Socratic sense.

(6) ὅστις γε μαστιγοῦν παρείχε τοῖς δούλοις καὶ τύπτειν ξύλοις τὰ νῶτα καὶ πυγμαῖς τὸ πρόσωπον: This is the proto-Cynic Odysseus, who allows himself to be beaten and dresses like a beggar: in his speech, Odysseus will reclaim the value of this behavior, as the means toward a fine goal (t. 54.9). (See, further, Hoistad 1948:95–102, understanding this image as a more intentional “allegory” than it probably was: the Cynicizing reading was, rather, part of Antisthenes’ later reception.) There is Homeric precedent for Odysseus’ disguise as a beggar in a spying mission into Troy at the end of the war (*Od.* 4.244–51, which had later versions: see Parca 1981:76–78) and for his homecoming in Ithaca (*Od.* 13.429–38), but there is little overlap of vocabulary between these passages: the only parallel is that Odysseus is dressed in a *ράκος* in *Od.* 13.434; this is, however, reinforced with a *χιτών*, unlike the doubled single garment attributed to the Cynics (t. 22A). Letter 19 of ps.-Crates shows that there was later a debate over whether Odysseus should count as a “Cynic”: in general, claims Crates in this letter, Odysseus enjoyed his sleep and food and pursued pleasure. Odysseus donned the “Cynic costume” only once, whereas Diogenes wore it for his whole life. It is unclear which single occasion ps.-Crates has in mind, whether the episode in *Od.* 13 or the apparently different episode Ajax alludes to here in connection with the sack of Troy.

περιβαλόμενος ῥάκη: Odysseus will subtly reverse this insult by implying that Ajax’ seven-layered shield is his own costume, one that really stands in for his identity (ἐπταβόειον . . . τεῖχος προβαλλόμενος ἑαυτοῦ, t. 54.7).

τῆς νυκτὸς εἰς τὸ τεῖχος εἰσδὺς τῶν πολεμίων, ἱεροσυλήσας ἀπήλθε:

Ajax refers again (see §3) to Odysseus’ theft of the Palladium, which was necessary for the sack of Troy, again naming it as “temple robbery.” Ajax attacks Odysseus again for hiding under the cover of night and implies that penetrating the walls of the enemy was also a crime. Penetrating the walls of the enemy becomes a goal for Odysseus, for which he uses his special tactics (t. 54.8).

(7) ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν λέγω τοῖς οὐδὲν εἰδόσι κριταῖς καὶ δικασταῖς, μὴ εἰς τοὺς λόγους σκοπεῖν περὶ ἀρετῆς κρίνοντας, ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ ἔργα μᾶλλον:

Starting his peroration, Ajax resumes the address to the jury in the same mode with which he began. Abuse of the jury in the peroration may be typical of the genre, perhaps especially characteristic of demagogues. (Compare, e.g., the speech of Athenagoras in Thucydides 6.39.2–40.) This ending occupies about a third of the speech; overall, the tirades about knowledge and its failure

occupy nearly half the speech. Amid repeated instances of the verb κρίνω and the prefix δια- in this peroration, the term διακρίνω, implied elsewhere as an activity necessary for good politics (t. 71A–B) and also basic understanding (t. 160), never occurs. It could be significant that the verb is missing: the external audience may be asked to supply it. (Compare the missing πολύτροπος at t. 54.14.)

καὶ γὰρ ὁ πόλεμος οὐ λόγῳ κρίνεται ἀλλ' ἔργῳ: Here the opposition between λόγος and ἔργον seems to turn from representation versus reality to two modes for fighting. In Homer, the opposition is of the second kind: compare, e.g., Patroclus' speech soon before death (*Il.* 16.630–31), and see Janko 1992:391 ad loc., listing other cases of the opposition. The verb κρίνεται also changes force at this point, referring no longer to the decision the jury is about to perform in court (as in the previous clause and in §4) but to the “decision” of victory in war, in practice and without human judges. It is not clear why these terms change their force here, but this shift prepares for the citation in the following clause of the principle that looks like Antisthenes' famous paradox. Possibly this is evidence that the paradox itself entailed a component of action and behavior—in assigning a name to a thing and in fighting through an argument—and was not a thesis about representation in the abstract; alternatively, Ajax' use of the paradox might be ironic. Clearly Aristotle and his tradition understand the paradox to concern abstract representation primarily (t. 152–53).

οὐδ' ἀντιλέγειν ἔξεστι πρὸς τοὺς πολεμίους: This is a variation on Antisthenes' famous thesis οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν (t. 148, 152–56, 174, 41A title 6.4), here with a meaning closest to what appears in t. 174, as a mode of action. For the most general discussion, see t. 148, 152B.3. Ajax means not that the act of gainsaying cannot occur as a phenomenon but that it cannot be successful. The speech implied, if given “against the enemies” on the literal battlefield, might be brief, a mere claim for survival: simple descriptive phrases are the scale of the speeches examined in the Peripatetic exegeses of Antisthenes' paradox (t. 152B–D, 153 B–C), and even the present speeches of Ajax and Odysseus might be reducible to “I am good” or “I am singular [in the right way].” But possibly the speech needed for such confrontation against the enemies, if it were a bid to be spared from slavery or death, would be long and complicated, a full self-presentation of the kind Ajax is giving now (and such as characters in the *Iliad* often offer to their captors, for example, Lycaon to Achilles at *Il.* 21.74–96). Thus, it is possible that Antisthenes' thesis as he presented it was meant not only at the simplest level but at every level of representation. Plausibly such a representation was always an aggressive action of some kind, like the linguistic acts at every scale in this pair of speeches, from the level of single names and descriptive terms to the level of each whole *logos*.

ἀλλ' ἡ μαχομένους κρατεῖν ἢ δουλεύειν σιωπῇ: This polar opposition between winning and losing, cast in political as well as military terms, might be compared to the choice between ruling and being ruled that Socrates imposes on Aristippus in Xen. *Mem.* 2.1. In this case, it is plausible that this polar opposition, with no third option, is a principle Antisthenes endorsed, under conceptions of fighting, power, and slavery that were intellectual and ethical, not exclusively political. (But see also the book titles in t. 41A third *tomos*, for which we lack knowledge of the contents.) Because Ajax has begun his peroration and is speaking about the decision of the judges, he also speaks at some level about intellectual and ethical assets, not brute force or military might. But in this speech, he has failed to use intellectual (i.e., verbal) assets in the way he now implicitly recommends.

πρὸς ταῦτα ἀθρεῖτε καὶ σκοπεῖτε· ὥς, εἰ μὴ δικάσετε καλῶς, γνῶσεσθε ὅτι οὐδεμίαν ἔχει λόγος πρὸς ἔργον ἰσχύν: Ajax has told the jury throughout the speech that representational λόγος cannot replace ἔργον. Here his point seems to be slightly different, in that the λόγος at stake is a λόγος of action, one with potential “force” (ἰσχύς), even if this vanishes, according to Ajax, when opposed to a nonverbal ἔργον. The λόγος whose power is denied is literally the verdict of the court, which has compelling power in the particular case but also has force because it will stand as a precedent for the future. The ἔργον that Ajax seems to threaten must be something like the slaughter he intends to commit in the background of Sophocles’ *Ajax*. (See t. 54.5.) This power of deed over word is something the jury will “come to know” through their experience, whether as victims or only as witnesses to a deed against the kings.

(8) οὐδ' ἔστιν ὑμᾶς ὅτι λέγων ἀνὴρ ὠφελήσει: Blass’ reading ἀνὴρ (the man) would make it clear that Ajax refers to Odysseus, who is about to speak. This would imply that Ajax knows Odysseus as a people’s benefactor (see t. 54.1), who might be thought to save them from the punishment Ajax is predicting. However, Ajax warns that the πολλοὶ καὶ μακροὶ λόγοι of Odysseus will be only a lie, covering for his “lack of deeds.” If the traditional reading is retained (ἀνὴρ, “a man,” indefinite), Ajax is referring to anyone who uses speech over deeds and who might try to help the jury by doing so, but he still refers obliquely to Odysseus. On Ajax’ naming of Odysseus overall, see §3.

εἴσεσθε δὲ ἀκριβῶς: This is a statement of ultimate epistemological certainty, emphasized by the adverb. Ajax’ statement is, in a sense, unfalsifiable: this is a fiction, and there is no future or definite outcome to this trial or the subjectivity of the internal audience. But he might be speaking about Odysseus’ succeeding speech, where words, many by contrast with Ajax’ speech, do compensate for the absence of the deeds of the Trojan War. In this sense, he is correct: but even so, he takes very bold responsibility for the future

exact knowledge of the jury. His confidence that the jurors would thereby know the just outcome to the trial would be overthrown by one obviously likely outcome, also “true” by reference to the history of the myth: that the jurors will be persuaded by Odysseus and vote for him. Finally, Antisthenes could be making a kind of promise in his own voice to the external audience, who, if they study with him, will gain perfect knowledge. Such a reading is coherent for the whole of §8, as though addressed by Antisthenes to the audience of his epideictic advertisement.

δι’ ἀπορίαν ἔργων πολλοὶ καὶ μακροὶ λόγοι λέγονται: This seems to be both a general statement and a prediction about Odysseus’ forthcoming speech. It could also be an ironic statement about his own speech, since all parties to the present forensic event suffer from a lack of deeds, insofar as the deeds are of the past and now require that words represent them. On the phrase μακρὸς λόγος, see t. 150A.4, 150B; see also t. 30.

ἀλλ’ ἢ λέγετε ὅτι οὐ ξυνίετε τὰ λεγόμενα, καὶ ἀνίστασθε, ἢ δικάζετε ὀρθῶς: ἀνίστασθε refers to the departure of the jury at the end of the case (e.g., Demos. 21.221): Ajax tries to dismiss the jury, which is anticipated overall as a jury who will vote against him, from its duty.

καὶ ταῦτα μὴ κρύβδην φέρετε, ἀλλὰ φανερώς: The opposition between “secret” and “open” deliberation repeats the opposition between Ajax and Odysseus posited in §5. On one level, Ajax is asking the jury to vote “openly” for the man who acts openly, not in secret and with trickery for the man who acts with stealth.

κἄπειτ’ ἴσως γνῶσεσθε ὅτι οὐ κριταὶ τῶν λεγομένων ἀλλὰ δοξασταὶ κάθησθε: This is a paradox: the one thing the jury will perhaps know is that they are not knowers but believers. The term δοξασταί, as a pun on the term for jurors, δοκασταί, is used also by Antiphon (*On the Murder of Herodes* §94). Gorgias’ *Palamedes* uses the term δοξάζειν repeatedly in a strong polar opposition between the knowing (εἰδῶς ἀκριβῶς) and the conjecturing (δοξάζων) stance of the jury (§3, 22, 24). On Plato’s use of the participle ἀντιδοξάζοντες in *Theaet.* 171, see t. 148 notes. This other usage shows that this term is part of contemporary debate about the role of courtroom oratory in generating belief, as well as the question whether testimony, rather than eyewitness observation, can establish knowledge. The opposition between knowing and believing here and through §9 is the clearest reason to attribute an oppositional force to knowledge and belief in Antisthenes’ book title 7.4 in t. 41A. This reason should be rejected because of the irony in Ajax’ speech overall and the pointed self-refutation of this final section: at the least, Ajax’ positions need nuance. (See also Eucken 1997:254.)

(9) ἐγὼ δὲ διαγιγνώσκειν μὲν ὑμῖν περὶ ἐμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐμῶν ἐπιτρέπω: This is the climactic self-contradiction in the speech, a performative one: having just

berated the jury for their incompetence, Ajax delegates to them his fate. The expression *περὶ ἐμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐμῶν* sounds totalizing, as though he is on trial for his life and his property, in a serious Athenian case. The epistemological term *διαγιγνώσκειν* echoes *διαγνῶναι* in §4, part of the competence of doctors. The prefix *δια-* implies a “separative or analytical force” (Rankin 1986:160) and seems to set the standard for achieving knowledge. It seems clear that this prefix is associated with the kind of knowledge Antisthenes does advocate: see t. 71A–B, 160. The term *διαλέγεσθαι* (t. 41A title 6.2, 187.6) might also be evoked.

διαδοξάζειν δὲ ἅπασιν ἀπαγορεύω: Ajax forbids the very act the jury will necessarily perform, as he has just stated, and this is flat self-refutation. Possibly there is special force in the prefix *δια-*, added here to the simple form *δοξασταί* used above, which fits properly with sound knowledge, not mere belief. Possibly a jury that analyzed its beliefs adequately would have not belief but knowledge; that is, perhaps the word *διαδοξάζειν* is internally self-contradicting, lacking any correspondence to a concept, and impossible for everyone. Such a reading could make sense as Antisthenes’ meaning (as part of his paradoxical address to the external audience), not Ajax’.

καὶ ταῦτα περὶ ἀνδρὸς ὃς οὐχ ἐκὼν ἀλλ’ ἄκων ἀφίκεται εἰς Τροίαν: Here Ajax finally scores an important point against Odysseus, by reference to mythical tradition, but also sets himself up for Odysseus’ thorough examination of what “voluntary” action really is, which Ajax will lose. According to the tradition of the epic *Cypria*, which was apparently replayed in Palamedes plays by all three major fifth-century Athenian tragedians, Odysseus was drafted against his will to fight at Troy: he pretended to be mad, but Palamedes tricked him into revealing his sanity. (See Gantz 1993:576, 580.) Therefore, for all Odysseus’ emphasis on the goal of the war as a justification for his various behaviors (t. 54.2–3), his ethical standing is undercut if the war itself was not worthy of his voluntary and ethical participation. This problem of the moral authority of the war and the standing of the heroes who participated is debated by Menelaus and Teucer in Sophocles’ *Ajax* (1052–1117), where Ajax is said to have fought not to recover Menelaus’ wife but because of his oath (1111–14) and where Ajax came to war not explicitly ἐκὼν but still αὐτὸς . . . αὐτοῦ κρατῶν (“himself in power over himself,” 1099), which, in the context, is another way to say αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ ἄρχων (“himself ruling himself”: see also 1234) or, by a wordplay on ἄρχω and ἀρκέω that seems to lurk through Sophocles’ *Ajax*, αὐτὸς ἀρκῶν (himself sufficing), that is, αὐταρκής (“self-sufficient”: see t. 82). Ajax’ statement could, then, be also ironically about himself: in both Sophocles’ *Ajax* and this pair of texts, the “voluntary” and “singular” (μόνος) character of Ajax is examined for what it really is.

καὶ περὶ ἐμοῦ ὃς πρῶτος αἰεὶ καὶ μόνος καὶ ἄνευ τείχους τέταγμαί: Ajax’ way

of being “first and singular” will be contested by Odysseus on many levels (see notes on t. 54.1, 7, 11, 14; Prince 1999; Worman 2002:186–87). The description *μόνος* is used of Ajax nine times in Sophocles’ *Ajax*.

Notes (*Odysseus*)

(1) οὐ πρὸς σέ μοι μόνον ὁ λόγος: Whereas Ajax’ opening (and closing) words are self-centered, Odysseus aims to expand the audience and realm of his discourse to the widest possible scale: everyone. He refers to himself only lightly, and the polarized contest with Ajax is rejected.

πλείω γὰρ ἀγαθὰ πεποίηκα τὸ στρατόπεδον ἐγὼ ἢ ὑμεῖς ἅπαντες:

Throughout his speech, Odysseus emphasizes his benefaction to all, which seems to be the measure of virtue for him, sooner than any inner state of his own. (He does, however, assess Ajax’ inner state.) He acknowledges no opposition between his interests and those of another individual or any group of Greeks. Only the Trojans, who will be mentioned as the enemy in war (§9), are the targets of harm. Competition for honor is important, as implied in this sentence, but the measure for honor is the “goods” produced, which seems to be victory in the war, not a status conferred. Odysseus will measure all intermediate actions by reference to this goal.

καὶ ταῦτα καὶ ζώντος ἄν ἔλεγον Ἀχιλλέως: This boast can be read on two levels. First, Odysseus seems to cite words spoken by Sophocles’ character Ajax in his protest that if Achilles had lived to be the judge of the contest for his own arms, Ajax would have prevailed (Soph. *Ajax* 442–44). Antisthenes’ point in having Odysseus gainsay a statement by Sophocles’ Ajax is unclear: in his own voice, this is merely competitive self-assertion, but in Antisthenes’ voice, it could be a challenge to the assumption that there should be one best hero after Achilles (compare Soph. *Ajax* 1339–41), and it could hint that the οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν paradox might apply, in a sense, to the present debate. Second, without intertextuality, Odysseus’ boast that he would be the best of the Greeks even if Achilles were living imagines Achilles as his nearest rival, not the judge. In this case, the speeches might presuppose a polarized contest between Achilles and Odysseus, rather than between Ajax and Odysseus, over the better kind of heroism. This is the opposition reflected in Plato’s *Hippias Minor*, as well as t. 187.2–3, and it might be traced back to *Od.* 8.72–82. (See Nagy 1979:42–58; Luzzatto 1996:297–99.) If this is the main paradigm for Antisthenes’ speeches as well as the beginning of t. 187, Ajax has been inserted to replace Achilles (his cousin in mythology, who was made Athenian through the tribal reorganization by Cleisthenes) in a Homeric contest between the virtue of fighting talent and the virtue of intelligence. However, the contest between Odysseus and Ajax itself is pre-Homeric (*Od.* 11.543–67), and this particular contest is the one refigured by Pindar, Aeschylus, and Sophocles.

(See introductory note on the history of the myth.) It is possible, then, that Achilles became assimilated to Ajax in the Athenian tradition (especially during the Sophistic period, as reflected in *Hippias Minor*), rather than vice versa. In that case, the present pairing could be a reversion to Homeric poetry rather than an innovation; or if it is *Hippias Minor* that makes this innovation, Antisthenes' characterizations could have stimulated this. In the Alexandrian Homeric scholia, Odysseus and Achilles are figured as the main opposed heroes in the sack of Troy: see Luzzatto 1996:299–303.

ὕμεις μὲν γὰρ οὐδεμίαν ἄλλην μάχην μεμάχησθε, ἢν οὐχὶ καὶ ἐγὼ μεθ' ὑμῶν:

On the face of it, this is a rhetorical exaggeration. Ajax uses the same all-or-nothing language, contrasting himself and Odysseus (t. 53.5). Odysseus' exaggeration is less polarized and tidy than that of Ajax, and it will not cause him to refute himself. He does, perhaps, insult his audience, but his emphasis on his singular benefactions seems to give him the ethical credit to deny the importance of his subordinate colleagues. As in §4, Odysseus' implications about his audience and temporal setting are suggestive but indefinite.

Although he implies that they are or were his colleagues on the battlefield, his entire expression is negative. He makes no reference to any definite act his audience did perform; he only notes what they did not perform. Even the external audience had fought no other battle at Troy at which also he had not fought with them. (Of course, if they "fought battles at Troy" by hearing epic poetry, there are many scenes where Odysseus is not present. But it is also true that they never fought battles at Troy at all.) For this criterion of excellence, compare Soph. *Ajax* 1237, where Agamemnon insists, in similar language, that Ajax fought nowhere where Agamemnon was not.

ἐμοὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων κινδύνων οὐδεὶς ὑμῶν οὐδὲν ξύνοιδε: This is the first of Odysseus' many references to knowledge and opinion. Here he draws a strong boundary at the personal level, allowing shared knowledge to no one. This might indicate a highly experiential general theory of knowledge, and it is also a measure of Odysseus' superior view of himself in comparison to his colleagues.

(2) καίτοι ἐν μὲν ταῖς κοιναῖς μάχαις, οὐδὲ εἰ καλῶς ἀγωνίζοισθε, πλεον ἐγίγνετο οὐδέν: Odysseus risks offending the jury by speculating that they could have added no value to his personal feats, even if they had joined in these feats as a group effort. Contrast his statement about Ajax' hypothetical joint feats in §11. Because Odysseus' feats are feats of mind, they can exceed the collected feats of multiple agents, who all together cannot match his mind. Ajax' feats, being feats of body, can be matched or exceeded by multiplication of bodily agents.

ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἐμοῖς κινδύνοις, οὓς ἐγὼ μόνος ἐκινδύνευον: Odysseus emphasizes his singular private risks; Ajax, by contrast, used the adjective μόνος to refer

to his singular shield (t. 53.9). Odysseus will turn Ajax' way of being *μόνος* against him in §7.

εἰ μὲν κατορθώσαιμι, ἅπαντα ἡμῖν ἐπετελεῖτο ὧν ἔνεκα δεῦρο ἀφίγμεθα, εἰ δ' ἐσφάλην, ἐμοῦ ἂν ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς ἐστέρησθε: These alternative scenarios for the consequences to the army of Odysseus' personal risk are asymmetrical, perhaps significantly so. (There might be a textual problem: ἐσφάλην is emended from an optative in the manuscripts.) If the text is sound, Odysseus presents his success as an open future possibility relative to the situation in the past that he is imagining as the point of his decision; but his failure is counterfactual. In addition, the army's benefit from his success is out of balance with its loss from his failure: the whole common goal of the expedition (ἅπαντα ἡμῖν) versus one man (ἐμοῦ . . . ἑνὸς ἀνδρὸς). Finally, Odysseus' interests are aligned with those of the army in the first scenario, through the first-person plural verb and pronoun (also an emendation), whereas the army becomes the second person in the second scenario, where Odysseus' personal fate is distinguished from the outcome for them.

οὐ γὰρ ἵνα μαχοίμεθα τοῖς Τρωσὶ δεῦρ' ἀφίγμεθα, ἀλλ' ἵνα τήν τε Ἑλένην ἀπολάβοιμεν καὶ τὴν Τροίαν ἔλοιμεν: Odysseus seems to object to an interpretation of the Trojan War according to which the goal was to provide an opportunity for heroes to win glory or behave heroically, rather than to achieve an external end. At the same time, it is not clear, for Antisthenes, that fighting to recover another man's beautiful wife would be worthwhile (t. 61; see also t. 123, t. 41A title 9.4); if the external audience shared in this widely discussed doubt and knew that Odysseus was a reluctant participant in the Trojan War (t. 53.9), Odysseus here casts himself as an opportunist. But the goal this character Odysseus rejects, behaving as a hero, is also important, because this seems to be the kind of heroism the present Ajax character upholds. (See the character sketch in Rankin 1986:153–60.) Questioning the interpretation of the Trojan War as an opportunity for earning glory is also consistent with the alternative story of Helen: that Helen never went to Troy and that only her phantom was there (Stesich. fr. 15 Page; Herod. 2.113–20; Eur. *Helen*; arguably Gorg. DK B11). The warriors, in fighting for a phantom, might have been fighting for their own psychological projections of what is beautiful. Odysseus dispels this delusive possibility by referring the tactics of warfare to the achievement of a definite goal, which was to recover Helen. Two verbal resonances in this sentence are also notable. First, there seems to be a pun on the name Ἑλένην and the verb ἔλοιμεν, already used famously by Aeschylus (Ag. 681–98). The point would be that the sack of Troy was equivalent to the retrieval of Helen, which could be a metafictional joke. Within Odysseus' fiction, both events are equally and exchangeably objective, but both may be equally fictional outside it: in the end (§14), Odysseus also

claims his own existence external to Homer's fiction, possibly undercutting everything he has said. A second resonance is related to a possible connection between Antisthenes' Odysseus character and Alcibiades as Thucydides portrays him. Strategic reasoning expressed through the locution οὐ γὰρ ἵνα . . . , ἀλλ' ἵνα . . . is attested in only two other passages of classical Greek, once in a fragment of Demades (fr. 102 De Falco) and once in a speech that Thucydides attributes to Alcibiades (6.18.1). It is attested over three dozen times in later Greek. The resemblance between Odysseus' strategic argument and that of Thucydides' Alcibiades could be accidental, but it is possible that Thucydides' Alcibiades and Antisthenes' Odysseus were crafted on the same model. See t. 68 for another possible resonance with Alcibiades' speech to the Athenians.

(3) ταῦτα δ' ἐν τοῖς ἐμοῖς κινδύνοις ἐπὶ ἅπαντα: This sentence, as transitional, can be compared with Ajax' statement at t. 53.4. By contrast with Ajax' concession, Odysseus here takes more credit and control.

ὅπου γὰρ ἦν κεχρημένον ἀνάλωτον εἶναι τὴν Τροίαν, εἰ μὴ πρότερον τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς θεοῦ λάβοιμεν: According to mythical tradition, the Trojan prince Helenus betrayed his city and told the Greeks that the fall of Troy would be linked to the theft of the Palladium.

τὸ κλαπὲν παρ' ἡμῶν: The claim that the Greeks were the original owners of the Palladium, which Alexander previously stole, is not otherwise attested; rather, the Palladium was always originally Trojan, either given by the gods or made by a craftsman. (See Ziehen *RE* 36.2 [1949]: 171–89; Brommer 1983:40–48.) From the point of view of the original external reader, it is unclear that this point in Odysseus' argument is not obvious opportunism or even lying.

ὄν σὺ γὰρ ἱεροσυλίας κρίνεις: This is the most explicit case where Odysseus challenges Ajax' practice of naming: throughout the speech, he will reassign Ajax' words to different objects and rename Ajax' objects of reference. Naming is called judging: because judging is also the prospective activity of the jurors at the trial, this must be a marked term. The implication is that names do not have a self-evident fit to particular referents; rather, they are assigned by a particular subject, who judges the world in his behavior of naming. Odysseus would call this act not temple robbery but salvation of the goddess, a fine deed. Because the historical Antisthenes was also highly interested in naming (t. 41A titles 7.1–2, 160, 187, 189), the relationship between Odysseus' position on the truth of names and the position of the historical Antisthenes demands examination. Within the pair of speeches, it is not clear that either character is a better name giver than the other; each seems to assign names carefully, as does the wise poet Homer (§14), but each does so from the outlook of his own character and his own interests. Odysseus may be affirmed as correct in his naming practice, as well as his representations more broadly,

through allusion to the external Sophocles and Homer, who say the same thing Odysseus says about both characters. Whereas Homer says the same thing in words but not exactly in meaning (see comments on §14), Sophocles (arguably) says the same thing in meaning, if not in words, about Ajax' isolation and singularity and Odysseus' generosity. Ajax has no such external validation of his representational practices, especially in the case of the temple robbery and Odysseus' status as ὄδε ὁ μαστιγίας καὶ ἱερόσυλος ("this rogue fit for whipping, this temple robber," §6). Furthermore, his policies about epistemological certainty, which must be related to judging and naming, refute themselves (§8–9). Of course, the loss of literature to which Ajax could be alluding makes this question impossible to settle definitively. But it seems that Odysseus' views of naming are endorsed within the fiction, whereas those of Ajax are not. This still does not yield a view that can be simply attributed to the historical Antisthenes or equated to the one-to-one relationship Aristotle reports (t. 152D). This relationship is usually interpreted as an impersonal, objective criterion for correct naming, not a principle operating on the level of particular statements by particular persons in reference to particular objects. But the "polytropic view," as one might call Odysseus' position, is not inconsistent with Antisthenes' series of book titles, with his demand that learning correct usage in naming is the beginning of education (t. 160), or with the οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν paradox. The status of these speeches as epideictic for Antisthenes' teaching agenda would count in support of attributing to the historical Antisthenes either Odysseus' views on naming or, perhaps, some kind of progress from Ajax' views to Odysseus' views.

σὺ γὰρ οὐδὲν οἶσθας: Odysseus turns Ajax' own epistemological standard against him, by equating an alleged error with total ignorance (οὐδὲν οἶσθας). This is close to Ajax' portrayal of his judges (t. 53 §1, 7).

ὅστις τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀνασώσαντα τὸ ἄγαλμα τῆς θεοῦ, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸν ὑφελόμενον παρ' ἡμῶν Ἀλέξανδρον, ἀποκαλεῖς ἱερόσυλον: Odysseus objects to Ajax' framing of a morally valued incident: stealing the Palladium cannot be isolated from its motivation, Odysseus implies, and that motivation was a previous theft of the Palladium by Alexander (Paris). Odysseus' theft is then compensation, or counter-stealing, which is justified, whereas Alexander is the temple robber. Odysseus has already excused his behavior by referring to the prophecy, and it is unclear why he needs to add this further explanation, unless to protest too much and betray the self-interested quality of his version of events. See, further, §10. If a Trojan had stolen the Palladium from the Greeks, it would make sense that this was Alexander, since he also stole Helen: Odysseus might be a good creative poet here. Helenus' betrayal of the secret prophecy to the Greeks was, in turn, motivated by Helen's behavior when she took Deiphobus, rather than Helenus, as her new partner after the death of

Paris. Defending Odysseus' theft of the Palladium was allegedly held against Socrates by his accusers (SSR IE 1.105 = Libanius 1.105).

(4) καὶ τὴν Τροίαν μὲν ἄλῶναι ἅπαντες εὐχεσθε, ἐμὲ δὲ τὸν ἐξευρόντα ὅπως ἔσται τοῦτο: The form εὐχεσθε could be either present or imperfect (as in the translation), and the sentence overall is ambiguous in time, as though the speech could be in progress after the death of Achilles and after the theft of the Palladium but before the fall of Troy. This is the traditional chronological position for the Judgment of the Arms and is consistent also with Ajax' whole speech. The present section of Odysseus' speech suggests, however, that Troy has already fallen. Yet this is never absolutely explicit, and only the intending and plotting have necessarily already taken place. Possibly Antisthenes here tries, as one aspect of his play with characters and fictions, to connote temporal transcendence for Odysseus. Ajax, for his part, is securely situated in time and place, even as these do not match up: he is in his assigned mythical chronology but also in classical Athens, speaking before its kind of jury. Odysseus, in neglecting to characterize his jury much at all (see §1), leaves it undetermined just where he is.

ἀποκαλεῖς ἱερόσυλον: The compound verb ἀποκαλεῖς emphasizes the negative evaluation in Ajax' way of naming Odysseus' action of temple robbing.

καίτοι εἶπερ καλὸν γε ἦν ἐλεῖν τὸ Ἴλιον, καλὸν καὶ τὸ εὐρεῖν τὸ τοῦτου

αἵτιον: Noting that this sentence can almost be scanned as two iambic trimeters, Blass proposed moving the syllables γε ἦν to the second clause to improve the rhythm. In general, the embedded trimeters in the speech could be references to preexisting and now lost versions of the Odysseus character or the Judgment of the Arms. The phrase ἐλεῖν τὸ Ἴλιον might imply another pun on the name of Helen: see §2. Calling the goal of the war "fine" or "beautiful" (καλόν) could also allude to Helen, not without irony.

ὑπὸ γὰρ ἀμαθίας ὧν εὖ πέπονθας οὐδὲν οἶσθα: Here Odysseus introduces his diagnosis of Ajax' overall moral failing, which he will expand through the rest of the speech (esp. §5–7, 13). Ignorance (ἀμαθία) is introduced as a cause, like a disease (as it will be called explicitly in §13). What it causes is further ignorance. On the cumulative nature of corruption in the soul, compare t. 129.

(5) κἀγὼ μὲν οὐκ ὄνειδιζω σοι τὴν ἀμαθίαν· ἄκων γὰρ . . . : This statement can be compared with a thesis or paradox attributed to Socrates by Plato and Aristotle, οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν ἀμαρτάνει (Pl. *Prot.* 358c–d; Pl. *Gorg.* 509e; Arist. *NE* 3.1, 3.4; see Segvic 2000). In Odysseus' words, the condition of ignorance is an involuntary affliction, not a particular choice or action. The object of Ajax' potential knowledge, which is instead ignorance, is, similarly, not a particular fact but general, the ways in which he has benefited from his situation. This could be a version of "knowing oneself," although Ajax fails to know not his

inner self but himself as located in a social context. This involuntary ignorance is not, then, “Socratic intellectualism” (in the sense Aristotle understood it) but something broader.

καὶ σὺ καὶ <οἱ> ἄλλοι πεπόνθατε ἅπαντες: Ajax’ personal ignorance is immediately generalized. The “others” who share Ajax’ disease are literally the other Greek soldiers, including those who constitute the jury and whose non-contributions to the Trojan mission have already been noted. But the addition of ἅπαντες, “all,” might imply indeterminate others and could include the external readers. The ending on the verb πεπόνθα- is unclear in the manuscript tradition, and the reading best documented would be the second-person plural form πεπόνθατε: other editions print the third-person plural. **ἀλλ’ ὅτι διὰ τὰ ὀνειδὴ τὰ ἐμὰ σφζόμενος οὐχ οἶός τε εἰ πείθεσθαι:** Odysseus seems to imply that virtue is teachable, but only to those fit to learn it (similarly Caizzi 1964:71). By contrast with Ajax, who does not seem to contemplate people’s ability to learn about virtue or their potential for virtue but considers virtue simply a field of knowledge in which kings are the experts (§4), Odysseus seems to hold out hope that Ajax, through the present harangue, might be persuaded to look anew at what virtue is and how it should be practiced. Possibly Odysseus is trying to save Ajax through the present service of his *logos* from the suicide fated to him in myth.

ἀλλὰ καὶ προσαπειλεῖς ὡς κακὸν δράσων τι τοῦσδε: This is Odysseus’ interpretation of Ajax’ statement at t. 53.7. The wise man, according to Socrates, will not cause harm or retaliate. (See Vlastos 1991:194–99.) As his second insult, Odysseus doubts Ajax’ power to execute his threats.

ἀλλ’ εἴπερ ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων τι χρή τεκμαίρεσθαι: On the terms of contemporary dicastic theory, which opposed “probability” against “evidence,” this might be a violation of the epistemic possibilities. (Compare Antisthenes’ apparent quarrel with Isocrates evidenced in t. 41A titles 1.5–6, 55.) Odysseus will bear witness, apparently, from his knowledge of mythical tradition, according to which Ajax did become angry and do himself in. But from his point of view as a character, Ajax’ demise is in the future, and Odysseus can only conjecture from likelihood.

ὑπὸ τῆς κακῆς ὀργῆς οἶομαι σε κακὸν τι σαυτὸν ἐργάσεσθαι: As a character embedded in the present debate, Odysseus uses the modest epistemic verb οἶομαι, not the οἶδα or ἐπίσταμαι favored by Ajax (t. 53.1). Anger is the most dangerous and immoral emotion also for the Stoics. (See Graver 2007:122–32.)

(6) δελίαν ὀνειδίζεις: This is an explicit accusation against Ajax’ application of moral terms, possibly the main point of interest in the debate and in Antisthenes’ interest in language generally. Ajax charges cowardice at t. 53.3. Odysseus will show that Ajax is the coward (§7).

ὅτι φανερώς ἐμόχθεις καὶ μάτην ἡλίθιος ἦσθα: Toiling in vain is a fault of the hero, not one obviously accused against Homer's Ajax on the battlefield, although the fact that both of his Iliadic duels (*Il.* 7.181–282, 23.700–739) end in a draw could be considered toiling in vain from Odysseus' goal-oriented perspective. In Sophocles' *Ajax*, Teucer lays such a charge against the Greeks who fought at Troy, but he explicitly exempts Ajax (1112). Toiling in vain is charged also by Isocrates against Heracles (*Helen* §24), in a possible attack on Antisthenes' ethic of πόνος (Eucken 1983:101–6). On Antisthenes' conception of πόνος (a term not used in the speeches), see t. 113A.

<ἦ> ὅτι μετὰ πάντων τοῦτο ἔδρασας, οἷε βελτίων εἶναι: Odysseus accuses Ajax of following his peers, or social conventions, in deciding what is good. This accusation is extended into §7 and repeated in §14. There is no obvious traditional parallel for this accusation, although Ajax has to be conventional by contrast with Odysseus' flexibility and originality.

ἔπειτα περὶ ἀρετῆς πρὸς ἐμὲ λέγεις: Whereas Ajax always uses the phrase περὶ ἀρετῆς in reference to the present event of judgment, Odysseus uses it more broadly, to refer to the overall belief systems of the disputants. The same difference between the character's use of language, Ajax' very clear and literal and Odysseus' wide ranging and metaphorical, is evident in their use of various terms, most conspicuously ὅπλα (weapons) (Prince 1999).

ὃς πρῶτον μὲν οὐκ οἶσθα οὐδ' ὅπως ἔδει μάχεσθαι: Odysseus implies that there is a moral code for fighting, which he knows but Ajax does not, even though Odysseus' tactics are indeterminate while Ajax' tactics, bound as they are to the "wall" of a shield he carries, are quite definite. Ironically, insofar as Ajax is the fighter and Odysseus is the speaker, Ajax himself roughly implies that there is a moral code for speaking (ἐμὲ μὲν ἔδει σιωπᾶν, 53.1).

ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ὅς ἄγριος ὀργῇ φερόμενος: In *Il.* 7.255–56, both Ajax and his opponent Hector are compared to wild boars and lions who eat raw meat, in the thick of a savage duel where Ajax' seven-layered shield saves his life. Some kind of traditional connection lurks behind this duel and the anger and suicide of Ajax, which he committed with the sword Hector traded to him (Soph. *Ajax* 661–65, 817–18, 1025–35, 1283–89). Ajax was selected by lottery to represent the Greeks, but he was also the hero the Greeks would have chosen (*Il.* 7.179) as best to face Hektor in the absence of Achilles. See the other Homeric animal similes in §14. The lion that occurs in the Homeric passage is dropped by Odysseus.

τάχ' ἂν ποτε ἀποκτενεῖς σεαυτὸν κακῶ περιπεσὼν τῷ: Blass added ξίφει as final word to give a more definite closure to the sentence and to correspond with Soph. *Ajax* 828. But the indefinite accident fits better to Odysseus' fictional position. Odysseus' prediction is nevertheless very definite, showing his knowledge of the tradition and Sophocles.

οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι τὸν ἄνδρα τὸν ἀγαθὸν οὐθ' ὑφ' αὐτοῦ χρή οὐθ' ὑφ' ἑταίρου οὐθ' ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν πάσχειν: Compare Pl. *Apol.* 30c6–d5, where Socrates says that the better man cannot be harmed by the worse and that the good man cannot be harmed at all. Odysseus accuses Ajax of failure to know not facts of the case, as Ajax has accused against the jurors, but an ethical principle, which happens to be Socratic. (Compare t. 191.)

(7) σὺ δὲ ὥσπερ οἱ παῖδες χαίρεις ὅτι σέ φασιν οἶδε ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι:

The demonstrative οἶδε should imply that the jury is comprised of Ajax' contemporaries or peers, the ones who sustain his reputation as brave. If the speeches were performed, the external audience could also be implicated. A child might necessarily depend on the opinions of others, but this is an insult for Ajax. On children's behavior and on advice to them regarding praise and blame, see t. 10, 94A.

ὅστις γε πρῶτων ὄπλα ἔχεις ἄρρηκτα καὶ ἄτρωτα, δι' ἅπερ σέ φασιν ἄτρωτον εἶναι: The qualities of Ajax' external equipment are transferred, in public opinion, to Ajax himself. Ajax' unbreakable seven-layered shield, with an eighth layer of bronze, is described at *Il.* 7.219–23 and saves his life at 7.259. In the literary tradition, this is divinely given and renders him invulnerable (Pind. *Isth.* 6.45; Soph. *Ajax* 576; Pl. *Symp.* 219e). Odysseus goes on to emphasize, nevertheless, that the weapons are external attire and that Ajax' internal self is deficient.

καίτοι τί ἂν δράσαις, εἴ τις σοὶ τῶν πολεμίων τοιαῦτα ὄπλα ἔχων προσέλθοι: Since Ajax' assets are external, they could be replicated by the enemy. Odysseus also seems to replicate his enemy's weapons (§8), but it is never imagined that they could replicate his.

οἶε τι διαφέρειν τοιαῦτα ὄπλα ἔχειν ἢ ἐντὸς τείχους καθῆσθαι: Before Odysseus explicitly calls the shield a wall—echoing *Il.* 7.129, where the wall is a simile for Ajax' shield (σάκος ἡύτε πύργον, “a shield like a defense tower”)—he introduces the notion that protection by a wall is cowardly. Clearly Ajax would not “sit” behind the wall if it were his shield, but he might sit behind a wall that keeps the fighting outside, like the Trojans inside Ilium or the Greeks inside their pallisade. For the positive image of a “wall,” or τεῖχος, of reasoning around the self in Antisthenes' testimonia, see t. 107–8, 122, 134u–v.

μόνος μὲν οὖν σὺ γε ἑπταβόειον περιέρχῃ τεῖχος προβαλλόμενος ἑαυτοῦ: Despite the traditional revered status of Ajax' shield, Odysseus implies here that it is a self-fashioned costume, and he aligns it with Ajax' chief vulnerability, his mode for being “single” or “alone.” He will bring out the etymology of ἑπταβόειον (of seven ox hides) in his final image of Ajax as cattle (§14). The Homeric eighth layer of bronze is never mentioned, and this could be a signal that the Bronze Age hero is fighting now in a new world

where that invulnerability is gone. On the rhetorical level, Odysseus replies here to Ajax in t. 53.6, where he used the same verb to accuse Odysseus of crafting the beggar's costume.

(8) ἐγὼ δὲ ἄοπλος οὐ πρὸς τὰ τεῖχη τῶν πολεμίων ἀλλ' εἰς αὐτὰ εἰσέρχομαι τὰ τεῖχη: Odysseus, being weaponless in the sense of lacking Ajax' kind of military armor, works outside the laws of physics by penetrating into walls instead of attacking against them. Since Odysseus' weapons are the weapons of intelligence and rhetoric, this might mean that he penetrates the minds of his opposition, against the fortress of their own rationality or awareness. καὶ τῶν πολεμίων τοὺς προφύλακας ἐγρηγορότας αὐτοῖς ὄπλοις αἰρῶ: As the sentence develops, Odysseus regains weapons of the kind fitting to himself, which he seems to appropriate from his opposition, the sleeping guards of the enemy. On the metaphorical level, this could mean that Odysseus' tactics are not predetermined; rather, he adapts to each situation by meeting the enemy where they are and reversing their tactics, that is, using their own weapons against them because they are not alert to this vulnerability. On the rhetorical level, Odysseus is working this very kind of attack against Ajax' previous speech. Within the narrative, whereas Ajax is a sleeping colleague (§10), the enemy guards whom Odysseus here overwhelms are awake. See t. 164 for the possibility that sleeping and wakefulness are metaphors for intellectual activation. If the guards' wakefulness means that they are intelligent, their weapons might be the ones most useful to Odysseus, sooner than those of sleepers.

εἰμὶ στρατηγὸς καὶ φύλαξ καὶ σοῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀπάντων: Odysseus might claim the title φύλαξ from the προφύλακες he has just claimed to beat, on a rhetorical level of theft. These leadership roles appear frequently as similes, sometimes with development, in the Socratic literature of Plato and Xenophon. Plato's Socrates in *Rep.* 1 (334a1–5) suggests that the best guard, or φύλαξ, is also the best thief, or φῶρ, the competence accused against the traditional Odysseus and also by Antisthenes' Ajax and claimed in the preceding sentence, more euphemistically, by Antisthenes' Odysseus. The φύλαξ metaphor for kingship is also clearly traditional: see, e.g., *Soph. OT* 1418. Another standard expert, the doctor, is missing here, maybe intentionally: see t. 53.4.

καὶ οἶδα τὰ τ' ἐνθάδε καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς πολεμίοις: This is Odysseus' most explicit claim to omniscience. He seems to support this claim through the models for expertise that he has evoked for himself, but he says neither how he really knows (i.e., what function *logos* might play) or what he really knows. In the following sentence, he implies that his knowledge arises from direct experience.

οὐχὶ πέμπων κατασκεψόμενον ἄλλον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸς, ὥσπερ οἱ κυβερνῆται τὴν

νύκτα καὶ τὴν ἡμέραν σκοποῦσιν ὅπως σώσουσι τοὺς ναύτας: In comparing himself to the successful pilots, Odysseus might recall his role in the *Odyssey*, where he sails home through major dangers and troubles. This could also be cast as a failure, since he loses his men (*Od.* 1.6) and needs a magical ship in the end; the explicit reference to saving the sailors should bring this to mind. Antisthenes might have devised a positive interpretation of these adventures. (Compare t. 190.) The opposition between πέμπων κατασκεψόμενον ἄλλον and [going] αὐτός (some editors have wanted to insert a participle to improve the balance) captures Odysseus' own version of self-sufficiency, which is here aimed at the benefaction to the others. On the Cynic scout (κατάσκοπος), who also goes back and forth between realms to serve others, see t. 41A title 10.4. **οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἔγωγε καὶ σὲ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας σῶζω:** Odysseus poses himself as ultimate benefactor of the Greeks, defensively speaking. In Homer and the Trojan cycle, it seems that Odysseus' singular benefactions are offensive sooner than defensive. In *Il.* 2, he saves the mission for Agamemnon by persuading all the Greeks not to run for the ships; in the final acts of the war, the theft of the Palladium and the devising of the Trojan horse, he enables the sack of Troy. He "saves" the Greeks only in a derived sense, that they save face and escape their offensive mission without losing what they risked. When it comes to real defense in local episodes within the Trojan War, Ajax is more properly the hero of defense; indeed, Ajax saves Odysseus at a key moment. (See §10.)

(9) οὐδ' ἔστιν ὄντινα κίνδυνον ἔφυγον αἰσχρὸν ἡγήσάμενος: This is the most proto-Cynic section of Odysseus' speech. Odysseus responds to Ajax (t. 53.5), where Ajax contrasted the two heroes over their tolerance for faring badly and holding bad reputation. Risks might be classified with toil, or πόνος (see t. 82.35), and ethical questions arise over how such risks are "spent," that is, what they are exchanged for, what the final goal is, and whether there is a limit of baseness or foulness beneath which the subject cannot properly operate, in order to maintain the decorum essential to a social class or human identity. The Cynics are distinctive for rejecting all social decorum as a limit on ethical behavior. Similarly here, Odysseus claims that no risk in war is so shameful that it must be shunned on that basis alone. Rather, the goal of harming the enemy (τοὺς πολεμίους κακὸν τι δράσειν) and, presumably, sacking Troy (§4) lends its value to the means necessary for achieving this.

ἀλλ' εἴτε δούλος εἴτε πτωχὸς καὶ μαστιγίας: Odysseus quotes and claims one of the two derogatory names Ajax set on him (t. 53.6), the μαστιγίας, while implicitly rejecting the other, the ἱερόσυλος, which he argued away in §2–3. He adds two, the slave and beggar, which he does not develop. These must be roles drawn from *Od.* 13–20.

καὶ εἰ μηδεὶς ὀρώη: Odysseus' effective action below the level of sight,

emphatically mentioned, should count as evidence against a view of Antisthenes whereby only sight is admitted as an organ of perception while the mind is renounced. (See t. 149A–C.)

οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ὁ πόλεμος ἀλλὰ δρᾶν αἰεὶ καὶ ἐν ἡμέρᾳ καὶ ἐν νυκτὶ φιλεῖ τι: Ajax has made a similar statement, when he insisted that it is possible to resist the enemy not in speech but only in action (t. 53.7). Odysseus, who never so much as alludes to a representative theory of *logos*, recasts Ajax' opposition as seeming versus doing, not speaking versus acting. He has successfully portrayed Ajax as a character of seeming, totally reversing the image Ajax tried to present.

οὐδὲ ὅπλα ἐστὶ μοι τεταγμένα . . . ἀλλ' ὄντινα ἐθέλει τις τρόπον, καὶ πρὸς ἓνα καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς ἔτοιμός εἰμ' αἰεὶ: The phrase ὄντινα . . . τρόπον must be a version of the epithet πολύτροπος, which is technically missing from the speech. (See §14.) In t. 187, τρόπος is said in reference to character and ways in words; here, it seems wide open, for any mode of assault on opposition (or audience) at any scale. The immediate context implies that clothing is meant (Worman 2002:189). Since the rhetorical situation is so heavily thematized, especially by Ajax, Odysseus' rhetorical tactics must also be meant: a reference to rhetoric gives significance to the distinction καὶ πρὸς ἓνα καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς. (See t. 69.) The tactic itself, disguise, could also be called a τρόπος. Here, Odysseus is not just multiple or flexible but ultimately and indefinitely so: he is ready for every challenge anyone might “wish” him to take.

(10) οὐδ' ἡνίκα κάμνω μαχόμενος, ὥσπερ σύ, τὰ ὅπλα ἐτέροις παραδίδωμι: At *Il.* 13.709–11, Ajax is accompanied by his large and noble company, who “receive his shield, whenever toil and sweat reach his knees” (ἀλλ' ἦτοι Τελαμωνιάδῃ πολλοὶ τε καὶ ἐσθλοὶ / λαοὶ ἔπονθ' ἔταροι, οἱ οἱ σάκος ἐξεδέχοντο / ὀππότε μιν κάματός τε καὶ ἰδρώς γούναθ' ἴκοιτο). In context, this is a mark of distinction for Telamonian Ajax, whose partner in the episode, Locrian Ajax, has no such accompaniment. (See, further, §14, where Odysseus alludes again to this passage.) In addition, the Homeric episode is climactic in the narrative, the scene where the Trojans give up their attack on the Achaean ships and decide to return to the city. Odysseus manages to reinterpret the episode as an insult to Ajax.

ἀλλ' ὁπότεν ἀναπαύωνται οἱ πολέμοι, τότε αὐτοῖς τῆς νυκτὸς ἐπιτίθεμαι: Conventions for battle in the *Iliad* cause the heroes to stop fighting at nightfall (*Il.* 7.279–82). A night raid, such as Odysseus and Dolon perform in *Il.* 10, is somewhat out of bounds. Odysseus recasts this convention as a cover for failure by the enemies and implies that he never needs to rest.

ἀλλ' ἡνίκα ἂν ῥέγχῃς σύ, τηνικαῦτα ἐγὼ σφῶ σέ: Odysseus seems to forget a key episode in *Il.* 11.401–488, where he becomes the fifth Achaean soldier critically wounded by the Trojans and is nearly killed, but for the intervention of Athena and the saving services of Telamonian Ajax. Sleeping, meanwhile,

is what Ajax would normally do at night while Odysseus stays awake for his special missions, but it is probably also a metaphor for the pre-philosophical man: see t. 164, capturing an older metaphor also in Heraclitus.

(11) **σὺ δ' ὅτι φέρων ἐκόμισας τὸν νεκρόν, ἀνδρείος οἶε εἶναι:** Ajax never said he was brave, but he implies this through his narrative in §2 and opposition to Odysseus in §3.

ὄν εἰ μὴ ἡδύνω φέρειν, δύο ἄνδρες ἂν ἐφερέτην: Although Ajax meant his “carrying” of the body to count for moral credit, not as a token of his brute strength, Odysseus reinterprets the feat as a physical one. There was controversy in the Epic Cycle about how this role in the salvage mission, the core event for deciding the Judgment of the Arms, was to be rated. In the version of the *Little Iliad*, Odysseus rejected the role of recovering the body, because “even a woman could carry a burden, if a man placed it on her, but she could not fight” (καὶ κε γυνὴ φέροι ἄχθος, ἐπεὶ κεν ἀνὴρ ἀναθείη, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἂν μαχέσαιο, *Little Iliad* fr. 2 Barnabé, preserved in the scholia to Ar. *Eq.* 1056). The comparison to two men has further resonance on several levels, Homeric and philosophical. In Homer, heroes of the Bronze Age have superhuman strength, not to be matched in the present day unless by two men (*Il.* 12.447–49). So Antisthenes' Odysseus seems to be dismissing the magical heroism of the Homeric breed and noting that it can be matched. Also in Homer, in the salvage of Patroclus' body (*Il.* 17.715–34), Ajax works in tandem with Locrian Ajax: Odysseus could be reminding him that not all his famous feats were done alone. Philosophically, the unity of the individual is of central concern. Whereas Odysseus has characterized himself as uncountable (§9), Ajax is solidly one individual (characterized repeatedly as “solitary,” μόνος). But Odysseus berates him on this very point: whereas Odysseus has multivalent talents against opponents of any kind and number, these are unified in his mind (to supplement from Antisthenes' tenets elsewhere: the μονοτροπία established in t. 187.11 is a unity in the art of rhetoric in the text that survives, but it is plausible that Odysseus' unity of self was somehow reestablished, after the challenge in 187.2, in the full original text; compare also t. 192A, 100A). The physical power of Ajax can be balanced by mere multiplication of bodies and therefore has no real unity or principle of individuation.

κάμοι μὲν ὁ αὐτὸς ἂν πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἦν λόγος: Whether or not Odysseus has a unity of mind, he has a unique discourse for the Judgment of the Arms, no matter who his opponent is. Obviously, this cannot be literally true, since some of his present discourse is addressed to his particular opponent Ajax. He must mean that his account would be the same in all important respects, as a representation of his own virtue in its own right. (See his opening words.) Ajax, by contrast, has argued very closely against the particular rival Odysseus and has said little that could be transferred to a different debate.

ἢ δυοῖς μὲν οὐκ ἂν φροντίσαις, ἐνὸς δ' ἂν αἰσχύνοιο ὁμολογῶν δειλότερος εἶναι: Odysseus slyly shifts the comparison from the realm of brute force back to courage, while also, apparently, teasing Ajax for his pride in brute force. It would be no shame to lose out to two men (in force), but it would presumably be a shame to lose to one: Ajax is the strongest. Insofar as this strength is courage, as implied by Ajax' account, he could tolerate being considered more cowardly (weaker) than two men but not more cowardly than one. Since ethics is, after all, not additive in the way brute strength is additive, Ajax' account of his courage is made ridiculous.

(12) οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι οὐ τοῦ νεκροῦ τοῖς Τρωσὶν ἀλλὰ τῶν ὅπλων ἔμελεν ὅπως λάβοιεν: Odysseus comes at last to his account of the salvage episode (answering t. 53.2–3), simply gainsaying Ajax' version of what the Trojans intended to do. Since there is no standard of truth for what would have happened in a situation that never came about, neither speaker can claim to have given a true account. Possibly one account is implied to be more likely, and this should be Odysseus' account, since it appeals to religious norms rather than a new epic fiction. (See t. 53.2 notes.) Possibly Odysseus has delayed this counterclaim so that he could first build credibility with the judges.

τὸν μὲν γὰρ ἀποδώσειν ἔμελλον: In this clause, Odysseus reassigns to the Trojans the “giving back” that Ajax claimed for himself in t. 53.3.

(13) φθόνον δὲ καὶ ἀμαθίαν νοσεῖς: Odysseus brings out the diagnosis to which he has been leading since §5. On jealousy's corrupting power, see t. 129. Moral sickness appears in t. 123, (moral) doctors in t. 167, 169, 174; see also t. 187.9; medical intervention is in t. 124A. The diseases diagnosed seem to be Antisthenes' contribution to the myth: Ajax is not otherwise known as especially jealous or ignorant. In Pindar (*Nem.* 8.22–27), jealousy is a factor in the unjust verdict of the contest and the death of Ajax, but this is probably the jealousy of the Achaeans, not that of Ajax (Montiglio 2000:83–84). As for ignorance, Sophocles' Ajax can be considered unknowing of himself or of true ethical εὐγένεια (“good birth”: Soph. *Ajax* 480, 524; see t. 134b), but such a judgment would be embedded in the story itself and possibly in Ajax' so-called deception speech (646–92) and would not be stated explicitly. (See C. Gill 1996:204–61.)

ὁ μὲν σε ἐπιθυμεῖν ποιεῖ τῶν καλῶν, ἡ δὲ ἀποτρέπει: The “fine things” in each case must be the philosophical fine things, the things of virtue. Ajax must be jealous, prospectively, of the victory Odysseus is going to win, for virtue. But his ignorance seems to guarantee the failure of this very quest, insofar as this is a contest in knowledge, where Ajax has been consistently wrong while Odysseus has been consistently right. All this suggests that Antisthenes held some version of the “virtue is knowledge” thesis traditionally attributed to

Socrates, even though some testimonia seem to make virtue unintellectual (t. 134d).

διότι γὰρ ἰσχυρός, οἶει καὶ ἀνδρεῖος εἶναι: Odysseus comes to his conclusion about true courage: it is a matter not of (physical) strength but of wisdom. Similar accounts of courage as part of Socratic virtue appear in Plato's *Lach.* 194e, *Prot.* 360d, and *Rep.* 430b. (See Kahn 1996:164–70.) There is no verbal overlap that would suggest literary interdependence; both authors must be representing a Socratic view.

καὶ οὐκ οἶσθα ὅτι σοφία περὶ πόλεμον καὶ ἀνδρεία οὐ ταυτόν ἐστιν ἰσχύσαι: The sentence is ambiguous: either the datives are in tandem and are different together from being strong (as in the translation above: “You do not know that being strong is not the same thing as wisdom in war and courage”), or the datives are separately instrumental with ἰσχύσαι and are the items being distinguished: “You do not know that it is not the same to be strong with wisdom in war and [to be strong] with courage.” Natural Greek strongly suggests the latter, but the sequence from the previous sentence nearly requires the former. Under the second interpretation, Odysseus is reversing the statement he has just made about true courage and resuming Ajax’ faulty conception of courage, which is physically based and separate from wisdom. But Odysseus could have expressed the sense of the first interpretation far more clearly and without this ambiguity. It could be that Antisthenes’ Odysseus is pitching a puzzle to the external audience, ambiguously using “courage” in Ajax’ sense. For Antisthenes, true courage is likely to be a core virtue, identical to virtue itself. (See t. 77A–B.) Wisdom also is likely to be identical to virtue itself. (See t. 187.6.) But see t. 78, where these very virtues, wisdom and courage, are said not to be absolutely “good and fine”; only justice is. If the present speeches are protreptic, it seems plausible that Antisthenes planted a puzzle here: to understand just what wisdom and courage are and just how they are related to each other and to virtue and strength, more thinking might be needed.

(14) **ἂν ποτέ τις ἄρα σοφὸς ποιητὴς περὶ ἀρετῆς γένηται:** This ironic reference to Homer renders Odysseus a meta-character, with existence before Homer, although Homer was surely considered the creator of the original fictional Odysseus in Antisthenes’ time: discussion refers consistently to the Odysseus Homer made. (See t. 187.2; Pl. *Hipp. Min.* 364c4–7.) The descriptions that follow in Odysseus’ sentence are drawn from the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, and he is referring to his own creator. Calling Homer the “wise poet about virtue” seems to square fully, without irony, with Antisthenes’ real views about Homer’s value as a teacher. (See t. 188–92, esp. 191.) In using his modest epistemic verb, οἶμαι, twice in this sentence, Antisthenes plays up the irony in Odysseus’ impossible knowledge of the future.

πολύτλαντα καὶ πολύμητιν καὶ πολυμήχανον καὶ πτολίπορθον καὶ μόνον τὴν Τροίαν ἐλόντα: These four adjectives, the last expanded with an explanation, are Odysseus' epithets in the Homeric poems. πολύτλας is used of Odysseus forty-three times in the Homeric poems; πολύμητις, eighty-six times; πολυμήχανος, twenty-two times. On πτολίπορθος, see the next note. The very multiplicity of the epithets might capture the epithet that is blatantly missing, πολύτροπος. (See t. 187.) Goulet-Cazé 1992 ("L'Ajaj et l'Ulysse"):18–19 takes this omission as reason to doubt the authenticity of the speeches; but surely the opposite is the case, that no imitator would have so subtly avoided but also tacitly included the key epithet. See also t. 53.5, on Ajax' likely allusion to this epithet, and see §9 of this speech. If Odysseus were to claim the epithet, he might concede the controversial point about his ethical unity, over which the heroes contend through their use of μόνος. (See also §11.) Instead, he represents his signature epithet without using it. The single epithet in the list that does not begin πολύ-, πτολίπορθον, has its own special place in the story of the competing heroes (see following note). In addition, it might make a sophisticated wordplay on πολύτροπος: the first unit, πτολί-, shares its consonants (almost) with πολύ-, and the second unit, πορθ-, could be read as a palindrome for τροπ-. (θροπ would be pronounced nearly the same as τροπ.) This would be wordplay beyond serious etymological speculation, but it could meet the standards jokingly asserted in Pl. *Crat.* (e.g., 426c–e, 437a–c). There is no case of palindrome in *Cratylus*, and the ordering of sounds seems to be always important to its etymologies. But *Cratylus* is only one indication of contemporary discussion.

πτολίπορθον: A scholion preserved at *Od.* 8.3 presents a problem and solution querying the use of this epithet for Odysseus rather than Achilles, and it is plausible that this dispute should be traced to Antisthenes (Luzzatto 1996:301–5).

σὲ δέ, ὡς ἐγῴμαι, τὴν φύσιν ἀπεικάζων τοῖς τε νωθέσιν ὄνοις καὶ βουσι τοῖς φορβάσιν: To activate the Homeric Ajax, Odysseus cites not epithets but likenesses (with adjectives), and the comparanda are plural: this might be a way of undercutting the singularity Ajax claimed for himself in his own final words (t. 53.9). See t. 51A–B on Antisthenes' reputation for making likenesses; compare t. 150A.4. Both the similes Odysseus cites are from the *Iliad*: Ajax is like an ὄνος νωθῆς (singular) at *Il.* 11.558–65, where, having just saved Odysseus from being killed (see §10), he gives up his attack and retreats to the Achaean ships when the Trojans chase him off like boys chasing a stubborn ox from the cornfield: the adjective νωθῆς occurs only here in Homer, and, by contrast with the epithets for Odysseus commonly used, Antisthenes might intentionally refer to a unique usage. Although Odysseus implies that Homer insults Ajax in this passage, the ancient bT scholiasts read

it as praise (Hainsworth 1993:284 ad loc.; Richardson 1980:279–80), a sign that Ajax is determined to finish his task and does not give up easily. Cattle serve as the simile at *Il.* 13.703, where, as the Trojans and Greeks fight at the ships, the narrative turns to the two Ajaxes, the Locrian and the Telamonian, fighting like a yoked pair of cattle. Homer's simile there is also favorable, and Telamonian Ajax is distinguished as better than Locrian Ajax because he has the support of his unit. (See §10.) But Odysseus adds an adjective that is not Homeric and renders the simile negative. The same negative comparison of Ajax to the ox is in Soph. *Ajax* 1253–54, where the point is also to emphasize Ajax' stupidity. In addition to changing their tone, Odysseus selects his Homeric similes for Ajax carefully, omitting the many that ennoble him. See, e.g., *Il.* 17.132–37, where Ajax, protecting the body of Patroclus, is compared to a lion.

ἄλλοις παρέχοισι δεσμεύειν καὶ ζευγνύναι αὐτούς: The final jab is that Ajax, like a herd animal, is deferent to and dependent on others, as Odysseus has implied also earlier (§7). The terms δεσμεύειν καὶ ζευγνύναι imply ethical slavery: see t. 79–80, 119, 128.

Testimonia from the First Two *Tomoi**testimonia 55–67*55. Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 188–89 (Mandilaras)

(188) . . . τοὺς δὲ τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητοῦντας πρὸς μὲν τὴν παρακαταθήκην καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὧν νῦν φλυαροῦσιν [*sc.* χρή] παύεσθαι γράφοντας, πρὸς δὲ τοῦτον τὸν λόγον ποιεῖσθαι τὴν ἄμιλλαν καὶ σκοπεῖν ὅπως ἄμεινον ἐμοῦ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἐροῦσιν, (189) ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι τοῖς μεγάλ’ ὑπισχνουμένοις οὐ πρέπει περὶ μικρὰ διατρίβειν, οὐδὲ τοιαῦτα λέγειν ἐξ ὧν ὁ βίος μηδὲν ἐπιδώσει τῶν πεισθέντων, ἀλλ’ ὧν ἐπιτελεσθέντων αὐτοὶ τ’ ἀπαλλαγῇσονται τῆς παρούσης ἀπορίας καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις μεγάλων ἀγαθῶν αἵτιοι δόξουσιν εἶναι.

(188) τῶν λόγων Γ E vulg. : τὸν λόγον Λ | παύεσθαι Γ E : παύσασθαι Λ vulg. (189) μεγάλα (μεγάλ’ ed.) ὑπισχνουμένοις Γ E : μεγάλας τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ποιουμένοις Λ vulg. | ἀλλ’ ὧν codd. : ἄλλων E | αὐτοὶ codd. vulg. : αὐτοῖς οὗτοι Γ² E | παρούσης Γ E : τοιαύτης Λ vulg.

(188) . . . But those who argue about words with respect to *The Deposit*, and about the rest of the topics they currently babble about, [should] stop writing, and make their contest against the speech I am giving now, and consider how they will speak better than I do about the same topics, (189) keeping in mind that it is unbefitting to those who make large promises to spend their time talking about small matters. Nor is it befitting to say things for which those who are convinced will make no repayment in their lives, but things that, when brought to fulfillment, will release the authors from their present frustration and make them appear to others as responsible for the greatest goods.

Context of Preservation

This is the conclusion of Isocrates’ *Panegyricus*, composed in 380 BCE and presuming a (fictional) Panhellenic audience at the athletic games. The final exhortation to the audience is that they should reconcile Athens with Sparta and declare a joint war against the Persians.

Importance of the Testimonium

There is no explicit reference to Antisthenes here, but certainly Antisthenes is among the rivals of Isocrates generally: see t. 41A titles 1.5–6, for which this is the most likely testimonium. The ground for seeing Antisthenes in this passage is the reference to *The Deposit*, which is probably another title for the extant speech now known as *Against Euthynus*, on which Antisthenes wrote an attack under the title *Without Witnesses* (which is also the title in the manuscripts of Lysias, who wrote the opposing speech for the case). The case was brought soon after the restoration of the democracy in 403 BCE, about twenty-two years prior to the *Panegyricus*. It is unlikely that Isocrates here refers to Lysias, who is not known for quibbling or claiming to teach. Lysias died around 380, and Antisthenes' response could be from the early 390s, if not before Socrates' death in 399. Giannantoni (1990 v.4:271) thinks Antisthenes' text was a counter-attack against Isocrates, not at the time of the case, but after Isocrates opened his rhetorical school in 393, proclaimed the shortcomings in the educational programs of all his rivals in *On the Sophists* (t. 156), and denied his former career as a speechwriter in the courts. That either Isocrates' anger or the mutual hostility lingers still in 380 implies that Antisthenes' attack or parody was notably powerful (Patzner 1970:238). A different, more intellectual impact of Isocrates' speech is implied by the apparent reference to the book title by Speusippus the Academic of the next generation (Πρὸς τὸν Ἀμάρτυρον, Diog. Laert. 4.5).

Notes

τοὺς . . . τῶν λόγων ἀμφισβητοῦντας: The genitive with ἀμφισβητέω indicates the matter or object about which the quarrel is made, not the mode in which it is conducted. Hence these opponents argue *about* λόγοι, not *in the mode of* discourses. Isocrates seems to imply, as well, a comparison between the λόγοι of his quibbling rivals and the present λόγος he is bringing to its close. The former argue about λόγοι—verbal accounts, definitions, names and terms (see t. 151A for contemporary meanings)—whereas his own discourse has a grander political purpose. If Isocrates refers to a protest Antisthenes lodged about particular uses of arguments or terms in *Without Witnesses*, a likely term for dispute would be τεκμήριον (evidence), which Isocrates uses boldly in reference to arguments for which there is no evidence from eyewitnesses but only what he elects to name as the “evidence” of probability arguments. See t. 54.5 for Antisthenes' representation of Odysseus' combination of argument from evidence and probability.

τὴν παρακαταθήκην: One commentator in 1920 (R. J. Bonner, *CP* 15:386) claimed that this is a general expression for a standard and tiresome rhetorical

theme, but most, from H. Wolf in 1570 to Usener, Zeller, Wilamowitz, Deleva Caizzi, and Giannantoni, see reference to the title of a text. (See list in Patzer 1970:238 n.136.) The latter understanding leads to Antisthenes' book title. The definite article tells against Bonner's interpretation: "the deposit" is hardly a prominent theme elsewhere in Athenian oratory or rhetorical discussion.

φλυαροῦσιν: Compare Timon's description of Antisthenes as a παντοφυῆ φλέδονα (t. 41B). The verb φλυαρέω, much more widely attested, seems to be close in meaning to the noun φλέδων, a quality for which the *Suda* takes Antisthenes as the emblem (see notes to t. 41B).

περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων: On the match required between λόγοι and πράγματα in Antisthenes' view, see t. 153B, 53.1. For Isocrates' complaint about such views when applied on a minimalist, elemental level, see t. 156.

56. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.3 (Marcovich)

= 114 DC

ἔλεγέ τε συνεχές· . . . “χρὴ τοιαύταις πλησιάζειν γυναῖξιν αἱ χάριν εἶσονται.”

συνεχές B P : συνεχῶς F Φ

And he [Antisthenes] used to say constantly, . . . “One should keep company with such women as will be grateful.”

Context of Preservation

This statement appears in Diogenes Laertius' earliest list of Antisthenes' positions, before the anecdotes: see t. 3. It is paired with t. 122A (elided here), “I would rather go mad than have pleasure.”

Importance of the Testimonium

The statement might be derived from Antisthenes' speech on his freedom of lifestyle in Xenophon's *Symposium* (t. 82.38). Alternatively, Xenophon and Diogenes could have a common source.

Notes

χάριν εἶσονται: Compare t. 82.38. This description implies that Antisthenes' potential girlfriends are not paid as prostitutes but circulate in a world of free love, like the world of male ἐρώμενοι in Plato's *Symposium*. In this world, the younger male who is pursued repays the pursuer with deferent “gratitude,” which is a euphemism for sex. (See Dover 1980:44–45.) Antisthenes' implied world of freely circulating women is not otherwise documented for classical Athens: from what we know otherwise, women would either be protected

under the guardianship of their male kin or work for financial compensation as prostitutes. Either Antisthenes is joking, possibly to draw attention to the sexual double standard that allowed free love for men but not for women, or he refers to a practice that otherwise escaped the historical record. (Roy 1985 posits the latter, proposing that this system included both metic women and unhappily married citizen women.) On Antisthenes' recognition of χάρις (gratitude) as a mode of exchange, see t. 13A, 83. Its use here does not depend on Xenophon, as the term is not in *Sym.* 4.38.

57A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.3 (Marcovich)

= 180 DC

πρὸς δὲ τὸν ἐρόμενον ποδαπὴν γῆμῃ ἔφη, “ἂν μὲν καλὴν, ἔξεις κοινήν, ἂν δὲ αἰσχράν, ἔξεις ποινήν.”

ἐρόμενον codd. plur. : ἐρώμενον B | γῆμῃ P F : γῆμαι B : γήμαι Cobet | ἂν . . . ἂν F : ἐὰν . . . ἐὰν B : ἂν . . . ἐὰν P

To someone who asked what sort of woman he should marry, he [Antisthenes] said, “If you marry a beautiful woman, you will have her in common; if you marry an ugly woman, you will have your punishment.”

57B. *Gnomologium Vaticanum* no. 4 (Sternberg)

ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος, εἰ γῆμῃ, εἶπεν· “εἰ μὲν καλὴν, κοινήν ἔξεις· εἰ δὲ αἰσχράν, ποινήν.”

The same man [Antisthenes], when asked by someone whether he should marry, he said, “If you marry a beautiful woman, you will have her in common; if you marry an ugly woman, you will have your punishment.”

Context of Preservation

The *chreia* appears early in Diogenes Laertius' biography of Antisthenes: see t. 3. On the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, see t. 5. The same punning reply is attributed to Bion of Borysthene (Diog. Laer 4.4, 4.48; Codex Parisinus Graecus 1168 = F61A–B Kindstrand) and to Aristippus, Solon, and Theocritus (Sternberg 1963:5–6). It is related, but not identical, to Hesiod, *Works and Days* 701–3: it might, then, be considered a proverb. Another attribution common to Antisthenes and Bion is t. 6.

Importance of the Testimonium

The *chreia* fits with Antisthenes' conception of a competitive circulation or marketplace of women (t. 56, 82.38), with his use of punning language (t. 8, 131, 143, 148, 171, 41A titles 1.5 and 6.3), and with his apparently negative attitude toward marriage (t. 59, 82), unless based in virtue and for the purpose of reproduction (t. 41A title 2.2, 58).

Notes

καλὴν . . . αἰσχράν: Antisthenes elsewhere ties these terms, when used correctly, to the moral realm (t. 134s, 78). Here the meaning must remain aesthetic to some extent, in reference to external beauty, because the *apophthegma* is addressed to pre-philosophical men who hold commonplace views. But it could be that both meanings are active and that the unending circulation of the beautiful woman holds both for women beautiful in body, among lovers attracted to that, and for those beautiful in soul, among lovers attracted to that.

ἔξεις ποινήν: Punishment might come either from the bad reputation accruing to the man who can win only an ugly wife or from the personal pain of perceiving her or dealing with her. Possibly the ποινή gained is also in some way a good, like the πόνος of bad reputation or a kind of exercise. (See t. 134f, 18.)

58. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.11 (Marcovich)

= 115 DC (also in t. 134h–i)

[= Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 109.6–7 Walz]

γαμήσειν τε [sc. τὸν σοφὸν] τεκνοποιίας χάριν, ταῖς εὐφρεστάταις
συνιόντα γυναιξί. καὶ ἐρασθήσασθαι δέ· μόνον γὰρ εἰδέναι τὸν σοφὸν
τίνων χρὴ ἐρᾶν.

τεκνοποιίας codd. plur. : τεκνοποιείας B | συνιόντα codd. plur. :
συνόντα F | χρὴ B P F et Arsenius : δεῖ Φ

[Antisthenes held that] he [the wise man] will also marry for the sake
of producing children, mating with the women best in nature. And he
will fall in love: for only the wise man knows whom it is right to love.

Context of Preservation

This is the last pair of doctrines listed in the first, unattributed section of Diogenes' doxography of Antisthenes (t. 134a–i).

Importance of the Testimonium

The first statement, with a book title (t. 41A title 2.2), is the only evidence transmitted for Antisthenes' views on "marriage," procreation, or a household composed of more than himself. This passage, along with more of the pronouncements in t. 134, could be from a Stoic "checklist" of positions related to the choice of lifestyle, where the question about marriage is foremost a choice between the political life and the life of contemplation: marriage is the base of the political life (see Schofield 1991:119–27). But the passage might echo Xenophon (see notes below), which would imply that it is reported relatively directly from Antisthenes. The second statement fits a common question posed to the philosophers in Hellenistic tradition, where the reference is to pederasty. But the sequence, together with t. 41A title 2.2, implies that heterosexual *eros* might be included. The sequence need not imply that Antisthenes presented a choice between female and male partners, because this is not a narrative but a highly condensed list of positions. (See Buffière 1980:459–60; Ogden 1996:203.)

Notes

γαμήσειν: This must mean "mate" rather than "marry," because the wise man has a plurality of females whom he approaches and because the participle *συνιόντα* sounds occasional. The lifestyle Antisthenes describes for himself in t. 82 implies a household consisting only of himself, and sexual partners are transient. In Pl. *Rep.* 5 458e3–461b1, the *γάμοι* are mating rituals, not marriages. However, a possible parallel in Xen. *Mem.* 2.2 concerns a permanent domestic partnership under which children are raised and educated. This seems to be the sense also in t. 41A title 2.2. If we assume that Antisthenes did not endorse marriage in itself, his advocacy of marriage and reproduction might indicate a concern for the state (as it does in Stob. 2.7.11b, from a Stoic doxography) or, if Antisthenes declined to support the state, for biological or cultural continuity of the human race.

τεκνοποιίας χάριν: A similar statement is attributed to Socrates in Xen. *Mem.* 2.2.4, where reproduction is distinguished from sexual satisfaction: for the second, both streets and households are full of possible partners. Plato's term for child production (*Rep.* 4 424a1 and elsewhere) is *παιδοποιία*; Xenophon uses the verbal forms corresponding to both nouns, *παιδοποιεῖσθαι* and *τεκνοποιούμεθα*.

εὐφρεστάταις: The force of the root "nature" (φυ-) is the key to the question whether these women are virtuous by philosophical standards as well as good (in body and other uneducated traits) for reproduction. On Antisthenes' use of the term φύσις, see t. 18, 41A title 2.1, 123, 179A. Xenophon's Socrates,

speaking to his son Lamprocles, who is complaining about Xanthippe, gives no adjective for potential wives but just describes the men's project: φανεροὶ δ' ἔσμεν καὶ σκοπούμενοι ἐξ ὁποίων ἂν γυναικῶν βέλτιστα ἡμῖν τέκνα γένοιτο· αἷς συνελθόντες τεκνοποιούμεθα (and we openly search out from which kinds of women we will have the best children: mixing with them, we produce children). Since Antisthenes seems to question Socrates' marriage to Xanthippe (see t. 18, which shares language with *Mem.* 2.2.7), it is possible that Xenophon adopted but reframed Antisthenes' principle for "marriage." ἐρασθήσεσθαι . . . ἐρᾶν: The difference between these two verbal forms is mainly aspectual: the future form has an aorist aspect, for falling in love, and the present has an imperfective aspect, for being in love. (The imperfective stem appears only twice in Diogenes Laertius, whereas the aorist is normal in the many passages recording various philosophers' rulings on this topic.) Although the first form is the normal way to express the future tense and although its passive form regularly has an active meaning, it is interesting to note that the sexual relationships Antisthenes reports in t. 82.38 are reciprocal, and it is not impossible that he emphasized reciprocity also in *eros*. Such a position would counter the normal Athenian ideology, by which *eros* was polarized as active and passive roles, but it finds support in Socraticism (Pl. *Sym.*, e.g., 191d3–5; Xen. *Sym.* 8.3).

τίνων: This form has no marked gender, despite some translations that render it masculine.

χρῆ ἐρᾶν: The phrase indicates a sense of moral obligation, not just permissiveness. A similar idea appears just below in Diogenes Laertius' doxography, in the section citing Diocles in 6.12 (t. 134k): ἀξιέραστος ὁ ἀγαθός (the good man is worthy of love).

59. ps.-Clement of Rome, *Homilies* 5.18 (Irmscher-Paschke-Rehm)

= 116 DC

καὶ ὁ Σωκρατικὸς δὲ Ἀντισθένης περὶ τοῦ δεῖν τὴν λεγομένην μοιχείαν μὴ ἀποσεῖσθαι γράφει.

Also the Socratic Antisthenes writes about the thesis that one should not reject so-called adultery.

Context of Preservation

The romance fiction of Clement of Rome's conversion to Christianity was apparently composed in the mid-fourth century CE in Syria (Jones 1982). The "erotic epistle" in *Homilies* 5.10–19 is a letter allegedly composed by Clement's pagan tempter: he is told to deliver it to his beloved, who is said to be the

cause of his ailments. A slew of examples from the gods and philosophers is meant to persuade her to consent. The text's source for statements by the pagan philosophers is a well-informed doxography of unknown origin. The proximate source seems to be Jewish, and its origin has been posited in Alexandria around 135 CE. Harris (1921:143–45) argues that the ultimate source is one of Chrysippus' erotic epistles.

Importance of the Testimonium

The endorsement of promiscuity against legal boundaries conflicts with t. 60, where adultery is dangerous and where prostitutes are a safer option for satisfying sexual needs. But monogamy is hardly prominent in Socratic literature. (Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* and the fragments of Aeschines' *Aspasia* are the exceptions.) Free love, as a continuation of friendship based in virtue, might have been the Socratic ideal. Possible sources are *On Marriage* or *On Law or On the Government* (t. 41A titles 2.2, 3.3).

Notes

περὶ τοῦ δεῖν . . . : The language suggests discussion of a formal thesis. This is probably a rubric added by the doxographical source, especially if Chrysippus was involved in the transmission.

τὴν λεγομένην μοιχείαν: A distinction between “conventional” adultery and “true” adultery seems to be implied. The former might involve breaking civil marriage oaths; the latter, taking a partner who is not worthy. The position endorsed here could fit into a Cynic tradition of wife sharing in the ideal state (Diog. Laert. 7.131; Decleva Caizzi 1966:117).

60. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.4 (Marcovich)

= 182 DC

ιδὼν ποτε μοιχὸν φεύγοντα, “Ὡς δυστυχής,” εἶπε, “πηλίκον κίνδυνον ὀβολοῦ διαφυγεῖν ἐδύνασο.”

ὡς B P F : ὥ P² in mg. et Frobenius | πηλίκον codd. plur. : ποιλικόν
B | ἐδύνασο B P Φ : ἴσχυες F

Once when he [Antisthenes] saw an adulterer defending himself in court, “How unfortunate [you are],” he said. “How great a risk you could have avoided for an obol.”

Context of Preservation

This appears early among Diogenes Laertius' *apophthegmata* of Antisthenes. See t. 3.

Importance of the Testimonium

See t. 59 for an apparent conflict on the topic of adultery.

Notes

μοιχὸν φεύγοντα: In Athenian legal terminology, the verb φεύγω means “flee a charge,” that is, “defend oneself in court.” But the anecdote may imply that the speaker sees the adulterer really escaping, in flight, from the scene. This seems a more exciting setting for the observer’s advice and also for the flavor of “risk.”

πηλίκον κίνδυνον ὀβολοῦ: Xenophon (*Mem.* 2.1.5) refers to adultery as a danger undertaken by those who are too unintelligent to calculate risk and to benefit correctly by denying their impulse for present pleasures. This overlap might show that Xenophon used Antisthenes as a source for this episode (Gigon 1956:22). For a clear connection between *Mem.* 2.1 and Antisthenes, see t. 112.

61. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.10 (Marcovich)

= 181 DC

εἰ δέ ποθι θεάσαιτο γύναιον κεκοσμημένον, ἀπήει ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν καὶ ἐκέλευε τὸν ἄνδρα ἐξαγαγεῖν ἵππον καὶ ὄπλα, ὥστε εἰ μὲν ἔχοι ταῦτα, ἔαν τρυφᾷ· ἀμύνεσθαι γὰρ τούτοις· εἰ δὲ μὴ, περιαιρεῖν τὸν κόσμον.
τὴν οἰκίαν B P¹ Φ : τὴν οἰκίαν αὐτῆς P² Q F² et Marcovich | ἔχοι
codd. plur. : ἔχειν F | ἀμύνεσθαι B P F Φ : ἀμυνεῖσθαι Richards

If he [Antisthenes] ever saw a woman beautiful with makeup, he went off to her house and asked her husband to bring out his horse and weapons. If her husband had these, he could let her revel in luxury, because he could protect her with these. But if he did not, he should destroy her adornment.

Context of Preservation

This is the last anecdote Diogenes tells of Antisthenes’ life in Athens. See t. 3.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes’ opposition to the woman beautiful with makeup has a more social flavor than the similar opposition in Plato and Xenophon. Antisthenes seems concerned mainly with the cost of living on the same terms as the conventional culture. To succeed on these terms requires a real superiority, not just a sign of superiority. The character Helen, whom Antisthenes wrote about (t. 41A title 9.4), could be related to the militaristic imagery associated with holding a very beautiful woman. Compare t. 123.

Notes

γύναιον κεκοσμημένον: Hostility to the adornment of women is shared by the Socratics. For Plato (*Gorg.* 465b1–c1; *Rep.* 2 373c1) and Xenophon (*Oec.* 10.2–13), makeup is a false and superficial compensation for what is lacking naturally, the health that should be fostered through exercise. For Plato, makeup is also a token for a lazy and corrupt lifestyle. Once the primitive city in book 2 of the *Republic* grows beyond its scale of subsistence, art and theater arise, and with these come “women’s cosmetics” (γυναικεῖον κόσμον).

ἐκέλευε τὸν ἄνδρα ἐξαγαγεῖν ἵππον καὶ ὄπλα: The horse and weapons are probably symbolic for household wealth, not just the real equipment needed for the perpetual defensive posture entailed here. Compare *Letter* 23 of ps.-Crates, where the “weapons of Diogenes” (τὰ Διογέχεια ὄπλα) are recommended for driving away rival suitors. Donning these weapons (the Cynic costume) amounts to a change of lifestyle, parallel to Antisthenes’ second solution, not resisting the suitors in the present situation. The logical slip probably shows that the anecdote had a fuller form in the background tradition.

εἰς τρυφᾶν: Enjoying luxury is a curse that Antisthenes wishes on the children of his enemies in t. 172b. Here he might be permitting his advisees to curse themselves. For the idea that the woman beautiful with makeup is more attractive to strangers than to her friends, see Xen. *Oec.* 10.8.

ἀμύνεσθαι γὰρ τοῦτοις: Antisthenes assumes that the population in general wants to acquire the woman beautiful with makeup. The advice he offers is for a household that agrees to live on the same terms as other conventional households. An alternative would be the lifestyle he practices (t. 82).

εἰ δὲ μή, περαιοῦν τὸν κόσμον: This destruction of cultural material, so to speak, might be comparable with t. 87A–B and 172a.

62. Athenaeus, *Wise Men at Dinner* XIV 656f (Kaibel)

= 16 DC

Ἀντισθένης δ’ ἐν Φυσιογνωμονικῷ· “Καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖναι [sc. αἱ καπηλικαὶ] τὰ δελφάκια πρὸς βίαν χορτάζουσιν.”

Ἀντιφάνης A : Ἀντισθένης Dindorf

Antisthenes says in his *Physiognomicus*, “For also those women [the tavern keepers or shop retailers] feed their piglets by force.”

Context of Preservation

In his discussion of types of meat served at a banquet, the speaker mentions that some writers (Aeschines and Antisthenes) used “piglets” (τὰ δελφάκια, in the neuter, rather than masculine, gender).

Importance of the Testimonium

Apparent resonances in Plato's *Sophist* suggest that Antisthenes compared Sophistic education to the retailing of prostitutes, who were described in terms fitting to animals. The mention of pigs and the use of the term χορτάζουσιν suggest that Plato might have intended his “City of Pigs” in the second book of the *Republic* to refer to Antisthenes. See the history of this discussion in Giannantoni 1990 v.4:281–83.

Notes

αἱ καπηλικά: This subject is supplied from Athenaeus' previous sentence. Plato uses the καπηλική as a metaphor for one kind of provider in the Sophistic educational program (*Soph.* 223d7), the kind who sells goods produced by others, not himself, and who resides in the city rather than traveling. Since this statement is cited from Antisthenes' own *On the Sophists*, [a] physiognomic [work] (t. 41A title 2.3), Antisthenes might have referred to force-feeding in an educational program. See also Xen. *Mem.* 1.6.13, where Sophists are compared to πόρνοι, prostitutes, because they sell their intellectual companionship to any buyer.

τὰ δελφάκια: This term is used for female genitals (Henderson 1991:132). Hence it seems the reference is to female brothel owners who, to their own profit, prepare prostitutes for employment. On the use of the houses of prostitutes in Socratic literature as a metaphor for teachers and philosophers, see Xen. *Mem.* 3.11 (minimally excerpted in t. 14B); see also t. 13A.

χορτάζουσιν: This word is used of feeding animals. Plato uses it twice in the *Republic* (2 372d5, of feeding the pigs in the “City of Pigs”; 9 586a8, of persons unacquainted with virtue who behave like herd animals); Aristophanes (*Peace* 176) uses it of the dung beetle. Antisthenes assimilates his tavern keepers to animals. Whether he also assimilates the Sophists and their pupils to animals is not clear, but this has been the conjecture of some.

63. Athenaeus, *Wise Men at Dinner* XIV 656f (Kaibel)

= 17 DC

καὶ ἐν Προτρεπτικῷ δέ· “ἀντὶ δελφακίων τρέφεσθαι.”

[Antisthenes says] also in his *Protreptikos*, “being nourished in the way of piglets.”

Context of Preservation

This sentence follows immediately on t. 62 and is the third of three examples of the use of the term for “piglets” in the neuter, rather than masculine, gender.

Importance of the Testimonium

The topic of Sophistic education might have been discussed in Antisthenes' sympotic *Protreptics*. In that case, the *Protreptics* should be compared with Plato's *Protagoras* and Aeschines' *Callias*, as well as with Xenophon's *Symposium*.

Notes

τρέφεσθαι: The Syracusan entertainer in Xen. *Sym.* 4.55 uses the same term in reference to the audience who pays for his services: οὔτοι γὰρ τὰ ἐμὰ νευρόσπαστα θεώμενοι τρέφουσί με. This term might be a low-register equivalent for “attend” (θεραπεύω), used of higher-class customers: compare t. 186. Both terms imply power of the customer over the provider.

64A. Athenaeus, *Wise Men at Dinner* XI 784d (Kaibel)

=18D DC

βομβυλῖός, θηρίκλειον Ῥοδιακόν, οὗ περὶ τῆς ἰδέας Σωκράτης φησίν·
 “οἱ μὲν ἐκ φιάλης πίνοντες ὅσον θέλουσι τάχιστ’ ἀπαλλαγῆσονται, οἱ
 δ’ ἐκ βομβυλίου κατὰ μικρὸν στάζοντος. . . .” ἐστὶ δὲ καὶ ζῷόν τι.
 στάζοντες C E : στάζοντος Koppiers

“Humming bee,” a Rhodian cup made by Therikles. About its shape Socrates says: “Some will drink as much as they want from the saucer and immediately depart, but others may drink from the humming bee that drips little by little. . . .” It is also a type of animal.

Context of Preservation

This is an entry in the lengthy list of drinking vessels in Athenaeus' eleventh book. This section in the alphabetized list is missing from the full text of Athenaeus (in ms. A) and is supplemented from the epitome.

Importance of the Testimonium

In attributing words to Socrates, this testimonium shows that Socrates was a speaking character in Athenaeus' source. On the assumption that Athenaeus' ultimate source is the same as for Pollux (t. 64C–D), one may infer that Socrates appeared as a speaker in Antisthenes' *Protrepticus*, which is said elsewhere (t. 11B) to be composed in a style partly dialogical and partly rhetorical. Testimonia 64B–D are unanimous in attributing to Antisthenes the use of the term βομβυλῖός for a drinking cup, but only Pollux names a text. Hesychius of Alexandria might preserve evidence that links this term for drinking vessels to Theognis and possibly, then, to the combination of

Antisthenes' titles *Protrepticus* and *On Theognis* that is suggested in the book catalog (t. 41A titles 2.4–5). This connection depends on Hesychius' entry for πολυπαίδης (= Theognis dub. fr. 3 Young), which might use the term βόμβων or βόμβον (the text is corrupt), which Hesychius seems to equate with βομβυλιός, glossed as a drinking cup. See Giannantoni 1990 v.4:288.

64B. Scholium on Apollonius Rhodius, *Argonautica* 2.569–70a (Wendel)

= 18C DC

κοῖλαι δὲ σπήλυγγες ὑπὸ σπιλάδας τρηχείας
κλυζούσης ἀλὸς ἔνδον ἐβόμβεον . . .

ἐβόμβεον· ἤχουν· ὅθεν καὶ βομβυλιὸς εἶδος μελίσσης· καὶ
ποτηρίου δὲ εἶδος, ὡς Ἀντισθένης παραδίδωσιν· ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο
στενοτράχηλον.

βομβυλιός K : βομβυλιοὶ L : βομβύλη P

And the hollow caves below the rough rocks
boomed inside when the sea surged.

[Apoll. Rhod. *Arg.* 2.568–69]

“They boomed”: They sounded. For this reason “humming insect” is also a species of bee. And it is a form of drinking cup, as Antisthenes transmits. This form is narrow-mouthed.

Context of Preservation

In Apollonius' *Argonautica*, the Argonauts are sailing through the Clashing Rocks.

64C. Pollux, *Vocabulary Book* 6.98–99 (Bethe)

= 18B DC

βομβυλιὸς δὲ τὸ στενὸν ἔκπωμα καὶ βομβοῦν ἐν τῇ πόσει, ὡς
Ἀντισθένης ἐν Προτρεπτικῷ. τὸ δὲ ποτήριον Ἴων ἐκάλεσεν.

The “humming bee” is the slender drinking vessel that hums during the drinking, as Antisthenes [uses it] in *Protrepticus*. Ion called the drinking vessel by this name.

Context of Preservation

Pollux, appointed to the chair of rhetoric at Rome in or soon after 178 CE, addressed his *Vocabulary Book* to the emperor Commodus. Book 6 handles terminology for the symposium.

Importance of the Testimonium

This testimonium gives the name of the text in which Antisthenes discussed the βομβυλιός. The reference to Ion of Chios (c. 490/480–420 BCE) suggests that Antisthenes could have inherited the metaphor from Ion (if not Theognis: see comment on t. 64A). Pollux uses information transmitted by Alexandrian sources, and these writers could have associated facts about the use of the term βομβυλιός in various independent texts available to them.

64D. Pollux, *Vocabulary Book* 10.68 (Bethe)

= 18A DC

τὸ δὲ καλούμενον κυρίλλιον πρὸς τῶν Ἀσιανῶν βομβύλιον μὲν
Ἀντισθένης εἶρηκεν ἐν τῷ Προτρεπτικῷ.
κυρίλλιον codd. plur. : βηρύλλιον A | πρὸς codd. plur. : ὑπὸ F S

What is called the “cyrillion” by the Asians Antisthenes said in the *Protrepticus* is the “humming bee.”

Context of Preservation

Book 10 of Pollux’ *Vocabulary Book* handles tools and furnishings useful in various activities of life, including drinking, cooking, and serving food (10.66–94).

Notes

κυρίλλιον: Pollux seems to assert, in his own voice, the parallel between the Asian term and the Greek. This word is not otherwise extant except as a proper name (attested in Galen, Herodian, and the medical writer Meletius, then often in Christian texts). But the parallel between Asian and Greek could be from Antisthenes: Antisthenes’ texts on Cyrus show his interest in the Asians, possibly because they are Asians (see esp. t. 85), and the similarity between this term and the very name “Cyrus” could be more than a coincidence. For detailed vocabulary on drinking cups, see also t. 197.32.

65. Photius, *Lexicon* (E-Ω) s.v. οὐροδόκην (Porson)

= 121 DC

οὐροδόκην· τὴν ἀμίδα Ξενοφῶν· οὐρειον δὲ βῆκον Ἀντισθένης.

“Urine receptacle”: Xenophon [says it is] a chamber pot. But Antisthenes [says that] a “urine holder” [is] a drinking bowl.

Context of Preservation

The lexicon attributed to Photius is alphabetical. On Photius (c. 820–91 CE), see t. 50.

Notes

βῖκον: This must be a name for a wide-mouthed bowl or drinking vessel from which drinkers can guzzle their wine, parallel to what Socrates calls a φιάλη in t. 64A. Antisthenes appears to give it the crude name οὔρειον in order to generate disgust for the idea of excessive drinking.

66. Isocrates, *Helen* 12 (Mandilaras)

(12) σημείον δὲ μέγιστον· τῶν μὲν γὰρ τοὺς βομβυλίους καὶ τοὺς ἄλας καὶ τοιαῦτα βουληθέντων ἐπαινεῖν οὐδείς πώποτε λόγων ἠπόρησεν, οἱ δὲ περὶ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ καλῶν ἢ τῶν διαφερόντων ἐπ' ἀρετῇ λέγειν ἐπιχειρήσαντες πολὺ καταδεέστερον τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἅπαντες εἰρήκασιν.

(12) τι post ἀρετῇ add. Λ Θ Δ : post λέγειν E | λέγειν codd. : [τὸ λέγειν] vulg.

(12) But this is the greatest indication: of those who have wanted to praise slender drinking cups and salt and such things, no one has ever been at a loss for words, but those who have made an attempt at speaking about what is agreed to be good or fine or of consequence for virtue, all of them have spoken much more deficiently than available words [allow].

Context of Preservation

This passage is near the end of Isocrates' polemical introduction to *Helen*, which precedes his own text of praise, §16–65. Antisthenes is not named, but reference to him is plausible because of the term βομβυλίους, for which Antisthenes seems to be well known (t. 64B–D), and because his presence is likely also in the opening paragraph of *Helen* (t. 156). In the preceding context, Isocrates attacks those who praise the lives of beggars and exiles—on the ground that this is the most difficult rhetorical challenge (§8)—and those who use jokes rather than serious discourse (§11). He could be aiming at Antisthenes in these attacks, too. (See Eucken 1983:65 with older bibliography.)

Importance of the Testimonium

The importance for Antisthenes depends on the extent of Isocrates' reference to him. According to the scholiasts, Polycrates is Isocrates' main opponent.

Notes

τοὺς βομβυλιούς: Scholiasts on Isocrates say only that this term indicates a type of bird or insect, and so it is usually translated in this case. But other ancient lexical sources combine this option with the drinking cup: compare t. 64B, where the insect appears first, and the entry on βομβυλιός in Hesychius of Alexandria, where the drinking cup appears first. Although Isocrates pairs the βομβυλιός with salt, it seems that his scholiasts missed a reference to feasting as the main context for these unlikely subjects of praise. In the Hippocratic *On Diseases* (3.16), βομβυλιός is used with the meaning “narrow-necked drinking cup,” as part of a therapy, and so the metaphor seems to have become well established in ordinary discourse.

τοὺς ἄλας: Nothing in the evidence for Antisthenes shows that he praised salt, but this could be appropriate for someone who rejected luxury and who might, then, have advocated for culinary pleasure in ordinary flavors. Compare t. 116, 128, 133. Plato presents Phaedrus complaining that he has read a praise of salt but none of Love (*Sym.* 177b). Since Antisthenes is so prominent as a character in Xenophon’s *Symposium*, where he rejects love, embraces simple living, and is teased for his positions (t. 82, 14A), it is possible that both Plato’s *Symposium* and Xenophon’s react to Antisthenes’ earlier portrayal of Socrates at the symposium.

οὐδεὶς πώποτε λόγων ἠπόρησεν: See t. 41B for Antisthenes’ reputation as a prolific babbler.

περὶ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ καλῶν ἢ τῶν διαφερόντων ἐπ’ ἀρετῇ: Antisthenes and the Socratics were concerned to challenge conventional agreement about what was good, fine, and of consequence for virtue. (See t. 134.) We see here Isocrates’ normal impatience with the Socratic quibbling (t. 170). This suggests that the opponent here might be a Socratic. On the possibility that Antisthenes was a predecessor to Stoic thinking on “values” and “indifferents,” see t. 110.

67. Xenophon, *Symposium* 2.26 (Marchant)

[= Athen. 11 504c; Stob. 3.20.18]

“ἂν δὲ ἡμῖν οἱ παῖδες μικραῖς κύλιξι πυκνὰ ἐπιψακάωσιν, ἵνα καὶ ἐγὼ ἐν Γοργιεῖσι ρήμασι εἶπω, οὕτως οὐ βιαζόμενοι μεθύειν ὑπὸ τοῦ οἴνου ἀλλ’ ἀναπειθόμενοι πρὸς τὸ παιγνιωδέστερον ἀφιξόμεθα.”

ἂν codd. : ἦν Athen. et Stob. | ἡμῖν codd. : ἡμῶν Athen. et Stob. | πυκνὰ codd. et Stob. : μικρὰ Athen. | ἐπιψακάωσιν codd. plur. : ἐπιψεκάωσιν B F H² | ἐν om. Athen. | Γοργιεῖσι codd. : γοργείοισι Athen. : γοργίοις Stob. | μεθύειν ὑπὸ τοῦ οἴνου Athen. et Stob. : ὑπὸ τοῦ οἴνου μεθύειν codd. : μεθύειν del. Orelli : οἴνου πρὸς τὸ μεθύειν Richards

“But if the slaves ‘dribble it [the wine] out’ for us ‘in small cups but often’ (that also I might speak in Gorgianic words), by that route we will arrive at our most playful state of mind not under the force of drunkenness but being persuaded.”

Context of Preservation

Socrates, as implied leader of the symposium, sets out the procedure for the evening. Reference to Antisthenes is an inference from the reference to Gorgias (see t. 12, 203) and to measured drinking cups (t. 64). But Xenophon could have his own direct affinity with Gorgias. (See Gautier 1911:111–16.)

Importance of the Testimonium

If there is a reference to Antisthenes, the passage adds to the image of a definite relationship between Antisthenes and Gorgias.

Notes

μικραῖς κύλιξι πυκνὰ ἐπιψακάζωσιν: The colorful verb ἐπιψακάζωσιν (besprinkle) might be understood to convey the Gorgianic ring. In Athenaeus’ different text, μικραῖς κύλιξι μικρὰ ἐπιψακάζωσιν (printed by Diels Kranz, 82C2), the clause displays *polyptoton*, the use of the same word in different cases in the same clause. But Socrates’ overall point, advocating for a middle level of inebriation that will still promote playfulness, seems lost in Athenaeus’ text, if the wine is to be poured “in small amounts in small cups.” On figures in Gorgianic style, see Allen 2001.

καὶ ἐγώ: Socrates adds his speech to that of someone else who previously spoke “in Gorgianic words,” a speaker not obvious in the text. Critics have seen reference to Plato’s Socrates: in Pl. *Sym.* 198c1–5, Socrates notes that Agathon has just spoken in the style of Gorgias, and Socrates’ own statement has the Gorgianic figures of *polyptoton* and *paronomasia*, punning wordplay. But it would be preferable if Xenophon’s reference is self-contained. Huss 1999 (*Xenophons Symposion*):171 refers the καὶ to Callias’ words at *Sym.* 1.4, where he invites the Socratics to his banquet: Gorgias is named as one of the Sophists Callias has hired to teach him (1.5). Later in the text (4.62 = t. 13A), Antisthenes is credited with introducing Callias to the Sophists, although Gorgias is not mentioned in the list. Both passages are well separated from 2.26, but Socrates could be making a joke against either Callias or Antisthenes. Antisthenes has not spoken in Gorgianic words so far in the text and will not obviously do so, but he was possibly well enough known as a follower of Gorgias for the reference to work. His *Protrepticus* is cited for its “rhetorical” style (t. 11B).

οὐ βιαζόμενοι . . . ἀλλ' ἀναπειθόμενοι: This standard antithesis is defied by Gorgias in his *Encomium of Helen*, esp. §12. (See Porter 1993.)

πρὸς τὸ παιγνιωδέστερον: Gorgias' *Encomium of Helen* closes with the point that the whole *logos* has been a game, a παίγνιον. Each of the symposiasts' speeches in Xen. *Sym.* 4 will also close with what is plausibly a joke or παιδιά, although that term is not used (Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposion*]:203).

Politics and Wealth

testimonia 68–8368. Aristotle, *Politics* 3.13 1284a10–17 (Ross)

= 100 DC

ὥσπερ γὰρ θεὸν ἐν ἀνθρώποις εἰκὸς εἶναι τὸν τοιοῦτον. ὅθεν δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τὴν νομοθεσίαν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι περὶ τοὺς ἴσους καὶ τῷ γένει καὶ τῇ δυνάμει, κατὰ δὲ τῶν τοιούτων οὐκ ἔστι νόμος· αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσι νόμος. καὶ γὰρ γελοῖος ἂν εἴη νομοθετεῖν τις πειρώμενος κατ' αὐτῶν. λέγοιεν γὰρ ἂν ἴσως ἅπερ Ἀντισθένης ἔφη τοὺς λέοντας δημηγορούντων τῶν δασυπόδων καὶ τὸ ἴσον ἀξιούντων πάντας ἔχειν.

In probability such a man is like a god among humans. From this it is clear that legislation is necessarily concerned with equals in birth and capacity, and that over men of this [superior and unequal] sort there is no law. For they themselves are the law. Indeed, anyone who tried to legislate over them would be ridiculous. They would probably say [in reply] what, according to Antisthenes, the lions said when the hares were speaking in public assembly and demanding that everyone have an equal share.

Context of Preservation

Pol. 3.13 concludes Aristotle's treatment of oligarchy and democracy and makes the transition to monarchy. In this transition, Aristotle addresses a debate about whose good—that of the few or that of the many—should be addressed by the legislator in a city-state. He interrupts his basic conclusion, that the common good of all citizens should be served, with this warning about the individual whose excellence is so far out of proportion from that of others that it becomes qualitatively, not quantitatively, different: he has no peers but is “like a god.” (See discussion in Schütrumpf 1991:525–30.) This possibility justifies ostracism. In the same context (1284a22–25), Aristotle cites also Heracles, one of Antisthenes' most famous fictional heroes (t. 44C, 85, 92–99), abandoned by the Argonauts. The abandonment was already in

Hesiodic poetry (see Gantz 1993:348) and could have been addressed by Antisthenes. Aristotle concludes 3.13 with further notice that such individuals exist and present problems for political justice, and this serves as a transition to the topic of kingship.

Importance of the Testimonium

This text suggests that Antisthenes held prominence in Aristotle's eyes as a thinker on political issues and possibly as a defender of kingship. Antisthenes is not, however, cited elsewhere in the *Politics*. When Aristotle discusses the thesis that men and women are equal in virtue (1.13 1260a20–22), it is attributed to Socrates (probably as cited from Pl. *Meno* 72d4–73c8). Although a similar doctrine about the identity of a man's and a woman's virtue (ἀρετή) is attributed to Antisthenes (t. 134r; compare t. 18) and although Antisthenes is the only Socratic ever cited by name for this doctrine in the surviving tradition, Aristotle debates instead with Socrates and Plato. Unmarked references to Antisthenes in the *Politics* can, meanwhile, be suspected. In addition to Antisthenes' possible presence among the writers on slavery mentioned in 1.3 1253b18–23 (see t. 41A title 3.5), there might be references to Antisthenes in the very opening of the work, at 1.1 1252a7–10, where some people are said to believe (wrongly) that scales of government differ only quantitatively, not qualitatively, and that households can thus be compared with cities (see t. 72B, 189), and especially in 1.2 1253a3–5, where it is said that political self-sufficiency (ἡ αὐτάρκεια) is located in the city, where humans live by nature. The individual without a city (ἄπολις) is either worse or better than the human being. By contrast with Aristippus, whose personal freedom is represented by Xenophon (*Mem.* 2.1.11–12) as independent of a city, and by contrast with Diogenes of Sinope, who allegedly called himself “without a city, without a house, stripped of a fatherland” (ἄπολις, ἄοικος, πατρίδος ἐστερημένος, Diog. Laert. 6.38), it seems clear that Antisthenes' conception of human life includes a city (t. 70A–C, t. 82). But he also seems to have idealized independence from a city, at least in image or fiction (see t. 82; compare t. 189, esp. A-3, B-1, C-2), in an approach to individual αὐτάρκεια. Antisthenes' presence in the background to the framing of the project in *Pol.* 1.2 might also be suggested by Aristotle's citation of Homer's description of the individual without a city as “without brotherhood, without law, without hearth” (ἄφρήτωρ, ἀθέμιστος, ἀνέστιος), in the words of Nestor, with reference to the quarrel of Achilles and Agamemnon (*Il.* 9.63): this quotation cannot be irrelevant to the quip of Diogenes of Sinope cited above. The epithet ἀθέμιστος is central to Antisthenes' discussion of Homer's character Polyphemus (t. 189), whose life without a city might corrupt him (t. 189C–D), and the material preserved from that discussion might show relics of debate with the Peripatetics. (See 189A-1, A-4.)

Notes

αὐτοὶ γὰρ εἰσι νόμος: The “law of virtue” is opposed to the “legislated laws” in t. 134g. The “law” of the superior player is singular here, as in that passage. See also t. 41A titles 3.3–4.

ἄπερ Ἀντισθένης ἔφη τοὺς λέοντας: No title in Antisthenes’ catalog is obvious as the source for this fable. Susemihl (1887:210) proposed *Politicus* (t. 41A title 3.3; see t. 204); Newman (1902 v.3:243) thought of *Cyrus or On Kingship* (t. 41A title 5.1), where it could have been used to justify kingship. However, although Aristotle is about to discuss kingship, Antisthenes’ fable refers to several lions, not one, and so would be set in the polis. A Homeric simile could be the inspiration: Achilles says of foes on the battlefield that they cannot make “trustworthy oaths” because they are like lions with men or like wolves with sheep (*Il.* 22.262–66). Lions and rabbits are standard characters in the fables attributed to Aesop, where lions are strong and hares or rabbits are sometimes too bold (Perry 1952, e.g., no. 140–51, 257–59). The present text is Perry’s no. 450: early editors of this anecdote, supplementing from Plutarch’s *Spartan Sayings* 229c or *Agesilaus* 212c, supplied the words of the lions: οἱ λόγοι ὑμῶν, ὧ δασύποδες, ὀνύχων τε καὶ ὀδόντων, οἷων ἡμεῖς ἔχομεν, δέονται (Your words lack claws and teeth, of the sort we have). The character Callicles in Plato’s *Gorgias* (483d4–e2) compares the powerful young men curtailed by Athenian democratic ideology to lions who are enchanted and enslaved: πλάττοντες τοὺς βελτίστους καὶ ἐρρωμενεστάτους ἡμῶν αὐτῶν, ἐκ νέων λαμβάνοντες, ὥσπερ λέοντας, κατεπάδοντές τε καὶ γοητεύοντες καταδουλούμεθα λέγοντες ὡς τὸ ἴσον χρὴ ἔχειν καὶ τοῦτ’ ἔστιν τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ δίκαιον (In molding the best and strongest ones among ourselves, in taking them from their youth, just like lions, by singing chants and spells, we enslave [this group], saying that it is necessary to have the equal [share] and that this is the fine and the just). As for the original reference of the fable for Antisthenes, a likely possibility is Alcibiades, who is compared to a lion in the state by Aristophanes’ character Aeschylus in *Frogs* 1431–32, in recollection of the metaphor Aeschylus had used in *Agamemnon*, as well as Homer’s Helen. (See Bloedow 1991:63–65; see also Plut. *Alc.* 2.2–3; Gribble 1999:1–3.) Meanwhile, Antisthenes compared Alcibiades and Achilles for their beauty (t. 199). Alcibiades’ objections to equality and his flagrant transgression of νόμος are both represented by Thucydides (6.16.4–5, 6.15.4; compare t. 141A). References to animals elsewhere in Antisthenes’ testimonia are frequent (lions in t. 5, other animals and insects in t. 8, 27, 38, 41A titles 2.1 and 9.10, 54.14, 62, 63, 64, 66, 131A), although there is no other surviving evidence for fables. In *Phaedo* 60d1, Plato says that Socrates, in his last days, set Aesop’s fables to music, which could make it plausible that the animal fable was a favorite Socratic form.

δημηγορούντων: This could be understood as a neutral term for addressing the citizen body in assembly, but it also carries the pejorative tones of the term “democracy” (δημοκρατία). In Aristotle’s scheme of six types of constitution at *Pol.* 1279b4–10, democracy is one of the inferior forms, in which the many hold power and serve the interest of the mob. It seems clear that Antisthenes shared this view.

τὸ ἴσον . . . πάντας ἔχειν: The Athenian democracy was founded on equal right to speak (ἰσηγορία), equality before the law (ἰσονομία), equal distribution of power (ἰσοκρατία) (e.g., Herod. 5.78, 3.83, 5.37), and equal share in the goods of the city (ἰσομοιρία) (Thucydides 7.75.6). “Equality” becomes problematic, however, when citizens are not equal in their virtues. In the fourth century, debate opened over the meaning of “equality,” whether it should be “arithmetic,” so that the shares of each individual were exactly equal, or “proportional,” so that each individual had a share “equal” to his own value (Arist. *NE* 5.3 1131a10–b24). The present text seems to imagine difference in virtue that exceeds the discourse of even proportional equality. (See Schütrumpf 1991:525.) Thucydides’ character Alcibiades anticipates this debate (in comparable language) in his speech in *Histories* 6.16.4. Surely Antisthenes, like the critics of Athenian democracy, favored “proportional” equality, but he might have perceived an ideology of “arithmetic” equality in Athens. If Antisthenes was barred from citizenship himself, his opposition to Athenian ideology would have been all the more bitter. (See t. 1-3 and Irwin 2014.) The term ἴσον recurs in t. 82.35; see also t. 53.4 and notes there.

69. Philodemus, PHerc 1506 col. 18.9–28, from *Rhetoric* book 3, fr. 17 (Acosta-Méndez and Angeli)

= 106 DC

- πῶς οὐκ ἐπ[ήλθε]ν α[ὐ]-
 10 τῶι ταῦτα γρά[φον]τι καὶ τὰ
 πρὸ τούτων π[ρ]ὸς αὐτὸν ἐν-
 θ]υμηθῆναι; τί δῆποτε οὐ-
 [τ]ε [Σ]ωκράτης ὁ γινώ[σκων
 15 ἐν]α [π]ρὸς ἓνα συλλύ[ειν] ἔοι-
 κεν ἱκα]νὸς εἶς [πρὸς πλήθη,
 οὐτ’ Ἀντ]ισθέ[νης οὔτε Ζή-
 νων οὔ]τε Κ[λεάνθης οὔτε
 Χρύσι]ππος οὐτ’ ἄλ[λος τις
 20 τοιαύ]τας προκοπὰς ἐκ[πεποι-
 ηκώς;] καὶ μὴν καὶ [λέγει]
 ὅτι· “ὁ[σ]ας δυν[ατ]ὸς κἄ[ν]

εἶη] πρὸς ἀλλήλας συλλύειν
καὶ συ]μμαχίδα[ς ποιεῖν]
ὥς ὁ μουσικὸ[ς] τ[ὴν μίαν]
25 λύραν εἰς συμφ[ωνίαν ἄγει]
πρὸς τὰς π[ολλάς.] οἱ δὲ ῥήτο-]
ρες οὐ τοῦτο πάσ[χουσι μα-]
χ[ο]μένους ἔχειν

10 τὰ leg. Acosta-Méndez et Angeli : τὸ Sudhaus 15 εἰς leg. Acosta-Méndez et Angeli : ἔ[να Sudhaus 16 Ἀντ]ισθέ[νης et cetera nomina suppl. Sudhaus 20 : πεποιηκώς coni. Acosta-Méndez et Angeli : πεποιημένοι Sudhaus | καὶ μὴν καὶ [λέγει] coni. Acosta-Méndez et Angeli : KA[. . .] Pap. : KAIMH[.] apogr. Oxon. : καὶ μὴ[ν] ἄ[ν] λέγει Sudhaus 21–22 leg. et suppl. Acosta-Méndez et Angeli : ὅτι ἔστ]αι . . . [καὶ πολ-λὰς Sudhaus 23 leg. Acosta-Méndez et Angeli : καὶ μὴ μαχ[ο]μ[ένους Sudhaus 24 T apogr. Oxon. 26 οἱ ῥήτο]ρες Sudhaus 27 πάσ[χουσι μα-]χ[ο]μένους conj. Acosta-Méndez et Angeli : E apogr. Oxon. et Neap. : σ[κ]ο[ποῦσι τὸ μὴ μα]χ[ο]μένους Sudhaus

How did it not occur to him [Diogenes of Babylon], when he wrote this and the parts before this, to consider himself? Whyever is it that Socrates, who understands how to reconcile one individual with another, does not seem capable [of reconciling himself] as an individual to a crowd, nor does Antisthenes, or Zeno, or Cleanthes, or Chrysippus, or anyone else who has achieved similar progress in virtue? Indeed he [Diogenes of Babylon] also says that “He would be able to reconcile as many cities to each other, and make them allies, as the musician brings the single lyre into harmony with the many.” But the rhetors do not suppose that fighting cities attain this.

Context of Preservation

Acosta-Méndez and Angeli (after Sudhaus) reconstruct this column as a continuation of PHerc 1506 col. 5 (= PHerc 240 fr. XXb). Philodemus’ opponent is the Stoic Diogenes of Babylon, and at stake is whether the political art (or, more strongly, political knowledge) is part of philosophy. More specifically, Diogenes claims (fr. 125 SVF III.243) that it is part of the same competence to reconcile individuals to individuals and individuals to cities. Philodemus, citing a list of philosophers who fail to master both skills, notes that not even the rhetoricians claim to accomplish what Diogenes says the philosophers can do.

Importance of the Testimonium

If the reconstruction is correct, this statement shows that Antisthenes' rhetorical skill is aligned in a Stoic (and non-Cynic) tradition, the ability to reconcile individuals with each other but not individuals to groups. For endorsement of Philodemus' point, that Socratic "agreement" (ὁμόνοια) was among like-minded wise persons, not in real cities, see Höistad 1948:107, 111–13 (who discusses this as a Cynic theme); Giannantoni 1990 v.4:408–9; Acosta-Méndez and Angeli 1992:264–72. The testimonium is potentially at odds with two other bits of evidence for Antisthenes. (See also Brancacci 2011.) First, Antisthenes' success in the role of reconciler is touted in Xenophon's *Symposium* (t. 13A), where Antisthenes is called a go-between for Socrates' art of matchmaking. Antisthenes' own expertise is focused on matching individuals (*Sym.* 8.62–64) and does not extend to matchmaking between cities or reconciling individuals to groups; but making individuals pleasing to the whole city is part of Socrates' vision of the craft (8.59–60). Plausibly this whole passage is a joke, pointing out through parody Antisthenes' failure to be useful to Athens. Second, Antisthenes' picture of Odysseus' rhetorical skill entails the ability to draw many kinds of people together into political unity (t. 187.11–12). As the present passage in Philodemus continues, the lyre is said to match or blend in sound with many although it is one: this power is not unlike the skill of Antisthenes' Odysseus, which is also illuminated through musical metaphors. The Cynics Diogenes and Crates seem also to be renowned for addressing cities as well as individuals, and Crates especially is known for settling disputes in the household (*SSR* VH 18). Socrates as well, in his "protreptic" speech Ποι φέρεσθε, ἄνθρωποι; reported in the Platonic *Clitophon* and by Epictetus and Dio Chrysostom, addresses the Athenian crowd, in an attempt to benefit them. (See t. 208.) Yet Socrates' failure to save himself at his trial is a clear instance in support of Philodemus' point. It seems plausible that some images of Socrates and some images of the wise man created by Socratics idealized a skill that Socrates and Antisthenes could not really use to good effect, lest higher principles be compromised. Plausibly the Cynic tradition chose a different emphasis, more in line with addressing a crowd.

Notes

ὁ γινώ[σκων ἓνα πρ]ὸς ἓνα συλλ[ύειν]: The statement fits well with Socrates: for example, his skill at reconciling a pair of brothers is portrayed in *Xen. Mem.* 2.3, whereas his inability to persuade the Athenian court of his benefits to society is central to the memory of his conviction and emphasized in the *Apology* of both Plato and Xenophon. When Xenophon implicitly compares

Socrates' rhetoric to that of Odysseus (*Mem.* 4.6.15), the emphasis is on mastery of tactics for addressing each individual separately.

τοιαύ]τας προκοπὰς ἐκ[πεποιηκώς: Human beings, even wise men, could not fully achieve virtue by most Stoic accounts, but they could make moral progress (προκοπή). Antisthenes is an example of someone “in moral progress” in t. 137B also.

ὥς ὁ μουσικὸς[ς] τ[ὴν μίαν] λύραν εἰς συμφ[ωνίαν ἄγει] πρὸς τὰς π[ολλὰς]: Compare Odysseus' rhetorical skill in t. 187.11: λόγου δὲ πολυτροπία καὶ χρῆσις ποικίλη λόγου εἰς ποικίλας ἀκοὰς μονοτροπία γίνεται.

70A. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 4.4.28 (Hense)

= 168 DC

[= *Gnom. Vindob.* no. 98; *Gnom. Paris.* no. 69]

Ἀντισθένης ἐρωτηθεὶς, πῶς ἂν τις προσέλθοι πολιτεία, εἶπε· “καθάπερ πυρί, μήτε λίαν ἐγγύς, ἵνα μὴ καῖς, μήτε πόρρω, ἵνα μὴ ῥιγώσης.”

lemm. hab. M A : sine lemm. S

Antisthenes, when asked how someone should approach the government of the city, said: “Like a fire, neither too close, lest you be burned, nor too far away, lest you shiver.”

70B. *Gnomologium Vaticanum* 743 no. 8 (Sternbach)

ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος, πῶς ἂν προσέλθοι πολιτεία, εἶπεν, μήτε λίαν ἐγγύς, ἵνα μὴ κατακαῖ, μήτε πόρρω, ἵνα μὴ ῥιγοῖ.

ὁ om. V | προσέλθοι πολιτεία Sternbach e Stob. (70A) : προσέλθ ἡ πολιτεία (sic) V : προσέλθοι τῇ πολιτεία Wachsmuth | ῥιγοῖ Sternbach : ῥαγῇ V : ῥιγῇ Wachsmuth

The same man [Antisthenes], when asked by someone how he should approach the government of the city, said, “Neither too close, lest he be burned up, nor too far away, lest he shiver.”

Context of Preservation

Stobaeus' passage, from his fourth book on politics, is from a section titled “On Those in Power in the Cities” (Περὶ τῶν ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι δυνατῶν).

Stobaeus cites Antisthenes four times in his fourth book (see also t. 74, 75, 77). The statement is attributed to Diogenes of Sinope in ps.-Maximus Confessor 9.44/47 and elsewhere (SSR VB 357) and to Aesop in *App. Gnom.* 24. (See Ihm 2001:226.) On Antisthenes' prominence in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, see t. 5.

Importance of the Testimonium

This anecdote suggests that Antisthenes did not reject the city outright but took a complicated position on the relationship between the individual and the city. This could be because he lived in Athens and lacked the perspective or the precedent to reject the context of the city completely, as Aristippus and Diogenes of Sinope could. (See t. 68.) Further, it is possible that he thought life in community at some level was critical for virtue: see t. 82, 189C-2, 189D.

Notes

πῶς ἂν προσέλθοι πολιτείᾳ: The question might seek the method for getting power in the city. Antisthenes' answer would then be a clever revision of the question "πῶς;"

μήτε λῖαν ἐγγύς . . . μήτε πόρρω: Antisthenes generally casts himself as an individualist (t. 82) and rejects the "standing laws" of the city (t. 134g). There is no good evidence for the benefit he stands to gain from belonging to the city. But his difference from Aristippus (as portrayed in Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.11–12), who preferred to live as a "foreigner everywhere," is clear. If Socrates' views represented in that episode are any guide to what Antisthenes might have thought, he must have seen human inter-dependence as a fact of life and thought it better to be a free participant in the community than a subservient slave, because there is no other position to take.

70C. Augustine of Hippo, *On the City of God* 18.41 (Dombart-Kalb)

= 11B, 102 DC (SSR IH 13)

nonne ibi Aristippus in voluptate corporis summum bonum ponens, ibi Antisthenes virtute animi potius hominem fieri beatum adseverans, duo philosophi nobiles et ambo Socratici, in tam diversis atque inter se contrariis finibus vitae summam locantes, quorum etiam ille fugiendam, iste administrandam sapienti dicebat esse rem publicam, ad suam quisque sectam sectandam discipulos congregebat?

Was it not there [in Athens] that Aristippus put the highest good in the pleasure of the body, and there that Antisthenes declared, to the contrary, that the human becomes happy by virtue of the soul, two fine philosophers and both Socratici, who placed the pinnacle of life in such different and mutually contradictory ends? Also did not the first say the state should be shunned by the wise man, the second that it should be served? Did not each assemble disciples for following his own sect?

Context of Preservation

Augustine's eighteenth book traces the history of pagan civilization from its beginnings to the Christian era: this is set in parallel to the history of Israel, which he has traced in previous books. Archaic Greece and Rome are treated in ch. 8–41, with passages also on Egyptians and comparisons to the Hebrews. As the climax of this treatment, Augustine examines the self-contradictory philosophical views of the Athenians, under the opposition Epicureans versus Stoics. Varro is cited as a source throughout, especially in books 18 and 19, and is likely the source here.

Importance of the Testimonium

This account is still more positive about Antisthenes' attitude toward government than that in t. 70A–B. Either Augustine uniquely preserves this information, or, more likely, the opposition is generated from that between Epicurean and Stoic attitudes toward government as constructed in the later Roman Republic. See also t. 138B.

71A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.5 (Marcovich)

= 103 DC

[= Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 107.23–24 Walz]

τότ' ἔφη τὰς πόλεις ἀπόλλυσθαι, ὅταν μὴ δύνωνται τοὺς φαύλους ἀπὸ τῶν σπουδαίων διακρίνειν.

He said that then cities are destroyed, when they are unable to distinguish the bad people from the good.

71B. ps.-Maximus Confessor, *Common Topics* 9.76/79 (Ihm)

Ἀντισθένους. Τότε τὰς πόλεις ἀπόλλυσθαι συμβαίνει, ὅταν μὴ δύνωνται οἱ κρατοῦντες τοὺς φαύλους ἐκ τῶν σπουδαίων διακρίνειν.
ἀπόλλυσθαι G I L Bas. Ross. : ἀπολεῖσθαι Π | κρατοῦντες G I L Bas.
Ross. : κατοικοῦντες P

From Antisthenes: Then it happens that cities are destroyed, when those in power cannot distinguish the bad people from the good.

Context of Preservation

In Diogenes, the *apophthegma* is in the middle of the list: see the outline at t. 3. Ps.-Maximus' passage is from a section titled "On Rule and Power" (Περὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐξουσίας). The same *apophthegma* is attributed to Anacharsis in *App. Vat.* 1.5. (See Kindstrand 1981:118.)

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes puts the criterion of good governance in intelligence of the rulers, whose understanding is about the people governed rather than any type of external ideal. The rulers are plural, not a king.

Notes

τότε τὰς πόλεις ἀπόλλυσθαι: Pl. *Rep.* 3 415c5–6 could have an intertextual relationship with this *apophthegma*. Plato, using the same tension in his ordering of clauses, says “then the city is destroyed” (τότε τὴν πόλιν διαφθαρῆναι), when a guardian made from a metal baser than gold holds office. Plato’s prevention for this outcome appeals to a second distinction in the guardians’ essential nature: guardians must remain true watchdogs, who can distinguish friends from enemies, and not become similar to wolves (416a2–6). It is not idle to ask, with caution, whether the reference to dogs, together with the analogy of an essential distinction between two kinds of animals with similar appearance, could be Plato’s signal for a reference to Antisthenes. (Compare t. 72A; see also t. 113.) If Plato is alluding to Antisthenes’ views, it is not clear whether he means to accept and develop them further or to oppose them. The main difference between the views is that Antisthenes asks for rulers with ideal perception, whoever they might be, whereas Plato asks for rulers who are ideal in their nature or “metal.” One component of the guardians’ superiority for Plato is the ideal perception and discernment of a watchdog, which might have the aura of a joke. Plato’s guardians are to distinguish friends and enemies within their own class, not in the city at large. It seems that their successful government is determined by a correct class division and its mechanics, not by correct continuing interactions between the rulers and the ruled.

οἱ κρατοῦντες: The rulers could be democrats, a term built from this verb. Whatever their number or their authority for power, they need one special quality, discernment.

διακρίνειν: Compare the epistemological vocabulary at the end of the speech of Ajax, which includes διαγιγνώσκειν (t. 53.9); although διακρίνειν does not appear, κρίνειν does (t. 53.4).

72A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.8 (Marcovich)

= 169 DC

συνεβούλευν Ἀθηναίοις τοὺς ὄνους ἵππους ψηφίσασθαι· ἄλογον δὲ ἡγούμενων, “ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ στρατηγοί,” φησί, “γίνονται ποθ’ ὑμῖν μηδὲν μαθόντες, μόνον δὲ χειροτονηθέντες.”

γίνονται B P Φ : φαίνονται F | ποθ' Φ : ποτ(ἐ) B P¹ : παρ' F P² Q |
 ὑμῖν B P¹ F Φ : ὑμῶν P² Q | παρ' ὑμῖν post μηδὲν μάθοντες F

He advised the Athenians to vote in asses as horses. When they considered this unreasonable, he said, “But in fact also you sometimes come to have generals who know nothing, but have only been voted in.”

Context of Preservation

This anecdote appears early among Diogenes Laertius' stories about Antisthenes in Athens, just after the interactions with Plato. See t. 3.

Importance of the Testimonium

This anecdote (with t. 153B.3 and 196) tells against Antisthenes' nominalism, on a communal level: no decision of the community can override the facts of nature. This position apparently differentiates Antisthenes from the Protagoras character in Plato (*Theaet.* 167c4–5, 168b5–6), who holds that cities determine their own “justice” and “goodness.” Of course, the nature of horses and the nature of justice could be different. The anecdote also illustrates Antisthenes' opposition to the Athenians' exercise of their political sovereignty, not necessarily in theory, but because of its actual decisions.

Notes

τοὺς ὄνους ἵππους: The example in Antisthenes' analogy has a parallel in Plato (*Phaedr.* 260b1–c1), where the city's difficulty distinguishing horses from asses is typical in the absence of philosophy. See further t. 149.

ψηφίσασθαι: Antisthenes' political objection fits with Athenian antidemocratic discourse, called “Socratic” by Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1393b4–7), against the selection of officials by lottery. Antisthenes requires not only that generals be selected individually, as they historically were (in distinction from other officials), but that their qualification should be knowledge rather than, for example, power to induce erotic devotion, as Critobulus proposes in *Xen. Sym.* 4.16, with irony; *Xen. Mem.* 1.2.9 matches the present testimonium.

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ στρατηγοί . . . γίνονται: Despite Antisthenes' ontological principles, the Athenians do successfully create “generals” who know nothing. These men are called generals, and they fulfill the functions and receive the honors of generals, but Antisthenes' view is that they are not really generals. Plato might allude to the same point at *Lach.* 184c9–e9, where Socrates states that decisions about who will teach courage should be made from knowledge, not by a vote of the majority. The idea that natural ontology is being defied by this vote is reinforced by *Letter* 25 of ps.-Crates, addressed to the Athenians,

where voting that asses are horses is equivalent to producing τὸ μὴ ὄν, “what is not.” Such philosophical phrasing does not appear often in the Cynic epistles.

ποθ’ ὑμῖν: Antisthenes addresses the Athenians as though he is an outsider, one who does not vote in the elections. (See t. 1 on his political status.)

Marcovich’s text (ποθ’ ὑμῖν over παρ’ ὑμῶν) makes most sense of the manuscript variants. The adverb ποτέ mitigates the accusation: some Athenian generals are better than others.

χειροτονηθέντες: This is a standard Athenian word for voting by “extending the hand” (e.g., Isoc. *On the Peace* 55), but the context, where the Athenians try to override nature with their culture, together with the use of the verb γίνονται, which emphasizes origin (and possibly deficient ontology, when nature is being defied: there is hardly enough evidence from Antisthenes to adjudicate this question, but see t. 150A.3), might lead one to wonder whether Antisthenes intended a pun with χειροτεχνηθέντες, “manufactured” (used of artifacts). For plausibly parallel “Gorgianic” puns based on symmetrical syllables, see t. 109, 116, 131.

72B. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 3.4 (Bandini)

(not in *SSR*)

[3.4.7–12 = Stob. 4.13.29]

(1) Ἰδὼν δέ ποτε Νικομαχίδην ἐξ ἀρχαιρεσιῶν ἀπιόντα ἤρετο· “Τίνες, ὦ Νικομαχίδη, στρατηγοὶ ἤρηνται;” Καὶ ὅς, “Οὐ γάρ,” ἔφη, “ὦ Σώκρατες, τοιοῦτοὶ εἰσιν Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥστε ἐμὲ μὲν οὐχ εἴλοντο, ὅς ἐκ καταλόγου στρατεούμενος κατατέτριμμαι καὶ λοχαγῶν καὶ ταξιαρχῶν καὶ τραύματα ὑπὸ τῶν πολεμίων τοσαῦτα ἔχων”—ἅμα δὲ καὶ τὰς οὐλὰς τῶν τραυμάτων ἀπογυμνούμενος ἐπεδείκνυνεν—“Ἀντισθένης δέ,” ἔφη, “εἴλοντο τὸν οὔτε ὀπλίτην πώποτε στρατευσάμενον ἔν τε τοῖς ἵππευσιν οὐδὲν περίβλεπτον ποιήσαντα, ἐπιστάμενόν τε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ χρήματα συλλέγειν;” (2) “Οὐκοῦν,” ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, “τοῦτο μὲν ἀγαθόν, εἴ γε τοῖς στρατιώταις ἰκανὸς ἔσται τὰ ἐπιτήδεια πορίζειν;” “Καὶ γὰρ οἱ ἔμποροι,” ἔφη ὁ Νικομαχίδης, “χρήματα συλλέγειν ἱκανοὶ εἰσιν, ἀλλ’ οὐχ ἔνεκα τούτου καὶ στρατηγεῖν δύναντ’ ἄν.” (3) Καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης ἔφη· “Ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλόνομος Ἀντισθένης ἐστίν, ὃ στρατηγῷ προσεῖναι ἐπιτήδειόν ἐστιν· οὐχ ὅρᾳς ὅτι καὶ ὁσάκις κεχορήγηκε πᾶσι τοῖς χοροῖς νενίκηκε;” “Μὰ Δί,” ἔφη ὁ Νικομαχίδης, “ἀλλ’ οὐδὲν ὁμοίον ἐστί χοροῦ τε καὶ στρατεύματος προεστάναι.” (4) “Καὶ μήν,” ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, “οὐδὲ ψόδης γε ὁ Ἀντισθένης οὐδὲ χορῶν διδασκαλίας ἔμπειρος ὢν ὅμως ἐγένετο ἱκανὸς εὐρεῖν τοὺς κρατίστους ταῦτα.” “Καὶ ἐν τῇ στρατηγίᾳ οὖν,” ἔφη ὁ Νικομαχίδης, “ἄλλους μὲν εὐρήσει τοὺς τάζοντας ἀνθ’ ἑαυτοῦ, ἄλλους δὲ τοὺς μαχουμένους.”

(5) “Οὐκοῦν,” ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, “ἐάν γε καὶ ἐν τοῖς πολεμικοῖς τοὺς κρατίστους, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς χορικοῖς, ἐξευρίσκη τε καὶ προαιρήται, εἰκότως ἂν καὶ τούτου νικηφόρος εἴη· καὶ δαπανᾷ δ’ αὐτὸν εἰκὸς μᾶλλον ἂν ἐθέλῃν εἰς τὴν σὺν ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν πολεμικῶν νίκην ἢ εἰς τὴν σὺν τῇ φυλῇ τῶν χορικῶν.” (6) “Λέγεις σύ;” ἔφη, “ὦ Σώκρατες, ὡς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρός ἐστὶ χορηγεῖν τε καλῶς καὶ στρατηγεῖν;” “Λέγω ἔγωγ;” ἔφη, “ὥς, ὅτου ἂν τις προστατεύῃ, ἐὰν γινώσκῃ τε ὦν δεῖ καὶ ταῦτα πορίζεσθαι δύνῃται, ἀγαθὸς ἂν εἴη προστάτης, εἴτε χοροῦ εἴτε οἴκου εἴτε πόλεως εἴτε στρατεύματος προστατεύοι.” (7) Καὶ ὁ Νικομαχίδης, “Μὰ Δί;” ἔφη, “ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐκ ἂν ποτε ᾤμην ἐγὼ σοῦ ἀκοῦσαι ὡς οἱ ἀγαθοὶ οἰκονόμοι ἀγαθοὶ στρατηγοὶ ἂν εἴεν.” “Ἴθι δὴ,” ἔφη, “ἐξετάσωμεν τὰ ἔργα ἐκατέρου αὐτῶν, ἵνα εἰδῶμεν πότερον τὰ αὐτὰ ἐστὶν ἢ διαφέρει τι.” “Πάνυ γε,” ἔφη. (8) “Οὐκοῦν,” ἔφη, “τὸ μὲν τοὺς ἀρχομένους κατηκόους τε καὶ εὐπειθεῖς ἑαυτοῖς παρασκευάζειν ἀμφοτέρων ἐστὶν ἔργον;” “Καὶ μάλα,” ἔφη. “Τί δέ; τὸ προστάττειν ἕκαστα τοῖς ἐπιτηδεύουσιν πράττειν;” “Καὶ τοῦτ’,” ἔφη. “Καὶ μὴν τὸ τοὺς κακοὺς κολάζειν καὶ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς τιμᾶν ἀμφοτέροις οἶμαι προσήκειν.” “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν,” ἔφη. (9) “Τὸ δὲ τοὺς ὑπηκόους εὐμενεῖς ποιεῖσθαι πῶς οὐ καλὸν ἀμφοτέροις;” “Καὶ τοῦτ’,” ἔφη. “Συμμάχους δὲ καὶ βοηθοὺς προσάγεσθαι δοκεῖ σοι συμφέρειν ἀμφοτέροις ἢ οὐ;” “Πάνυ μὲν οὖν,” ἔφη. “Ἀλλὰ φυλακτικούς τῶν ὄντων οὐκ ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι προσήκει;” “Σφόδρα γ’,” ἔφη. “Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐπιμελεῖς καὶ φιλοπόνους ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι προσήκει περὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα;” (10) “Ταῦτα μέν,” ἔφη, “πάντα ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρων ἐστίν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μάχεσθαι οὐκέτι ἀμφοτέρων.” “Ἄλλ’ ἐχθροὶ γέ τοι ἀμφοτέροις γίνονται;” “Καὶ μάλα,” ἔφη, “τοῦτό γε.” “Οὐκοῦν τὸ περιγενέσθαι τούτων ἀμφοτέροις συμφέρει;” (11) “Πάνυ γ’,” ἔφη· “ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο παρίης· ἂν δέη μάχεσθαι, τί ὠφελήσῃ ἢ οἰκονομική;” “Ἐνταῦθα δήπου καὶ πλείστον,” ἔφη· “ὁ γὰρ ἀγαθὸς οἰκονόμος, εἰδὼς ὅτι οὐδὲν οὕτω λυσιτελές τε καὶ κερδαλέον ἐστίν, ὡς τὸ μαχόμενον τοὺς πολεμίους νικᾶν, οὐδὲ οὕτως ἀλυσιτελές τε καὶ ζημιῶδες, ὡς τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι, προθύμως μὲν τὰ πρὸς τὸ νικᾶν συμφέροντα ζητήσῃ καὶ παρασκευάζεται, ἐπιμελῶς δὲ τὰ πρὸς τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι φέροντα σκέψεται καὶ φυλάσσεται, ἐνεργῶς δ’ ἂν τὴν παρασκευὴν ὁρᾷ νικητικὴν οὖσαν, μαχεῖται, οὐχ ἥκιστα δὲ τούτων, ἐὰν ἀπαράσκευος ᾖ, φυλάσσεται συνάπτειν μάχην. (12) μὴ καταφρόνει;” ἔφη, “ὦ Νικομαχίδη, τῶν οἰκονομικῶν ἀνδρῶν· ἡ γὰρ τῶν ιδίων ἐπιμέλεια πλήθει μόνον διαφέρει τῆς τῶν κοινῶν, τὰ δὲ ἄλλα παραπλήσια ἔχει, τὸ <δὲ> μέγιστον, ὅτι οὔτε ἄνευ ἀνθρώπων οὐδετέρα γίνεταί οὔτε δι’ ἄλλων μὲν ἀνθρώπων τὰ ἴδια πράττεται, δι’ ἄλλων δὲ τὰ κοινά. οὐ γὰρ ἄλλοις τισὶν ἀνθρώποις οἱ τῶν κοινῶν ἐπιμελόμενοι χρῶνται ἢ οἷσπερ <οἱ> τὰ ἴδια οἰκονομοῦντες· οἷς οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι χρῆσθαι καὶ τὰ

ἴδια καὶ τὰ κοινὰ καλῶς πράττουσιν, οἱ δὲ μὴ ἐπιστάμενοι ἀμφοτέρωθι πλημμελοῦσι.”

(1) ἔχων codd. : ἔχω Cobet | πώποτε codd. plur. : πω B (4) στρατηγία codd. plur. : στρατιᾷ B (5) ἐξευρίσκη τε καὶ Valckenaer : ἐξευρίσκηται καὶ codd. | μᾶλλον ἂν ἐθέλιν Ven. et Victorius : ἂν om. cet. (7) οἱ ἀγαθοὶ Stob. : ἀγαθοὶ codd. (8) παρασκευάζειν codd. : κατασκευάζειν Stob. | καὶ μὴν τὸ codd. plur. : καὶ τὸ C et al. : καὶ μὴν Stob. | προσήκειν codd. : προσήκει Stob. (11) παρίης B² : παριεῖς vel παρίεις cet. : παριεῖς Cobet (12) μὴ καταφρόνει codd. : μὴ οὖν καταφρόνει Stob. *Vind.* : μὴ σὺν καταφρόνει Gaisford | τὸ . . . κοινὰ secl. Dindorf | <δὲ> Castalio | οὐδέτερα codd. plur. : οὐδέτερα B C et al. | <οἱ> Zeune | οἷς οἱ Ernesti : ὅσοι codd. (ὥς οἱ unus) | οἱ ἐπιστάμενοι codd. : οἱ μὲν ἐπιστάμενοι K. Schwartz

(1) When he once saw Nicomachides departing from the elections of officers, he [Socrates] asked him, “Who, Nicomachides, have been elected as generals?” And he said, “Isn’t this typical of the Athenians, that they would fail to elect me as general, I who have spent my life serving as an enlisted soldier and leading a battle unit and commanding a squadron, and who have sustained so many wounds from the enemy”—and here he exposed the scars of his wounds and showed them—“but they have elected Antisthenes,” he said, “a man who has never served as a hoplite and in the cavalry has done nothing spectacular and knows how to do nothing other than amass money?” (2) “Well,” said Socrates, “isn’t this good, if he will be able to provide provisions for the soldiers?” “But also merchants can amass money,” said Nicomachides, “but they would not also be able to command the army because of this.” (3) And Socrates said, “But Antisthenes is also fond of victory, a quality fitting to belong to a general. Don’t you see that every time he has been a chorus leader, he has won with all his choruses?” “Yes, by Zeus,” said Nicomachides, “but there is no likeness between being head of the chorus and being head of the army.” (4) “In addition,” said Socrates, “Antisthenes, though without experience of training the chorus in song or dance, was able to find men exceedingly good at these things.” “So also in his generalship,” said Nicomachides, “he will find others who will organize the troops in place of himself, and others who will fight.” (5) “Well,” said Socrates, “if in fact also in matters of war he should find and select exceedingly good men, as he did in matters of the chorus, it is likely that he would be victorious also in that. And it is likely that he would be more willing to spend his money for victory over the enemy along with the whole city than for

victory over the choristers with his tribe.” (6) “Do you claim,” he said, “Socrates, that it is characteristic of the same man to lead the chorus well and to be a general?” “What I claim,” he said, “is that whatever someone is in charge of, if he recognizes what is required and is able to provide these things, he would be a good leader, whether he were in charge of a chorus or a household or the city or the army.” (7) And Nicomachides said, “By Zeus, Socrates, I would never have thought I would hear you say that good household managers would also be good generals.” “Come then,” he said, “let us make explicit the tasks of each of them, so that we might know whether they are the same or whether they differ at all.” “Sure,” he said. (8) “Well,” he said, “is rendering those over whom they rule attentive and ready to obey them a task of both?” “Very much so,” he said. “And what next? Assigning each thing to those fit to carry it out?” “Also this,” he said. “In addition, punishing the bad men and honoring the good men is, I think, fitting to both.” “Definitely so,” he said. (9) “And how is it not a fine thing for both to make their subordinates kindly disposed to them?” “Also this is true,” he said. “Don’t you think it benefits both to bring in allies and auxiliaries?” “Definitely so,” he said. “And is it not fitting for both to be preserving of what they have?” “Yes, indeed,” he said. “So then it is fitting for them both to be careful and happily diligent concerning their own tasks?” (10) “All these things,” he said, “are in like measure characteristic of both. But fighting battles is not characteristic of both.” “But both have enemies?” “That is very much the case,” he said. “So then being superior to them is beneficial to both?” (11) “Very much so,” he said, “but you are neglecting this: if battle is required, how will the skill of household management be helpful?” “In that situation, indeed, actually the most,” he said. “For the good household manager, who knows that nothing is so lucrative and profitable as defeating the enemies in battle, and nothing is so non-lucrative and punitive as losing, will seek out and prepare eagerly what is advantageous for victory, and he will inspect and guard carefully against the things conducive to losing. If he sees that his preparation is likely to win, he will fight actively, but, no less than all this, if he should be unprepared, he will take caution against engaging in battle. (12) Do not scorn, Nicomachides,” he said, “men proficient in household affairs. For the care of private affairs differs from that of public affairs only in scale, but it is similar in other respects, and chiefly in this, that neither takes place without people, nor are private affairs conducted through some people and public affairs through other people. So those concerned for public affairs do not associate with different people than those managing their

own private affairs in their households. And those who know how to associate with these people perform well in both private and public matters, but those who do not know hit the wrong key in both realms.”

Context of Preservation

This episode is from a series on military and political leadership (*Mem.* 3.1–3.7). The Antisthenes discussed in the passage is normally not identified with the Socratic: Davies (following Kirchner and others) thought he was Antisthenes son of Antiphates of the deme Cytherrus (*APF* 1196), a victor in choral competitions, c. 380. The Socratic is tacitly ruled out (already in Cobet’s 1836 prosopography of Xenophon) because he was not wealthy and never served as chorus leader or general. But this is to take the episode literally, and we might allow instead that Xenophon could be joking, which is possible even if we lack the background knowledge necessary to read the joke exactly as his contemporary readers would have read it. See Nails 2002:35 on the unlikelihood of Davies’ identification. Without giving a positive argument, Nails 2002:36 identifies the present Antisthenes with the father of Antisthenes the Socratic (named in t. 1A). (Antisthenes the father could be the basis for this story, insofar as he is more likely to have run a wealthy household.) Stobaeus excerpts this episode for his chapter titled “Advice on Generals and Things Useful in War,” which includes also *Mem.* 3.1–2, as well as a maxim attributed to Antisthenes the Socratic (t. 77B).

Importance of the Testimonium

The passage expounds a unity of ruling competence that is independent of the scale of the group ruled or its mission and that consists in knowing how to deal with people. (Compare *Pol.* 1.1 1252a7–10, where Aristotle rejects the principle.) Such a unity of political virtue would be consistent with some evidence for Antisthenes the Socratic (see t. 189) and would fit into the historical context of Aristophanes’ *Lysistrata* and *Ecclesiazousai* and Plato’s *Republic*, where an analogy between governing the city and governing the household is staged or expanded (see t. 41A title 3.3 for the possibility of Antisthenes’ participation in this debate). It could also be a thesis that Antisthenes would have rejected or never approached, insofar as the anecdote becomes hostile to the person who puts too high a value on self-sufficiency. (This is unclear.) If Xenophon meant to signal a connection to Antisthenes the Socratic by assigning the name “Antisthenes” to a fictional character discussed by Socrates, he probably understood Antisthenes to hold a doctrine on leadership different from that of Socrates. The identification of Antisthenes as one who knows nothing other than how to make money, in its reversal of Antisthenes’ real views or competencies, could be compared to the episode

about *eros* that Xenophon wrote for the *Symposium* (t. 14A). Joël (1901 v.2.2:1073–80) proposed that Xenophon here writes against Antisthenes, unmasking his mistaken assumptions in devaluing wealth through a paradox, just as he does with respect to *eros* in the *Symposium*. Overlaps of language between this passage and Xenophon's treatment of Antisthenes the procurer in t. 13A are also apparent. The connection between the passage and Antisthenes the Socratic remains speculative.

Notes

(1) **Νικομαχίδην**: This name (“Son of the Winner in Battle”) fits perfectly to the character, who is skilled in military battle and bent on victory. He also has hereditary claim to these traits. If it were fictional, it would be well invented. *On Victory* is the title of one of Antisthenes' books (t. 41A title 3.8), which has the second title “On Household Management,” referencing the very skill this Antisthenes has (ἡ οἰκονομική in §11). Antisthenes rejects heredity as a factor in his excellence (t. 3C).

ἄμα δὲ καὶ τὰς οὐλὰς . . . ἐπεδείκνυνεν: Socrates scolds Antisthenes for displaying his pride through the holes in his garment (t. 15).

τὸν οὐτε ὀπλίτην πώποτε στρατευσάμενον: If the stories about Socrates' valor in battle were known to be fictions (see t. 200; compare t. 4), Xenophon could be joking. Among the Socratics, Xenophon himself was foremost in military experience and wisdom.

ἐπιστάμενον τε ἄλλο οὐδὲν ἢ χρήματα συλλέγειν: Contrast t. 82.34–35. Compare also Antisthenes' reputed failure to attract enough pupils to sustain himself as a professional teacher (t. 34C). The use of the term *ἐπιστάμενον* for this derivative skill of moneymaking might carry an edge of polemic: possibly there was a debate about whether moneymaking is a τέχνη. (Compare t. 78, 83.)

(2) **ἱκανὸς ἔσται τὰ ἐπιτήδεια πορίζειν**: Taken differently, this is the goal of Antisthenes' ethics. In t. 82, he endeavors to minimize his needs so that few resources will be sufficient to meet them. Again, this could work as a joke for the knowing audience.

Ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλόνομος Ἀντισθένης ἐστίν: Xenophon seems to characterize the Socratic Antisthenes as φιλόνομος in the dialectical realm (t. 83, 185A, 186). In Xenophon's portrayals, he tends to fail in achieving victory.

(3) **ὁσάκις κεχορήγηκε πᾶσι τοῖς χοροῖς νενίκηκε**: If Antisthenes never led a chorus, this statement would be true. If this is said of a real chorus leader, it must be hyperbole.

(4) **οὐδὲ ὧδῃς γε ὁ Ἀντισθένης οὐδὲ χορῶν διδασκαλίας ἔμπειρος ὢν**: Again, this negatively based sentence could be true about the Socratic Antisthenes. The joke is that as he claims to have effect beyond his literal role or

competence, his own role becomes managerial, which removes the relevance of any special competence Antisthenes might have.

(5) **εἰς τὴν σὺν ὅλῃ τῇ πόλει τῶν πολεμικῶν νίκην**: Compare the goal Socrates attributes to Antisthenes the procurer (or matchmaker) in t. 13A.64.

(6) **ἐὰν γιγνώσκῃ τε ὧν δεῖ καὶ ταῦτα πορίζεσθαι δύνηται**: This Socratic qualification for good leadership has two components: not just the knowledge familiar throughout Socratic literature, but knowledge plus resources. This is plausible as Xenophon's version of the Socratic message.

(7) **ἐξετάσωμεν τὰ ἔργα ἑκατέρου αὐτῶν, ἵνα εἰδῶμεν**: Socrates says nearly the same thing of the matchmaker in t. 13A.56.

(8) **Πάνυ μὲν οὖν**: Compare t. 13A.56, where Xenophon seems to joke about this expected response of Socrates' passive interlocutor.

(9) **προσάγεσθαι**: This activity could be related to the craft of the *προαγωγή* attributed to Antisthenes in t. 13A.61. Although the words are different (*προσ-* vs. *προ-*), the senses are close.

καὶ ἐπιμελεῖς καὶ φιλοπόνους ἀμφοτέρους εἶναι προσήκει περὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἔργα: In this criterion, the final one Socrates gives before his interlocutor takes control of the discussion, Socrates slyly refutes Antisthenes' qualifications as a leader: this Antisthenes specifically did not expend care and toil on his own work; he hired others to do his work. The more familiar Antisthenes is, of course, self-sufficient.

(10) **ἀλλὰ τὸ μάχεσθαι οὐκ ἐτι ἀμφοτέρων**: Nicomachides points out one apparent difference between the general and the household manager: this might have marked the limit of the alleged identity being built in the discussion, but Socrates will show how the household manager is also competitive. Because this is the unpredicted thesis, it is a main point of the episode.

(11) **τὸ μαχόμενον τοὺς πολεμίους νικᾶν**: A text entitled *Περὶ νίκης οἰκονομικός* (t. 41A title 3.8) might have presented competition as the core principle of household management. This conjunction of titles that are not obviously equivalent or mutually relevant is parallel to the surprising likeness that Socrates has just drawn between being a general and managing a household.

τὴν παρασκευὴν: In addition to skills for drawing in others as helpers (§4) and knowledge (§6), preparation and guardianship emerge here as the central virtues of leadership in this episode. Preparation is not directly discussed in surviving testimonia for Antisthenes, but it could be considered a topic of t. 82. More loosely, in t. 53–54, Ajax has the wrong kind of preparation for contest (t. 54.7), and Odysseus claims to be the guardian (*φύλαξ*, t. 54.8).

(12) **οὔτε ἄνευ ἀνθρώπων οὐδετέρα γίγνεται**: Plausibly this is a closing attack on Antisthenes, for his privileging of self-sufficiency.

πλημμελοῦσι: The metaphor resonates with the fictive Antisthenes' skill as chorus leader. On the musical expertise of the Socratic Antisthenes, see t. 101A.

73. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.6 (Marcovich)

= 104 DC

ἄτοπον ἔφη τοῦ μὲν σίτου τὰς αἶρας ἐκλέγειν καὶ ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ τοὺς
ἀχρείους, ἐν δὲ πολιτείᾳ τοὺς πονηροὺς μὴ παραιτεῖσθαι.
πονηροὺς B F : φθονηροὺς P

He said it was strange to sort out the rye grass from the wheat, and in war to sort out the unfit, but in the government not to excuse the bad men from service.

Context of Preservation

This is the twenty-second of twenty-seven *apophthegmata* attributed to Antisthenes by Diogenes in *Lives* 6.3–7: see t. 3.

Importance of the Testimonium

The agricultural metaphor for men in the city is similar to the famous anecdote about Thrasybulus of Miletus' advice to Periander of Corinth (Herod. 9.92; Arist. *Pol.* 3.13 1284a28–33; Diog. Laert. 1.100), to cut down the tallest cornstalks. The image is adapted to represent democracy rather than tyranny.

74. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 4.9.10 (Hense)

= 170 DC

Ἀντισθένους. Ἀντισθένης ὁ Σωκρατικὸς εἰπόντος τινὸς ὅτι ὁ πόλεμος
ἀπολεῖ τοὺς πένητας, “Πολλοὺς μὲν οὖν” <ἔφη> “ποιήσῃ.”
lemm. hab. M A : om. S | ἀπολεῖ Gaisford : ἀπόλλει S M A | ἔφη
add. Hense

From Antisthenes. Antisthenes the Socratic, when someone said that war would wipe out the poor people, said, “Well, it will create many.”

Context of Preservation

Stobaeus' section is titled “On War” (Περὶ πολέμου).

Notes

πολλοὺς μὲν οὖν ποιήσῃ: In Xenophon's *Symposium*, the character Charmides speaks just before Antisthenes and praises his poverty as his

greatest asset (*Sym.* 4.29–32). Charmides says he lost his wealth in the Peloponnesian Wars. In Xenophon’s text, this poverty turns out to be an advantage, granting Charmides greater freedom. There is a connection within the *Symposium* to Antisthenes’ speech (see introductory discussion for t. 82), and the present anecdote could show a connection of this theme to Antisthenes as an author. It is futile to speculate far, but Antisthenes might have discussed the financial effects of the Peloponnesian Wars, which might have been related to his Socratic conversion. Admittedly the anecdote of his military service with Socrates (t. 3B) imagines that he was already a Socratic early in the Peloponnesian Wars. We know nothing secure about Antisthenes’ formative period.

75. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 4.8.31 (Hense)

[= *Gnom. Paris.* no. 268]

= 166 DC

Ἀντισθένης. Ἀντισθένης ὁ φιλόσοφος τοὺς δημίους εὐσεβεστέρους
ἔλεγεν εἶναι τῶν τυράννων· πυθομένου δέ τινος τὴν αἰτίαν ἔφη, “Ὅτι
ὑπὸ μὲν τῶν δημίων οἱ ἀδικοῦντες ἀναιροῦνται, ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν τυράννων
οἱ μὴδὲν ἁμαρτάνοντες.”

lemm. hab. M A : om. S

From Antisthenes. Antisthenes the philosopher said that the public executioners are more pious than tyrants. When someone asked why, he said, “Because by the public executioners are slain offenders in justice, but by the tyrants, those who are doing nothing wrong.”

Context of Preservation

Stobaeus’ section is titled “Censure of Tyranny” (Ψόγος τυράννιδος). Antisthenes’ anecdote appears near the end of the series of thirty-four excerpts.

Notes

τῶν τυράννων: These are likely to be the Thirty Tyrants of 404–403. (See t. 16.) Antisthenes might also rate as “tyrants” those who killed Socrates, who were officials of the restored democracy.

οἱ μὴδὲν ἁμαρτάνοντες: Compare the phrasing of Ajax (t. 53.1), ὑμεῖς δὲ οἱ οὐδὲν εἰδότες.

76. ps.-Maximus Confessor, *Common Topics* 9.77/80 (Ihm)

= 105 DC

[= Antonius 2.2.15 Migne]

ἐπισφαλές μαινομένῳ δοῦναι μάχαιραν καὶ μοχθηρῷ δύναμιν.

It is risky to give a dagger to a madman and power to a rogue.

Context of Preservation

This *apophthegma* follows t. 71B in ps.-Maximus, in the section titled “On Rule and Power” (Περὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἐξουσίας).

Importance of the Testimonium

If this *apophthegma* is correctly attributed to Antisthenes, it might suggest a relationship to Pl. *Rep.* 1 331d5–8 and to similar arguments in Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.17. Compare also t. 37.

77A. Plutarch, *On the Luck and Virtue of Alexander the Great* II.3 336a (Nachstaedt)

= 99 DC

ὁρθῶς γὰρ Ἀντισθένης ἔλεγεν ὅτι πάντα δεῖ τοῖς πολεμίοις εὐχεσθαι τὰ ἀγαθὰ, πλὴν ἀνδρείας· γίνεται γὰρ οὕτως οὐ τῶν ἐχόντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν κρατούντων.

Ἀντισθένης codd. plur. : ὁ Ἀντισθένης J S

For rightly Antisthenes said that one should pray for all good things for one's enemies, except for courage. For in this way [the good things] come to be possessed not by those who have them [now] but by those who conquer [the former].

77B. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 4.13.41 (Hense)

Ἀντισθένης. Ἀντισθένης ἔλεγεν ὅτι πάντα δεῖ τοῖς πολεμίοις εὐχεσθαι τὰγαθὰ παρῆναι χωρὶς ἀνδρείας· γίνεται γὰρ οὕτως οὐ τῶν ἐχόντων ἀλλὰ κρατούντων.

sine lemm. hab. S : addito lemm. hab. M A | πάντα om. S | εὐχεσθαι codd. plur. : ἔχεσθαι A | τὰγαθὰ codd. plur. : τὰ ἀγαθὰ M | χωρὶς ex χώρας corr. A | ἀνδρείας codd. plur. : ἀνδρίας A²

From Antisthenes. Antisthenes said that one should pray that all good things are provided to the enemies apart from courage. For in this way [the good things] come to be possessed not by those who have them [now] but by those who conquer [the former].

Context of Preservation

Plutarch argues that Alexander must have been great through the craft of virtue (τέχνη), not through fortune alone (τύχη). Resources such as arms, money, soldiers, and horses (τύχη) are a benefit to those who can use them, but they are a liability to those who cannot. Antisthenes' maxim is cited in support of this point. In Stobaeus, the maxim is cataloged under "Advice on Generals and Things Useful in War" (Περὶ στρατηγῶν καὶ περὶ τῶν κατὰ πόλεμον χρειῶν ὑποθήκαι).

Importance of the Testimonium

The testimonium, with its context in Plutarch, supports other testimonia showing Antisthenes' emphasis on the virtuous use of amoral resources. (See discussion at t. 34f and 187.4.) Here courage is an aspect of virtue, on a level above the other "good things," which are the amoral resources.

Notes

πάντα δεῖ τοῖς πολέμοις εὔχεσθαι τὰγαθὰ: Compare t. 132.

πλὴν ἀνδρείας: Possibly this indicates that courage is the chief virtue (compare t. 54.13). See also t. 123B, where self-control (σωφροσύνη) seems to get this distinction; compare t. 161. Contrast t. 78, where courage may be an indifferent resource and where only justice is good.

τῶν κρατούντων: The anecdote holds an optimism that the good and courageous parties will prevail over their enemies and take over their resources. The idea that people with vice corrupt or defeat themselves (t. 129, 54.13) seems to be latent here, in the enemy's lack of courage.

78. Xenophon, *Symposium* 3.4–5 (Marchant)

(4) "ἐγὼ μὲν τοίνυν," ἔφη, "λέγω ὑμῖν ἐφ' ᾧ μέγιστον φρονῶ. ἀνθρώπους γὰρ οἶμαι ἰκανὸς εἶναι βελτίους ποιεῖν." καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης εἶπε: "Πότερον τέχνην τινὰ βαναυσικὴν ἢ καλοκάγαθιαν διδάσκων;" "Εἰ καλοκάγαθία ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη." "Νῆ Δι'," ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης, "ἢ γε ἀναμφιλογωτάτη· ἐπεὶ τοὶ ἀνδρεία μὲν καὶ σοφία ἔστιν ὅτε βλαβερὰ καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει δοκεῖ εἶναι, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη οὐδὲ καθ' ἑν συμμίσγνται τῇ ἀδικίᾳ." (5) "Ἐπειδὴν τοίνυν καὶ ὑμῶν ἕκαστος εἴπη ὅ τι ὠφέλιμον ἔχει, τότε καὶ γὰρ οὐ φθονήσω εἰπεῖν τὴν τέχνην δι' ἧς τοῦτο ἀπεργάζομαι."

(4) πότερον D F : ποτέραν cett. | εἰ F : ἢ A : ἡ cett. (5) ὑμῶν Castalio : ἡμῶν codd.

(4) “Now let me,” he [Callias] said, “tell you of what I am most proud. I consider myself capable of making people better.” And Antisthenes said, “[Do you do this] by teaching a particular artisan’s craft or teaching [the] fine and good?” “If justice is [the] fine and good, [then by teaching that],” [said Callias]. “By Zeus,” said Antisthenes, “that much is indisputable. Since, of course, sometimes courage and wisdom seem harmful to friends and the city, but justice is mixed with injustice not even in a single respect.” (5) “Well, when each of you states what he considers useful, then also I will not begrudge telling you the craft through which I achieve this.”

Context of Preservation

Xenophon’s *Symposium* is structured around a cycle of speech making by the guests. In an initial round of short speeches (ch. 3), each diner states which of his resources is “worth the most”; in a second round (ch. 4), each explains his view in more detail. Antisthenes is assigned the role of first responder and cross-interrogator to both the brief proposals and the longer discussions of two speakers, Callias (see also t. 83A) and Niceratus (t. 185A, 186), who both are non-Socratics according to the careful distinction of the parties laid out in *Sym.* 1.2–3. (On the importance of this distinction, see Halliwell 2008:141–42.)

Importance of the Testimonium

Like other passages in the *Symposium* (t. 13A, 14A, 18, 51B, 82, 83A, 103A–B, 185A, 186), this passage contributes to the characterization of Antisthenes as an aspiring successor to Socrates who ultimately fails to achieve his goals. In having Antisthenes deliver the elenchus against Callias and Niceratus, Xenophon shows Antisthenes acting for Socrates: but Socrates intervenes in both cases (83A and 185A), which suggests that Antisthenes is unable to finish. This passage also attributes to Antisthenes ethical statements unparalleled in other testimonia. Patzer (1970:66–68, endorsed in Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposion*]: 183–84) doubted that they can be attributed historically, but the argument is from silence. Antisthenes wrote texts with ethical titles—*On Justice and Courage* (t. 41A title 2.4), *On Good* (3.1), *On Courage* (3.2), and *On Fine and Just* (3.4)—and we do not know what they said. Xenophon might be adapting Antisthenes’ statements to make them clear or even to make them paradoxical in the way of a protreptic, but it seems unlikely that he would fabricate them, unless he were offering a complete, recognizable reversal. This is plausible in t. 14A and 72B and possibly also in t. 13A, but here Antisthenes must have said more nearly what he is presented saying, not the opposite.

Notes

ἀνθρώπους . . . βελτίους ποιεῖν: Callias' claim to "make people better" echoes the claims of the Sophists, according to Plato in texts such as *Protagoras* (e.g., 319a–328d) which, like Xenophon's *Symposium*, is set at Callias' house (see also *Apol.* 25b3; *Meno* 70a1–3; *Hipp. Maj.* 283c4). Like Plato, Xenophon represents Callias as a good customer of the Sophists (t. 13A.62). On the Sophists' claim, compare also t. 170 (from Isocrates).

Πότερον τέχνην τινὰ βαναυσικήν: The term τέχνη is connected in Socraticism with secure knowledge, in opposition to a "knack" (ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή, *Pl. Gorg.* 463b4) or "divine gift" (θεία μοίρα, *Pl. Ion* 542a1–6; *Aesch. Alc.* SSR VIA 53); but it might fall short of being a "science" (ἐπιστήμη). (See Gill 2003:313 n.34 on *Phaedrus*; in *Rep.* 6 483d9, e.g., τέχνη and ἐπιστήμη are roughly equated; on Plato's early dialogues, see Wolfsdorf 2008 [*Trials of Reason*]; more broadly, see Angier 2010:13–35, 145 n.14.) Whether or not a craft of ethical wisdom exists is the central argument of Plato's *Protagoras*, and Socrates there doubts that it does; this is also Socrates' position in *Pl. Apol.* 19e–20c. See t. 13A.61 (containing the only other reference to τέχνη in Xenophon's *Symposium*) for the possibility that Xenophon is commenting overall on Antisthenes' own field of knowledge and its description as a τέχνη. Xenophon presents Antisthenes here expecting, by implication, that someone who can produce reliable results has a craft, for which the artisan's craft would be an analogy (as often in Socratic dialogues: see *Mem.* 4.2.2). Antisthenes does not, however, demand that teaching the good and fine, καλοκάγαθία, is practicing or teaching a craft: teaching this subject is the alternative to "some artisan's craft." Since Callias is elite, Antisthenes' proposal must anticipate this alternative answer. (Antisthenes, for his part, might have tried to make learning virtue accessible even to artisans: see t. 207C, 94B.) Meanwhile, Callias is well known as a consumer of teaching rather than a provider (e.g., *Xen. Sym.* 1.5, 4.62), and his claim to make people better was surely going to be a joke before Antisthenes seized it. He probably meant to rile the Socratics by implying that "better" men were wealthier men, and he made his teachers "better" by paying them well.

Εἰ καλοκάγαθία ἐστὶν ἡ δικαιοσύνη: "The fine and good" is the highest value for Xenophon's Socrates and probably for Antisthenes also: compare the equation of these predicates in t. 134s and 172a and their separate uses in t. 53.3 and 41A titles 3.1 and 3.4 (where καλόν is combined with δίκαιον). But these are common-language terms that have non-Socratic meanings, with reference to goods such as wealth and social status. To decree that they are the same as justice, as Xenophon's Socrates and Antisthenes do, is to revise their meaning. Such revision of evaluative terms seems to be central to Antisthenes'

project: see t. 134b, l, s, t and t. 3A–B and t. 102 notes; compare t. 187.6. Xenophon is often understood as an advocate of conventional, “gentlemanly” values (as his *καλοκάγαθία* is often translated), favoring wealth and social success over virtue attained through philosophy; but his interest in Socratic virtue is genuine. (See *Sym.* 8.3.) The *Symposium* poses a tension between the “virtue,” “pleasure,” “wisdom,” and “love” of the non-Socratic characters and those of the Socratics; in the end, it seems that the non-Socratics never understand or accept Socrates. But all agree that *καλοκάγαθία* is the highest good, and their disagreement is over what this entails. By citing a major Socratic thesis, Callias may be playfully inviting Antisthenes’ attempt to refute him.

ἀνδρεία μὲν καὶ σοφία ἔστιν ὅτε βλαβερὰ καὶ φίλοις καὶ πόλει δοκεῖ εἶναι: Together with the following clause, this is almost a statement that courage and wisdom are either relative virtues or amoral resources, since they can apparently be “mixed” with injustice. This seems to conflict with the absolute ethical statements often cited from Antisthenes (e.g., t. 77 and 156 on courage and t. 134 generally) and with the Socratic thesis that virtue is wisdom (e.g., *Xen. Mem.* 3.9.5), which Antisthenes’ Odysseus endorses in some sense (t. 54.13; see also LévyStone 2005). Instead of making justice equivalent to wisdom, Xenophon’s Antisthenes puts justice on a higher level and seems to equate wisdom with a resource like money. (See Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposion*]:183–85, discussing further conflicting and corresponding passages in Plato and Xenophon.) Here it may be significant that courage and wisdom only “seem” sometimes to be harmful: what seems to be the case need not be true, as Antisthenes says in t. 195. In the protreptic conversation Socrates conducts with Euthydemus (*Xen. Mem.* 4.2.33), wisdom seems to have harmed Palamedes; but this appearance might be corrected, for example, by the principle that the good man can never be harmed (a principle that Odysseus seems to cite in t. 54.6). Moreover, it is possible that the ethical certainty Antisthenes preached was based in particular individual beings and events, not in general kinds or classifications, and that recognizing the good depended on the expert’s perception, whereas any general statement could be refuted. (For Antisthenes’ favor of particular individuals, see t. 149, 53–54; compare the analogy of medicine and the minutely distinguished individual acts of hearing in t. 187.9–12.) If favor for particulars entailed aporia or polemic against general classifications, it might be confused with relativism, and Xenophon might have written this passage for the purpose of clarifying Antisthenes’ position, on a simple scale: the following statement about justice shows that Antisthenes recognized objective ethical truth, even while he used relativist-sounding puzzles as protreptics or puzzled sincerely himself over hard cases. In an earlier scene, Socrates and Antisthenes agreed to postpone

ethical controversies and difficulties (t. 103A) but then also agreed that the dancer's routine showed courage (t. 103B).

ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη οὐδὲ καθ' ἑν συμμίσγνται τῇ ἀδικίᾳ: It is possible that Xenophon is here defending Antisthenes' absolute ethics without Plato's theory of Forms, by attributing to Antisthenes a somewhat different position than he historically held on the distinction between amoral intellectual resources (e.g., the kind of wisdom Odysseus and Palamedes had) and moral virtue. This very difference seems to be explicitly erased in t. 187 (but interpretation there is controversial). Xenophon's Socrates calls justice fully separate from injustice elsewhere (*Mem.* 4.4.10). In *Rep.* 1 (335d12–13), Plato's Socrates presents an argument for a similar point, in a way that might point to the relevance of the Forms in this realm. Socrates argues that the "task" of justice is not to harm, just as the task of heat is not to chill and as the task of dryness is not to moisten: this is an account of the absolute presence versus absence of a single positive force, whose opposite is its negation. Because the arguments about heat and cold are so important to establishing the theory of Forms in *Phaedo* 103b1–e1, this argument in *Rep.* 1 would seem to be a pointer to Plato's theory of Forms, introduced later in the text. Antisthenes rejects the Forms, and Xenophon's silence about them might be less naive than is normally assumed. He might have embraced Antisthenes' Socraticism exactly because it lacked the metaphysics.

εἰπεῖν τὴν τέχνην: Callias is sure that his knowledge is a craft, consistent with the claims of Protagoras and the Sophists.

79. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.8.14 (Hense)

= 119 DC

Ἀντισθένους· ὅστις δὲ ἑτέρους δέδοικε, δοῦλος ὦν λέληθεν ἑαυτόν.

lemm. hab. M A : primam capitis Br : om. S | ἑτέρους M^d Br : τοὺς
ἐταίρους A

From Antisthenes: Whoever fears others, he eludes himself in his ignorance that he is a slave.

Context of Preservation

Stobaeus' brief chapter is titled "On Cowardice" (Περὶ δειλίας).

Importance of the Testimonium

The same ethical stance might be laid out more fully in the speech of Odysseus, t. 54.6–7.

Notes

ἐτέρους δέδοικε: The good man, according to Antisthenes' Odysseus, can suffer no harm from himself, from a friend, or from enemies (t. 54.6). Fear of death makes Ajax a coward (54.7).

δοῦλος ὢν: For “slavery” as an ethical metaphor in Antisthenes, see also t. 82.43, 41A title 3.5.

δοῦλος ὢν λέληθεν ἑαυτόν: Self-deception is important also in t. 54.7 and 123. The translation tries to bring out the syntactical parallel between others and oneself, both accusatives in the Greek: compare t. 54.6.

80. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.10.41 (Hense)

= 94 DC

[Compare *Anecd. Gr.* v.3 p. 473.14–15 (Boissonade)]

Ἀντισθένης· φιλάργυρος οὐδείς ἀγαθὸς οὔτε βασιλεὺς οὔτε ἐλεύθερος.

lemma hab. S M A : sine lemm. Boissonade *Anecd. Gr.* 3 p. 473.14 |
ἐλεύθερος codd. Stob. : ιδιώτης anon. apud Boissonade

From Antisthenes: No lover of money is good, either as a king or as a free man.

Context of Preservation

Stobaeus' chapter is titled “On Injustice” (Περὶ ἀδικίας).

Importance of the Testimonium

The connection between indifference to money and freedom is developed in t. 82. On kingship, see t. 41A title 5.1, 86.

Notes

φιλάργυρος: A lover of money is, by definition, other than a lover of wisdom, φιλόσοφος. Plato uses the verbal device of anti-philosophical φιλο-compound adjectives (and μισο-compound adjectives) throughout his corpus. For possible resonances in Antisthenes' literary remains, see t. 82.45 (φιλορηματώτερος), 197 (φιλοστέφανος). See also φιλόνικος in t. 72B. **οὐδείς ἀγαθὸς οὔτε βασιλεὺς οὔτε ἐλεύθερος:** The condensation of this excerpt probably contaminated Antisthenes' main point, to offer three coextensive descriptions of the ideal man (the good man, the king, and the free man) in his own vocabulary, denying each of these to the lover of money. In the text as phrased, the οὔτε . . . οὔτε . . . construction frames two alternative roles in which the lover of money is not good, as king or as not-

king. This structure motivates Boissonade's emendation of the transmitted ἐλεύθερος to ιδιώτης, "private man" (adopted by Decleva Caizzi). But then the symbolic reinterpretation of "king," from conventional association with ample money to "free man," is lost, and the saying loses its force. For the likely equation between true "kingship" (of oneself) and true freedom in Antisthenes' thinking, compare t. 82; see also Höistad 1948:201–4 and *passim*.

81A. Xenophon, *Symposium* 3.8 (Marchant)

= 117 DC

“Τί γάρ σύ,” εἶπεν, “ἐπὶ τίνι μέγα φρονεῖς, ὦ Ἀντίσθενης;” “Ἐπὶ πλούτῳ,” ἔφη. ὁ μὲν δὴ Ἑρμογένης ἀνήρετο εἰ πολὺ εἴη αὐτῷ ἀργύριον. ὁ δὲ ἀπώμοσε μηδὲ ὀβολόν. “Ἀλλὰ γῆν πολλὴν κέκτησαι;” “Ἴσως ἄν,” ἔφη, “Αὐτολύκῳ τούτῳ ἱκανὴ γένοιτο ἐγκονίσασθαι.” “Ἀκουστέον ἂν εἴη καὶ σοῦ.”

μὲν codd. plur. : μὲν γὰρ A : δὲ B | πολλήν codd. plur. : πολλήν ἔφη D F | τουτῷ codd. plur. : τουτῷ Mehler

“What about you?” he [Socrates] said. “Of what are you most proud, Antisthenes?” “Of my wealth,” he said. Then Hermogenes asked if he had a lot of money. And he swore that he had not even an obol. “Then you have a lot of land?” “Perhaps,” he [Antisthenes] said, “it would be enough for Autolycus here to cover himself with dust.” “We will have to hear from you also” [said Socrates].

Context of Preservation

This is Antisthenes' reply to the first question of the central discussion in Xenophon's *Symposium*, that of what is worth the most (t. 78). The explanation comes in t. 82.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes introduces his own greatest asset, his “wealth,” but leaves a puzzle about what this wealth could be, if not money or land.

Notes

ἐπὶ πλούτῳ: Hermogenes' questions will immediately make it clear that this is no literal wealth.

ὁ δὲ ἀπώμοσε μηδὲ ὀβολόν: It cannot be true that Antisthenes really had not even an obol: an obol was less than a day's wage, and in his longer speech at 4.34–43, especially at 37–40 (t. 82), he implies that he lives independently and takes jobs to support himself. If he has a house, he must also have land, as well as transient obols for his sustenance, which he gains not by farming

but through exchange in the city. The point must be that he saves no money and only sustains himself day by day. If the external reader knew already that Antisthenes was literally poor or that he emphasized a metaphorical wealth versus poverty of the soul, Xenophon intends only humor in playing out the point. For the uninformed reader (whom Xenophon probably targets also), the questions set up a puzzle about Antisthenes' "wealth." Although most of the speakers can be understood to introduce a "riddle" in ch. 3 (Körte 1927:23; Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposium*]:175–76), only in Antisthenes' case is an unsolved question explicitly noted (Ἀκουστέον ἂν εἴη καὶ σοῦ). Finally, by making the point of Antisthenes' material poverty so explicit, Xenophon could be marking a degree of license he takes in his own account, which need not be literally true about the historical Antisthenes and his lifestyle but might represent Antisthenes' thinking.

ἀλλὰ γῆν πολλὴν κέκτησαι: The adjective πολλήν could be a relative term whose meaning depends on the terms of comparison. In his "digression" on the philosopher's life in *Theaetetus* (172c–177c), which can be compared at points to Antisthenes' longer speech (t. 82), Plato's Socrates says the following of the philosopher's attitude toward land (*Theaet.* 174e2–5): γῆς δὲ ὅταν μυρία πλέθρα ἢ ἔτι πλείω ἀκούσῃ ὥς τις ἄρα κεκτημένος θαυμαστὰ πλήθει κέκτηται, πάνσμικρα δοκεῖ ἀκούειν εἰς ἅπασαν εἰωθὼς τὴν γῆν βλέπειν (And whenever he hears about land, tens of thousands of acres or even more, that someone has acquired them and owns an expanse amazing in size, he thinks he is hearing trivialities, since he is used to looking at the whole earth). See Plutarch's parallel (t. 81B). Alcibiades was known for his wide holdings in land, and an anecdote preserved by Aelian presents Socrates chiding him over his pride in the value of these holdings by presenting the larger perspective (VH 3.32 = SSR IC 34, maybe from Aeschines).

Αὐτολύκῳ τούτῳ ἰκανὴ γένοιτο ἐγκονίσασθαι: The middle voice of the verb refers to the athlete's practice of "dusting" himself after he has been oiled, so that he will have a good grip during his contest. (See Jüthner *RE* 11.2 [1922]: 1312–15, cited in Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposium*]:193.) How much is "sufficient" for Autolycus, the athletic victor and honorand at the party? Plutarch (t. 81B) takes this criterion literally. But surely the Athenians did not parcel land in plots just right for Autolycus to dust himself in or wrestle in. This is a joke about Autolycus' prowess as a wrestler.

81B. Plutarch, *On the Thesis That the Philosopher Should Conduct Dialogue Foremost with Rulers* 778b–c (Hubert-Pohlenz)

“σπείρω δ’ ἄρουραν δώδεχ’ ἡμερῶν ὁδὸν
βερέκυντα χῶρον.”

οὗτος, εἰ μὴ μόνον φιλογέωργος ἀλλὰ καὶ φιλάνθρωπος ἦν, ἥδιον ἂν ἔσπειρε τὴν τοσούτους τρέφειν δυναμένην ἢ τὸ Ἀντισθένης ἐκεῖνο χωρίδιον, ὃ μόλις Αὐτολύκῳ παλαίειν ἂν ἤρκεσε· εἴ σε δὲ ἡρόμην τὴν οἰκουμένην ἅπασαν ἐπιστρέφειν, παραιτοῦμαι.

οὗτος codd. plur. : οὕτως Θ : <οὐχ> οὗτος . . . ἤρκεσε; Pohlenz
| ἢ τὸ Ἀντισθένης ἐκεῖνο χωρίδιον, ὃ μόλις Αὐτολύκῳ παλαίειν
ἂν ἤρκεσε Wyttenbach e Xen. *Mem.* 3.8 : ἢ τὸ Ἀντισθένης ἐκεῖνο
χωρίδιον, ἢ μόλις αὐτῷ <γ> αὖ πάλιν ἤρκει Barigazzi sec. codd. | ὃ . . .
παραιτοῦμαι om. γ, lac. 30–40 lit. | εἰ δὲ σε ἡρόμην . . . παραιτοῦμαι Ω :
“locus lacunosus et corruptus” Hubert-Pohlenz

“And I sow a field as large as a twelve days’ journey,
Berecynthian land.”

[Aeschylus, *Niobe*, TrGF 158.1–2]

This man [Tantalus], if he were fond not only of his land but also of human beings, would have more gladly sowed a field able to feed so many than that little parcel of Antisthenes, which hardly would have sufficed for Autolycus to wrestle in. But if I were asking you to plow up and down the whole inhabited world, I reject this.

Context of Preservation

Plutarch argues that the philosopher should engage with kings: through one powerful person, he has the capacity to influence many. Virtue does not exclude worldly goods, and it is possible to associate with kings without becoming a flatterer. This passage is not tightly connected to its context, but the sense must be that there is virtue in a king’s abundant resources, if they are used for the common good, whereas there is no virtue if they are mere self-aggrandizement. Possibly the philosopher is also told not to try influencing the whole world but reach for only a substantial portion of it.

Importance of the Testimonium

Plutarch gives a negative interpretation to Antisthenes’ scorn for material wealth, as reported from his speech in Xenophon’s *Symposium* (t. 82): he was no king in the sense of providing economic goods for others. Plutarch might mean to say that Antisthenes’ conception of kingship is self-refuting: such a tactic is characteristic of his whole text. (See Roskam 2009:83–84.)

Notes

εἰ δὲ σε ἡρόμην τὴν οἰκουμένην ἅπασαν ἐπιστρέφειν, παραιτοῦμαι: Both the syntax of this final, corrupt sentence and its fit to context are difficult, but it

might add substance to the reference to Antisthenes. It is not impossible that there is allusion to something Antisthenes was known to have said, just as the previous sentence alludes to his speech in Xenophon. The speaker seems to place a limit on the amount of territory a philosopher should aim to control at second hand by influencing the rulers. ἐπιστρέφειν might continue the agricultural metaphor in Aeschylus' verses, by referring to the back-and-forth motion of plowing (a suggestion by R. Janko per litt.): this is the meaning translated here. It could also mean "convert," as it does elsewhere in Plutarch, at, for example, *Alcibiades* 16. (See also Roskam 2009:120, 179–80; Roskam would emend to yield a positive meaning for the ambition to rule the world.) A reference to ruling the whole earth could be related to Antisthenes' figure of Cyrus the Great. (See t. 86C.) Plutarch rarely shows detailed knowledge of Antisthenes: his most detailed information is in t. 195. This does not mean that he does not know Antisthenes' most famous fictions.

82. Xenophon, *Symposium* 4.34–45 (Marchant)

= 117 DC

(34) “Ἄλλ’ ἄγε δῆ,” ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, “σὺ αὖ λέγε ἡμῖν, ὦ Ἀντίσθενης, πῶς οὕτω βραχέα ἔχων μέγα φρονεῖς ἐπὶ πλούτῳ.” “Ὅτι νομίζω, ὦ ἄνδρες, τοὺς ἀνθρώπους οὐκ ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τὸν πλούτον καὶ τὴν πενίαν ἔχειν ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς. (35) ὁρῶ γὰρ πολλοὺς μὲν ιδιώτας, οἱ πάνυ πολλὰ ἔχοντας χρήματα οὕτω πένεσθαι ἡγοῦνται ὥστε πάντα μὲν πόνον, πάντα δὲ κίνδυνον ὑποδύονται, ἐφ’ ᾧ πλείω κτήσονται, οἶδα δὲ καὶ ἀδελφούς, οἱ τὰ ἴσα λαχόντες ὁ μὲν αὐτῶν τάρκοῦντα ἔχει καὶ περιττεύοντα τῆς δαπάνης, ὁ δὲ τοῦ παντὸς ἐνδεΐται· (36) αἰσθάνομαι δὲ καὶ τυράννους τινάς, οἱ οὕτως αὖ πεινώσι χρημάτων ὥστε ποιοῦσι πολὺ δεινότερα τῶν ἀπορωτάτων· δι’ ἔνδειαν μὲν γὰρ δήπου οἱ μὲν κλέπτουσιν, οἱ δὲ τοιχωρυχοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀνδραποδίζονται· τύρρανοι δ’ εἰσὶ τινες οἱ ὅλους μὲν οἴκους ἀναιροῦσιν, ἀθρόους δ’ ἀποκτείνουσι, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ὅλας πόλεις χρημάτων ἔνεκα ἐξανδραποδίζονται. (37) τούτους μὲν οὖν ἔγωγε καὶ πάνυ οἰκτίρω τῆς ἄγαν χαλεπῆς νόσου. ὅμοια γάρ μοι δοκοῦσι πάσχειν ὥσπερ εἴ τις πολλὰ ἔχων καὶ πολλὰ ἐσθίων μηδέποτε ἐμπίμπλαιτο. ἐγὼ δὲ οὕτω μὲν πολλὰ ἔχω ὥς μόλις αὐτὰ καὶ ἐγὼ [ἄν] αὐτὸς εὕρισκω· ὅμως δὲ περίεστί μοι καὶ ἐσθίοντι ἄχρι τοῦ μὴ πεινῆν ἀφικέσθαι καὶ πίνοντι μέχρι τοῦ μὴ διψῆν καὶ ἀμφιένυσθαι ὥστε ἔξω μὲν μηδὲν μᾶλλον Καλλίου τούτου τοῦ πλουσιωτάτου ῥιγοῦν· (38) ἐπειδάν γε μὴν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ γένωμαι, πάνυ μὲν ἀλεεινοὶ χιτῶνες οἱ τοίχοι μοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, πάνυ δὲ παχεῖαι ἐφεστρίδες οἱ ὄροφοι, στρωμνὴν γε μὴν οὕτως ἀρκοῦσαν ἔχω ὥστ’ ἔργον μέτεστι καὶ ἀνεγείραι. ἂν δέ ποτε καὶ ἀφροδισιάσαι

τὸ σῶμά μοι δεθηῇ, οὕτω μοι τὸ παρὸν ἀρκεῖ ὥστε αἷς ἂν προσέλθω ὑπερασπάζονται με διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἄλλον αὐταῖς ἐθέλειν προσίεσθαι. (39) καὶ πάντα τοῖνυν ταῦτα οὕτως ἡδέα μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι ὡς μᾶλλον μὲν ἡδεσθαι ποιῶν ἕκαστα αὐτῶν οὐκ ἂν εὐζαίμην, ἤττον δέ· οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ ἔνια αὐτῶν ἡδίω εἶναι τοῦ συμφέροντος. (40) πλείστου δ' ἄξιον κτῆμα ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ πλούτῳ λογίζομαι εἶναι ἐκεῖνο, ὅτι εἰ μού τις καὶ τὰ νῦν ὄντα παρέλοιτο, οὐδὲν οὕτως ὀρῶ φαῦλον ἔργον ὁποῖον οὐκ ἀρκοῦσαν ἂν τροφήν ἐμοὶ παρέχοι. (41) καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἡδυπαθήσῃ βουληθῶ, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς τὰ τίμια ὠνοῦμαι (πολυτελεῇ γὰρ γίγνεται), ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ταμιεύομαι. καὶ πολὺ πλεον διαφέρει πρὸς ἡδονήν, ὅταν ἀναμείνας τὸ δεηθῆναι προσφέρωμαι ἢ ὅταν τινὶ τῶν τιμίων χρώμαι, ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν τῷδε τῷ Θασίῳ οἶνῳ ἐντυχὼν οὐ διψῶν πίνω αὐτόν. (42) ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ πολὺ δικαιότερους γε εἰκὸς εἶναι τοὺς εὐτέλειαν μᾶλλον ἢ πολυχρηματίαν σκοπούντας. οἷς γὰρ μάλιστα τὰ παρόντα ἀρκεῖ ἥκιστα τῶν ἄλλοτρίων ὀρέγονται. (43) ἄξιον δ' ἐννοῆσαι ὡς καὶ ἐλευθερίους ὁ τοιοῦτος πλοῦτος παρέχεται. Σωκράτης τε γὰρ οὗτος παρ' οὗ ἐγὼ τοῦτον ἐκτρησάμην οὐτ' ἀριθμῶ οὔτε σταθμῶ ἐπὶ ἡμέρῃ μοι, ἀλλ' ὅποσον ἐδυνάμην φέρεσθαι, τοσοῦτόν μοι παρεδίδου· ἐγὼ τε νῦν οὐδενὶ φθονῶ, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι τοῖς φίλοις καὶ ἐπιδεικνύω τὴν ἀφθονίαν καὶ μεταδίδωμι τῷ βουλομένῳ τοῦ ἐν τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ πλούτου. (44) καὶ μὴν καὶ τὸ ἀβρότατόν γε κτῆμα, τὴν σχολὴν αἰεὶ ὁρᾷτε μοι παροῦσαν, ὥστε καὶ θεᾶσθαι τὰ ἀξιοθέατα καὶ ἀκούειν τὰ ἀξιάκουστα καὶ ὃ πλείστου ἐγὼ τιμῶμαι, Σωκράτει σχολάζων συνδιημερεῦειν. καὶ οὗτος δὲ οὐ τοὺς πλείστου ἀριθμοῦντας χρυσίον θαυμάζει, ἀλλ' οἱ ἂν αὐτῷ ἀρέσκωσι τούτοις συνῶν διατελεῖ." οὗτος μὲν οὖν οὕτως εἶπεν. (45) ὁ δὲ Καλλίας, "Νῆ τὴν Ἥραν," ἔφη, "τά τε ἄλλα ζηλῶ σε τοῦ πλούτου καὶ ὅτι οὔτε ἡ πόλις σοι ἐπιτάττουσα ὡς δούλῳ χρῆται οὔτε οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἂν μὴ δανείσης, ὀργίζονται." "Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί," ἔφη ὁ Νικήρατος, "μὴ ζήλου· ἐγὼ γὰρ ἤξω παρ' αὐτοῦ δανεισάμενος τὸ μηδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι, οὕτω πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ Ὀμήρου ἀριθμεῖν 'ἔπτ' ἀπύρους τρίποδας, δέκα δὲ χρυσοῖο τάλαντα, / αἰθωνας δὲ λέβητας ἐείκοσι, δώδεκα δ' ἵππους,' σταθμῶ καὶ ἀριθμῶ, ὡς πλείστου πλούτου ἐπιθυμῶν οὐ παύομαι· ἐξ ὧν ἴσως καὶ φιλοχρηματώτερός τιςι δοκῶ εἶναι." ἔνθα δὴ ἀνεγέλασαν ἅπαντες, νομίζοντες τὰ ὄντα εἰρηκέναι αὐτόν.

(36) οὕτως αὖ codd. plur. : οὕτω E (teste Huss) (37) ἔχων codd. : ἔχοι Nitsche | ἔχω Marchant : ἔχων A B G H¹ H² H^a | ἐγὼ secundum del. Cobet | καὶ ἐγὼ ἂν αὐτὸς εὐρίσκω codd. plur. : ἂν om. B : καὶ ἐγὼ αὐτὸς ἀνευρίσκω Winckelmann (38) ἔργον μέτεστιν vel ἔργον μέτ' ἐστι codd. plur. : ἔργον μὲ ἐστὶ A in mg. : ἔργον μέγ' ἐστὶ Jacob et Marchant : ἔργον μέ γ' ἐστὶ Bach | ποτε καὶ ἀφροδισιάσαι codd. : ποτε ἀφροδισιάσαι A B E G H¹ H^a (39) δοκεῖ primum codd. plur. : δοκοῦσιν

A B E H¹ | εὐξαίμην codd. : δεξαίμην Naber | οὕτω Mosche : τούτων
 codd. (42) σκοποῦντας codd. plur. : ἀσκοῦντας F (43) νῦν codd. plur.
 : νυνὶ F G H² (44) καὶ μὴν καὶ codd. plur. : καὶ μὴν H² | θεᾶσθαι codd.
 plur. : θεάσασθαι F G H² | ὁ Stephanus : οὗ codd. | οὗτος . . . οὕτως
 codd. plur. : οὕτως . . . οὗτος A B E G H¹ H^a

(34) “But come then,” said Socrates, “it is your turn to tell us, Antisthenes, how when you have such slender resources you are proud of your wealth.” “Because I believe, gentlemen, that people have wealth and poverty not in their household, but in their souls. (35) For I see many private persons who, while they have quite a lot of money, think they are so poor that they undertake every toil and every risk that might enable them to acquire more. I even know brothers who have inherited equally, but one of them has enough and more for his expenditures, whereas the other is needy of everything. (36) I perceive certain tyrants who, in their turn, are so hungry for money that they commit acts far more terrible than the most desperate people. On account of neediness, you see, some steal, others break into houses, and others take slaves. There are some tyrants who destroy entire households and kill in throngs, and often they even enslave whole cities for the sake of money. (37) I for my part actually pity such people for their excessively difficult disease. For I think they suffer in a similar way to someone who has a lot and eats a lot but never gets filled up. But I have so much that I can hardly find it even myself. Nevertheless, I have more than enough to eat to the point of not being hungry, and drink to the point of not being thirsty, and get dressed in such a way that outdoors I shiver no more than the very wealthy Callias here. (38) And when I go to my house, the walls seem to me like very warm undergarments, and the roof like very thick outer garments, and I have such a sufficient bed that even to get up is a job along with it. If ever my body needs also to make love, what is available is so sufficient that whichever women I approach welcome me in abundance, because nobody else wants to approach them. (39) All these things seem so pleasant to me that I could not pray to get more pleasure from doing them, but rather less. So much do some of them seem to be more pleasant than what is advantageous. (40) And I reckon the possession that is worth the most amid my wealth is this, that if someone should take away from me also what I have now, I see no job so base that it could not provide me with sufficient sustenance. (41) For whenever I want to enjoy myself, I do not buy the costly things from the agora (for they are expensive), but I manage a transaction in the shop of my soul.

And this makes much more difference toward pleasure, when I wait out my need and then take satisfaction, than when I enjoy one of the costly things: just as now I encounter this Thasian wine when I am not thirsty, but I drink it. (42) Furthermore, it is likely that those looking out for frugality are far more just than those looking out for enormous wealth. For those who are most satisfied by what they have are least desiring of the possessions of other people. (43) It is worth considering how this sort of wealth renders people free. For Socrates here, from whom I have acquired so much, supplied me neither by number nor by weight, but however much I could carry off, that much he granted me. Now I begrudge it to no one, but to all my friends I display my generosity and I share the wealth in my soul with anyone who wishes. (44) Furthermore, you see that the most splendid possession, leisure, is always my possession, with the result that I can behold the things worth beholding and hear the things worth hearing, and, what I value most, I can spend the day at leisure with Socrates. And he does not marvel at those who count out the most golden money, but whoever please him, he perseveres in associating with them.” So he spoke. (45) And Callias said, “By Hera, I envy you your wealth, both for other reasons and because the city does not use you as a slave, in setting its orders on you, nor do people become angry if you fail to lend.” “But by Zeus,” said Niceratus, “don’t envy him. For I shall come back after borrowing from him the power to need nothing, having been educated by Homer to count ‘seven unfired tripods, ten talents of gold, twenty glowing cauldrons, and twelve horses’ [*Il.* 9.122–23, 264–65] by weight and by number, since I never stop wanting the greatest wealth. Hence I might seem to some to be rather fond of money.” Then everyone laughed out loud, believing that he had spoken the truth.

Context of Preservation

This is Antisthenes’ explanation of the “greatest good” he has previously identified as his wealth (t. 81A). The purpose of the speech in Xenophon’s text is not primarily to present a biography of Antisthenes: we do not know whether Antisthenes was really poor or how he became poor if he was. Rather, it is a central piece in Xenophon’s ideological goal in the *Symposium* to show the superiority of Socratic values over conventional Athenian values. Antisthenes’ speech is connected tightly with the speech just before (*Sym.* 4.29–32), where Charmides has explained why poverty is his most valuable possession. Originally wealthy, Charmides lost his wealth in the Peloponnesian Wars (4.31); but his new poverty grants him courage, freedom, power over others, and credibility (4.29), because he is no longer a target for

thieves and sycophants. Antisthenes' speech presupposes the same ideas but adds positive value to freedom. The pairing of the two speeches is indicated also by the fact that these speakers reverse their speaking order from the third chapter (uniquely, apart from the placement of Socrates in last position: see Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposium*]:203), and Callias responds to Antisthenes' speech by wishing for the situation Charmides enjoys (4.45). Charmides' speech, in turn, is internally ironic, and this irony takes at least two forms. First, at the dramatic date of the dinner party, 422 BCE, Charmides was still a very wealthy young man. His property was confiscated seven years later, in 415, as a penalty for profaning the Eleusinian Mysteries (see Nails 2002:90–94). Second, Charmides compares himself to “a tyrant” in a positive sense (4.32), but in 404, he would become closely affiliated with the Thirty Tyrants and killed by the democrats in battle, a conflict that also took the lives of his fellow diners Niceratus and Autolycus, who were on the democrats' side. (See Huss 1999 [“The Dancing Socrates”].) Even though Xenophon's setting of Callias' party is chronologically impossible (Patzner 2010:232), this is unlikely to be the result of ignorance or sloppiness and is surely a tactic. The connection between Antisthenes' and Charmides' speeches, together with the ironies it holds, implies that Antisthenes' speech on his wealth is part of Xenophon's own ideological goal to criticize and revise Athenian values, with reference to the oligarchic revolution of 404–403, which is still somehow relevant at the time of writing, probably about forty years later.

Importance of the Testimonium

This is the most extensive evidence for Antisthenes' conception of the freedom and leisure of the philosophical life. It is outstanding for presenting an internal limit to the individual's pursuit of material wealth (an idea that may seem banal to us but that either Antisthenes or Xenophon strives here to develop: see Long 1996 [“The Socratic Tradition”]:32) as well as an internal limit, of a different kind, to the individual's acquisition of immaterial “wealth.” It is outstanding also for its overlap with Xenophon's portrayal in the *Memorabilia* of Socrates himself, who instantiates the virtues of αὐτάρκεια and ἑγκράτεια. (See Joël 1893; Caizzi 1964:95–96: the latter term does not occur in this speech and is used in the *Symposium* by only Charmides, at 4.15, and Socrates, at 8.27.) Xenophon is probably not quoting Antisthenes but attributing to him a speech composed from firsthand knowledge of the man and his writings, as well as, plausibly, from Antisthenes' image as generated in previous literature. (Such a source has never been proposed for this passage: contrast t. 13A.) This speech lacks the kind of humor and irony directed against Antisthenes in other passages (esp. t. 13A, 14A, 83), except possibly in the comments on *aphrodisia* in §38. (For this reading, see

Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposium*]:280.) The description of the philosophical life bears comparison with the speech attributed to Socrates in Pl. *Theaet.* 172c–177c, especially its notion of the philosophical “way” (175d7–e2): οὗτος δὴ ἑκατέρου τρόπος, ὃ Θεόδωρε, ὁ μὲν τῷ ὄντι ἐν ἐλευθερίᾳ τε καὶ σχολῇ τεθραμμένον, ὃν δὴ φιλόσοφον καλεῖς . . . (But this way of the other man, Theodorus, of the one truly brought up in freedom and leisure, whom we call the philosopher . . .). It seems unlikely that Xenophon would have borrowed from Plato’s texts and attributed to Antisthenes this or any of the other ideas in this speech that have Platonic parallels, because the parallels are imprecise and lack Plato’s more complicated associations. It is more likely that Xenophon represents points that were in fact closely associated with Antisthenes, of which some have parallels in Plato because Antisthenes and Plato shared a Socratic background and also participated in the same literary nexus.

Notes

(34) οὐκ ἐν τῷ οἴκῳ τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν πενίαν . . . ἀλλ’ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς: Antisthenes revises—indeed, reverses—the meaning of “wealth” by changing its realm from external to internal: compare ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἢ ἐν τῷ βαλαντίῳ as the possible locations for justice in Antisthenes’ question to Callias (t. 83). As the speech unfolds, other dichotomies, such as pleasures of the body versus pleasures of the soul, or one’s own asset or power versus that of another, emerge as structures relevant to this reinterpretation of “wealth,” and the house seems even to become a metaphor for the self. Xenophon presents Antisthenes as though he states a radical and original view, although the idea that true wealth is internal is commonplace, certainly in Socraticism (see, e.g., Pl. *Rep.* 7 521a2–4; Pl. *Phaedr.* 279c1–3; Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.9; Xen. *Oec.* 2.2). Xenophon might be exploiting Antisthenes’ fondness for simile and metaphor. (See t. 51A–B; compare t. 124.) Moreover, if this speech marks the central pivot in Xenophon’s text, where conventional ideas of virtue, wealth, beauty, friendship, and wisdom give way to Socratic ideas, a commonplace might receive special embellishment. The pair Charmides and Antisthenes, who are proud of their poverty and wealth, appear between the two other Socratic disciples, Critobulus, whose asset is beauty and who seems to have made little progress in becoming Socratic (*Sym.* 4.23–26), and Hermogenes, whose asset is friendship with the gods and who offers Socrates so little tension that he has nothing to teach him (*Sym.* 4.49).

(35) πάντα μὲν πόνον, πάντα δὲ κίνδυνον ὑποδύονται: Compare the purchase of friends at the price πρὸ πάντων χρημάτων καὶ πόνων in t. 110; on toil itself, see t. 85, 113, 126; on danger as a kind of expenditure, see t. 54.2, 54.9. Antisthenes begins his speech by discussing the pursuit of real

money, χρήματα, which can be collected at a certain price, toil and risk. For some, money has such great value that toil and risk have virtually none: the balance in the calculus of good against bad is missing, and the pursuit of wealth has no limit. In this image, money is clearly much more than a medium for measuring and exchanging other goods, but it is pursued as itself a good within the exchange network. Xenophon does not display this kind of criticism of money elsewhere: in *Oec.* 1.7–8, the function of money seems to be neatly reconciled with the Socratic value of usefulness; in *Mem.* 2.7, its importance is directly recognized. The charge that money has wrongfully become a good in its own right might, then, be part of the ideology of the historical Antisthenes. Gorgias (*Palamedes* §15) denies love of “wealth and money” (πλοῦτου καὶ χρημάτων ἐρασθεῖς) in terms similar to those Xenophon attributes to Antisthenes. Love and pursuit of wealth is criticized regularly in the Attic tragedies.

οἶδα δὲ καὶ ἀδελφούς: Antisthenes might refer to Callias and Hermogenes, half brothers who are both present at the banquet. Callias is extremely wealthy, and Hermogenes is extremely poor. (See Nails 2002:162–64.) However, these brothers did not inherit equally (according to Pl. *Crat.* 391b12–c4), and the *Symposium* does not otherwise acknowledge their relationship. Moreover, Antisthenes’ statement might appear to be a compliment to Callias and an insult to Hermogenes, the reverse of what one would expect (Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposium*]:271). But Callias was known for having squandered his inheritance by 390 (Lysias 19.48; Nails 2002:68), whereas he had been “the richest man in Greece” in 422: there could be irony. It is possible also that Antisthenes refers to a general pattern, available in poetry since Hesiod and Perses in *Works and Days* 37–41.

ὁ μὲν αὐτῶν τάρκοῦντα ἔχει καὶ περιττεύοντα τῆς δαπάνης: This is the first reference to a criterion for “enough,” that is, a balance between resources and expenditure. Variations on the term τάρκοῦντα occur four additional times in the speech (στρωμνὴν . . . ἀρκοῦσαν, §38; ἀρκοῦσαν τροφήν, §40; τὰ παρόντα ἀρκεῖ, §42; Σωκράτης . . . ἐπῆρκει μοι, §43), where the word and its usage are equivalent to αὐτάρκεια, or “self-sufficiency,” although that term occurs nowhere in the speech or in the *Symposium* overall. According to the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon’s Socrates strove foremost to make his disciples self-sufficient (*Mem.* 4.7.1) and was a model of self-sufficiency himself (*Mem.* 1.2.14, 4.8.11: see O’Connor 1994). Other words related to the concept of an internal limit that recur in Antisthenes’ speech are “need” (τοῦ παντὸς ἐνδεῖται, in the present sentence; δι’ ἐνδειαν, §36; ἂν . . . ἀφροδισιάσαι τὸ σῶμα . . . δεηθῇ, §38; ἀναμείνας τὸ δεηθῆναι, §41), “fill” (ἐμπίμπλατο, §37), “hunger” (πεινώσι, §36; πεινῇν, §37), and “thirst” (διψῇν, §37; διψῶν, §41). These have parallels in Plato’s versions of Socrates’ discussions of desire (*Lysis*

221a; *Gorgias* 496c–497d; *Rep.* 4 437d–439d), and they might be motivated originally from medical discourse (Holmes 2010: esp. 148–211). Antisthenes speaks also of exceeding such a limit, on the supply side: the first such term here is περιττεύοντα, and excess is later designated in the terms περίεστι (§37), ὑπερασπάζονται (§38), ἡδίω τοῦ συμφέροντος (§39), and σχολὴν ἀεὶ παροῦσαν (§44). Body-based pleasure is related to replenishing a deficiency, and the pleasure so experienced is itself subject to a limit (§38–39: this could be a joke). By contrast, soul-based pleasure seems not to have a limit, other than the soul's own capacity to experience the pleasure (§41–44).

(36) αἰσθάνομαι δὲ καὶ τυράννους τινάς: The term τύραννος occurs in the *Symposium* only three times, twice in this section and once, in a positive sense, in Charmides' speech (4.32), where it is marked explicitly as a simile for Charmides' current life. Generally in Xenophon, the “tyrant” is not a metaphor for a type of unbridled personality but a political figure who rules through power rather than persuasion. (*Hiero* may be an exception, but interpretation of that text is difficult. The suggestions of a personality disorder in *Hiero* could be true to memories of the historical *Hiero* rather than a type.) Among the fourteen other occurrences of words from this stem in Xenophon's Socratic works (*Mem.* 1.2.43–44 [four times], 1.2.56, 1.3.2, 3.9.12–13 [twice], 4.2.38–39 [twice], 4.6.12 [twice]; *Oec.* 1.16, 21.12), all are references to the political figure, and none are metaphors for a type of personality. At *Mem.* 4.2.36–39, where Socrates sets out to show his interlocutor Euthydemus that he does not really understand what wealth and poverty are, the discussion runs parallel to the first part of Antisthenes' present speech. At 4.2.38, Euthydemus responds to a question from Socrates in words that recall those of Antisthenes in §35 here: οἶδα [γὰρ] καὶ τυράννους τινάς, οἱ δὲ ἔνδειαν ὥσπερ οἱ ἀπορώτατοι ἀναγκάζονται ἀδικεῖν. Whichever passage is prior and whatever Antisthenes' role was as inspiration for either (see von Fritz 1935:34–40 for one model for interpreting such repetitions within Xenophon's corpus), the discussion in *Mem.* 4.2.36–39 addresses the literal class groupings in democratic Athens: Socrates has asked Euthydemus whether he understands what a democracy is (4.2.36). Consequently, we might assume that Antisthenes, too, speaks of tyrants who hold a certain unassailable power in the city, perhaps with reference to the Thirty Tyrants, whom Charmides' speech has just implicitly evoked. It turns out that these tyrants have “tyrannical” personalities according to Antisthenes' description, committing the same kinds of crimes as the tyrants in Plato's *Gorgias* and the ninth book of the *Republic*. (See next note.) But Xenophon depicts Antisthenes creating the psychological metaphor, not assuming it, as he might if he had borrowed the metaphor from Plato. A possible explanation for this is that Antisthenes did create or activate it freshly, in opposition to a positive image of kingship.

(Fifth-century tragic playwrights had depicted “tyrannical” personalities, and Thucydides’ Pericles had called the city itself a “tyrant” [1.122: see, generally, Morgan 2003]. T. 75 and 32 show signs of Antisthenes’ interest in real tyrants; see also t. 16.) In sum, the present passage uses the figure of the tyrant not to add color to a preconceived idea about the ungoverned personality but to illuminate, in a basic way, the nature and perhaps the origin of such a personality and its quest to hold power over the rest of the community. A view of competitive struggle as essential to living in a community might explain Antisthenes’ renunciation of community as the situation for attaining virtue and his turn to an individualist image of virtue and pleasure, such as it emerges in the rest of his speech. Such an interpretation goes beyond the evidence but is supported by the title *On Victory* (περὶ νίκης) attached to Antisthenes’ text on household management (t. 41A title 3.8), where he might have shown the absurdities entailed in running a household in competition with other households rather than on its own terms of self-sufficiency.

οἱ μὲν κλέπτουσιν, οἱ δὲ τοιχωρυχοῦσιν, οἱ δὲ ἀνδραποδίζονται: The combination of these three verbs has four parallels in Socratic literature: one in Plato’s *Gorgias* (508e3–4, where Socrates is explaining his special view of justice to Callicles), two in Plato’s *Republic* (1 344b4, Thrasymachus’ description of the advantages in living without justice, and 9 575b6, Socrates’ description of the tyrant’s life), and one in Xenophon’s description of Socrates’ difference from ordinary criminals (*Mem.* 1.2.62). Otherwise, it recurs in only two later writers, both authors who depend on Socratic literature: Plotinus (*Ennead* 4.4.31) and the fourth-century CE bishop Asterius of Amasea (*Homily* 1.10.2), who is clearly borrowing from the present passage in Xenophon and includes other Cynic motifs. The tyrant is an important figure in many discourses of fifth- and fourth-century Athens (Morgan 2003), but the language Xenophon attributes to Antisthenes’ description of tyrannical behavior is distinctive. It must come from Xenophon’s knowledge of Plato’s *Gorgias* or *Republic*, from a source common to these works (which could be Antisthenes: see t. 196 for another sign of his intertextuality with *Rep.* 9), or from the law code of Athens (as suggested by Xenophon’s words in *Mem.* 1.2.62). If the cluster of verbs were from the Athenian law code, one might expect other survivals. An origin in Socratic literature seems more likely.

οἱ ὅλους μὲν οἴκους ἀναιροῦσιν, ἀθρόους δ’ ἀποκτείνουσι, . . . καὶ ὅλας πόλεις χρημάτων ἔνεκα ἐξανδροποδίζονται: These practices are not typical of Plato’s tyrannical personalities in *Gorgias* and the *Republic*, and this difference shows the independence of this passage from Plato. Seizing whole houses was apparently a practice of the Thirty Tyrants (Lysias, *Or.* 12). Killing individuals is something the tyrannical personality in *Gorgias* wants to do, sometimes to get money (compare, e.g., 466b11, 468b4–5, 468e8, 470b2, 508d7), but

no one in Plato's works kills people in throngs. Enslaving whole cities might have been the work of individual tyrants in Sicily, but in Athens, it would have been the work of the Athenian state at war, under a general. Xenophon uses the verb ἀνδροποδίζεσθαι or its fuller form ἐξανδροποδίζεσθαι in his historical texts (e.g., *Hellenica* 2.2.16, 6.5.46) and in Socrates' conversation with Euthydemus (*Mem.* 4.2.15), where Socrates shows that taking slaves is not always unjust: a general might justly enslave a hostile city. Antisthenes may be referring to the acts of the Sicilian tyrants (compare t. 32). See also Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposion*]:273, arguing that ἀνδροποδίζεσθαι should refer to private acts of kidnapping, not enslavement of cities. But Demos. 1.5, for example, uses this term metaphorically for Philip's enslavement of the Olynthian fatherland, and the etymology does not restrict its usage to kidnapping. This implication of action at the level of nation-state might indicate that Antisthenes' ethical choice was motivated by the general culture of Athens. It might also be related to his use of a political metaphor, kingship, in ethics. These proposals assume that Xenophon is composing allusively and that the original audience had more knowledge of Antisthenes' ethical position and its explanation.

(37) **τούτους . . . οἰκτίρω τῆς ἄγαν χαλεπῆς νόσου**: Odysseus' words of diagnosis to Ajax (t. 54.13) can be compared. The disease here is a drive for getting more, similar to what Plato called πλεονεξία (*Gorg.* 508a7; *Rep.* 2 359c5); see t. 189B-1, 206. Ajax' disease is φθόνον . . . καὶ ἀμαθίαν, jealousy and ignorance, which could be related to the tyrants' disease but causes Ajax' pursuit of fine things in the wrong way rather than pursuit of too much.

Aphrodite is called a disease in t. 123, a more traditional trope. Antisthenes' "pity" must be ironic, since the tyrants are surely to blame for their own ailment, just as Ajax is responsible for himself, by Odysseus' account.

ὥσπερ εἴ τις πολλὰ ἔχων καὶ πολλὰ ἐσθίων μηδέποτε ἐμπίμπλαιτο: This clause is the climax of Antisthenes' description of the tyrant, before he turns to the portrait of himself, in an image that is possibly the kingly life. (No such term is used in his speech; but the Thasian wine he enjoys in §41 might be a pleasure of kings: see Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposion*]:284–85.) It is worth asking whether Antisthenes was the advocate of the Socratic "kingly art" (βασιλικὴ τέχνη) Xenophon knows, the practice of self-control resisted by the hedonist Aristippus in *Mem.* 2.1.17 and learned by Euthydemus in *Mem.* 4.2.11. The *Symposium* overall points to Antisthenes' mastery of some kind of craft or τέχνη (t. 13A, 78) and may indicate that he is interested in Homeric kingship (t. 186). See also t. 80, 81B; Höistad 1948:22–102; Brancacci 1990:80–83. The implication of this final statement about the tyrant is that no measure of "much" can be enough. (Compare t. 81A.) The infinite drive for more money is supposedly analogous to (ὥσπερ) the infinite drive for more

food: there is no measure of “full” for either. Antisthenes does not identify the causes in either case: these must be either human nature itself or human nature driven by certain social circumstances. Brancacci 1993:37 cites a “psychological mechanism regulated by the series need-desire-pleasure and destined by its very nature to continue to infinity.” This would be essentially an animal nature, at least as imagined in some texts (e.g., *Mem.* 2.1.4–5), common to the human who has not learned self-restraint. Pl. *Gorg.* 493c–494a implies, rather, that this might be a style of life deliberately chosen, τὸν ἀπλήστως καὶ ἀκολάστως ἔχοντα βίον (493c5–7). Nickel 1972:43 (in explicating the paradoxical infinite regress of “the useful” wealth in ps.-Pl. *Eryxias* 403e–404a) implies that Socrates’ point is to show the relativity of wealth to some external end (which is life or health in *Eryxias*). Evidence available from Antisthenes cannot determine whether animal nature or misguided reliance on the conventional world is the more important cause for moral ailment: in t. 54.13, Odysseus says that Ajax’ ailment is human nature (ἀνθρώπινον μὲν οὖν τι πέπονθας); Ajax is immersed in a conventional world of competitive virtue (t. 54.7,11), but he also resembles an animal (54.14). **περίεστί μοι καὶ ἐσθίωντι ἄχρι τοῦ μὴ πεινῆν ἀφικέσθαι**: The immediate difference between Antisthenes and the tyrant is that Antisthenes has an internal measure for what is enough, in food, drink, and clothing. The resources he uses to fulfill his needs are in excess of these needs (περίεστί μοι). He has not explained why these three needs are the fundamental ones, but they are presumably his needs for bare survival. So far, filling these needs has not been related to pleasure, as it is in Pl. *Gorg.* 496d–497a, but is merely an activity with self-evident necessity. The first references to pleasure in this speech, in §38, are related to Antisthenes’ house and his satisfaction of sexual need, and it is not said whether these are necessary or optional.

(38) **ἐπειδάν γε μὴν ἐν τῇ οἰκίᾳ γένωμαι, πάνυ μὲν ἀλεινοὶ χιτῶνες οἱ τοῖχοί μοι δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, πάνυ δὲ παχεῖαι ἐφ’ ἐστρίδες οἱ ὄροφοι**: The metaphor of walls as warm garments and of the roof as very thick outer garments comes as a surprise. The adjective ἀλεινοὶ is rare and apparently not Attic (Gautier 1911:166; see Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposion*]:278), although it is used repeatedly by Xenophon to describe the functional house (*Mem.* 3.8.9; *Oec.* 9.4). Xenophon is possibly attributing his own metaphor to Antisthenes because Antisthenes was known for generating simile (t. 51A), but it is not impossible that Antisthenes was his source, and it is plausible that Antisthenes really proposed the house—with its inner and outer assets, all of them functional—as a metaphor for the person or self (see also t. 124, 134u–v, 185B): compare his “stewardship” from his soul in §41. This description of the house as though it were luxurious apparel marks a turn in the speech toward the perceptions of plenty available to the man who limits his consumption to

satisfaction of need. In the second book of Plato's *Republic*, the first, simple city accounts for "necessities such as houses, clothes and shoes," but not for luxuries such as painting, embroidery, gold, and ivory (373a5–7). Antisthenes has alluded to his sufficient clothes in the previous sentence, where they prevent cold, but his first full reference here, through the metaphor, verges toward a statement of luxury. It is notable that the metaphorical clothing has two layers, neither of them minimal and both indeed ample, the warm χιτῶνες underneath and the thick ἐφεστρίδες above (possibly suggesting a soldier's cloak: Plut. *Luc.* 28). Although the walls and roof of the house constitute different sides of the house, the tunics and cloaks must be understood as layers. Contrast the later reports that Antisthenes rejects the two-layered dressing style: he was the first to double his τριβῶν (t. 22A), and he instructed Diogenes to double his ἱμάτιον (t. 34F). Here the point could be that Antisthenes needs no luxurious clothes in the real sense, because his house serves the function exceedingly well, by "seeming" to be a luxurious wardrobe. In §39–41, Antisthenes maintains control of his own *perceptions* of pleasure, luxury, and excess beyond sufficiency (οὕτως ἡδέα μοι δοκεῖ εἶναι, §39; οὕτω μοι δοκεῖ . . . ἡδίω εἶναι τοῦ συμφέροντος, §39; οὐδὲν οὕτως ὀρῶ φαῦλον ἔργον, §40; ὅταν ἡδυπαθεῖν βουληθῶ, §41). Possibly Antisthenes held the view that these perceptions admit of no objective truth or falsity but are merely appearances. Such a reasoned view about pleasure would be directly opposed to the position of the Cyrenaics, who held that particular pleasures and pains were the most knowable phenomena (Diog. Laert. 2.86–90) and hence the core of ethical action. For more possible evidence supporting this point, see t. 120.

ὥστ' ἔργον μέτεστι καὶ ἀνεγείραι: (See discussion of textual problems in Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposium*]:279.) If this text is correct, the lush bedding causes as its by-product nonproductive "work," that is, effort, a liability. "Toil" (πόνος), which elsewhere in the testimonia is an investment toward virtue (t. 85–86, 90, 134f), is markedly absent from this whole description of Antisthenes' lifestyle, although it is part of the tyrants' life (§35), where it is spent unwisely. Plausibly the more decorous Xenophon was not a fan of Antisthenes' doctrines on toil. On "work" (ἔργον), see also §40, where it is again a necessary remedy for a problem, not exercise productive of virtue. ἄν δέ ποτε καὶ ἀφροδισιάσαι τὸ σῶμά μοι δεηθῇ: The body is subject for its own sexual desire, differentiated from the subject for the other desires mentioned. This is an alienation not of the body simply, since it is also the body that needs food, drink, and shelter, but of the sex drive. Plausibly Antisthenes was famous for positing a double *eros*, one in a bodily subject and for a bodily object, the other in a soul-like or ethical subject and for a soul-like or ethical object; plausibly he never called *eros* of the body by that term but only called it *aphrodisia*. See further t. 14A, 123.

οὕτω μοι τὸ παρὸν ἀρκεῖ: The speech of Pausanias in Plato's *Symposium*, where love of the body is sharply divided from love of the soul, likewise emphasizes the point that any available object will satisfy the lover's quest (ὅτι ἂν τύχη, 181b1; ὅτι ἂν τύχωσι, 181b7). The neuter gender of "the thing available" for Antisthenes does not refer directly to genderless partners (as Hindley 1999:76 suggests) but assimilates this desire under the general rule that what is available is enough for every basic need: see the repetition in §42. For the Cynics, self-sufficiency in erotic matters replaces the sufficiency of any available external person: Diogenes of Sinope is self-sufficient in sex (Diog. Laert. 6.69) as well as minimally needful of housing (Diog. Laert. 6.23). For self-sufficiency in Antisthenes, see t. 100, 189. The persona Antisthenes presents never seeks or pursues anything related to basic needs, because it is already there, as a result of his previous planning. He directs all his quests to Socrates and the wealth of the soul.

αἷς ἂν προσέλθω ὑπερασπάζονται με διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἄλλον αὐταῖς ἐθέλειν προσιέναι: This statement contains a reversal of desire and quest. Although it is Antisthenes' body that needed gratification, the women at hand are sufficient because *they* are starved for gratification. The relationship becomes reciprocal, but in a negative (surely humorous) way: neither party is choosing or pursuing a partner, but both are taking the available option. ὑπερασπάζονται has a sexual connotation, "kiss beyond (adequate)." Compare the pun on Aspasia's name in t. 143A; the same compounded form is also in t. 34C-2, and a different compound is in t. 84C. A more positive reciprocity in courtship is implied in a saying attributed to Diogenes of Sinope (Diog. Laert. 6.72): ἔλεγε δὲ καὶ κοινὰς εἶναι δεῖν τὰς γυναῖκας, γάμον μηδὲν νομίζων ἀλλὰ τὸν πείσαντα τῇ πεισάσῃ συνεῖναι (He said that also women should be common, since he believed in no kind of marriage but the male who persuades mingling with the female who persuades). (On the text, see Schofield 1991:12 n.21.) A mutual exchange of gratification (χάρις) between the lover and the beloved is explained by Socrates in Xen. *Mem.* 3.11.2–3 (in an episode excerpted in t. 14B). See also t. 56 on the possible reciprocity of loving and being loved. If Antisthenes advocated for reciprocity, this would counter the dominant ideology of love as an activity with one active party and one passive party.

(39) μᾶλλον μὲν ἥδεσθαι ποιῶν ἕκαστα αὐτῶν οὐκ ἂν εὐξαίμην, ἥττον δέ: Antisthenes is referring ambiguously to all the pleasures of the body he has discussed, but chiefly to *aphrodisia*, discussed last. Presumably the pleasure with which he compares madness (t. 122) is sexual pleasure (see t. 123B), and presumably he would pray to have less of this because it overwhelms his rationality and compromises the ordering of the rest of his lifestyle. But he gives no such explanation here. In the concluding section of the speech (§39–44), Antisthenes explains further the positive pleasures and even luxury of his lifestyle, which he does not regret or pray to be diminished.

ἡδίω . . . τοῦ συμφέροντος: Antisthenes derives more than the full quantity of pleasure from his small resources, and some of his satisfactions “appear” even more pleasant than what is “advantageous.” If pleasure is a mental response to a state of the body and if this mental response is subjective, not objective, an appearance and not a truth, it seems that the pursuit of pleasure can be fixed not in its own terms but only in some other terms. Those terms are Antisthenes’ standard of “enough” for the body, here rephrased as “the advantageous,” as measured separately from pleasure. Contrast the measure of mental satisfaction in §43: for that, there is no external measure for “enough” separable from the desire itself; rather, the level of fulfillment is self-determined, however much the subject can carry. Presumably this desire is allowed to lack external, independent limit because it is good in itself, and there is no excess that could count as sickness.

(40) πλείστου δ’ ἄξιον κτῆμα: Here and again in §44, Antisthenes names as “possession” (κτῆμα) an abstract item, a creation of his own mind in thought about his lifestyle. In §44, the item has a name, leisure or σχολή, but here the “possession” is a fact about his system of values, expressed as a clause. Since these “possessions” are the elements of his “wealth,” Antisthenes’ wealth of soul must be the sum of all his ethical attitudes, tastes, and principles, as developed from his associations with Socrates.

οὐδὲν οὕτως ὀρώ φαῦλον ἔργον: Antisthenes refers to “work” for which he will be financially compensated in a way that sustains his food supply (τροφή). If no “work” is so “foul” that it must be rejected, this means that Antisthenes dismisses the ideology of decorum or honor that would make some jobs too menial for him. (See similarly the discussion of verse 311 of Hesiod’s *Works and Days* in Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.57 and Pl. *Charm.* 163a–c, with Wolfsdorf 2008 [“Hesiod and Others”]:1–3.) Hard physical labor is not obviously included in Antisthenes’ picture of acceptable work, since φαῦλον is a social term referring to suitability for elite persons rather than a strenuous quality, but neither is it excluded. In the anecdote of t. 136B, Antisthenes does advocate for a physically strenuous labor, climbing the Acropolis by the steep route: but the labor there is the direct mechanism, metaphorically, for attaining happiness, whereas here it is a means to secure an underlying condition, sustenance, necessary for the development of virtue. In the present scenario, Antisthenes develops his wealth of soul merely by spending the day with Socrates (§44).

(41) καὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἡδυπαθεῖσαι βουλευθῶ: Antisthenes speaks as though he decides when to experience pleasure, as a calculation or a shopping trip. This is supreme rational control.

οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς τὰ τίμια ὠνοῦμαι (πολυτελὴ γὰρ γίγνεται), ἀλλ’ ἐν τῆς ψυχῆς ταμιεύομαι: The metaphor of house for self is continued and extended,

as this house is located in a city with a marketplace. Because the house is self-sufficient, all good things are already there. The opposition between the “expensive” (πολυτελής) lifestyle offered in the Athenian marketplace and the “frugal” one (εὐτελής) becomes standard in Cynic discourse: see note on §42. On Antisthenes’ stewardship of his soul, which becomes a metaphorical wine vault or storage area for other luxury pleasures, compare t. 197.33.

καὶ πολὺ πλεόν διαφέρει πρὸς ἡδονήν, ὅταν ἀναμείνας τὸ δεηθῆναι προσφέρωμαι ἢ ὅταν τινὶ τῶν τιμίων χρώμαι: This principle, which Antisthenes seems to claim to have discovered, is commonplace in Xenophon and Plato, and similar statements are in Teles, Bion, and Cicero. See Long 1996 (“The Socratic Tradition”); Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposium*]:284. ὥσπερ καὶ νῦν τῷδε τῷ Θασίῳ οἴνῳ ἐντυχὼν οὐ διψῶν πίνω αὐτόν: Thasian wine might suggest the luxury enjoyed by a king: the comic playwright Hermippus, from the period of the Peloponnesian Wars, associates it with the gods (fr. 82 PCG). It survives as a token of luxury in later Cynic discourse (Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposium*]:284–85). At the party, Antisthenes indulges in a (harmless) luxury good before his base desire is ready, and he enjoys it. This is inconsistent with what he prescribes, but he is able to use what is available (ἐντυχὼν) appropriately, being in power over it and not allowing it to take power over him. If he resisted the wine, he would perhaps be expending active resistance for no gain.

(42) τοὺς εὐτέλειαν μᾶλλον ἢ πολυχρηματίαν σκοποῦντας: This corresponds to Antisthenes’ line of questioning with Callias (t. 81), where he appeared skeptical that justice is created by distributing money. The term εὐτέλεια is important in the later Cynic discourse of Teles and in the pseudo-Cynic epistles: see t. 206; compare t. 34C-1. The term πολυχρηματία is rare, occurring otherwise only in Philo of Alexandria, Favorinus, and Pollux’ list of words for wealth (*Vocabulary Book* 3.110, 6.196).

τὰ παρόντα ἀρκεῖ: This is the principle Antisthenes illustrated in §38, where this language was used of sexual needs.

ἥκιστα τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ὀρέγονται: This verb of desire is different from the need and lack of the body (δεηθῆναι, §38); it is an elevated desire, a mental appetite: see Arist. *Met.* A 980a21; compare t. 188B.4. The term ἀλλοτρίων evokes the antithesis οἰκεῖος versus ἀλλότριος; see t. 3, 152A–B; Brancacci 1993:43 n. 17.

(43) οὐτ’ ἀριθμῷ οὔτε σταθμῷ: The metaphor is drawn from the field of commerce in the marketplace and applied to the wealth of the soul in which Socrates trades. Since Socrates’ wealth is hard to measure objectively, its value depending finally on the person apprehending it, it is possible that this statement is connected to contemporary debates about “relativism.” The Hippocratic *On Ancient Medicine* §9 also rejects weight and number (οὐδὲ

ἀριθμὸν οὔτε σταθμὸν ἄλλον) as the appropriate measure (μέτρον) for how to treat a patient, appealing instead to the “perception of the body” (τοῦ σώματος τὴν αἴσθησιν). See Schiefsky 2005:193–200 for a discussion of this subjectivism in its fourth-century context, including comparison to Plato’s report of Protagoras’ doctrine, in *Theaetetus*, that “man is the measure.” See also t. 160.

ὅποσον ἐδυνάμην φέρεσθαι τοσοῦτόν μοι παρεδίδου: When it comes to wealth of the soul, the standard for saturation or sufficiency is determined by the soul itself. However much that unique soul can “bear” is just the right amount for it. (For the metaphorical sense of the verb φέρω in reference to the soul, compare t. 191.) The measure of wealth for the soul is circular, in a way, and arguably of a different kind than the measure of material wealth, which is defined by a balance or economy with objective needs. Compare Socrates’ closing prayer on wealth in Pl. *Phaedr.* 279c1–3: ὦ φίλε Πάν τε καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσοι τῆδε θεοί, δοιήτέ μοι καλῶ γενέσθαι τᾶνδοθεν· ἐξωθεν δὲ ὅσα ἔχω, τοῖς ἐντὸς εἶναί μοι φίλια. πλούσιον δὲ νομίζοιμι τὸν σοφόν· τὸ δὲ χρυσοῦ πλήθος εἴη μοι ὅσον μήτε φέρειν μήτε ἄγειν δύναιτο ἄλλος ἢ ὁ σώφρων (Oh dear Pan and the other gods, as many as are here, grant to me to be fine in respect to what is internal. And however much I have externally, [grant it] to be friendly to what is internal. And may I believe the wise man to be wealthy. And may I have so large a sum of gold as no man could plunder other than the temperately sound man.) Winckelmann 1842:50 n.1 connected this to Antisthenes; the connection is rejected in Patzer 1970:25. There may be a common Socratic background in this kind of ethical doctrine. Whereas Xenophon’s Antisthenes relocates true wealth fully to the inner person, Plato’s Socrates seems to make a prayer about literal, external wealth and to imply that the wise man sets his own limit of sufficiency to that. According to anecdote, Plato never renounced material wealth and luxury in a way comparable with the Cynics. (See t. 27 and notes.)

ἐγὼ τε νῦν οὐδενὶ φθονῶ: Throughout Plato’s works, the good teacher is supposed to share his wisdom without “envy.” Ps.-Pl. *On Virtue* 376d5–11 spells out the reason why an expert would “begrudge” sharing his expertise: if the craftsman spreads expertise in his craft too liberally, he creates rivals for himself in the city. Philosophy and the philosophical teacher, by contrast, aim to maximize expertise in their field, being good and just. There is no competition for these goods in the city, but the good man is better off if he has many colleagues like himself. Compare Diotima in Pl. *Sym.* 210d6, where, at the peak of his ascent, the student of philosophy “bears many fine discourses . . . and thoughts in [the medium of] ungrudging philosophy” (πολλοὺς καὶ καλοὺς λόγους καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖς τίκτηι καὶ διανοήματα ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ ἀφθόνῳ).

(44) τὸ ἀβρότατόν γε κτῆμα, τὴν σχολὴν αἰεὶ . . . μοι παροῦσαν: Antisthenes' most luxurious "possession" is not a possession in any material sense (the kind that could be literally ἀβρότατον) but a space in time, a thing one could even understand as a negative being. Leisure is the prerequisite for philosophy, but spending it on philosophy is an option not everyone takes, according to Plato's Socrates in, for example, *Apol.* 23c. For passages in Plato that advocate for good use of leisure, see Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposium*]:287–88. The longest treatment is in the digression on the philosophical life in *Theaet.* 172c–177c. See Brancacci 1993:43.

καὶ θεᾶσθαι τὰ ἀξιοθέατα καὶ ἀκούειν τὰ ἀξιάκουστα: We do not learn exactly which things are most worth seeing and hearing in this experience at the center of Antisthenes' philosophical life, but these things might take the position of "the fine itself" at the climax of Diotima's discourse in Plato's *Symposium* (210e5, 211e1–3). (See also Brancacci 1993:43, who, using Xen. *Mem.* 4.5.9–11, associates this pleasure closely with φρόνησις and ἐγκράτεια.) That they are aesthetic rather than purely noetic could represent the same difference between Antisthenes and Plato illustrated in t. 149. But the things worth seeing and hearing in this passage are surely different from those noted at the beginning of Xenophon's *Symposium* (1.10), where the term ἀξιοθέατα is used twice, in reference to the beauty of Autolycus and to the beauty of Callias when inspired by his love for Autolycus; that is, Antisthenes' things worth seeing and hearing are something different from the pre-philosophical kind of vision worth seeing, the beautiful young athlete.

καὶ ὁ πλείστου ἐγὼ τιμῶμαι, Σωκράτῳ σχολάζων συνδιημερεῦειν: Being with Socrates holds the position of highest value for Antisthenes, according to this formulation. This is the same position given to "the wealth of the soul" in Antisthenes' answer to the party question at t. 81A. Being with Socrates can be the same as the wealth of the soul insofar as Socrates is the source of the wealth of his soul, as Antisthenes must be implying. We have to imagine that after Socrates' death, Antisthenes will generate or maintain the wealth of his soul by himself, through his lifestyle and his activities of exercising soul and body. (See t. 160, 163.) But here Xenophon depicts him, at the climax of his self-accounting, as highly dependent on Socrates the man. On the tension between following Socrates the man and following a Socratic lesson or philosophy, see t. 14A.

(45) ὁ δὲ Καλλίας: Callias and Niceratus serially respond to Antisthenes, just as he responds to their speeches (t. 83, 186). Unlike Antisthenes in his response to each of them, they do not cross-examine him by question and answer; rather, he is allowed a long speech before they reply.

οὔτε ἡ πόλις σοι ἐπιτάττουσα ὥς δούλῳ χρῆται: This is one mode of Antisthenes' freedom, freedom from the liturgical requirements of Athens.

Callias is probably comparing Antisthenes' wealth to his own, conventional wealth, not to the position Antisthenes would hold if he valued conventional wealth. The latter possibility might imply that Antisthenes was otherwise a typical Athenian aristocrat, who had renounced his wealth by choice. (See t. 12C and 83B for this probably apocryphal tradition.) Charmides, who has just spoken in praise of his poverty, was likewise relieved to be free of his "slavery" to supporting the city (Xen. *Sym.* 4.32).

ἐγὼ γὰρ ἤξω παρ' αὐτοῦ δανεισάμενος τὸ μηδενὸς προσδεῖσθαι: Niceratus contradicts Callias' statement that Antisthenes' wealth will not be demanded for loans, while extending Antisthenes' metaphor. Niceratus can ask for a "loan" on Antisthenes' wisdom, which amounts to learning how to care less about money and luxury.

οὕτω πεπαιδευμένος ὑπὸ Ὁμήρου ἀριθμεῖν . . . σταθμῷ καὶ ἀριθμῷ: Because Homer, meanwhile, seems to emphasize the literal measurement of real wealth, Niceratus might learn from Antisthenes how to interpret Homer otherwise, as an advocate for frugality. (See t. 185A and 186 on the contest over Homer earlier in the text.) This might be a challenge to Antisthenes' ability to interpret Homer in conformity with his Socratic standards. (See t. 191 for an example of this.)

φιλοχρηματώτερος: This term, attested in Plato but not otherwise in Xenophon, must suggest a joke about alternatives to being a φιλόσοφος. Compare φιλάργυρος in t. 80.

83A. Xenophon, *Symposium* 4.1–5 (Marchant)

= 120 DC

(1) Ἐκ τούτου ἔλεξεν ὁ Σωκράτης· “Οὐκοῦν λοιπὸν ἂν εἴη ἡμῖν ἅ ἕκαστος ὑπέσχετο ἀποδεικνύναι ὡς πολλοῦ ἄξιά ἐστιν.” “Ἀκούοιτ' ἄν,” ἔφη ὁ Καλλίας, “ἐμοῦ πρῶτον. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ᾧ ὑμῶν ἀκούω ἀπορούντων τί τὸ δίκαιον, ἐν τούτῳ δικαιότερους τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ποιῶ.” καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, “Πῶς, ὦ λῶστε;” ἔφη. “Διδούς νῆ Δί' ἀργύριον.” (2) καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης ἐπαναστὰς μάλα ἐλεγκτικῶς αὐτὸν ἐπήρετο· “Οἱ δὲ ἄνθρωποι, ὦ Καλλία, πότερον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἢ ἐν τῷ βαλαντίῳ τὸ δίκαιόν σοι δοκοῦσιν ἔχειν;” “Ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς,” ἔφη. “Κάπειτα σὺ εἰς τὸ βαλάντιον διδούς ἀργύριον τὰς ψυχὰς δικαιότερους ποιεῖς;” “Μάλιστα.” “Πῶς;” “Ὅτι διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ὡς ἔστιν ὅτου πριάμενοι τὰ ἐπιτήδεια ἔξουσιν οὐκ ἐθέλουσι κακουργοῦντες κινδυνεύειν.” (3) “Ἦ καὶ σοι,” ἔφη, “ἀποδιδόασιν ὃ τι ἂν λάβωσι;” “Μὰ τὸν Δί’,” ἔφη, “οὐ μὲν δή.” “Τί δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀργυρίου; χάριτας;” “Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί’,” ἔφη, “οὐδὲ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἔνιοι καὶ ἐχθιόνως ἔχουσιν ἢ πρὶν λαβεῖν.” “Θαυμαστά

γ’,” ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης ἅμα εἰσβλέπων ὡς ἐλέγχων αὐτόν, “εἰ πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἄλλους δύνασαι δικαίους ποιεῖν αὐτούς, πρὸς δὲ σαυτόν οὔ.” (4) “Καὶ τί τοῦτ’,” ἔφη ὁ Καλλίας, “θαυμαστόν; οὐ καὶ τέκτονάς τε καὶ οἰκοδόμους πολλοὺς ὀρᾷς οἱ ἄλλοις μὲν πολλοῖς ποιοῦσιν οἰκίας, ἑαυτοῖς δὲ οὐ δύνανται ποιῆσαι, ἀλλ’ ἐν μισθωταῖς οἰκοῦσι; καὶ ἀνάσχου μέντοι, ὦ σοφιστά, ἐλεγχόμενος.” (5) “Νῆ Δί’,” ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, “ἀνεχέσθω μέντοι· ἐπεὶ καὶ οἱ μάντιες λέγονται δήπου ἄλλοις μὲν προαγορεύειν τὸ μέλλον, ἑαυτοῖς δὲ μὴ προορᾶν τὸ ἐπιόν.” οὔτος μὲν δὴ ὁ λόγος ἐνταῦθα ἔληξεν.

(1) τοὺς ἀνθρώπους G : τῶν ἀνθρώπων codd. plur. (3) ἡ Marchant : ἡ codd. plur. | Τί δὲ . . . χάριτας; sic interpunxit Huss (4) μισθωταῖς Portus : μισθῶ αὐταῖς vel αὐτὰς vel αὐτοῖς codd. (5) προαγορεύειν codd. plur. : προσαγορεύειν B D

(1) Here Socrates said, “Well, it would remain for us to demonstrate how the things we respectively have supported are worth a lot.” “Please listen to me first,” said Callias. “For in the time I listen to you puzzling over what the just is, in this very time I make people more just.” And Socrates said, “How, my fine man?” “By giving them money, by Zeus.” (2) And Antisthenes jumped up and asked him in a very confrontational way, “Do you think, Callias, that people have the just in their souls or in their purse?” “In their souls,” he said. “And then you make them more just in their souls by giving money to their purse?” “Yes indeed.” “How?” “Because since they know that they have the resources from which they will be able to buy their provisions, they do not want to take the risk of crime.” (3) “And do they also pay back to you whatever they take?” “By Zeus,” he said, “surely not.” “What then [do they give you back] for the money? Gratitude?” “No, by Zeus,” he said, “not this either, but some in fact hold more hostility toward me than before they got the money.” “It is marvelous indeed,” said Antisthenes, glaring at him as though he were refuting him, “if you are able to make them just toward others, but not toward yourself.” (4) “And how is this marvelous?” said Callias. “Don’t you see many builders and architects who produce houses for many other people, but are not able to produce them for themselves, but they live in rented houses? And lay off, then, you Sophist, since you’ve been refuted.” (5) “By Zeus,” said Socrates, “let him definitely lay off. Since also prophets, of course, are said to foretell the future for others, but for themselves not to see in advance what is coming.” And this discussion stopped there.

Context of Preservation

This is the beginning of the second round of speeches in Xenophon's *Symposium*, where each speaker defends his identification of his most valuable asset. Just as Callias was the first symposiast to identify his asset (t. 78), so he is the first to explain. Compare t. 13A, 82, 185A, 186.

Importance of the Testimonium

This image of Antisthenes as an aggressive interrogator, who fails to refute his interlocutor and gets refuted himself, dominated early studies of Xenophon's interest in Antisthenes, which focused on his personality. See Zambynski 1921/22; Körte 1927; von Fritz 1935; Patzer 1970:87–90 (including a review of the previous); Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposion*]:204–11. It is possible, however, that Xenophon's main goal was not to represent Antisthenes' personality but to represent him as a poor substitute for Socrates as teacher. The issues Antisthenes raises with Callias are similar to those he addresses in his own speech on wealth (t. 82), where, however, they are embedded in his lifestyle, not formulated as principles being taught. Xenophon presents Socrates endorsing these same principles elsewhere (*Mem.* 4.2.9, cited in Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposion*]:204).

Notes

(1) ἐν τῷ χρόνῳ ᾧ ὑμῶν ἀκούω . . . , ἐν τούτῳ δικαιότερους . . . ποιῶ: This is a joke against the Socratics: compare Isocrates in *Against the Sophists* 1 (t. 170).

Διδούς νῆ Δι' ἀργύριον: Whereas Callias had played along with the Socratics in his first introduction of his asset (t. 78), he here cuts right to the issue, challenging them to refute him.

(2) ὁ Ἀντισθένης ἐπαναστὰς μάλα ἐλεγκτικῶς: This is supposed to be humorous, but not necessarily at Antisthenes' expense: compare the phrase μάλα ἐσπουδακῶτι τῷ προσώπῳ, said of Socrates at 2.17 and similarly at 3.10 (Huss 1999 ["The Dancing Socrates"]:387). These are dramatic signals that compensate for the prose medium, where there is no stage or visual presentation. Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposion*]:205 compares Plato's portrayal of Thrasymachus at *Rep.* 336b. The humor is turned against Antisthenes when he takes himself seriously (compare ἅμα εἰσβλέπων ὡς ἐλέγχων αὐτόν below).

πότερον ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἢ ἐν τῷ βαλαντίῳ τὸ δίκαιόν σοι δοκοῦσιν ἔχειν: The opening statement of Antisthenes' own account of his wealth (t. 82) sets out the same opposition, except that "houses" is substituted for "wallet."

(3) Ἡ καὶ σοι . . . ἀποδιδόασιν ὃ τι ἂν λάβῃσι: The Socratic view of wealth,

as Xenophon presents it, is that wealth is any resource one knows how to use so as to turn it to one's own profit. (See Gray 1992:73, citing *Oec.* 1.1–12 as well as passages in Xenophon's *Symposium*; see also ps.-Pl. *Eryxias* 403a1–b5.) Antisthenes expects that Callias' wealth must produce something good for himself.

ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀργυρίου χάριτας: On gratitude as a currency of exchange that must be recognized, see t. 13A.63, 56.

(4) **τέκτονάς τε καὶ οἰκοδόμους:** Callias appears to refute Antisthenes through this parallel to experts who help others but not themselves. Possibly this is the self-irony of the aristocrat, who thinks he has a unilateral relationship with society as its benefactor. (See Patzer 1970:71.)

(5) **καὶ ἀνάσχου μέντοι, ὦ σοφιστά, ἐλεγχόμενος:** Callias' address to Antisthenes as "Sophist" agrees with statements elsewhere in the *Symposium* (t. 13A.62–63) that he knows the Sophists and matches them with appropriate clients. The accusation that he has been refuted (*ἐλεγχόμενος*) turns against Antisthenes the situation he probably aims to produce for Callias (and Niceratus; compare t. 185A, 186). Later in the text, Callias teases Antisthenes for his tendency to be the refuter (t. 101A).

ἀνεχέσθω μέντοι: Socrates' endorsement of Callias' scolding might be part of Xenophon's depiction of Antisthenes' "harsh" personality (Huss 1999 [*Xenophons Symposion*]:210, following the scholarly tradition cited above). It might also show that Socrates is still functioning as Antisthenes' teacher, whom Antisthenes still needs.

καὶ οἱ μάντις: For Plato, prophets are not a positive example of the expert: see *Gorg.* 511c–512b and *Lach.* 195c–196a, where he states that even if they can foresee the future, they cannot tell what is best. There is no evidence for Antisthenes, but compare t. 178. Possibly this is Xenophon's irony for Socrates' inability to see what was coming for him.

83B. Jerome, *Letters* 66.8.3 (Hilberg)

et tamen non est satis perfecto et consummato viro opes contemnere, pecuniam dissipare et proiecere, quod in momento et perdi et inveniri potest. fecit hoc Crates Thebanus, fecit Antisthenes, fecerunt plurimi, quos vitiosissimos legimus.

And yet it is not enough for a perfected and fulfilled man to scorn wealth, to destroy his money and throw it out, wealth that can be both lost and found in an instant. Crates of Thebes did this; Antisthenes did it; very many have done it, and them we call most base.

Context of Preservation

This letter (written in 397 CE) is addressed to Pammachius, a Roman senator who had become a monk after the death of his wife. The passage on wealth comes in the middle of the letter, where Jerome urges that despising wealth is not enough for virtue.

Importance of the Testimonium

Probably Jerome assimilates Antisthenes to Crates for voluntary renunciation of wealth; his is the only such account. (See also t. 12C.) On Crates, see Diog. Laert. 6.87. The text overall scolds Antisthenes and Crates for a wrong application of their disregard for wealth, which is not a vice or virtue in itself but only part of the social system. Compare t. 81B.

Cyrus, Heracles, and Ethics

testimonia 84–99

84A. Cicero, *Letter to Atticus* 12.38.5 (Shackleton Bailey)

= 13 DC

Κυρσᾶς mihi sic placuit, ut cetera Antisthenis, hominis acuti magis quam eruditi.

KΥΡΣΑΣ *codd.* : †KΥΡΣΑΣ† *Decleva Caizzi* :
Κῦρος δ', ε' *Bosius* : Κῦρος β' *Kasten*

Kyrsas pleased me just as the other writings of Antisthenes, a man more intelligent than learned.

Context of Preservation

This is a concluding sentence in a letter to Atticus, dated 7 May 45 BCE, concerning Cicero's state of mind following the death of his daughter Tullia in February and his efforts to purchase land for a shrine. The reference to Antisthenes has no explicit connection to the rest of the letter. Possibly Atticus had sent Cicero the copies of Antisthenes' texts.

Importance of the Testimonium

This is the clearest surviving evidence for Antisthenes' readership in republican Rome and the clearest testimony whatsoever that Antisthenes' works were read. (See also t. 184.) If the manuscript reading Κυρσᾶς is retained and not emended to Κῦρος, it is central evidence for the hypothesis that Antisthenes was the author of the *Kyrsas* story, as attested in the *Suda* (t. 84B). Accepting the emendation Κῦρος β', Shackleton Bailey (1966 v.5:331) follows an old assumption that Cicero was reading the second *Cyrus* (in the fifth *tomos*) of Antisthenes in preparation for a letter of political advice to Caesar (which is mentioned in a letter written two days later). But Cicero implies that he has read several works by Antisthenes, and this reading could have been related to his ongoing philosophical compositions, in which Antisthenes is cited, if rarely (see t. 121, 180A; Müller 1995). For the many

works composed in 45 BCE (such as t. 180A), it seems clear that Cicero used doxographical sources: plausibly Atticus tried to supply him with some of the original material. Or, if Antisthenes' *Κυρσᾶς* was a consolation after the death of Socrates (so Brancacci 2003:266 n.25), Cicero might have been reading the full corpus of consolation literature in preparation for writing his own (now lost) *Consolatio* for Tullia. Brancacci proposes that the text to which Cicero refers was in the seventh *tomos* and had the double title *On Things in Hades, or Kyrzas*, from which the second title was dropped in the catalog. A slight emendation of a title in the tenth *tomos* seems to be the more likely solution: see t. 41A title 10.3.

Notes

Κυρσᾶς: Scholars have assumed that Cicero refers to one of Antisthenes' Cyrus texts, which were renowned (t. 85–87). However, the reading in all manuscripts is ΚΥΡΣΑΣ, in capital Greek letters, except for one report from a lost manuscript by the humanist scholar Bosius: this variant is κυρβας, an easy mistake for κυρσας. *Kūpos* would have been the easier reading for the unknown proper name, and the fact that no ancient copyist transmits this variant, which was first proposed by the same Bosius in an edition of the early sixteenth century, weighs against the likelihood that this was Cicero's text. Wilamowitz 1922:27 n.2 notes that Cicero would not have written the name "Cyrus" in Greek letters. On Bosius, see Shackleton Bailey 1965 v.1:93. On the range of conjectures, see Patzer 1970:153–54, who argues for the manuscript reading (endorsed also by Müller 1995:249).

hominis acuti magis quam eruditi: This characterization from the highly literate Cicero fits with the impression given in the *apophthegmata* and anecdotes in Diogenes Laertius' biography and suggests that Antisthenes' writing (possibly like his behavior: see t. 14A) made its impact in small-scale points rather than comprehensive accounts. The adjectives are descriptive of Antisthenes' mind sooner than his writing style. The adjective *eruditus* might seem an unlikely label for the author of consolation literature and more appropriate to topics on which one could be learned, such as the life of Cyrus or political history. But the supernaturalism in the story of Kyrzas as it is preserved in the *Suda* (t. 84B), if this is what Cicero read, could have caused such a judgment. *Acutus* seems to be a positive judgment, and perhaps Antisthenes is intelligent or shrewd at evoking or controlling emotional response. For *acutus* used of intelligent thoughts (*sententiae*), see *De or.* 3.223; for its use in the field of emotion, especially anger, see *De or.* 3.216–17.

84B. *Suda*, no. Σ.829 “Socrates” (Adler)

(SSR ID 3)

Κυρσᾶς δέ τις ὄνομα, Χίος τὸ γένος, ὡς συνεσόμενος ἦλθε Σωκράτει·
 ᾧ καθευδήσαντι παρὰ τὸν τάφον ὄναρ ὀφθείς ὠμίλησεν. ἀπέπλευσε δὲ
 εὐθύς ἐκεῖνος, τοῦτο μόνον ἀπολαύσας τοῦ φιλοσόφου.

ὄνομα codd. plur. : τοῦνομα G | τὸ γένος ὡς codd. plur. : ὅς V |
 παρὰ codd. plur. : περὶ V M¹ (sed corr. altera manus) | codd. plur. : καὶ
 εὐθύς ἐκεῖνος ἀπέπλευσε V

A certain man, Kyrzas by name, Chian by birth, came [to Athens] to
 associate with Socrates. While he was sleeping next to the tomb, a
 vision in a dream kept company with him. And he sailed home right
 away, having had only this benefit of the philosopher.

Context of Preservation

The anecdote is the final passage in the *Suda*’s lengthy biography of Socrates,
 which concludes with anecdotes about his persecution, trial, and death.

Importance of the Testimonium

The text is included speculatively, because there is reasonable probability that
 Antisthenes was author of the Kyrzas story. (See t. 84A.) The *Suda*’s sources
 for all other anecdotes in the first life of Socrates (entry Σ.829) are extant
 fifth- and fourth-century Athenian literature. A forged text from a later time
 is not impossible as the source for this anecdote, but the parallels point to a
 lost Socratic dialogue from the original cycle. If the source was an older text,
 Antisthenes is a plausible candidate for author because of the associations
 with other evidence from him. Aeschines can also be related to this evidence.

Notes

Κυρσᾶς: Patzer 1970:155, most recently, points to the exact resemblance
 between this name and the title transmitted in Cicero’s letter (t. 84A). Dittmar
 (1912:71 n.14), Wilamowitz (1922 v.2:27 n.2), and Brancacci (2003) have
 endorsed the identification, most declaring strongly for no other possible
 conclusion. On the Chian form and accentuation of the name, see Dittmar
 1912:63 n.63.

ὡς συνεσόμενος ἦλθε Σωκράτει: There is a range of evidence for stories about
 young men coming to Athens to associate with Socrates, then learning, too
 late, of his death (Dittmar 1912:62–64). Libanius’ *Apology of Socrates* 174
 offers a parallel, as does the letter of the anonymous Socratic printed as t.
 84C. Dittmar attributes transmission of the story pattern to Lysias’ defense of

Socrates because it was a source for Libanius. But we have little knowledge of Libanius' sources overall (Russell 1996).

συνεσόμενος/ὠμίλησεν: The verbs σύνειμι and ὠμιλέω are used frequently of associating with Socrates, and οἱ συνόντες is used of his followers or disciples. See, e.g., Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.8; Pl. *Apol.* 25e. The terms occur frequently in the remnants of Antisthenes. See t. 187.6, 22A, 100A.

ὄναρ ὀφθείς: Dittmar 1912:64 attributes the supernatural quality of this detail, shared with the *Theages* attributed to Plato, to “the circle of Heraclides of Pontus.” But supporting detail for this hypothesis is lacking. There is little evidence for what Antisthenes, for his part, would have said about dreams and visions: the only vestige of evidence is his commentary on *Il.* 23.65, Achilles' vision of Patroclus' ghost (t. 193), which takes place in the fictive world of Homer, not in real life. Plato's *Phaedo*, featuring a conversation at which Antisthenes is said to be present, is the best available frame of reference for what Antisthenes might have thought about survival of the soul after death. Individual theses, which include the visibility of ghosts among the tombs (81c4–d4) as well as the complete separation of soul from body (with its three proofs, 70c4–77d5, 78b4–84b8, 102a10–107b10), are represented there as controversial.

84C. Letters of the Socratics, no. 17.3 (Köhler)

(not in SSR)

κίνησε δὲ αὐτοὺς μάλιστα καὶ τὸ τοῦ νεανίσκου τοῦ Λακεδαιμονίου πάθος. ἦκε γάρ τις κατ' ἔρωτα Σωκράτους συγγενέσθαι αὐτῷ, μὴ προειδώς Σωκράτην, ἀλλ' ἀκούων περὶ αὐτοῦ. ὡς δὲ ἡδομένῳ αὐτῷ τῆς ἀφίξεως ὄντι ἤδη περὶ τὰς πύλας τοῦ ἄστεος προσηγγέλη ὅτι Σωκράτης, πρὸς ὃν ἐληλύθοι, τεθνήκοι, ἐς μὲν τὴν πύλην οὐκέτι εἰσῆλθε, διαπυθόμενος δὲ ὅπου εἶη ὁ τάφος, προσελθὼν διελέγετο τῇ στηλῇ καὶ ἐδάκρυε. καὶ ἐπειδὴ νύξ κατέλαβεν αὐτόν, κοιμηθεὶς ἐπὶ τοῦ τάφου, ὀρθρου πολλοῦ φιλήσας τὴν ἐπικειμένην αὐτῷ κόνιν, πολλὰ δὲ περιασπασάμενος πάσῃ φιλότῃ ὥχετο ἀπὼν Μέγαράδε.

προσηγγέλη Hercher : προσηγγέλη P : προσαγγέλλεται Allatius |
περιασπασάμενος Köhler : περισπασάμενος P

And they [the Athenians] were motivated very much also by the experience of the young man from Lacedaemon. For a certain young man came because of love for Socrates to associate with him, not knowing Socrates beforehand, but hearing about him. But just as he was arriving at the gates of the city and was feeling glad at his arrival, it was announced to him that Socrates, to whom he had come, was

dead. And so he did not after all enter the gate, but he inquired where the tomb was, and he went there and held conversation with the gravestone and cried. And when night overtook him, he lay down on the tomb, and during the long hours before dawn kissed the dust lying upon it. And after embracing it very much in full affection, he went away toward Megara.

Context of Preservation

This is a fictional letter from the collection of the Socratics, composed probably around 200 CE. (See, further, t. 206.) The fictional writer is unidentified, uniquely among the twenty-six Socratic letters. Its addressee is a person in Chios who used to argue with Socrates, alongside Prodicus and Protagoras, about virtue, “where it came about and how it came about and that it was necessary for everyone to aim for it.” The purpose of the letter is to inform this addressee of the Athenians’ prosecution of Anytus and Meletus, which tradition credited to Antisthenes (t. 21). Upon learning of the episode narrated here, the Athenians became ashamed that Socrates was appreciated so much by a Spartan, whereas they had failed to keep him, and so they sought a scapegoat for Socrates’ execution. Like the other pseudo-Socratic letters, this one is probably a clever recombination of details, mimicking features and content in genuine Socratic literature, but not necessarily loyal to any single source. If the addressee is supposed to be someone definite and recognizable from extant Socratic literature, the most likely candidate is Dionysodorus of Chios and Thurii, one of the eristic brothers in Plato’s *Euthydemus*, who also appears at *Xen. Mem.* 3.1. (See Nails 2002:136–37.) Sykutris 1933:67 proposes Euthydemus.

Importance of the Testimonium

The text is included speculatively, because coincidental details—the prosecution of Anytus and Meletus, the theme and treatment of ἔρωρ, the philosophical sense of erotic language—invites the hypothesis that it is informed by Antisthenes’ Kyras story. Aeschines is also implied in the background to the letter, and he might be the intended fictional writer (Sykutris 1933:67).

Notes

κατ’ ἔρωρτα Σωκράτους: Antisthenes’ story of Heracles speaks also of the quest for a teacher “because of love” (t. 92A). Aeschines, too, wrote about Socratic ἔρωρ (see Kahn 1994; Kahn 1996:18–29), but evidence for his treatment sets the ἔρωρ within the presence of the teacher and pupil. Its situation can be either in the teacher, as in *Alcibiades* (SSR VIA 53) or in the pupil, as in the

teacher's craft described in *Aspasia* (Ehlers 1966:88–94; Kahn 1994:102). But no surviving text from Aeschines posits ἔρωσ as a motivation for seeking out an absent teacher, known only by reputation.

ὅπου εἴη ὁ τάφος: Plato (*Phaed.* 115c3–116a1) plays down the fact that Socrates should even have a tomb, since his essential self was not his corpse; an independent variant of this point is in Aelian, *VH* 1.16. If Antisthenes wrote texts about real communication between living disciples and the tomb of Socrates, this need not imply anything about his eschatological views; such stories could have been symbolic, for example, for Socrates' continuing influence in the world through natural media, such as the succession of Socratic disciples and their writings.

διελέγετο: This standard term for Socratic discourse is featured in two of Antisthenes' titles (t. 41A titles 6.2 and 6.4).

ἐδάκρυε: The opposed heightened emotions of joy (ἡδομένῳ) and grief are emphasized also in Pl. *Phaedo* 59a–9. Here the joy occurs before Socrates' death is known, but a second kind of joy seems to be implied in the encounter the youth achieves with the tomb.

φιλήσας τὴν . . . κόνιν, πολλὰ δὲ περιασπασάμενος: The erotic language, displaced from literal sexual passion to a passion for a teacher or for knowledge, is paralleled in Antisthenes' fr. 14A and 92. See also t. 143A, 147. Here the passion is acted out in bodily behavior.

περιασπασάμενος: The base of this verb is in t. 143A, and see also ὑπερασπάζεται in t. 82.39 and 34C-2. Both compounds are very rarely attested, and this would be reason to attribute this vocabulary to Antisthenes.

85. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.2 (Marcovich)

= 19 DC (and same as SSR VA 97)

[= ps.-Eudocia, *Violarium* no. 96 "Antisthenes" p. 95.11–13 Flach]

καὶ ὅτι ὁ πόνοσ ἀγαθὸν συνέστησε διὰ τοῦ μεγάλου Ἡρακλέους
καὶ τοῦ Κύρου, τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων
ἐλκύσας.

Ἡρακλέους codd. plur. : ἡρακλέως B

And that toil is a good, he established through the great *Heracles* and the *Cyrus*, drawing the one [example] from the Greeks and the other from the barbarians.

Context of Preservation

This statement concludes Diogenes' compressed narrative of Antisthenes' life and forms a transition to his doctrine. An array of gnomes and anecdotes follows in ch. 3–10. See t. 3.

Importance of the Testimonium

The thesis bluntly stated, that toil is a good, might have been meant provocatively, as an inversion of the more plausible thesis that pleasure is (the) good. (See t. 119.) If the Socratic Aristippus advocated for pleasure as the chief good, Antisthenes might have taken an opposite stance for rhetorical purposes. (See t. 33.) Clearly Antisthenes meant the thesis seriously also: insofar as toil was the work or resistance implied in any exercise that trained the soul, the body, or the pride (αἰδώς) of self-esteem, it was a good investment and so, apparently, also good in its own right. See t. 113A–B, 163, 134f, 86. Diogenes' testimonium, which is prominent in his account of Antisthenes, suggests that Antisthenes' most famous thesis about virtue was not stated directly but was demonstrated or illustrated through fictional representations of great men who acquired virtue.

Notes

ὁ πόνος ἀγαθόν: The adjective ἀγαθόν is neuter in gender, whereas πόνος is masculine. Therefore, ἀγαθόν is predicated not as an adjective to πόνος but as a substantive: toil is *the* good or *a* good. (Compare t. 117A, 127.) The omission of an article could have ontological implications, as it might in Antisthenes' title *On Good* (t. 41A title 3.1): that is, "good" could be the kind of thing that is not a separate individual, such as Plato's Forms, even while it is a noun. Aristotle shares this usage (t. 117A), and it might be commonplace after him. See note on t. 41A title 3.1; compare also the statement of Aspasius in t. 120 and notes on t. 118.

διὰ τοῦ μεγάλου Ἡρακλέους: The "great" *Heracles* must refer to the longer text in the fourth *tomos*.

τοῦ Κύρου: There were two long texts by Antisthenes titled *Cyrus*, in the fourth and fifth *tomoi*. Presumably the story of Cyrus the Great (t. 41A title 5.1) was the parallel to the story of Heracles. Despite Diogenes' preservation of the book catalog, he seems, in this section of the biography, to be unaware that there was more than one *Cyrus*.

τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν βαρβάρων: The symmetry resonates with a Cynic conception of cosmopolitanism (Gomperz 1931:161–63). Antisthenes' interest in non-Greeks seems to be restricted to the *Cyrus* texts, and it is not always sympathetic: in t. 141, the Persians are a model for deviance; see also t. 208.23–25. See t. 41D note, an erroneous statement in the *Suda*, sometimes understood as evidence for Antisthenes' interest in the east.

86A. Epictetus, *Discourses* 4.6.20 (Schenkl)

= 20A DC

τί οὖν λέγει Ἀντισθένης; οὐδέποτ' ἤκουσας; “Βασιλικόν, ὦ Κύρῃ, πρᾶττειν μὲν εὖ, κακῶς δ' ἀκούειν.”

Well, what does Antisthenes say? Have you never heard? “It is kingly, Cyrus, to perform well but to carry a bad reputation.”

Context of Preservation

Epictetus' discourse is addressed “to those who are vexed at being pitied” (Πρὸς τοὺς ἐπὶ τῷ ἐλεεῖσθαι ὀδυνωμένους). The reference to Antisthenes comes at the climax, where he chides the addressee for moral failure on a second level: he has mastered independence from wealth, but to take offense at criticism for his poverty is itself a moral failure. The same *apophthegma* appears as an anecdote about an interaction between Antisthenes and Plato in t. 28. Plutarch (*Life of Alexander* 41.2) attributes the saying to Alexander the Great.

Importance of the Testimonium

This seems to be a remnant from an episode early in Cyrus' kingship, when he was learning how to be a king. See Dittmar 1912:72–76; Giannantoni 1990 v.4:305; Müller-Goldingen 1995:37.

Notes

Βασιλικόν: The Socratic writings refer to a “kingly art,” or βασιλική τέχνη (Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.17, 4.2.11; Pl. *Euthyd.* 291c5, 291d7; Pl. *Politicus* passim; ps.-Pl. *Amatores* 138c9; ps.-Pl. *Minos* 320c1–2, with Müller 1995). *On Kingship* is the second title of Antisthenes' Cyrus text (title 5.1). Plausibly Antisthenes developed the “kingly art” as the art of Socratic ethics in his Cyrus fiction. (See Joël 1893 v. 1:387–90; summary in Giannantoni 1990 v. 4:306.) On Antisthenes' claim to have an ethical art or τέχνη, see t. 79, 13A.

ὦ Κύρῃ: Apparently, a character within Antisthenes' text is giving instruction to Cyrus. Dittmar 1912:73 proposes that the teacher was Oebares, who appears in this role in Aelius Aristides, *Or.* 14.18; Müller-Goldingen 1995:38–39 agrees.

πρᾶττειν μὲν εὖ: There is no surviving evidence for the kind of positive achievement Cyrus was pursuing. The good ruler in Socratic literature rules in the interests of his subjects, and so a benefaction that arouses hostility from a misunderstanding audience might be implied in the anecdote (Müller-Goldingen 1995:42–43). A goal of benefaction might be attributed to Antisthenes in t. 13A.64; Odysseus claims benefaction to his general audience in t. 54.1. In Cyrus' rise to power, we do not know whether Antisthenes gave him a positive ambition or divine injunction to rule the world (as Herodotus

does) or whether his power came to him by accident—for example, because he happened, through hard work, to succeed Astyages, whom he once served as a slave (as in a version preserved in Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 15.22)—or through opportunities that were initially defensive (as in Xenophon’s *Cyropaedia*). See Höistad 1948:84–85. Ambition seems least likely, in light of Antisthenes’ generally defensive moral imagery (t. 106, 124A, 134n–p, u–v). Plutarch (in t. 81B) may know of a kingship image in Antisthenes that entailed ruling the world. See also Decleva Caizzi 1966:94 on the hypothesis that Cyrus had universal dominion and responsibility for the whole world.

κακῶς δ’ ἀκούειν: Compare t. 89, 90, 109, 113.

86B. Marcus Aurelius, *To Himself* VII 36 (Dalfen)

= 20B DC

Ἀντισθενικόν. Βασιλικόν εὖ μὲν πράττειν, κακῶς δ’ ἀκούειν.

Ἀντισθενικόν lemm. hab. T | Βασιλικόν codd. plur. : ασιλικόν A | εὖ
μὲν Gataker : μὲν εὖ codd.

An Antisthenean maxim. It is kingly to perform well but carry a bad reputation.

Context of Preservation

See Rutherford 1989:45–47 on the composition of Marcus’ twelve-book *Meditations*: no obvious structure or chronology has been found. The sequence in the seventh book is short precepts, some like *apophthegmata*. The overlap with Epictetus (t. 86A) implies that this was Marcus’ source (Rutherford 1989:225).

86C. Dio Chrysostom, *Public Address in his Homeland* 47 (de Budé)

ἔφη δ’ οὖν τις ὅτι καὶ τὸ κακῶς ἀκούειν καλῶς ποιοῦντα καὶ τοῦτο
βασιλικόν ἐστίν.

ποιοῦντα Urton : ποιοῦντας codd.

And indeed someone said that also this is kingly, to get a bad reputation when performing well.

Context of Preservation

This is the final sentence in Dio’s oration, a public address to the citizens of Prusa on the need to rebuild the city. At the end of the speech, Dio defends himself against a critic who has called him a tyrant.

Notes

ἔφη δ' οὖν τις: Dio's citation of this maxim as his closing words suggests that it is important. Its anonymity is odd: either Dio expects that his audience will not recognize Antisthenes' name and so he omits it; or this audience will recognize the quotation and take pleasure in supplying the author. The former seems more likely, because Dio names many authorities throughout the oration, and his style is informative sooner than allusive. See t. 208, where Dio's Σωκράτης τις might refer to Antisthenes or his Socrates character.

87A. Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 502.13–14 (Walz)

= 21A DC

Κυρος ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἀναγκαιότατον εἴη μάθημα, “Τὸ ἀπομαθεῖν,” ἔφη, “τὰ κακά.”

Cyrus the king, when asked what was the most necessary thing to learn, said, “To unlearn the bad things.”

Context of Preservation

Arsenius lists the *chreia* under “Cyrus” rather than “Antisthenes.” Attribution to Antisthenes is based on the parallels.

Importance of the Testimonium

Cyrus is a moral adviser, whereas he receives advice in t. 86. (See Dittmar 1912:73.) The negative starting position for ethical progress is remarkable, by contrast with the positive foundations implied in other ancient ethical theories. T. 34E might point to positive foundations (χρήσις φαντασιῶν).

Notes

ἀναγκαιότατον: Parallels in the florilegia call this negative learning ἄριστον (best) rather than ἀναγκαιότατον (most necessary). The phrase “the best and first learning” supplies the title of one florilegium, where this maxim appears first, anonymously.

87B. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.7 (Marcovich)

= 174 DC

ἐρωτηθεὶς τί τῶν μαθημάτων ἀναγκαιότατον, “Τὸ περαιοεῖν,” ἔφη, “τὸ ἀπομανθάνειν.”

ἀναγκαιότερον F | τὸ περαιοεῖν B P¹ F del. P² Q et Marcovich | τὸ ἀπομανθάνειν B P¹ F : τὸ κακὰ ἀπομαθεῖν P² Q | post ἀπομανθάνειν

addit τὰ κακὰ F² et Marcovich | “textus iam ex duabus v. lect. . . .
commixtus et mutilatus” Dorandi

When asked what was the most necessary thing to learn, he said, “To dispose of [the need for] unlearning.”

Context of Preservation

In Diogenes Laertius, the oldest source, this statement is listed at the end of the *apophthegmata* (twenty-sixth of twenty-seven in Diog. Laert. 6.3–7). See t. 3. Further parallels are attested: *Excerpta e ms. Florentino Ioannis Damasceni* 2.13.34; *Florilegium Ἀριστον καὶ πρῶτον μάθημα* no. 1; *Codex Neapolit.* II D 22 no. 9. The maxim is attributed also to Socrates in ps.-Maximus Confessor (17.39/48 Ihm).

Notes

τὸ περιαιρεῖν: Marcovich omits the phrase “to dispose of” from Diogenes’ text so that it agrees with Arsenius and Stobaeus (t. 87A, 87C). Some manuscripts make similar corrections in a second hand, also changing the tense of the verb for “unlearning.” Dorandi 2013:410 holds that the transmitted text of Diogenes is a corrupted combination of two versions, “to dispose of the bad things” and “to unlearn the bad things.” Decleva Caizzi (1966:126) explains the text as transmitted: “The sense of the fragment is that he who understands does not need to unlearn.” That is, unlearning is a continuing activity for those who do not yet understand that socially generated “truths” are not necessarily true, whereas those who do understand no longer need to unlearn.

87C. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.31.34 (Wachsmuth)

= 21B DC

ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς τί ἀναγκαϊότατον εἴη μάθημα, “Τὸ ἀπομαθεῖν,” ἔφη,
“τὰ κακά.”

The same man [Antisthenes], when asked what was the most necessary thing to learn, said, “To unlearn the bad things.”

Context of Preservation

On Stobaeus’ ch. 2.31, see t. 162.

88A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.5 (Marcovich)

= 178A DC

ἐπαινούμενος ποτε ὑπὸ πονηρῶν, ἔφη, “Ἀγωνιῶ μὴ τι κακὸν
εἵργασμαι.”

When he was once being praised by base people, he [Antisthenes] said,
 “I am distressed in case I might have done something wrong.”

Context of Preservation

This *apophthegma* comes near the middle of Diogenes’ series (6.3–7): see t. 3.
 See also t. 89, from a later section of Diogenes’ biography.

88B. *Gnomologium Vaticanum* no. 9 (Sternbach)

= 178B DC

[= Antonius Monachus II.XXXII 57 Migne]

ὁ αὐτὸς ἐπαινούμενος ὑπὸ μοχθηρῶν, “Ἀγωνιῶ,” ἔφη, “μή τί κακὸν
 εἴργασται μοι, ὅτι τοιούτοις ἀρέσκω.”

The same man [Antisthenes], when he was being praised by bad
 people, said, “I am distressed in case something bad has been done by
 me, because I am pleasing to people like this.”

Context of Preservation

Among the thirteen *apophthegmata* of Antisthenes in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, one each can be attributed to *Cyrus* and *Heracles*. In addition, t. 113A could be also from *Cyrus*. On Antisthenes in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, see, further, t. 5.

89. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.8 (Marcovich)

= 178C DC

πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα “πολλοὶ σε ἐπαινοῦσι,” “Τί γάρ,” ἔφη, “κακὸν
 πεποίηκα;”

To someone who said, “Many people praise you,” he said, “Then what
 bad thing have I done?”

Context of Preservation

This appears amid the eleven anecdotes set in Athens (6.7–10). It seems to be
 another version of t. 88A, which Diogenes has apparently received through a
 different source.

Notes

πολλοί: The speakers of praise are called not “bad” but merely “many.” It
 is presupposed that the good people (in Athens?) are few and that the bad
 people are many (as in t. 134o). This is common to other antidemocratic

Athenian discourse, where οἱ πολλοί is virtually a term for base persons or the mob.

90A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.7 (Marcovich)

= 85 DC

παρεκελεύετό τε κακῶς ἀκούοντας καρτερεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ εἰ λίθοις τις βάλλοιτο.

μᾶλλον om. F

And he advised those who got bad reputations to hold strong more than if someone should pelt them with stones.

Context of Preservation

This is the last maxim in Diogenes' series of timeless *apophthegmata* in sections 3–7 of his biography, before he turns to anecdotes from Antisthenes' life in Athens: see t. 3.

Importance of the Testimonium

The value in being slandered is emphasized in many *apophthegmata*: t. 86, 91, 109, 113, 134f, 134p. Here no positive value is given to slander, but it is presented as a more important occasion for bravery than physical assault.

90B. John of Salisbury, *Policraticus* III.14.6 (Keats-Rohan)

(SSR under VA 88)

[= *Gnomologium Monacense Latinum* XXXV.2]

Antisthenes quoque cuidam dicenti, “Maledixit tibi ille,” “Non michi” inquit, “sed illi, qui in se, quod ille culpat, agnoscit. sed etsi michi maledicere curet, non curo, quia auditus lingua debet esse robustior, cum singulis hominibus linguae sint singulae sed aures binae. aliquatenus tamen curo, quia eo ipso me fatetur esse superiorem, quoniam superioris personae usus est detractationibus subiacere, inferioris inferre. gauderem itaque, nisi urgente humanitate homini compaterer infelici.”

Antisthenes Wölfflin : Antitanes *codd.*

Also Antisthenes, when someone said, “That man spoke badly against you,” replied, “Not against me, but against that man who recognizes in himself what he condemns. But even if he should try to speak badly against me, I pay no heed, because the hearing must be stronger than the tongue, since for individual people the tongues are one, but the

ears are two. To a certain extent, though, I do pay heed, because in this very thing he admits that I am better, since it is the practice of the better person to lie exposed to defamation and the practice of the lesser person to deliver it. And so I would be glad, except that since humanity urges me, I pity the unhappy man.”

Context of Preservation

The passage is in a section of John of Salisbury’s treatise “On Governing the State” that treats flattery and defamation. Antisthenes’ statement appears among those of other Socratics (Aristippus, Xenophon, Diogenes, Plato). SSR prints only the first sentence in Antisthenes’ reply, but the remainder seems equally appropriate to him.

Importance of the Testimonium

If the whole passage can be attributed to Antisthenes, this is a fuller explanation of indifference to slander than anything surviving elsewhere. Compare t. 94A.

Notes

non michi . . . , sed illi: That the speaker fails to say anything at all about the object he intends to address (here Antisthenes) and succeeds in speaking about another thing, the person implied by his words, is at least partly consistent with the view of language evident in t. 152B and 153B. Compare also Odysseus’ reference to Apollo, not Poseidon, in t. 190.

qui in se, quod ille culpatur, agnoscit: If the bad person is the same as the accuser, he is projecting his own faults onto another. Odysseus’ examination of Ajax (t. 54), including his tendency to turn Ajax’ accusations back against himself, might imply the same diagnosis. Compare Polyphemus in t. 189C-2-4, 189D.5; see also t. 29.

auditus lingua debet esse robustior: A similar idea is attributed to Aristippus in the anecdote immediately preceding in John’s text: when someone slandered him, he replied, “Just as you are the master of your tongue, so I am the master of my ears.” This seems to be the link John recognizes between the anecdotes, and it is a sign that the extended passage, not just the first sentence of the reply, is being attributed to Antisthenes.

linguae sint singulae sed aures binae: This clever reason for the superiority of the ears over the tongue has no parallel in Antisthenes (but compare t. 30). A similar retort is attributed to Zeno of Citium (Diog. Laert. 7.23). Elsewhere Antisthenes is facetious about counting and numbers: see esp. t. 54.9, 54.11, 187.11-12 (associated with Odysseus); compare t. 152A.

eo ipso me fatetur esse superiorem: The interlocutor’s real message is carried

not in his literal words but in his behavior, the attempt to slander. This is different from, for example, t. 188B, where Odysseus “indicates” his beliefs through the words he speaks; it is different also from the picture of speaking in t. 152B and 153B, where the attempt and intention of the speaker seem to be irrelevant. In this anecdote, the interpreter is in the presence of the speaker, which seems to give him the authority to attribute unspoken “statements” to the speaker.

homini compaterer infelici: The speaker seems to pity the false accuser for his unhappiness. Compare t. 82.37 and Odysseus in t. 54.5 and 54.12.

91A. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Oration* 4.72 (= *Against Julian* 1), PG 35 col. 596B (Migne)

= 147 DC

μέγας ὁ Ἀντισθένης, ὅτι τὸ πρόσωπον συντριβεῖς ὑπὸ τινος τῶν
ὑβριστῶν καὶ θρασέων, ἐπιγράφει τῷ μετώπῳ μόνον, ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντι
δημιουργῶν, τὸν παῖσαντα, ἴσως ἵνα κατηγορήσῃ θερμότερον.

Great was Antisthenes, because when he had been beaten up in the face by a bold and violent man, he merely wrote on his forehead the name of the assailant, as if doing handwork on a statue, perhaps so that he could press a more heated charge.

Context of Preservation

Gregory, amid his attack on the emperor Julian, lists ironic praises of nine pagan philosophers whose virtue and wisdom Julian prefers over Christianity. Antisthenes appears in last position, offering a climax to the ridiculous claims of the philosophers. (The list includes Solon, Socrates, Plato, Xenocrates, Diogenes, Epicurus, Crates, an anonymous figure indifferent to loss in a shipwreck [probably Zeno], and Antisthenes.) A similar anecdote is attributed to Diogenes of Sinope (Diog. Laert. 6.33), Crates (Diog. Laert. 6.89; Themistius, *On Virtue* sec. 46), and Zeno (Plut. 87A).

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes' position in this list suggests his importance in the pagan canon of the fourth century CE, as confirmed by the citations in Julian (t. 44) and Themistius (t. 96).

Notes

ὥσπερ ἀνδριάντι δημιουργῶν: An implicit negative comparison between a human and a statue is in t. 172c. See also the book title on physiognomy, t. 41A title 2.3.

91B. ps.-Nonnus, Commentary on *Oration* 4 of Gregory of Nazianzus, PG 36 col. 1001d (Migne)

λ'. Περὶ τοῦ Ἀντισθένους. Οὗτος ὁ Ἀντισθένης κυνικὸς ἦν φιλόσοφος·
ὃς τυφθεὶς καὶ πληγεὶς τὸ πρόσωπον, λαβὼν χαρτίον καὶ ἐγγράψας τὸν
τύψαντα, ἐκόλλησεν εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μέτωπον, καὶ οὕτω περιῆγε.

Note 30. On Antisthenes. This Antisthenes was a Cynic philosopher. When he was beaten and struck in his face, he took up a sheet of papyrus and wrote on it the [name of the] one who had struck him, then glued it onto his forehead and walked around in this condition.

Context of Preservation

Ps.-Nonnus (writing probably in the fifth or sixth century CE, probably in the region of Tyre or Antioch: see Smith 2001:xxxvi–xxxviii) wrote commentary on four orations of Gregory in which he explained classical references. This is his explanation for t. 91A.

Notes

λαβὼν χαρτίον καὶ ἐγγράψας τὸν τύψαντα, ἐκόλλησεν εἰς τὸ ἑαυτοῦ μέτωπον: This rationalization of Gregory's account is the only new information ps.-Nonnus brings to the text and probably has no external basis. Reference to papyrus and glue does not appear in any other version of this anecdote. In the versions told of other philosophers, Diogenes hangs the tablet around his neck by a cord, and Crates "attached a plaster tablet to his forehead" (προσθεὶς οὖν πιττάκιον τῷ μετώπῳ, Diog. Laert. 6.89).

91C. Basil "the lesser" of Caesarea, *Commentary on the "Orations" of Gregory of Nazianzus*, PG 36 col. 1169A (Migne)

"Ταῦτα τῆς Ἀντισθένους ἀλαζονείας," καὶ οὗτος φιλόσοφος ἦν ἀλαζών καὶ ὑπερήφανος, ὃς ὑπὸ τινος ὕβριστοῦ τὸ πρόσωπον συντριβεῖς, ἐπέγραψε τῷ προσώπῳ, ὥσπερ ἐν ἀνδριάντι, τὸν παίσαντα, στηλιτεύων τὸν ὕβριστήν, ἵνα θερμότεραν τὴν κατηγορίαν ἐνδείξαιτο.

"[Why is it necessary to say how much greater and lofty are] these things by comparison with the boastfulness of Antisthenes [?]" [Gregory of Nazianzus *Or.* 25.19] Also this man was a boasting and haughty philosopher, who, when his face was beaten up by a violent person, wrote on his forehead the name of the assailant, as if on a statue, inscribing the violent man publicly so that he could display a more heated charge.

Context of Preservation

Basil, a tenth-century bishop of Caesarea, called himself “Basil the lesser” to avoid confusion with the fourth-century St. Basil. This passage is from his commentary on Gregory of Nazianzus’ *Oration 25, On the Praise of Heron the Philosopher*, where Antisthenes’ boastfulness is mentioned in passing as a poor example of a product of philosophy. Basil quotes verbatim from Gregory’s *Oration 4* (t. 91A). Maximus Heron of Alexandria, contemporary with Gregory, was a former Cynic who converted to Christianity (Downing 1992:269–70).

Notes

φιλόσοφος ἦν ἀλαζών καὶ ὑπερήφανος: Basil adds the negative judgment that is implied but withheld in Gregory’s original passage.

ἵνα θερμότεραν τὴν κατηγορίαν ἐνδείξαιτο: Basil’s paraphrase of Gregory allows him to get in a reference to Cynic “demonstration,” understood here as vainglory. See also t. 22B.

92A. ps.-Eratosthenes, *Catasterisms* 40 (Massana)

= 24A DC

οὗτος δοκεῖ Χείρων εἶναι, ὁ ἐν τῷ Πηλίῳ οἰκήσας, δικαιοσύνη δὲ ὑπερενέγκας πάντας ἀνθρώπους καὶ παιδεύσας Ἀσκληπίον τε καὶ Ἀχιλλέα· ἐφ’ ὃν Ἡρακλῆς δοκεῖ ἐλθεῖν δι’ ἔρωτα, ᾧ καὶ συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ ἄντρῳ τιμῶν τὸν Πᾶνα. μόνον δὲ τῶν Κενταύρων οὐκ ἀνείλεν, ἀλλ’ ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ Ἀντισθένης φησὶν ὁ Σωκρατικὸς ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ. χρόνον δὲ ἱκανὸν ὁμιλοῦντων αὐτῶν ἐκ τῆς φαρέτρας αὐτοῦ βέλος ἐξέπεσεν εἰς τὸν πόδα τοῦ Χείρωνος καὶ οὕτως ἀποθανόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Ζεὺς διὰ τὴν εὐσέβειαν καὶ τὸ σύμππτωμα ἐν τοῖς ἀστροῖς ἔθηκεν αὐτόν.

οὗτος δοκεῖ E : οὗτος δὲ ὁ Κένταυρος δοκεῖ B | δικαιοσύνη δὲ E : δικαιοσύνη τε Heyne et edd. plur. | post δι’ ἔρωτα add. παιδείας Koppiers Schaubach Mullach | ᾧ καὶ συνεῖναι codd. : ᾧ om. S (frag. Vat.) | μόνον δὲ τῶν Κενταύρων Koppiers et T (frag. Vat.) : μόνον δὲ τὸν Κένταυρον E : μόνον δὲ τοῦτον τῶν Κενταύρων S (frag. Vat.) | τοῦ Χείρωνος E : τοῦ χείρονος P¹ (corr. P²)

This seems to be the Chiron who lived on Mount Pelion and surpassed all humans in justice. He taught Asclepius and Achilles. To him, it seems, Heracles came because of love, and he kept company with him in his cave, honoring Pan. And him alone of the Centaurs Heracles did not kill, but he learned from him, just as Antisthenes says in the

Heracles. When they had associated for a fair length of time, an arrow fell out of Heracles' quiver onto Chiron's foot. After he died in this way, Zeus set him among the stars because of his piety and the accident.

Context of Preservation

The anonymous prose text known as *Catasterismi* (in Greek, *Καταστερισμοί*), which survives as an epitome of approximately the late first century CE but is attributed (probably falsely) to the astronomer Eratosthenes of Alexandria (276–194 BCE), collects older Greek lore associated with the constellations. This passage is the beginning of the account of the constellation Centaurus.

Importance of the Testimonium

This shows that Antisthenes' story of Heracles was in the main current of mythical literature in the Hellenistic period. However, the citation of author and title suggests that neither was fully familiar. Together with t. 95, this is the best surviving evidence for narrative episodes in the story of Heracles. (See t. 41A title 4.2.) It may also be part of the story, known from Apollodorus' *Library of Greek Myth*, of Heracles' apotheosis in exchange for Chiron's reward of death. (See Robertson 1951; Gantz 1993:146–47.)

Notes

δικαιοσύνη δὲ ὑπερενέγκας πάντας ἀνθρώπους: In *Il.* 11.832, Chiron, mentioned as Achilles' tutor, is called the “most just of the Centaurs.” His superiority over humans may be implied in the old myths of his tutelage of the heroes: a collection of “Chiron's advice” (Χίρωνος ὑποθήκαι) is attributed to Hesiod.

παιδεύσας Ἀσκληπίον τε καὶ Ἀχιλλέα: The mention of Asclepius evokes Chiron's skill as a doctor, which is not obviously relevant in the remainder of the story as preserved but could have been important in a story where Chiron suffers an unbearable wound. Although a teacher of medicine, he was unable to cure himself. (In the version of Apollodorus 2.5.4, Heracles tries in vain to apply a “cure” [φάρμακον] to Chiron.) Compare t. 83A on the position of the expert as object of his own expertise, where the doctor is one example. T. 100A also advocates for the expert's service to himself.

Ἡρακλῆς δοκεῖ ἐλθεῖν δι' ἔρωτα: Compare the youth's quest for Socrates “on account of love” in t. 84C. Early editors added the word παιδείας here to disambiguate the sexual undertones.

ὃ καὶ συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ τιμῶν τὸν Πᾶνα: The verb συνεῖναι is common for Socratic conversation but also carries an erotic nuance: see note at t. 22A.14; Brancacci 1990:158–64. Compare the story of Kyrsas in t. 84B (ὥς συνεσόμενος ἦλθε Σωκράτει). The setting in a cave must be borrowed from

the traditional stories of the Centaurs: in particular, Heracles is supposed to have visited Pholus in his cave as a side trip from one of his labors. The honor to Pan might have special sexual connotations; but Πᾶν could also be understood as the god or divinity of “all” (so Massana 2004:237 n.353), and Antisthenes might have offered an extended series of ambiguous details that could be understood as erotic both in the ordinary sense and also in a sublimated, “Socratic” sense. It seems unlikely, in light of t. 122, that he implied a sexual relationship between Heracles and his teachers. T. 123 and the alienation of his own need for *aphrodisia* in t. 82.38 are specifically heterosexual; t. 14A probably implies that physical homoeroticism was also rejected by Antisthenes.

μόνον δὲ τῶν Κενταύρων οὐκ ἀνείλεν: It is not clear whether Heracles’ slaying of the other Centaurs was part of Antisthenes’ story, rather than the broader tradition, but this is the conclusion to be drawn if we assume that ps.-Eratosthenes gives a continuous account from one source. Previous phrases, ἐλθεῖν δι’ ἔρωτα and συνεῖναι, are surely Socratic, as is ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ at the end of this sentence. If the Centaurs were slain in Antisthenes’ narrative, this could have been either their punishment in the war with the Lapiths (a traditional Homeric story, occurring repeatedly in the lore of Nestor) or the outcome of a brawl that broke out over wine, as in the traditional story of Pholus, whose fate overlaps in some ways with that of Chiron here (for caution about wine, compare t. 64–67, 191, 197). To conjecture further is probably not profitable, except that if the Centaurs were labeled “Hippocentaurs,” Heracles’ slaying of them could be an allegory for slaying false or fictional beliefs: see t. 149A note on ἐν ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις.

ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ: This is the language for philosophical instruction.

καθάπερ Ἀντισθένης φησὶν ὁ Σωκρατικός ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ: Antisthenes “the Socratic” is a full identification, addressed to the unacquainted. Contrast Demetrius (t. 45), writing around the same time and in a comparable scholarly context, who classifies Antisthenes neither with the Socratics nor with the Cynics.

χρόνον δὲ ἰκανὸν ὁμιλούντων αὐτῶν: The elapsed time must have been “sufficient” for instruction in justice and virtue to be achieved. (Compare *super bona loquentes* in t. 92C.) The accident was possibly a device to end the episode, although it also resonates with traditional stories of Pholus and Chiron himself (if this is traditional in Soph. *Trach.* 8). On the probably episodic structure of *Heracles*, see Giannantoni 1990 v.4:315–17.

ἐκ τῆς φαρέτρας αὐτοῦ βέλος ἐξέπεσεν εἰς τὸν πόδα τοῦ Χείρωνος: There seems to be an uncaused, chance accident here, for which neither Heracles nor Chiron has any responsibility. (Possibly the arrows Heracles was carrying had been dipped in the poison of the Hydra, whom he killed in a previous

adventure.) To the contrary, Heracles probably tried to help Chiron find a cure and may have volunteered to become immortal in his place (if Apollodorus 2.5.4 and 2.5.11 are relevant). The language for “falling” on trouble occurs also in Odysseus’ speech to Ajax (t. 54.6), where Ajax probably does have responsibility.

καὶ οὕτως ἀποθανόντος αὐτοῦ: The narrative elides the difficulty of Chiron’s death, which is an important theme in Apollodorus 2.5.4: since he is an immortal, he cannot die to escape his pain, but he depends on a miraculous exchange of status with a willing volunteer, with Zeus as retailer. Because of the coincidence of the characters Chiron, Heracles, and Prometheus (and Zeus, on another level) in both Apollodorus’ story and the fragments of Antisthenes’ *Heracles*, but nowhere else in Greek literature or art (unless Chiron is implied as Prometheus’ liberator in Aesch. *PV* 1027: see, further, Robertson 1951), it is possible that Antisthenes’ story is the basis for Apollodorus and that his Heracles gained his immortality, eventually, at the end of his education with Prometheus, not only through his own virtue, but by exchange with Chiron. This would entail that Chiron had to wait in pain for a long period (acknowledged by Robertson as a problem for his reconstruction). It might also make Heracles’ immortality an ambiguous “prize,” not something he aimed to win; this would conflict with t. 188A and 188C (if they should be attributed to Antisthenes), where Zeus gives immortality as a reward for deeds. If Antisthenes portrayed an exchange between Heracles and Chiron, he probably also showed that Heracles earned his immortality.

διὰ τὴν εὐσέβειαν καὶ τὸ σύμπτωμα: It is hardly certain but is not impossible that the catasterism of Chiron was part of Antisthenes’ story. Compare t. 176, where earning immortality depends on living “piously and justly,” precisely the two virtues mentioned in this story. (The ultimate source for t. 176 could be the Heracles text.) As for the “accident” (τὸ σύμπτωμα), Zeus’ provision of a remedy for this chance misfortune implies that he is a just god.

ὁ Ζεὺς . . . ἐν τοῖς ἄστροις ἔθηκεν αὐτόν: Compare t. 188A and 188C, where immortality is bestowed by only Zeus and on the basis of deeds.

92B. ps.-Eudocia, *Violarium* no. 998 “Chiron” p. 732.20–733.13 (Flach)

= 24B DC

καὶ αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς δοκεῖ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐλθεῖν δι’ ἔρωτα, ᾧ καὶ
 συνεῖναι ἐν τῷ ἄνθρωπῳ, τιμῶν τὸν Πάνα. μόνον δὲ τῶν Κενταύρων οὐκ
 ἀνείλεν, ἀλλ’ ἤκουεν αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ Ἀντισθένης φησὶν ὁ Σωκρατικός
 ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ. χρόνον δὲ ἱκανὸν ὁμιλούντων αὐτῶν, ἐκ τῆς φαρέτρας
 αὐτοῦ βέλος ἐξέπεσεν εἰς τὸν πόδα τοῦ Χείρωνος, καὶ οὕτως

ἀποθανόντος αὐτοῦ ὁ Ζεὺς διὰ τὴν εὐσέβειαν καὶ τὸ σύμπτωμα ἐν τοῖς
ἄστροις ἔθηκεν αὐτόν. ἀλλ' οὕτω μὲν ὁ μῦθος.

μόνον δὲ τῶν Κενταύρων scripsi e ps.-Erat. (92A) : μόνον δὲ τὸν
Κένταυρον codd. | ἐκ τῆς φαρέτρας αὐτοῦ P : ἐκ τῆς φαρέτρας αὐτοῦ
V

And Heracles himself seems to have come to him because of love, and he kept company with him in his cave, honoring Pan. And him alone of the Centaurs Heracles did not kill, but he learned from him, as Antisthenes the Socratic says in his *Heracles*. When they had associated for a fair length of time, an arrow fell from his quiver onto the foot of Chiron. After he died in this way, Zeus set him among the stars because of his piety and the accident. So this is the story.

Context of Preservation

This passage appears in the second half of ps.-Eudocia's chapter titled "On Chiron the Centaur" (Περὶ τοῦ Χείρωνος τοῦ Κενταύρου), which appears in alphabetical order under Χείρων, entry 998. The beginning of the entry recites genealogy and other myths, and the end focuses on the mixed nature of Chiron's special craft, medicine, both practical and logical, which arises from his own mixed nature as horse and human. This last section bears no visible relationship to Antisthenes, but compare the discussion of hippocentaurs at t. 149A, note on ἐν ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις). The source for this excerpt is clearly ps.-Eratosthenes (92A), but ps.-Eudocia uses other sources at the beginning and end of the entry. (The whole of the *Violarium* is a late Byzantine compilation: see t. 1D.)

92C. Anonymus Latinus II, *Commentary on Aratus, "Phaenomena"* at verse 436 (p. 264–65 Maass)

= 24C DC

hic videtur Chiron esse qui in Pelio habitavit iustitia quidem superans homines omnes et ipse correxit Asclepium et Achilleum. apud quem Hercules videtur venisse propter amorem, cum quo et simul fuerat in antro honorificans Panem. solum modo quidem Centaurum non occidit, sed obaudibat ei, ut ait Antisthenis Socratensis in tempore Herculis . . . super bona loquentes. . . et quoniam †de cura† eius excidit sagitta supra pede Chironis, et ita mortuus est. quem Iuppiter propter eius pietatem et ruinam inter astra posuit.

Chiron *codd. plur.* : chirion B : chyron P | Pelio *codd. plur.* : pilio P : pilo B | habitavit *codd. plur.* : habitabit B | iustitia *codd. plur.* : iusticia

B | *superans codd. plur.* : *superabit B* | *Hercules codd. plur.* : *ercules P*
 | *Panem codd. plur.* : *paneam B P* | *Socratensis codd. plur.* : *socratentis*
B | *lacunam post Herculis posui* | *Herculis super codd. plur.* : *Herculis*
semper B | *lacunam post loquentes posui* | *de cura codd. plur.* : *decura*
P : *an de curvature quaer. Maass* | *pede codd. plur.* : *pedes B* | *Chironis*
codd. plur. : *ironis B* : *chyronis P* | *Iuppiter codd. plur.* : *iupiter B* | *inter*
codd. plur. : *in B*

This seems to be the Chiron who lived on Mount Pelion and surpassed all humans in justice and he educated Asclepius and Achilles. To him Hercules seems to have come because of love, and he was together with him in the cave, honoring Pan. And indeed only him of the Centaurs he did not kill, but he was his student, as Antisthenes the Socratic said in the time of Heracles. . . . speaking on the topic of goods . . . and since an arrow fell from his quiver on the foot of Chiron, and in this way he died. Jupiter, because of his piety and his downfall, placed him among the stars.

Context of Preservation

This is from a Latin commentary on Aratus' *Phaenomena*, preserved in multiple manuscripts, at the passage where Aratus mentions the Centaur (v. 436–42).

Notes

Antisthenis Socratensis: Anonymus II transliterates Greek Ἀντισθένης, which is clearly unfamiliar.

in tempore Herculis: The Latin translator has probably misunderstood the reference to the book title in the Greek original. He is also unaware that a Socratic writer could not have lived in the time of Heracles. But see t. 95 for the possibility that this is, instead, evidence for the nature of Antisthenes' text, as episodes framed by dialogue in which Antisthenes appeared as speaker.

super bona loquentes: The first of two lacunae added here divides the reference to Antisthenes and his book from the narrative contained within it, which must represent a scene of conversation between Heracles and Chiron. Compare χρόνον δὲ ἰκανὸν ὁμιλούντων αὐτῶν in the Greek version. Anonymus II might have translated a different Greek version from t. 91A, since the topic of discussion (*super bona*) is not preserved there but is probably accurate.

et quoniam: The fatal incident is here given a heavier causal emphasis than in the Greek version. Again a lacuna is added, because the conjunctions suggest that a clause is missing.

de cura eius excidit sagitta: The meaning is clear from the Greek, where an arrow falls from a quiver. But *de cura* cannot mean “from the quiver” in classical Latin. Possibly the variant in ms. P (*decuaura*) points to a medieval word that became English *quiver* (R. Janko per litt.). Maass proposed *de curvatura*, or “from his curved sack.” The parallels in 92D–E say *e pharetra*.

92D. Scholium on the *Aratea* of Germanicus, codex G at verse 417 p. 178.14–19 (Breysig)

Centaurus dicitur fuisse Chiron et habitasse in stabulis et sectasse iustitiam et, quoniam Asclepium et Achillem nutrierit, inter astra conlocatus [sit]. Antisthenes autem dicit e pharetra Herculis lapsam sagittam pedem eius vulnerasse acceptoque vulnere animam exhalasse et ob hoc a Iove inter astra conlocatum esse.

iustitiam *Breysig* : iusticiam G | sit *del. Breysig* | Antisthenes *Breysig*
: antistenis G | e pharetra *Breysig* : hae faretra G | : exhalassa *Breysig* :
exalasse G

Chiron is said to have been a Centaur and to have lived in a lair and to have pursued justice, and, because he nurtured Asclepius and Achilles, to have been placed among the stars. Antisthenes, moreover, says that an arrow fell from the quiver of Hercules and wounded his foot. Once the wound was received, he breathed out his life, and because of this he was placed among the stars by Jupiter.

Context of Preservation

This is from commentary on Germanicus’ Latin translation of Aratus, *Phaenomena* 417–22, preserved in the ninth-century ms. G (Parisinus Sangermanensis 778), which Breysig (1967:xxvi–xxvii) classifies in the inferior class of scholia on Germanicus, deviating from the main tradition he reconstructs. In this passage, the added material seems to come from ps.-Eratosthenes (t. 92A), possibly through the scholia on Aratus, but the translation is different from t. 92C.

92E. Scholium on the *Aratea* of Germanicus, codex S at verse 417 p. 178.9–12 (Breysig)

cuius [*sc.* Chironis] hospitio Hercules usus, sicut Antisthenes dicit, e pharetra sagitta lapsa dicitur pedem eius vulnerasse, acceptoque vulnere animam exhalasse et ab Iove astris inlatus.

lapsa S : elapsa V | dicitur *om.* S | animam S : illum animam V |
exhalasse *Breysig* : exalasse S V | inlatus S : illatum V

After Hercules enjoyed his [Chiron's] hospitality, as Antisthenes says, an arrow reportedly fell from his quiver and wounded his foot. Once this wound was received, he [Chiron] breathed out his life and was put among the stars by Jupiter.

Context of Preservation

This is from commentary on Germanicus' Latin translation of Aratus, *Phaenomena* 417–22, preserved in the fourteenth-century ms. S (Strozianus XLVI, in Florence) and its fifteenth-century copy V (Urbinas 1358, Vatican Library), which Breysig (1967:xxvi) places in the fourth generation of his stemma.

93. Proclus, *Commentary on Plato's "Alcibiades"* 98.14–16 (Westerink)

= 25 DC

λέγει γοῦν καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης Ἡρακλῆς περὶ τινος νεανίσκου παρὰ τῷ Χείρωνι τρεφομένου· “Μέγας γάρ,” φησι, “καὶ καλὸς καὶ ὠραῖος, οὐκ ἂν αὐτοῦ ἡράσθη δειλὸς ἐραστής.”

Indeed also the Heracles of Antisthenes says about a certain youth being nurtured with Chiron: “For he was tall and handsome and in his prime, and no cowardly lover would have fallen in love with him.”

Context of Preservation

Proclus explains Pl. *Alc.* 103b2–5, an early sentence in Socrates' opening speech, where Alcibiades is said to have driven away his many lovers through his contempt (φρόνημα). Proclus uses the parallel from Antisthenes to support his point that a person worthy of love (ἀξιέραστος, 98.13) will be loved by the right lover and will scorn the love of (be ἀνέραστος to, 98.14) the “cowardly” (δειλός, 98.11) or the “many ignoble” (τοῖς πολλοῖς καὶ ἀγενέσιν, 98.14) lovers. Therefore, to note the many scorned lovers is a kind of “hymn” to the worthy lover.

Importance of the Testimonium

Proclus cites Antisthenes' *Heracles* either because the worthy beloved reminded him of Plato's Alcibiades or because it really referred to Alcibiades. (See also t. 199A, from the same text.) In either case, this is evidence for the possibility that Antisthenes produced a positive image of Alcibiades, at least in some respects. On the wise man's worthiness for love, see t. 134k and, in the Cynic tradition generally, t. 99.

Notes

λέγει . . . ὁ Ἀντισθένης Ἡρακλῆς: This probably implies that Proclus had the text of Antisthenes' *Heracles* at hand and that Heracles appears as a speaking character. Heracles could be speaking about Achilles: compare t. 199A, from the same commentary by Proclus (where Antisthenes is apparently the speaker). See also t. 95, where Achilles might appear in a scene that is framed by a dialogue.

μέγας . . . καὶ καλὸς καὶ ὠραῖος: These are external qualities that apparently attract the good lover. They are nearly the same qualities Alcibiades had, by Antisthenes' account (ὠραῖος, t. 198; καλός, t. 199A). Compare *Od.* 6.276.

94A. Plutarch, *On Excessive Shame* 18 p. 536b (Pohlenz)

= 26 DC

οὕτως ἄτρεπτος ἦν καὶ ἀνάλωτος ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων καὶ κρατῶν
ἐκείνης τῆς παραινέσεως, ἦν ὁ Ἀντισθένης Ἡρακλῆς παρήνει,
τοῖς παισὶ διακελεύόμενος μηδενὶ χάριν ἔχειν ἐπαινοῦντι [αὐτούς].
τοῦτο δ' ἦν οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ μὴ δυσωπεῖσθαι μὴδ' ἀντικολακεῦν τοὺς
ἐπαινοῦντας.

Ἀντισθένης codd. plur. : Ἀντισθένης XW | αὐτούς del. Bern

So unmoved and uncorruptible he [Menedemus] was by people of that sort, and so much in mastery of that advice which the Heracles of Antisthenes gave, directing the children to have gratitude for no one who praised them. And this was nothing other than neither to be put to shame inappropriately by one's praisers nor to flatter them in return.

Context of Preservation

Plutarch's essay *Περὶ Δυσωπίας* begins with a definition of the vice and follows with recommendations for overcoming it, concluding in a collection of traditional precepts useful in various situations. (See the analysis in De Lacy and Einarson 1959:42–45.) In this section, he recommends ways to resist inappropriate requests from baser persons: their own vices should be turned against them.

Importance of the Testimonium

This shows that Antisthenes' Heracles character, like his Cyrus, was a teaching figure as well as a pupil. (See t. 86A versus 87A.) There is no relationship necessarily implied between Menedemus (c. 339–265 BCE, founder of the Eretrian school) and Antisthenes. But Menedemus' pupil Pasiphon wrote or edited Socratic dialogues, possibly including those of Antisthenes: see t. 43A.

Notes

ὁ Ἀντισθένης Ἡρακλῆς: Antisthenes' name appears in adjectival form in two other passages, t. 150A.4 and 44C, where Heracles is also relevant. τοῖς παισὶ διακελευόμενος: Heracles is probably speaking to children internal to the fiction, not in the external audience (as in t. 94B). But this is not entirely clear, and they could be his own sons.

94B. Letters of the Socratics, no. 9.4 (Köhler)

(SSR IVA 222)

πέμψω δέ σοι τῶν θερμῶν τῶς μεγάλως τε καὶ λευκῶς, ἵν' ἔχῃς μετὰ τὸ ἐπιδείξασθαι τὸν Ἡρακλέα τοῖς νέοις ὑποτρώγειν.

[Aristippus to Antisthenes.]

And I will send you some large white beans, so that you can have them to eat after you perform your *Heracles* for the youth.

Context of Preservation

This comes toward the end of Aristippus' reply to letter 8 from Antisthenes (= t. 206). On the Socratic epistles, see t. 206.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes' *Heracles* is implied to be an epideictic work, a piece for performance. The audience of youth implies that the text could be meant as a protreptic, to attract them toward education, whether with Antisthenes as teacher or generally. This is the only reference to a title of a Socratic text in the letters, although the "Encomium" of Heracles by Prodicus is also mentioned (t. 207C). Aristippus implies that Antisthenes cannot make money from his teaching, because his clients are too poor.

95. *Gnomologium Vaticanum* 743 no. 11 (Sternbach)

= 28 DC

[= *Gnom. Vindob.* no. 100]

ὁ αὐτὸς θεασάμενος ἐν πίνακι γεγραμμένον τὸν Ἀχίλλεα Χεῖρωνι τῷ Κενταύρῳ διακονούμενον, "Εὖ γε, ὦ παιδίον," εἶπον, "ὅτι παιδείας ἔνεκεν καὶ θηρίῳ διακονεῖν ὑπέμεινας."

ἐν πίνακι γεγραμμένον codd. : πίνακα γεγραμμένον *Gnom. Vindob.*,
corr. Wachsmuth | τὸν om. *Gnom. Vindob.* | παιδείας ἔνεκεν codd. :
παιδείας ἔνεκεν διακονούμενον *Gnom. Vindob.*

The same man [Antisthenes], when he saw Achilles drawn on a tablet, doing service to Chiron the Centaur, “You’ve done well, oh lad,” he said, “because for the sake of education you have endured to serve even a beast.”

Context of Preservation

On the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, see t. 5.

Importance of the Testimonium

This anecdote might offer a clue to the structure of the Heracles text. A negative mode of learning, through response to a non-ideal teacher, might also have been presented in this text.

Notes

ὁ αὐτὸς θεασάμενος ἐν πίνακι: Declava Caizzi 1966:95–96 proposes that this anecdote offers a clue to the framework of the whole Heracles text: narrated episodes in Heracles’ education could have been set into a frame dialogue where contemporary characters such as Socrates (and Antisthenes) were the speakers. The characters in the frame dialogue might have been stimulated into their conversation about Heracles from a picture of Achilles on a tablet. Such a structure would also give sense to the phrase *in tempore Herculis* in t. 92C, which would then not be an error of translation. It is not clear, however, that this anecdote must come from a Heracles text. To endure the humiliation of serving a beast might be one type of toil, or πόνος, useful in education. εὖ γε, ὦ παιδίον: The direct imperative address is opposite in evaluation to that in t. 112B (“O te,” ait “infelicem”). On the frequency of this imperative form in Bion and the diatribe, see Kindstrand 1986:30.

παιδείας ἔνεκεν καὶ θηρίῳ διακονεῖν ὑπέμεινας: The pupil seems to have learned negatively or indirectly, through a kind of humiliation. The idea that a teacher might be effective through negative mechanisms has a possible parallel in an anecdote about Heracles’ interaction with Prometheus “the Sophist” preserved in Dio Chrysostom (8.33). Possibly this story was inspired by Antisthenes (Luz 1996:92 and n.18, citing older advocates).

96. Themistius, *On Virtue* p. 43 R. (Mach)

= 27 DC

sin autem vere cognoscere vultis prudentiam aliquid sublime esse, nec Platonem neque Aristotelem testes invoco, sed Antisthenem sapientem, qui hanc viam docuit. ait enim Promethea Herculi ita locutum esse: “Vilissimus est labor tuus, quod res humanae tibi sunt

curae, sed tamen curam eius, quod iis maioris momenti est, deseruisti. perfectus enim vir non eris, priusquam ea, quae hominibus sublimiora sunt, didiceris. si ista disces, tunc humana quoque disces; sin autem humana tantum didiceris, tu tamquam animal brutum errabis.” qui enim rebus humanis studet et mentis suae prudentiam calliditatemque suam rebus tam vilibus et angustis includit, is, ut Antisthenes dixit, non sapiens est, sed animali similis, cui sterquilinum gratum est. sublimes vero sunt omnes res caelestes, et nos oportet sententiam de eis habere sublimem.

But if you want to really understand that virtue is something sublime, I call as witnesses neither Plato nor Aristotle, but the wise Antisthenes, who taught this path. For he said that Prometheus spoke thus to Hercules: “Your labor is entirely base, because you attend to human affairs. But you have abandoned the cultivation of what is more important than these. For you will not be a perfect man until you have learned the things that are more exalted than humans. If you learn these, then you will also learn human matters. But if you will learn only human matters, you will wander like a brutish animal.” The one who has his zeal for human affairs, then, and shuts up the intelligence and cleverness of his mind in things so low and narrow, he, as Antisthenes said, is not wise, but like an animal, to whom the manure heap is a welcome thing. But exalted are all heavenly things, and we should have an exalted way of thinking about them.

Context of Preservation

Themistius’ oration *On Virtue* is preserved through a ninth-century Syriac translation, rendered in German by Gildemeister and Bücheler (*Rheinisches Museum* 27 [1872] 439–62) and in Latin by Mach (1974). The manuscript in which the oration survives is the same that preserves ps.-Plutarch, *On Exercise* (t. 113B).

Importance of the Testimonium

This is the clearest surviving evidence for Antisthenes’ conception of a transcendent object of knowledge. Some critics attribute the lesson Hercules receives to the late antique world of Themistius, not Antisthenes. But various parallels in Antisthenes and Plato show that it is not anachronistic for Antisthenes.

Notes

nec Platonem neque Aristotelem testes invoco: Plato and Aristotle are introduced as the main authorities in wisdom from the opening of the text

(p. 17). Antisthenes is named as an early traveler on the best road to wisdom, discovered by Socrates (p. 21), but Antisthenes reappears only here.

vilissimus est labor tuus: The idea that labor (πόνος) can be too lowly to be useful is not otherwise attested for Antisthenes. Isocrates (*Helen* §24) attacks an unnamed advocate of Heracles' heroism because Heracles' πόνος (and κίνδυνος) is vain, yielding no public benefits.

perfectus enim vir non eris, priusquam ea, quae hominibus sublimiora sunt, didiceris: The *perfectus vir* must be the σοφός Heracles aims to become. Prometheus recommends knowledge of heavenly things as a kind of device, not to make the human being heavenly or godlike, but so the human being can become fully human, possibly by having a kind of superhuman perspective over himself. (For a similar assessment of Socrates' self-sufficiency according to Xenophon, see O'Connor 1994: esp. 170–71.) The one who learns only human things, by contrast, remains animal-like. Compare also Socrates' statement in Pl. *Phaedr.* 274a1–5, where he commends the “long road” of education in true rhetoric over the shortcut promoted by, for example, Tisias and the probability theorists. Socrates claims that the right goal is to become able to argue in a way that gratifies the gods, not the “fellow slaves” (ὁμοδούλοις)—that is, human beings—and that humanly pleasing rhetoric will follow from divinely pleasing rhetoric. (For Antisthenes' pronouncement on divine philosophy versus human rhetoric, see t. 173.)

animali similis, cui sterquilinium gratum est: For Antisthenes' apparent use of animals as images of the pre-philosophical human, compare t. 54.14, 62, 63, 41A titles in *tomos* 2. See also Luz 1996:97 for possible precedent in Heraclitus for humans who enjoy dung, as well as other parallels, including Diogenes of Sinope (Diog. Laert. 6.39).

97. = t. 85

98. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.104 (Marcovich)

= 22 DC

ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τέλος εἶναι κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν, ὡς Ἀντισθένης φησὶν ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ, ὁμοίως τοῖς Στωικοῖς.

And they [the Cynics] hold that the goal is to live according to virtue, as Antisthenes says in the *Heracles*, in similar manner to the Stoics.

Context of Preservation

This is from Diogenes' summary of the Cynic philosophy, excerpted from the passage in t. 135A.104. Diogenes has a Stoic source.

Importance of the Testimonium

This statement of the Cynic τέλος is at odds with Clement and Theodoret's account in t. 111. See Goulet-Cazé 1986:28–42; Goulet-Cazé 1993b.

Notes

κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν: This goal is phrased at the most general level of the options in Hellenistic philosophy, virtue versus pleasure. Both are supposed to be paths to happiness. (See t. 136A–B.) The Stoic goal is expressed more particularly as τὸν κατὰ φύσιν βίον, “the life according to nature” (Diog. Laert. 7.105).

99. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.105 (Marcovich)

= 23 DC

ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι, καθά φησιν Ἀντισθένης ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ, καὶ ἀναπόβλητον ὑπάρχειν· ἀξίεραστόν τε τὸν σοφὸν καὶ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ φίλον τῷ ὁμοίῳ, τύχῃ τε μηδὲν ἐπιτρέπειν.

And they [the Cynics] hold also that virtue is teachable, according to what Antisthenes says in the *Heracles*, and that it persists inalienably. [They hold] that the wise man is worthy of love and without error and a friend to a like person, and he entrusts nothing to fortune.

Context of Preservation

See t. 98, 135A.105.

Importance of the Testimonium

Some of the qualities attributed to virtue and the wise man are uniquely attested here, although they are consistent with other evidence. Diogenes' source for his Cynic doxography is probably Apollodorus of Seleucia: see, further, t. 135A.

Notes

τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι: On the range of positions available to Antisthenes in Sophistic and Socratic debate, which had been collapsed by the time Diogenes inherited the material, see t. 103A. A repetition of this statement is in t. 134a.

ἀναπόβλητον ὑπάρχειν: There was a controversy between Cleanthes and Chrysippus over whether virtue could be lost, expressed in this very term (Diog. Laert. 7.127; also Simpl. *Commentary on Aristotle's "Categories"* p.

402.19–26 Kalbfleisch). Here Diogenes or his source sides with the earlier Cleanthes, perhaps reflecting a genuine connection between Cleanthes' doctrine and the *Heracles* of Antisthenes. (Simplicius says that also Aristotle and Theophrastus discussed the loss of virtue, and they, too, could have used the term ἀναπόβλητον.) The term does not occur elsewhere in Diogenes. See also t. 187.12 note.

ἀξιέραστον . . . τὸν σοφόν: Compare t. 134k, and see t. 93.

φίλον τῷ ὁμοίῳ: As for the Stoics, the Cynics' community of sages is comprised of the like-minded. This might be a fictional community, not a real one. (See Goulet-Cazé 2003.)

τύχη τε μηδὲν ἐπιτρέπειν: On τύχη, compare t. 22A; on the act of ἐπιτρέπειν, t. 41A titles 3.6–7, 53.9. Compare also t. 208.22–23.

Ethics, Toil, and Pleasure

testimonia 100–134

100A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.6 (Marcovich)

= 177 DC

ἐρωτηθεὶς τί αὐτῷ περιγέγονεν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, ἔφη τὸ δύνασθαι ἑαυτῷ
ὁμιλεῖν.

περιεγένετο F | ἔφη in mg P²

When asked what he had gained from philosophy, he said the power to associate with himself.

Context of Preservation

This appears near the end of Diogenes' series of *apophthegmata* (6.3–6). On the ordering of the list, see t. 3.

Importance of the Testimonium

This illustrates Antisthenes' self-sufficiency.

Notes

τί αὐτῷ περιγέγονεν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας: The same question is put to Aristippus (Diog. Laert. 2.68), Plato (*Gnom. Vat.* no. 430), and Diogenes of Sinope (Diog. Laert. 6.63) in the doxographies and must have been a standard topic. The answers of Aristippus and Plato refer, respectively, to associating with and superiority over others. There might be a direct resposnion between Antisthenes and Aristippus (Giannantoni 1990 v.2:177). In *To Nicocles* §39, Isocrates might refer to Antisthenes' individualist interpretation of wisdom, which he opposes (Dümmmler 1889:64).

τὸ δύνασθαι ἑαυτῷ ὁμιλεῖν: Antisthenes' basic answer is self-sufficiency, with a dialogical tone. To “unify” or “associate” or “assimilate” opposing parties through speech is a characteristic talent of the politically adept speaker, from Nestor in the *Iliad* (*Il.* 1.261) to Alcibiades in Thucydides (*Histories* 6.17.1): more generally, the rhetorician “associates” with his civic audience

in Pl. *Gorgias* 484d4. In Antisthenes, “association” is the social relationship among the participants at a symposium (t. 22A, 125). The related term συνεῖναι is said of the wise rhetor’s relation to his audience in t. 187.6. Overall, “association” is normally an external relationship between different persons.

100B. Plutarch, *Precepts for Governing the State* 15 811b (Hubert)

=193 DC

ἀλλὰ βοηθεῖ μοι τὸ τοῦ Ἀντισθένης μνημονεύμενον· θαυμάσαντος γάρ τινος, εἰ δι’ ἀγορᾶς αὐτὸς φέρει τάριχος, “ἐμαυτῷ γ” εἶπεν.

But the traditional saying of Antisthenes helps me: For when someone wondered at the fact that he was carrying salted fish across the agora himself, he said, “For myself, of course.”

Context of Preservation

Plutarch cites Antisthenes in the course of explaining how his own service of sanitation control is not demeaning. He reverses part of Antisthenes’ point in his next sentence, by saying that his own menial duty is “not for myself but for my country.”

Importance of the Testimonium

This illustrates Antisthenes’ self-sufficiency in a Cynic sense.

Notes

τὸ τοῦ Ἀντισθένης μνημονεύμενον: This is probably a term for “the saying of Antisthenes that is recalled in tradition” (substantive participle), rather than “when I call it to mind” (circumstantial participle). The former suggests a looser fit with Antisthenes, who might have been assimilated to the Cynics. (On this assimilation, see t. 6, 22B.) Plutarch regularly uses the term ἀπομνημόνευμα where the doxographical tradition uses ἀπόφθεγμα (Kindstrand 1986:222).

αὐτὸς φέρει τάριχος: Salted fish is a “currency” for economic exchange in Cynic discourse attributed to Diogenes of Sinope. (See t. 172d.) This *chreia* indicates economic self-sufficiency, indifference to norms of privacy, and indifference to external “harm” such as the bad reputation arising from menial duty. (See t. 54.9, 82.40.)

101A. Xenophon, *Symposium* 6.5 (Marchant)

καὶ ὁ Καλλίας ἔφη· “ὅταν οὖν ὁ Ἀντισθένης ὁδ’ ἐλέγχῃ τινὰ ἐν τῷ συμποσίῳ, τί ἔσται τὸ αὐλημα;” καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης εἶπε· “τῷ μὲν ἐλεγχομένῳ οἶμαι ἄν,” ἔφη, “πρέπειν συριγμόν.”

And Callias said, “So when Antisthenes here refutes someone at the symposium, what will be the music on the pipes?” And Antisthenes said, “For a person refuted, I think a shrill whistling would be appropriate.”

Context of Preservation

Chapters 5–7 in Xenophon’s *Symposium*, between the cycle of speeches on “what is worth the most” and Socrates’ climactic speech on *eros*, contain short episodes on various sympotic and Socratic themes. (See also t. 51B.) In ch. 6, discussion turns to the match between sympotic music and speech, and Hermogenes is defeated in the discussion. Socrates refutes Hermogenes, whereas Antisthenes refutes others in other scenes (t. 78, 83, 185A, 186).

Notes

ὅταν . . . ὁ Ἀντισθένης . . . ἐλέγχῃ τινά: The unmotivated reference to Antisthenes suggests that he is a recognized expert in refutation through dialogue. But Callias is a hostile commentator, and Antisthenes is possibly being insulted for his failures. Earlier in the text, he has attempted but failed to refute Callias on the topic of justice (t. 83).

τί ἔσται τὸ αὐλημα: The context in Xenophon implies that certain modes of music follow certain modes of speaking, in a secondary way. There is an implied contrast to tetrameters, where the musical rhythm directs the speech. In *Rep.* 3 (398e1–399e6), Plato discusses musical modes (ἁρμόνιαι) appropriate to various emotional states and situations, including the drinking party, but bans the αὐλός, an elaborate reed instrument, from the ideal state, because that instrument is “many-moded.” He allows the σύριγξ, a simpler pipe, for shepherds in the fields. On styles of philosophical speech, see also t. 46.

καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης εἶπε: That Antisthenes delivers the answer suggests that he is the expert on the topic, even while he is the butt of Callias’ joke. Xenophon must be delivering either a joke at Antisthenes’ expense or an imitation of his typical tactic, to answer a personal insult by redirecting it toward a more general statement, as in many of the preserved *apophthegmata*. (See t. 1A.)

συριγμόν: This is a play on words: the rustic musical instrument is called the σύριγξ, whereas a συριγμός (by a dead metaphor) is a sound of derision from the audience, as in hissing or booing.

101B. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.6 (Marcovich)

= 159 DC

εἰπόντος αὐτῷ τινος παρὰ πότον, “ἄσον,” “σὺ <δέ> μοι,” φησίν,
“αὐλησον.”

πότον P F Φ : τόπον B | <δέ> Cobet

When someone said to him over drinking, “Sing,” he said, “And you, play the pipe for me.”

Context of Preservation

This is the twenty-fourth in Diogenes’ list of twenty-seven *apophthegmata* from Antisthenes: see t. 3. The *Protreptics*, Antisthenes’ symposiastic work, is a possible source. Compare t. 63–67.

Notes

σὺ <δέ> μοι . . . αὔλησον: This response is appropriate to competitive and insulting banter at the symposium. Antisthenes puts words before music, a point that could be ambiguous in t. 101A.

102. Plutarch, *Life of Pericles* 1 152f (Ziegler-Gärtner)

= 158 DC

διὸ καλῶς μὲν Ἀντισθένης ἀκούσας ὅτι σπουδαῖός ἐστιν αὐλητῆς Ἴσμηνίας “Ἄλλ’ ἄνθρωπος,” ἔφη, “μοχθηρός· οὐ γὰρ ἂν οὕτω σπουδαῖός ἦν αὐλητῆς.”

ἄνθρωπος codd. et edd. : ἄνθρωπος Janko per litt.

Wherefore Antisthenes said it well, when he heard that Ismenias was a good flute player: “But he is a bad human being. For he would not otherwise be such a good flute player.”

Context of Preservation

Plutarch’s preface to his *Life of Pericles* explains the value of observing examples of excellence. This statement comes in a digression (1.4–2.2) that explains that admirable cultural products sometimes derive from human behavior not excellent in itself.

Importance of the Testimonium

The remark implies that to be a human being is something more than to be a flute player (or to serve in any other particular role). There are parallels in Socrates’ warnings against certain brands of learning for its own sake, rather than for the purpose of becoming a better human being (e.g., Xen. *Mem.* 4.7.2). Diogenes of Sinope repeated this message more emphatically—for example, scorning the musicians for harmonizing the strings on their lyre but not the aspects of character in their soul (Diog. Laert. 6.27–28, 73).

Notes

Ἴσμηνίας: This might be the wealthy Theban Ismenias mentioned in Plato’s *Meno* (90a). However, the Ismenias who was most famous as a flute player, the

son of Plato's Ismenias, went on campaign with Philip II in 339, too late for Antisthenes to have said this about him (Stadter 1989:56–57). Ismenias seems to be a stock example for a bad flute player, even when he has a superior flute (Lucian, *Against the Uneducated Bookseller* §5).

ἀλλ' ἄνθρωπος . . . μοχθηρός: R. Janko (per litt.) would emend to ἄνθρωπος . . . μοχθηρός, “to make clear the subject.” But the subject is probably still Ismenias: the phrase “good flute player” is accepted as a predicate for him, but the phrase “good human being” is not accepted. μοχθηρός . . . σπουδαῖος: This polar opposition is probably equivalent to those elsewhere attested for Antisthenes: φαύλους/σπουδαίους (t. 71), κακούς/ἀγαθούς (t. 134a). σπουδαῖος, a term which generally carries social connotations, refers to ethical virtue in Antisthenes' testimonia (t. 134l; the similar ἀστεῖος appears in t. 106). Antisthenes might have reassigned the semantic value of this term, as he does for the similar term εὐγενής (t. 134b) and, most explicitly, for πλοῦτος (t. 82).

103A. Xenophon, *Symposium* 2.6 (Marchant)

καὶ ὁ μὲν τις αὐτῶν εἶπε· “Ποῦ οὖν εὐρήσει τούτου [sc. καλοκάγαθίας] διδάσκαλον;” ὁ δὲ τις ὡς οὐδὲ διδακτὸν τοῦτο εἶη, ἕτερος δὲ τις εἶπερ τι καὶ ἄλλο καὶ τοῦτο μαθητόν. ὁ δὲ Σωκράτης ἔφη· “Τοῦτο μὲν ἐπειδὴ ἀμφιλογόν ἐστιν, εἰς αὐθις ἀποθώμεθα.”

αὐτῶν : αὐτῶ A B E H¹ H^a | εὐρήσει : εὐρήσεις A B E H¹ H^a | οὐδὲ : οὐ B | τοῦτο D A : τούτου cet. | μαθητόν Stephanus : μαθητέον codd.

And one of them said, “So where will he find a teacher for this [trait of being fine and good]?” And another said that this was not even teachable, and a third said that, if anything else was learnable, also this was. And Socrates said, “Since this is disputable, let us postpone it for later.”

Context of Preservation

In ch. 2 of the *Symposium*, preliminary to the central speeches of the diners, Xenophon sets the scene by drawing a distinction between Socratic pleasures and those offered by the professional entertainers. Here Socrates intervenes into Lycon's concerns about how to educate his son Autolycus. (Lycon is probably one of Socrates' accusers of 399: see Huss 1999 [“The Dancing Socrates”].) Antisthenes is not named, but the possibilities for speakers here are limited, and the debate and language suggest that he is implied.

Importance of the Testimonia

These passages (103A–C) are relevant to Antisthenes' views on the teachability of virtue (t. 134a, 99), the virtue of women (t. 18 and 134r), the problem of

Alcibiades (t. 198–202), and the use of Theognis (t. 41A title 2.5). All are possible topics for Antisthenes' three-part protreptic text *On Justice and Courage* (t. 41A title 2.4), as well as his *On Good* and *On Courage* (titles 3.1–2) and *On Theognis* (title 2.5).

Notes

τούτου (*sc.* καλοκάγαθίας) διδάσκαλον: Antisthenes asks Callias about his ability to teach καλοκάγαθία, as well as its relationship to justice, later in the *Symposium* (t. 78, 83). The theme is fundamental in Socratic literature: see, e.g., Pl. *Apol.* 20a–c; Pl. *Meno* 90a–91c; Pl. *Prot.* 318d–320b; Xen. *Apol.* 30–31. In *Meno* and Xenophon's *Apology*, the father who seeks to educate his son is Anytus, who, like Lycon, was one of Socrates' accusers. Antisthenes might be the author of a lost dialogue featuring Anytus: see t. 21.

μαθητόν: The “learnability” of virtue, in distinction from teachability, is included in the range of possibilities in ps.-Pl. *Clitophon* 407b5–7 and Pl. *Meno* 70a1–4. Both these passages also include ἀσκητόν (able to be developed through exercise) as an option. Given the prominence of πόνος (toil) in Antisthenes' ethics, it seems likely that Antisthenes emphasized the “learnability” of virtue through an individual's self-directed exercises, at least as much as, if not more than, its “teachability” by the agency of another person: see t. 34, 131, 163; t. 187 and 189 might imply that reading Antisthenes' texts on Homer was a form of training. On the history of this widely discussed question of the fifth and fourth centuries, see Müller 1975:220–48; Slings 1999:106–11.

ἀμφίλογον: This term here might anticipate Socrates' declaration in t. 103B that a certain question about virtue can no longer be disputed. Antisthenes declares a thesis ἀναμφιλογωτάτη, “indisputable,” at Xen. *Sym.* 3.4 (t. 78). On the possibility that ethical debates had priority in the scope of Antisthenes' thesis οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, see t. 152B.3 notes.

103B. Xenophon, *Symposium* 2.12–13 (Marchant)

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης καλέσας τὸν Ἀντισθένην εἶπεν· “Οὔτοι τοὺς γε θεωμένους τάδε ἀντιλέξειν ἔτι οἶομαι, ὥς οὐχὶ καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία διδακτόν, ὁπότε αὕτη καίπερ γυνὴ οὔσα οὕτω τολμηρῶς εἰς τὰ ξίφη ἵεται.” καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης εἶπεν· “Ἄρ' οὖν καὶ τῷδε τῷ Συρακοσίῳ κράτιστον ἐπιδείξαντι τῇ πόλει τὴν ὀρχηστρίδα εἰπεῖν, ἐὰν διδώσιν αὐτῷ Ἀθηναῖοι χρήματα, ποιήσιν πάντας Ἀθηναίους τολμᾶν ὁμόσε ταῖς λόγχαις ἰέναι;”

οὐχὶ : οὐ D F H² | οὖν codd. : οὐ Richards | ἐπιδείξαντα F | ποιήσιν Stephanus : ποιήσει codd.

And Socrates, calling to Antisthenes, said, “Indeed people who see these performances will not, I think, still dispute that even courage is teachable, when this dancer, although a woman, charges so boldly toward the swords.” And Antisthenes said, “So then it would be best also for this Syracusan to display his dancing girl to the city and say that, if the Athenians give him money, he will make all the Athenians dare to charge up to the spears?”

Context of Preservation

This is from a private discussion between Socrates and Antisthenes on the entertainer’s show.

Notes

οὐ . . . ἀντιλέξειν ἔτι: On Antisthenes’ thesis οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, see t. 148, 152–56. Socrates seems to be joking, by applying a sophisticated principle to an unimportant situation. This text suggests that those who engage in disputes are open to changing their minds and that firsthand evidence should be sufficient to settle a question. See also t. 159.

καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία διδακτόν: On the tradition that Antisthenes held that virtue is teachable (t. 99, 134a), see t. 103A note.

καίπερ γυνὴ οὐσα: The virtue of a man and a woman is the same, according to t. 134r. See also t. 18. In Pl. *Rep.* 5 (466d–467b), courage for the dangers of warfare is assumed to be the same for men and women.

ἐὰν διδῶσιν αὐτῷ Ἀθηναῖοι χρήματα: “Paying money” is mentioned sarcastically in Socratic texts as an unrealistic way to attain virtue. (According to Isocrates in his *Antidosis*, meanwhile, public teachers of gymnastics were employed in fourth-century Athens). Compare Antisthenes’ discussion with Callias (t. 83) and Pl. *Prot.* 311d–e. In extending Socrates’ joke, Antisthenes shows that he gets it (von Fritz 1935:28).

103C. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 1.2.19 (Marchant)

ἴσως οὖν εἵποιεν ἂν πολλοὶ τῶν φασκόντων φιλοσοφεῖν ὅτι οὐκ ἂν ποτε ὁ δίκαιος ἄδικος γένοιτο, οὐδὲ ὁ σώφρων ὑβρίστης, οὐδὲ ἄλλο οὐδὲν ὧν μάθησίς ἐστιν ὁ μαθὼν ἀνεπιστήμων ἂν ποτε γένοιτο. ἐγὼ δὲ περὶ τούτων οὐχ οὕτω γιγνώσκω.

Perhaps, then, many of those claiming to be philosophers would say that the just man could never become unjust, nor the self-controlled man violent, nor could someone who has learned anything else of the things for which there is learning ever become a non-knower. But I do not recognize the same conclusions about these questions.

Context of Preservation

This statement, in Xenophon's own voice, about the experts' views on the permanence of virtue is part of his explanation that Socrates was not responsible for the vices of Alcibiades and Critias.

Importance of the Testimonium

This passage might be relevant to Antisthenes' views on Alcibiades, depending on the identity of Xenophon's would-be philosophers. It shows Xenophon's independence of thought from his sources, as well as his preference for the wisdom of Theognis, whom he cites as an authority in 1.2.20, over that of philosophers.

Notes

πολλοὶ τῶν φασκόντων φιλοσοφεῖν: Compare t. 53.4, where Ajax complains about those who “claim to be kings” (φάσκοντες εἶναι βασιλεῖς). It is not impossible that Xenophon mocks Antisthenes here; but Xenophon also uses this expression often himself.

ἀνεπιστήμων: This refers to an intellectualist theory of virtue: that virtue is knowledge and that whatever is learned cannot be erased from the mind. Therefore, virtue gained cannot be lost. Reference to Antisthenes is widely recognized because he is attributed with the thesis that virtue is inalienable (t. 99), because there is no other such ready candidate, and because of Xenophon's general use of Antisthenes (Giannantoni 1990 v.4:392). There are problems in identifying a reference to Antisthenes, however. Antisthenes' view cannot be entirely intellectualist: t. 134d says that deeds were more important than accounts; according to t. 134c, virtue required also the component “strength,” which could presumably be lost if exercise is relaxed. In t. 161, it appears that virtue achieved can be lost through exposure to others (which is Xenophon's very point in what follows at *Mem.* 1.2.20). Goulet-Cazé (1986:141–50) has tried to reconcile these problems by arguing that Antisthenes separates the intellectual and willful components in virtue whereas Xenophon subordinates virtue, from the start, to ἐγκράτεια, which captures the component Antisthenes calls “strength.” On Antisthenes' views of Alcibiades and his potential for changing, see also t. 198. Gigon (1953:45) thought that Xenophon here refers to a Sophistic thesis, from opponents of Socrates.

104A. *Gnomologium Vaticanum* no. 12 (Sternbach)

= 86 DC

[= *Gnom. Vindob.* no. 99]

ὁ αὐτὸς ἔφη τὴν ἀρετὴν βραχύλογον εἶναι, τὴν δὲ κακίαν ἀπέραντον.
ἀπεραντολόγον Wachsmuth e Diog. Laert. 6.26

The same man [Antisthenes] said that virtue is brief in speech, but vice is boundless [in speech].

104B. ps.-Caecilius Balbus, in the *Gnomologium Monacense Latinum* 27.2 (Woelfflin)

= 87 DC

inscitiae esse multa dicere, et qui hoc faceret, quid esset satis, nescire.

It is characteristic of ignorance to say a lot, and it is characteristic of the person who would do so not to know what is enough.

Context of Preservation

On the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, see t. 5. Caecilius Balbus is the name (probably a pseudonym) assigned to the author of a Latin anthology of ethical maxims composed in about the second century CE and transmitted through the Middle Ages: John of Salisbury cites him as a source, and from there his works were reconstructed by Woelfflin in 1855. The Munich codex, which is the fifth of six parts in Woelfflin's reconstruction, has forty-eight topical sections. Section 27, with six entries (all from Socratics), is on loquacity.

Importance of the Testimonium

This *apophthegma* might be related to the rivalry between Antisthenes and Plato (see t. 30, which is listed next in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*), although it is attributed also to Diogenes of Sinope (Diog. Laert. 6.26). A similar statement is attributed to Theocritus of Chios in a nearby passage in Caecilius Balbus (26.6).

Notes

τὴν ἀρετὴν . . . εἶναι (A): Giannantoni 1990 v.4:389 takes this text as a “definition” of virtue and associates it with Antisthenes’ statement that virtue is in deeds not words (t. 134d, 53.1).

βραχύλογον (A): βραχυλογία, or terseness in speech, is considered a characteristic of the Spartans (Pl. *Prot.* 343b5; Arist. fr. 13 Rose) and also of philosophers. Socrates associates its virtue with a dialogical setting, where there is continuous exchange and understanding between the interlocutors. The aphoristic mode of pronouncement associated with the Cynics depends on no definite interlocutor but implies a quality of intelligence in getting to the point. The provocation of a response is implied, but from a greater distance than in Socratic dialectic.

ἀπέραντον or ἀπεραντολόγον (A): Diogenes of Sinope begs for wine and figs from Plato and then accuses Plato of being “boundless in speech” when he fails to treat Diogenes on his own terms but instead showers him with generosity (Diog. Laert. 6.26). Diogenes tells Plato that it would be the same to say that two and two make twenty: he neither gives in response to the request nor answers in response to the question. His abundance indicates an agent obtuse to the other party to exchange, whether in discourse or another mode, Cynic begging.

105. Plutarch, *On Stoic Self-Contradictions* 14 1039e–1040a (Pohlenz)

= 67 DC

καὶ μὴν οὐχ ἕτερα δεῖ βιβλία διελῆσαι τοῦ Χρυσίππου τὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐνδεικνυμένους μάχην, ἀλλ’ ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις ποτὲ μὲν τοῦ Ἀντισθένης ἐπαινῶν προφέρεται τὸ δεῖν κτᾶσθαι νοῦν ἢ βρόχον. . . . Ἀντισθένη μὲν γὰρ ἐπαινῶν ὅτι τοὺς μὴ νοῦν ἔχοντας εἰς βρόχον συνήλανεν, <αὐτὸν> αὐτὸς ἔψεγεν εἰπόντα μηδὲν εἶναι τὴν κακίαν πρὸς τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ζῆν ἡμᾶς ἀπαλλάττειν.

ἐνδεικνυμένου Φ | ἐαυτοῖς F a A¹ (ε eras.) | προσφέρεται v z : φαίνεται g | ἀντισθένην g et fort. X¹ | <αὐτὸν> add. Reiske et post αὐτὸς Bernardakis

Moreover, there is no need to show Chrysippus’ battle against himself by unrolling other books of his, but in these very ones, he at one time brings up and praises the saying of Antisthenes that one must acquire a mind or a noose. . . . [but criticizes Plato for saying that not living is more profitable than living badly and ignorantly]. So in praising Antisthenes because he drove those having no mind to the noose, [Chrysippus] blamed himself for saying that vice is no reason for us to depart from life.

Context of Preservation

Plutarch has listed examples of Chrysippus’ self-contradiction in his doctrine and turns, in ch. 14, to contradictions in his criticisms of other thinkers.

Importance of the Testimonium

T. 133 confirms that Antisthenes was known for this *apophthegma* in the Cynic reception. Diogenes of Sinope was reportedly famous for a similar statement (Diog. Laert. 6.24 = SSR VB 303), as was Crates of Thebes (various, SSR VH 79). See also t. 32.

Notes

ἐν αὐτοῖς τούτοις: The book is Chrysippus' *Περὶ τοῦ προτρέπεσθαι* (*On Exhortation*). This might be an indication that Antisthenes offered the injunction in his own *Protreptics*.

συνήλauen: The sense of an escorted departure, as in an exit from the stage, has a parallel in t. 133, ἐξάγειν.

106. Philo of Alexandria, *On the Thesis That Everyone Good Is Free* 28 (Wendland-Cohn)

= 91 DC

ἀλλ' ἄπιστον ἴσως τοῖς μὴ πεπονθόσιν ἀρετὴν τὸ λεγόμενον· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνο τοῖς τοὺς παγκρατιαστὰς οὐκ εἰδόσι, γέγονε δ' οὐδὲν ἦττον ἐπ' ἀληθείας. εἰς ταῦτα δ' ἀπιδὼν Ἀντισθένης δυσβάστακτον εἶπεν εἶναι τὸν ἀστεῖον· ὥς γὰρ ἡ ἀφροσύνη κοῦφον καὶ φερόμενον, <οὕτως> ἡ φρόνησις ἐρηρυσμένον καὶ ἀκλινὲς καὶ βάρος ἔχον ἀσάλευτον.

ἀρετὴν codd. plur. : ἀρετῇ M : <πρὸς> ἀρετὴν Mangey :
προσπεπονθόσιν ἀρετῇ Wilamowitz | λεγόμενον : γινόμενον Q T |
παγκρατιαστῶν (in ras.) F | εἰδόσι codd. plur. : ἰδοῦσι v | post ἀπιδὼν
add. καὶ in mg. F | <οὕτως> add. Cohn | ἐρηρυσμένον A, corr. supra :
ἐρηρυσμένη H P | ἀκλινὴς H P

But perhaps what I am saying is incredible to those who have not experienced virtue: for also that episode is incredible to those who do not know pancratiasts, but, nonetheless, it truly happened. In consideration of these ideas, Antisthenes said that the good man is hard to bear: for just as foolishness is light and fickle, so intelligence is fixed and unwavering and unshakable in its weight.

Context of Preservation

Philo's treatise in defense of the Stoic thesis that "everyone good is free" opens with an apology for the counterintuitive character of the thesis, of which this passage is almost the end. Philo has just described a wrestling scene (the *pankration*), in which the aggressor delivered many more punches but the defensive contestant stood firm and won the prize. The text continues with argument for the thesis and then a series of examples of virtuous men, who include Heracles (cited from Euripides' lost satyr play *Syleus*, possibly through Antisthenes) and Diogenes of Sinope.

Importance of the Testimonium

This is evidence for the Stoic reception of Antisthenes and possibly for his wordplay. The colorful vocabulary, together with its overlap of one term

with t. 107, might be a sign that Philo is quoting Antisthenes, if indirectly. Panaetius of Rhodes also used the pancratiast as a figure for the wise man, or *vir prudens*: see notes. Philo's text also shares material with his own *Allegories of the Laws* 3.201, which von Arnim attributed to Chrysippus (fr. 676 SVF III.169). Chrysippus is a plausible link from Antisthenes to both Panaetius and Philo. See also Joël 1893 v.1:353 n.2; Decleva Caizzi 1966:114.

Notes

τοῖς μὴ πεπονθόσιν ἀρετήν: The expression “experience virtue” is puzzling, since virtue seems to be an active trait whereas the Greek verb is strongly marked as passive. Perhaps the examples of the defensive athlete and Antisthenes’ stalwart hero illuminate what it could mean to “experience virtue,” namely, to endure assault. It is unclear whether the implied addressee of the text and the implied audience of the pancratiast should enact his or her own (defensive, endurance-based) virtue privately in response to the impression taken from the exemplar or should merely be a (passive) witness to the virtue of this exemplar. The examples might suggest the former, but the parallel to the audience who does not “know” the pancratiasts suggests the latter. Colson 1941:26 offers further possibilities but finds none persuasive.

τοὺς παγκρατιαστάς: Wrestlers (παλαιστικοί) are a common metaphor for competitors in philosophy or eristic (see t. 3C), and a metaphorical use of pancratiasts fits with this. Plato's character Gorgias uses the pancration as a metaphor for rhetorical contest (*Gorg.* 456d2). In literal athletics, the pancratiast differs from the wrestler in being allowed a wider range of tactics and hence practicing a rougher, more brutal sport. Here the metaphor seems to reflect life at large, not just in eristic. In a parallel passage, Panaetius speaks of the moral agent who “lives in the middle of events” and so faces “trouble and sudden dangers constantly and almost daily” (fr. 116 van Straaten).

εἰς ταῦτα δ' ἀπιδών: The citation of Antisthenes' words as response to the vision of a scene has a parallel in t. 95. This strategy is typical of the *chreia* and could indicate that the narrative situation is contrived just to provide a setting for the *apophthegma* (Wehrli 1973). But the fit here between the apparent wordplay and the pancratiast's setting suggests that the saying was composed for this context.

δυσβάστακτον: This rarely attested word might be deliberately ambiguous and provocative. Its literal sense, “hard to lift,” gives way to a metaphorical sense, “hard to endure or tolerate,” when said of a person who is ostentatiously “good” (so Zeller 1888). Antisthenes' outspoken manner in correcting others might fit this metaphorical sense. But the rest of the statement startles by restoring the literal sense, within a new metaphor of the “weighty” versus “light” soul. Philo clearly understood this latter sense.

τὸν ἀστεῖον: This term for the ethically good person, usually associated with

social status rather than virtue, is absent from Plato but apparent elsewhere in Antisthenes' remains (t. 165) and prominent in a facetious syllogism attributed to Diogenes of Sinope (Diog. Laert. 6.72 = SSR VB 353).

ἡ φρόνησις: The term is in the title of the “lesser” *Heracles* (t. 41A title 10.2) and probably in the Greek original of t. 96 (for *prudentiam*). See, further, Brancacci 2005 (“Episteme and phronesis”).

βάρος ἔχον ἀσάλευτον: On weight and the superior soul, compare t. 191 (of Nestor). The adjective ἀσάλευτον is used for the walls of the soul in t. 107.

107. Epiphanius, *Abbreviated True Creed* 9.30 (Dummer)

= 90 DC

Ἀντισθένης ὁ ἐκ Θράκτις μητρός, αὐτὸς δὲ Ἀθηναῖος, τὸ πρῶτον Σωκρατικός, ἔπειτα Κυνικός, ἔφησε μὴ χρῆναι τὰ καλὰ ζηλοτυπεῖν ἐτέρων ἢ τὰ παρ' ἀλλήλοις αἰσχρά, τὰ δὲ τεῖχη τῶν πόλεων εἶναι σφαλερὰ πρὸς τὸν ἔσω προδότην, ἀσάλευτα δὲ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς τεῖχη καὶ ἀρραγῇ.

καλὰ Holl : κακά J | ἐτέρων Cornarius : ἕτερον J | ἀλλήλοις codd. : fort. ἄλλοις Diels : ἢ τὰ παρ' ἀλλήλοις αἰσχρά secl. Diels

Antisthenes, who had a Thracian mother but was Athenian himself, and who was at first a Socratic but then a Cynic, said that one should not be jealous of the good things of others or the bad things people do to each other, and that the walls of cities are vulnerable to the traitor within, but the walls of the soul are unshakable and unbreakable.

Context of Preservation

Between 374 and 377, Epiphanius (c. 320–403 CE), bishop of Salamis in Cyprus, active in the Christian persecutions of pagans and paganism, wrote a compendium of eighty heresies for the purpose of combating them, which he called the *Panarion* (Medicine chest). A summary of Christian orthodoxy (entitled, separately, Σύντομος ἀληθῆς δόξα τῆς καθολικῆς καὶ ἀποστολικῆς ἐκκλησίας, or *De fide* in Dummer's edition) concludes the text in some manuscripts, and Epiphanius (or the tradition) appends to this statement a second, expanded list of pagan heretics, much more extensive and from a different source than the list in his main text. This list, arranged chronologically, is not integrated into the overall anti-heretical polemic. Three Cynics are treated (Antisthenes, Diogenes, Crates), placed after Plato and three Cyrenaics and before the later, skeptical Academics Arcesilaus and Carneades. Diels (1879:175–77) assigns the source (an *optimus scriptor*) to the tradition he calls the *Placita* of Aëtius, a Stoicizing compilation

from the Tiberian period, and commends its information on paternity and nationality, which Epiphanius himself has sometimes corrupted. The overlap of vocabulary (ἀσάλευτα) with t. 106 suggests that the language is close to Antisthenes' own words.

Notes

ἔπειτα Κυνικός: There are no parallels for the notion that Antisthenes converted from Socraticism to Cynicism. (For the combination of the terms, see t. 29.) This suggests a pro-Socratic and anti-Cynic tradition, surely through the Stoics (whose entries on Epiphanius' list are the most numerous and detailed).

τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς τεῖχη: Diogenes Laertius and Stobaeus also transmit the metaphor of walls of the soul (t. 134u–v; implied in t. 124).

τὸν ἔσω προδότην: Antisthenes thinks that persons who have bad souls are corrupted from within: see t. 129.

ἀσάλευτα . . . καὶ ἀρραγῇ: Goulet-Cazé 1986:141–50 discusses the ethical implications of these terms.

108. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.6 (Marcovich)

= 92 DC

[= Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 108.1–2 Walz]

Ὅμοιοῦντων ἀδελφῶν συμβίωσιν παντὸς ἔφη τείχους ἰσχυροτέραν εἶναι.

ἔφη παντὸς F

He said that the shared life of like-minded brothers was stronger than every city wall.

Context of Preservation

This is one of the few *apophthegmata* in Diogenes' series (see t. 3) that is phrased as a doctrine, rather than an anecdote, and so resembles more the doxography in 6.11–13. The *apophthegma* is also preserved, unattributed, in a short florilegium (Cod. Paris. Gr. 1168 f. 106v no. 18) that might be descended from Favorinus (J. Freudenthal, *RM* 35 [1880]: 414).

Importance of the Testimonium

The metaphor of the city wall coheres with t. 107 and 134u–v. This is the only reference to a familial relationship in Antisthenes' literary remains, apart from the statements about marriage and childbearing (t. 56–58), a brief reference to divergent brothers in t. 82.35, and notice of the goal of fostering

good relations with family (including brothers) in t. 208.16 (if this is from Antisthenes). Discussion on how to train a son is evident in t. 103B, 173, and 208.16–17. No title in Antisthenes' catalog is obvious as a source for this *apophthegma*. Possibly Xenophon was inspired by Antisthenes in *Mem.* 2.3, where Socrates counsels a brother about getting along well with his brother.

Notes

ὁμονοούντων: In t. 107, the walls of the soul are superior to those of the city. If the same metaphor is active here, the “like-minded” brothers form a certain unity in virtue, opposed to the unity of any city. This could be the same unity that forms the core of the alternative, philosophical city, as implied by t. 134g, m, and o. On ὁμόνοια, see also Höistad 1948:107–10.

109. Plutarch, *How to Make Use of One's Enemies* 89b (Paton-Gärtner)

= 77 DC

[= ps.-Maximus 16.20/24 Ihm]

ὅθεν ὀρθῶς ὁ Ἀντισθένης εἶπεν ὅτι τοῖς μέλλουσι σῶζεσθαι φίλων
δεῖ γνησίων ἢ διαπύρων ἐχθρῶν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ νουθετοῦντες τοὺς
ἀμαρτάνοντας, οἱ δὲ λοιδοροῦντες ἀποτρέπουσι.

For this reason Antisthenes was right when he said that those who are going to survive need genuine friends or ardent enemies: for the former deter those who stray by their warnings, the latter, by their rebukes.

Context of Preservation

Plutarch turns from the benefits in insulting one's enemies to the benefits in receiving insults from them. Whereas friends tend to flatter, enemies tell the truth. Maximus, who also attributes the maxim to Antisthenes, classifies it under the title “On Warning.”

Importance of the Testimonium

The *apophthegma* is attributed also to Diogenes of Sinope (SSR VB 420), twice by Plutarch: with closely similar wording in the first clause in *How Someone Would Know That He Is Progressing in Virtue* 74c, and phrased differently earlier in *How to Make Use of One's Enemies* 82a. Cicero attributes a similar saying to Cato (*On Friendship* 24.90). See parallels in Ihm.

Notes

νουθετοῦντες . . . λοιδοροῦντες: The metrical equivalence of these participles might be intentional, and the phrasing might then be genuine to the

“Gorgianic” Antisthenes. Versions of the statement attributed to Diogenes use different words.

οἱ δὲ λοιδοροῦντες: Related ideas, that one should beware of flattery from base people and endure their scolding, are in t. 28, 86, 88–90, and 130–32.

110. Xenophon, *Memorabilia* 2.5.1–3 (Bandini)

Ἦκουσα δὲ ποτε καὶ ἄλλον αὐτοῦ λόγον, ὃς ἐδόκει μοι προτρέπειν τὸν ἀκούσαντα ἐξετάζειν ἑαυτὸν ὅπόσου τοῖς φίλοις ἄξιος εἴη. ἰδὼν γάρ τινα τῶν συνόντων ἀμελοῦντα φίλου πενία πιεζομένου, ἦρετο Ἀντισθένη ἐναντίον τοῦ ἀμελοῦντος αὐτοῦ καὶ ἄλλων πολλῶν. “Ἀρ,” ἔφη, “ὦ Ἀντίσθενες, εἰσὶ τινες ἄξιοι φίλων, ὥσπερ οἰκετῶν; τῶν γὰρ οἰκετῶν ὁ μὲν πού δυοῖν μναῖν ἄξιος ἐστίν, ὁ δὲ οὐδ’ ἡμιμναίου, ὁ δὲ πέντε μνῶν, ὁ δὲ καὶ δέκα· Νικίας δὲ ὁ Νικηράτου λέγεται ἐπιστάτην εἰς τὰργύρεια πρίασθαι ταλάντου· σκοποῦμαι δὴ τοῦτο,” ἔφη, “εἰ ἄρα, ὥσπερ τῶν οἰκετῶν, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φίλων εἰσὶν ἄξιοι.” “Ναὶ μὰ Δί,” ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης· “ἐγὼ γοῦν βουλοίμην ἂν τὸν μὲν τινα φίλον μοι εἶναι μᾶλλον ἢ δύο μνάς, τὸν δ’ οὐδ’ ἂν ἡμιμναίου προτιμησαίμην, τὸν δὲ καὶ πρὸ δέκα μνῶν ἐλοίμην <ἂν>, τὸν δὲ πρὸ πάντων χρημάτων καὶ πόνων πριάμην ἂν φίλον μοι εἶναι.”

ἀντισθένης B | δυοῖν Victorius : δύο codd. | οὐδ’ ἂν Φ : οὐδὲν B |
<ἂν> Schneider | πρὸ del. Muretus | πόνων B Φ : πόνω A : †πόνων†
Marchant

And I once heard also another discourse of his [Socrates’], which seemed to me to direct the audience to examine himself regarding how much he was worth to his friends. For when he saw one of his associates neglecting a friend who was pressed by poverty, he asked Antisthenes in the presence of the man who was neglecting, as well as many others: “Antisthenes, are there certain values for friends, as there are for slaves? For among our slaves, one is worth about two minae, another not even half a mina, but a third worth five minae, and a fourth worth even ten. Nicias, son of Niceratus, is said to have purchased an overseer for his silver mines for a talent. So I inquire about this,” he said, “whether, just as for slaves, so also for friends there are values.” “Yes, by Zeus,” said Antisthenes. “Speaking for myself, I would wish one person to be my friend more than I would wish to have two minae, but another I would rate ahead of not even half a mina. And a third I would have for the price of ten minae, and a fourth I would buy for all my money and toil to be my friend.”

Context of Preservation

In the second book of the *Memorabilia*, Xenophon presents conversations of Socrates that demonstrate his positive usefulness and protreptic practices. The early episodes focus on family and friends. This is the majority of episode 2.5, omitting only Socrates' conclusions about the lesson. Libanius applauds the episode in his *Apology of Socrates* 150: τί βέλτιον ὦν περὶ φίλων πρὸς Ἀντισθένην Σωκράτης διεξήλθε; (What is better than what Socrates narrated about friends to Antisthenes?). On the episode see also Gigon 1956:121–25 and Dorion 2011:188–91.

Importance of the Testimonium

If concern about the pricing of friends can be attributed to Antisthenes, this shows that Antisthenes perceives exchange as fundamental in a social network: even friendship can be translated into commensurable terms of exchange, until the highest level. Xenophon is fascinated by finance himself, but his depictions of Antisthenes consistently privilege awareness of two-way exchange: see t. 13A, 82, 83A. There is no obvious source for this episode in Antisthenes' catalog. However, a man named Nicias (not the famous general) was the defendant in a lawsuit on “the deposit,” for which Isocrates wrote the prosecution speech (under the title *Against Euthynus*) and Lysias wrote the defense speech and about which Antisthenes wrote a critique. (See t. 41A title 1.7, 55.) In Isocrates' extant text, a lot is made of Nicias' friends, and he seeks to recover the money from a cousin.

Notes

ἤκουσα δέ ποτε: This formula seems to indicate that Xenophon is presenting a Socratic conversation of his own composition, rather than rewriting older Socratic literature. He could still have used written sources.

ιδὼν γάρ τινα τῶν συνόντων ἀμελοῦντα φίλον: Xenophon presents Socrates conducting discussion with one party for the purpose of influencing a third party in several episodes of the *Memorabilia*, including 1.3.8 and 4.2.2. See Dorion 2011:189.

πενία πιεζομένου: Both Socrates and Antisthenes renounced the pursuit of money in order to pursue philosophy, and Socrates depended on his friends for financial support (Pl. *Apol.* 36d; Pl. *Crito* 44c). On this model, Antisthenes might sympathize with the impoverished man who nevertheless has great value and who is worth “buying” or maintaining at whatever price he commands. The lesson in the episode is addressed not to this man oppressed by poverty but to the negligent friend, whose lesson is, nevertheless, to be the sort of friend who would not himself get betrayed in favor of money (2.5.4).

Gigon 1957:123 notes a “difficult hiatus of thought” between the apparently innocent neglected friend and Socrates’ final lesson, that nobody gives up a valuable friend. The connection could be located in Xenophon’s two previous episodes, where Socrates has persuaded interlocutors that friendship is reciprocal (2.3) and that it must be tended and maintained (2.4).

ἀξία: This term becomes important in Stoic ethics, as a component in things good by nature, rather than merely preferable (Gigon 1956:124: see fr. 124–26 in *SVF* III.30; Long and Sedley 1987 v.2:349–55). If Antisthenes is approached as an expert on “values,” he might have held distinctive views that were developed by the Stoics. (See also t. 135A.105.) This episode does not say what constitutes the value of a friend, just that it has a calculus, until the highest level, where the scale of commensurability is exceeded. The following episode, 2.6, does offer a view of what constitutes the value of a friend. Basis for the Stoic position can also be found in Plato (Long and Sedley 1987 v.2:350) and so is presumably Socratic.

Νικίας: Nicias the Athenian general (c. 470–413) is a common figure in Socratic literature (see Nails 2002:212–15), and his son Niceratus spars with Antisthenes in the *Symposium* (t. 185A, 186), about the value of knowing Homer. This is the wealthy Nicias who inherited silver mines. If the Nicias in Isocrates’ *Against Euthynus* is also relevant, the connections cannot be recovered.

ταλάντου: This very high price is six times higher than the previous: the ratios from the first case to the fifth are 4:1:10:20:120. If Nicias paid this much for his slave, he was exceeding the normal scale in the marketplace and exercising the privilege of his extraordinary wealth. The slave has this high value to Nicias, but the price is not commensurate with what he is “worth” in the slave trade that assigns monetary values to people. (Antisthenes might have rejected this slave trade, and the example might have been chosen for the way it sets up the case that shows the limit of the system. If so, Xenophon missed this point.)

ἐγὼ γοῦν βουλοίμην ἄν: That Antisthenes, who allegedly has no money (t. 81A, 82), speaks with such authority about his buying price for friends has raised queries (see, e.g., Gigon 1954:122). It is not implied that Antisthenes really has these sums of money: the whole statement is hypothetical and possibly humorous.

τὸν μὲν . . . , τὸν δ’ . . . , τὸν δὲ καὶ πρὸ δέκα μνῶν: Socrates’ pattern for evaluating slaves is here applied almost exactly to friends, until Antisthenes comes to the case that exceeds the limits of the assumption that friends have monetary value.

πρὸ πάντων χρημάτων καὶ πόνων: Since Antisthenes cannot spend a sum of money comparable with Nicias’ talent, he uses his own terms to express total commitment to the value of this friend. Compare the phrase πάντα μὲν

πόνον, πάντα δὲ κίνδυνον ὑποδύονται in t. 82.35, of people who misplace their expenditure. (These are also favorite terms of Xenophon, sometimes joined with “expenditures,” δαπανήματα: e.g., *Hell.* 3.15.12.) This value exceeds any calculus of other, exchangeable goods or expenditures, in both the abstract medium of money and the real medium of toil. Friendship with Socrates presumably fits the bill for Antisthenes (t. 14A, 82.44). Whether or not Antisthenes supported Socrates financially, he made the toilsome journey every day from the Piraeus to have his company (t. 12A). Antisthenes himself is deemed by Socrates to be “worth a lot for cities and individuals to acquire as an ally and friend” (t. 14A).

111A. Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies* 2.21.130.7 (Stählin-Früchtel-Treu)

= 97A DC

πάλιν Ἀντισθένης μὲν τὴν ἀτυφίαν [sc. τοῦ βίου τέλος εἶναι ἔταξε] . . .

On the other hand, Antisthenes [situated] lack of arrogance [as the goal of life] . . .

Context of Preservation

Clement’s second book is on ethics, and §127–36 address the end for humans, beginning from a wide survey and narrowing to Plato from §131. Clement treats hedonism first and then alternatives: Antisthenes falls toward the end of this second part, after a chronological treatment of the Stoics in §129 and amid a survey of “the physicists” in §130, ranging from pre-Socratics such as Anaxagoras, Heraclitus, and Democritus to later figures such as Apollodorus of Cyzicus and Nausiphane of Teos. No true Cynic is mentioned. Negative views of the goal (terms with alpha privative) are attributed also to Nausiphane and Democritus. Conceptions that seem to be attached to Antisthenes elsewhere are in Clement’s list, attributed to others: self-sufficiency (αὐτάρκεια) is attributed to the historian of Egypt Hecataeus of Abdera (c. 300 BCE), freedom (ἐλευθερία) to Anaxagoras. The Stoics are credited with “living according to virtue” (Zeno) and “living in agreement with nature” (Cleanthes).

111B. Theodoret, *Cure of Greek Maladies* 11.8 (Canivet)

= 97B DC

ὁ δὲ Ἀντισθένης τὴν ἀτυφίαν [sc. ἔσχατον ὑπέλαβε ἀγαθόν.]

And Antisthenes [adopted] lack of arrogance [as the final good].

Context of Preservation

Theodoret's discussion is condensed from Clement's or from the same source and appears under the heading *Περὶ τέλους καὶ κρίσεως* (On the End and Judgment), which introduces his section on ethics. He reduces his treatment of the Epicureans, omits (or lacks the source for) the Stoics, and gives fullest (but reduced) treatment to those in Clement's §130, before putting his focus on Plato. The order is changed, and Antisthenes appears between Hecataeus and Anaxagoras. (In Clement, he appears just after the later Stoic Diotimus (c. 100 BCE), who had an inclusive view of many goods, and in the same sentence with the later Cyrenaics, who thought that the end for man is particular to each action: both are omitted by Theodoret.)

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes' position is surprising because it is classified by Clement under "the physicists" and because this Cynicizing doctrine, by no means false for Antisthenes but never isolated elsewhere, prevails over alternatives such as those listed above. Diogenes Laertius' account prefers the more positive, perhaps Stoicizing alternatives and leaves ἀτυφία latent in the anecdotes. But Clement clearly has a detailed, comprehensive source. On the Cynic "end," see Goulet-Cazé 1993 ("Le Cynisme Est-il une Philosophie?").

Notes

ἀτυφίαν: The terms τῦφος and ἀτυφία appear elsewhere in Antisthenes' testimonia only in t. 27. (See also Decleva Caizzi 1980.) Opposition to conceit and pretension seems to be Antisthenes' goal in his interactions with Plato, according to anecdotes that show both ethical and intellectual aspects to this attack. (See t. 27, 148, 159.)

112A. Pomponius Porphyryon, Scholium on Horace, *Satires* 2.2.95–96 (Holder)

= 191 DC

Das aliquid famae, quae carmine gratior aurem
occupat humanum?

occupat R Ψ (excl. λ) Porphyryon : occupet a E λ V

hoc Antisthenes dixisse traditur. is enim cum vidisset adolescentem
luxuriosum acroamatibus deditum, ait: "Miserum te, adolescens, qui
numquam audisti summum acroama, id est laudem tuam."

Do you grant anything to fame, which catches the human ear more
welcome than a song?

[Horace, *Satires* 2.2.94–95]

Tradition holds that Antisthenes said this. For he, when he saw an extravagant young man given over to the public entertainments, said, “Wretched are you, boy, who have never heard the highest entertainment, that is, praise of yourself.”

112B. ps.-Helenius Acron, Scholium on Horace, *Satires* 2.2.95–96 (Keller)

Antisthenes philosophus cum vidisset adulescentem multum acroamatibus delectari: “O te,” ait, “infelicem, qui summum acroama numquam audisti, idest laudes tuas,” quia plus delectamur laudibus nostris.

Antisthenes the philosopher, when he saw a young man taking great delight in the public entertainment, “Oh, you unhappy boy,” he said, “you who have never heard the highest entertainment, that is, praises of yourself,” because we delight more in praises of ourselves.

Context of Preservation

This is an *apophthegma* preserved in commentaries on Horace composed probably in the third century (Porphyryon) and fifth century (ps.-Acron) CE. The passage in ps.-Acron might depend on Porphyryon, but it seems to have an independent source for the quotation. In Horace’s satire, the verses introduce the speaker’s point that an ostentatious host might be able to display a luxurious table but could gain better fame by spending for the public good or saving for a time of need.

Importance of the Testimonium

This *apophthegma* seems to oppose the several that call public shame better than public flattery (see t. 109). The difference must be that the praise recommended here is sincere praise from a knowing audience for genuine virtue. A plausible setting is a symposium, where the Socratics disdained hired entertainment and preferred educating discourse (t. 103A). It is likely, too, that the original context for this speech or a similar one was one of Antisthenes’ Heracles stories (see notes).

Notes

summum acroama numquam audisti, idest laudes tuas: A close parallel, apparently the Greek original for this Latin translation, appears in Xenophon’s

account of the speech of Virtue to Vice before Heracles at the crossroads (*Mem.* 2.1.31): τοῦ δὲ πάντων ἡδίστου ἀκούσματος, ἐπαίνου σεαυτῆς, ἀνήκοος εἶ, καὶ τοῦ πάντων ἡδίστου θεάματος ἀθέατος· οὐδὲν γὰρ πώποτε σεαυτῆς ἔργον καλὸν τεθέασαι (But the sweetest sound of all, praise of yourself, you do not hear, and you do not see the sweetest vision of all: for you have never yet seen your own fine deed.). The speech begins (fifteen lines back) with the exclamation ὦ τλήμων (Oh, wretched one). This might indicate that Antisthenes' Heracles myth was a common source or background for both Xenophon and the Horace commentators. It could also mean that Antisthenes imitated Prodicus. (The parallel is noted in Maier 1913: 64 n.2 and Joël 1901 v.2.2:518–19.) See also t. 207C.

quia plus delectamur laudibus nostris: This last clause was probably added by the scholiast as general explanation; it might miss Antisthenes' distinction between real praise and flattery.

113A. *Gnomologium Vaticanum* 743 no. 1 (Sternbach)

= 96 DC

[= *Gnom. Vindob.* no. 95]

Ἀντισθένης τοὺς πόνους ἔφησεν ὁμοίους εἶναι κυσὶ· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τοὺς ἀσυνήθεις δάκνουσιν.

ἔφησεν εἶναι τοὺς πόνους ὁμοίους *Gnom. Vindob.*

Antisthenes said that toils are like dogs: for also they bite people who are not used to them.

Context of Preservation

On Antisthenes' prominence in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, see t. 5.

Importance of the Testimonium

This gnome supports the appearance that Antisthenes endorsed toil for its own sake, rather than as a means to a clearly conceived end. (See also t. 85, 134f.) Antisthenes seems to have developed a concept of exercise, or ἄσκησις, that was essentially voluntary toil, in service of education and self-improvement (t. 163). In this conception, he (and the Cynic and Stoic traditions that followed him) might have opposed rival ideologies of toil, such as that in traditional aristocratic athletics or traditional models of military service or service to the state. (See Höistad 1948:37–47; Goulet-Cazé 1986:53–76.) If Antisthenes advocated toil for advancing personal virtue only, if the nature of this “virtue” was unclear, and if the persons whose virtue was being developed were not aristocrats and had no obvious value to the city, he could

have been vulnerable to the charge that he advocated useless or vain toil. Such a charge is made by Isocrates (*Helen* §24) in reference to Heracles (although Isocrates elsewhere upholds the value of profitable toil) and so was current in the early fourth century. In the present image, moreover, the development of personal virtue is defensive, as development of immunity against future trouble or toil, not a means to positive performance.

Notes

ἄσυνήθεις: In *Rep.* 2 375e1–2, Plato notes the φύσις (nature) of a good dog to be gentle toward “customary and familiar” people (συνήθεις τε καὶ γνωρίμους) and the opposite toward “unknown” (ἀγνώτας) people. For Antisthenes, the humans are the party experiencing familiarity (or not), and the dogs’ treatment of them is a consequence. Although the image is simpler in Plato, it is not impossible that Plato’s use of the dog imagery is supposed to trigger allusion to Antisthenes’ theory of education.

ὁμοίους . . . κυσί: This is one of the few references to dogs in Antisthenes’ literary remains. (See t. 22B, 41A, title 9.11, and notes on 51A; Goulet-Cazé 1996.) The external toils, not the ethical subject or the figure of the wise man, are like dogs.

113B. ps.-Plutarch, *On Exercise* 185.26–186.2 (Gildemeister -Bücheler)

(German translation from a Syrian manuscript presumed to represent a Greek original)

Nicht also flieht gute Werke, wenn sie an Ungemach [πόνος?] geknüpft sind, denn Ungemach ist (zwar) den nicht daran Gewöhnten Lästig, gering aber denen, die durch es geübt sind. Den Hunden gleicht das Ungemach, denn wie jene die, an die sie nicht gewöhnt sind, beißen, aber die, an welche sie gewöhnt sind, anwedeln, so ist auch das Ungemach; es bringt den nicht Geübten Leiden und bekommt den Geübten wohl.

So do not flee from good tasks, when they are tied to toil, for toil is a burden to those not accustomed to it, but trivial to those who have practiced in it. Toil is similar to dogs, for just as they bite those to whom they are not accustomed, but wag their tails for those to whom they are accustomed, so also is toil: it brings suffering to the unpracticed and does good for the practiced.

Context of Preservation

This text appears in a Syrian manuscript from the eighth or ninth century, under the title *On Exercise* (rendered by the editors as Περὶ ἀσκήσεως) and

attributed to Plutarch. The style of the text has been deemed unsuitable to Plutarch, but there are correspondences with his *On Education of Youth*, and it seems to be a composition of the same period. This manuscript is the same that contains Themistius' *On Virtue*, excerpted in t. 96.

Importance of the Testimonium

The text consists in a series of anecdotes with settings from the fifth to the first centuries BCE that attest to the power of practice and exercise for overcoming a bad natural character. Included are a discussion between Socrates and the physiognomist Zopyrus and a discussion of Aspasia's instruction of Pericles. Because so many anecdotes from the Socratic period are included, with more detail than survives elsewhere, the author had sources with roots in Socratic literature. Connection to Antisthenes is therefore plausible. The discussion fits neatly with t. 113A and even Pl. *Rep.* 2 376a5–7.

114. = t. 172b

115. Isidore of Pelusium, *Letter 3.154* 849a PG v. 78 (Migne)

δι' ἣν γὰρ αἴτιαν Σωκράτης μὲν κωνεῖω κατακριθεὶς οὐκ ἐνόμισεν ἀδικεῖσθαι; Πλάτων δ' ἀπεμποληθεὶς οὐχ ἡγεῖτο ἐκπεπωκέναι τῆς ἐλευθερίας; Διογένης δὲ ἐν ῥακίοις ζῶν τοῦ Περσῶν βασιλέως ἡγεῖτο ἑαυτὸν πλουσιώτερον; Ἀντισθένης δὲ ῥυπῶν καὶ αὐχμῶν ἔχαيره, καὶ κατὰ τῶν τρυφόντων ὥπλιζε τὴν γλῶτταν;

Because was it not for this reason that Socrates, when condemned to the hemlock, did not believe he had been wronged? And Plato, after being sold, did not think that he had been expelled from freedom? And Diogenes, while living in rags, thought himself more wealthy than the king of the Persians? And Antisthenes used to rejoice in being dirty and squalid, and would arm his tongue against those living in luxury?

Context of Preservation

Isidore (died c. 449 CE), an ascetic Egyptian monk, is credited with some two thousand letters addressing theological issues of his time and citing pagan philosophers, in a general and undetailed way, for support. This lengthy letter (three columns in Migne's edition, about five or six times longer than surrounding letters) aims to show that εἰμαρμένη (fate) and τύχη (fortune) are not real. After the four philosophers, Isidore cites the fourth-century Athenian general Phocion.

Importance of the Testimonium

This reference shows the cliché under which Antisthenes was known to Isidore, who seems to be quoting, probably indirectly, a comic verse from the fourth century BCE. Isidore does not mention Antisthenes elsewhere, whereas the others in the list are more frequent in his letters.

Notes

Πλάτων δ' ἀπεμποληθείς: The story of Plato's sale into slavery is first attested in the first century BCE (in Philodemus, *Index Academicorum* and in Diodorus Siculus, in different versions), but it could have origins in earlier comedy or farce (Riginos 1976:86–92).

ῥυπῶν καὶ αὐχμῶν ἔχαιρε: This is a near quotation from the *Odysseus* of the fourth-century comic poet Anaxandrides (fr. 35.6 PCG), preserved in Athenaeus 242e–f: χαίρει τις αὐχμῶν ἢ ῥυπῶν, κονιορτὸς ἀναπέφηνεν (if someone rejoices in being dirty or squalid, he is shown up to be a cloud of dust); the verb αὐχμέω is derived from the noun αὐχμός, which means “drought,” and the cloud of dust activates this etymology. The passage is about reductive nicknames, in a list. There is no other surviving evidence in classical texts for the association of these qualities, being dirty and squalid, with Antisthenes, but the traits are associated with the Cynics, including Antisthenes, by their detractors: see t. 207C.2 (and, on the Cynics generally, Epictetus 3.22.89; Lucian, *Menippus* §4). If the verse in Anaxandrides was associated with Antisthenes, this would be new evidence for his currency on the comic stage (see also t. 128); its source in a play called *Odysseus* lends support. Antisthenes' *Odysseus* of the *Judgment of the Arms* is not squalid to this degree, but he has let himself be beaten (t. 53.6); there could be Homeric precedent, at *Od.* 13.434–38. See also Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.31, from the final speech of Virtue in the “Choice of Heracles,” where association with Antisthenes is likely, although this is probably indirect and also involves Xenophon's likely preference for Prodicus' “Choice of Heracles” over that of Antisthenes. (See t. 112, 94B, 207C.) Lucian's caricature of Antisthenes (*Dialogue of the Dead* 22.1, 6) shows him rejoicing in watching the pain and grief of others, though not in the midst of it himself.

κατὰ τῶν τρυφόντων ὥπλιζε τὴν γλῶτταν: See t. 172b. If the metaphor of arming is from Antisthenes, it coheres with other military imagery for the wise man's battle in current society (t. 134m–o, 53, 54, 61; see Malherbe 1983). But Isidore himself is interested elsewhere in how one fights and how the tongue is a weapon.

116. ps.-Maximus Confessor, *Common Topics* 27.26/26 (Ihm)

= 163 DC

Ἀντισθένης· Ἀντισθένης ἐρωτηθεὶς “τί ἐστὶν ἐορτή;” ἔφη
 “γαστριμαργίας ἀφορμή.”

From Antisthenes. Antisthenes, when asked “What is a feast?” said,
 “The starting point of gluttony.”

Context of Preservation

Maximus’ section is titled “On Incontinence and Gluttony.”

Importance of the Testimonium

Parallels for this *chreia* appear in the *Gnomologium Parisinum* and the *Loci Communes* of Antonius the monk: all are repetitions of this text and are unattributed (Ihm 2001:602).

Notes

ἀφορμή: A wordplay between ἐορτή (feast) and ἀφορμή (starting point), which have the same metrical shape and a common middle syllable, might be intended. Compare t. 109, 131.

117A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 9.101 (Marcovich)

= 111C DC

Φύσει τε μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν· εἰ γὰρ τί ἐστι φύσει ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, πᾶσιν ὀφείλει ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν ὑπάρχειν, ὥσπερ ἡ χιών πᾶσι ψυχρόν· οὐδὲν δὲ κοινὸν πάντων ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν ἐστίν· οὐκ ἄρα ἐστὶ φύσει ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν. ἤτοι γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ὑπὸ τινος δοξαζόμενον ῥητέον ἀγαθὸν ἢ οὐ πᾶν· καὶ πᾶν μὲν οὐ ῥητέον, ἐπεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑφ’ οὗ μὲν δοξάζεται ἀγαθόν, ὡς ἡ ἡδονὴ ὑπὸ Ἐπικούρου, ὑφ’ οὗ δὲ κακόν, ὑπ’ Ἀντισθένης.

τί P¹ F Φ : τοι B : om. D, expunxit P⁴ | φύσει ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν Φ :
 φύσει ἀγαθὸν καὶ κακόν B P F D | πᾶσιν . . . κακόν om. B | ὥσπερ P F
 D : ὥστε B | οὐδὲν δὲ κοινὸν BP : κοινὸν δὲ οὐδέν F | φύσει ultimum
 codd. plur. : φύσις B | πᾶν μὲν οὐ ῥητέον F² : πᾶν μὲν ῥητέον codd.
 plur., | ὑπὸ Ἐπικούρου om. F D | ὑπ’ Ἀντισθένης P B F D : ὡς ὑπ’
 Ἀντισθένης Φ

[The Skeptics say that] by nature there is neither good nor evil. For
 if a thing is good or evil by nature, it ought to be good or evil for

everyone, just as snow is cold for everyone. But nothing is good or evil in common to all. Therefore, [nothing] is good or evil by nature. Further, either everything thought by anyone to be good must be said to be good, or not everything. And everything [thought by anyone to be good] must not be said [to be good], since the same thing is thought by one person to be good, for example, pleasure by Epicurus, but by another person evil, by Antisthenes.

Context of Preservation

Diogenes summarizes the positions of the Skeptics in book 9, under the life of Pyrrho.

Importance of the Testimonium

Like t. 120 and 122, this passage shows that Antisthenes was counted in some ancient traditions as the foremost opponent of pleasure as a good. The example of Epicurus' and Antisthenes' opposed positions on pleasure was probably set up by the Skeptics, possibly already Pyrrho (c. 360–270 BCE), for the purpose it serves here: to claim, by means of the flat contradiction, that neither position and hence no position can be correct. (See also t. 122D–E.) They have simplified the position of Epicurus and so probably also that of Antisthenes. If this is mainly a Pyrrhonist tradition, the story might have been formulated before the Hellenistic ethical debates became complex. Cicero's virtual silence about Antisthenes (see t. 121) in his discussions of pleasure in moral philosophy (e.g., in *De finibus*) suggests that later debates among the Hellenistic schools did not assign the role of opposing pleasure to Antisthenes.

117B. Augustine of Hippo, *On the City of God* 8.3 (Dombart-Kalb)

= 111A DC (SSR IH 13)

sic autem diversas inter se Socratici de isto fine sententias habuerunt, ut (quod vix credibile est unius magistri potuisse facere sectatores) quidam summum bonum esse dicerent voluptatem, sicut Aristippus; quidam virtutem, sicut Antisthenes, sic alii atque alii aliud atque aliud opinati sunt, quos commemorare longum est.

Moreover, the Socratic disciples had such diverse opinions among themselves about this end [of virtuous action]—an issue one can hardly believe could have created factions from a single master—that some would say that the highest good is pleasure, just as Aristippus did, and some [would say] virtue, just as Antisthenes did, and likewise

different followers had different opinions, whom it is too much trouble to recount.

Context of Preservation

Preliminary to his discussion of Plato's natural theology, Augustine discusses its background. Ch. 3 is on Socrates, and the aporetic conclusion about minor Socratics points to Plato, introduced in ch. 4, as the main subject for treatment.

Importance of the Testimonium

Augustine cites a plausible contemporary antagonist for Antisthenes, rather than Epicurus. Compare t. 122B. If Augustine is not reflecting an actual fourth-century assessment of the Socratics (see Giannantoni 1990 v.4:150), this picture might have been fabricated in Republican Rome: see t. 138B (Cicero), 70C (Augustine, possibly through Varro). On the conflict between Antisthenes and Aristippus in general, see t. 33A.

118A. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.11 1152b8–10 (Bywater)

τοῖς μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ οὐδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, οὔτε καθ' αὐτό οὔτε
κατὰ συμβεβηκός· οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτό τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν.
τὸ ἀγαθὸν K^b : ἀγαθὸν codd. plur. : Aspasius de lectione dubitat
(vid. t. 120)

Some thinkers, however, believe that no pleasure is a good, neither in itself nor accidentally: for [they say] the good and pleasure are not the same.

118B. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 7.13 1153b19–21 (Bywater)

οἱ δὲ τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα
εὐδαιμόνα φάσκοντες εἶναι, ἐὰν ᾗ ἀγαθός, ἢ ἐκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες οὐδὲν
λέγουσιν.

And those who say that the man undergoing torture or falling on great misfortunes is happy, if he is good, make no sense, whether intentionally or unintentionally.

Context of Preservation

Aristotle is discussing pleasure and pain and their relationship to the final end or goal in ethics. His own view, as it emerges, is that pleasures are good, but not the supreme good. Different but overlapping discussions of the topic are in books 7 and 10. (See t. 119.)

Importance of the Testimonia

Reference to Antisthenes here is uncertain. The commentator Aspasius (second century CE) recognizes Antisthenes in 118A, but he is not sure (see t. 120). Modern commentators hold that Aristotle refers to views held by members of the Old Academy. (See Gosling and Taylor 1982.) The possibility that Aristotle refers to Antisthenes' ethical views must be considered despite its uncertainty. (See also Giannantoni 1990 v.4:400–401.) If Aristotle refers to Antisthenes, this would give him a firm proto-Stoic position in the history of ethics; t. 134, the supporting material, is already filtered by the Stoics. It could be thought odd that Antisthenes is not identified by name if he truly matters here, but Aristotle might avoid naming contemporary intellectual players from outside the Academy. (Compare the discussion at t. 68 of Antisthenes' possible position in the background to Aristotle's *Politics*.) Aristotle's catalog of six contemporary arguments for the thesis that pleasure is not at all good, at NE 7.11 (1152b12–20, directly after t. 118A), can be compared with surviving evidence for Antisthenes: the fourth and sixth arguments (1152b16–18, 19–20) seem compatible with t. 123 and 54.7 respectively; the third argument (1152b15–16) seems flatly incompatible with t. 85.

Notes

(A) οὔτε καθ' αὐτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός: This is Aristotle's standard language for opposing the nature of a thing in its own right, without reference to its circumstances, consequences, or any other properties, against its nature when these other factors are included. Here κατὰ συμβεβηκός refers to the possibility that pleasure could be a good instrumentally, as a means to something good in its own right, or consequentially, as a product of something good—and perhaps in other senses as well. In t. 126 and 127, pleasure for Antisthenes is worth pursuing and good in some circumstances, which might be κατὰ συμβεβηκός on Aristotle's terms. If Aristotle writes here with total precision, this conflict would eliminate the possibility that he refers to Antisthenes. It is possible, however, either that Aristotle uses rhetorical inflation or that he has misunderstood Antisthenes' rhetorical inflation. It is also possible that Antisthenes' view of good pleasure is not covered by Aristotle's class κατὰ συμβεβηκός but had some nature more special or subtle than Aristotle accommodates in his distinction.

οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτὸ τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν: Aristotle's indirect discourse form (infinitive and accusative) shows that this is a quotation of the rival's view. This reason for denying that pleasure is good—that it is not identical with a good or the good (the transmitted text wavers on the presence or absence of the article, as Aspasius notes in the extended context of t. 120)—would

be consistent with one interpretation of Antisthenes' linguistic philosophy, that which denies that a morally evaluative predicate such as "good" can be predicated of anything without the implication that the thing is entirely good, admitting of nothing bad. (Compare t. 78.) Even if this is not Antisthenes' view in general, the term "good," like "virtue," has a special status in his enunciations (t. 80, 134f, 134s), and he wrote a text under this title (t. 41A title 3.1), listed in the apparently emphatic first position in its *tomos*. In saying that toil is "good" (t. 85), Antisthenes' purpose was probably not only to assert that toil is entirely good (although he might have thought this); he might have intended also to gainsay, for rhetorical as well as philosophical purposes, the opposing thesis, that pleasure is "good."

(B) τὸν τροχιζόμενον καὶ τὸν δυστυχίαις μεγάλαις περιπίπτοντα: In the speeches of Ajax and Odysseus (t. 53–54), Ajax attacks Odysseus for holding that a man who is good could submit himself to torture (t. 53.6), and Odysseus predicts that Ajax will meet his demise by "falling upon" (περιπεσών) some unidentified evil; yet no good man can suffer anything bad, at either his own hands or those of a friend or enemy (t. 54.6). It seems that Odysseus is both good and happy, despite the torture, and that Ajax is not happy and (in the strict sense demanded by this ethical position) not good. When Ajax encounters bad fortune, then, it does count as bad. T. 53–54, probably protreptic pieces, allow for various levels of interpretation, including this one consistent with the present text from Aristotle.

ἢ ἐκόντες ἢ ἄκοντες: Aristotle recognizes that those who state this position might be presenting nonsense deliberately. This would be consistent with his interpretation of motive in t. 119. Such an accusation seems more plausible for Antisthenes than for a member of the Academy.

119. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 10.1 1172a28–33 (Bywater)

οἱ μὲν γὰρ τἀγαθὸν ἡδονὴν λέγουσιν, οἱ δ' ἐξ ἐναντίας κομιδὴ φαῦλον, οἱ μὲν ἴσως πεπεισμένοι οὕτω καὶ ἔχειν, οἱ δὲ οἰόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡμῶν ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐστίν· ῥέπειν γὰρ τοὺς πολλοὺς πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ δουλεῦν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς, διὸ δεῖν εἰς τοῦναντίον ἄγειν· ἐλθεῖν γὰρ ἂν οὕτως ἐπὶ τὸ μέσον.

For some say that pleasure is the good, and others, conversely, say that it is entirely bad, the former perhaps because they are persuaded that this is the case, the latter believing it is better for our lives to advertise pleasure as one of the bad things, even if it is not: for common people are inclined to it and serve as slaves to their pleasures, and therefore it is necessary to lead them in the opposite direction. In this way they would come to the middle state.

Context of Preservation

This is from the introduction to Aristotle's second discussion of pleasure in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in book 10.

Importance of the Testimonium

Reference to Antisthenes here is not certain, but the possibility is worth considering for reasons given above (t. 118).

Notes

οιόμενοι βέλτιον εἶναι . . . ἀποφαίνειν τὴν ἡδονὴν τῶν φαύλων, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἔστιν: This might be like the rhetorical exaggerations of Diogenes of Sinope, his tendency to sing in a key too high so that others will hit the right note (Diog. Laert. 6.35). Zeller 1888:309–10 n.2 makes the same comparison.

120. Aspasius, Commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* CAG 19.1 p. 142.8–23 (Heylbut)

(1) ἐνίοις μὲν οὖν δοκεῖ μηδεμία ἡδονὴ εἶναι ἀγαθόν, ἥς δόξης φασι καὶ Ἀντισθένη γεγονέναι· λέγουσι γοῦν τὴν ἡδονὴν μῆτε καθ' αὐτὸ μῆτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός εἶναι ἀγαθόν. ἔστι γὰρ τῶν ἀγαθῶν τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτά, οἷον αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ αἱ κατ' αὐτὰς ἐνέργειαι, τὰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ἰατρεῖαι τομαὶ καύσεις καὶ οἱ πόνοι· οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτων αἰρούμεθα δι' αὐτό, ἀλλὰ δι' ἕτερον καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· τὴν δὲ ἡδονὴν οὐδετέρως εἶναι ἀγαθὸν οὔτε ὥς καθ' αὐτὸ οὔτε ὥς κατὰ συμβεβηκός. (2) “οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν”· οὕτως μὲν οὖν ἐχούσης τῆς γραφῆς, ῥαδίᾳ ἢ ἐξηγησίς· οὐ γὰρ φασιν οὔτε καθ' αὐτὸ οὔτε κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὴν ἡδονήν, ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔστι †τινι† ταῦτὸν τινὶ ἀγαθῷ. (3) ἐὰν δὲ ἢ σὺν τῷ ἄρθρῳ γεγραμμένον, “οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτὸν τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν,” ἀλόγως φανεῖται τοῦτ' ἐπενηνέχθαι· εἴτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὥς γένος λαμβάνεται τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴτε ὥς εὐδαιμονία, πῶς τοῦτο ἐνδείκνυται, ὅτι οὔτε τῶν καθ' αὐτὸ τι ἀγαθῶν ἔστιν ἡ ἡδονὴ οὔτε τῶν κατὰ συμβεβηκός; ὥσπερ γὰρ αἰτίαν ταῦτα ἐπιφέρει, οὐκ ἔστι δὲ αἰτία τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἀγαθὸν τὴν ἡδονήν τῷ μῆτε γένῃ εἶναι τῶν ἀγαθῶν μῆτε ταῦτὸν τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ.

(1) αἱ κατ' αὐτὰς ἐνέργειαι Heylbut : αἱ καθ' αὐτὰς ἐνέργειαι Z
 N | δι' αὐτό Z : δι' αὐτῶν N, corr. in δι' αὐτό (2) οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτὸν
 ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν Z N : οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ ἡδονήν
 codd. plur. Arist. NE 1152b9–10, excepto cod. K^b : οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτὸν
 ἀγαθῷ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν censet Aspasium legisse Diels, e versione sequi.
 in §3 : †τινι† susp. Heylbut (3) εἴτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν Z : εἴτε γὰρ καὶ τὸ
 ἀγαθὸν N | πῶς Heylbut : πῶς Z N | ἔστιν om. Z

(1) Some thinkers, indeed, believe that no pleasure is a good, and they say that Antisthenes was of this opinion. They say that pleasure is a good neither in itself nor accidentally. For among goods, some are good in themselves, for example, the virtues and the activities according to the virtues, and others are good accidentally, for example, medical treatments (surgeries and cauterizations) and toils: for we choose none of these things for itself, but for something else and accidentally. But pleasure [they say] is a good in neither way, neither as something good in itself nor as something good accidentally. (2) “For good and pleasure are not the same” [Arist. *NE* 1152b9–10]. When the text is written like this, the interpretation is easy: for they deny that pleasure is good either in itself or accidentally, because it is not possible for any [individual attribute] [to be] the same as any good [attribute]. (3) But if it is written with the article, “For pleasure is not the same as the good” [Arist. *NE* 1152b9–10], this argument will seem to have been adduced without reason. For whether “the good” is taken as the class of good things, or whether as happiness, how does this show that pleasure is neither one of things good in itself nor one of those good accidentally? For he [Aristotle, citing his opponents] adduces this as a reason, but there is no reason for pleasure not to be good by [virtue of] its being neither classes of good things nor the same thing as happiness.

Context of Preservation

Aspasius lived c. 80–150 CE and taught Peripatetic philosophy, perhaps in Athens. His text sometimes provides illustrative detail that is historically false (Barnes 1999:2–3), but the names he supplies for philosophers show no such mistakes, as far as we can tell. (See, overall, Barnes 1999:1–50.) This passage of commentary treats *NE* 1152b8–10 (t. 118A).

Importance of the Testimonium

This is evidence that Antisthenes was a name familiar to Aspasius as an anti-hedonist. Its suggestion that Aristotle refers to Antisthenes in *NE* 1152b8 is neither reliable nor impossible: his exposition could be his own interpretation of Aristotle’s text. No commentary on *NE* 10, where Speusippus’ views against pleasure are discussed, survives from Aspasius, whose single reference to Speusippus (p. 150.3–4 Heylbut, on 1153b1, where Aristotle himself names Speusippus) rates him as an advocate of pleasure as a good. Apparently, Aspasius received no tradition about positions on pleasure held by members of the Old Academy (to whom most modern commentators refer Aristotle’s statement at *NE* 1152b8–10), and he chooses the most famous figure he knows from Aristotle’s time who opposed pleasure.

Notes

(1) ἡς δόξης φασι καὶ Ἀντισθένη γεγονέναι: The language shows that Aspasius' knowledge of Antisthenes is indirect. The exposition of this minority view continues in the plural, which means that Antisthenes is remembered as the outstanding spokesman of this argument, not the only one.

τὰ μὲν καθ' αὐτά, οἷον αἱ ἀρεταὶ καὶ αἱ κατ' αὐτὰς ἐνέργειαι: This primary class of goods forms the basis of virtue ethics, as advocated presumably by Socrates and by the Peripatetics, Cynics, and Stoics. Asclepius seems to attribute the distinction between primary (or essential) and accidental goods to his opponents (λέγουσι γοῦν), but his language in this additional sentence does not use indirect discourse, and he is probably just reciting Aristotle's doctrine, which differs from rigorous Stoicism and Cynicism for its classification of accidental goods (as follows).

τὰ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, οἷον ἰατρεῖαι τομαὶ καύσεις καὶ οἱ πόνοι: The very concept of accidental or instrumental goods might have been devised by Aristotle (and less clearly by Plato, in *Euthydemus* and *Rep.* 2) to combat the absolute ethical positions of others, such as Antisthenes or Socrates. The present list of examples happens to include "goods" prominent in the literary remains from Antisthenes. πόνος is outright called a "good" (t. 85); medical treatments, especially surgery, are mentioned (t. 124). The instrumental value of medical treatment is clear, and surely the goodness Antisthenes recognized in πόνος was also instrumental, as training. But it is not clear that Antisthenes would have analyzed goodness in the same way as Aristotle, putting toil in a lower class. Plausibly his own distinction of "real" goodness had more to do with the unmixed quality of goodness: actions were good when they shared in nothing bad (t. 78). This qualification would have nothing to do with pleasure and pain but would involve goodness only, as derived from conceptions such as strength, health, or godliness. So far, Asclepius is offering exposition of Aristotle's doctrine, not explaining Antisthenes' denial that pleasure is good. But he could be anticipating that view.

(2) "οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ταῦτ' ὁ αὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν": The quotation differs from the text of Aristotle transmitted in the manuscripts in two respects, both probably trivial. The expression translated as "the same thing" has a final ν here, an alternative spelling for the neuter accusative form, and the noun meaning "pleasure" has an article. Both features recur in the second citation of the sentence, in §3. But the second citation differs in a third way from the manuscripts of Aristotle: there, "good" (which is "the good," with the definite article) is in the dative case, not the accusative (which stands for what would be nominative in primary discourse). Diels (according to

Heylbut's report) proposed that Aspasius read the dative also in the first citation. Grammatically, either form is sound, but the sense differs subtly, and the dative fits better with the "interpretation" (ἐξήγησις) that Aspasius offers as the "easy" one, where "the same" also construes with the dative (τινὶ ἀγαθῷ). Written with all accusatives, the clause would be translated "For good and pleasure are not the same," where "good" and "pleasure" are considered as though they are symmetrical entities, which, as it turns out, fail to match up. If "good" is in the dative case, however, the translation is "For pleasure is not the same as the good," and here "good" seems to be the prior standard that pleasure fails to match. Possibly this is only a rhetorical difference. But a similar problem or ambiguity appears among moral terms in t. 54.13 (see notes), and it is not impossible that some syntax of ontology, so to speak, lurks behind these variations. Aristotle's own ontology sometimes seems to depend on linguistic syntax, especially of the dative and genitive. (See Aubenque 1962.)

ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔστι †τινὶ† ταῦτόν τινι ἀγαθῷ: This is the new information Aspasius brings to the interpretation: there is no certainty that it is external rather than his own exegesis. Unfortunately, the text seems to be corrupt, but Aspasius is clearly drawing the contrast between a particular good thing (τι ἀγαθόν), that is, an individual attribute "good," and the universal good (τὸ ἀγαθόν), which he will gloss (in §3) as either the set of good things or happiness. If the opponents' argument is that the particular good thing—that is, the attribute of goodness in a larger "individual" such as a person or action—is not identical to another particular thing (τινι), it is easy to explain, Aspasius says, what this means. In context, the second particular thing should be a particular pleasant thing. (See, alternatively, Konstan 2006:202 n.359, emending to supply the universal "pleasure," τὴν ἡδονήν, and translating "it is not possible for pleasure to be the same as any particular good.") Behind this point might be a more general one, that no particular can be identical to another particular; a fortiori, no particular good thing can be identical to a different particular. Pleasant "things" might not even be things, in Antisthenes' view: see t. 82.38, where the vocabulary of seeming is regularly used for experience of the pleasant. The present text needs supplement, but perhaps simply ἐπεὶ μὴ ἔστι τινὶ ταῦτόν <εἶναι> τινὶ ἀγαθῷ, "since it is not possible for anything [other] <to be> the same as any good thing." Surviving evidence for Antisthenes does not allow much evaluation of the likelihood that he engaged in such ontological subtlety. But see t. 187.11–12, where individuals are differentiated at the minute level; see t. 150A.5 and 150B.8, where Aristotle and Michael of Ephesus might imply that Antisthenes had a doctrine concerning noetic particulars. Aspasius seems to accept this first argument, on the level of particulars, for the non-identity of good and pleasure. Possibly this is trivially true (so Konstan 2006:202 n.358).

(3) εἴτε γὰρ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὡς γένος λαμβάνεται τῶν ἀγαθῶν, εἴτε ὡς εὐδαιμονία: The class of good things or happiness are the accounts Aspasius supplies for the rivals' two possible assumptions about "the good" as a universal. If the argument was meant on the universal level, he explains, it fails, because it neglects the possibility that pleasure can be a component in the good. This is Aristotle's own doctrine in book 10 of the *Nicomachean Ethics*.

121. Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations* 5.9.26 (Pohlenz)

laudat tenuem victum. Philosophi id quidem, sed si Socrates aut Antisthenes diceret, non is qui finem bonorum voluptatem esse dixerit.

He [Epicurus] praises the frugal lifestyle. Philosophers indeed do this, but if Socrates or Antisthenes were speaking, [this would be appropriate], not he who said that pleasure is the highest of goods.

Context of Preservation

In the fifth book of the *Tusculan Disputations* (written in the second half of 45 BCE), the interlocutors discuss the thesis that virtue is sufficient for happiness, even under conditions such as torture. The immediate context is a discussion of how even the Epicureans could defend this claim. Antisthenes is not mentioned anywhere else in the text or in Cicero's *De finibus*.

Importance of the Testimonium

This passage is valuable mostly for its negative evidence, Cicero's general neglect of Antisthenes as ethical theorist. A possible explanation is that Cicero's sources were closely linked to the Academy, where he had studied and where the more recent and developed positions of Stoics, Epicureans, and Peripatetics were discussed; whatever Antisthenes might have contributed to the rudiments of the active debates had been absorbed and developed by later figures. But Cicero read at least some of Antisthenes' texts directly: see t. 84A, dated soon before the composition of the *Tusculan Disputations*.

122A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.3 (Marcovich)

= 108A DC

ἐλεγέ τε συνεχές· “Μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖν.”

συνεχές B P : συνεχῶς F Φ | ἄν μᾶλλον F

And he used to say constantly, “I would go mad rather than have pleasure.”

Context of Preservation

Diogenes records this *apophthegma* almost immediately after the basic biographical information on Antisthenes. It is paired with t. 56, the injunction to “keep company with such women as will be grateful.”

Importance of the Testimonium

As the full set of passages shows, this is the most striking and famous evidence for Antisthenes as an adamant anti-hedonist. However, given the references to good or acceptable pleasures elsewhere (t. 125–27, 82.39), it is likely that the “pleasure” he speaks of here is a certain kind of pleasure, modeled on erotic pleasure caused on sub-rational levels, and that the comparison with madness shows why he opposed it: it conflicted with his pursuit of wisdom and the ordering of his life in a way that maximizes opportunity for the pursuit of wisdom. Only Theodoret (t. 122H, 123B) specifies erotic pleasure as the type Antisthenes privileged. Being in love is compared to madness several times in the Platonic corpus: *Rep.* 403a4–11; *Phaed.* 244b–245b. (See discussion of the fuller Greek tradition in Holmes 2010:252–59.)

Notes

μαίνειν . . . ἡσθεῖν: The first-person verbs suggest a quotation of Antisthenes in life rather than from a book. Possibly this *apophthegma* was collected from Antisthenes’ historical behavior; possibly a character Antisthenes was represented saying this in the writings of another author. Aristotle (t. 153A) knows Antisthenes as someone who makes proclamations on his individual authority.

122B. POxy 3659 col. II.25–28 (*Against the Philosophers*) (Hughes -Parsons)

(not in SSR)

. . .]αὐτὸς γοῦν οὗτος ὁ Ἀντι-
[σθέ]νης ἀσμεναίτερον ἄν
[μα]νῆναί φησιν ἢ ἡσθη-
ναι.]

αὐτὸς γοῦν οὗτος vidi ex imagine : οὗτος γοῦν οὗτος vid. Hughes and
Parsons

Indeed this very Antisthenes says he would more gladly go mad than
have pleasure.

Context of Preservation

The papyrus fragment (= 18 3T CPF), dated to the second or third century CE, is from a diatribe or dialogue against philosophers, showing that they disagree more boisterously than a house full of madmen. Whereas Antisthenes would prefer madness over pleasure, Aristippus would do anything, including going mad, to get pleasure (but the text is missing here), and Plato held some third position (perhaps that going mad and having pleasure are the same). The authorities cited, who include also the archaic natural philosopher Thrasyalces of Thasos (DK 35), otherwise known only through a tradition stemming from Aristotle, point to the later fourth century, perhaps the Peripatos, as the setting for composition. Hughes and Parsons look, rather, to the second sophistic, comparing Lucian and Dio Chrysostom, with Seneca as a predecessor. There are possibilities, as well, in the Hellenistic schools, as represented in the embedded diatribes in Cicero and Philodemus. In addition to the reference to Thrasyalces, the use of Aristippus (rather than Epicurus) in opposition to Antisthenes supports an early date.

Notes

αὐτὸς γοῦν οὗτος ὁ Ἄντι[σθέ]νης: From the image of the papyrus available from the Oxyrhynchus Online project, it appears to me that the first letter in this line is a partly preserved A, not O, as read by Hughes and Parsons. In this case, the language indicates that Antisthenes was cited earlier in the text. Antisthenes might have been known for an opinion about the color of silver (t. 150A.4), the topic on which Thrasyalces is cited just above. If one reads a repeated demonstrative pronoun, this could imply Antisthenes' presence in the setting of the text (a possibility denied by Hughes and Parsons) or as literary interlocutor. A doubled οὗτος is not otherwise attested in ancient Greek.

ἀσμεναίτερον: This alternative for the otherwise unanimous μᾶλλον and κρεῖττον could be original to Antisthenes, especially if he intended a wordplay with the stem of ἀνδάνω or ἥδομαι.

122C. Aulus Gellius, *Attic Nights* 9.5.3 (Marache)

= 108C DC

de voluptate veteres philosophi diversas sententias dixerunt. . . .
Antisthenes Socraticus summum malum dicit; eius namque hoc
verbum est: “μανεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖν.”

On pleasure, the ancient philosophers pronounced various opinions. . . . Antisthenes the Socratic says it is the highest evil. For this saying is his: “I would go mad rather than have pleasure.”

Context of Preservation

Gellius' short summary of views on pleasure has no obvious goal. His source seems to be Stoic and post-Peripatetic, and his sympathy lies with the anti-hedonists. Epicurus is the hedonist, and the list of those opposed includes Speusippus, Zeno, Critolaus, Plato, and Hierocles. His source seems, then, to be different from that of the patristic writers in t. 122F–H.

122D. Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors* 11.73 (Mutschmann-Mau)
= 108B DC

οἷον τὴν ἡδονὴν ὁ μὲν Ἐπίκουρος ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φησιν, ὁ δὲ εἰπών·
“Μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖην” κακόν, οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἀδιάφορον
καὶ οὐ προηγμένον.

For example, pleasure is said to be a good thing by Epicurus, but a bad thing by the one who said, “I would go mad rather than have pleasure,” and indifferent and not preferable by those from the Stoa.

122E. Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 3.23.181 (Mutschmann)

ἔνιοι δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἡσπᾶσαντο ὡς ἀγαθόν, τινὲς δὲ κακόν αὐτὴν
ἄντικρυς εἶναι φασιν, ὥστε καὶ τίνα τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἀναφθέγγασθαι
“Μανείην μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθεῖην.”

Some greeted pleasure as a good thing, whereas some say it is straight-out a bad thing, to the extent that one of those employed in philosophy actually declared, “I would go mad rather than have pleasure.”

Context of Preservation

Sextus uses the same statement for the same purpose in two contexts (t. 122D–E), as an argument against the possibility of ethics. According to this argument, there is no good and bad by nature, since opinions of reputable thinkers are opposed. In neither passage is Antisthenes named; in *Against the Professors* 11.74, the quotation is said to belong to “someone of the Cynics.” The juxtaposition of Epicurus versus Antisthenes appears also in t. 117A, and these examples are chronologically plausible for Pyrrho himself, the original Skeptic. The mention in t. 122D of the third position of the Stoics implies that Antisthenes' rejection of pleasure was strong and that he did not consider it merely indifferent (as one could infer from evidence such as t. 125).

122F. Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies* 2.20.121.1 (Stählin-Früchtel-Treu)

= 108D DC

καὶ Ἀντισθένης δὲ μανῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθῆναι αἰρεῖται.

And also Antisthenes prefers to go mad rather than have pleasure.

Context of Preservation

Clement's second book is on ethics, and §103–26 advocate for asceticism. In §120–21, he documents his view that Greek philosophy, like Hebrew, uses fear, threat, and warning to enforce asceticism. Antisthenes is cited between Socrates and Crates of Thebes. Zeno of Citium follows.

122G. Eusebius, *Preparation for Demonstration of the Gospel* 15.13.7 (Mras)

= 108E DC

Σωκράτους τοῖνυν ἀκουστῆς ἐγένετο Ἀντισθένης, Ἡρακλεωτικός τις ἀνὴρ τὸ φρόνημα, ὃς ἔφη τοῦ ἡδεσθαι τὸ μαίνεσθαι κρεῖττον εἶναι· διὸ καὶ παρῖναι τοῖς γνωρίμοις μηδέποτε χάριν ἡδονῆς δάκτυλον ἐκτείνειν.
Ἡρακλεωτικός edd. : Ἡρακλειωτικός codd. : Ἡρακλείτειος Mullach

Now Antisthenes became the pupil of Socrates, and he was a Heracleotean sort of man in his thought. He said that being mad was better than having pleasure. Therefore he also used to advise his associates never even to stretch out a finger for the sake of pleasure.

Context of Preservation

Eusebius discusses doctrines of being and soul: see t. 139A.

Notes

Ἡρακλεωτικός τις ἀνὴρ τὸ φρόνημα: Eusebius is the only author who associates the property “Heracleotean” with the citation of this *apophthegma*. As emended by editors, the adjective is a derivative from Heracles the hero (see t. 92–99) or from one of the cities called “Heraclea” after Heracles. (See Giannantoni 1990 v.4:197 n. 7; Athenaeus 500a also uses this form.) Presumably Antisthenes’ Heracles resisted pleasure in his “thought” (*On Intelligence* [Περὶ φρονήσεως] is an alternate title for one of Antisthenes’ Heracles texts, t. 41A title 10.2), and so Antisthenes is compared to his fictional character. Mullach’s emendation, Ἡρακλείτειος, makes Antisthenes not similar to Heracles but a follower of Heraclitus of Ephesus. This option is flatly rejected in current scholarship. However, in the discussion of the Stoic doctrine of soul that follows closely, Heraclitus’ doctrine of fire is cited in comparison to Zeno’s doctrine. (See Chiesara 2001:80–81, calling this comparison “a commonplace” crafted originally by Cleanthes.) In light of this

detail, Mullach's reading might be reconsidered. In case it is correct, either Eusebius' combination of the description "Heraclitean" with the thesis on pleasure is arbitrary, or Antisthenes had a position about change and motion that was related to his position on pleasure, as did Aristippus of Cyrene, according to Diog. Laert. 2.85–86, and as did some of the anti-hedonists Aristotle cites in the context of t. 118A. See also t. 159D.

μηδέποτε χάριν ἡδονῆς δάκτυλον ἐκτείνειν: Julian reports a Cynic injunction (in *To the Uneducated Cynics* 200d) that one should not "taste luxury" (γευέσθω τρυφῆς) even "with the tip of the finger" (μηδὲ ἄκρῳ τῷ δακτύλῳ) until one has fully mastered one's inner desires for vulgar pleasure. Eusebius' phrase δάκτυλον ἐκτείνειν seems to refer to effort expended in pursuit of pleasure, but the original meaning might be related to the risks one takes in making any contact with pleasure before the soul has become indifferent to it. (Compare notes on t. 124A-B.)

122H. Theodoret, *Cure of Greek Maladies* 12.47 (Canivet)

= 108F DC

καὶ Ἀντισθένης δὲ ὁ Κυνικός—Σωκρατικός δὲ καὶ οὗτος—τοῦ ἡδεσθαι τὸ μαίνεσθαι κρείττον εἶρηκεν εἶναι· διὸ καὶ παραινεί τοῖς γνωρίμοις μηδὲ δάκτυλον ἐκτείνειν ποτε εἵνεκα ἡδονῆς.

And also Antisthenes the Cynic—and he, too, a Socratic—said that being mad was better than having pleasure. Therefore he also advises his associates never even to lift a finger for the sake of pleasure.

Context of Preservation

Theodoret is demonstrating, in the midst of ethical discussion that occupies his final books 11 and 12, that virtue is difficult in the face of temptation. He sets up Antisthenes as a Cynic teacher whose strong advice was disobeyed by his disciples Diogenes of Sinope and Crates of Thebes, who fell into bad ways; both are famous for erotic adventures. Clearly Theodoret shares a source with Eusebius (122G), but he also cites the same verses from Crates as Clement (122F). Arius Didymus (a Stoic teacher from Alexandria who taught Augustus in the late first century BCE) might be the common source for all. Aristocles of Messene is cited later in the context as the source for scandals in the Peripatos. Compare t. 139A, where the same two writers are the best candidates for Eusebius' source on Antisthenes.

123A. Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies* 2.20.107.2–3 (Stählin-Früchtel-Treu)

= 109A DC

ἐγὼ δὲ ἀποδέχομαι τὸν Ἀντισθένη, “τὴν Ἀφροδίτην,” λέγοντα “κἂν κατατοξεύσαιμι, εἰ λάβοιμι, ὅτι πολλὰς ἡμῶν καλὰς καὶ ἀγαθὰς γυναικάς διέφθειρεν.” τὸν τε ἔρωτα κακίαν φησὶ φύσεως, ἥς ἦττους ὄντες οἱ κακοδαίμονες θεὸν τὴν νόσον καλοῦσιν. δέικνται γὰρ διὰ τούτων ἡττᾶσθαι τοὺς ἀμαθεστέρους δι’ ἄγνοιαν ἡδονῆς, ἣν οὐ χρὴ προσίεσθαι, κἂν θεὸς λέγηται, τουτέστι κἂν θεόθεν ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς παιδοποιίας χρεῖαν δεδομένη τυγχάνῃ.

But I accept [the view of] Antisthenes, when he says, “I would shoot down Aphrodite, if I could catch her, because she has destroyed many of our fine and beautiful women.” And he says that *eros* is an evil of nature, and those ill-fortuned people who are beaten by it call the disease a goddess. He shows through this discussion that the ignorant are beaten by it because of their ignorance about pleasure, which one must not accept, even if it is called a goddess, that is, even if it happens to be divinely given for the necessity of making children.

Context of Preservation

Clement cites Antisthenes amid his discussion of asceticism (*Misc.* 2.103–26), which he grounds in imitation of the divine and for which he cites support from biblical and pagan sources. He has just mentioned Helen of Troy and attacks on her by Menelaus and Euripides; after his mention of Antisthenes, there is a quotation from Xenophon’s account of Heracles at the crossroads (*Mem.* 2.1.30).

Importance of the Testimonium

This is the fullest explanation preserved for Antisthenes’ rejection of sexual *eros* and also the clearest surviving evidence for his allegorization of the gods. (See Laurenti 1962.) It shows, as well, that φύσις (nature) in his conception cannot be fully good. Antisthenes’ original text might have concerned Homer, especially the character Helen (e.g., *Il.* 3.373–420), as one could infer from Clement’s context, Theodoret’s different context (t. 123B), and close parallels of language in Gorgias, *Encomium of Helen* §19 (details below). Title 9.4, *On Helen and Penelope*, is possibly the text. Decleva Caizzi 1966:116 suggests a treatment of *Il.* 5.330 ff., although it is not clear which of Antisthenes’ titles could have discussed this episode.

Notes

τὴν Ἀφροδίτην . . . εἰ λάβοιμι: Antisthenes speaks, certainly with humor, of a public benefaction, not a private cleansing of his own desire, which probably is within his power. He speaks on behalf of all “fine and beautiful” women. (Similar public efforts are visible in t. 57 and 61.)

τόν τε ἔρωτα κακίαν φησὶ φύσεως: This is the only use of ἔρω in the testimonia that renders it definitely bad. Elsewhere, ἔρω is sublimated and good: see t. 92A–B and the conjectural 84C; t. 14A is a joke on this very question; t. 41A title 2.2 is presumably good. Sex is called ἀφροδίσια (t. 82.38). Evidence apart from this passage suggests that Antisthenes distinguished ἔρω from ἀφροδίσια in the same way Plato and Xenophon distinguished between two ἔρωτες and two Ἀφροδίται (Pl. *Sym.* 180c6–e3; Xen. *Sym.* 8.9–10). Either Antisthenes also distinguished two ἔρωτες (he would not have recognized a heavenly Aphrodite), or the tradition has contaminated his distinction. Because φύσις (nature) seems inherently to have or generate νόσος (disease), it cannot be fully good for Antisthenes, as it would be according to a simple antithesis between φύσις and νόμος such as is sometimes attributed to the Cynics (e.g., Heinimann 1945:42). φύσις itself might have two meanings, one animal and one divine, for Antisthenes: see, further, comments on the second *tomos* at t. 41A.

ἥς ἤπτους ὄντες: In Gorgias, *Encomium of Helen* §19, Helen’s eye is said to be “pleased” by the body of Alexander (τῷ τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου σώματι τὸ τῆς Ἑλένης ὄμμα ἡσθέν): the eye then gave desire to the soul. In the next sentence, the speaker asks how someone “lesser” (ὁ ἥσσων) than Eros is able to push it away. A pun or semantic connection between ἡσθέν (pleasured) and ἡσσωθέν (beaten) might have been intended by Gorgias or perceived by Antisthenes. The idea of being beaten by pleasure or Aphrodite is common: compare Ar. *Clouds* 1081; Democritus DK 68B214 (see, further, Holmes 2010:210 n.63). Eros is figured as a kind of slavery by the Cynics: compare Diogenes of Sinope in Diog. Laert. 6.66, and see Zeller 1888:306–7 and n.1.

οἱ κακοδαίμονες: This term was current in the late fifth century (Aristophanes used it of Socrates in *Clouds* 104) and may be a play on Socrates’ beneficent guiding spirit, the δαιμόνιον. It could then be Antisthenes’ term, though it fits also with the theology of Clement and Theodoret. Antisthenes could be assigning the most radical cause of those who divinize love to a previous divine force, albeit a malevolent one. Or he could be using the term as a joke.

θεὸν τὴν νόσον καλοῦσιν: Some humans, those who are controlled by this “evil” in nature, make it into a goddess by calling it one. On the face of it, this is a statement about popular culture, language, and religion, not about poetry. Socrates similarly refers, in Xen. *Mem.* 1.3.13, to an erotic element as “this

beast, which people call beautiful and youthful” (τοῦτο τὸ θήριον, ὃ καλοῦσι καλὸν καὶ ὠραῖον). See also discussion of the “many gods” in t. 179 and 180. The likely connection to Homer’s Aphrodite and Helen raises the possibility that the poet’s voice is also responsible for generation of this fiction. Gorgias, by contrast, offers the possibilities, first, that *eros* is really divine (εἰ μὲν θεὸς <ὦν ἔχει> θεῶν θείαν δύνανται . . .) and, second, that it is a “human illness and ignorance of the soul” (ἀνθρώπινον νόσημα καὶ ψυχῆς ἀγνόημα), which is therefore no “error” but “bad luck” without ethical liability.

τοὺς ἀμαθεστέρους δι’ ἀγνοίαν ἡδονῆς: The phrasing is close to Gorgias’ ψυχῆς ἀγνόημα.

οὐ χρὴ προσίσθαι: There is ethical liability to resist this disease, according to Antisthenes. T. 58 suggests that there might be a positive ethical liability also, to love some people (in the sublimated sense): μόνον γὰρ εἶδέναι τὸν σοφὸν τίνων χρὴ ἐρᾶν.

κἂν θεὸς λέγεται: Many things are widely “said” to be the case, in Antisthenes’ view, and often these must be actively resisted or refined. See t. 149A.2, 179B, 72A.

ἐπὶ τὴν τῆς παιδοποιίας χρείαν: A parallel is in t. 58, and title 2.2 in Antisthenes’ catalog links procreation with *eros*, although the term ἐρωτικός in the title could be the language of a bibliographer, not Antisthenes.

θεόθεν . . . δεδομένη: Clement concedes in the context that pleasures are divinely given, but only to accompany what is necessary. Whether Antisthenes, too, had this view cannot be assessed from surviving evidence. If Brancacci 1997 (“Le modèle animal”) is correct in conjecturing that Antisthenes was Xenophon’s source for his discussion of the benevolent creator god in *Mem.* 1.4 and 4.3, he might have agreed with Clement, that erotic pleasure has this divine purpose.

123B. Theoderet, *Cure of Greek Maladies* 3.53 (Canivet)

= 109B DC

αὐτίκα τοίνυν Ἀντισθένης, ὁ Σωκράτους ἐταῖρος καὶ Διογένης διδάσκαλος, τὴν σωφροσύνην περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενος καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν μυστατόμενος, τοιάδε περὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης λέγεται φάναι· “ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν Ἀφροδίτην κἂν κατατοξεύσαιμι, εἰ λάβωμι, ὅτι πολλὰς ἡμῶν καλὰς κάγαθὰς γυναικας διέφθειρεν.” τὸν δὲ γε ἔρωτα κακίαν ἐκάλει τῆς φύσεως, ἧς ἦττους ὄντες οἱ κακοδαίμονες, θεὸν τὴν νόσον καλοῦσιν. ταύτῃ τοι μανῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθῆναι ἥρεϊτο.

κἂν κατατοξεύσαιμι Raeder e Clem. (123A) : κἂν τοξεύσαιμι K :

κατατοξεύσαιμι ἄν B L V : κατατοξεύσαιμι M S C

Immediately in any case Antisthenes, the companion of Socrates and teacher of Diogenes, who values self-control foremost and feels disgust at pleasure, is said to have made the following remark about Aphrodite: “I myself would shoot down Aphrodite, if I could catch her, because she has destroyed many of our fine and beautiful women.” And he called *eros* an evil of nature: and those ill-fortuned people who are beaten by it call the disease a goddess. And for this reason, of course, he preferred to “be mad rather than have pleasure.”

Context of Preservation

Theodoret discusses Greek rationalist interpretation and allegory amid his broader discussion of supernatural beings, with the intent to dismiss Greek “theology” as fallacious. Antisthenes is the first example given for Greek allegorism, which is said to cover an array of Olympian gods and to contain many sorts of nonsense and self-contradiction.

Notes

τὴν σωφροσύνην περὶ πλείστου ποιούμενος καὶ τὴν ἡδόνην μυσσάττομενος: This is the only testimonium suggesting that self-control (σωφροσύνη) is the leading virtue for Antisthenes; t. 161 might support this. See t. 77 for the focus on courage (ἀνδρεία), and compare also t. 78. The term is not in Antisthenes’ catalog, whereas courage, the good, the fine, and justice are there. ταύτῃ τοι μανῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἡσθῆναι ἡρεῖτο: Theodoret explicitly connects Antisthenes’ paradox of t. 122 with bodily *eros*.

124A. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.6.43 (Hense)

= 112A DC

Ἀντισθένους· Ἀντισθένης ἔλεγεν τὰς μὴ κατὰ θύρας εἰσιούσας ἡδονὰς ἀναγκαῖον μὴ κατὰ θύρας πάλιν ἐξιέναι· δεῖσει οὖν τμηθῆναι ἢ ἐλλεβορισθῆναι.

lemm. hab. M A : sine lemm. L | θύρας (bis) L M^d : θύραν A | δεῖσει L M^d A : δεῖσειν tacite Gesner² | ἐλλεβορισθῆναι codd.

From Antisthenes. Antisthenes used to say that pleasures that do not come in through the doors necessarily do not go back out through the doors. There will be need, then, to get them out by surgery or hellebore.

124B. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.18.26 (Hense)

= 112B DC

τὰς μὴ κατὰ θύρας, φησὶν ὁ Ἀντισθένης, εἰσιούσας ἀπολαύσεις δεήσει
ἢ σχασθῆναι ἢ ἐλλεβορισθῆναι ἢ πάντως λιμαγχονηθῆναι, κακὰς
ἀμοιβὰς ἐκτίνοντα τῆς προγεγενημένης ἀπληστίας ἔνεκα μικρὰς καὶ
ὀλιγοχρονίου ἡδονῆς.

θύρας S M^d A : θύραν Hense | σχασθῆναι S A : χασθῆναι M^d | ἢ ἐλλ.
A1 mg. ἐλλεβορισθῆναι S M^d | λιμαγχονηθῆναι S A : λιμαγχονισθῆναι
M^d | ἐκτίνοντα S (?) : ἐκτείνοντα M : ἐκτείνοντα cum ἱ superscripto A

Enjoyments that do not come in through the doors, Antisthenes says, will need to be purged by an incision or hellebore or strangled by hunger, [each an intervention] that pays back bad compensations for small and short-lived pleasure caused by previous insatiate desire.

Context of Preservation

Stobaeus' third book begins with sections titled "On Virtue" and "On Vice" and then proceeds through aspects of virtue in paired sections, those with odd numbers being about a virtue and those with even numbers, the corresponding vice. These passages come, respectively, under the headings *Περὶ ἀκολασίας* (On lack of discipline) and the similar *Περὶ ἀκρασίας* (On lack of self-control). There is overlap of topic within these sections, but the passages collected are largely different. The two passages from Antisthenes are similar enough that they are probably versions of the same statement.

Importance of the Testimonia

T. 124–27 add complexity to the reconstruction of Antisthenes' views on pleasure, which must recognize types that are good (or accompany something good) in at least some ways. The intruding pleasures in t. 124 are contrasted, by implication, with those that are admitted legitimately, through the doors of the soul, which is probably the rational faculty. The "doors" may be something like self-respect (ἡ αἰδώς), such as Antisthenes constructs through his brand of exercise and toil in good and bad reputation. Epictetus refers to αἰδώς as the Cynic's replacement for a house and its doors (and so on): ὁ Κυνικὸς δ' ἀντὶ πάντων τούτων ὀφείλει τὴν αἰδῶ προβεβλῆσθαι. . . . τοῦτο οἰκία ἐστὶν αὐτῷ, τοῦτο θύρα . . . (3.22.15). The present passages use technical vocabulary and colorful metaphors, even mixing two strong metaphors of the house and the diseased patient. If they are close to textual quotations from Antisthenes, they show a style more marked in these respects than t. 53–54. Metaphors are typical of *apophthegmata*, which are usually understood to be products of oral

transmission (see Kindstrand 1986:240, citing Diogenes Laertius' reference at 5.34 to the "unwritten voice," ἄγραφος φωνή, of the *apophthegma*), but the dense abstract vocabulary is not.

Notes

κατὰ θύρας: This metaphor figures the mind or soul as a house or building, rather than a city, which would have been implied by κατὰ πύλας. On the soul figured as a city, with walls (τείχη), see t. 109, 134, 54.7. On the soul or the whole individual person possibly figured as a house (οἰκία) with its walls (τοιχοί) and roof (ὄροφοι), see t. 82.38.

ἡδονάς (A) / ἀπολαύσεις (B): These are results of a previous act (or thought), not desires for the future. (Compare Xen. *Mem.* 1.3.8–13, where Socrates warns Xenophon and Critobulus against a kiss.) Presumably they are dangerous because they generate desire for more such pleasures.

τμηθῆναι ἢ ἐλλεβορισθῆναι (A) / σχασθῆναι ἢ ἐλλεβορισθῆναι ἢ πάντως λιμαγχονηθῆναι (B): These are strongly medical metaphors. For the philosophical teacher as doctor of the soul, see t. 167, 169, 174, 187.9, 53.4. Hellebore is an emetic, causing vomiting; it is also said, in later sources, to be a cure for madness (Horace, *Sat.* 2.3.166); compare t. 206, where it is a cure for attraction to pleasure. The cutting in question is probably bloodletting, as implied in σχασθῆναι, not surgery, as implied in τμηθῆναι: classical Greek doctors did not perform surgery. λιμαγχονηθῆναι is literally "to be strangled by hunger," as though food is analogous to breath. The metaphor is absorbed in the technical language of the Hippocratic corpus, where the term means "be weakened or reduced by low diet." This is a medical treatment in *On Joints* 81, although it is elsewhere a symptom. To "reduce the diet" of a pleasure might be to eliminate a desire by refusing to satisfy it. The other metaphors are harder to rationalize, and they might indicate desperation and the unlikelihood that such pleasures can be expelled at all. Diogenes of Sinope is said to have recommended λιμός (fasting) or βρόχος (the noose) as a solution for ἔρωσ (love) (Diog. Laert. 6.86).

κακὰς ἀμοιβὰς ἐκτίνοντα τῆς προγεγενημένης ἀπληστίας ἔνεκα μικρᾶς καὶ ὀλιγοχρονίου ἡδονῆς (B): This implies, perhaps, a calculus of pleasures, such as Socrates discusses in Plato's *Protagoras*, *Republic*, and *Phaedo*. The dimensions of pleasure here would be magnitude (μικρά), in some presumably non-temporal sense, and longevity (ὀλιγοχρόνιος).

125. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.1.28 (Hense)

= 93 DC

[= ps.-Maximus 12.37/36 Ihm]

Ἀντισθένης· οὔτε συμπόσιον χωρὶς ὁμιλίας οὔτε πλοῦτος χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἡδονὴν ἔχει.

Ἀντισθένης add. Trincavellus : sine lemm. hab. M A | χωρὶς A Tr
: ἄνευ M^d | ὁμιλίας codd. Parisini (A et al.) : ὁμονοίας cet. | χωρὶς . . .
ἔχει om. A

From Antisthenes: Neither a symposium without community nor wealth without virtue brings pleasure.

Context of Preservation

Stobaeus' lengthy ch. 1 in book 3 is titled "On Virtue." Maximus' section is titled "On Wealth and Poverty and Love of Money." The maxim is attributed to Socrates later in the same chapter of Stobaeus (3.1.87) and to Plutarch or the Athenian general Phocion elsewhere in the tradition (Arsenius).

Importance of the Testimonium

The implication is that real pleasure comes from community (of the wise) and virtue, not from the symposium or the wealth on which these good things supervene. There seem to be three levels: the symposium and the wealth, whose value is not given (but is presumably indifferent); the community and virtue, which are good (as indicated in other evidence); and the pleasure, whose value is also not given. Antisthenes' own symposiastic text (t. 41A title 2.4) might be the source.

Notes

συμπόσιον / πλοῦτος: There is no indication that wealth is bad, as the testimonia on luxury (t. 114–15), love of wealth (t. 80), and poverty (t. 81–82) might imply. This saying of Antisthenes is not proto-Cynic. It suggests that the passages in Xenophon implying that Antisthenes held some positive attitudes toward society (t. 13A, 110, possibly 72B) are not entirely farces, but reflect the real Antisthenes in some way.

χωρὶς ὁμιλίας / χωρὶς ἀρετῆς: Community (of the wise) and virtue are clearly good in Antisthenes' view generally, and the terms occur often. (See t. 22A, 100, 134.)

126. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.29.65 (Hense)

= 113 DC

Ἀντισθένης· ἡδονὰς τὰς μετὰ τοὺς πόνους διωκτέον, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ τὰς πρὸ τῶν πόνων.

lemm. hab. S M A

From Antisthenes: Pleasures after toils should be pursued, but not those before toils.

Context of Preservation

Stobaeus' section is titled Περὶ φιλοπονίας, "On Fondness for Work." On his general practices of citation, see t. 79.

Importance of the Testimonium

With t. 127, this is the most positive assessment of pleasure in the evidence for Antisthenes. Both might be ultimately from *Heracles*.

Notes

τὰς μετὰ τοὺς πόνους: This implies either the rewards for which the toil was the means, such as being with Socrates after the hike from the Piraeus (t. 12A), or the heightened enjoyment after abstinence, if abstinence can be called a "toil." Abstinence (from food and drink) is often recommended by the Socrates of Plato and Xenophon as an induction of pleasure. It is unclear whether pleasure necessarily follows every toil, or whether this is a statement about some toils. The temporal sequence implies an exchange or succession of toils and pleasures, in reverse direction from that in t. 124B.

127A. Athenaeus, *Wise Men at Dinner* XII 513a (Kaibel)

= 110 DC

Ἀντισθένης δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φάσκων προσέθηκεν τὴν ἀμεταμέλητον.

Antisthenes, when he claimed that pleasure is a good, added, "when it is not regretted."

Context of Preservation

Athenaeus' twelfth book is presented in a uniform authorial voice, rather than in the voices of dinner guests he has used previously. The topic is pleasure, and Megaclides, a Peripatetic literary critic active probably in the late fourth or early third century BCE (Janko 2000:138–43), is cited at length as advocate for a figure of Heracles who indulged in pleasures, not Heracles the soldier. After Megaclides blames the lyric poets Stesichorus and Xanthus for inventing Heracles' fiercer iconography, he immediately cites this opinion of Antisthenes. The Heracles topic ends there, and Megaclides goes on to the hedonism of Odysseus, documented from *Od.* 9.5–11, where Odysseus admires the banquet of the Phaeacians. This turns out to be not Odysseus'

sincere opinion but a special communication to the Phaeacians, whom he must please in order to secure a homecoming. Because of the sequence and because of the parallel with t. 188 (where this explanation is attributed to Aristotle, though Antisthenes is cited also; possibly both critics used it), it is plausible that the example of Odysseus is borrowed also from Antisthenes. On Odysseus' alleged hedonism in the Cynic tradition, see t. 53.6 notes.

Importance of the Testimonium

This is the only evidence that attributes to Antisthenes an outright statement that pleasure is good. In its original context (probably one of the Heracles texts or possibly a treatment of Odysseus), it could have been meant as a paradox, which the added last word helps to resolve. But see t. 82.39, where Xenophon portrays Antisthenes as saying that his lifestyle brings him pleasure, even more than what is right. The kind of pleasure in question is hard to identify, but according to the citation from Megaclicides, Heracles enjoyed sex, food, drink, baths, and warm beds, and Odysseus enjoyed the banquet. The phrase ἡδοναὶ ἀμεταμέλητοι in *Letter* 10 of ps.-Crates refers to moderate wine drinking. If the reference to Antisthenes should be read with the discussion of Odysseus rather than Heracles, this passage suggests that Megaclicides might have followed Antisthenes as a literary critic.

Notes

Ἀντισθένης . . . φάσκων προσέθηκεν: The apophthegmatic form might indicate that Megaclicides had an intermediate source for Antisthenes; but his otherwise direct citation of the literature he discusses, as well as his historical position, favors direct knowledge.

ἀμεταμέλητον: Plato uses this word once, when the title character at *Timaeus* 59d1 refers to indulgence in a “likely account” of cosmic creation (rather than rigorous discussion of eternal objects) as an “unregrettable pleasure”: ἦν ὅταν τις ἀναπαύσεως ἕνεκα τοὺς περὶ τῶν ὄντων αἰὶ καταθέμενος λόγους, τοὺς γενέσεως περὶ διαθεώμενος εἰκότας ἀμεταμέλητον ἡδονὴν κτᾶται, μέτριον ἂν ἐν τῷ βίῳ παιδιὰν καὶ φρόνιμον ποιοίτο (When, for the sake of a rest, one puts aside the accounts about what always is and surveys instead the likely accounts about creation, and so gets an unregrettable pleasure, he would make a moderate and sensible amusement in his life.) Possibly there is a parody of Antisthenes here, if Antisthenes counted fiction writing as a harmless pleasure. Plato's passage may refer also to Gorgias (παιδιὰν) and to “Heraclitean” ontological preferences (τοὺς περὶ τῶν ὄντων αἰὶ καταθέμενος λόγους), both plausible associations with Antisthenes. *Letter* 10 of ps.-Crates (cited above) points to wine drinking as the most obvious source of unregrettable pleasure.

127B. Eustathius, *Commentary on Homer's "Iliad"* 10.116 p. 588.3–5 (van der Valk)

ὡς ἐξεῖναι εἰπεῖν, ὅτι καλῶς Ἀντισθένης τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι φάσκων προσέθηκε τὴν ἀμεταμέλητον. ἡ τοιαύτη γὰρ μόνη ἀγαθόν, οὐ μὴν ἅπαντα ἡδονή.

Therefore it is possible to say that Antisthenes did well, when he was claiming that pleasure is a good, to add “when it is not regretted.” For only this kind of pleasure is a good, not, indeed, every pleasure.

Context of Preservation

Eustathius digresses into discussion of Paris’ responsibility for the Trojan War through his choice of pleasure. Empedocles is cited for blaming Aphrodite, and Antisthenes’ doctrine follows.

Importance of the Testimonium

This could suggest that Homeric discussion, rather than a Heracles text, was the context for Antisthenes’ statement about unregretted pleasure. He could have used the same concept in multiple texts. Compare t. 141B, where Eustathius again overlaps closely with Athenaeus in the phrasing of a report about Antisthenes, and possibly Athenaeus is the source here also.

128. Plutarch, from *On Love* fr. 134 (Sandbach)

[= Stob. 4.20.34]

πάλιν δὲ τὸ συνουσίᾳ τὸν ἐρώντα μὴ κρατεῖσθαι, διὰ τὸ τῇ αὐτῇ συγγενόμενον ἄλλον ἀπαλλαγῆναι καὶ καταφρονῆσαι, τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν, οἷον εἰ λέγοι τις μὴδὲ χυμῶν ἡδονῇ δεδουλῶσθαι Φιλόξενον τὸν ὀψοφάγον, ὅτι τῶν αὐτῶν Ἀντισθένης γευσάμενος οὐδὲν ἔπαθε τοιοῦτον· μὴδ’ ὑπὸ οἴνου μεθύειν Ἀλκιβιάδην, ὅτι Σωκράτης πίνων τὸν ἴσον οἶνον ἔνηφεν.

ἄλλον <μὲν δουλοῦσθαι ἄλλον δ’> ἀπαλλαγῆναι Wyttenbach : “alter irretiat” Gesner : post καταφρονῆσαι lac. stat. Meineke

And again, the argument that the lover is not overpowered by intercourse, because another lover who lies with the same woman walks away and spurns her, is the same sort of argument as if someone should say that Philoxenus the delicacy eater is not enslaved to the pleasure of flavors, because Antisthenes, when he took a taste of the same things, experienced nothing of this kind, or that Alcibides does not get drunk from wine, because Socrates, when drinking equivalent wine, was sober.

Context of Preservation

Stobaeus' excerpt from Plutarch's lost *On Love* is an exegesis of a fragment from a comic poet, said by Plutarch to be Menander (fr. 541 Koch = 568 Koerte; authorship is doubted by more recent editors of comic fragments), that rejects the senses as the cause of love and calls it a νόσος ψυχῆς (disease of the soul) that is καιρός (opportunity bound). The contrast between Antisthenes and Philoxenus could come from a single lost written story or Socratic dialogue, just as the contrast between Alcibiades and Socrates is probably from Plato's *Symposium*.

Importance of the Testimonium

This might show that Antisthenes was used as an example of the ascetic character in some fourth-century literature, whether a Socratic dialogue or a comedy.

Notes

δεδουλῶσθαι: "Slavery" is a common Socratic metaphor for attachment to pleasure in general and to erotic desires in particular: see t. 79 and 80; Xen. *Mem.* 1.3.11. The comic fragment on which Plutarch comments asks to what the lover is enslaved and proceeds to dismiss vision and συνουσία (as anticipated), because these experiences do not have the same causal powers over everyone. Plutarch's answer counters that some people are enslaved to their senses and that this interpretation of love is not disproved by the fact that others are not.

Φιλόξενον τὸν ὀψοφάγον: Probably the same Philoxenus is mentioned repeatedly in Athenaeus' *Wise Men at Dinner* (e.g., 5f–6b and 6e–7a, both in passages attributed to Peripatetic sources). If this is the dithyrambic poet Philoxenus of Cythera (*RE* 23), he lived c. 435–380 and was the subject of stories involving Dionysius I of Syracuse, as were many of the Socratics. (See t. 206–7.)

129. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.5 (Marcovich)

= 82 DC

[= Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 107.25–27 Walz]

ὥσπερ ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰοῦ τὸν σίδηρον, οὕτως ἔλεγε τοὺς φθονέρους ὑπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου ἥθους κατεσθίεσθαι.

Just as iron is eaten up by rust, he [Antisthenes] used to say that jealous people are eaten up in the same way by their own character.

Context of Preservation

This *apophthegma* appears near the middle of Diogenes' list: see t. 3. The same saying is also attributed to Cleitarchus the Peripatetic in most manuscripts of ps.-Maximus; one assigns it to Plutarch (47.31/54.38 Ihm).

Importance of the Testimonium

The internal self-destruction of the jealous character is consistent with t. 100 and 107. Metaphors and images of metal occur also in t. 83A, 150A.4, 165, 169, and 170.4.

Notes

τὸν σίδηρον: Men of iron are the lowest of the five classes in Hesiod, *Works and Days* 174–78 and in Pl. *Rep.* 3 415a–c. Corruption of iron by rust is noted, among other forms of corruption proper to a given thing, in *Rep.* 10 609a2, where the goal is to show that the soul, too, is corrupted by injustice and other vice.

[130. ps.-Maximus Confessor, *Common Topics* 11.24/31 (Ihm)]

[= Antonius 1.52.22 Migne]

ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς “Τί τῶν θηρίων κάκιστα βλάπτει;” ἔφη “Τῶν μὲν ἀγρίων συκοφάντης, τῶν δὲ ἡμέρων κόλαξ.”

The same man, when asked “Which of the beasts harms the worst?” said, “Among the wild ones, the informer; among the tame, the flatterer.”

This is an *apophthegma* attributed in ancient sources to Diogenes of Sinope only. See Diog. Laert. 6.51 and SSR VB 423. It is close in thought to t. 131, with which it is adjoined in Antonius, and there is no reason it could not be associated with Antisthenes, but no ancient source makes this attribution.

131A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.4 (Marcovich)

= 84A DC

κρεῖττον ἔλεγε, καθά φησιν Ἑκάτων ἐν ταῖς Χρεῖαις, εἰς κόρακας ἢ εἰς κόλακας ἐμπεσεῖν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ νεκρούς, οἱ δὲ ζῶντας ἐσθίουσιν.

He said it was better, according to what Hekaton says in his *Chreiai*, to be thrown in among the crows than among the flatterers. For the former eat corpses, the latter, living persons.

131B. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.14.17 (Hense)

= 84B DC

[= ps.-Maximus 11.26/33 Ihm; Antonius 1.52.24 Migne]

Ἀντισθένης. Ἀντισθένης αἰρετώτερόν φησιν εἰς κόρακας ἐμπεσεῖν ἢ εἰς κόλακας· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀποθανόντος τὸ σῶμα οἱ δὲ ζῶντος τὴν ψυχὴν λυμαίνονται.

lemm. hab. M A, om. S Br Mac | Ἀντισθένης et φησιν om. Br | ζῶντος suppl. A²

From Antisthenes. Antisthenes says it is preferable to be thrown in among the crows than among the flatterers. For the former make spoil of the body of the dead, the latter, the soul of the living.

Context of Preservation

This *apophthegma* appears in the first half of Diogenes' list: see t. 3. Stobaeus' section is titled "On Flattery" (Περὶ κολακείας), and ps.-Maximus' section has the same title.

Importance of the Testimonium

This is one of the clearest examples of punning wordplay (εἰς κόρακας . . . εἰς κόλακας), if the phrasing is from Antisthenes. The same joke is in the opening scene of Aristophanes' *Wasps*. Diogenes' citation of Hekaton's *Chreiai* (c. 100 BCE) as a source supports attribution to Antisthenes. The *apophthegma* is attributed also to Diogenes of Sinope (Athenaeus 254c) and Demosthenes (*Gnom. Vat.* no. 206 and elsewhere: see Sternberg ad loc.).

Notes

εἰς κόρακας . . . ἐμπεσεῖν: This euphemism for death is often used a curse, as in "To the crows!"—that is, "Drop dead!"

οἱ μὲν . . . ἀποθανόντος τὸ σῶμα οἱ δὲ ζῶντος τὴν ψυχὴν: Gorgias also polarized body and soul (*Encomium of Helen* §1 and *passim*), and the survival pattern of the *apophthegma*, including its use by Aristophanes, could point to Gorgias as the original inspiration (as suggested by R. Janko per litt.). With t. 163, this is the clearest case of polar opposition between body and soul in Antisthenes. As in t. 163, there are no implications of ontological separability.

132. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 3.14.19 (Hense)

= 89 DC

Ἀντισθένης. Ἀντισθένης ἔλεγεν ὥσπερ τὰς ἐταίρας τάγαθὰ πάντα εὐχεσθαι τοῖς ἐρασταῖς παρεῖναι, πλὴν νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως, οὕτω καὶ τοὺς κόλακας οἷς σύνεισιν.

sine lemm. hab. S, addito lemm. M A | παρείναι S M^d A : περιεῖναι
Meineke

From Antisthenes. Antisthenes used to say that just as female companions pray for all good things to belong to their lovers, except for a mind and intelligence, likewise also flatterers, for those who keep their company.

Context of Preservation

Stobaeus' section is titled Περί κολακείας, "On Flattery." This item comes just after t. 131B, separated by one saying of Pythagoras, which is similar in sense to t. 109.

Notes

πλὴν νοῦ καὶ φρονήσεως: It is likely that these are the only sources of good, according to Antisthenes.

οὕτω καὶ τοὺς κόλακας: The Syracusan entertainer at the dinner party in Xenophon's *Symposium* prays that his audience acquire a φρενῶν ἀφορία, "dearth of wits" (*Sym.* 4.55), and this statement would render him a flatterer on this account. See t. 63, from the *Protreptics*, which might have connections to both this testimonium and the passage in Xenophon.

133. Athenaeus, *Wise Men at Dinner* IV 157b (Kaibel)

= 165 DC

“ὁρῶ γὰρ πολλὴν παρ’ ὑμῖν τῆς φακῆς τὴν σκευήν· εἰς ἣν ἀποβλέπουσα συμβουλευσάμ’ ἂν ὑμῖν κατὰ τὸν Σωκρατικὸν Ἀντισθένην ἐξάγειν ἑαυτοὺς τοῦ βίου τοιαῦτα σιτουμένους.”

[Nicion speaks:] “For I see that you have an abundant supply of lentil soup, and when I look at it, I would advise you, to quote the Socratic Antisthenes, to lead yourselves out of this life, if that is what you eat.”

Context of Preservation

At the dinner party of Larensis, the Cynic character Cyniscus takes the floor to commend a simple meal of lentils. In support, he cites *The Cynics' Drinking Party*, by Parmeniscus, an otherwise unknown author of unknown date. In that text, which is in the form of a letter, two courtesans break in to scold the diners for their simplicity. One of the courtesans, called “Nicion the dog-fly” (because she is a nuisance to Cynics, who deny sexual relations inspired by bodily qualities), delivers these words to the diners. The quotation from Antisthenes is embedded in three layers of citation, and at least one is

a parody. But ἐξάγειν ἑαυτοὺς τοῦ βίου, τοιαῦτα (verb replaced) could be a genuine quotation.

Importance of the Testimonium

This shows a Cynic reception of Antisthenes (possibly his *Protreptics*, which were probably set at a symposium: see t. 63–67) in the time of Parmeniscus, whenever that was. The letter of Parmeniscus cites Meleager of Gadara (fl. c. 95–93 BCE) as a “forefather” of the Cynics: this places Parmeniscus in the first or second century CE. (Possibly he is Athenaeus’ own fiction.) The fourth-century BCE comic playwright Eubulus wrote a play called *Parmeniscus*, and fragments surviving from his other plays show that he wrote of dinner parties. If this was the same Eubulus who wrote a *Sale of Diogenes* (Diog. Laert. 6.30), his works might have inspired later Cynic literature. Meleager, who wrote a *Symposium*, could be responsible for transmitting details, such as the citation of Antisthenes, to later authors. See Martin 1931:161–62, denying this hypothesis but collecting opinions from previous scholarship.

Notes

ἐξάγειν αὐτοὺς τοῦ βίου: A parallel is t. 105, where Antisthenes recommends “getting a mind or a noose.” See also t. 32, 178. Antisthenes’ own life seems to be worth living, as he is reportedly too reluctant to die (t. 37A). The remainder of Parmeniscus’ letter equates heavy eating with demise of the mind, which may be closer to Antisthenes’ real position.

τοιαῦτα σιτουμένους: For the meager evidence on Antisthenes’ injunctions about eating, see t. 116, 128. Presumably this is a parody, the very opposite of his own position, shared with the later Cynics, in support of simplicity and frugality. For frugality in eating, see t. 135A–B; for frugality with wine, t. 64, 82.41, 197.

134. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.10–13 (Marcovich)

= 69, 70, 80, 95, 101, 81, 79, 71, 76, 74, 72, 73, 88, 63 DC

(SSR omits two sentences here and prints them as t. 58, where they are discussed herein.)

- (10) ἤρσεκεν αὐτῷ καὶ τάδε. (a) διδακτὴν ἀπεδείκνυε τὴν ἀρετὴν. (11.) (b) καὶ τοὺς αὐτοὺς εὐγενεῖς οὓς καὶ ἐναρέτους· (c) αὐτάρκη δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην ὅτι μὴ Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος. (d) τὴν τ’ ἀρετὴν τῶν ἔργων εἶναι, μῆτε λόγων πλείστων δεομένην μῆτε μαθημάτων. (e) αὐτάρκη τ’ εἶναι τὸν σοφόν· πάντα γὰρ αὐτοῦ εἶναι τὰ τῶν ἄλλων. (f) τὴν τε ἀδοξίαν ἀγαθὸν καὶ

ἴσον τῷ πόνῳ. (g) καὶ τὸν σοφὸν οὐ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους πολιτεύσεσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς. (h) γαμήσειν τε τεκνοποιίας χάριν, ταῖς εὐφροσύναις συνιόντα γυναῖξι. (i) καὶ ἐρασθήσεσθαι δέ· μόνον γὰρ εἰδέναι τὸν σοφὸν τίνων χρὴ ἐρᾶν. (12.) ἀναγράφει δ' αὐτοῦ καὶ Διοκλῆς ταυτί. (j) τῷ σοφῷ ξένον οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἄτοπον. (k) ἀξίεραστος ὁ ἀγαθός. (l) οἱ σπουδαῖοι φίλοι. (m) συμμάχους ποιεῖσθαι τοὺς εὐψύχους ἅμα καὶ δικαίους. (n) ἀναφαίρετον ὄπλον ἢ ἀρετή. (o) κρεῖττον ἔστι μετ' ὀλίγων ἀγαθῶν πρὸς ἅπαντας τοὺς κακοὺς ἢ μετὰ πολλῶν κακῶν πρὸς ὀλίγους ἀγαθοὺς μάχεσθαι. (p) προσέχειν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς· πρῶτον γὰρ τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων αἰσθάνονται. (q) τὸν δίκαιον περὶ πλείονος ποιεῖσθαι τοῦ συγγενοῦς. (r) ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἢ αὐτῇ ἀρετῇ. (s) τὰγαθὰ καλὰ, τὰ κακὰ αἰσχροῦ. (t) τὰ πονηρὰ νόμιζε πάντα ξενικά. (13) (u) τεῖχος ἀσφαλέστατον φρόνησιν· μήτε γὰρ καταρρεῖν μήτε προδίδωσθαι. (v) τεῖχη κατασκευαστέον ἐν τοῖς αὐτῶν ἀναλώτοις λογισμοῖς.

(11) (b) οὓς Richards : τοὺς codd. | (f) καὶ codd. : κατ' Croenert | (g) τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς B P Φ : τοὺς τῶν ἀρετῶν F | (h) συνιόντα B P : συνόντα F | (i) χρὴ codd. : δεῖ Φ et Hesych. (12) (j) τῷ σοφῷ F Φ : τῷ γὰρ σοφῷ B P | οὐδ' F P⁴ : om. B P¹ Φ | ἄτοπον Kuehn teste Dorandi : ἄπορον Stephanus : ἄπο P F : ἀπὸ B : om. Φ (13) (u) προδίδωσθαι codd. plur. : προδίδωσθαι F : προδίδωσθαι τύχη Arsenius | (v) αὐτῶν φ et Arsenius : αὐτῶν B P F

(10) He held also the following views. (a) He used to demonstrate that virtue is teachable. (11) (b) And that the same people are wellborn who are also endowed with virtue. (c) And that virtue is self-sufficient for happiness, needing nothing in addition except for Socratic strength. (d) And that virtue is a characteristic of deeds, needing neither a lot of words nor learning. (e) And that the wise man is self-sufficient: for everything belonging to others belongs to him. (f) And that bad reputation is good and equivalent to toil. (g) And that the wise man will conduct government not according to the legislated laws, but according to the law of virtue. (h) And he will marry for the sake of producing children, mating with the women best in nature. (i) And he will fall in love: for only the wise man knows whom it is right to love. (12) Diocles ascribes to him also the following views. (j) To the wise man, nothing is foreign or out of place. (k) The good man is worthy of love. (l) The good are friends. (m) One should make allies of those good in soul and likewise just. (n) Virtue is an inalienable weapon. (o) It is better to fight with a few good men against all the bad ones than with many bad men against a few good ones. (p) One should pay

attention to one's enemies, for they are the first to notice one's errors. (q) One should value a just man more than a relative. (r) Virtue is the same for a man and a woman. (s) Good things are fine, and bad things are ugly. (t) Believe that all base things are foreign. (13) (u) Intelligence is the safest city wall, for it neither falls down nor is betrayed. (v) City walls must be constructed in one's own unassailable reasonings.

Context of Preservation

Diogenes gives Antisthenes' doxography, marked by a formal transition, after the anecdotes that illustrate his life and before the list of book titles.

Importance of the Testimonium

The doxography appears to come from a Stoic history of philosophy, which is both accurate, on the one hand, and interested, on the other, in representing Antisthenes and perhaps early Cynicism as proto-Stoic. It is consistently positive and optimistic in its tone, indicating nothing of Antisthenes' possibly dour or pessimistic persona (for which see notes on t. 14A and 208.26), and there is no humor or paradox. Mansfeld 1986 (following older scholarship) argues that this whole doxography is from Diocles, not just the passage beginning at section 12. If this is true, Diogenes has an intermediate source for the first section (10–11), since some of the maxims are doublets, phrased differently (e/j, f/p, i/k), and the second section (12–13) emphasizes militaristic imagery, which is absent in the first. The first section is also written with connective particles, whereas the items in the second list have none. Schofield 1991:141–43 argues that the first section follows the same scheme as the doxography of Diogenes of Sinope in Diog. Laert. 6.72: both cover real virtue first, then false virtue, then political participation, then marriage. Both doxographies, Schofield says, have been Stoicized.

Diocles of Magnesia is one of Diogenes Laertius' main sources for Cynicism and Stoicism (see t. 22A; Mejer 1978:42–45; Mansfeld 1986; Goulet-Cazé 1992). His dates are uncertain, but possibly he wrote soon after the time of Chrysippus, c. 200 BCE (Schofield 1991:11 n. 20). The maxims are doubtless drawn from Antisthenes' whole corpus, selected and paraphrased in the interest of answering the questions posed in a Hellenistic Stoic "checklist" on ethics (Schofield 1991:119–27). Some have parallels in other evidence, but many are unique testimonia. A similar list for Aristotle appears at 5.30–31, where the doxography has three clear sections: logic, ethics, and physics. Only the middle section is parallel to the present doxography of Antisthenes. This might imply that Antisthenes had doctrines only in the realm of ethics, according to the judgment of the source. His ample writing on "logic" was either too negative to count or too fully superseded by later developments. See also the broadly historical passages in t. 22A and 135A.

Notes

(a) *διδασκὴν ἀπεδείκνυε τὴν ἀρετὴν*: The mention of demonstration might suggest actual teaching performances: see t. 94B, referring to the Heracles story. The Hellenistic debate on whether virtue is “teachable” probably assumes a simple opposition between “teachable” versus “not teachable,” whereas the Sophistic and Socratic debate imagined a larger set of distinctions, including also “learnable” (*μαθητὴν*) and “trainable” (*ἀσκητὴν*).. See t. 103A.

(b) *τοὺς αὐτοὺς εὐγενεῖς οὓς καὶ ἐναρέτους*: Antisthenes is attributed with several identity statements in the realm of virtue, not only in this passage (see also 134s–t), which seems to be reduced, but also in t. 54.13 and 187.6; see also t. 78. These resemble statements set out frequently in Plato’s dialogues as Socratic theses, to which an interlocutor is asked to agree before discussion proceeds. Presumably they reflect a Socratic thesis (or inquiry) about the identity of virtue: true virtue, however we call it, is one thing, and terms such as “wellborn” or “noble” or “high class” or “beautiful” or even “wealthy” (t. 82) might have differentiated senses in popular usage, but when correctly applied, they all refer to the same thing, virtue. Since Antisthenes seems eager in some cases to differentiate multiple senses of single words or syllables, rather than reduce multiple words to one sense (see t. 187, 189), it is plausible that human ethical virtue was the special realm where he advocated for this unity underlying differentiated language. We lack adequate material to investigate this question directly. It seems plausible that the nuances in Antisthenes’ thinking on this topic are reflected in the pseudo-Platonic dialogues (for example) in addition to Xenophon and Dio Chrysostom, the sources consistently favored in Brancacci 1990.

(c) *αὐτάρκη δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν, μηδενὸς προσδεομένην . . .*: This is Antisthenes’ position on the (possibly anachronistic) Hellenistic ethical question whether virtue or pleasure is sufficient for happiness. For a different account of Antisthenes’ view of the ethical goal, see t. 111. For the term *εὐδαιμονία* as the goal, see t. 136B, 136D. The phrase [*τινὸς*] *προσδεομένην* is used repeatedly in Plato’s construction of the complex city in *Rep.* 2 373c1–8, for which the basic motivation is that no individual person is “himself sufficient for himself toward living well” (*αὐτὸς αὐτῷ αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν*, 387e1): it is plausible that competing minor Socratics, as reflected in Xenophon and possibly including Antisthenes, held a distinctive view against which Plato was writing. The definition of happiness in the Platonic *Definitions* is “a self-sufficient power toward living well” (*δύναμις αὐτάρκης πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν*, 412d10–11). The addition of one additional element beyond *ἀρετή* in Antisthenes’ account of happiness seems critically significant, given this background discourse.

Σωκρατικῆς ἰσχύος: This additional element seems to be something external to “virtue” that must complement it before happiness is achieved. This would distinguish Antisthenes’ view from the Stoic position as reported in doxographies, that virtue alone is sufficient. Some versions of Stoic theory do require a “strength” in every act that will count as moral, not indifferent (Galen, *Diagnosis and Cure of the Soul’s Errors* 1.3). Exactly what this “strength” is depends partly on what “virtue” is: if “virtue” is purely intellectual, a matter of understanding certain things, then “strength” adds the will or power to overcome hindrances and temptations and to use wisdom toward happiness. If virtue already includes the ethical dimension (see Segvic 2000 for this interpretation of Socratic virtue), then “strength” may be more like a special power to confront difficulty inherent in human life, as in the metaphor of the path to the top of the mountain (t. 136B; Hesiod, *WD* 289–92; Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.21–33). Possibly it is an inborn quality (see t. 198). On the possible connection with the force or motivation of philosophical *eros*, see t. 92. The term is in the title of Antisthenes’ minor work on Heracles (see t. 41A title 10.2). See Goulet-Cazé 1986:141–50.

(d) **τὴν τ’ ἀρετὴν τῶν ἔργων εἶναι, μήτε λόγων πλείστων δεομένην μήτε μαθημάτων:** This statement, along with the rejection of the traditional curriculum in education and rejection of literacy (t. 161), has traditionally been understood as part of a Cynic tradition of “radical anti-intellectualism” (Giannantoni 1990 v.4:389; see, e.g., Sayre 1948:18–19; Dudley 1937; Cynic evidence in Kindstrand 1976). But the abundant evidence for Antisthenes’ interest in language (t. 41A *tomoi* 1 and 6–9) tells against this interpretation for him. Either the statement reflects a tradition that Cynicizes Antisthenes at a high cost of falsification, or it must be understood in a way that admits his extensive work in the realm of language. Antisthenes’ doctrine probably did not oppose “deeds” and “accounts” as mutually exclusive: see t. 53–54. Because *λόγοι* is here coupled with *μαθήματα*, it seems that the opposition between practice and theory is also relevant. Ethical doctrine does not constitute virtue, but ethical behavior does; and the “use” of *λόγοι*, both passively and actively, is ethical behavior. Brancacci 1990:92 n. 19 emphasizes that *πλείστοι λόγοι* are rejected here, not *λόγοι* simply; this can be compared to Ajax’ rejection of *πολλοὶ καὶ μακροὶ λόγοι* (t. 53.8).

(e) **αὐτάρκη:** The term *αὐτάρκης* as a description of the wise man, important for both Zeno and Epicurus, appears nowhere in Antisthenes’ literary remains. The verbal form *ἀρκεῖ* occurs six times in t. 82, and Xenophon insists that Socrates was *αὐτάρκης*, possibly by inspiration from Antisthenes (so Joël 1893–1901). With or without the term, the idea of self-sufficiency is clearly important to Antisthenes. (See esp. t. 82, 100A, 53–54.)

(f) **τὴν τε ἄδοξίαν ἀγαθόν:** See t. 85–86, 90. This sentence confirms that bad

reputation is a form of toil (or “like toil,” if this difference is significant), a form of ethical training (t. 85) that might supplement athletic and intellectual training (t. 163).

(g) οὐ κατὰ τοὺς κειμένους νόμους . . . ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς: A similar position is attributed to Socrates, by his accusers, at Xen. *Mem.* 1.2.9. Whereas the legislated laws are many, the law of virtue is singular. Since law, like theology, is embedded in language, the difference between the one real law and the many in circulation might be parallel to the one and many gods of t. 179–80. (See also Müller 1995:259.) This opposition between kinds of law might be the basis for the differentiation of titles 3.3–4 in Antisthenes’ catalog (Decleva Caizzi 1966:80). Compare also the individualist implications in t. 68 (where the powerful “are themselves the law”), 189. Pl. *Rep.* 9 592a5–10 ends with the observation that the good man will practice politics “in the city of himself, and not in his fatherland” (ἐν γε τῇ ἑαυτοῦ πόλει καὶ μάλα, οὐ μέντοι ἴσως ἐν γε τῇ πατρίδι).

(h–i) γαμήσειν . . . τίνων χρὴ ἐρᾶν: This is t. 58. See also t. 123, 41A title 2.2.

(j) τῷ σοφῷ ξένον οὐδέν οὐδ’ ἄτοπον: The term ξένον suggests a transcendence of nationalism or ethnic boundary. In making a hero of the barbarian Cyrus, Antisthenes might have practiced this (see t. 85), and Cynic cosmopolitanism could be related. Odysseus’ journeys and knowledge of the minds of many men (*Od.* 1.3) might also be related: Schrader 1890 ad loc. proposes that surviving scholia on this verse can be traced to Antisthenes. The term ἄτοπον (Kuehn’s conjecture recovered by Dorandi in place of the normally printed ἄπορον) is roughly synonymous and resonates with Stoic tenets.

(k) ἀξιέραστος: On Antisthenes’ view of philosophical *eros*, see t. 92A–C.

(l) φίλοι: Friendship for Antisthenes might have a political as well as a personal basis, depending how one reads evidence from Xenophon: see t. 13A, 110. But his relationship to Socrates is one of both personal *eros* (of the philosophical kind) and friendship (see t. 14A). Compare t. 37B.

(m) εὐνύχους ἅμα καὶ δικάιους: These are probably further descriptions of the same virtuous persons who are called εὐγενεῖς and ἐναρέτους in (b), σπουδαῖοι in (l), ἀγαθοὺς in (o), and τὸν δίκαιον in (q). See also t. 102.

(n) ἀναφαίρετον ὄπλον: This is the proto-Stoic view that virtue gained cannot be lost. Such a view might be basically intellectualist, but there is nothing to exclude memories of all kinds, including emotional, from the virtue accumulated in the soul. See the nearest parallel in t. 135A; for Xenophon’s apparent objections to the doctrine, see t. 103C.

(o) κρεῖττόν ἐστι . . . μάχεσθαι: A close parallel is in Xen. *Mem.* 2.6.27: πολὺ δὲ κρεῖττον τοὺς βελτίστους ἐλάττονας εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τοὺς χείρονας πλείονας ὄντας. But Xenophon interprets “better” and “worse” in reference to wealth, “well-off in resources” versus “needy.”

(p) προσέχειν τοῖς ἐχθροῖς: See t. 109.

(r) ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετή: This is the most direct surviving evidence that Antisthenes followed Socrates in a view of full identity between the virtue of a male and a female. See, further, t. 18, 143A. The Stoic Cleanthes is credited with a book title on the thesis (Diog. Laert. 7.175), and the theme may be visible in the evidence for Zeno of Citium, as well as in the marriage of Crates and Hipparchia. It is likely that the Stoics followed Antisthenes' tradition in their view of ethical and philosophical equality between the sexes. (See Schofield 1991:43–46; Asmis 1996.)

(s) τὰγαθὰ καλά, τὰ κακὰ αἰσχρά: See note on (b).

(t) τὰ πονηρὰ νόμιζε πάντα ξενικά: Zeller 1888:304 and n.1 compares similar maxims in Pl. *Sym.* 205e and *Charm.* 163c and Themistius *On Virtue* (from which comes t. 96) and posits that the notion of equivalence between τὸ ἀγαθὸν and τὸ οἰκεῖον and between τὸ κακὸν and τὸ ἀλλότριον was primarily Antisthenes' doctrine. See also t. 34E, 152B.2 notes.

(v) τεῖχη κατασκευαστέον ἐν τοῖς αὐτῶν ἀναλώτοις λογισμοῖς: This seems to show that *logos* is not merely a tool for attaining virtue but must be exercised continually to maintain virtue against defeat by the enemies (Decleva Caizzi 1966:110). For the term λογισμοῖς, see t. 149B-2. Compare ἀναπόβλητον (t. 135A–B) with ἀναλώτοις.

Antisthenes, the Cynics, and the Stoics

*testimonia 135–140***135A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers*****6.103–5 (Marcovich)**

= 66, 22, 23 DC

(The ellipses stand for sentences about Diogenes of Sinope, which SSR omits from this passage and prints as passages VB 368–69 and 497. SSR omits three sentences here and prints them as t. 161 and 98–99, where they are discussed herein.)

(103) προσυπογράψομεν δὲ καὶ τὰ κοινῇ ἀρέσκοντα αὐτοῖς, αἵρεσιν καὶ ταύτην εἶναι ἐγκρίνοντες τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οὐ, καθά φασι τινες, ἔνστασιν βίου. ἀρέσκει οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸν λογικὸν καὶ τὸν φυσικὸν τρόπον περιαιρεῖν, ἐμπερὶς Ἀρίστωνι τῷ Χίῳ, μόνῳ δὲ προσέχειν τῷ ἠθικῷ. . . .
(104) παραιτοῦνται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα. γράμματα γοῦν μὴ μανθάνειν ἔφασκεν ὁ Ἀντισθένης <τοὺς σοφοὺς> ἢ σώφρονας γενομένους, ἵνα μὴ διαστρέφοντο τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις. περιαιροῦσι δὲ καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα. . . . ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τέλος εἶναι τὸ κατ' ἀρετὴν ζῆν, ὡς Ἀντισθένης φησὶν ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ ὁμοίως τοῖς Στωικοῖς· ἐπεὶ καὶ κοινωνία τις ταῖς δύο ταύταις αἵρεσεσὶν ἐστίν. ὅθεν καὶ τὸν Κυνισμὸν εἰρήκασι σύντομον ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ὁδόν. καὶ οὕτως ἐβίω καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς. (105) ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ λιτῶς βιοῦν, αὐτάρκεσι χρωμένοις σιτίοις καὶ τρίβωσι μόνοις, πλούτου καὶ δόξης καὶ εὐγενείας καταφρονοῦσιν. ἔνιοι γοῦν καὶ βοτάναις καὶ παντάπασι ὕδατι χρώνται ψυχρῷ σκέπαις τε ταῖς τυχοῦσαις καὶ πίθοις, καθάπερ Διογένης, ὃς ἔφασκε θεῶν μὲν ἴδιον εἶναι <τὸ> μηδεὶς δεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ θεῶν ὁμοίων τὸ ὀλίγων χρῆζειν. ἀρέσκει δ' αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι, καθά φησιν Ἀντισθένης ἐν τῷ Ἡρακλεῖ, καὶ ἀναπόβλητον ὑπάρχειν· ἀξιέραστόν τε τὸν σοφὸν καὶ ἀναμάρτητον καὶ φίλον τῷ ὁμοίῳ, τύχη τε μηδὲν ἐπιτρέπειν. τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα λέγουσιν ὁμοίως Ἀρίστωνι τῷ Χίῳ.

(103) οὐ, καθά φασι τινες, ἔνστασιν βίου in mg. F² (104) <τοὺς σοφοὺς> Marcovich | ἢ σώφρονας B P F : τοὺς σώφρονας Frobenius | γενομένους P F : γεναμένους B (105) ἔνιοι F : ἔνιοί τε B P : ἐνίστε Φ | ἴδιον εἶναι codd. plur. : εἶναι om. F | <τὸ> Marcovich e *Suda*

(103) We shall append [to the lives of the individual Cynics] also their common doctrines, because we judge that also this philosophy is a school, not, as some say, a way of life. They hold, then, that the logical and physical fields should be removed, like Aristo of Chios, and that one should attend to the ethical field only. . . . (104) They renounce also the liberal arts curriculum. Indeed Antisthenes used to say that those who have become wise and sound in mind should not learn letters, lest they be distracted by other people's thoughts. They renounce also geometry and music and all such things. . . . And they hold that the ethical goal is to live according to virtue, as Antisthenes says in his *Heracles*, in similar manner to the Stoics, since there is in fact a certain common ground to these two schools. For this reason some have said that Cynicism is the shortcut road to virtue. And in this way also Zeno of Citium lived. (105) They hold that one should live frugally, and they use food for sustenance only and single cloaks, and they scorn wealth and reputation and high birth. Some even consume vegetables and cold water only and use as shelter whatever is available and wine barrels, like Diogenes, who used to say that it is proper to the gods to need nothing, and to those like the gods to want little. And they hold also that virtue is teachable, according to what Antisthenes says in the *Heracles*, and that it persists inalienably. [They hold] that the wise man is worthy of love and without error and a friend to a like person, and he entrusts nothing to fortune. They say that things between virtue and vice are indifferent, similarly to Aristo of Chios.

135B. *Suda* no. K.2712 “Kunismos” (Adler)

Κυνισμός· αἴρεσις φιλοσόφων. ὁ δὲ ὀρισμός αὐτοῦ σύντομος ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν ὁδός. τέλος δὲ τοῦ κυνισμοῦ τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν, ὡς Διογένης καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς. ἤρεσκε δ’ αὐτοῖς λιτῶς βιοῦν, αὐτάρκεσι χρωμένοις σιτίοις, πλούτου καὶ δόξης καὶ εὐγενείας καταφρονεῖν. ἔνιοι δὲ βοτάνοις καὶ ὕδατι ψυχρῷ ἐχρῶντο σκέπαις τε ταῖς τυχούσαις καὶ πίθοις καὶ ἔφασκον θεοῦ μὲν ἴδιον εἶναι τὸ μηδενὸς δεῖσθαι, τῶν δὲ θεῶ ὁμοίων τὸ ὀλίγων χρῆζειν. ἀρέσκει δ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν διδακτὴν εἶναι καὶ ἀναπόβλητον.

Cynicism: A school of philosophers. Its definition is the shortcut road to virtue. The ethical goal of Cynicism is to live according to virtue, as

Diogenes and Zeno of Citium did. They used to hold that one should live frugally, using foods for sustenance only, and one should scorn wealth and reputation and high birth. And some used to consume vegetables and cold water [only] and use for shelter whatever is available and wine barrels, and they would say that it is proper to the god to need nothing, and to those like the god to want little. They hold also that virtue is teachable and inalienable.

Context of Preservation

This is the closing section of Diogenes Laertius' history of the Cynics in book 6, in transition to the (partially preserved) history of the Stoics in book 7. The *Suda* passage is directly dependent.

Importance of the Testimonium

This summary of Cynicism takes a clear position on three controversial points: that Cynicism is a philosophy, that Antisthenes was a Cynic, and that Cynicism and Stoicism are continuous. Diogenes' source for the whole section might be the Stoic Apollodorus of Seleucia (fl. c. 150 BCE), who, in his handbooks, seems to have promoted the continuity of Stoicism, Cynicism, and Socraticism. (See t. 136A). Possibly Diogenes writes from his personal convictions (see Brancacci 1992).

Notes

(103) αἵρεσιν . . . εἶναι . . . τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οὐ . . . ἔνστασιν βίου: The controversy over whether Cynicism counted as an ethical school is noted also in Diog. Laert. 1.19, where Hippobotus, author of *On the Sects* (Περὶ αἰρέσεων), is reported as denying that there was a Cynic (or Eleatic or Dialectical) School. Hippobotus' work treated individual philosophers from the Seven Sages to the second-generation Stoics, the pupils of Zeno of Citium, and therefore he was writing probably soon before 200 BCE. By this time, any serious philosophical views distinctive of the early Cynics (Antisthenes, Diogenes, and Crates of Thebes) differing from views of the Academy and Peripatos (and, likewise, any serious views of Eleatics and "Dialectical" Eretrians) had probably been absorbed by Stoics such as Aristo, Persaeus, and Cleanthes. (See t. 138B.) But the rigorous Chrysippus had not yet isolated what was to become a more theoretical and consistent Stoicism, which again opened space for the Cynics, albeit in a realm more easily called "lifestyle" than "philosophy." It is clear that Diogenes Laertius, writing from his perspective in c. 230 CE, rejects Hippobotus' judgment and counts Cynicism as one of the ten ethical schools.

ἐμπερῶς Ἀριστῶνι τῷ Χίῳ: The ideas of Aristo of Chios (fl. c. 260 BCE), a pupil of Zeno in the second generation of the Stoa, were held as radical by the

orthodox succession led by Cleanthes and followed by Chrysippus. On his similarity to the Cynics, see Porter 1996; Goulet-Cazé 2003:125–29.

παρατιοῦνται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα: This is a rejection of the standard educational curriculum preparatory to study of philosophy: see t. 161. On this rejection by Aristo, see Ioppolo 1980:73–90.

(104) περαιοῦσι δὲ καὶ γεωμετρίαν καὶ μουσικὴν καὶ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα: The Cynics’ rejection of educational fields of study is, oddly, framed in two steps. Possibly Diogenes separates mathematics, music, and experimental science (which is suggested in the next sentence, elided here) from the ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα (usually translated “liberal arts”) he mentioned above. (See Erskine 1990:18.) The mature Socrates, according to Xen. *Mem.* 4.7, recommended the study of such subjects as geometry and astronomy only to the limit of everyday usefulness. The additional rejection of literary studies (γράμματα), mentioned first (t. 161), might be more fundamental.

τέλος εἶναι τὸ κατ’ ἀρετὴν ζῆν: See t. 98.

τὸν Κυνισμόν εἰρήκασι σύντομον ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν ὁδόν: The plural subject in the perfect tense, “they have said,” seems to refer to a particular and current Stoic tradition, rather than popular opinion generally. On Apollodorus and the shortcut, see t. 136.

(105) ἀναπόβλητον ὑπάρχειν: See t. 99.

τὰ δὲ μεταξὺ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας ἀδιάφορα λέγουσιν: Goulet-Cazé 2003:118, 125–29 argues that this statement is from the scheme of Apollodorus of Seleucia (see t. 136A), who attributed the concept of indifferents to the Cynics even though it was developed by Zeno and Aristo. Goulet-Cazé argues (87 n.281) that Antisthenes in particular could not have contributed to the theory of indifferents, because his ethical thinking is heavily polarized (t. 134s–t). However, it is important to remember that t. 134 is in epitomized form. See also t. 110; Gigon 1956:124. Ioppolo 1980:154–59 associates the concept τὰ ἀδιάφορα with the dichotomy between τὸ οἰκεῖον and τὸ ἀλλότριον, a dichotomy probably important to Antisthenes (see t. 34E), albeit in a non-technical sense by comparison with Stoic οἰκείωσις, the base of the dichotomy to which Ioppolo appeals.

136A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 7.121 (Marcovich)

κυνεῖν τ’ αὐτόν· εἶναι γὰρ τὸν κυνισμόν σύντομον ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν ὁδόν, ὡς Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Ἡθικῇ.

σύντομον Φ et Stephanus ex 6.104 : εὐτονον B P¹ et D in mg. :
ἀσύντονον F D : εὐσύντονον γρ. in mg. P⁴

And he [the wise man] will Cynicize: for Cynicism is the shortcut road to virtue, as Apollodorus says in the *Ethics*.

Context of Preservation

This statement occurs in Diogenes' catalog of the Stoics' positions on ethical questions.

Importance of the Testimonium

The shortcut road is praised, as in other passages probably depending on Apollodorus (t. 135A, 136E). It seems that the choice implied by the Cynics was between a short and difficult road and a long and easy one. (See t. 136B.) This is different from the choice of Heracles as told by Prodicus (and renarrated in Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.21–33), where the choice is between the short and easy road and the long and difficult one. Writers in the Second Sophistic tend to follow Prodicus: for example, when Lucian (*Vit. auct.* 11; *Rhet. paed.* 3) sneers at the shortcut in the education of the philosopher and the rhetor, he speaks of the short and easy road, chosen over the long and difficult.

Notes

Ἀπολλόδωρος ἐν τῇ Ἠθικῇ: (fr. 17 SVF III.261) Apollodorus of Seleucia was a Stoic of the second century BCE, a pupil with Panaetius of Diogenes of Babylon, and author of an introduction to the doctrines of the Stoa that contained parts on physics, ethics, and probably logic (Goulet-Cazé 1986:22–23 n.22). He is probably recommending a Cynic lifestyle, the practice of living by one's precepts even at the risk of forfeiting social goods, not the Cynic rejection of Stoic education. The image of the shortcut was probably not his invention; he may have taken it from older Cynicism, possibly Antisthenes (see t. 136B).

136B. Letter of Diogenes, no. 30 (Hercher)

(not in SSR)

Ἰκέτη.

(1) Ἦκον, ὦ πάτερ, Ἀθήναζε, καὶ πυθόμενος τὸν Σωκράτους ἐταῖρον εὐδαιμονίαν διδάσκειν, εἰσηλθὼν παρ' αὐτόν. ὃ δὲ ἐτύγγανε τότε σχολάζων περὶ ταῖν ὁδοῖν ταῖν φερούσαιν <ἐπ' αὐτήν>, ἔλεγε δὲ αὐτὰς εἶναι δύο καὶ οὐ πολλὰς, καὶ τὴν μὲν σύντομον, τὴν δὲ πολλήν· ἐξεῖναι οὖν ἐκάστῳ ὅποτέραν βούλοιο βαδίζειν. ἀγῶ ταῦτα ἀκούσας τότε μὲν κατεσίγησα, τῇ δὲ ἑξῆς, ἐπειδὴ πάλιν εἰσιόντων ἡμῶν παρ' αὐτόν περὶ ταῖν ὁδοῖν παρεκάλεσα αὐτόν ἐπιδείξαι ἡμῖν, καὶ ὃς μάλ' ἐτοίμως ἀπαναστὰς τῶν θάκων ἦγεν ἡμᾶς εἰς ἄστν καὶ δι' αὐτοῦ εὐθὺς εἰς

τὴν ἀκρόπολιν. (2.) καὶ ἐπεὶ ἀγχοῦ ἐγενόμεθα, ἐπιδείκνυσιν ἡμῖν δύο τινὲς ὁδὴν ἀναφερούσα, τὴν μὲν ὀλίγην προσάντη τε καὶ δύσκολον, τὴν δὲ πολλὴν λείαν τε καὶ ῥαδίαν καθιστάς. ἅμα γὰρ “αἱ μὲν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν,” εἶπε, “φέρουσαι ὁδοὶ εἰσιν αὗται, αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοιαῦται· αἰρεῖσθε ἕκαστος ἣν ἐθέλετε, ξεναγήσω δ’ ἐγώ.” τότε οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τῆς ὁδοῦ τὸ δύσκολον καὶ πρόσαντες καταπλαγέντες ὑποκατεκλίνησαν καὶ τὴν μακρὰν καὶ λείαν παρεκάλουν αὐτὸν διαγίνειν, ἐγὼ δὲ κρείττων γενόμενος τῶν χαλεπῶν τὴν προσάντη καὶ δύσκολον· ἐπὶ γὰρ εὐδαιμονίαν ἐπειγομένῳ κἂν διὰ πυρὸς ἢ ξιφῶν βαδιστέον εἶναι.

(1) <ἐπ’ αὐτήν> Boissonade : ταῖν φερούσαιν codd. | καὶ ὅς codd.
: αὐτὸς Emeljanow 1967:145 (2) αἰρεῖσθε ἕκαστος ἣν ἐθέλετε scripsi
sequ. Westerman qui maluit αἰρεῖσθε δὲ ἕκαστος ἣν ἐθέλετε : αἰρεῖσθαι
ἕκαστον ἣν ἔθελοι codd.

To Hiketas,

(1) I arrived, father, in Athens, and when I learned that the companion of Socrates was teaching happiness, I went to him. He happened to be teaching at the time about the two roads leading <to it [sc. happiness], and he said that the roads are two and not many, and that one is a shortcut and the other long: and so it is up to each person which of them he wishes to tread. And I, when I heard this, was quiet then, but on the next day, when we went back to him, when I appealed to him to demonstrate for us his point about the two roads, he very agreeably stood up from his seat and led us to the city and through it straight to the Acropolis. (2) And when we got close, he showed us two paths leading up, rendering the short one as steep and difficult and the long one as smooth and easy. And simultaneously he said, “The roads leading to the Acropolis are these, and the roads leading to happiness are similar. Choose, each of you, the one he wishes, and I shall be your tour guide.” Then the others, startled at the difficult and steep quality of the road, gave up and bid him to lead by the long and smooth road, but I stood up to the challenge and chose the steep and difficult road. For to one in pursuit of happiness, it is necessary to walk, even if through fire and swords.

Context of Preservation

The fifty-one letters transmitted as letters of Diogenes were composed probably in several sets, ranging in date from the late first century BCE (1–29) to the second century CE (30–40) to possibly as late as the fourth century

CE (41–51). See Malherbe 1977:14–19. The second-century letters, of which this is the first, are distinguished by their length and their apparent Socratic content. See also Emeljanow 1965 and 1967:142–49, a textual commentary on the letter. This is the first half of the letter: in the second half, Antisthenes dresses Diogenes in the Cynic costume of doubled cloak, wallet, eating utensils, and staff. (See t. 22A.)

Importance of the Testimonium

Emeljanow 1965 shows that the image of the roads in this letter amounts to a more geographically realistic allegory than the more common image, whereby the long road is hard and the short road is easy. In that image, the roads must lead to different destinations. In this image, the roads lead to the same place, and the short road must be harder and steeper. In Xenophon's "Choice of Heracles" (*Mem.* 2.1.28), the long road advocated by the character Virtue is described in terms fitting here to the short road. See Emeljanow 1967:144. This suggests that Antisthenes might be behind the scenes in Xenophon, but not straightforwardly. See also t. 94B, 207C.

Notes

τὸν Σωκράτους ἐταῖρον: In *Letter* 37 of ps.-Diogenes, Antisthenes is named as the teacher of the short road.

σχολάζων: This word, given its syntax, must refer to teaching, not just practicing leisure. But leisure or σχολή in a more open sense is important in Antisthenes' vision of happiness: see t. 82.44.

ἐξεῖναι οὖν ἐκάστῳ ὁποτέραν βούλοιο βαδίζειν: Antisthenes has no position on which is the better road: each person must make his own choice.

ἀπαναστὰς τῶν θάκων: Xenophon uses this phrase in *Hiero* ch. 7 (three times), *Sym.* 4.31 (in Charmides' speech: see t. 82), and *Cyropaedia* 8.7 to indicate subordinates' respect for a superior. Since Xenophon probably was not a model for this epistle, this overlap might point to Antisthenes as the common source. See also t. 51A, ἐκ φρυγάνων ἀναστὰς.

(2) **τὴν μὲν ὀλίγην προσάντη τε καὶ δύσκολον, τὴν δὲ πολλὴν λείαν τε καὶ ῥαδίαν καθιστάς:** The participle "rendering" (καθιστάς) suggests that the contrasting natures of the two roads were not obvious but needed demonstration through the teacher's account. The translation here understands "the small [road]" and "the great [road]" (τὴν μὲν ὀλίγην <ὁδόν> . . . τὴν δὲ πολλὴν <ὁδόν>) as direct objects of "rendering" and takes the pairs of adjectives (προσάντη τε καὶ δύσκολον . . . λείαν τε καὶ ῥαδίαν) as the complements, the qualities the teacher demonstrated. The opposition between ὀλίγη and πολλή is not an obvious way to contrast "short" and "long" roads, which would more naturally be βραχεῖα and μακρά. It could have a

social resonance, contrasting the “few” good men (such as would be fit for the short road) with the “many” lazy men (such as would choose the long road). As Antisthenes used this contrast between ὀλίγοι and πολλοί (t. 134o), it already recasts Athenian political rhetoric opposing the “few” wealthy, politically elite men to the “many” poorer men of democratic Athens.

αἱ μὲν εἰς τὴν ἀκρόπολιν . . . φέρουσαι ὁδοὶ εἰσὶν αὐται: In the classical period there was only one road up the Acropolis, and it was a steep one. A gradual, winding road was built in the Roman period. Shortcuts did not need to be good roads (Herod. 1.185, 4.136), and what is imagined here is probably a choice between “the well-worn path taken by all visitors to the Acropolis, or over the rocks” (Emeljanow 1967:142).

αἱ δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τοιαῦται: The roads go to happiness, not to virtue: see also t. 136D.

136C. Plutarch, *Erotic Discourse* 759d (Hubert)

ὥσπερ οἱ Κυνικοὶ λέγουσι σύντονον ὁμοῦ καὶ σύντομον εὐρηκέναι πορείαν ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν.

As the Cynics say, that they have discovered at once the intense and the shortcut pathway to virtue.

Context of Preservation

In this fiction by Plutarch, Plutarch’s son Autobulus recites a discourse on love once told to him by his father, in which the embedded character Plutarch has to defend the divinity and goodness of love against various skeptics. Here Plutarch has just quoted the Roman Cato and seems to add in his own voice a parallel statement of the Cynics. (The text is corrupt.) Cato has said (with possible reference to Pl. *Phaedr.* 252e–253b: see Helmbold 1961:367 n.e) that the lover’s relationship to the beloved leads him quickly to virtue. The speaker Plutarch echoes this statement in Cynic terms.

Importance of the Testimonium

If the association between the Cynic shortcut and true love can be attributed to the historical Cynics and is not Plutarch’s contribution, this passage might imply that virtue is quickly attained through an “intense” dispositional change such as falling in love.

Notes

σύντονον ὁμοῦ καὶ σύντομον . . . πορείαν: The wordplay on σύντονον (intense) and σύντομον (shortcut) seems appropriate to the Cynics and so might be loyal to them. See t. 136E for a variation on σύντομον.

136D. Galen, *On the Diagnosis and Cure of Errors of the Soul* 3.12 (de Boer)

ετοιμότατον δ' ἐστὶ πείθεσθαι μειρακίοις ἀπαιδεύτοις διδάσκαλον
 τὸν ἐροῦντα σεμνῶ προσώπῳ, ῥάστην ὁδὸν ἐπὶ σοφίαν ὑφηγημένην
 παρὰ π[ᾱ]σι τοῖς Κυνικοῖς ὀνομαζομένοις. καὶ γὰρ καὶ οὗτοι σύντομον
 ἐπ' ἀρετὴν ὁδὸν εἶναι φασὶ τὸ σφέτερον ἐπιτήδευμα. τινὲς δὲ αὐτῶν
 ἐλέγχοντες οὐκ ἐπ' ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ δι' ἀρετῆς ἐπ' εὐδαιμονίαν ὁδὸν εἶναι
 φάσκουσι τὴν κυνικὴν φιλοσοφίαν. ἀλλ' ἕτεροί γ' ἀληθέστερον αὐτῶν
 ἀποφαινόμενοι σύντομον ἐπ' ἀλαζονείαν ὁδὸν εἶναι φασὶ δι<ᾱ τὴν>
 ἀμαθῆ τῶν τοιούτων ἀνθρώπων τόλμαν. ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ Κυνικοὶ πάντες,
 οὓς γε δὴ τεθέαμαι κατὰ τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον, οὕτω καὶ τῶν φιλοσοφεῖν
 ἐπαγγελλομένων ἔνιοι φεύγειν ὁμολογοῦσι τὴν ἐν τῇ λογικῇ θεωρίᾳ
 γυμνασίαν.

διδάσκαλον τὸν ἐροῦντα *ed. Chart.* : διδάσκαλον τ' ἐρῶν cum
 τ superscripto L : διδάσκαλον τὸν ἐρῶντα *ed. Ald.* : διδασκάλῳ τῷ
 ἐροῦντι de Boer | ῥάστην ὁδὸν L : ῥάστην εἶναι τὴν ὁδὸν Marquardt |
 ὑφηγημένην Goulston : ὑφηγμένην L : ὑφηγημένον *ed. Chart.* | <τὴν>
 ante ὑφηγ. add. de Boer sequ. Pantazidis | παρὰ π[ᾱ]σι Schoene : π...σὶ
 τοῖς initio folii novi L | οὐκ ἐλέγχοντες L : transpos. *ed. Ald.* | αὐτῶν
 ἀποφαινόμενοι Schoene : αὐτὴν ἀποφαινόμενοι L | ἀλαζονείας L : corr.
 Marquardt | δι<ᾱ τὴν> ἀμαθῆ τῶν Deichgraeber : δι' ἅμα τῶν cum θ
 superscripto L | φιλοσοφεῖν ἐπαγγελλομένων Goulston : φιλοσόφων
 ἐπαγγελλομένων L

But it is very possible that a teacher who will speak with a straight face can persuade uneducated young men that there is a very easy path leading to wisdom in the common teachings of the so-called Cynics. And indeed also they say that their way of life is a shortcut road to virtue. But some of them, refuting this, claim that the Cynic philosophy is not a road to virtue, but a road to happiness through virtue. Yet others of them, declaring their opinions more truthfully, say that it is a shortcut road to charlatanry, because of the ignorant boldness of such people. Well, in the same way as all the Cynics agree (at least those I have seen in the course of my life), likewise also some of those who proclaim that they philosophize agree that they shun exercise in logical theory.

Context of Preservation

This passage comes near the end of Galen's introduction to his topic, how to cure intellectual errors (ἀμαρτήματα) of the soul. Correction of emotional passions (πάθη) is treated in a separate, prior text. In this passage, he warns that those who claim there is no science of ethical action might be persuasive:

but the view he goes on to develop is that there is a science of virtue parallel to mathematics.

Importance of the Testimonium

This is the only evidence for a dispute among the Cynics and their sympathizers over the exact nature of the shortcut. It is the clearest description of what is elided in this shortcut, namely, the Stoic science of logical theory as a tool for ethics. (Compare t. 135A.104.)

Notes

τινὲς δὲ αὐτῶν ἐλέγχοντες: These people may not be Cynics (they refer to “the Cynic philosophy” from a third-party perspective), but they have a sympathetic interpretation of Cynicism. Possibly these are contemporaries of Galen debating the true message of older Cynicism; possibly they are Stoics. οὐκ ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἀρετῆς ἐπ’ εὐδαιμονίαν ὁδόν: Happiness, rather than virtue, is the goal also in Diogenes’ letter (t. 136B). In the allegory of Heracles at the crossroads that is attributed to Prodicus, Virtue and Vice are the leaders or teachers on the alternative routes to joy (ἐπὶ τὰς εὐφροσύνας) or happiness (ἐπὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν) (Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.29).

ἕτεροί γ’ ἀληθέστερον . . . ἀποφαινόμενοι: These are critics of the Cynics. Galen might mean that some of the Cynics or Cynic sympathizers “say”—that is, demonstrate—unintentionally that the Cynic short route is really a sham. σύντομον ἐπ’ ἀλαζονείαν ὁδόν: The short route has an inferior destination. This problem is common to versions of the choice that favor the long route: there can be no shortcut because the long route leads to a higher destination (Hesiod, *WD* 289–92; Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.21–33; Dio Chrys. 1.67–68).

<τὴν> ἀμαθῆ . . . τόλμαν: This is a standard charge against sham intellectuals: compare Lucian, *Rhet. praecept.* 15 and *Runaways* 13.

τὴν ἐν τῇ λογικῇ θεωρίᾳ γυμνασίαν: This is an important part of Stoic education: compare Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.27.6.

136E. *Suda* no. K.2711 “Kunismos” (Adler)

εὐτονος ἐπ’ ἀρετὴν ὁδός. καὶ κυνιεῖν δεῖν τοῖς σπουδαίοις.

The vigorous road to virtue. And it is right for the good to cynicize.

Notes

εὐτονος: This term, replacing σύντομος (shortcut) in the parallel passages, is in the Stoic vocabulary for mental fitness, in analogy to bodily fitness (cited from Chrysippus by Galen: fr. 471 *SVF* III.120–21). Possibly the kind of analogy in t. 163 was in the background for Chrysippus. For εὐτονος as a marked trait of the Cynics, see t. 183.

136F. Diodorus Siculus, *Library of History* 33.7.7 (Vogel)

(not in SSR)

πολλά δὲ καὶ ἕτερα φασιν αὐτὸν ἐν βραχέσιν ἀποφθέγξασθαι, τῆς μὲν ἐγκυκλίου παιδείας ἄπειρον ὄντα, πρακτικῇ δὲ συνέσει πεπαιδευμένον· ἀνδρὸς γὰρ ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζώντος σύντομος λόγος ἐστὶν ἀρετῇ συνησκημένος, τὸ δὲ ἀφελεία λόγου βραχέως καὶ ἀπερίττως ῥηθὲν τοῦ μὲν εἰπόντος ἀπόφθεγμα γίνεται, τοῦ δὲ ἀκούσαντος ἀπομνημόνευμα.

And they say that he [Viriathus] spoke also many other pronouncements in brief form, being without experience of a liberal education, but educated in practical intelligence. For concise discourse, exercised by virtue, is typical of a man living in accordance with nature, and something said with simplicity of discourse, briefly and without excess, becomes a noted saying of the speaker and a firm memory of the audience.

Context of Preservation

Viriathus (d. 139 BCE) was leader of the Lusitanian people of the Iberian Peninsula in their resistance to Roman expansion in the mid-second century BCE. Diodorus' description assimilates him to a Stoic and a Cynic ("living in accord with nature," "shortcut speech cultivated in virtue"), although, as a Portuguese native, he had no connection to Greek philosophies. Diodorus is using a Cynico-Stoic template to describe the uneducated wise man. His source here is probably Posidonius (Schwartz *RE* 5.1 [1903]: 690), whose use of the Cynic template for a barbarian is plausible.

Importance of the Testimonium

This shows that the tag "shortcut" could be applied to the apophthegmatic Cynic style of discourse, not only to their route to virtue or happiness.

Notes

ἐν βραχέσιν ἀποφθέγξασθαι: See t. 30, 104.

ἀκολούθως τῇ φύσει ζώντος: This is the Stoic way of life (Diog. Laert. 7.88).

σύντομος λόγος . . . ἀρετῇ συνησκημένος: Compare t. 163, the exercise of the soul in *logos*.

137A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 7.19 (Marcovich)

= 1 notes DC (p. 87)

πρὸς δὲ τὸν φάσκοντα ὡς τὰ πολλὰ αὐτῷ Ἀντισθένης οὐκ ἀρέσκοι, χρεῖαν Σοφοκλέους προενεγκάμενος ἠρώτησεν εἴ τινα καὶ καλὰ ἔχειν

αὐτῷ δοκεῖ· τοῦ δ' οὐκ εἰδέναι φήσαντος, “εἴτ' οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ,” ἔφη, “εἰ
 μὲν τι κακὸν ἦν εἰρημένον ὑπ' Ἀντισθένης, τοῦτ' ἐκλεγόμενος καὶ
 μνημονεύων, εἰ δέ τι καλόν, οὐδ' ἐπιβαλλόμενος κατέχειν;”

ἀρέσκει Arsenius | προς ἐνεγκάμενος B | μὲν τοι B | ὑπ'
 Ἀντισθένης secl. Wilamowitz | οὐκ B | ὑποβαλλόμενος Φ

To someone who said that for the most part Antisthenes did not please him, he [Zeno of Citium] brought forth a *chreia* of Sophocles and asked if he thought it had also any fine points. And when he said he did not know, he [Zeno] said, “Then are you not ashamed that, if something bad was said by Antisthenes, you pick out this and remember it, but if something good was said, you do not even pay attention or retain it in your mind?”

Context of Preservation

This is from a series of anecdotes recorded by Diogenes Laertius in his life of Zeno of Citium (7.16–25).

Importance of the Testimonium

The anecdote shows that Zeno defended the value of Antisthenes' sayings and possibly his writings, perhaps against a real hostile party. In addition, the anecdote has been understood as evidence for an otherwise unknown text by Antisthenes (Decleva Caizzi 1966:87) or an alternative title for a subsection of a work attested in Diogenes' catalog (Brancacci 1990:74 n.60, 2003:262). Such a work, about useful maxims in Sophocles, would be compatible with Antisthenes' profile as a reader and proto-scholar of earlier Greek literature in a range beyond Homer. For Antisthenes' reception of Sophocles, see the speeches of Ajax and Odysseus (t. 53–54) and t. 196.

Notes

χρεῖαν Σοφοκλέους: Decleva Caizzi (with some translators of Diogenes Laertius) understands this as a book title or informal reference to an “essay” by Antisthenes. (Kindstrand 1986:223 n.20 surveys opinion.) But no likely title appears in Diogenes' catalog. Brancacci 1990:74 n.60 proposes that this is an informal title for Antisthenes' study or “use” of Sophocles: Antisthenes collected the verses of Sophocles (and Euripides) that praised poverty, in a proto-form of the collections later called *chreiai*. Patzer 1970:161 argues that the reference, because it is in the singular, is not to a book title but to a verse cited from one of Sophocles' plays and used by Zeno as a *chreia*, whether on the spot for this occasion or frequently in his circle. Radt (*TrGF*, Sophocles fr. 1116c) also thinks Zeno uses a saying from Sophocles. The book title normally appears in the plural; but the catalog of Aristippus' works (Diog. Laert. 2.19) contains three titles using or implying *χρεῖα* in the singular.

προενεγκάμενος: The verb προενεγκάμενος might imply a physical object, but in Diog. Laert. 4.40, Archesilaus is said to defend himself against charges of luxurious living by “bringing forth the *chreiai* of Aristippus” (προεφέρετο τὰς Ἀριστίππου χρείας), which means citing his sayings or famous deeds from memory. Zeno could be citing a popular anecdote about or a saying attributed to Sophocles.

εἴ τινα καὶ καλὰ ἔχειν αὐτῷ δοκεῖ: The major question is whether the *chreia* of Sophocles functions as a parallel to Antisthenes’ case, because Sophocles, too, mixed bad with good, or whether it is the direct source or proof of the good things Antisthenes said, which balance the bad. The phrasing (ἔχειν) implies a collection of statements, which includes good ones. There is an implication, in καὶ καλὰ, that bad ones are also contained. If Sophocles was the one who said bad things as well as good, in parallel with Antisthenes, these have been elided. In the anecdote as preserved, the only bad things definitely implied are the bad things Antisthenes sometimes said. It seems most likely that this version of the anecdote is elided and that Sophocles is mentioned as a parallel to Antisthenes.

εἰ μὲν τι κακὸν . . . εἰ δέ τι καλόν: On the possibility that Antisthenes made a habit of mixing praise and blame, see t. 9, 198; on misanthropy balanced with philanthropy, see t. 53–54, possibly 208. Possibly the critic objects to obscenity or rudeness in Antisthenes: see t. 147B, 65.

εἰ δέ τι καλόν, οὐδ’ ἐπιβαλλόμενος κατέχειν: Zeno implies that Antisthenes’ sayings should be considered and held, not rejected quickly. This might imply that their meaning is more complicated than what first appears.

137B. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 7.91 (Marcovich)

τεκμήριον δὲ τοῦ ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν φησιν ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ λόγου τὸ γενέσθαι ἐν προκοπῇ τοὺς περὶ Σωκράτην, Διογένην, Ἀντισθένην.

Evidence that virtue exists, says Posidonius in the first book of his ethical treatise, is the fact that Socrates, Diogenes, and Antisthenes and their followers made moral progress.

Context of Preservation

Diogenes discusses Stoic theses about virtue on the most fundamental level.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes is ranked in an important class, which might represent the highest level of virtue Posidonius allowed for anyone. That Socrates and Diogenes are named first might reflect that Antisthenes was less radical or less well known than either.

Notes

ὑπαρκτὴν εἶναι τὴν ἀρετὴν: Stoic virtue was so severe that its existence could be doubted.

ἐν προκοπῇ: The older Stoics denied that there was middle ground between virtue and vice, but the Peripatetics added the intermediate stage of being “in moral progress” (προκοπή) (Diog. Laert. 7.127), and the later Stoics accepted this stage. In illustrating this class, Posidonius reaches back to pre-Stoic wise men.

τοὺς περὶ Σωκράτην: This expression can mean either “followers of Socrates” or “Socrates along with his followers” (see t. 150A.4 note on οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι). Since the famous teachers are more likely than their unknown followers to stand as examples of moral progress, the second meaning must be correct here.

138A. Philodemus, PHerc 339 col. 13.1–2 from *On the Stoics* (Dorandi)

τὴν ἀρχή[ν] καὶ Ἀντι[σ]θέδους καὶ Διογένους συνέστη, διὸ καὶ
Σωκρατικοὶ καλεῖσθαι θέ[λ]ουσιν.

Originally it [the Stoa] was established from Antisthenes and Diogenes, and for this reason they [the Stoics] tend to be called Socratics.

Context of Preservation

Philodemus reports a history of moral attack on the Stoa through attack on the *Republic* attributed to Zeno of Citium, then addresses (and apparently refutes) various attempts by the Stoics to defend the school. (The papyrus has gaps.) This passage seems to describe one class of Stoic defenders. (See Dorandi 1982:115–17; Dümmmler 1901:68–70.)

Importance of the Testimonium

The passage shows that tracing the origin of the Stoa to its Socratic prehistory was one strategy used by some Stoics to diminish Zeno’s status and authority as founder. The time of this quarrel about Zeno is plausibly the early first century BCE (Schofield 1991:20). The passage does not show that the story of succession from Socrates to Antisthenes to Diogenes to Zeno can be nothing more than a fiction (as is assumed in some discussions, e.g., Mansfeld 1986): many testimonia suggest that Stoics before Chrysippus followed Antisthenes. The passage shows, rather, that some Stoics had an interest in emphasizing a broader context for the emergence of the school than the foundation by Zeno. The inclusion of Diogenes in this defense is surprising, since it was Diogenes’ *Republic* that allegedly influenced Zeno’s scurrilous statements.

These defenders of the Stoa would have needed to take the additional step of denying the scurrilous works of Diogenes (Dümmler 1901:69).

138B. Cicero, *On the Orator* 3.61–62 (Kumaniecki)

= 134B DC (SSR IH 4)

nam cum essent plures orti fere a Socrate, quod ex illius variis et diversis et in omnem partem diffusis disputationibus alius aliud apprehenderat, proseminatae sunt quasi familiae dissentientes inter se et multum diiunctae et dispares, cum tamen omnes se philosophi Socraticos et dici vellent et esse arbitrarentur. ac primo ab ipso Platone Aristoteles et Xenocrates, quorum alter Peripateticorum, alter Academiae nomen obtinuit, deinde ab Antisthene, qui patientiam et duritiam in Socratico sermone maxime adamarat, Cynici primum, dein Stoici, tum ab Aristippo, quem illae magis voluptariae disputationes delectarant, Cyrenaica philosophia manavit. . . . fuerunt etiam alia genera philosophorum, qui se omnes fere Socraticos esse dicebant, Eretriorum, Herilliorum, Megariorum, Pyrrhoneorum; sed ea horum vi et disputationibus sunt iam diu fracta et exstincta.

primo ab ipso *codd.* : primum ab ipso *Leeman et al.*

For although many schools of philosophy have sprung more or less from Socrates (because some understood one thing and others another from his many diverse discussions, which spread in every direction), they have propagated like members of a household disagreeing among themselves, and very much disconnected and different, although, at the same time, all philosophers wanted themselves to be called Socratics and believed they were such. And first, from Plato himself have descended Aristotle and Xenocrates, of whom the first took the name of the Peripatetics and the second the name of the Academy. And then from Antisthenes, who fell in love most with the persistence and rigor in Socratic conversation, arose first the Cynics and then the Stoics. Then from Aristippus, who was delighted by those discussions more pertaining to pleasure, the Cyrenaic philosophy has sprung. . . . There have been also other classes of philosophers, almost all of whom used to say they were Socratics: the Eretrians, the Herillians, the Megarians, the Pyrrhonians. But these are long since broken up and annihilated by the impact and discussions of the former.

Context of Preservation

The speaker Crassus introduces his extended discussion of oratorical “embellishment” (*ornatus*) (*De or.* 3.53–209) by positing a historical schism

between philosophy and rhetoric and attributing this to Socrates (3.60). He digresses on the historical importance of Socraticism to explain the endurance of this schism. It seems likely that Cicero is attributing to Crassus an untraditional account of the schism (although the opposition between Socrates and the Sophists was a commonplace since Plato) and has sketched his own history of the Socratic tradition, albeit from Academic and Peripatetic doxographical sources. See Mankin 2011:35–38; Leeman et al. 1996:220–23.

Importance of the Testimonium

This is the oldest testimony (parallel with Philodemus in t. 138A) for the succession of the Cynics and Stoics from Socrates through Antisthenes. The Stoic motive for Socratic ancestry evident in t. 138A is not evident here; rather, Crassus' motive is to derive all contemporary philosophy from Socrates. As in t. 138A, this goal might bring distortions: Crassus implies that even Epicureans, through their alignment with Aristippus, are post-Socratic. But the very premise that Hellenistic philosophy descends from Socrates is subordinated to no other point, and Crassus must have assumed that this claim was plausible to his audience. There is room to wonder whether Cicero is ironic in his picture of Crassus, whose philosophical education was scant (see 3.75), but there is no obvious sign that Cicero did not intend this main statement about the succession from Socrates through Antisthenes to the Cynics and Stoics as a true historical claim.

Notes

ac primo ab ipso Platone . . . deinde ab Antisthene . . . tum ab Aristippo:

Chronologically this is unlikely: Plato's Academy must have been later in developing than the "minor schools" of Socraticism. (See t. 170.) Cicero (or his source) makes a temporal story from the traditions he receives, privileging the most important. Diogenes Laertius also narrates the Cynic and Stoic succession (books 6–7) after the Academic and Peripatetic succession (books 3–5), but in 2.47, where he discusses the ordering of his discussion, he posits no chronology among the Socratic pupils.

patientiam et duritiam in Socratico sermone: Diogenes Laertius, naming the qualities Antisthenes admired in Socrates (t. 12A) as τὸ καρτερικόν (perhaps translated as *duritiam*) and τὸ ἀπαθές (perhaps translated as *patientiam*), interprets them differently. He separates these from Socratic discourse and implies that they are qualities of living. See also similar terms in t. 122A. Possibly Cicero is biased toward a Socraticism based only in discourse, whether because discourse is Crassus' topic or because this was the emphasis Cicero learned through his own Academic studies. Alternatively, Diogenes' tradition seems to have uniformly neglected Antisthenes' attention to discourse, possibly under the influence of more recent trends in Cynicism.

139A. Eusebius, *Preparation for Demonstration of the Gospel* 15.13.6–8 (Mras)

πλὴν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐκτεθεῖσιν ἀρκεσθέντες μεταβησόμεθα καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν Στωικῶν αἵρεσιν. Σωκράτους τοίνυν ἀκουστής ἐγένετο Ἀντισθένης, . . . τούτου δὲ ἀκουστής γέγονε Διογένης ὁ Κύων. . . . τοῦτον Κράτης διεδέξατο· Κράτητος δὲ ἐγένετο Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεύς, ὁ τῆς τῶν Στωικῶν φιλοσόφων αἵρέσεως καταστάς ἀρχηγός.

Ἀντισθένης N² : Ἀντισθένους D

But let us be satisfied with these excerpts [concerning Plato's views on soul] and move next to the school of the Stoics. Now Antisthenes became the pupil of Socrates . . . and Diogenes the Dog became his pupil . . . and Crates succeeded Diogenes. And the pupil of Crates was Zeno of Citium, who was the founding leader of the school of the Stoic philosophers.

Context of Preservation

Eusebius gives transition from account of doctrines on being and soul in Aristotle and Plato (15.2.1–15.13.5) to those in the Stoics (15.13.6–15.22.67). This is the last section and the climax of the work. He traces the succession of the Stoics from Socrates, adding some famous details for most names in his list. (See t. 122G and 34B, in ellipses here.) As sources for the earlier sections in his treatment of the Stoics, he cites Aristocles of Messene (a Peripatetic from the first century CE) and Arius Didymus (see t. 140), either of whom could have been the source for the information here. Chiesara 2001:77 proposes that Aristocles and Arius themselves had the same source, “probably Posidonius.” Chiesara (xxxii n.21) also denies that this introductory section is drawn from Aristocles, attributing it to Eusebius, who would have used some common doxographical source.

Importance of the Testimonium

This passage complements t. 138A–B and agrees with the succession mapped in Diogenes Laertius (t. 135A).

Notes

See also t. 122G notes.

ὁ τῆς τῶν Στωικῶν φιλοσόφων αἵρέσεως καταστάς ἀρχηγός: Eusebius or his source is clear that, although Stoicism has a Socratic heritage, Zeno of Citium was the founder of the school. This is consistent with the discourse in Philodemus' partially preserved account (t. 138A) as well as the other accounts.

139B. Theodoret, *Cure of Greek Maladies* 12.32 (Canivet)

οὐ γὰρ Ἀντισθένης καὶ Διογένης καὶ Κράτητι παραπλησίως κενῆς ἕνεκα δόξης, ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ γε εἵνεκα τοῦ καλοῦ δρῶσιν ἃ δρῶσιν.

Not like Antisthenes and Diogenes and Crates, for the sake of vainglory, but for the sake of the fine itself they do what they do.

Context of Preservation

Toward the close of his work, Theodoret discusses practical virtue and finds a model for the Christian hermit in Pl. *Rep.* 2 361b–d. He underlines the difference between seeming good and being good, then implies that, unlike Plato, the Cynics endorsed the former. In difference from the Cynics, Christian hermits live in seclusion, not in cities and towns.

Importance of the Testimonium

The contrast between Cynic and Christian lifestyle can be compared with t. 183 (from Origen) and might arise from the similarity that could also be discerned. (See, generally, Downing 1992.)

Notes

κενῆς ἕνεκα δόξης: Compare t. 15B, 37C.

140. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.7.11s (Wachsmuth)

ἀστηρόν τε λέγεσθαι τὸν σπουδαῖον καθ' ὅσον οὔτε προσφέρει τινὶ οὔτε προσίεται τὸν πρὸς χάριν λόγον. κυνιεῖν τε τὸν σοφὸν λέγουσιν, ἴσον <ὄν> τῷ ἐπιμένειν τῷ κυνισμῷ, οὐ μὴν σοφὸν ὄντα ἐνάρξασθαι τοῦ κυνισμοῦ.

<ὄν> Valckenaer : ὅσον ἐπιμένειν τῷ κυνισμῷ Madvig : ὅσον τῷ κυνισμῷ ἐπιμένειν Meineke : ἔτοιμον ἐπιμένειν τῷ κυνισμῷ Mullach | ἐπιμενεῖν Usener | ἐνάρξασθαι F P: ἐνάρξασθαι Wachsmuth : ἄρξασθαι Madvig

And the good man is said to be rigorous insofar as he neither offers to anyone nor accepts speech directed at favor. And they say the wise man will Cynicize, this being equivalent to abiding in Cynicism, not, of course, to make a beginning in Cynicism when [already] being wise.

Context of Preservation

The lengthy ch. 2.7 in Wachsmuth's edition of Stobaeus, "On the Ethical Form of Philosophy" (Περὶ τοῦ ἠθικοῦ εἶδους τῆς φιλοσοφίας), is a Stoic doxography apparently from Arius Didymus, who might have used Apollodorus of Seleucia in this passage (so Goulet-Cazé 1986:24 n.22).

Importance of the Testimonium

The Stoic source shows a sympathetic but reserved attitude toward Cynicism, comparable to t. 135 and 136A. Antisthenes is not mentioned whatsoever in the context, but he would seem to be the source of this respectable rigor and “Cynicism.”

Notes

αὔστηρός: On this Stoic virtue of the wise man, see SVF III.162–63. Goulet-Cazé traces it to Apollodorus.

τὸν πρὸς χάριν λόγον: Antisthenes warns against flatterers (κόλακες) in t. 130–32. Favor or gratitude, χάρις, seems to be an important term in Antisthenes’ conception of exchange transactions (t. 13A, 56, 83).

κυνιεῖν τε τὸν σοφόν: The same maxim is in t. 136A and 136E.

τῷ ἐπιμένειν τῷ κυνισμῷ: The verb ἐπιμένειν indicates a refusal to give in to forces urging compromise. Goulet-Cazé compares Diogenes’ injunction to Crates in *Letter 12*: σὺ δὲ ἐπίμενε ἐν τῇ ἀσκήσει ὥσπερ ἤρξω (And you, abide in the exercise, as you began it). If a Stoic sage has been living as a Cynic, he should not stop.

οὐ μὴν σοφὸν ὄντα ἐνάρξασθαι: But a Stoic sage has no obligation to start a Cynic lifestyle, and it is implied in the expression οὐ μὴν that one who is already a sage has nothing at all to gain from Cynic living. This could be the opening needed by the Roman Stoics, such as Seneca, to enjoy the goods of wealth and power without counting as bad Stoics.

Ethical Characters: Alcibiades and Aspasia

testimonia 141–144

141A. Athenaeus, *Wise Men at Dinner* V 220c (Kaibel)

= 29A DC

Ἀντισθένης δ' ἐν θατέρῳ τῶν Κύρων κακολογῶν Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ παράνομον εἶναι λέγει καὶ εἰς γυναῖκας καὶ εἰς τὴν ἄλλην δίαιταν. συνεῖναι γάρ φησιν αὐτὸν καὶ μητρὶ καὶ θυγατρὶ καὶ ἀδελφῇ, ὥς Πέρσας.

κύρων codd. plur. : κυρῶν A | λέγει C : λέγων A | ὥς Πέρσας codd.
plur. : ὥς τοὺς Πέρσας C

Antisthenes, in the second of his texts titled *Cyrus*, slanders Alcibiades and says also that he is deviant from the norm both toward women and in the rest of his lifestyle. For he says that he coupled with [his?] mother and daughter and sister, like Persians.

Context of Preservation

This passage (as well as t. 142, 147A, 200, 203–4) is in a speech by the banqueter Masurius, a jurist and poet who is hostile to philosophers. Herodicus “the Crateteian” of Babylon, author of a text called *In Reply to the Lover of Socrates*, is cited as the source for part of the speech (215f) and assumed as the source for all of it (Düring 1941:54–59, 63–81). In this section, near the end of his tirade, Masurius charges that most philosophers are more abusive than the comic poets. His series on Antisthenes includes largely sexual slander but also general “abuse” of politicians.

Importance of the Testimonium

This is evidence that Antisthenes wrote about Alcibiades in one of his texts entitled *Cyrus*, not only under the title *Alcibiades*, and that the text might have portrayed the Persians in a negative light. (Compare t. 208.24.) It suggests that he

did not share the Cynics' indifference to incest. On the attribution of testimonia on Alcibiades to *Alcibiades* or *Cyrus*, see Giannantoni 1990 v.4:299–308.

Notes

ἐν θατέρῳ τῶν Κύρων: Antisthenes' catalog contains two texts titled *Cyrus*, t. 41A titles 4.1 and 5.1. (In some editions, titles 10.3–4 are also read “Cyrus”: see title 10.3 note.) In referring to the “second,” Athenaeus' source either presupposes knowledge of a published order (which could be different from the order in t. 41A) or refers to a text about Cyrus the younger, in contrast to Cyrus the Great. Cyrus the younger, who aspired to be king of Persia but was killed in battle against his half brother in 401 BCE, was contemporary with Alcibiades. See also t. 43A.

παράνομον: The νόμοι, “laws” or “norms,” seem to have existed on three levels in Antisthenes' view (see t. 41A titles 3.3–4, 68, 134g, 189): norms in circulation in the common culture, norms legislated by the state, and norms (or the single norm) in accordance with virtue. Only the last is valid, according to Antisthenes, but this does not mean that the norms of culture or the legislated norms cannot sometimes capture correctly the law of virtue. Here all three types would probably outlaw incest.

καὶ εἰς τὴν ἄλλην δίαιταν: Depending on the referent of “other,” this refers either to Alcibiades' life as a whole, which involved treachery against the Athenian state, or to “the remaining” modes of sexual practice, which might be sex with males. Antisthenes might have opposed homosexuality, to judge from his mode of slander against the sons of Pericles (t. 142), from his discourse with Socrates on love of the soul versus love of the body (t. 14A), and from his implication that only females satisfy his own erotic desires (t. 82.38). One anecdote presents him trying to court a young man (t. 175).

συνεῖναι: Often in Antisthenes' testimonia, this verb refers to philosophical companionship (t. 92, 13A), but its sexual meaning is common, and Antisthenes might have intended the double meaning regularly.

καὶ μητρὶ καὶ θυγατρὶ καὶ ἀδελφῇ, ὡς Πέρσας: Whereas the Persians were wary of “the Greek way”—that is, homosexuality (Xen. *Cyr.* 2.2.28)—the Greeks were wary of Persian incest. The mother and daughter Alcibiades slept with might have been Medonis and her daughter, who might have been Alcibiades' daughter also, as Lysias accused in a lost speech cited by Athenaeus (534e). See Rankin 1986:124–25. Medonis was not Alcibiades' mother, and this identification of the reference would show that Antisthenes' sexual slander against Alcibiades was inflated.

141B. Eustathius, *Commentary on Homer's "Odyssey"* 10.7 v.1 p. 1645.9–13 (Stallbaum)

= 29B DC

τοῦ καὶ δώδεκα παῖδες ἐνὶ μεγάροις γεγάασιν,
 ἕξ μὲν θυγατέρες, ἕξ δ' υἱέες ἡβώνοντες.
 ἐνθ' ὃ γε θυγατέρας πόρεν υἷας εἶναι ἀκοίτις.

καθ' ὃ καὶ ὁ Ζεὺς συνώκει τῇ Ἥρᾳ. ἐδόκει γὰρ τοῖς παλαιοῖς μέγα τι
 καὶ τὴν ἐκ φύσεως φιλοστοργίαν εἰς ὁμοφροσύνην συμβάλλεσθαι.
 Ἀλκιβιάδην μέντοι παρεξηλημένον ἐν τῷ ἄλλως βιοῦν ἐξωλέστερον,
 ἔσκωψε [φησιν] Ἀντισθένης <λέγων> παράνομον εἶναι καὶ εἰς
 γυναικάς καὶ εἰς τὴν ἄλλην δίαιταν. συνεῖναι γὰρ καὶ μητρὶ καὶ θυγατρὶ
 καὶ ἀδελφῇ ὡς Πέρσας.

ἔσκωψέ φησιν Ἀντισθένης Stallbaum : φησιν seclusi et <λέγων>
 scripsi : codd. non feruntur apud Stallbaum

And he had twelve children born in his house,
 six daughters and six vigorous sons.
 So he gave the daughters to the sons to be their wives.

[*Od.* 10.5–7]

In this manner also Zeus cohabited with Hera. For it seemed to the ancients that also the deep affection arising from nature contributes very much to like-mindedness. Alcibiades, however, who had spent himself out most abominably in living differently, Antisthenes mocked, saying he was deviant both toward women and in the rest of his lifestyle. For he says that he coupled with mother, daughter, and sister, like Persians.

Context of Preservation

Eustathius (c. 1110–98 CE, bishop of Thessalonica) comments on Homeric lines describing the children of Aeolus, god of the winds. See also t. 6.

Importance of the Testimonium

This shows that Eustathius (or someone later correcting his text) looked to Antisthenes' criticism of Alcibiades as one of the clearest objections to incest among the ancients, who, Eustathius says, were tolerant in general. It seems that Antisthenes also objected specifically to the incest among Aeolus' children, although this was a response to Euripides' play *Aeolus*, not to Homer. (See t. 195.) Eustathius (or the corrector) might have cited Antisthenes here because he knew this.

Notes

ἔσχωψέ [φησιν] Ἀντισθένης <λέγων>: The variant reading in codex A of Athenaeus (t. 141A) suggests that the original sentence might have had two participles, σκώψας (or κακολογῶν) and λέγων, before a finite clause using φησί. Eustathius (or a later copyist) has jumbled his conversion of the clauses into finite form. The mistake might indicate that the sentence was added later, as a correction to Eustathius. Athenaeus was surely the source for the whole sentence.

142. Athenaeus, *Wise Men at Dinner* V 220d (Kaibel)

= 34 DC

ἡ δ' Ἀσπασία τῶν Περικλέους υἱῶν Ξανθίππου καὶ Παράλου διαβολὴν (sc. περιέχει). τούτων γὰρ τὸν μὲν Ἀρχεστράτου φησὶν εἶναι συμβιωτὴν τοῦ παραπλήσια ταῖς ἐπὶ τῶν μικρῶν οἰκημάτων ἐργαζομένου, τὸν δ' Εὐφήμου συνήθη καὶ γνώριμον τοῦ φορτικὰ σκώπτοντος καὶ ψυχρὰ τοὺς συναντῶντας.

μικρῶν codd. : μιᾶρῶν Casaubon

And the *Aspasia* [contains] slander of the sons of Pericles, Xanthippus and Paralus. For he [Antisthenes] says that the first lived with Archestratus, who behaved similarly to those women at the small houses, and that the second was a companion and friend of Euphemus, who made vulgar and cold jokes against those who encountered him.

Context of Preservation

See t. 141A. The sentence follows immediately after t. 204 and 203, which supply the verb περιέχει. T. 141A is immediately before t. 204, and t. 147 follows the present passage.

Importance of the Testimonium

This shows that Antisthenes' intentions in *Aspasia* were not directed fully at Aspasia herself. T. 142–44 are attacks on Pericles, his sons by his first wife, and his sons' friends, who might have been Athenian politicians. In Pl. *Meno* 94b2 and ps.-Pl. *On Virtue* 377d8, these sons are exempla for the thesis that virtue cannot be taught (by fathers): the same meaning is plausible for Antisthenes. Antisthenes is on record as saying that virtue can be taught (t. 99, 134a); for subtleties that might have been lost in the tradition, see t. 103A.

Notes

Ξανθίππου καὶ Παράλου: These are the sons of Pericles by his first wife, Aspasia's stepsons. Since Xanthippus (PAA 730515) and Paralus (PAA 765275) both died in the plague of 430, Antisthenes' story must have been set before the Peloponnesian Wars.

Ἀρχεστράτου: This is PAA 211100. Several men by this name were prominent in late fifth-century Athens. An Archestratus was elected general in 407 and died in 406 (PAA 211665). Another is cited by Aelian and Plutarch for claiming that Athens could not endure more than one Alcibiades (PAA 211040); Plutarch (*Life of Alc.* 16.5) implies that the comment was made soon after the Olympics of 416, in reference to Alcibiades' multiple victory. This might indicate a family that was politically important.

ταῖς ἐπὶ τῶν μικρῶν οἰκημάτων: This phrase seems to refer to prostitutes in brothels (Aeschines 1.74: see Dover 1978:108) and would imply that Archestratus is a passive sexual partner. Xanthippus was, then, an active partner. Therefore, Antisthenes' slander is not about male sexual passivity (see Dover 1978:103–8) but must address the relationship itself. The term συμβιωτὴν implies a shared household.

Εὐφήμου: This is PAA 449458. One Euphemus was an Athenian archon in 417 (PAA 449480). One was an Athenian ambassador to Camarina in 415, during the Sicilian Expedition (PAA 449540). One, probably too young to be the friend of Paralus, was accused with Alcibiades of mutilating the herms in 415 (PAA 449565). These many namesakes, as in the case of Archestratus, could indicate a politically important family. See Düring 1941:70–71.

τοῦ φορτικὰ σκώπτοντος καὶ ψυχρά: Euphemus has bad taste and lacks rhetorical skill in everyday verbal interactions, an offense against Antisthenes' Socratic ideals. Compare t. 14A, where Antisthenes is exasperated that Socrates will withhold “conversation” (διαλέγεσθαι) rather than other forms of erotic relationship.

143A. Athenaeus, *Wise Men at Dinner* XIII 589e (Kaibel)

= 35 DC

Ἀντισθένης δ' ὁ Σωκρατικὸς ἐρασθέντα φησὶν αὐτὸν Ἀσπασίας <καὶ εἰς Ἀσπασίας> δις τῆς ἡμέρας εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα ἀπ' αὐτῆς ἀσπάεσθαι τὴν ἄνθρωπον, καὶ φευγούσης ποτὲ αὐτῆς γραφὴν ἀσεβείας λέγων ὑπὲρ αὐτῆς πλείονα ἐδάκρυσεν ἢ ὅτε ὑπὲρ τοῦ βίου καὶ τῆς οὐσίας ἐκινδύνευε. καὶ Κίμωνος δ' Ἑλληνίκῃ τῇ ἀδελφῇ παρανόμως συνόντος, τῇ ὕστερον ἐκδοθείσῃ Καλλίᾳ, καὶ φυγαδευθέντος μισθὸν ἔλαβε τῆς καθόδου αὐτοῦ ὁ Περικλῆς τὸ τῇ Ἑλληνικῇ μιχθῆναι.

Ἀντισθένης δ' codd. : Αἰσχίνης δ' Jacobs | <καὶ εἰς Ἀσπασίας> conl.

Janko per litt. | τῇ ὕστερον ἐκδοθείσῃ Καλλιᾷ Kaibel : εἴθ' ὕστερον ἐκδοθείσης Καλλιᾷ codd. : καίτοι τῷ καλλιᾷ ἐκδοθείσῃ post μυχθῆναι C

And Antisthenes the Socratic says he [Pericles] fell in love with Aspasia, and twice a day when he entered <the home of Aspasia> and exited from it [or her] he embraced the person; and when she once was prosecuted on a charge of impiety, while speaking on her behalf he cried more than when he was in danger over his life and property. And when Cimon coupled against the norms with his sister Elpinice (the one who was later married to Callias), and when he was sent into exile, Pericles took sexual relations with Elpinice as the payment for his return.

Context of Preservation

This passage is in a speech by Myrtilus, who dislikes philosophers. (See t. 141A.) The main topic is courtesans as companions at the symposium. In a digression, Myrtilus adds a “catalog of (prostitute-grade) women” (590b) to whom philosophers and other wise men have succumbed sexually.

Importance of the Testimonium

Since punning language on a proper name (ἀσπάζεσθαι) is attested for Antisthenes also against Plato, Isocrates, and Lysias (t. 41A titles 1.6 and 6.3), it seems likely that Antisthenes is the source here. The passage is focused on Pericles' faults, not Aspasia's.

Notes

<καὶ εἰς Ἀσπασίας> δις τῆς ἡμέρας εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα ἀπ' αὐτῆς: Adding this supplement (proposed by R. Janko in private correspondence) clarifies the sexual meaning of εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα ἀπ' αὐτῆς, where the pronoun refers, slyly, to Aspasia rather than the house. The parallel in Plutarch (t. 143B) shows that without the supplement, ἀπ' αὐτῆς might refer to the agora, where Pericles went every day for business of the city.

ἀσπάζεσθαι: This is a pun on Aspasia's name, which means “the embraced/embracing woman” or “the delighting woman.” A scholiast on Aelius Aristides, *On the Thirty* 127 (3.468 Dindorf) says, “She was called Aspasia because everyone embraced her” (Ἀσπασία ἐκλήθη ἐκ τοῦ πάντας αὐτὴν ἀσπάζεσθαι). Dittmar 1912:10 n.24 attributes the pun to Antisthenes. For use of the verb, compare t. 82.39, 34C-2, 84C.

τὴν ἄνθρωπον: In refusing to call Aspasia a γυνή (“woman” or “wife”), Myrtilus shows his disdain. But this rare use of ἄνθρωπος in the feminine gender also makes it clear that Aspasia is a female human, not a woman in a

separate kind (as Greek misogynist texts can imply: see Semonides). In the original text, it could have functioned to make Aspasia the equal of Pericles or even his superior. See t. 41A title 5.2 on Aspasia literature generally. See also t. 134r.

πλείονα ἐδάκρυσεν: Weeping might be a sign of love: compare t. 84C (not necessarily material from Antisthenes). Aeschines (SSR VIA 51) emphasizes emotional responses to Socrates. It is possible, then, that Aspasia is to Pericles as Socrates was to some of his followers and that the relationship between these two as presented in Plato's *Menexenus* was contemplated by Antisthenes also, not only by Aeschines (SSR VIA 70).

καὶ Κίμωνος δ' . . . παρὰ νόμῳ συνόντος: The adverb is common to Antisthenes' judgment of Alcibiades (t. 141A) and supports the possibility that this wording, too, survives from Antisthenes' *Aspasia*. Kaibel notes that it does not fit its context, which is a list of Pericles' sexual liabilities.

τῇ ὕστερον ἐκδοθείσῃ Καλλιᾷ: If this phrase belongs to the end of the sentence (as suggested by the reading in codex C) rather than the middle, it would emphasize that Pericles had relations with Elpinike in violation of marriage bonds. This would imply that no such violation is important in his relationship with Aspasia, but the slander addresses the unusually strong attachment. In particular, the association between the negative value of Aspasia and Pericles' divorce of his first wife (see t. 143B, 144) is absent from this passage. On the possibility that Antisthenes did not recognize marriage in a legal sense, see t. 59.

143B. Plutarch, *Life of Pericles* 24.7–8 165d (Ziegler-Gärtner)

φαίνεται μέντοι μᾶλλον ἐρωτική τις ἢ τοῦ Περικλέους ἀγάπῃς γενομένη πρὸς Ἀσπασίαν. ἦν μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ γυνὴ προσήκουσα μὲν κατὰ γένος, συνωκηκυῖα δ' Ἱππονίκῳ πρότερον, ἐξ οὗ Καλλιᾶν ἔτεκε τὸν πλούσιον· ἔτεκε δὲ παρὰ τῷ Περικλεῖ Ξάνθιππον καὶ Πάραλον. εἴτα τῆς συμβιώσεως οὐκ οὔσης αὐτοῖς ἀρεστῆς, ἐκείνην μὲν ἐτέρῳ βουλομένην συνεξέδωκεν. αὐτὸς δὲ τὴν Ἀσπασίαν λαβὼν ἔστερξε διαφερόντως. καὶ γὰρ ἐξίων, ὥς φασι, καὶ εἰσιὼν ἀπ' ἀγορᾶς ἡσπάζετο καθ' ἡμέραν αὐτὴν μετὰ τοῦ καταφιλεῖν.

Indeed it is clear that the affection of Pericles for Aspasia became something more erotic. For he had a wife related to him by birth, who had lived earlier with Hipponicus, with whom she gave birth to the wealthy Callias. With Pericles she bore Xanthippus and Paralus. Then, since their life together was not pleasing to them, he gave her, in accord with her will, to another man, while he himself took Aspasia as his partner and loved her preeminently. For both going out, as they say,

and coming in from the marketplace he embraced her every day and kissed her.

Context of Preservation

Plutarch narrates Pericles' leadership of Athens through the wars of the late 440s. Aspasia is said to be responsible for some of Pericles' decisions, and Plutarch then digresses to tell the story of their relationship.

Importance of the Testimonium

The connection with Antisthenes is in the last sentence, which matches Athenaeus' testimony (t. 143A). All of Plutarch's information about Aspasia probably comes ultimately from comedy or the writings of the Socratics Aeschines, Antisthenes, and Plato.

Notes

καὶ γὰρ ἐξιὼν, ὥς φασι, καὶ εἰσιὼν ἀπ' ἀγορᾶς: The phrase ὥς φασι might show Plutarch's awareness of the sexual double entendre. See t. 143A.

[144. Athenaeus, *Wise Men at Dinner* XII 533c–d (Kaibel)]

Περικλέα δὲ τὸν Ὀλύμπιον φησὶν Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικὸς ἐν τῷ Περὶ ἡδονῆς ὡς ἀπὴλλαξεν ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας τὴν γυναικα καὶ τὸν μεθ' ἡδονῆς βίον προείλετο ᾧκει τε μετ' Ἀσπασίας τῆς ἐκ Μεγάρων ἐταίρας καὶ τὸ πολὺ μέρος τῆς οὐσίας εἰς ταύτην κατανάλωσε.

Heraclides of Pontus says in his *On Pleasure* that the Olympian Pericles dismissed his wife from his house and chose the life with pleasure and lived with Aspasia, the courtesan from Megara, and spent the majority of his property on her.

This passage probably has no connection with Antisthenes but was included in SSR under the influence of Dittmar (1912:17, 300), who holds that all disapproval of the love affair was transmitted through Antisthenes. Heraclides Ponticus was active in the generation after the Socratics and must have had sources for his statements on Pericles and Aspasia, but his primary model seems to be Aristophanes, *Acharnians* 524 ff., where Pericles is called Περικλῆς οὐλύμπιος and where Aspasia is connected with Megara rather than Miletus, as in this passage.

SECTION 12

Language

testimonia 145–159

145. the title *Truth*

See t. 41A title 6.1, 11B

146. the title *On Discussing: [An] Antilogical [Work]*

See t. 41A title 6.2

147–48. the title *Sathon*

147A. Athenaeus, *Wise Men at Dinner* V 220d–e (Kaibel)

= 37A DC

καὶ Πλάτωνα δὲ μετονομάσας “Σάθωνα” ἀσυρῶς καὶ φορτικῶς τὸν ταύτην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν διάλογον ἐξέδωκε κατ’ αὐτοῦ.

And renaming Plato in a lewd and vulgar way as “Sathon” [Little Prick], he [Antisthenes] published against him the dialogue having this title.

147B. Athenaeus, *Wise Men at Dinner* XI 507a (Kaibel)

= 37B DC

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδ’ Ἀντισθένη ἐπαινῶ· καὶ γὰρ καὶ οὗτος πολλοὺς εἰπὼν κακῶς οὐδ’ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀπέσχετο ἀλλὰ καλέσας αὐτὸν φορτικῶς “Σάθωνα” τὸν ταύτην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν διάλογον ἐξέδωκεν.

However, neither do I approve of Antisthenes. For also he slandered many men and refrained not even from Plato himself, but called him in a vulgar way “Sathon” [Little Prick] and published the dialogue having this title.

Context of Preservation

Athenaeus uses the same material twice, in similar formulation. Athenaeus' source is apparently Herodicus "the Crateteian" of Babylon (Düring 1941:54–59, 63–81). The passage in book 5 appears in a speech against the philosophers by the jurist Masurius, amid a full paragraph on Antisthenes' ability to level abuse: see the list of further passages at t. 141A. The passage in book 11 is from a speech by the philosopher Pontianus, who endorses the style of moderate drinking that Socrates recommends in Xenophon's *Symposium* (see t. 67), not the excessive drinking recommended (as he claims) by Socrates at the conclusion of Plato's *Symposium*. The contrast between the Socratics introduces an extended rant against Plato. Amid this rant, the speaker condemns Antisthenes' own slander of Plato.

Importance of the Testimonia

These testimonia support the authenticity of the title *Sathon* in the catalog of Antisthenes' writings (t. 41A title 6.3), mentioned also in an anecdote in Diogenes Laertius (t. 148), and tell us that the text was a dialogue. It is clear that Herodicus of Babylon noted the title as an example of his general allegations of mutual hostility, mutual contradiction, and overall unreliability in the Socratics. There is an ancient tradition that the name "Plato" itself is already a nickname (a replacement for the original familial "Aristocles"), awarded on the basis of Plato's "breadth" (πλατύτης) in either chest, forehead, or style. This tradition, also transmitted by Diogenes Laertius (3.4), might be false historically (Riginos 1976:34–38; Notopoulos 1939:135–45), although Sedley 2003:21–23 sees reason to accept it, and it was accepted in antiquity: for example, one of Plato's epitaphs reported by Diog. Laert. 3.43 refers to "Aristocles." Whether "Plato" was a name given from birth or an assumed name, humorous etymologies can be traced as early as Timon of Phlius (fr. 20 di Marco; compare fr. 19, with a different etymology, πλαττω, "fabricate") and maybe back to Plato's contemporary Diogenes of Sinope: compare the addition of the quality πλατυώνυχον, "with broad fingernails," to the definition of the human (Diog. Laert. 6.40). Both Timon and Diogenes probably inherited the spirit of punning on names from the culture of fourth-century Athens (Pl. *Crat.* 383b; see t. 115 from Middle Comedy), in which Antisthenes participated.

Notes

Σάθωνα: Σάθων is a vulgar rhyme on Plato's proper name, Πλάτων, formed by replacing the first pair of letters; the middle letter, θ, would have been pronounced almost like the original τ. The word σάθων is a belittling term

for the male member, derived from the more commonly attested *σάθη* (Henderson 1991:109–10). This term is attested in cult, and according to the lexicographer Hesychius, it was a term of affection for young boys and male babies: this is the source of its diminutive sense. Antisthenes' variant is not his own coinage but was used previously by the comic poet Teleclides, active in the 440s and 430s. Possibly Antisthenes means something by the change of gender from *σάθη* to *σάθων*, such as an ambiguous femininity in Plato. In choosing a term for the phallus, Antisthenes might have been chiding Plato for his erotic tendencies or for elevating erotic themes in Socraticism (Müller 1975:176 n.4). Antisthenes was also about fifteen years older than Plato and could have been attacking his immaturity. On Antisthenes' apparent hostility toward *eros* of the body, see t. 14A, 56, 82.38, 123. Elsewhere, Antisthenes allegedly attacked Plato for his luxurious living (t. 27) and his long-windedness (t. 30).

τὸν ταύτην ἔχοντα τὴν ἐπιγραφὴν διάλογον ἐξέδωκε: If the language is precise and the account true, we learn that *Sathon* was a dialogue (see t. 11B) and that Antisthenes himself assigned the title at the time he “published” it. The event of publication could be the invention of Herodicus, inferred from the title. The parallel case of Antisthenes' punning on the names of Lysias and Isocrates (t. 41A title 1.5) supports the likelihood that Antisthenes is responsible for these titles. On language of abuse in classical Athens generally, see Worman 2008.

148. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 3.35 (Marcovich)

= 36 DC

λέγεται δ' ὅτι καὶ Ἀντισθένης μέλλων ἀναγινώσκειν τι τῶν γεγραμμένων αὐτῷ παρεκάλεσεν αὐτὸν παρατυχεῖν. καὶ πυθομένῳ τί μέλλει ἀναγινώσκειν, εἶπεν ὅτι περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν· τοῦ δ' εἰπόντος· “Πῶς οὖν σὺ περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου γράφεις;” καὶ διδάσκοντος ὅτι περιτρέπεται, ἔγραψε διάλογον κατὰ Πλάτωνος Σάθωνα ἐπιγράφας· ἐξ οὗ διετέλουν ἀλλοτρίως ἔχοντες πρὸς ἀλλήλους.

πυθομένῳ Cobet : πυθόμενος B P F :

πυθομένου Reiske : ἐρωτηθεὶς F

It is said that Antisthenes, as he was about to read aloud something from his writings, invited him [Plato] to attend. And when he [Plato] asked what he was going to read, he said, “On the Impossibility of Gainsaying.” And when he [Plato] said, “So how do you write about that very thing?” and taught him that he had refuted himself, he wrote a dialogue against Plato and entitled it “Sathon” [Little Prick]. From this episode began their long-lasting estrangement from each other.

Context of Preservation

Diogenes Laertius' third book is on Plato, and paragraphs 34–36 discuss his relations (mainly hostile) with other Socratics.

Importance of the Testimonium

This anecdote, probably fashioned in the Hellenistic period and probably unhistorical, reflects a tradition hostile to Antisthenes' famous thesis οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν. (On ancient attributions of this thesis to others, Protagoras and Prodicus, see t. 154.) Resistance to the thesis appears in virtually all surviving testimonia (t. 152A–C, 153B–D), but the objection here is distinctive for drawing the conclusion that nothing can be said, rather than the opposite, that everything can be said and almost no statement is false, as Aristotle and his commentators explain Antisthenes' thesis at *Met.* 1024b (t. 152A–C, 153B). See also t. 155 (Proclus), 156 (Isocrates).

Notes

λέγεται: Diogenes marks the anecdotal nature of his material. (See also t. 1A.) This is probably an apocryphal anecdote, generated to illustrate the intellectual differences between Plato and Antisthenes and to explain the origin of a personal distancing. The anecdote, together with the book title, is the clearest evidence we have for an animosity rooted in intellectual issues: t. 27 is hostile, but the rivalry for status or prestige seems to outweigh intellectual questions; t. 149 is intellectually serious, but not necessarily hostile. (See also t. 28–30.) Plato's sarcastic references to Antisthenes in his dialogues, if they exist, might confirm such intellectual animosity. But such references are hard to prove, humor is hard to weigh for its force, and the whole matter can easily become circular. The hostility among the Socratics could have been exaggerated by an early anti-Socratic tradition, and Riginos 1976:101 posits Herodicus of Babylon (see t. 147A–B) as Diogenes' indirect source. But the anecdote has a learned content suggesting an origin closer to positive Athenian philosophy: while Herodicus might have picked it up, Diogenes probably had a different ultimate source, possibly Peripatetic or Megarian (through Stilpo, who took interest in logical paradox), possibly Pyrrhonian (see t. 117A) or Epicurean (as proposed by Pohlenz 1913:210; see also Brancacci 1990:174 n.2).

περὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν: This is Antisthenes' famous thesis, οὐκ ἔστι ἀντιλέγειν, nominalized. The most closely corresponding book title, t. 41A title 6.4, refers to the thesis in positive form, Περὶ τοῦ ἀντιλέγειν, in three parts. See t. 152–56; compare also t. 53.7, 103B, and 174, where similar statements occur in different kinds of context. Antisthenes' thesis claims

either (1) that two opposed and (by all appearances) mutually inconsistent accounts of something can both be true, in different ways, and that the truth of one account does not conflict with the truth of the other because both are simultaneously true (this is similar to Protagoras' man-is-the-measure claim as explicated in Pl. *Theaet.* 152a ff.); or (2) that when two opposed and mutually inconsistent accounts of something are produced, at most one is true, and the other (or even each of them) has no truth value because it is mere noise and fails to refer at all. (See, further, t. 152B, 153B–D.) The first interpretation, where the claims to truth are balanced, should be understood here, because the second would not entail the total failure of speech (or writing), which is the punch line of the anecdote. The translation “gainsay” for ἀντιλέγειν is meant to imply a successful refutation of a previous speaker's account through compelling statement of an opposite, or contradictory, account. The term seems to come originally from the law courts (e.g., Pl. *Phaedr.* 261c5) and possibly other contexts of competitive democratic oratory (Demos. *On the False Embassy* 4) and then take on a specialized meaning in Socratic contexts, where the truth value of any account is assessed at the level of its minimal units, presumably propositions such as “X is f.” (See Rankin 1981:28–31 on the fifth-century background; Kraus 2006 covers the ground from Homer through Antisthenes.) In the single case where Antisthenes' thesis is preserved in his own context (t. 53.7, a pseudo-forensic speech), it addresses a pair of complex speeches arguing for opposite outcomes to a dispute and seems to imply that ἀντιλέγειν is a mode of action sooner than a mode of representation (although representation is also entailed); moreover, it is unclear whether these speeches can be reduced to simple opposed propositions. (See comments on t. 53.7.) According to the Peripatetic tradition that has transmitted most of our other evidence, Antisthenes' paradox does also address representational speech or truth claims at the level of minimal units (whatever those turn out to be). In the present anecdote, whether or not it offers a fair picture of Antisthenes' intention, Plato presumably believes that Antisthenes will claim that X is both f and not-f, which is impossible, and so posits that he can say nothing.

Πῶς οὖν σὺ . . . γράφεις: The challenge against “writing” anything, rather than speaking anything, points to a later date for the anecdote. Although Plato, Antisthenes, and their contemporaries may have performed some of their philosophical quarrels in writing, the representations of philosophical quarrels in fourth-century texts refer to speaking. In questioning how such a thesis is compatible with writing anything at all, Plato's reply seems to equate the thesis against gainsaying with violation of the principle of non-contradiction, which, according to Aristotle, must be in place if anything positive is to be said (*Met.* Γ.3–4 1005b18–1009a5, esp. 1006a11–15; see t. 157B–C for the possibility that

Antisthenes is in the background in *Met.* Γ). The criticism is leveled there at least partly against Protagoras, who is represented by Plato in *Theaetetus* (esp. 171a–c) as liable to such a criticism. But Aristotle's term for "contradiction" throughout *Met.* Γ.3–4 is not ἀντιλέγειν but ἀντίφασις. In *Theaet.* 171, Plato uses no single precise term for "contradiction" or "self-contradiction," but Protagoras is cornered, at 171a6–9, into accepting both his own belief (οἴησις) and that of those "believing in opposition" (οἱ ἀντιδοξάζοντες) against him. If Plato is writing parody of contemporaries in *Theaetetus*, he could be using the odd phrase οἱ ἀντιδοξάζοντες in place of Antisthenes' proper phrase, οἱ ἀντιλέγοντες, which appears in Alexander of Aphrodisias' explications of his paradox in t. 152B.3–4 and 153B.2 (in the second text, the parties are only "seeming" to gainsay, οἱ ἀντιλέγειν δοκοῦντες). This would be a consequence of Plato's reduction of Antisthenes' problem to a pre-articulated, belief-level stage, which might or might not be faithful to Antisthenes but might have served Plato's purposes in some way. On Antisthenes' use of δοξάζω with serious epistemological weight, see t. 53.8–9. If Diogenes' anecdote is derived ultimately from Aristotle's image of the misguided dialectician in *Met.* Γ.3–4, if this image is indeed inspired by Plato's *Theaetetus*, and if Plato wrote *Theaetetus* against contemporaries including Antisthenes, then the anecdote could reflect, at several removes, a real, historical quarrel between the two over Antisthenes' thesis, without connection to any particular live encounter. The thesis that Antisthenes was a target of *Theaetetus* was advanced by Dümmler (1882:40–63), who thought that most of *Theaetetus*, including the account of materialist perception, referred to Antisthenes. Dümmler had predecessors in this thinking, including Schleiermacher, Winckelmann (1842:36), and Chappuis (1854:70–73); see also Natorp 1894: col. 2543. Recently, Lee 2005:92 allows the possibility of intra-Socratic rivalry in *Theaetetus* without addressing the details. See comment on the book title *Truth*, t. 41A title 6.1. Burnyeat 1970:110 proposes that the anecdote could represent Antisthenes' response to Pl. *Euthyd.* 285d–286b, where followers of Protagoras are also mentioned. Alternatively, the anecdote could represent a later generation's assimilation of Antisthenes' thesis to the thesis of Protagoras. (See the parallel for this connection in t. 154.)

περιτρέπεται: This is a standard term in Sextus Empiricus for "self-refutation." It might mark the origin of the anecdote among the Skeptics, in the tradition of Pyrrho.

Σάθωνα ἐπιγράψας: Antisthenes' response can be understood in two ways. By changing rhetorical modes and using foul language at Plato's expense rather than trying to reply on Plato's terms, Antisthenes might concede that Plato is correct and that indeed nothing can be said in the mode of discursive speech under conditions where gainsaying, or contradiction, is impossible.

Antisthenes might do what he can to score a point in the cheap way, by going out of bounds. A second interpretation is more charitable to Antisthenes: if Plato insists on discursive language according to Academic standards, Antisthenes concedes failure. Since Academic speech is not all speech, however, he is free to change register and still say something about Plato and his logical theses in a mode where the illocutionary force is not just discursive. On the possible content of *Sathon*, see t. 41A title 6.3; Brancacci 1990:28–30. For later Cynic “discourse” in the mode of rude behavior, compare, e.g., Diog. Laert. 6.32 (Diogenes of Sinope) and 2.117 (Crates).

ἀλλοτρίως ἔχοντες: The estrangement in this anecdote is understated: ἀλλοτρίως ἔχοντες is a weaker expression than the language Diogenes uses otherwise in his biography of Antisthenes for his relationships with others. (Worman 2008:162 n.27 collects a list.) This understatement could be irony, or it could mean that the Socratics were estranged but mutually respectful to some extent: possibly the lewd book title was a tolerable joke within the culture that supported Old Comedy. See t. 29, where Antisthenes appears to defend Plato, at least on one level.

149. Antisthenes’ “horse” versus Plato’s “horseness”

149A. Ammonius, *Commentary on Porphyry’s “Introduction”* CAG 4.3 p. 39.13–41.5 (Busse)

= 50C DC

- (1) ἵνα δὲ σαφὲς γένηται τὸ λεγόμενον, εἰπωμεν οὕτως. τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ὑφέστηκε, τὰ δὲ ἐν ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις ὑπάρχει οἷον ἵπποκένταυρος <ἢ> τραγέλαφος, ἅτινα ἐπινοούμενα μὲν ὑφίσταται, μὴ ἐπινοούμενα δὲ οὐχ ὑφίσταται, ἀλλὰ παυσαμένης τῆς ἐπινοίας καὶ αὐτὰ συμπαύεται. οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἵπποκένταυρος ἐν ὑποστάσει, ἀλλὰ θεασάμενοι ἵππον καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἀνεπλάσαμεν τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ σύνθετόν τι τὸν ἵπποκένταυρον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τράγον μὲν ἐποίησεν ἡ φύσις καὶ ἔλαφον, ἀναπλάσαντες δὲ καθ’ ἑαυτοὺς τῇ ἐπινοίᾳ ἀποτελοῦμεν σύνθετόν τι τὸν τραγέλαφον, καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ εἶναι ἔχει. (2) ὁ τοίνυν Ἀντισθένης ἔλεγε τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη ἐν ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις εἶναι λέγων ὅτι “Ἴππον μὲν ὁρῶ, ἵππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ” καὶ ἄλλιν “Ἀνθρωπον μὲν ὁρῶ, ἀνθρωπότητα δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ.” ταῦτα ἐκεῖνος ἔλεγε τῇ αἰσθήσει μόνῃ ζῶν καὶ μὴ δυνάμενος τῷ λόγῳ εἰς μείζονα εὑρεσιν ἑαυτὸν ἀνενεγκεῖν. (3) τῶν οὖν ὑφεστηκότων τὰ μὲν σώματά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα. ὅλως δὲ τῶν παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἔλεγον εἶναι ταῦτα, οἱ δὲ μὴ εἶναι. . . . (4) τοσοῦτων οὖν οὐσῶν αἰρέσεων περὶ τοῦ εἶναι ταῦτα καὶ μὴ εἶναι

φησι δυνατόν ἦν ζητεῖν περὶ γενῶν τε καὶ εἰδῶν εἴτ' εἰσὶν εἴτε ἐν ψιλῇ ἐπινοίᾳ κεῖνται· οὕτω γὰρ ὁ Ἀντισθένης ᾤετο. καὶ εὐρὼν δὲ αὐτὰ ὑφεστηκότα ἡδύνατο πάλιν ζητεῖν, εἴτε σώματά ἐστιν εἴτε ἀσώματα.

(1) ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις D V : ψιλῇ ἐπινοία E M p : oblitt. F | <ῆ> supplevi : οἷον ἵπποκένταυρος τραγέλαφος D F V : οἷον τραγέλαφος E M : om. p | post τραγέλαφος add. plur. verba de substantia E M V p, quae apud Busse invenientur | παυσαμένης τῆς ἐπινοίας καὶ αὐτὰ συμπαύεται : F M p : συμπ. καὶ αὐτὰ τῆς ἐπιν. παυσ. D | συμπαύεται D F M V p : παύεται E | οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἵπποκένταυρος D F : οἷον ἵπποκένταυρος οὐ γάρ ἐστιν E M V p | ἄνθρωπον E : ταῦρον D F M : κένταυρον V p | ἐπινοία D E M V : διανοία F p | καθ' ἑαυτοὺς E F M V p : om. D | ἀποτελοῦμεν D E F M V : ἀνεπλάσαμεν p | σύνθετον τι τὸν τραγέλαφον E F M V : τι σύνθετον τραγέλαφον p : τὸν om. D | καὶ ταύτῃ τὸ εἶναι ἔχει om. E : vel ὅς ἐν ταύτῃ conī. Busse | ἐπινοία D E F M V : διανοία p (2) ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις D F p : ψιλῇ ἐπινοία E M : ἐπινοίαις ψιλαῖς V | λέγων D E p : λέγει γὰρ F : λέγων τοῦτο M V | καὶ πάλιν . . . οὐχ ὁρῶ om. V | ἄνθρωπον μὲν F M p : ἄνθρωπον D E V | ἀνενεγκεῖν D P : ἀναγαγεῖν E M : ἀγαγεῖν F V (3) ὅλως δὲ . . . μὴ εἶναι om. E | μὴ εἶναι D : οὐκ εἶναι F M V p | καὶ μὴ εἶναι om. E M V (4) φησὶν om. p | δυνατόν ἦν codd. plur. : ἦν δυνατόν E M | κεῖνται codd. plur. : κεῖται D M V | ὑφεστηκότα codd. plur. : ὑφεστῶτα M | εἴτε ἀσώματά ἐστιν εἴτε σώματα p

(1) In order that what is said [by Porphyry] should become clear, let us speak as follows. Of things that are, some really exist ["subsist"], whereas others pertain in our mere thoughts, such as the hippocentaur or the goat-stag, and as many things as subsist when they are thought of, whereas when they are not thought of do not subsist: but when the thinking has stopped, also they cease along with it. For there is no hippocentaur in reality, but once we have seen a horse and a man, we fashion in our thought a certain composite, the hippocentaur. In similar manner nature, for its part, has made both the goat and the stag, and we, for our part, by fashioning unto ourselves in our thought bring to actuality a certain composite, the goat-stag, and it has its being by means of this [thought]. (2) Now Antisthenes said that genuses and [species] forms are in our mere thoughts, when he said, "I see a horse, but I do not see horseness," and likewise, "I see a human, but I do not see humanity." He said these things because he lived by perception alone and was not able to bring himself by reason to a greater discovery. (3) So of subsisting things, some are bodies and some are bodiless. And in general among the ancients, some said that these

things exist, whereas others said that they do not exist. . . . (4) Since, then, there are so many schools of thought about whether or not these exist, he [Porphyry] says it was possible with reference to genres and species [forms] to seek whether they exist or whether they lie in mere thought: for this is what Antisthenes believed. And after discovering that these are subsisting things, he [Porphyry] was able to next ask whether they are bodies or bodiless.

Context of Preservation

Ammonius (head of the Neo-Platonic school in Alexandria c. 435/445–517/526 CE; see also t. 152C) discusses Porphyry's introductory statement about topics beyond the scope of his present *Introduction to Aristotle's "Categories"* (written sometime after 263 CE). Porphyry announces that he will address the logic of genus, difference, species, property, and accident (τί γένος καὶ τί διαφορά τί τε εἶδος καὶ τί ἴδιον καὶ τί συμβεβηκός) but will "avoid the deeper questions" (τῶν μὲν βαθυτέρων ἀπεχόμενος ζητημάτων) about the very reality of these entities, since there was disagreement among the ancients "already about the genres and species" (αὐτίκα περὶ τῶν γενῶν τε καὶ εἰδῶν), "whether they really exist or whether they lie in bare thoughts only" (τὸ μὲν εἴτε ὑφέστηκεν εἴτε καὶ ἐν μόναις ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις κεῖται). Ammonius elucidates in two ways the question Porphyry avoids, by adding examples of things that lie only in thoughts, the hippocentaur and the goat-stag, and by naming a thinker who held the minimalist view, Antisthenes. Porphyry and Ammonius distinguish three hierarchically arranged questions about the ontology of genres and species, and four possible combinations of answers that could be held: (1 vs. 2) these might or might not really exist; (1A vs. 1B) if they really exist, they might be embodied or bodiless; (1Bi vs. 1Bii) if they really exist and are bodiless, they might or might not be separable from material individuals. Antisthenes is the only thinker Ammonius cites for any of the positions implicitly rejected, presumably because his rejection occurs at the primary level, by this scheme. (Simplicius, at *In Cat.* 216.12–19, uses the Eretrians, another group of minor Socratics, as well as Dicaearchus and Theopompus, to illustrate the same level of rejection: see t. 149B-1.) The second and third divisions in the scheme might be anachronistic for Antisthenes, if he was rejecting the particular metaphysics of Plato, which made incorporeal existence and separability fundamental attributes of the Forms; that is, we have no license to assume that Antisthenes equated real existence with bodily existence, just because Plato and Porphyry aligned these criteria as they did. (On the late antique commentators generally, see Sorabji 1990:1–30.)

Importance of the Testimonium

This anecdote is the clearest surviving account of the ontological dispute between Antisthenes and Plato, but because the sources are Neo-Platonic, its historicity is often rejected. Scholars have noted conflicts between the apparently nominalist doctrine attributed to Antisthenes here and the apparently realist doctrines of *oikeios logos* in Aristotle (t. 152A) and *logos* in Diogenes Laertius (t. 151A). But these conflicts might admit resolution, and the origin of the anecdote can surely be placed in the Hellenistic period, prior to Neo-Platonism.

The particular dispute over horse and horseness and over human and humanity is first attested in Ammonius, then recited in Alexandrian and Athenian Neo-Platonists of two later generations (t. 149B–E) and finally in the Byzantine scholar Tzetzes (t. 149F). However, there are near parallels for this dispute, over different entities, in Diogenes Laertius that must have been formulated in the Hellenistic period. In the closest parallel (Diog. Laert. 6.53), Plato's opponent is Diogenes of Sinope, not Antisthenes, and the terms in dispute are *τραπεζότης* (tablehood) versus *τράπεζα* (table) and *κυαθότης* (cuphood) versus *κύαθος* (cup): on the possibility that terms for artifacts like these are at the heart of the dispute, whereas the biological examples in the present anecdote were chosen by parties hostile to Antisthenes, see t. 149B-1.2 note on οἱ δὲ τινὰς μὲν ἀνῆρουν ποιότητας. A pair of anecdotes involving Antisthenes and Plato (Diog. Laert. 6.7 = t. 27) is also related: when Antisthenes saw that Plato had vomited, he said, *χολὴν μὲν ὀρῶ ἐνταῦθα, τῦφον δὲ οὐχ ὀρῶ* (I see the bile there, but the arrogance I do not see). See t. 27 notes. These anecdotes are sympathetic to the Cynics and hostile to Plato; the version here, especially when Plato's response is included (t. 149B-1, 149C), is sympathetic to Plato and hostile to Antisthenes. The origin, to judge from the strong opposition between seeing with visual versus mental organs, might be a retelling of part of the argument in *Theaetetus*: see 149B-1. Of course, it is also possible that the closest textual source is now lost or that the general epistemology of Plato, as it is represented in *Rep.* 476b4–7 and 477b3–478d11, is assumed. A complete fabrication of the anecdote, by, for example, Pyrrho or Timon of Phlius in the third century BCE, is not impossible, but its survival in this serious and learned Neo-Platonic setting suggests that the Neo-Platonists, at least, thought it carried truth.

The clearest difference between Antisthenes and Plato that is consistent with the considerations below is that Antisthenes located the identity of an individual entity in its individual nature and discerned this nature through sense perception, whereas Plato located this identity in a more general being and discerned it through either thought or a priori knowledge. Comparison

with other evidence suggests that Antisthenes could not have held a purely “materialist” or “aesthetic” view of recognition—such as Plato seems to attribute to an opponent in *Theaet.* 151e2–152c7 (and with more subtlety at 156a2–157c1)—since, for example, Antisthenes considers true military generals to be characterized by their knowledge (t. 72A), a quality that could be recognized only in ways more abstract than sense perception. Many other testimonia for Antisthenes suggest mental organs and functions: see index s.v. νοῦς and φρόνησις and Brancacci 2005 (“Episteme and phronesis”). But both the priority of individuals over types and the understanding of the nature of types (or at least most types: discussion follows in the notes) as constructions within individual human minds—in the mode of their respective private languages and perhaps compounded from material individuals perceived and experienced—are consistent with all the evidence. (See also Pl. *Phaedr.* 249b6–c1 for the articulation of this kind of view in Antisthenes’ time.) If Ammonius’ examples of the goat-stag and hippocentaur can be associated with Antisthenes, this reconstruction of his views becomes all the more interesting, but this association remains speculative. Ammonius wrote a commentary on Aristotle’s *De interpretatione*, and goat-stags and hippocentaurs are used as key examples there (16b16–18, 18b21–23).

Notes

(1) τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν ὑφέστηκε, τὰ δὲ ἐν ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις ὑπάρχει:

Ammonius has three classes of being here. The most inclusive set, τὰ ὄντα, are named from the basic Greek verb “to be.” Of these things, there are two subsets: what really exists and what exists as thoughts. On the Stoic background to this scheme, see Caston 2007. But whereas Stoic ὑπόστασις (translated “subsist”) is the class of noetic being (things thought but not existing in a more determinate sense), Porphyry introduces here a class of beings with ontology less than ὑπόστασις. This new class “pertains” in the mode of a third term, ὑπάρχει. In the account that follows, these third-tier entities created temporarily in thought are matched also to the stronger verb ὑφίσταται: they “subsist” temporarily and dependently (as long as the thought is occurring) and then cease “subsisting.” In §4 of this discussion and in the original formulation of Porphyry, the fabricated mental entities are said to “lie” in our thoughts, κεῖνται, a verb that probably avoids ontological precision. Elsewhere, the Stoics are said to hold that a genus exists as a collection of thoughts (ἐννοημάτων σύλληψις, Diog. Laert. 7.60). Antisthenes’ view as described here is weaker, if he really said that the existence of these entities is transient. Brancacci 2005 (“Antisthène et le stoicisme”) argues for a close connection between Antisthenes’ view and that of the Stoics.

ἐν ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις: ψιλός might be an ordinary word with no technical

resonance outside the Neo-Platonists' standard opposition between real and nominalist universal terms, as Barnes states (2003:40–41). On a similar line, scholars on Antisthenes (e.g., Graeser 1992) have said that the whole anecdote of t. 149 reflects Neo-Platonic concerns only and is anachronistic for Antisthenes. But the same term occurs in pre-Plotinian testimonia for Antisthenes: see t. 153B.6 (Alexander of Aphrodisias). Moreover, similar terminology is attested in Antisthenes' original intellectual context. In Pl. *Theaet.* 165a2, ψιλοὶ λόγοι, which are the mode and subject matter of Protagoras' dialectic, are contrasted with the more ontologically grounded science of geometry. Brancacci (1990:190–93; 2005:58–59) posits that Antisthenes' own language for a nominalist construct was νόημα ἐν ψυχᾷς (Pl. *Parm.* 132b4–c8), which has pre-Socratic parallels, including Gorg. *Helen* §17; the term νόημα also appears in t. 187.6. (On this term, see also Zeller 1888:295–6 n.2.) It is not implausible to ask whether ἐπίνοια, too, is Antisthenes' term: in its implication that the mental construct supervenes on something else, it could have a parallel in his literary critical term ἐπισημαίνεται (see t. 188) and might be opposed to ὑπόνοια (see t. 185A), the literary critical term of the allegorists, who seek deeper meaning “under” the text rather than interpretive meaning “on top of” it. One manuscript reads here the singular ἐν ψιλῇ ἐπινόιᾳ rather than the plural, and the singular is used when the phrase is repeated in §4. If Antisthenes was serious about the individuation of noetic entities, as t. 187.11–12 may suggest, then the plural is probably correct, since multiple minds in agreement, or at least multiple occasions of thought in one mind, are required for construction of the categories of language.

οἶον ἵπποκένταυρος <ἦ> τραγέλαφος: There is no direct evidence that Antisthenes discussed the existence of hippocentaurs and goat-stags, but he did give prominence to the hippocentaur Chiron in his story of Heracles (see t. 92), and it may be no accident that the examples in the present anecdote are horses and humans, the components of the hippocentaur. There is, furthermore, evidence for ontological treatment of hippocentaurs (or similar beasts) by thinkers associated with Antisthenes. Gorgias puzzled over the reality “in thought” of the Chimaira and Scylla and of the chariot running on the sea (*On Not Being* in Sextus' version, §79–80 Buchheim). Around Antisthenes' time, Xenophon mentions that the hippocentaur is a compound being (*Cyrus* 4.3.20) and allegedly had a famous dog named “Hippocentaurus” (Pollux 5.47). The term ἵπποκένταυρος is first attested in Plato (*Phaedr.* 229d5–6), where its “form” (εἶδος) is in question and where the Chimaira is mentioned as the next example. The τραγέλαφος appears in *Rep.* 6 488a2–6, where Socrates says he will make a compound likeness for the philosopher's experience in the city “such as the painters paint, mixing up goat-stags and

such things”: the likeness of the philosopher to the pilot subjected to mutiny by his crew follows (488a7–489a2), and soon after that comes the famous likenesses of the Sun, the Line, and the Cave. On issues involving other kinds of compound beings, see t. 150A–B, 152A–B. On likenesses, see t. 150A.4, 51A, 181A–B.

(2) τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη: Because the commentary is about Aristotle’s *Categories*, these are probably the Aristotelian genus and species forms as discussed in *Cat.* 2a14–19, two levels in the general classification of individual beings: this is consistent with the biological examples used, and no language in the passage implies a looser meaning. (Contrast Barnes 2003:26–27, holding that the terms need not mean precisely “genus” and “species” but might be close synonyms for such broad notions as “type” or “class.” Clearly this kind of general meaning is eventually understood in the Neo-Platonic tradition: compare t. 149C–D, where Elias and David equate τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη simply with “universals,” τὰ καθόλου; in t. 149F, Tzetzes understands the anecdote to concern the Platonic ἰδέαι. But Plato’s Ideas in their own time were not simply universals; they were also particular entities [Harte 2011:209]. It is plausible that this very distinction between type and individual, as much as the ontological reality of the individual, was outstanding among the differences between Antisthenes and Plato.) In the *Categories*, Aristotle gives the example of “human being” as the species form or εἶδος of the individual human, with “animal” as the genus or γένος of the species human being. Aristotle says in the *Categories* that the species and the genus are “secondary substances,” generalizations from the “primary substances,” the individual humans. So the view of Antisthenes, that the classifications of individuals (at two levels) are merely conceptual entities, would seem not to be clearly different from that of Aristotle in the *Categories*. Aristotle’s explicit rejection of Plato’s Ideas (e.g., in *EE* 1217b20–21) confirms the same: τὸ εἶναι ἰδέαν μὴ μόνον ἀγαθοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλου ὅπου οὖν λέγεται λογικῶς καὶ κενῶς ([The claim] that there is an Idea, not only of the Good, but of anything else, is said logically and vapidly). A full account of Aristotle’s mature views, however, would note that Aristotle recognizes continuity (or possibly identity) of the species form from individual to individual through reproduction (e.g., *Met.* Z.8 1033b26–32) and thereby must posit extra-conceptual reality to the species: but the genus of many species of animals, which, in Aristotle’s view, are not connected by reproduction, should be just a mental collection of those species that share common traits, and Aristotle comes down clearly, against the Platonists, in denying substance (οὐσία) to this classification (*Met.* Z.10 1035b27–30, H.1 1042a21–22). We have no secure evidence for the role of reproduction in Antisthenes’ own views of human beings, but the simplest explanation for his insistence on wives “best in nature” (ταῖς εὐφρεστάταις

γυναιξί, t. 58; see also t. 41A title 2.2) is that he thought mothers transmit their φύσις to their offspring. However, he might have remained agnostic about the ontology of this φύσις, that is, whether it was a potential for excellence rather than excellence itself, as well as about the modes for recognizing it, and he might have insisted that φύσις could be recognized only in individuals through direct (sensory or more broadly experiential) perception, not imputed to individuals a priori on the basis of an origin or membership in a preconceived class. (See t. 134b.) Horses and humans are both superior beings in Antisthenes' view, by contrast with asses and fools, and it could be that they are what they are not only from biology but also from training and education. (See t. 41A comments on φύσις in the introduction to the second *tomos*.) A passage classified under the heading "On Good Birth" in Stob. 4.29c.53, which some have attributed to Antisthenes, assumes a strong biological component in virtue: see t. 41A title 2.5 note. If that passage was written by Antisthenes, it would sway the balance in favor of an essential nature in superior humans. But the passage also insists that knowledge, which is, presumably, acquired and developed, is critical for successful human mating, and the passage requires a careful assessment in its own right.

"Ἴππον μὲν ὀρώ, ἰππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὀρώ": This statement of Antisthenes is probably taken from a Hellenistic anecdote that posed him against Plato: see general comment above. Parallel texts (including t. 149B-1, 149D) attribute a reply to Plato. The form of the horse was surely debated among members of the Academy and external interlocutors. The horse and the human are the examples Plato uses in *Crat.* 385a6–10, where Socrates proposes that "public" (δημοσίᾳ) and "private" (ιδίᾳ) names for the horse and the human can be reversed in a situation where there is no underlying truth about their application. The horse and human are also the examples in *Theaet.* 195d6–10, where the infallibility of private thought is contrasted with the fallibility in the match between thought and perceptible object. The distinction between the ass and the horse is an example of the public's liability to deception by the sophistic rhetor in *Phaedr.* 260b1–c2. Aristotle, in the *Metaphysics* (1039a26–28), imagines the human and the horse as the central cases in his protests over the incoherence between Academic definitions by division and Plato's theory of Forms. (See, further, t. 150A.)

"Ἀνθρώπων μὲν ὀρώ, ἀνθρωπότητα δὲ οὐχ ὀρώ": In addition to the passages cited for the horse, the question of the form of the human being occurs at *Parm.* 130c1–e3: young Socrates doubts that there is a form of the human, but Parmenides tells him that he will change his mind as he matures. For Aristotle, by contrast, the human is the most common example of an individual Substance in the *Categories* and *Metaphysics*. An Academic definition of the human is recorded in the pseudo-Platonic *Definitions*

(415a11–12), but there is none for the horse or any other animal. See also t. 150A, 152C.

τῇ αἰσθήσει μόνῃ ζῶν: Taken at face value, this statement would make Antisthenes into a materialist or aestheticist of a peculiar kind, one who accepts only sense perceptions and does not recognize also apprehension in the mind (like the hypothetical opponent criticized in Pl. *Theaet.* 163–64). But this model is contradicted by Antisthenes’ repeated emphasis on the mind, and it must have been shaped within the template drawn by Plato (e.g., *Rep.* 476b4–7, 477b3–478d11), who allows only sense perception of material individuals, while reserving mental cognition for the unchanging Forms. A thinker independent of Plato could allow for mental cognition of individuals, which is based not on preconceptions of their general kinds or classifications but on mental insight at the moment into the particular individual, extended within the mind to enduring thought.

μὴ δυνάμενος τῷ λόγῳ εἰς μείζονα εὑρεσιν ἑαυτὸν ἀνενεγκεῖν: Other testimonia (e.g., t. 72A, 96) conflict with this characterization of Antisthenes. His well attested interest in Homer, which involved derivation of “a greater discovery” from a poetic text (whatever the aesthetic status of that), also conflicts with this characterization. Since the Neo-Platonic commentators are hostile to Antisthenes, it is more plausible to reject this statement as polemic than to reinterpret the implications of Antisthenes’ Homeric studies or t. 72A and 96.

(3) ὅλως δὲ τῶν παλαιῶν: The “ancients” are probably the thinkers who predated the Neo-Platonists, so they might include the Hellenistic schools. The αἰρέσεις περὶ τοῦ εἶναι ταῦτα καὶ μὴ εἶναι, or schools of ontology, mentioned in §4 could have been differentiated around the same time as the ethical αἰρέσεις attributed to the historian Hippobotus, that is, around 200 BCE (Diog. Laert. 1.19; see t. 135A).

(4) οὕτω γὰρ ὁ Ἀντισθένης ᾤετο: Ammonius concludes his section on the status of species and genus (or form and classification, if the discussion should be generalized beyond biological individuals) by referring again to Antisthenes. No other thinker is mentioned by name, although Porphyry, who himself mentions no one by name, makes it clear that there were six ancient positions on the ontological question. Antisthenes seems to be used by Ammonius as an emblem for every wrong position or the most wrong position, and it appears that the audience was expected to recognize his name. Ammonius’ school seems to have inherited the basic anecdote from a Hellenistic source favorable to Plato and hostile to Antisthenes, not through the Stoics, whose position on this issue might resemble Antisthenes’ (Diog. Laert. 7.60). The Stoics overall are integrated more favorably into Porphyry’s views.

149B-1. Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Categories"* CAG 8 p. 208.23–209.1 (Kalbfleisch)

= 50A DC

(1) τὸ μὲν οὖν ὄνομα τῆς ποιότητος δοκεῖ πρῶτος ὁ Πλάτων πεποιηκέναι, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐν Θεαιτήτῳ ἐπισημαίνεται καὶ παράγει τὸ ὄνομα πεποιηκέναι· λέγει δὲ οὕτως· “Τὸ μὲν πάσχον αἰσθητὸν ἀλλ’ οὐκ αἰσθησιν γίνεσθαι, τὸ δὲ ποιῶν ποιὸν τι, ἀλλ’ οὐ ποιότητα. ἴσως οὖν ἡ ποιότης ἀλλόκοτόν τι φαίνεται ὄνομα καὶ οὐ μανθάνεις ἀθρόον λεγόμενον.” (2) τῶν δὲ παλαιῶν οἱ μὲν ἀνῆρουν τὰς ποιότητας τελῶς, τὸ ποιὸν συγχωροῦντες εἶναι, ὥσπερ Ἀντισθένης, ὅς ποτε Πλάτωνι διαμισθῆτων “ὦ Πλάτων,” ἔφη, “ἵππον μὲν ὀρῶ, ἵππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὀρῶ.” καὶ ὃς εἶπεν· “Ὅτι ἔχεις μὲν ὃ ἵππος ὀράται τότε τὸ ὄμμα, ὃ δὲ ἵπποτης θεωρεῖται, οὐδέπω κέκτησαι.” καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ ἥσαν τινες ταύτης τῆς δόξης. οἱ δὲ τινὰς μὲν ἀνῆρουν ποιότητας, τινὰς δὲ κατελίμπανον.

(1) καὶ παράγει τὸ ὄνομα πεποιηκέναι suspexit Kalbfleisch | αἰσθησιν γίνεσθαι codd. et cod. Platonis W: αἰσθησιν ἔτι γίνεσθαι codd. Platonis B T (2) ποιὸν codd. plur. : ν in ras. A : ποιῶν Kν

(1) Plato seems to be the first to have created the name of the “quality,” as he indicates himself in the *Theaetetus* [182a7–b1] and introduces invention of the name. He says the following: “The passive element becomes a perceiving thing but not perception, whereas the active element becomes a qualified thing but not a quality. Well, perhaps ‘quality’ seems a somewhat strange name and you do not understand it when said collectively.” (2) Among the ancients, some took away reified qualities completely, agreeing only that the qualified thing exists, for example, Antisthenes, who once in dispute with Plato said, “Plato, I see a horse, but I do not see horseness.” And he said, “Because you have the faculty with which a horse is seen, this eye; but the faculty by which horseness is contemplated you have not yet acquired.” There were also certain others of this opinion. And they took away some reified qualities, but left some.

Context of Preservation

Simplicius (c. 490–560 BCE), a pupil of Ammonius, who apparently moved to Athens after his education in Alexandria, prepares to explicate the opening of Aristotle’s section on ἡ ποιότης (quality) at *Cat.* 8b25: Ποιότητα δὲ λέγω καθ’ ἣν ποιοὶ τινες λέγονται (By “quality” I mean that according to which some people are said to be of a certain kind). First, Simplicius addresses the subtitle he has received for this section, Περὶ ποιοῦ καὶ ποιότητος (On what sort and

quality), which he explains as an error: if such a distinction were recognized, he says, Aristotle's categories would need to be doubled from ten to twenty, for each category would be subdivided into the general quality that is shared by an individual particular (the ποιότης) and the particular property contained in the individual (τὸ ποιόν). To show the identity of τὸ ποιόν and ποιότης, he cites the coining of ποιότης by Plato in *Theaetetus*, and his anecdote on Antisthenes follows immediately.

Importance of the Testimonium

This text associates Antisthenes' objection with Plato's ontology as expressed in *Theaetetus*. This seems to imply that Simplicius inherits a tradition that equates the hypothetical "Heraclitean" opponents in *Theaet.* 179e3–183c3 with Antisthenes.

Notes

(1) τὸ μὲν οὖν ὄνομα τῆς ποιότητος: At *Theaet.* 182a7–b1, Plato claims the coining of this term in its abstracted, technical form, to indicate the ontological hypostasis of an adjectival quality. In context, the term captures a hypostasized quality whose existence is denied by Socrates' imagined interlocutor, a "Heraclitean": the Heraclitean insists that there are perceiving entities (which are passive in the scheme of this description) but not perception (αἰσθητὸν ἀλλ' οὐκ αἰσθησιν: Plato's text is usually emended to αἰσθανόμενον, although two manuscript families agree with Simplicius) and that there are particular qualified things but not quality (ποιόν τι, ἀλλ' οὐ ποιότητα). The stability of mind denied to the Heracliteans by Plato in *Theaetetus* and to Antisthenes in all versions of this anecdote takes this symmetry seriously: according to this description of the Heraclitean's position, the absence of an enduring, hypostasized active quality is balanced by the absence of an enduring passive aesthetic faculty, whose identity transcends the particular instant of perception. The linguistic form ποιότης is novel only in its general character, as Plato's text tells us: thinkers in the Sophistic period had applied the nominalizing suffix -της to adjectives. See Sansone 2004:133, citing the term θρασύτης (boldness) in Pl. *Lach.* 197b–d and the term ὀνομάτων ὀρθότης, frequently associated with Prodicus. Other fifth-century thinkers and writers show innovation in abstract nouns: see Allison 1997 on Thucydides, Long 1968 on Sophocles, and Classen 1976 generally. Plato's contribution is to coin the general term and to assert that it stands for a kind of real, separable entity, analogous to the organ of perception.

(2) οἱ μὲν ἀνῆρουν τὰς ποιότητας τελέως: In speaking here of the ποιότητες rather than τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη but reciting the same anecdote about Antisthenes and Plato that Ammonius cites, Simplicius suggests that

he understands the ποιότητες to be equivalent to τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη of Ammonius' version in t. 149A. In *Theaetetus*, Plato's Forms are not present. But the ποιότητες seem to serve a theoretical function comparable to that of the Forms: see Silverman 2000:141–44.

τὸ ποιὸν συγχωροῦντες εἶναι: τὸ ποιόν, in distinction from ἡ ποιότης, is a quality inherent in and dependent on an individual object, which “exists” insofar as it is a characteristic of a real thing but which does not exist separately. In Aristotle's terminology and ontology from the *Categories*, τὸ ποιόν would be always ontologically dependent on a substance, οὐσία. In this anecdote, however, it seems to cover the very identity of the horse. That is, the status of horseness or humanity as a “quality” rather than a “substance” seems not to matter in this anecdote. Possibly this is a trivial issue. But it is also possible that Antisthenes explicitly failed or refused to acknowledge the ontological priority of substance over the other categories, as laid out in Aristotle's *Categories*: see t. 152A note on “musical Socrates”; compare also t. 150A.4 and 151B.

“Ὅτι ἔχεις μὲν ὃ ἵππος ὁράται τόδε τὸ ὄμμα, ὃ δὲ ἱππότης θεωρεῖται, οὐδέπω κέκτησαι”: This reply must be modeled on Plato's epistemology. In Pl. *Theaet.* 163–64, Socrates implies that the theorist who holds that all perceptions are true fails to account for the mental level that makes judgments about what is perceived. Other evidence for Antisthenes belies this statement: in t. 171, Antisthenes pointedly requires “mind” in addition to the material tools for learning, and so he seems to agree with the voice of Socrates in *Theaetetus*, not with the hypothetical opponents.

καὶ ἄλλοι δὲ ἥσαν τινες ταύτης τῆς δόξης: Simplicius implies further contemporaries of Plato and Antisthenes who reject the hypostases, possibly those he names below in his text (216.12–19): the Eretrians, Dicaearchus, and Theopompus.

οἱ δὲ τινὰς μὲν ἀνέηρον ποιότητος, τινὰς δὲ κατελίμπανον: It is unclear whether the plural pronoun οἱ includes Antisthenes or only the “certain others” just mentioned, whose position resembled his. Since Antisthenes might recognize a strong ontological distinction between natural or basic beings and artificial compounds (see t. 152A), the distinction between hypostases that exist and those that do not could correspond to this. If so, the examples of the horse and human in the anecdote are in conflict with this position, since horse and human should be prime examples of natural beings with existing hypostases. This difficulty is enough to throw the anecdote into question. Three explanations seem possible. First, the examples horse and human could have been chosen by hostile opponents, to show up the self-refuting character of Antisthenes' position on the *genos* and *eidos*: the dispute might have been more properly conducted over the artifacts used

in the parallel anecdotes of Diog. Laert. 6.53. Second, the horse and human might really be cases for *aporia*, not knowledge, for Antisthenes, but *aporia* at the most advanced stage. (See Tzetzes' apparent association of Antisthenes' "nominalism" with the Cynic hunt for the real human being, t. 149F.) Third, the main point of the original anecdote might be to distinguish modes of recognition, through sense perception versus an a priori method, rather than to state the ultimate ontology of the horse and human. The anecdote in t. 72A suggests that Antisthenes upheld the natural ontology of the horse but doubted most people's ability to apprehend it.

149B-2. Simplicius, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Categories"* CAG 8 p. 211.15–21 (Kalbfleisch)

= 50B DC

γνωριμώτερον δὲ καὶ προσεχέστερον ἡμῖν τῆς ποιότητος τὸ ποιόν,
εἴπερ τὴν μὲν ποιότητα καὶ ἀναιροῦσί τινες ὡς μηδὲ ὑφ'εστῶσαν
ὅλως, τὸ δὲ ποιὸν οὐδεὶς ἀναιρεῖ, καὶ τὸν μὲν ἵππον ὁρᾶν ὁμολογεῖ ὁ
Ἀντισθένης, τὴν δὲ ἰππότητα μὴ ὁρᾶν, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς ὁρᾶται,
ἡ δὲ λογισμῷ καταλαμβάνεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐν αἰτίου τάξει προηγείται,
τὸ δὲ ὡς ἀποτέλεσμα ἔπεται, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶ σῶμα καὶ σύνθετον, τὸ δὲ
ἀπλοῦν καὶ ἀσώματον.

μηδὲ J L : μη K v | ὁμολογεῖ codd. plur. : ὁμολογεῖν K | ἐν
ὀφθαλμοῖς codd. plur. : ἐν om. K v | ἀσώματον codd. : ὤματον L¹

The qualified thing is more known and closer to us than the reified quality, since indeed some thinkers take away the reified quality because they claim it does not even exist at all, whereas no one takes away the qualified thing: and Antisthenes agrees that he sees the horse, but he does not see horseness. The first is seen in the eyes, whereas the second is grasped by reasoning; and the first is the leader in the ordering of cause, whereas the second follows like a completion; and the first is body and composite, whereas the second is simple and bodiless.

Context of Preservation

Simplicius (in this passage soon after t. 149B-1) explicates Aristotle's text at *Cat.* 8b25 rather than the subtitle, but he is still concerned with the relationship between the ποιότης and the ποιόν. He explains why Aristotle defines the first by reference to the second and why this definition is not circular.

Notes

τὸν μὲν ἵππον ὁρᾶν ὁμολογεῖ ὁ Ἀντισθένης: As in all versions of the anecdote, but very clearly here, Antisthenes' "horse" is a quality, although it should be a substance according to the ontology of the *Categories*. See fuller comment at t. 149B-1.

ἡ δὲ λογισμῷ καταλαμβάνεται: This is probably Stoic terminology. Compare Diog. Laert. 7.45–46. It is plausible that Antisthenes used the term λογισμός for the secondary, mental processing of sensory phenomena: see t. 134(v). Although this latter text might also be preserved in Stoic terminology, the term is in ps.-Pl. *Axiochus* 370a in the required sense.

149C. Elias, *Commentary on Porphyry's "Introduction"* CAG 18.1 p. 47.14–19 (Busse)

οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγον ὑφεστάναι τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη, ὡς Πλάτων καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης καὶ οἱ τοιοῦτοι, Ἀντισθένης δὲ ὁ Κυνικός ὁ τοῦ Διογένης διδάσκαλος ἔλεγεν μὴ εἶναι τὰ καθόλου οὕτως ἐπιχειρῶν. “Ἄνθρωπον ὁρῶ, ἀνθρωπότητα δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ, καὶ ἵππον ὁρῶ, ἵππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ.” “Ἄλλ’, ὦ Ἀντίσθενης,” φησὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ὁ Πλάτων, “οἷς μὲν ὁράται ἵππος καὶ ἄνθρωπος τὰ κατὰ μέρος ἔχεις, τοῦτ’ ἔστιν ὀφθαλμοῦς, οἷς δὲ ὁράται ἀνθρωπότης καὶ ἵππότης τὰ καθόλου οὐκ ἔχεις· νοῦν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχεις”· ὅτι γὰρ εἰσὶ τὰ καθόλου καὶ οὐκ ἐν ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις μόνον κατέστηκεν, δηλοῖ κατὰ τὴν ὁμοιοπάθειαν· πόθεν γὰρ ὁρῶντες χασμωμένους τινὰς ἢ ἀποροῦντας παραχρῆμα ἀνάγκη τινὶ κινουμένθα πρὸς τὸ ὁμοιοπαθὲς ἐνεργεῖν, εἰ μὴ κοινόν τι καθόλου ὑπῆρχε πρὸς ἀλλήλους;

ἵππότης τὰ καθόλου codd. plur. : τὰ om. C | ὅτι γὰρ εἰσὶ . . . πρὸς ἀλλήλους om. V

Some said that classes and forms subsist, for example, Plato and Aristotle and thinkers of this sort, but Antisthenes the Cynic, the teacher of Diogenes, said that universals do not exist, attempting to argue in this way: “I see a human, but I do not see humanity. And I see a horse, but I do not see horseness.” “But, Antisthenes,” Plato says to him, “you have [the tools] with which horse and man in particular are seen, that is, eyes, but [the tools] with which humanity and horseness in general are seen, you do not have. For you do not have a mind.” For the proposition that universals exist, and that they are not established only in bare thoughts, he [Plato] demonstrates with reference to sympathy: for how, when we see people yawning, or unable to answer, are we moved immediately by some necessity toward activating our

sympathy, if there were not something general shared in common with each other?

Context of Preservation

Elias (writing c. 600 CE, probably in Alexandria) explicates the same section of Porphyry's introduction to Aristotle's *Categories* as Ammonius in t. 149A and expands further. In the passage preceding this excerpt (47.1–9), the goat-stag and the hippocentaur are examples of things that exist when they are thought but do not exist when they are not thought, whereas god, mind, and soul or life principle (θεός, νοῦς, ψυχή) are things that exist whether or not they are thought of.

Notes

τὰ καθόλου: Elias considers τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἶδη broadly as “universals,” whereas Ammonius seems to mean biological classifications.

νοῦν γὰρ οὐκ ἔχεις: The claim that Antisthenes has no mind or denies the function or importance of mind is polemic: see t. 149A.

ὁρῶντες χασμωμένους τινὰς ἢ ἀποροῦντας: In Pl. *Charm.* 169c3–6, Socrates notes that being puzzled by the argument seems, like yawning, to be contagious.

149D. Elias, *Commentary on Aristototle's "Categories"* CAG 18.1 p. 220.27–29 (Busse)

πέμπτη αἰτία, ὅτι ἔδει καὶ περὶ τῆς ποιότητος συντόμως διαλαβεῖν δι' Ἀντισθένην καὶ τοὺς περὶ αὐτὸν λέγοντας “Ἀνθρωπον ὁρῶ, ἀνθρωπότητα δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ,” ὡς ἀναιροῦντας τὴν ἀπλῶς ποιότητα.
ἀναιροῦντας corr. Brandis : ἀναιροῦντα H K P

The fifth reason [is] that it was necessary to give a treatment in summary about quality on account of Antisthenes and those around him, who said, “I see a human, but I do not see humanity,” as if destroying what is simply quality.

Context of Preservation

In his own commentary on the *Categories*, Elias gives five reasons for Aristotle's treatment of quality fourth (rather than third) in order of exposition, particularly after the category of relationship, πρὸς τι. Elias says that because some of Aristotle's opponents (the Atomists) explained quality as relative to perceivers, Aristotle treated relativity before quality. The fifth reason is stated very briefly by comparison with the others, and it seems not to address the same question but to explain why the term ποιότης is used at all to cover the wide range it covers in Aristotle's exposition.

149E. David, *Commentary on Porphyry's "Introduction"* CAG 18.2 p. 109.12–19 (Busse)

καὶ φαμεν ὅτι καὶ ἀμφεβάλλετο παρὰ τοῖς παλαιοῖς, εἰ ἔστι γένος καὶ εἶδος· ἔλεγε γὰρ ὁ Ἀντισθένης μὴ εἶναι γένος μήτε εἶδος· φησὶ γὰρ “Ἀνθρωπον ὁρῶ, ἀνθρωπότητα δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ, ἵππον ὁρῶ, ἵππότητα δὲ οὐχ ὁρῶ,” ὥστε οὖν οὐκ ἔστι τὸ καθόλου. ληρώδες δὲ τὸ τοιοῦτον· οὔτε γὰρ πάντα τὰ ὄντα ὑποπίπτει ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν. τούτῳ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ὄντων οὐκ ἔστι· τὰ γὰρ θεῖα αἰσθήσει οὐχ ὑποπίπτει, καὶ ὅμως ἔστιν· ἀλλὰ μὴν οὔτε λογικὴ οὔτε ἄλογος ψυχὴ οὔτε φυσικὴ ἔστι, καθὼ αἰσθήσει οὐχ ὑποπίπτει. ἄλλως τε δὲ καὶ αἰσθήσεσιν οὐ δεῖ καταπιστεύειν. . . . δείξαντες οὖν ἀδίκως τὸν Ἀντισθένην τῶν καθόλου ἀναίρεσιν ποιησάμενον φέρε κατασκευάσωμεν πῶς ἔστι.

ληρώδες δὲ codd. plur. : δὲ om. K | καὶ ὅμως . . . ὑποπίπτει om. K
| οὔτε ἄλογος ψυχὴ codd. plur. : ψυχὴ οὔτε ἄλογος T | ἄλλως τε δὲ
codd. plur. : δὲ om. V | οὖν om. V | ἀδίκως τὸν Ἀντισθένην codd. plur.
: τὸν Ἀντισθένην ἀδίκως K

And we agree that it was even disputed among the ancients, whether genus and [species] form exist. For Antisthenes said that there is neither genus nor [species] form. For he says, “I see a human, but I do not see humanity; I see a horse, but I do not see horseness,” with the result that the universal does not exist. But this sort of thing is silly. For all existing things do not come under sense perceptions, and by this argument the majority of things do not exist. For divine things do not come under sense perception, but they nevertheless exist. And moreover neither the reasoning soul nor the unreasoning soul nor the physical soul exists, insofar as it does not come under sense perception. Furthermore, it is not right to trust the senses. . . . Having shown, then, that Antisthenes created his abolition of the universals unjustly, come, let us elaborate how they exist.

Context of Preservation

David explains the same section of Porphyry as Ammonius in t. 149A and Elias in t. 149C. The example of the goat-stag is given briefly (108.26–109.2), and David develops two prongs to his refutation: things not perceptible by the senses nevertheless exist, and sense perception is itself deceiving. His examples supporting skepticism of sense perception (the size of the sun, the appearance of an oar in water, the movement of the shoreline when viewed from a sailing boat) have been elided here.

149F. Tzetzes, *Book of Histories* 7.604–11 (Kiessling)

τῶν ἰδεῶν δὲ λέγουσι τρεῖς δόξας πεφυκέναι.
 ψιλὰς ἐννοίας γάρ φησι ταύτας ὁ Ἀντισθένης
 λέγων, “Βλέπωμεν ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἵππον δὲ ὁμοίως,
 ἵππότητα οὐ βλέπω δ’ οὐδ’ ἀνθρωπότητά γε.”
 Ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἐγώ, Ἀντίσθενης, ὁ Τζέτζης ἄρτι βλέπω
 ποῦ ποτε ἀνθρωπότητα, οὐδ’ ἐν τοῖς πατριάρχαις·
 καὶ ὕδραργύρου γάρ εἰσι κλεπτότεροι τοῦ κλέπτου.
 ταῦτα τὸν Ἀντισθένην μὲν λέγουσι δογματίζειν.

And about the Forms they say there have been three opinions.
 Antisthenes calls these “bare thoughts,”
 saying, “Let us behold a human, and likewise a horse,
 but I do not behold horseness, nor indeed humanity.”
 Well, Antisthenes, neither do I, Tzetzes, in my time behold
 ever anywhere humanity, not even among the patriarchs:
 for they are more thieving than the thievish quick silver.
 As for Antisthenes, these opinions they say he taught.

Context of Preservation

The *Chiliades* (literally, “book of thousands”) of the Byzantine scholar John Tzetzes (c.1110–80 CE) is a collection of ancient wisdom, often with a political edge. The arrangement is apparently random. This outline of three opinions about the Forms is the conclusion of a section on Plato’s epistemology and metaphysics (7.480–628), which is surrounded by mythological and historical sections. Tzetzes’ source here was apparently works by Iamblichus, Porphyry, and others, whom he cites at 7.576.

Importance of the Testimonium

Tzetzes’ sympathy lies briefly with Antisthenes, although Plato, as topic of the whole passage, is dominant overall.

Notes

τρεῖς δόξας: The “three opinions about Forms” mentioned by Tzetzes are the nominalist, represented by Antisthenes; the realist, represented by Plato (612–16); and the opinion of Aristotle, who places Forms in the mind of the wise creator of artifacts, as the formal cause (617–23).

βλέπωμεν . . . βλέπω: This variation from the Alexandrians’ ὁρῶ is surely supplied by Tzetzes (for metrical reasons), not recovered from Antisthenes. Its effect is to remove the prominence of sense perception and suggest contemplation more generally.

ὁ Τζέτζης: Tzetzes (who makes frequent authorial interventions in his text) asserts some favor for Antisthenes' position on Forms but makes no equivalent comment on the positions of Plato and Aristotle, described in the following verses. This represents a deviation from the position of "Iamblichus, Porphyry, and others" that he normally prefers (as described in 7.576–89) and is related to his pessimism about his fellow humans: the mind, or νοῦς, required to view the Forms is not available to most humans (7.587).

πού ποτε ἀνθρωπότητα: Tzetzes adds a Cynic twist to his statement of Antisthenes' position: the case of "humanity" becomes more important for its reference in reality than for the theoretical point of nominalism. Tzetzes seems to allude to the Cynic mission to find an individual person who truly qualifies as a human, associated with Diogenes of Sinope (Diog. Laert. 6.41, 32, 60 = SSR VB 272–78).

150–151. Antisthenes' statements on *Logos* and definition

150A. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* H.3 1043b4–32 (Ross)

= 44A DC

(1) οὐ φαίνεται δὴ ζητοῦσιν ἢ συλλαβὴ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων οὔσα καὶ συνθέσεως, οὐδ' ἡ οἰκία πλίνθοι τε καὶ σύνθεσις. καὶ τοῦτο ὁρθῶς· οὐ γάρ ἐστιν ἡ σύνθεσις οὐδ' ἡ μίξις ἐκ τούτων ὧν ἐστι σύνθεσις ἢ μίξις. ὁμοίως δὲ οὐδὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐθέν, οἶον εἰ ὁ οὐδὸς θέσει, οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ οὐδοῦ ἡ θέσις ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον οὗτος ἐξ ἐκείνης. (2) οὐδὲ δὴ ὁ ἀνθρωπός ἐστι τὸ ζῶον καὶ δίπουν, ἀλλὰ τι δεῖ εἶναι ὃ παρὰ ταῦτά ἐστιν, εἰ ταῦθ' ὕλη, οὔτε δὲ στοιχεῖον οὐτ' ἐκ στοιχείου, ἀλλ' ἡ οὐσία· ὃ ἐξαιροῦντες τὴν ὕλην λέγουσιν. εἰ οὖν τοῦτ' αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ οὐσία τοῦτο, αὐτὴν ἂν τὴν οὐσίαν οὐ λέγοιεν. (3) ἀνάγκη δὴ ταύτην ἢ αἰδίων εἶναι ἢ φθαρτὴν ἄνευ τοῦ φθείρεσθαι καὶ γεγενῆσθαι ἄνευ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι. δέδεικται δὲ καὶ δεδήλωται ἐν ἄλλοις ὅτι τὸ εἶδος οὐθεὶς ποιεῖ οὐδὲ γεννᾷ, ἀλλὰ ποιεῖται τόδε, γίγνεται δὲ τὸ ἐκ τούτων. εἰ δ' εἰσὶ τῶν φθαρτῶν αἱ οὐσίαι χωρισταί, οὐδέν πω δῆλον· πλὴν ὅτι γ' ἐνίων οὐκ ἐνδέχεται δῆλον, ὅσα μὴ οἶόν τε παρὰ τὰ τινὰ εἶναι, οἶον οἰκίαν ἢ σκεῦος. ἴσως μὲν οὖν οὐδ' οὐσίαι εἰσὶν οὐτ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὔτε τι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μὴ φύσει συνέστηκεν· τὴν γὰρ φύσιν μόνην ἂν τις θεῖη τὴν ἐν τοῖς φθαρτοῖς οὐσίαν. (4) ὥστε ἡ ἀπορία ἦν οἱ Ἀντισθένησιοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαιδευτοὶ ἠπόρουν ἔχει τινὰ καιρόν, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἐστιν ὀρίσασθαι (τὸν γὰρ ὅρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν), ἀλλὰ ποῖον μὲν τί ἐστιν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι, ὥσπερ ἄργυρον, τί μὲν ἐστιν οὐ, ὅτι δ' οἶον καττίτερος· (5) ὥστ' οὐσίας ἔστι μὲν ἧς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ὅρον καὶ λόγον, οἶον τῆς συνθέτου, ἐάν τε αἰσθητὴ ἐάν τε νοητὴ ἢ· ἐξ ὧν δ' αὕτη

πρώτων, οὐκέτι, εἴπερ τι κατὰ τινὸς σημαίνει ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀριστικὸς καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ ὕλην εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὡς μορφὴν.

(1) οὐδ' A^b Al^c : καὶ E J | εἰ ὁ om. E J (add. E γρ) : ὁ om. Al^c (2) καὶ δίπουν A^b E J : καὶ <τὸ> δίπουν Jaeger sequ. Al^c | παρὰ ταῦτά E J Al^p : παρὰ τὰ ἄλλα A^b | οὔτε δὲ E J (sed var. lect. noverunt: ante οὔτε eras. o E et ante οὔτε scr. ὕλης J) : ὁ οὔτε A^b Al^c | ἀλλ' ἡ οὐσία codd. et Al^c : secl. Christ : ἡ οὐσία secl. Jaeger, qui interpunxit οὐτ' ἐκ στοιχείου, ἀλλ' ὁ ἐξαιροῦντες | οὐσία τοῦτο codd. : οὐσίας, τοῦτο Bonitz et Jaeger | οὐ λέγοιεν E J (sed οὐ eras. E et in marg. γρ.) : λέγοιεν A^b Al^p (3) γεννᾷ A^b : γεννᾷται E J | οὐτ' Bekker : οὐδέ τι E J : οὐδὲ A^b E γρ. | μόνην A^b E J : μόνον E γρ. | τὴν ἐν τοῖς φθαρτοῖς Bessario : τῶν ἐν τοῖς φθαρτοῖς A^b E J (4) ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξει E J : ἐνδέχεται [καὶ] διδάξει, <ὀρίσασθαι δ' οὐ> Jaeger ex Al. : ἐνδέχεσθαι καὶ διδάξει A^b (5) ἐάν τε νοητὴ ἢ E J : ἐάν τε νοητὴ A^b | οὐκέτι A^b : οὐκ ἔστι E J | ὡς μορφὴν E J : μορφὴν A^b

(1) To those who investigate the question, the syllable does not seem to be from the letters and the combination, nor is the house [identical to] bricks and the combination. And this is correct. For neither the combination nor the mixture is from the things of which it is the combination or the mixture. And likewise neither is any of the other things, for example, if the doorstep [is a doorstep] by its position, the position is not [what it is] from the doorstep, but rather this [the doorstep] from that [the position]. (2) Nor indeed is the human the animal and two-footed, but there must be something that is beyond these things, if these are the matter, and this is neither an element nor from an element, but the substance: and in removing this, they state the matter. So if this [something beyond] is responsible for its existence, and this is substance, they would not say the substance itself. (3) Either this [substance], then, must be eternal, or it must be corruptible without being corrupted and it must have come into being without becoming. It has been demonstrated and made clear elsewhere that nobody creates or begets the form, but what is created is "this," and what comes to be is the "out of these things." Whether for perishable things there are separable essences, it is in no way at all clear, except that it is clear that of some things it is not possible, as many things as cannot exist beyond the particulars, such as a house or tool. Perhaps, then, they are not even substances, either these very things or any of the other things, as many as have not come about by nature. For one might set nature alone as the substance in perishable things. (4) Therefore, the puzzle that the Antistheneans and those similarly uneducated [persons] puzzled over has a certain timeliness,

that it is not possible to define the “what is it” (for a definition is a long account), but it is possible [to demonstrate] such a thing as it is and to teach this, for example, silver, what it is one cannot [define], but that it is such as tin one can [demonstrate and teach]. (5) Therefore, of substance, there is some for which it is possible that there is a definition and an account, for example, the composite, whether it is perceptible or whether it is intelligible. But of the first elements from which this is composed, no longer, if in fact the defining account signifies something predicated of something, and the one must be like matter and the other like shape.

Context of Preservation

In the middle books of the *Metaphysics* (Z, H, Θ), Aristotle tries to identify the basic substance or reality in individual particular physical objects (“this something,” or τὸδε τι). His conception of substance (οὐσία) bears some kind of relationship to Plato’s conception of Forms, but Aristotle’s very purpose in the *Physics* and *Metaphysics* is to offer an alternative ontological theory to the Platonic Forms, which he thinks must be rejected on various grounds. (See Fine 1993.) Aristotle’s main candidates for substance in the middle books are the immanent form (the τι) of an individual particular or the combination of the form with the matter (the τὸδε τι). (See Z.3 1028b33–36, where a list of four possibilities is offered.) The relationship between book H, where the reference to Antisthenes appears, and book Z, where the inquiry of the middle books is most fully framed, has not been definitively explained. In book H, Aristotle might be developing special strands from the more comprehensive book Z: Devereux (2003) argues that parts of book H are earlier than and preparation for book Z, whereas Gill (1996) sees them as subsequent expansions. Code (2010:94–6) proposes, somewhat differently, that Aristotle commences on a new approach to definition in Z.17, through causes rather than the Platonic method of division, and that he pursues this new approach in the following book, H. Whatever the general purpose of book H, ch. H.3 treats the unity of form as it occurs—possibly by analogy—in definitions and numbers, and the capacity of this form for coming to be and passing away. The present excerpt from ch. H.3 focuses at least initially on the definition of the human (which serves as the core case throughout Aristotle’s middle books), contrasting it with the case of artifacts. (Ross [1924 v.2:231] calls the chapter a “collection of ill-connected remarks on various topics relating to essence and definition”; see also Burnyeat et al. 1979–82:13–20.) Aristotle’s main point in this chapter, to judge from its conclusion (1043b36–44a14), is to insist that a definition, like a number, is not a heap of properties or elements: it must have a unity, which is its own relative or analogical

substance or essence. (Similar, briefer statements appear in Z.17 10041b9–32, at the very end of that book.) This substance has an all-or-nothing existence and does not admit of degrees of being, such that it could experience gradual generation or decay. He accuses rivals, presumably the Platonists, of contradicting this basic principle, which is central to their own view of the Forms, in their approaches to both definition and number, which are inappropriately heap-like. Aristotle's overall goal is apparently negative, to show the deficiencies in the views of these rivals. The Antistheneans are not the main rivals, but they are somehow opportune to the debate between Aristotle and these main rivals, presumably because they support Aristotle's position on the all-or-nothing nature of ontological unity. It is unclear whether any positive "Antisthenean" view about definition (ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀριστικός, 1043b31) is presented here: this depends on details in §5 and especially the force of the ὥστε at 1043b28: see notes below.

Importance of the Testimonium

Together with Aristotle's other reference to Antisthenes in the *Metaphysics* (1024b26–34 = t. 152A), this is the most authoritative and most interesting surviving reference to Antisthenes' thought. Although Aristotle calls the Antistheneans "uneducated," the fact that Antisthenes merits mention twice in the pages of the *Metaphysics* implies that he was significant in the contemporary Athenian intellectual world. However, interpretation of each of the *Metaphysics* passages is difficult, and they seem to conflict with each other regarding the nature of *logos*. The key to resolving the conflict is to restore fuller context to the debate about language and reality in the Socratic and Academic periods: whereas the present passage seems to resist the Academic pursuit of definition by division, t. 152A seems to resist Aristotle's own ontological distinction, from the *Categories*, between substance and quality (which might have been part of his answer to the Academics' dilemma that he presents in *Met. Z* and *H*). Yet definition by division is discussed in the late antique commentators' exegesis of t. 152A also (t. 152B.6, 152C.2–5), and so there is likely to be a connection between Antisthenes' objections to both of these fundamental procedures for the use of language to investigate extralinguistic being.

The meaning of the sentence about the Antistheneans, *Met.* 1043b23–28, depends on its function in Aristotle's passage, which is not easy to determine. Ross, in his 1924 edition of the *Metaphysics*, placed parentheses around the extended passage immediately preceding the reference (the present §3: 1043b14–23, ἀνάγκη δὲ ταύτην . . . ἐν τοῖς φθαρτοῖς οὐσίαν), to make clear his belief that the inferential ὥστε (therefore) that introduces the Antistheneans continues not from the sentence just before it but from

the sentence ten lines back, at 1043b4–14. This sentence, in turn, can be associated with the account of Socrates' dream in Pl. *Theaetetus* 201d8–202c6 and its exegesis in 202e6–204a5. At the time of Ross' edition, scholarship on Antisthenes, notably Gillespie 1913–14, had recently emphasized a similarity between Antisthenes' views on language and knowledge and the account given in Socrates' dream; this parallel was originally proposed by Schleiermacher (1836:200), though not precisely, and endorsed by Zeller (1888: 294 n.1), after a half-century of discussion. (See also t. 148 notes.) Jaeger's 1957 text follows Ross. Editors of Antisthenes' fragments have extended the impact of this decision by suppressing the parenthetical passage completely: Decleva Caizzi's edition prints 1043b4–32 but marks an ellipsis at b14–23, and Giannantoni enlarges the ellipsis to b8–23. Because ancient Greek texts did not use elaborate devices of punctuation, such as long parentheses, this omission of the immediate context at 1043b14–23 is implausible, especially in view of the inferential particle ὥστε. Certainly Aristotle's text makes digressions, and his thought can take a line different from the ordering of sentences in the text; but the ancient reader also depended on the order of the sentences in the text for determining the meaning of every new sentence. It is necessary to keep an open mind about Aristotle's reason or reasons for mentioning the Antistheneans. It seems that the difference between nature and artifact at 1043b23, including the restriction of substance to natural beings, must be relevant to the reference, in addition to the difference between whole and part at b4–8 and b10–13. Aristotle's conclusion of the section by drawing a point about composition suggests that both reasons are relevant.

Like the statement against gainsaying (t. 152–56; compare 148), this passage makes a basically negative point about the power of language. Plausible paraphrases of the main point, not mutually exclusive, are the following: (1) the Antistheneans deny all possibility of definition of all essence (τὸ τί ἐστίν, not necessarily the same thing as Aristotle's substance, οὐσία); (2) the Antistheneans deny possibility of definition of all essence but allow an equivalent definite indication of quality and other attributes or perhaps of one privileged kind of attribute; (3) the Antistheneans deny possibility of all definition of essence but allow definition of compound beings, which do not have essence, through analysis into basic parts, the components of their quasi-essence. Interpretation 1 seems to conflict with t. 151A, where Antisthenes specifies the function of λόγος in a way that looks like essential definition, and it conflicts with a common interpretation of t. 152A, whereby οἰκεῖος λόγος is precisely definition. Interpretation 2, developed by Brancacci (1990:227–40), seems not to account enough for Aristotle's context, where analysis is important and where hylomorphic composition seems to provide the final resolution to the problem of unity that Aristotle is considering. Interpretation

3 might exceed the evidence of this passage, taking into account Pl. *Theaet.* 201d8–204a5. Interpretation 3 is an extension of interpretation 1, if one draws a strong distinction between natural and artificial beings. Interpretation 1, in turn, can be accepted for Antisthenes if one recognizes a distinction between definition, on the one hand, and true descriptive account of an individual, on the other, and rejects the interpretation of οἰκεῖος λόγος in t. 152A as definition of essence in favor of an interpretation such as definite articulation or descriptive statement. The best interpretation may, then, be a combination of interpretations 2, for beings with substance, and 3, for compounded beings. Whether or not *Theaet.* 201d8–204a5 is about Antisthenes, it cannot be used as primary evidence to reconstruct Antisthenes' views, because the extent of Plato's parody or reinterpretation cannot be gauged without a previous, independent understanding of Antisthenes.

Notes

(1) οὐ φαίνεται δὴ ζητοῦσιν: Aristotle appears to refer to a particular group of investigators, who seem, from what follows, to be members of Plato's Academy. Aristotle initially endorses the results of this investigation, although it is not clear that he includes himself among the investigators (as, e.g., Barnes' translation implies). Later in the passage (§2), he uses the third person to refer to theorists he opposes. Possibly this first reference is precisely to Pl. *Theaet.* 201d8–204a5 (so Brancacci 1990:229), but Hicken 1958 argues that both texts assume a common background in the Academy and that there is not necessarily direct dependence.

ἡ συλλαβή: Aristotle uses the example of the syllable twice in *Met. Z*: in Z.10 (1035a10–17), it is a positive example for the correspondence between parts of a being and parts of its formula (but only universal, intelligible syllables—not perceptible, particular syllables—have this correspondence); in the last paragraph of Z.17 (1041b11–33), the syllable is a negative example for the insufficiency of a list or heap of elements or letters to be, in themselves, a formula, since the principle of unity is lacking. The second point, from Z.17, seems to fit with Aristotle's concern in this section (see 1043b36–1044a2) and, indeed, in book H in full (see 1045a7–8). The first point might be relevant at the end of the discussion (see note on §5). Plato, too, uses the case of the syllable in a similar discussion of all-or-nothing unity in *Theaet.* 202e6–204a5, where it is concluded that a whole is “one idea” (μία ἰδέα), not the sum or list of its parts. Yet the contrary point, that the syllable is composed from sounds that could be understood as parts that can be gradually changed or removed, while the meaning of the syllable changes proportionally, without all-or-nothing unity, is entertained throughout *Cratylus* (with a statement of method at 424b7–425b4), whether seriously or in parody. Aristotle's present

discussion will eventually differentiate artifacts from natural objects for the purpose of locating their essence or unity (§3), and syllables (like definitions, Aristotle's main interest in this passage) seem to have an undetermined position on this grid: he never says whether they or the entities that seem to be of primary interest at the end of the chapter, numbers and definitions (1043b32–1044a14), are artificial or natural beings. The ontological status of linguistic entities, including such larger-scale entities as poems, is a topic that interests Aristotle: the nature of the *Iliad's* unity is brought up at *Met.* 1039b8 and 1045a13 and at *Poet.* 1457a29, and ontological terms are used in the *Poetics* generally. Although poems must be artifacts, Aristotle persists in using biological metaphors for describing their essence. As for Antisthenes, whose writings on poetry probably exceeded those of Aristotle at least in volume, comparable interests in the ontology of linguistic entities should not be ruled out, and there is evidence for such interests at scales ranging from letters and sounds (see t. 178B notes, 8, 57, 131, 143, 148, 171, 41A titles 1.5 and 6.3) to syllables (t. 187.4, 189) to the poet's construction of character (t. 54.14). The first group of evidence suggests that he might have attributed heap-like nature to the sounds that constitute the meanings of words; that is, he might have claimed that meaning is a product of the sum of sounds, like the naturalist's position portrayed in *Cratylus*. However, in t. 187.4, syllables, rather than letters, seem to be the ultimate level of semantic analysis, and this principle is confirmed generally in t. 189 (esp. t. 189A-1.2, 189A-2.1). Since much of Antisthenes' attested wordplay is polemical or humorous (see esp. t. 171), his final position on the meaning in sounds and letters might have been aporetic or paradox-generating sooner than dogmatically "naturalist."

ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων οὐσα καὶ συνθέσεως: The meaning of the preposition ἐκ is not immediately clear (Aristotle gives six senses in his philosophical lexicon, *Met.* Δ.24 1023a26–b11), and the meaning does not remain constant through all the examples in this passage. (See Burnyeat et al. 1979–82:13–14.) Either it means that the "composition" (σύνθεσις) is one element in the composite thing, of the same kind as and on the same level as the other elements, or it means that the composite emerges from its compositional elements and so is identical to the set of them all, in a sense, but also something different—that is, after its formation, which is a change. Under the second understanding, the composition could indeed count as the essence of the thing. Since this identity is denied, the first interpretation must be dominant. But one might note that the second interpretation is plausible for both house and doorstep and for the syllable as well, and a charitable view of the Academic definition of the human being would also use the second interpretation. The doorstep serves as an example in *Met.* H.2 1042b9, where it is a potential material actualized by its orientation and so has a hylomorphic unity consisting in its orientation.

(In the present passage, Aristotle obscures this previous analysis by thinking of the doorstep as the material for the orientation, not the product of the orientation of a material such as wood.) When it comes to the syllable, as for any other kind of meaningful locution such as a definition, the first model does describe it, and only if we expect the nature of the syllable to include its meaning do we encounter a puzzle and reject the model. The second model for the syllable, as for the definition, is better, if we allow reception by a native speaker of Greek to count as the formative change in the row of letters or terms, which produces meaningful statement; or, in the case of the definition, if we allow the term for the definiendum (the ὄνομα) to be like a “sign” (σημεῖον) for the unified definition (λόγος) and do not expect the name and the parts in the definition to have the same relationship to reality. (See *Met.* H.6 1045a23–29.) Aristotle’s opponents in each case, those who did argue that the syllable was letters plus arrangement (Democritus, plausibly, to judge from H.2 1042b11) and those who did think the definition of the human captured essence through the listing of appropriate genus and differentiae (the Academics), must have assumed that the native speaker supplied the formation of meaning that Aristotle finds lacking in the case of the syllable. (Compare the Stoics’ response to the Skeptics reported by Sextus Empiricus: see t. 150B.3 note.) As for the Antistheneans, it is plausible that they could have agreed with Aristotle’s opponents in the case of the syllable, holding that a syllable can be reduced to letters plus arrangement and that meaning is activated as if transparently in the receiving mind, but that they agreed with Aristotle against the opponents in the case of the definition, because each part of the definition has its own separable meaning and its own range of generalism: that is, humans can be two-footed, but so can chickens; therefore, the human is not the two-footed animal. This famous Cynic objection to Plato’s definition of the human (further discussed below, §2–3) is not exactly the same as Aristotle’s objection, which pertains to unity, not unique reference.

οὐδ’ ἡ οἰκία πλίνθοι τε καὶ σύνθεσις: Previously in H.2 (1043a7–9), Aristotle cites good definitions of the doorstep and the house. The difference in H.2 from the current objection is that the position or arrangement is not added in parallel to the materials but limits the materials or serves as the form for them. Aristotle explains in full and approves the pattern of definition he finds in the Pythagorean Archytas, a structured account of material and its “actuality” (1043a12–28). See Huffman 2005:491 on Aristotle’s likely imposition of his own scheme onto Archytas’ definitions. It is plausible that Aristotle is following the same procedure in the present passage, showing how a non-Academic predecessor who dealt with definition came close to anticipating his own hylomorphic view.

(2) οὐδὲ δὴ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ τὸ ζῷον καὶ δίπουν: Aristotle objects to the absence of unity from a definition by division in the Academic style, where genus and species are listed in parallel as though they are on the same level. The (apparently) same “puzzle” (ἀπορία) about the unity of definition is addressed in Z.12 (1037b10–14) and again in H.6 (1045a14–29), near the conclusion of book H. (On this puzzle, originally raised at *Post. An.* 2.6 92a29, see Code 2010 and Gill 2010.) In Z.12, Aristotle’s solution is to treat the genus in a definition as the matter for it (relatively, or metaphorically) and the last differentia in a definition by division as its form. A different problem of unity, the ontological unity in the thing itself, arises at Z.14 (1039a26–b6), where, if the definition of “human” is “animal” plus “two-footed” and if both “animal” and “two-footed” are ontological Forms in which the human “shares,” there is no unity for the human: there Aristotle shows no sympathy for the problem, which is the problem the Platonists create for themselves by maintaining the theory of Forms while also pursuing definition by division. The current passage seems to assume, like Z.14, that definition and reality are isomorphic and that unity in being must be matched by unity in account whereas compounded being is matched by compounded account. Aristotle uses the unity requirement against Academic definitions. His timely fellow critics of the Academics, the Antistheneans, seem to have a similar objection to Academic definition of the human (see comment on λόγον μακρόν). Although this part of the passage is elided from t. 150 in SSR, the late antique commentators unanimously assume that Antisthenes was interested in the account or λόγος of the human: see t. 152B.6, 152C.2–5; Michael of Ephesus on the present passage, at t. 150B.2–4; discussion in t. 149. Further, Antisthenes’ Homeric exegesis shows interest in being human: see esp. t. 188B. In an anecdote reported by Diogenes Laertius and possibly related to this passage, Diogenes of Sinope intrudes into Plato’s Academy holding a plucked chicken and says, “This is Plato’s human being,” since it met the terms of the Academic definition in being a featherless two-footed animal, ζῷον ἄπτερον, δίπουν. Because Diogenes made his point, an additional differentiating quality, “with flat nails” (πλατυνύχον), was added to the definition (Diog. Laert. 6.40; compare ps.-Pl. *Definitions* 415a11).

τι δεῖ εἶναι ὁ παρὰ ταῦτά ἐστιν, εἰ ταῦθ’ ὅλη: When Aristotle speaks here of the “matter” in definition, this must refer (analogically) to the constituents in Academic definitions, the genus and differentia together, both on the same level. When the genus and differentia lack structure or priority in relation to each other but are both simply Forms with ontologically equivalent status, the definition lacks its own form or unity. This interpretation is consistent with Aristotle’s objections to the account of the human in Z.14, which are reiterated in H.6 (1045a14–20). This analogical sense of the “matter” within definition—

that is, this set of parallel constituents—is not evident elsewhere in Aristotle, though endorsed by Ross (1924:232), who, however, is inclined to omit the Platonists from the passage (see also Menn 2011:186). Normally in Aristotle's references to "matter" in definition, either the "matter" is the literal matter of a compound being (e.g., Z.7 1033a2–5, H.2 1043a15–16), or, when he uses the hylomorphic analogy for definition, genus is like the "matter" (Z.12 1038a6). This may be the reason for the misunderstanding by Michael of Ephesus, who assumes that Aristotle objects to the Platonists for failing to account for real matter and referring to form only in their definitions. (See t. 150B.1 notes.) οὐτε δὲ στοιχείον οὐτ' ἐκ στοιχείου, ἀλλ' ἡ οὐσία: The substance in the definition, which must correspond to the unity in the being whose definition is given, must be "beyond" the constituents, just as in the examples of the syllable and the house with which Aristotle began the section. The language here is parallel to οὐ φαίνεται . . . ἡ συλλαβὴ ἐκ τῶν στοιχείων οὐσα above. ὁ ἐξαιρῶντες τὴν ὕλην λέγουσιν: The neuter relative pronoun refers back one line to τι . . . ὁ παρὰ ταῦτά ἐστιν, which is, in fact, the substance, ἡ οὐσία, of both the definition and the thing being defined—the thing omitted, against their very own goals and principles, by the Platonists. The opponents omit this when they "say" their definitions, and they "say" the matter only—that is, the constituents in the definition, which correspond to the constituents, not the unity, in the being they are trying to define. Here Michael of Ephesus reverses the objects of the verb and participle, understanding the phrase to mean "which [*sc.* the substance] they say as they remove the matter." (An apparently parallel reference to Platonists' "removal of the matter" can be found at Z.11 1036b23.) Bonitz and Jaeger follow Michael of Ephesus, as do Brancacci (1990:230) and Balmès (2001:400 and n.36). Caizzi (1964:52) thinks the reference is to materialists of some kind.

εἰ οὖν τοῦτ' αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι, καὶ οὐσία τοῦτο: Text and punctuation are retained from the manuscripts, as printed by Ross. Jaeger objected to "tautology" here, but this could be appropriate in a polemical context. Aristotle underlines the error, twice.

αὐτὴν ἂν τὴν οὐσίαν οὐ λέγοιεν: The negation οὐ is dropped in ms. A^b, but Ross explains plausibly that this change is consistent with the crossing of "matter" and essence above.

(3) ἀνάγκη δὴ ταύτην: From here to τὴν ἐν τοῖς φθαρτοῖς οὐσίαν (end of §3), Ross inserted parentheses. However, both the particle δὴ and the pronoun ταύτην (for the substance, or οὐσία, neglected by the Platonists despite their own ultimate intentions) suggest that Aristotle's discussion is tightly continuous, not a digression. The combination ἀνάγκη δὴ can even be felt to mark the apodosis, or conclusion, of an argument whose premises have been set up in an implied protasis (Bonitz 1870:172, δὴ sense 2): that is, if

the Platonists' definition could capture the substance, this substance would have some temporal characteristic, one of the following two possibilities. (Whatever its exact sense, δὴ always marks a point tightly entailed, whether as a premise or conclusion, with the previous point. When Aristotle makes a statement that is truly a parenthetical explanation, he uses γάρ. For the apodotic and resumptive senses of δὴ in Greek prose more broadly, see *GP* pp. 203–40, esp. 224–27. Denniston distinguishes twenty-four uses for δὴ, subordinated under the headings “Emphatic,” “Ironical,” and “Connective,” and these are all in the range of continuity rather than digression.) On the assumption that the text is continuous, ταύτην must be the substance within the definition (of the human), what unifies it as one account—its own, analogical οὐσία. Aristotle seems to be continuing the Platonists' investigation from the point where they fail, by considering the hypothetical nature of the missing substance in a definition built from constituents. He will apparently push the Platonists (and possibly himself) into a dilemma, a choice between two failing or at least problematic propositions about the substance in definition: either it is eternal, or it is created or born, and neither proposition seems possible. The dilemma will apparently be relieved (if not resolved) if a difference is drawn between artifacts and natural beings. The isomorphism implied between definition and ontology in the attack on the Platonists seems to remain in play throughout the passage; that is, the missing οὐσία is presumed to have a linguistic level, should the right kind of definition be possible, to match the ontological level it certainly has. (The linguistic level is probably impossible, unless the name of the thing itself captures its essence. This might be the insight behind the Antisthenians' *aporia*.) Even the final verdict on the proto-hylomorphism of the present approach to definition (1043b30–32, §5) seems to have a linguistic form, like a proposition with a subject and a predicate (τὶ κατὰ τινός); this contrasts with the proto-hylomorphism of Archytas' definitions in *H.2* 1043a22–26, where, in a closer approximation to Aristotle's own views as explained in *H.6*, “shape” (μορφή) is an analogy for the “activation” (ἐνέργεια) of the underlying “matter” (ὕλη), not a predicate said of a subject.

ἢ αἰδίων εἶναι: The obscurity of this passage is likely a major reason for its exclusion from the testimonia of Antisthenes. The outcome of the passage is a distinction between natural being and artifact for the purpose of defining substance, and the route for getting there might allude to thinking not fully expressed. The mutually exhaustive pair of alternatives αἰδίων, “eternal,” or φθαρτήν, “perishable,” is standard in Aristotle's ontology: the opposition is stated multiple times in *De caelo* and in the *Metaphysics* (e.g., *B.2* 997b8, *K.2* 1060a17–34). In Plato's corpus, on the other hand, the conjunction of these terms appears only in the argument for the immortality of the soul in *Phaedo*

106d2–4. Code 2010:95–96 and n.50 suggests, but does not develop a case for, the possibility that the human soul, which is probably the substance of the human on Aristotle's own view, is primary in his thinking here. The analogy of artifacts, however, seems to follow immediately, in the back reference *δέδεικται δὲ καὶ δεδήλωται ἐν ἄλλοις*. (See comment below.) Aristotle does not explicitly reject the possibility of eternity for the substance the Platonists need to capture in their definition: surely it should be eternal for the Platonists. But this possibility is neither developed nor adopted.

ἡ φθαρτὴν ἄνευ τοῦ φθίρεσθαι καὶ γεγενῆναι ἄνευ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι: If the substance in a being, whether a human being or a being of thought such as a definition, is not eternal, it must be perishable. But it cannot be the kind of perishable substance that undergoes a temporal process of gradual corruption or generation, because, as form, it has all-or-nothing existence. For Aristotle, coming to be and passing away without process are usually characteristic of accidental beings and accidental qualities, which have no substance (*Met.* E.3 1027a29, with Ross' note). Here he seems to be talking not about material beings at all but about noetic beings, the substance in definition (and possibly in the human).

δέδεικται δὲ καὶ δεδήλωται ἐν ἄλλοις: The reference is apparently to *Met.* Z.8 1033a28–b6 and 1033b17, where at the creation of the particular material bronze sphere, the form of the sphere preexists. That the maker of a particular composite artifact does not create the form reinforces the dilemma just mentioned, the choice between an eternal substance or a substance that comes to be and perishes without a process.

εἰ δ' εἰσὶ τῶν φθαρτῶν αἱ οὐσίαι χωρισταί, οὐδέν πω δῆλον: Perishable things are all things in the material world, living substances and material artifacts. Whether definitions or syllables are also “perishable things” remains an unfronted question in this chapter, and such a question might also have been related to the Antistheneans' *aporia*.

ὅτι γ' ἐνίων οὐκ ἐνδέχεται δῆλον, ὅσα μὴ οἶόν τε παρὰ τὰ τινὰ εἶναι, οἶον οἰκίαν ἢ σκεῦος: The house is one of Aristotle's standard examples of the artifact in the *Metaphysics*, but the tool is not. The word occurs only twice elsewhere in the *Metaphysics*, both in contexts peripheral to the main argument (Δ.4 1014b29–30, Z.5 1030b2). (It is, however, frequent in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.) It seems that “tool” is used in the present context where one might expect “sphere,” Aristotle's far more common example: indeed, the pair house and sphere appears in Z.8 1033b19–21, where Aristotle addresses the existence of these forms apart from their material instantiations. The substitution of “tool” here could be inconsequential, but it could be related to the possibility that an Antisthenean such as Diogenes of Sinope is the imagined interlocutor. Anecdotes preserved in Diogenes Laertius address

the complete independence of both the house (οἰκία) and the tool (σκεῦος) from their material constituents, according to the Cynics: the point of each anecdote is to insist that in the case of these artifacts, the function or final cause, not the form and not the material, makes a thing what it is. According to Diogenes, a collection of bricks and wood might be a house, but equally well, a wine barrel is a house when it is used as a house: “The wine barrel on the Metroon he had as his house” (τὸν ἐν τῷ Μητρώῳ πίθον ἔσχεν οἰκίαν, Diog. Laert. 6.23). Moreover, a cup might be a tool when it is used for drinking, but so is a morsel of bread: “And he threw away his cup, after he saw a slave likewise, when he had broken his tool, receiving his lentil soup in the hollow of his morsel of bread” (ἐξέβαλε δὲ καὶ τὸ τρυβλίον, ὁμοίως παιδίον θεασάμενος, ἐπειδὴ κατέαξε τὸ σκεῦος, τῷ κοίλῳ τοῦ ψωμίου τὴν φακὴν ὑποδεχόμενον, Diog. Laert. 6.37). A radical difference between “material” and “form”—and a radical break of the unity Aristotle promotes when he finds that material is potentially what the composite particular substance is actually (Θ.7 1049a18–24)—is evident in Diogenes’ positions on these artifacts. Whereas Aristotle sometimes comes close to assimilating the unity of particular material artifacts with that of particular living beings, in recognizing “functional matter” for both (see Gill 1989, 2010), the Cynics insist on a clear boundary.

ἴσως μὲν οὖν οὐδ’ οὐσίαι εἰσὶν οὗτ’ αὐτὰ ταῦτα οὔτε τι τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα μὴ φύσει συνέστηκεν: Aristotle’s uncertainty here is odd, since he states clearly elsewhere (e.g., *Met.* B.4 999b4–20 = K.2 1060b23–28) that artifacts (houses) are not substances, and he ends book Z on this note (1041b28–31). See Katayama 1999:25–27 and *passim*. In this passage, Aristotle could be tracing the genesis of this principle, perhaps in his own thought.

τὴν γὰρ φύσιν μόνην ἂν τις θεῖη τὴν ἐν τοῖς φθαρτοῖς οὐσίαν: One can presume that this statement would be fundamentally agreeable to the Antistheneans. Compare t. 179A, 180; Diog. Laert. 6.38, 6.71 (of Diogenes of Sinope).

(4) ὥστε: If the transmitted text is read sequentially without parentheses, Aristotle mentions the Antistheneans as his allies against the Platonists in consequence of the point he has just presented at 1043b21–23, that only natural objects have forms that are substance. (This is not to say that he could not have had the Antistheneans in mind for the whole attack on the Platonists, but he names them when he restates their key point.) In this case, artifacts like houses and tools might have unity different from that of humans, and their capacity for definition might also be different. There is no direct supporting evidence for attributing this view to Antisthenes, but it is consistent with the persistent use of the term φύσις for biological beings (see t. 18, 41A title 2.1, 54, 189C-2; in t. 179A, the one god could have biological or quasi-biological

being). Grube 1950:21 reads the reference of this ὥστε sequentially in this way, with the result that the Antistheneans are being credited only with a non-philosophical truism about the distinction between nature and artifact and have no importance in the discussion of analysis earlier or later in the passage. Similar is Hicken 1958:137 n.2, also dismissing the Antistheneans from the conversation about analysis. This minimal reading of Antisthenes' importance is plausible insofar as the conclusion of the passage (§5) can be read as Aristotle's own thinking; but this, in turn, is not clear. In either case, Grube and Hicken assume that the distinction between nature and artifact must be the major point Aristotle credits to the Antistheneans and that the topic of analysis is secondary to this. This is the best understanding of the text in the order it is presented.

ἡ ἀπορία: The Antistheneans' puzzle is not exactly a question about which things are substances (or have forms that are substances); rather, according to a literal reading of the apposition Aristotle writes in this sentence, it is their thesis that it is impossible to define the essence (ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἐστὶν ὀρίσασθαι). Aristotle might imply that the *aporia* is well known, and it might amount to *aporia* for the Antistheneans' own cause, not just for their Platonist opponents (see note below on ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἐστὶν ὀρίσασθαι). It seems also to be very close to the *aporia* Aristotle identifies in Z.12 and H.6: if defining, which is to state the essence of a thing through a multi-word formulation (a λόγος or, pejoratively, a λόγος μακρός), turns out to be necessarily a listing of components (a thesis Aristotle rejects, but one the Antistheneans might sustain insofar as they take their model of definition from the Platonists), and if this linguistic analysis in definition is also ontological because the component names are isomorphic with reality (a thesis Aristotle also rejects, first because he maintains the doctrine of his *Categories*, as the Antistheneans apparently do not, and also under the doctrine of hylomorphic unity developed in the *Metaphysics*), then defining the essence is impossible for natural objects, because they have ontological unity, which a definition in the Platonists' style cannot capture. But (jumping to §5, where Aristotle seems to draw an inference from the Antistheneans' *aporia*) defining the essence would not be impossible for artifacts, because artifacts do not have any unified essence to be missed or disrupted by such an analysis. Artifacts really are the sums of their parts. Other interpretations of the precise *aporia* of the Antistheneans have been proposed. Ross 1924:232–33, not privileging the opposition between nature and artifact in §3, relates the *aporia* closely to the problem of *Theaet.* 201e–202c, with which, as Ross says, Aristotle does not sympathize: the *aporia* is timely only for his present discussion, not to any serious philosophical point. Burnyeat 1970:115–16 proposes that it is comparable to Meno's paradox (Pl. *Meno* 71b, 80d), because

the Antistheneans do not distinguish between definitions and descriptive formulas and because the latter cannot communicate the precise essence of a thing to an audience that does not already know the thing. (See Burnyeat et al. 1979–82:18 for a rejection of this interpretation.)

οἱ Ἀντισθένηοι: “The Antistheneans” could mean either “the followers of Antisthenes” or “Antisthenes along with his followers” (compare von Staden 1989:245 on “the Herophileans”). The existence of followers need not imply a formal school. If the followers included Diogenes of Sinope (i.e., if the anecdote in Diogenes Laertius 6.40 is relevant), it might be odd that his name is not used. Aristotle never does use Diogenes’ name and possibly avoided it deliberately: he is ὁ Κῶν in *Rhet.* 1411a24–25. There is no surviving name for any other follower of Antisthenes, although Diogenes Laertius 6.2 (t. 12A) refers to a group of pupils.

καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι: Apparently the Antistheneans are not unique in their *aporia*, but there was a common misunderstanding in which they shared. In *Met.* Γ.3 1005b3 (t. 157B) and Γ.4 1006a6–8 (t. 157C), ἀπαίδευτοι refers to those who have not mastered Aristotle’s *Analytics*, which depends on his *Categories*, which sets up the difference between substance and attribute. In the present passage, the Antistheneans treat questions posed in the category of substance, which seek τὸ τί ἐστίν, as though they had the same status as questions in the category of quality, which answer the question ποῖόν τι ἐστίν; (see also t. 149B–1 notes, 151B). In eliminating the ontological hierarchy, they pose a challenge to Aristotle’s views as well as to Plato’s, although Aristotle is able to claim a kind of agreement (§5). In *Rhet.* 1404a27, the term ἀπαίδευτοι refers to those who, following Gorgias, mix poetic words into prose: the same context uses the adjective εὐήθης, which Aristotle uses of Antisthenes in t. 152A.

ἔχει τινὰ καιρόν: Aristotle accepts the puzzle as a good one and finds it to agree conveniently with his own objection to the opponents just described. Compare his own *aporia* over the unity in definitions in *Met.* Z.12 (1037b9–12) and *Post. An.* 2.6 (92a29). Michael of Ephesus (t. 150B) interprets this differently, saying that Aristotle has already solved the Antistheneans’ puzzle in the preceding passage.

ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἐστίν ὀρίσασθαι: The Antistheneans might encounter *aporia* in their own thought, as extension of the Socratic project, not merely pose an *aporia* for the Platonists. If they take the Socratic question τί ἐστίν; very seriously, as the gateway into philosophy, and if answering this question is impossible in the most important cases, then philosophy itself would seem to become impossible or, at least, to get stuck at this preliminary level. The statement οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἐστίν ὀρίσασθαι might be intentionally parallel to the paradox οὐκ ἔστι ἀντιλέγειν and might also be meant as a shock to

the philosophical audience. On the phrase τὸ τί ἐστι as a formulation for “essence,” see t. 151A. Whatever the connection of Aristotle’s use of this phrase to the Socratic question or to the logicians among the minor Socratics, it is firmly his phrase, which he uses about seventy times throughout his corpus (especially in the *Analytics*), including twenty-one instances in the *Metaphysics*. It occurs nowhere in Plato’s corpus.

τὸν γὰρ ὄρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν: In t. 150B, Michael of Ephesus explains λόγον μακρόν as a long name, that is, an account with too many compounded pieces and no essential unity. This seems correct in the current context. (See also Burnyeat et al. 1979–82:19.) More generally, the phrase might come from the poet Simonides (cited at Arist. *Met.* N.5 1091a7–8), who used it to imply “evasive verbiage such as slaves tell to cover up failure to do the job assigned to them” (Ross 1924:233). Compare the character Ajax’ use of μακροὶ λόγοι in t. 53.8. The work in which Simonides mimicked the μακροὺς λόγους of slaves was called the *Disjointed Stories* (Ἀτακτοὶ λόγοι: see ps.-Alex. *Aphr.* on *Met.* 1091a5, CAG 1.818.4–8), and so the absence of unity might be equally critical to the sense, even in the traditional phrase. Plato’s Socrates uses the phrase λόγον μακρόν often in its broad sense (e.g., *Phaedr.* 241e7) but might also allude to a more technical meaning at *Soph.* 263a2, where the proposition “Theaetetus is sitting,” offered by the Eleatic Stranger as the minimal scale of formulation for which truth value can be assessed, is checked for its size: the Eleatic Stranger asks, μὴ μακρὸς ὁ λόγος; (The *logos* is not long, is it?), and Theaetetus replies, Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ μέτριος (No, it is just right). On the nineteenth-century discussion about Antisthenes’ relevance to the discussion of truth and falsity in the *Sophist* (including Dümmmler 1882:49–50 and Zeller 1888:288, 293, 297), see references in Natorp 1894: col. 2544.

ἀλλὰ ποῖον μὲν τί ἐστιν ἐνδέχεται καὶ διδάξαι: According to the transmitted text, ἐνδέχεται should stand in parallel to οὐκ ἔστι: that is, Aristotle reports that one action is possible, according to the Antisthenians, whereas another is not. An infinitive verb is implied as the subject of ἐνδέχεται, just as ὀρίσασθαι is the subject for οὐκ ἔστι. If we understand καὶ as adverbial, not copulative, this infinitive is expressed, in διδάξαι, and the sense of the statement is that whereas definition is impossible, teaching is “even” possible. But an adverbial function for καὶ does not eliminate the problem, because teaching would be implied as an addition to or extreme instance of some other activity, and καὶ must be copulative at least by implication. In that case, either a word has been lost from the text (as Jaeger thought), or Aristotle must be understood to elide the first verb, either ὀρίσασθαι or a rough equivalent, and express the second, διδάξαι. (An appropriate verb might be ἀποδεικνύειν or aorist ἀποδείξει. The nominal form ἀπόδειξις is paired with ὀρισμός and ὀρίσασθαι in *Met.* Z.15 1039b27–40a7.) The question ποῖόν ἐστιν; can be answered for all things in

a way that is just as authoritative, basic, and insightful or informative as a definition of τί ἐστίν would be, but it answers a qualitative, not a substantial, question. Even so, this answer to the question ποῖόν ἐστιν; is the ultimate level of linguistic illumination of a particular thing. (Döring 1998:272–73 similarly emphasizes that such a qualitative statement, even when it is complemented by infinitely many further statements, can approach but will never truly amount to a definition. Yet such a discussion of approximate statements could fill a Socratic dialogue: see Döring 1985:234.) Antisthenes might have evaluated appropriate, descriptive, perhaps ontologically grounded comparisons in the same way others, such as the Platonists and Peripatetics, evaluated definitions. Compare t. 149B-1, 151B; see also t. 51A, 181A–B. For the idea that skill in making comparisons is close to philosophy, compare Pl. *Phaedr.* 246a4–7 (with Rowe 2009); Arist. *Poet.* 1459a5–8. Joël 1921 v.2.2:923 n.4 (cited in Kindstrand 1976:31) posits that Cynics generally used pictures and comparisons in the place of definitions. See also von Fritz 1927:463; Field 1930:166; Decleva Caizzi 1966:102. Burnyeat (1970:112 n.41) is skeptical. ὥσπερ ἄργυρον, τί μὲν ἐστίν οὐ, ὅτι δ' οἶον καττίτερος: The example of silver and tin is plausibly Antisthenes' own (although little hangs on this). For other instances of imagery of metals, see t. 83A, 169, 170, 185A (ἄργυρον, “silver”); 165, 170 (gold); 129 (iron and rust).

(5) ὥστ': The case for the link between Antisthenes and the dream passage in *Theaet.* 201d8–202c6 rests mainly on this final sentence, as Burnyeat 1970:113 makes clear. Like the dream, this sentence makes a strong distinction between complexes, which have accounts, and simple elements, which lack accounts. But the inference (ὥστε) does not follow obviously from the clause that ended the previous sentence, and it is not immediately clear whether this is Aristotle's own inference or one he reports from the Antisthenians. As Burnyeat shows, the clearest continuity of thought within the passage, without allusion to external material such as further knowledge about the Antisthenians' *aporia*, is found if the inference is taken from the previous main clause, the fact that the Antisthenians presented an *aporia*, which was timely for attacking the problem of heap-like definitions, not from the explanation of that *aporia*, the Antisthenians' own views on the impossibility of defining essence (Burnyeat 1970:114). By this understanding, this second ὥστε clause presents the inference of Aristotle, not the Antisthenians. (For similar positions, see Gillespie 1914:480; Festugière 1932:309; Grube 1950; Rankin 1986; Kalouche 1999:21 n.29. Opposing this tradition and retaining this second ὥστε clause as evidence for Antisthenes is Caizzi 1964:51 n.4, listing further scholars on this side back to Zeller. Dümmmler 1881 also takes this position.) Here Aristotle indeed resumes his own vocabulary for substance, οὐσία, instead of the Antisthenians' more Socratic τὸ τί

ἐστιν. But there are reasons to doubt that Aristotle is speaking here just in his own voice: the statement that follows, about the match between the hylomorphic analysis of substance and successful, unified definition, gives neither Aristotle's normal view of primary substance (so Caizzi 1964:51) nor his normal view of definition (as it appears in Z.12 1037a28–30 and H.6 1045a23 and 1045a29, whether or not these are themselves equivalent). Possibly it could be considered Aristotle's experimental or provisional analysis of definition in hylomorphic terms, but even in this case, this analysis must contain a significant ingredient from the Antistheneans that differentiates it from other possible experimental analyses. (Compare H.2 1043a25–29.) So it seems best to understand that this second ὥστε clause is still relevant to the Antistheneans. In this case, Aristotle's attitude toward the Antistheneans could be positive or negative: either he might reinterpret some aspect of the Antistheneans' position in hylomorphic terms (even though this analysis is not the same one he ultimately adopts), in order to show that their insight was, to an extent, indicative of the truth, like the definitions of the Pythagorean Archytas at H.2 1043a21–26; or, in consideration of the adjective ἀπαίδευτοι he applies to them, he might take the opportunity to correct their view, showing how they could have pointed toward the truth through their insight about analysis, if they had accepted a critical point about hierarchical structure that they did not accept.

οὐσίας ἔστι μὲν ἢς ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ὄρον καὶ λόγον, οἷον τῆς συνθέτου:
For the Antistheneans, then, it seems that some “substance” (οὐσία), such as “composite” substance (οἷον τῆς συνθέτου), will allow for definition and account (ὄρος καὶ λόγος) in a stronger sense than simple “substance” (Caizzi 1964:52), even if the concepts “account” and “substance” are not shared between the Antistheneans and Aristotle. It is hard to assess this statement against the Antistheneans' views as otherwise known, because we have no clear information about what they counted as simple or compound being (for possible *aporia* in this very realm, see t. 54, 187) or about endurance of being across time (see t. 151A). If a difference between natural beings and artifacts governs their outlook (as the first ὥστε in §4 suggests), natural beings might be assumed to be simple and undefinable, and artifacts would be compound and definable. But Socrates, a natural being, does have a λόγος (according to t. 152A), one that stands in a one-to-one relationship with himself. Possibly the term λόγος in t. 152A is not the same as that in the present passage, the former standing for Antisthenes' concept, which is identical not to definition but to precise verbal identification, and the present λόγος standing for Aristotle's concept, which is identical to definition.

ἐάν τε αἰσθητὴ ἐάν τε νοητὴ ἢ: The composite being Aristotle speaks of, in admitting definition, can be either an ordinary material (aesthetic) composite

or a composite in the noetic realm, admitting analysis into two or more noetic parts. These kinds of composite and the distinction between them could be based in Aristotle's thinking, Antisthenes' thinking, or both. (Some interpretations assume that Antisthenes necessarily rejects noetic entities, presumably on the evidence of t. 149.) Aristotle's clearest example of the intelligible composite is a geometric entity such as a sphere (a composite of shape and radius: see t. 150B.7): spheres are sometimes perceptible, when they are actual, composite bronze spheres, and sometimes intelligible, when they are universals (*Met. Z.10* 1036a2–5). In the same context (*Z.10* 1035a14–17), Aristotle seems to imply that the syllable, like the sphere, has both perceptible and intelligible existence, when he distinguishes the letters that are “perceptible matter” (ὕλη αἰσθητή), that is, “these wax figures or these sounds in the air,” and excludes these from status as parts in the formula of the syllable. If he had gone on in that passage to spell out the kind of letters that do count as parts of the formula, these would presumably have been ὕλη νοητή, the intelligible matter or universal letters, which are parts of the formula for the universal syllable. Aristotle's omission of intelligible letters and syllables as a parallel to the intelligible sphere might reflect a general unclarity in his time about the ontological status of tokens and types in language, and there is no evidence that Antisthenes was more aware of this issue: but hints in Aristotle, including the present passages, together with hints and puzzles in Gorgias (*Helen* §14; *On Not Being* 980b8–14 ps.-Arist. *MXG* = §23–24 Buchheim), suggest that such an awareness would not be anachronistic. (For the broad picture of developments in the realm of aesthetic and noetic entities in the late fifth century, see Porter 2010:179–260.) In t. 187.11–12, Antisthenes seems to recognize particular noetic individuals (which could be also aesthetic, depending on how the mind is conceived, but probably are not), and compounds of these, in more than one sense, are plausible. In the earlier discussion in t. 187 (§4–5), the meaning of the syllable might be a universal noetic individual (called $\tau\iota$), and Homer's epithets are shown to be compounds of these. All compound words and, by extension, even texts might be universal noetic composites, whose account would given by analysis. The discussions in t. 187 and 189 could even be examples of this practice. See t. 149A note on ἐν ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις, for other possible kinds of noetic compounds.

ἐξ ὧν δ' αὕτη πρώτων, οὐκ ἐτι: The dream passage in *Theaetetus* makes a similar statement about the στοιχεῖα (201d8–202a2): at the level of these, which are like Aristotle's πρώτα, definition is impossible. There is no good evidence for Antisthenes' view on the question whether there is an ultimate level of analysis. If Antisthenes recognized such a level in aesthetic compounds, this could be components or possibly elements such as silver

(§4). But no other surviving evidence shows or suggests that he had a doctrine about an elemental level in extralinguistic things. (Arguments that he did are based on the present passage, together with a certain interpretation of the imperfect verb tense in t. 151A: see note on τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι, the interpretation attributed to Caizzi and Hirzel.) His recognition of an elemental level in noetic compounds seems more likely and could explain why Aristotle introduces the opposition in the previous clause. If Antisthenes recognized an elemental level in noetic compounds, this would presumably be a thesis about language. (Mathematical objects would be plausible for some thinkers but not obviously for Antisthenes.) For Antisthenes' view of the basic level of analysis in linguistic things, see note on §1, ἡ συλλαβή. Aristotle himself agrees that beyond a certain level, accounts are no longer possible, lest one enter infinite regress: see, e.g., *Post. An.* 1.3 72b5–7 (= t. 157A), where he rejects the position of contemporaries who demand knowledge of τὰ πρῶτα and a “demonstration” of everything. For Aristotle, this level is the axioms and theses of a science (see Code 1987:130–39) and has nothing to do with parts in a separable sense.

εἴπερ τι κατὰ τινὸς σημαίνει ὁ λόγος ὁ ὀριστικός: Aristotle now brings up a principle of structured analysis, which, again, could be his or the Antisthenians' or one they share. This principle, that a defining λόγος must “signify something predicated of something,” aligns a definition with a statement or assertion, on Aristotle's standard expressed in *De interpretatione* (17a20–26) and *Prior Analytics* (e.g., 24a16–17, 25–30). The particle εἴπερ suggests that this is Aristotle's own principle, one he is bringing in to show that the position he has derived from the Antisthenians is consistent with or even fortified by one of his own insights on λόγος (which, in these other contexts, is not definitional λόγος but, rather, statement admitting of truth and falsity). This could be a point where Aristotle subtly (or not so subtly) corrects the Antisthenians, who might not have recognized a standard hierarchical structure in the parts of a λόγος and might have seen a λόγος as an additive string of names, whose internal relationship had to be discerned case by case by a reader. (Compare Antisthenes' interpretive maneuvers with the compound Homeric epithets in t. 187 and 189; see t. 187.4 note on ‘τρόπος’ τὸ μὲν τι σημαίνει τὸ ἦθος.) The alternative is that the τι κατὰ τινός structure did govern Antisthenian definitions. (This is what Michael understands: see t. 150B.3.) From the evidence in t. 187, 189, and 151A, this seems unlikely as a general position. In t. 151A, where a genus-species structure for λόγος-- which is one kind of speech among a larger class-- could have been given, it is not, but a functional criterion is. The Antisthenian use of the phrase τι κατὰ τινός seems more likely to pertain to reference in itself, similar to Aristotle's use in *Met.* Z.17 1041a20–22, the only other passage

in the *Metaphysics* where the expression is used. (Compare Alexander of Aphrodisias' diagnosis of the error of the οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν paradox, at t. 152B.6, where saying something κατὰ τινος is like saying something about something, περί τινος.) If so, Aristotle could be mimicking their phrase but using it in his own way, to imply that insofar as they are correct, they are correct in his way. By this interpretation, Aristotle here leaves the Antistheneans aside and draws his conclusion, confirmation of his intuition that definition has unifying structure. He has used the Antistheneans to show that definition needs unity; but he has not said what this Antisthenean unity is, and it seems most likely that they had no such doctrine but used their demand for unity in only negative ways, against the Platonists.

καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ ὕλην εἶναι τὸ δὲ ὡς μορφὴν: The hylomorphic analysis of definition suggested here, where one component is like the material and another component is like the shape and where one is like a predicate and the other like a subject (probably in chiasmic order), is not the same hylomorphic analysis Aristotle adopts in H.6, but it seems to be just a demonstration that definition must be complex (i.e., analogically “hylomorphic”) rather than compound, in some way or other. The passage has not established any particular rigorous hylomorphic analysis of definition for any of the interlocutors discussed—not for the Platonists (who do not have one), the Antistheneans (who probably did not have one), or Aristotle (who has one, but not this one).

150B. ps.-Alexander of Aphrodisias (= Michael of Ephesus?), *Commentary on Aristotle's "Metaphysics"* (1043b23) CAG 1 p. 553.31–554.33 (Hayduck)

= 44B DC

“Ὡστε ἡ ἀπορία ἦν οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι καὶ οἱ οὕτως ἀπαίδευτοι ἠπόρουν ἔχει τινὰ καιρόν.”

(1) δεῖ προσυπακούειν τοῦ “ἐξ ὧν εἵπομεν λυθῆναι,” ἵνα ᾗ τὸ λεγόμενον τοιοῦτον· “Ὡστε ἡ ἀπορία καιρὸν ἔχει, ἦν οἱ Ἀντισθένειοι ἠπόρουν, λυθῆναι ἐξ ὧν εἵπομεν.” ἐπειδὴ γὰρ δέδεικται ὅτι ἄλλα ἐστὶ τὰ ὡς εἶδους μέρη καὶ ἄλλα τὰ ὡς ὕλης, ἐκ τούτων λυθήσεται ἡ τῶν Ἀντισθενείων ἀπορία. (2) ἔστι δ' αὐτῶν ἡ ἀπορία, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρίσασθαι, οὐδ' ἔστιν ὀρισμός τινος. τοῦτο δὲ κατεσκευάζον ὠδί. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὁ ὀρισμός οὐκ ἔστιν ὄνομα, ἀλλ' ἐκ πλειόνων (τοῦτο γὰρ εἶπε “λόγον μακρόν”· τὸ γὰρ “ζῶν λογικὸν θνητὸν νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν” λόγος μακρὸς ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς τὸ “ἄνθρωπος” ὄνομα), ἐπειδὴ οὖν ὁ ὀρισμός οὐκ ἔστιν ὄνομα, οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρίσασθαι. (3) λέγουσι δὲ ὅτι, ὅταν εἴπωμεν “ζῶν λογικόν,” σύνθετόν τι λέγομεν ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἶδους, ὕλης μὲν τοῦ ζῶου,

εἶδους δὲ τοῦ λογικοῦ, καὶ ἔτι προστεθὲν τὸ “θνητόν” σύνθετον. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, τὰ μὲν σύνθετα ἐπεξερχόμεθα καὶ οἰοῖναι ἀριθμοῦμεν πόσα τινὰ τυγχάνει, “ζῶον λογικόν” λέγοντες, καὶ πάλιν “ζῶον λογικόν θνητόν,” ὁρισμὸν δὲ οὐ φαμεν. (4) λέγει δὴ ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης ὅτι ἡ ἀπορία αὕτη λύεται ἐξ ὧν εἶπομεν· ἐπειδὴ γὰρ δέδεικται ὅτι τὸ “ζῶον πεζὸν δίπουν” τοῦ εἶδους ἐστὶ μέρη, οὐ τῆς ὕλης, πῶς ἐστὶ δυνατόν λέγειν ὅτι τὸ “ζῶον” ἐστὶν ὕλη τὸ δὲ “λογικόν” εἶδος, ἢ πάλιν τὸ “ζῶον λογικόν” ὕλη, τὸ δὲ “θνητόν” εἶδος· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦσαν τῆς ὕλης μέρη τὸ “ζῶον,” τὸ “θνητόν,” τὸ “λογικόν,” ἔχρην ταῦτα λέγειν, ὅτι τὸ “ζῶον” καὶ τὸ “λογικόν” ὕλη ἐστί, τὸ δὲ “θνητόν” εἶδος, καὶ λέγοντες “ζῶον θνητόν” λέγουσι τὸ σύνθετον τὸ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἶδους· ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐκ εἰσιν ὑλικά, οὐ τὸ σύνθετον λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ μέρη τοῦ εἶδους· ὥστε ἔστιν ὁρισμός. (5) οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν, φασί, ὁρίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ ὅποιον μὲν ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος ἢ βοῦς ἐνδέχεται διδάξαι, ὁρίσασθαι δὲ οὐ· οἷον ὁρίσασθαι μὲν καὶ εἰπεῖν τί ἐστὶν ἄργυρος οὐχ οἷόν τε, ὅποιον δέ, δυνατόν, οἷον ἐρωτηθέντες ὅποιόν ἐστιν ἄργυρος, εἰπεῖν ὅτι οἷον καττίτερος. (6) ὥστε, φασί, λόγον μὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν οὐσίας συνθέτου τῆς ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἶδους, εἶδους δὲ ὅρον ἢ ὕλης ἐξ ὧν ἡ σύνθετός ἐστιν οὐσία οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποδοῦναι. (7) εἰπὼν δὲ ὅτι συνθέτου ἔστιν οὐσίας ἀποδοῦναι ὁρισμὸν, προσέθηκε τὸ “ἐάν τε αἰσθητῆς ἐάν τε νοητῆς.” ἀλλ’ ὅτι μὲν αἰ αἰσθηταὶ οὐσίαι σύνθετοὶ εἰσι, φανερόν· ὅτι δὲ εἰσι καὶ νοηταὶ σύνθετοι, δηλον· τὰ γὰρ μαθηματικά ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἶδους εἰσιν· ὁ γὰρ νοητὸς κύκλος ἐξ ὕλης μὲν τοῦ διαστήματος, εἶδους δὲ τοῦ τοιουδι σχήματος. (8) οὐχ ὡς ἀρεσκόμενος δὲ καὶ τὰ μαθηματικά οὐσίας εἶπεν, ἀλλ’ ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο τῶν Ἀντισθενείων λεγόντων εἴρηκεν αὐτὰ οὐσίας. τῆς μὲν οὖν συνθέτου φασί οὐσίας, εἴτε αἰσθητὴ ἐστὶν εἴτε νοητὴ, ἔστιν ὁρισμὸν ἀποδοῦναι, ἐξ ὧν δ’ αὕτη, οὐκ ἔστιν, εἴπερ τὸ ζῶον λογικόν καὶ ὅλως ὁ ὅρος τί κατὰ τινος σημαίνει, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐστὶν εἶδος τὸ δὲ ὕλη.

(1) ὥστε LFS : ὥσπερ A (5) ἐρωτηθέντες ALFM : ἐρωτηθέντα
Brandis

“Therefore, the puzzle that the Antistheneans and those similarly uneducated puzzled over has a certain timeliness . . .”

[Aristotle, *Met.* 1043b23]

(1) One must also understand “is resolved from what we have said,” so that what is meant [by Aristotle] is something like this: “Therefore, the puzzle that the Antistheneans puzzled over takes its occasion to be resolved from what we have said.” For since it has been demonstrated that the parts, as it were, of the form are one thing, and the parts, as it were, of the material are another thing, from these observations the puzzle of the Antistheneans will be resolved. (2) Their puzzle is that it is not possible to define, nor is

there a definition of anything. And they used to construct it like this: since the definition is not a name, but is from a plurality [of names] (for this he called the “long account”: the definition “rational animal receptive of mind and knowledge” is a long account, and not a name, like “human being”): since, then, the definition is not a name, it is not possible to define. (3) And they say that, whenever we say “rational animal,” we say something composite from material and form, that is, from the material “animal” and from the form “rational,” and it is further composite when “mortal” is added. And if this is the case, we give exposition of the composite parts, and, as it were, we count how many things happen to pertain, in saying “rational animal,” and alternatively “rational, mortal animal,” but we do not say the definition. (4) So Aristotle says that this puzzle is resolved from what we have said. For since it has been shown that “the terrestrial, two-footed animal” are parts of the form, not of the material, how is it possible to say that the “animal” is the matter and the “rational” is the form, or, alternatively, the “rational animal” is the matter and the “mortal” is the form? For if “animal,” “mortal,” and “rational” were parts of the material, it would have been necessary to say this, that “animal” and “rational” are the material, and “mortal” the form, and in saying “mortal animal” they say the composite from material and form. But since they are not material, they do not say the composite, but the parts of the form. So there is definition. (5) So it is not possible, they say, to define; but what sort of thing a human or a cow is, it is possible to teach, but not to define. For example, it is not possible to define and say what silver is, but it is possible to say what sort of thing it is: for example, when asked what sort of thing silver is, to say that it is like tin. (6) Therefore, they say, it is possible to say the account of a substance that is composite from matter and form, but a definition of the form or the matter from which the substance is composite it is not possible to render. (7) And having said that it is possible to render a definition of the composite substance, he [Aristotle] added the phrase “whether it is perceptible or whether it is intelligible.” But that perceptible substances are composite is clear. And that there are also composite intelligible substances is clear. For the objects of mathematics are comprised from matter and form: for the intelligible circle is comprised from the radius as its matter, and from this particular shape as its form. (8) But he [Aristotle] did not say that the objects of mathematics are substances because he held this view, but perhaps he said they are substances because the Antistheneans were saying this also. They say, then, that for the composite substance, whether it is perceptible or whether it is intelligible, it is possible to render a definition, but for

the elements from which this substance is constituted, it is not possible, if indeed “rational animal” and definition in general indicates something predicated of something, and the one is form and the other is matter.

Context of Preservation

The commentary on the later books (E–N) of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* attributed to Alexander of Aphrodisias was written not by Alexander but probably by the Byzantine scholar Michael of Ephesus, active c. 1118–38 CE. It remains an unsettled question how much external knowledge of the ancient tradition Michael brought to his commentary and how much he interpreted Aristotle only from the text of the *Metaphysics*, using his own ideas and those of his contemporary scholarly community. Scholarship on Antisthenes usually dismisses this text as mere exegesis.

Importance of the Testimonium

This interpretation of the Antistheneans’ concept of λόγος μακρός, “long account,” has been plausible for many scholars (Festugière 1932; von Fritz 1927; Caizzi 1964:51–54) and is likely to be correct (see t. 150A.4 note on τὸν γὰρ ὅρον λόγον εἶναι μακρόν). But Michael misunderstands Aristotle’s criticism of the Platonists (1043b10–14), and hence he misunderstands the opportunity, or καιρός, the Antistheneans present. He misunderstands or fails to remember Aristotle’s own hylomorphic analysis of definition (in Z.12) but attributes analysis of this kind to the Antistheneans. What he says about the Antistheneans could be inferred from Aristotle’s text, with three exceptions: the Antistheneans’ special interest in the definition of the human (available in the tradition on the οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν paradox: see t. 152–53), the Antistheneans’ special interest in the primacy of matter over form (available in the tradition of t. 149), and the idea that definition has a quasi-hylomorphic structure that treats genus as matter and species as form (available previously in the *Metaphysics*, at Z.12 and H.2, as well as here). The attribution of this hylomorphic analysis to the Antistheneans is either inferred by Michael from Aristotle’s conclusion at 1043b30–32 or transmitted uniquely here. Michael does claim to cite the Antistheneans’ own arguments (§2), and he seems to cite Antisthenes separately from the Antistheneans for the doctrine of λόγος μακρός. Probably this passage has little value for understanding Antisthenes, but Michael’s reasons and authority for saying what he says deserve attention.

Notes

(1) ἡ ἀπορία καιρὸν ἔχει, ἣν οἱ Ἀντισθένηιοι ἠπόρουσιν, λυθῆναι ἐξ ὧν εἵπομεν: Michael makes the assumption that Aristotle disagrees with the Antistheneans’ ἀπορία and that he has solved it. On their *aporia*, see the

comments at t. 150A.4. This mistake, which might depend on the hostile treatment Antisthenes receives in the Neo-Platonic tradition (t. 149), colors the whole interpretation.

ἐπειδὴ γὰρ δέδεικται ὅτι ἄλλα ἐστὶ τὰ ὡς εἶδους μέρη καὶ ἄλλα τὰ ὡς ὕλης: Michael might be referring to a passage ten lines back, *Met.* 1043b10–14 (part of t. 150A), and understanding Aristotle's point to be that “animal” and “two-footed” are not parts of the matter of the human but parts of the form. (His reading of this sentence [p. 553.2–12] is, meanwhile, fallacious, in taking τὴν ὕλην as the object of ἐξαίρουντες and thus making a Platonic point about the priority of form instead of understanding the diagnosis of the Platonists' self-refutation that Aristotle surely intends: see t. 150A.2 note on ὁ ἐξαίρουντες τὴν ὕλην λέγουσιν.) Later (§4), Michael refers to passages in book Z where Aristotle demonstrated that parts of definition are not parts of matter (Z.11 1036a24–b7) and that they are parts of form (Z.14 1039b4–6), and possibly he thinks the same point is being made here. In the explanations that follow (§2–4), the Antisthenians are said to err in two ways: they misunderstand the notion of part, likening part of form to part of matter; and they advance a hylomorphic view of definition, which does not work because all parts of a definition are form whereas none are matter. Michael assumes, on the one hand, that they are materialists and, on the other hand, that they have some notion of form, but not a plausible one. Michael implies that the parts of form are not really parts and that if the Antisthenians had recognized that definitions have parts of form, not parts of matter, they would not have found inappropriate compounding in the human or its definition.

(2) ἔστι δ' αὐτῶν ἡ ἀπορία, ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ὀρίσασθαι, οὐδ' ἔστιν ὀρισμός τινος: Michael understands here that the Antisthenians deny all definition, not just definition of simples. (Contrast t. 150A.5. In §8, however, the exegesis of t. 150A.5, he says that they allow hylomorphic definition of composites but not of simple matter or simple form.) Denial of all definition is a plausible summary position that the tradition could have attributed to the Antisthenians, because “definition” of composite artifacts by analysis, such as they allowed under the interpretation of t. 150A.5 presented above, is not the kind of “definition” in which the philosophical tradition took interest. τοῦτο δὲ κατεσκευάζον ὧδί: Either Michael is explicating the Antisthenians' position confidently on his own authority, or he has an independent source. This remains a crucial question. A scholar of the twelfth century CE cannot be compared simply to Alexander of Aphrodisias, Ammonius, or Simplicius, who were attached to schools and libraries in Athens and Alexandria where philosophical texts from the fourth century BCE had probably been continuously available: hence the exegeses in t. 152B–D, 153B, and 149A–B are of a different kind from the present one.

ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὁ ὀρισμός οὐκ ἔστιν ὄνομα, ἀλλ' ἐκ πλειόνων: Michael implies that the Antistheneans equate a definition with a name, and he diagnoses their puzzle as following from this error. This has seemed an accurate account of Antisthenes' views in some studies (Gillespie 1913–14; Festugière 1932; Grube 1950; Caizzi 1964), but it has more recently been rejected because, it is said, definition (λόγος or ὀρισμός) and name (ὄνομα) could not have been confused in Antisthenes' time (see, e.g., Zajonz 2002:81–82). Indeed, Plato and Aristotle explicitly reject this equivalence. In *Theaet.* 202a7–b6, the report of Socrates' dream, λόγος is called a complexity, or “weaving together,” of names (ὀνομάτων συμπλοκή). Aristotle repeats often that λόγος must have semantically significant parts (e.g., *De interp.* 16b26–27), and in his discussion of definition (ὅρος) at *Topics* 101b38–102a17 (see t. 151B), he insists that its form must be a phrase (λόγος), not a name (ὄνομα). But both authors also imply that some contemporaries equate the account and the name. Plato's Socrates argues, in *Crat.* 385c1–d1, that a name, like an account, can be true and false; At *Topics* 102a2–5, Aristotle implies that some contemporaries wrongly render statements of essence with names only: ὅσοι δ' ὅπως οὖν ὀνόματι τὴν ἀπόδοσιν ποιοῦνται, δῆλον ὡς οὐκ ἀποδιδόασιν οὗτοι τὸν τοῦ πράγματος ὀρισμόν, ἐπειδὴ πᾶς ὀρισμός λόγος τίς ἐστιν (But as for those who in various ways make their rendering with a name, it is clear that they do not render the definition of the thing, since every definition is an account). Hence it seems false that a name could not have been closely related to a λόγος for Antisthenes or that the difference between name and λόγος must have been one of complexity. The difference might have been, rather, that a name signifies, conventionally, whereas a λόγος reveals, essentially.

τοῦτο γὰρ εἶπε λόγον μακρόν: Michael switches from a plural verb to a singular. Either this is a routine kind of slip, or he starts reporting a doctrine from Antisthenes that he knows independently from this text. The plural is resumed below.

“ζῶον λογικόν θνητὸν νοῦ καὶ ἐπιστήμης δεκτικόν”: This is the standard Stoic definition of the human, which Michael uses earlier in his comments on Z.12 (p. 519–22). It appears also in Sextus Empiricus (*Pyrrh. hyp.* 2.26, 2.211; *Adv. math.* 7.269).

(3) λέγουσι δὲ ὅτι, ὅταν εἰπωμεν “ζῶον λογικόν,” σύνθετόν τι λέγομεν ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἰδους, ὕλης μὲν τοῦ ζώου, εἰδους δὲ τοῦ λογικοῦ, καὶ ἐτι προστεθὲν τὸ “θνητὸν” σύνθετον: After his summary of the Antisthenean argument that definition is impossible, Michael now expands, explaining that the Antistheneans hold that we “speak” a composite when we list qualities of the human, which is not definition. Here Michael seems to reflect external doctrine, of which the connection to the historical Antisthenes is unclear. He introduces two points, that the utterance is composite (repeating the thrust of

the summary) and that this composite has hylomorphic structure. The second point might come from Aristotle's own conclusion at 1043b30–32. But the terms there are ὕλη and μόρφη, not ὕλη and εἶδος, the terms Aristotle uses at Z.12 1038a5–26, a passage Michael (p. 519.35–36) had trouble accepting: ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν λύσις, ἣν, ὡς εἵπομεν, ἐπάξει μὲν, οὐ δοκεῖ δέ, αὕτη ἐστίν (But the solution, which, as we have said, he will introduce, but which does not seem [to be correct], is this one). The first point, a problem with composition that is related to material composition, seems to have a definite Skeptical history. When Sextus Empiricus discusses the impossibility of defining the human (*Adv. math.* 7.269–82), he cites some from the “dogmatic school,” presumably the Stoics, who defend the definition of man as “rational mortal animal” by appealing to “the composite understood as a whole,” not a partitionable string like a list of body parts. He notes, in part (7.277): ὡς γὰρ χεὶρ κατ' ἰδίαν οὐκ ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ κεφαλὴ, οὐδὲ πούς, οὐδὲ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξ αὐτῶν σύνθετον ὅλον νοεῖται, οὕτω καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὔτε ζῶον ἐστι ψιλῶς οὔτε λογικὸν κατ' ἰδίαν οὔτε θνητὸν κατὰ περιγραφὴν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξ ἀπάντων ἄθροισμα, τουτέστι ζῶον ἅμα καὶ θνητὸν καὶ λογικόν (For just as a hand by itself is not a human, or a head or a foot or anything else of this sort, but the composite from these is understood as a whole, in the same way also the man is not an animal merely, nor rational in itself, nor mortal individually, but the collection from all, that is, an animal and at the same time also mortal and rational). The Skeptical opponents who have challenged the Dogmatists here hold the same kind of position Michael attributes to the Antistheneans, that a definition with parts can be dissected just like a material body. It seems likely that Michael fills in the Antistheneans' objection from this background debate. Whether this background debate was inspired by the Antistheneans, through the Skeptics, is the further question.

(4) ἐπειδὴ γὰρ δέδεικται ὅτι τὸ “ζῶον πεζὸν δίπουν” τοῦ εἶδους ἐστὶ μέρη, οὐ τῆς ὕλης: Michael must be referring to a demonstration in Z.14 (1039b4–6), where Aristotle uses this example, the two-footed animal, to show that the Platonic Forms cannot be compatible with definition by division, unless the Forms “perhaps lie together and touch and are mixed” (ἀλλ' ἴσως σύγκειται καὶ ἅπτεται ἢ μέμικται). Michael seems to think that Aristotle accepts this solution, although Aristotle appears to reject it: “but all these are strange” (ἀλλὰ πάντα ἄτοπα). In Z.11 (1036a24–b7), Aristotle has argued that parts of matter do not occur in definitions.

πῶς ἐστὶ δυνατόν λέγειν ὅτι τὸ “ζῶον” ἐστὶν ὕλη τὸ δὲ “λογικόν” εἶδος: Taking “matter” literally, Michael flatly rejects the hylomorphic analysis of definition. He does not associate this analysis with preserving the unity in definition, which the Antistheneans, according to §2–3, supposedly deny. Michael does acknowledge Aristotle's own analysis of genus and

differentia as, analogically, matter and form: in his previous discussion of Aristotle's adoption of hylomorphic analysis in Z.12, he cited a text he calls "the Demonstrative Art" (Hayduck suggested *Post. An.* 2.13 97a28–38) for an analogical use of the term ὕλη to name the set of differentiae up to the terminal one, plus the genus (πᾶσαι αἱ πρὸ τῆς τελευταίας διαφορᾶς διαφοραὶ μετὰ τοῦ γένους ὕλης ἀναλογοῦσιν, p. 519.27–28). (The hylomorphic analogy is not in the *Analytics*, which features only a discussion of properly ordering the differentiae.) Here he attributes the hylomorphic analysis not at all to Aristotle but to the Antistheneans. In case Michael does, nevertheless, preserve historically correct information about the Antistheneans here, this would have to be related to their intuition that a human is only potentially logical or potentially rational and needs education to develop knowledge. (See t. 41A title 2.1.) Being a human animal might be the "material" substrate for being a rational human, and rationality could be the "formal" extra addition needed to comprise the rational human. If there is any historical truth to this, Michael might know about a debate between Aristotle and the Antistheneans over what counts as a biological differentia and what hierarchy governs the domain of animals. (For hints in this direction, albeit dim, see t. 152C.2 notes.)

(5) οὐκ ἔστιν οὖν, φασίν, ὀρίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ ὅποιον μὲν ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος ἢ βοῦς ἐνδέχεται διδάξαι, ὀρίσασθαι δὲ οὐ: Michael differentiates absolutely between a definition and a statement of quality, adding the biological examples beyond the example of silver Aristotle gave. Compare t. 151B. Jaeger follows this text in supplementing his text of Aristotle at 1043b27.

(6) ὥστε, φασί, λόγον μὲν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν οὐσίας συνθέτου τῆς ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἶδους, εἶδους δὲ ὅρον ἢ ὕλης ἐξ ᾧ ἡ σύνθετός ἐστιν οὐσία οὐκ ἔστιν ἀποδοῦναι: Michael paraphrases Aristotle 1043b28–32 and assumes that this text reports the Antistheneans' view. This is not simply Aristotle's view (see t. 150A.5 notes), but it might be an interpretation of the Antistheneans' view within the terms of Aristotle's hylomorphic analysis.

(7) προσέθηκε τὸ "ἐάν τε αἰσθητῆς ἐάν τε νοητῆς": Michael now attributes the statement in 1043b28–32 to Aristotle and explains what these respective composites are according to Aristotle's doctrine. His account of the circle reverses matter and form: the shape should be the matter, and the radius should be the form. (See Ross 1924 v.2:233.)

(8) οὐχ ὡς ἀρεσκόμενος δὲ καὶ τὰ μαθηματικὰ οὐσίας εἶπεν, ἀλλ' ἴσως καὶ τοῦτο τῶν Ἀντισθενείων λεγόντων εἴρηκεν αὐτὰ οὐσίας: Michael assumes that "noetic compounds" are mathematical objects, which Aristotle does not think are substances. He is clear that he is only surmising that it must be the Antistheneans who held that mathematical objects are substances, since Aristotle did not.

151A. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.3 (Marcovich)

= 45 DC

[= Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 107.5–6 Walz]

πρῶτός τε ὤρισατο λόγον εἰπών, “Λόγος ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἐστὶ δηλῶν.”
 ἦν om. F | ἦ codd. plur. et superscriptum F² : ἦ sive ἦ Casaubon | ἦ
 ἐστὶ scripsi : ἦ ἐστὶ edd. plur. | ἐστὶ <ἦ ἐσται> Radermacher

And he [Antisthenes] was the first to define *logos* [account], by saying,
 “*Logos* [account] is the [formulation] revealing the ‘what it was or is.’”

Context of Preservation

This statement, ostensibly a quotation, is the first information Diogenes Laertius provides about Antisthenes’ views after the narrative of his conversion to Socraticism. The fuller doxography (Diog. Laert. 6.11–13 = t. 134), attributed in part to the Hellenistic Stoic Diocles of Magnesia, includes only negative statements about *logos* and presents only ethical doctrine in the positive. Diogenes has collected this definition of *logos* from a different source, which could be Peripatetic, since it is phrased as a “first discoverer” story (see also t. 22A; Kleingünther 1934; Burnyeat 1970:116) and since Alexander of Aphrodisias preserves a parallel (t. 151B). Alexander, however, might have a Stoic source. Some have posited that Diogenes cites directly from Antisthenes’ text *Truth*, because this text is named in the preceding section (t. 11A; Brancacci 1990:26 rejects this proposal); Dümmmler 1881:51–4 thought of *On Belief and Knowledge* (t. 41A title 7.4), since being able to give a *logos* is the criterion for this distinction in Pl. *Theaet.* 202c7–8.

Importance of the Testimonium

The testimonium, whose authenticity is reinforced by t. 151B, is central evidence for Antisthenes’ views on *logos* and, by some accounts, *oikeios logos*, which, in turn, is the groundwork for the thesis against gainsaying (t. 148, 152–56). In t. 151B, Alexander of Aphrodisias understands Antisthenes’ account of *logos* as a precursor to Aristotle’s definition of “definition” (ἐστὶ δὲ ὁρος μὲν λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνων). However, if this account defines definition by relating it to essence (on the assumption that τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἐστὶ is the formulation for a statement of essence), it seems to conflict directly with the testimony of Aristotle (t. 150A), that it is impossible to define the essence (οὐκ ἐστὶ τὸ τί ἐστὶν ὀρίσασθαι). One of two conclusions is implied: either δηλοῦν (reveal) and ὀρίσασθαι (define) cannot be identical (a point developed in Centre de Recherche Philologique, Lille 1986:125–26), with the result that the *logos* in question here is not definition (see Giannantoni 1990

v.4:372 for a range of translations of λόγος along this line); or the imperfect verb tense (or the double verb) is more powerful than the simple present tense for specifying the definiendum and is essential for the project of definition. (The second possibility is attractive in light of Aristotle's own adoption of the imperfect tense, but it does not square easily with t. 151B.) When supplemented by t. 151B, where Alexander discerns a plurality of *logoi* for every one thing, under Antisthenes' (deficient) view, this definition of *logos* seems to conflict directly with t. 152A, where the *oikeios logos* is rigorously singular for each thing. The resolution of these contradictions must be related to Antisthenes' interest in the individual particular thing, which might be the base implied for the "proper" account, the account proper just to it and not appealing in a simple way to classification or universals, which are required in real definitions (according to Aristotle in *Met. Z.11* 1036a27–29 and more strongly by the Platonists). Other ways have been proposed to resolve this apparent contradiction in the evidence for Antisthenes: (1) t. 150A says not that definition of essence overall is impossible but only that definitions of specifically Platonic "essence" are impossible (Brancacci 1990:232–40); (2) t. 150A says that definition of essence is impossible but that (nearly) equivalent elucidation is possible (Burnyeat 1970; Döring 1985); (3) t. 151A is a conditional or hypothetical statement of what rigorous, technical *logos* tries but fails to do (Levi 1930:242; Burnyeat 1970:116–17); (4) t. 151A is about rigorous, technical *logos* but is meant polemically against other Socratics, especially Plato, and need mean nothing philosophically serious in itself (Döring 1985, 1999). Option 2 for t. 150A is often joined with option 3 or 4 for t. 151A. While a distinction between definition and *logos*, together with a focus in t. 152A on the particular (which cannot even be defined under most conceptions of definition), seems to be the best option for making sense of the evidence, it is important to stress that Antisthenes' *logos* was surely different from ordinary language and had a technical sense. The account of *logos* as quoted by Diogenes Laertius and presumably as formulated by Antisthenes states the function of *logos*, and functional accounts might have been a form Antisthenes favored, as close to definition. (See t. 13A note on ποῖά ἐστιν ἔργα τοῦ μαστροποῦ.) The comparison between silver and tin that Aristotle gives as an example of the Antisthenians' closest approximation to definition (t. 150A.4) does not square obviously with the hypothesis that Antisthenes privileged functional definitions. But according to t. 151B, true statements "in all the categories" might have equal value as core *logoi* for Antisthenes, which could mean that comparisons would count equally with statements of function.

Notes

πρῶτός τε ὥρίσατο λόγον: Whether or not Antisthenes was literally the first to posit a definition for *logos*, it is clear that the sense of the term in its relationship to knowledge was under negotiation in the decades when Antisthenes was active, the 390s to the 360s. It is also clear that the pairing of λόγος and πρᾶγμα is important to his paradox against gainsaying (t. 152–53, 156; see also t. 53.1), and it would be plausible that his “definition” of *logos*, as the tradition characterized it, should be related to the paradox. Although *logos* was a privileged term in the realm of wisdom since Heraclitus (DK 22B1,3), the Socratic successors tried to refine its sense. Pl. *Theaet.* 207c7–e5 lays out three possible accounts of *logos* in an attempt to specify what is meant by a definition of knowledge as “true belief with account” (δόξα ἀληθής μετὰ λόγου, 202c8–9), a definition that arises from Socrates’ dream in 201d8–202c6. (The present passage has been associated with this section of *Theaetetus* since at least Dümmler 1881.) *Theaetetus* aside, the demand to “give an account” (διδόναι λόγον) to support a claim or belief is standard in Socratic literature, in Xenophon (e.g., *Oec.* 11; *Cyrop.* 1.4.3) as well as Plato (e.g., *Charm.* 165b3; *Lach.* 187c2; *Phaed.* 76b8). Subsequently, a *logos*, or “defining account,” is a cornerstone in Aristotle’s discussion of ontology and truth. It is, then, plausible that Antisthenes proposed a historically important definition of technical *logos*, as the grounding for knowledge of truth, in the context of Socratic philosophy. In addition, the term is central to Gorgias, Antisthenes’ other alleged teacher (t. 11), who holds a rhetorical view: *logos* is the discourse in circulation in a society, which communicates beliefs from one mind to another (*On Not Being* 980a20–b8 ps.-Arist. *MXG* = §21–22 Buchheim; *Helen* §11–14 Buchheim). It carries falsifying tendencies, because beliefs cannot be cast into the mode of sounds without dissimulation, and it carries capacities for deception, because both it and its practitioners wield significant power that overrides personal rational choice. Antisthenes’ concept of *logos* seems intended to resist this account by Gorgias by anchoring *logos* in ontology (Brancacci 1990:204–14), but it might also reflect Gorgias’ influence, that is, a basic worry about the apprehension and communication of truth amid a public discourse full of distortions. On the senses of the term *logos* in this period, see, further, Kerferd 1982:68–82; from a different perspective, Goldhill 2002:54–59, 96–97. Historically, translations of the present passage, according to Giannantoni’s collection (1990 v.4:372–73), have rendered *logos* as Latin *definitio*, *sermo*, *oratio*; German *Rede*, *Begriff*; English *statement*, *assertion*; Italian *discorso*; and French *concept*. “Sentence” is used in Bobzien 2006. The term is here translated “account,” which should avoid prejudgment on the key questions: whether Antisthenes was dealing in logic or rhetoric and on what scale his articulation and its object was supposed to be understood. (See, further, next note.)

Λόγος ἔστιν: If the ἓν ἐφ' ἑνός (one for one) prescription for *oikeios logos* in t. 152A can be severed, at least temporarily, from this statement about *logos* (as suggested by the plurality of *logoi* that Alexander discerns in t. 151B), one can ask whether the *logos* under consideration here really is meant as definition, despite Alexander's assumption in t. 151B and despite Aristotle's use of the pairing ὅρον καὶ λόγον in t. 150A.5. In consideration of Antisthenes' historical position, this λόγος could be as broad as it is for Gorgias in *Helen* or for Aristotle in *Poet.* 1457a23–30, as long as it can be individuated as the representation of something (τι) and as long as the thing represented is or was (ἦν ἢ ἔστι) something, rendering the account true in the past or present. On the accentuation of this subordinate ἔστι, see next note. On the distinction of time, see next note. That is, λόγος here could range to the scale of “text,” which is definite and has a definite object, as required, but it could not mean “discourse,” which is a mass noun rather than a count noun and is too general to have a definite object. The word λόγος occurs in varied ways in Antisthenes' *Ajax* and *Odysseus* speeches, if these can be compared: in plural form (t. 53 § 1, 7, 8), where it seems to refer to the parts of the speech Ajax is delivering, whether his words or his points in argument; in singular form (t. 53 § 7, twice) in reference to the mode of discourse taken generally; and in singular form (t. 54 § 1, 11; in the title transmitted for t. 53) in reference to the particular whole speech. Also the οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν principle is applied to the scale of the orator's whole speech in t. 53.7, not to the scale of a proposition. In t. 155, albeit in the phrasing of Diogenes Laertius, the term *logos* refers to Antisthenes' famous argument or demonstration of his paradox; in t. 208, albeit in the phrasing of Dio Chrysostom, it refers to the long text Dio claims to quote. If the scale of *logos* in the present testimonium can range as broadly as it does in this other evidence, even the Σωκρατικός λόγος (as Aristotle calls the kind of text that imitates Socrates, *Poet.* 1447b11) might fit. The *oikeios logos* of Socrates is at stake in t. 152A, and one might understand that every genuine *logos* of Socrates is one that reveals who he was or is, even as each revelation is different from the next and, in a sense, reveals a different Socrates. As for the unique *oikeios logos* of simply Socrates, this would have to be his definition (if such were possible) or his proper name. This kind of distinction between *logos* and *oikeios logos* seems to reconcile t. 150A and Alexander's complaint in t. 151B, even though Alexander's focus is logical and grammatical.

τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι: Two controversies have governed the various interpretations of this formulation: the grammatical subject of the clause τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι and the reason for the compound verb. See following notes.

τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι: This formulation recalls the Socratic question τί ἐστι; (What is it?), where the subject, usually a general term, is supplied from context

and where τί is the predicate, whose value is to be determined in the answer to the question (see Giannantoni 1990 v.4:373–74). The whole question, in this extended form used by Antisthenes (τί ἦν ἢ ἐστί;), is rendered a substantive by the neuter article τό, and the long noun phrase is presumably a statement for “essence” or whatever alternative to “essence” Antisthenes recognized (compare Aristotle’s phrase τὸ τί ἐστί; see t. 150A.4 note). The phrase as a whole is the object of the participle δηλῶν (Brancacci 1990:220). One common alternative (represented by the translations into four modern languages listed in Giannantoni 1990 v.4:372–73; compare Kalouche 1999:21) is to understand “a thing,” apparently even the term πρᾶγμα, as subject of the clause; that is, “a statement is that which sets forth what a thing was or is” (Hicks in the Loeb translation). This presupposes that Antisthenes was interested in giving accounts of foregiven individual particulars or even material individual particulars and did not share Socrates’ interest in ethical universals (along with whatever other universals interested Socrates). There is no reason to deny Antisthenes interest in every plausible subject of Socrates’ questions. A second alternative interpretation is that τί is the indefinite or indirect interrogative subject (a shortened version of ὃ τί) of an existential predicate, which would have a different accentuation (ἔστί in place of ἐστί: the former is the accentuation printed in most modern texts), so that the translation would be “*Logos* is the formulation revealing what<ever> is or was” (also represented in the translations reported in Giannantoni 1990 v.4:372–73). This interpretation still understands the clause as a substantive governed by τό but renders τί a subject rather than a predicate. The background in the Socratic question, and Aristotle’s parallel formulation, should imply that τί is a predicate. It remains plausible, nevertheless, that the existential sense is also implied: the differentiation among existential ἔστί (signifying existence), veridical ἔστί (signifying truth), and predicative ἐστί (signifying copulation) is not systematically observed in contemporary texts (see Kahn 1966). This would allow the words of the absent Homer to project “what was” to a present-day reader when the subject matter is not known independently of the account; the same could apply to a writer of a Σωκρατικός λόγος.

ἦν ἢ ἐστί: The expansion of the simple verb in the Socratic question, “is,” to a compound or disjunctive verb, “was or is,” is puzzling, and so is the use of the imperfect tense, which Alexander implies, in t. 151B, is primary over the present tense but also equivalent to it. Aristotle’s formulation for definition, τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, “the what it was to be” uses the imperfect tense only, although Aristotle also refers more casually to the τί ἐστί. Aristotle’s own use of the imperfect is unexplained, and it is possible that this adaptation of the Socratic question is related to the formulation by Antisthenes. (See Hirzel 1882:5 n.1;

Aubenque 1962:466–72.) Commentators have taken three approaches to Diogenes’ disjunctive ἦν ἢ ἔστι. First, the disjunctive is a true disjunctive, distinguishing past time from present time. Future time is explicitly excluded (except on the reading of Radermacher 1951:121, who added the future by emendation). Second, the word ἦ is not a true disjunctive but designates clarification: ἦ means “that is,” and the phrase means “what it was, that is, what it is” (Aubenque 1962:466). Third, the reading ἦ should be emended (following the renaissance scholar Casaubon) to the dative relative pronoun ᾧ, yielding τί ᾧν ᾧ ἔστι, which eliminates the disjunction and adds a relativism or subjectivism like that attributed to Protagoras in, for example, Pl. *Theaet.* 171a7. The phrase then means “in what respect something was in the way that it is.” The third interpretation has found no supporters more recent than G. Kafka in 1921 (see Giannantoni 1990 v.4:372), and because it requires emendation and does not address the difference of verb tense, it can be disregarded. The second interpretation has been nearly unanimous in scholarship since Aubenque’s argument that the first interpretation, with the true temporal disjunction, is linguistically impossible. That judgment can be reconsidered (below), but first the range of the second interpretation should be surveyed. If the ἦ is clarifying, not disjunctive, there is no distinction of time in an ontological sense, but the double verb, as well as the imperfect tense, must be explained. Four explanations can be distinguished: (A) The past and present are continuous, and a statement in language can refer only to something that preexists itself (Aubenque 1962:466–67). Antisthenes is pointing out that essences are either everlasting or eternal: “what it is” is necessarily identical to “what it was,” and this point merits explicit statement. Aristotle’s discussion of unity across time and space in *Met.* Δ.6 1016a32–b1, which Aubenque cites in this connection, uses phrasing similar to Antisthenes’ definition of *logos* (Aubenque (1962:466 n.3), although it is hardly clear that Aristotle follows Antisthenes in this criterion; he could even be arguing against him. This explanation precisely reverses the disjunctive interpretation of ἦ, making Antisthenes agree with Plato against Heraclitus on the question of being and change. (B) The imperfect refers to a historically past time, particularly to the preexistence of the components that now comprise a complex entity (see Caizzi 1964:50–57, esp. 53; the interpretation originated with Hirzel 1882:5 n.1 and was expressed repeatedly in the earlier twentieth century). Ambiguously, the “material” of a thing is both still present in the thing and has perished because the new thing has come to be. (C) An ideal *logos* lists the features that have characterized all known instances of the subject in question up to the present date (Burnyeat 1970:117). This version comes close to a true temporal disjunction, but the instances of “the subject in question” are presumed to be the same thing in a strong sense, and so its

essence is persisting or eternal. (D) The imperfect tense refers to an earlier point in discussion in an implied dialogue, a use of the so-called philosophical imperfect, named from its occurrence in Plato's dialogues, where speakers frequently appeal backward to a point agreed on earlier in the conversation. The definition, as recalled after it has been worked out, "is" what it "was" in the detailed treatment at an earlier time in the discussion (Brancacci 1990:214–17). Giannantoni 1990 v.4:375–6 argues for a similarly dialectical interpretation of the imperfect on the basis of an allegedly dialectical origin for Aristotle's imperfect. Among these interpretations of the clarifying ἦ, B seems least likely, as it relies on an interpretation of t. 150A.5 that is also unlikely (and these interpretations are mutually dependent). Brancacci's argument for interpretation D brings a lot of conjectural reconstruction to the question; Giannantoni's version also depends on a certain hypothesis about Aristotle's imperfect. There is no surviving evidence that Antisthenes developed definitions in dialogical texts (t. 187 is the closest evidence for this, but many uncertainties remain) or that Diogenes' extract is meant to be read in reference to dialogical discussion. Interpretation A, while not obviously wrong, takes a dogmatic stand on the key question, Antisthenes' views on time: if a continuity of time were meant, the formulation could have used καὶ in place of ἦ, namely, τὸ τί ἦν καὶ ἐστὶν (as reads a comparable passage at Pl. *Soph.* 258c2–3). Interpretation C, which, like A, is designed to support a particular interpretation of t. 150A.4, would be more convincing if the embedded question were ποῖόν τι ἦν ἢ ἐστὶ, to match the Antistheneans' preference for statements of ποῖόν τι ἐστὶ over τί ἐστὶ in t. 150A.4. Interpretation of the true temporal disjunctive has also several versions. Aubenque (1962:466 n.3), who originally claimed that ἦ cannot be disjunctive, used linguistic arguments against this reading: a "banal" disjunctive of temporally distinguished predicates, he says, would need to be expressed as ὁ τί ἦν ἢ ἐστὶ rather than as ὁ τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἐστὶ, whereas a disjunctive question about particular individual subjects that have existed at different times would need to be articulated as two questions, τὸ τί ἦν ἢ τὸ τί ἐστὶ. But this is to assume that Antisthenes' Greek must be normal by some presupposed criterion. Aristotle's own phrase τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι is linguistically awkward. Of the disjunctive interpretations, the following can be distinguished: (A) The compound verb should be applied respectively to each subject, depending on whether the subject presently exists or once used to exist but no longer does. The point is that *logos* can reveal entities both past and present, those that used to exist, such as Centaurs, and those that now exist. See Zeller 1888:292 n.3; an earlier interpretation by Zeller, published in the second edition of his history of philosophy but reduced in the later revisions, developed the point that the imperfective aspect of the verbs connoted endurance and stability.

Homer's *logos*, for example, reveals what was, and a present speaker's *logos* reveals what is. (Insofar as the object was or is Odysseus, Antisthenes might exploit the irony in t. 54.14.) Socrates, after his death, might be the subject for the question "What was he?" rather than for the question "What is he?" Or the question might be intentionally open. (See, similarly, Döring 1985:231–32, 1998:273.) (B) On the assumption that the subject is common to both verbs at once, the compound verb recognizes the possibility of change and, indeed, gives privilege to this possibility, without assuming that anything is ever still, as Heraclitus supposed. A particular temporal location is always a component in determining the object of *logos*, which would be not essence in Plato's sense but more like his "becoming." The past and present are specified, whereas the future is excluded, because the future cannot be revealed. Experience is the source of knowledge, which is required for *logos*, and experience is located in the past or present but not in the future. (The last point—though not, explicitly, the rest—is posited in Centre de Recherche Philologique, Lille 1986:126.) On the question of Antisthenes' affiliations to Heraclitus, see t. 159D. Interpretation A seems superior to B because of the background in the Socratic question: each subject of being seems to be attributed a single temporal situation, not a changing one. But the very differentiation of time, with or without affiliation to Heraclitean flux, might amount to a significant difference from Plato's conception of essence. Interpretation A has seemed too "banal" to explain the preservation of this "first discovery" in the historical record (so, e.g., Aubenque 1962:433 n.3), but if its goal were resistance to Plato's more technical new position on *logos*, this could make sense of the tradition Diogenes inherits. At the same time, it seems that there must be some serious connection to Aristotle's formulation τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, with its shared use of the imperfect tense. This connection might be most plausible if Antisthenes successfully pointed to duration in time (in distinction from eternity) as a dimension in essence—that is, to a concept such as continuity or slow flux in distinction from rapid flux, by the standard of human perception or human maturation and life span—but failed or refused to distinguish what is essential to a thing from its many real (and sometimes accidental) attributes, just as Alexander complains in t. 151B.

δηλῶν: The relationship between a *logos* and its object is identified by the possibly naive, possibly polemical verb δηλοῦν, "to show, reveal." This verb should mark a naturalist conception of language, as reflected in its use in Plato's *Cratylus* and *Gorgias' On Not Being*. There it connotes a direct, seamless relationship between the linguistic marker and its object, which is apparently independent of particular human minds and their intentions. This relationship seems to be a combination of successful reference and true

illumination of the essence of the object. In the opposing conventionalist theory in *Cratylus* and in Aristotle (*De interp.* 16a19, 16b26), the term δηλοῦν is replaced with the term σημαίνειν, “signify,” which implies that linguistic markers are signs for meaning, generated by human minds. Meaningful signs need not have real references—“the goat-stag” signifies, according to Aristotle (*De interp.* 16a16–17), but must only communicate the information demanded by the situation, not refer to a real thing. Antisthenes, too, uses the term σημαίνειν, “signify,” for the relation between language and its object, and it seems to carry the main load in the description in t. 153B of what a speaker does when he speaks. Whether δηλοῦν and σημαίνειν are synonyms or distinct terms in Antisthenes’ view is not clear. Like δηλοῦν in the present case, Antisthenes’ use of the verb σημαίνειν can take as its agent a linguistic item rather than a human being: see t. 187.4 note on τὸ μὲν τι σημαίνει. In Gorgias’ *On Not Being*, the possibility that *logos* can reveal, as a medium in itself, is presented as ridiculous because of the modal difference between seeing shapes and colors, which are revealed, and understanding *logos*. We do not speak a color, but we speak a *logos* (*On Not Being* 980a20–b8 ps.-Arist. *MXG* = §21–22 Buchheim). In Plato’s *Cratylus*, by contrast, δηλοῦν is the verb used consistently (e.g., 418b6, 418c8) to express a relationship between objects, thought, and natural names, which do cross these modal boundaries and so capture meaning in sounds. In this historical context, Antisthenes must be either endorsing a view of natural language or giving a parody of the debate: the scenarios of the gainsaying paradox (t. 152B.2–4, 152C.6, 153B.2–4) might imply the former; the overall implications of the paradox, together with the situation and claims of Ajax in t. 53 (see notes on §1), might imply the latter. Brancacci 1990:204–14 argues that Antisthenes is squarely opposing Gorgias, asserting that *logos* achieves exactly what Gorgias said it cannot achieve. In this case, the polemic of the present text would be primarily against Gorgias, not Plato. The impersonal use of δηλοῦν, whereby a linguistic item effects revelation as a matter of its own power, is not original in *Cratylus* or Antisthenes’ account of *logos*. Thucydides uses this verb for the communication achieved in both mediums of hearing and seeing: in hearing by a letter, read out by secretary of the Athenian assembly (ὁ δὲ γραμματεὺς ὁ τῆς πόλεως παρελθὼν ἀνέγνω <sc. τὴν ἐπιστολὴν> τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις δηλοῦσαν τοιάδε, 7.10) and in seeing by the written message of a stele (ὁ γραφῆ στήλαι δηλοῦσι, 1.134). Thucydides, too, could be resisting Gorgias, or the contemporary discussion about the revelatory powers of language might have been more widespread.

151B. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Commentary on Aristototle's "Topics"* CAG
2.2 p. 42.8–22 (Wallies)

= 46 DC

“ἔστι δὲ ὅρος μὲν λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνων.”

... (1) ὁ γὰρ ὅρος τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἔστιν ἐκάστω τὸ εἶναι, τοῦτο δηλοῖ, οὐ συμβεβηκός τι οὐδὲ παρεπόμενον ἄλλως. πλείονων γὰρ ὄντων τῶν ὑπαρχόντων ἐκάστω ὁ ὅρος ἀποκρίνων τὰ ἄλλα μόνα δηλοῖ ταῦτα τῶν ὑπαρχόντων οἷς ὀρίζεται, καὶ ἐν οἷς ἔστιν αὐτῷ τὸ εἶναι, καὶ καθ’ ἃ διαφέρουν τῶν ἄλλων ἔστι τοῦτο ὃ εἶναι λέγεται. (2) οὐ μάτην δὲ οὐδὲ ἐκ περιττοῦ τῷ “ἦν” τὸ “εἶναι” πρόσκειται ἀλλ’ ἀναγκαίως. εἰ γὰρ τὸ “ἦν” τὸ “ἔστι” σημαίνει, εἴη ἂν ὁ “λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἦν σημαίνων” ὁ αὐτὸς τῷ “λόγος ὁ τὸ τί ἔστι σημαίνων,” δηλονότι τὸ προκειμένον πρᾶγμα οὐ ἀποδίδεται. ἀλλ’ εἰ τοῦτο, πᾶς ὁ τῶν ἐν τῷ “τί ἔστι” κατηγορουμένων τοῦ προκειμένου ἔχων τι λόγος ὀρισμὸς αὐτοῦ ἔσται. ἐν τῷ “τί ἔστι” δὲ κατηγορεῖται τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ γένη, συνωνύμως γάρ· ὁ ἐν τῷ γένει ἄρα τὸ εἶδος τιθεὶς λόγος εἴη ἂν ὀρισμὸς τοῦ εἶδους, δηλῶν τὸ τί ἔστιν, ὅπερ οὐκ ἀληθές. (3) οὐκ ἄρα αὐταρκες τὸ “ἦν,” ὥς τινες ἡγοῦνται, ὧν δοκεῖ πρῶτος μὲν Ἀντισθένης εἶναι, εἶτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς τινες, ἀλλὰ εὐλόγως τὸ “εἶναι” πρόσκειται.

(1) καὶ primum om. A P | ἐκάστω codd. plur. : ἐκάστου A | τὸ εἶναι om. P | τὸ εἶναι, τοῦτο vel τὸ εἶναι τοῦτο Wallies | post ὁ ὅρος add τὸ εἶναι a : signum defectus ponit P, fort. ad versum superiorem “ἐκάστω τοῦτο” | καθ’ ἃ Wallies : καθ’ ὃ codd. | διαφέρουν D : διάφορον a A B P | τῶν ἄλλων ἔστι a P : ἔστι τῶν ἄλλων A B D | τοῦτο B D : τούτων A : τούτω aP | ὃ εἶναι A B D : ᾧ εἶναι a P (2) τῷ codd. plur. : τῷ ex τὸ corr. D¹ | ἂν codd. plur. : κἂν a P | τὸ τί ἦν σημαίνων codd. plur. : τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι σημαίνων B | ὁ αὐτὸς codd. plur. : ὁ ὁ αὐτὸς B | τῷ “λόγος...” codd. plur. : ὁ τῷ λόγος a | δηλονότι codd. plur. : δηλῶν B | οὐ om. A | αὐτοῦ ἔσται codd. plur. : αὐτοῦ ἔστιν P : ἔστιν αὐτοῦ A | τὸ εἶδος om. B (3) ὧν codd. plur. : ᾧ in ras. P² | πρῶτος μὲν codd. plur. : μὲν om. D

“And the defining account is the one signifying the what it was to be.”

[Aristotle, *Topics* 101b38]

... (1) For the definition reveals this, the being and in what the existence is for each thing, not something accidental or otherwise consequential. For since the attributes belonging to each thing are multiple, the definition excludes the irrelevant ones and reveals only those of the attributes by which the thing is defined, and in which is its existence, and in respect to which this thing which it is said to be is

distinct from other things. (2) And not in vain or superfluously is the “to be” added to the “was,” but necessarily. For if the “was” signifies “is,” the “account signifying the what it was” would be the same as the “account signifying the what it is,” and it is clear that this is the proposed thing for which the account is rendered. But if this is the case, every one among the accounts in the “what is it?” predications of the proposed thing that has any sense will be its definition. And in the [answers to] “what is it” the genres are predicated of the [species] forms, for they share a name. So the account that places a [species] form in its genus would be a definition of the [species] form, by revealing the “what is it,” which is not true. (3) So the “was” [without the “to be”] is not after all sufficient, as some believe, the earliest of whom seems to be Antisthenes, and then some from the Stoa. But with good reason the “to be” is added.

Context of Preservation

Alexander of Aphrodisias was the leader of the Peripatetic School in Athens c. 198–209 CE, active in the time of Commodus (to whom he dedicated a book) and his successor Septimius Severus. His interpretations of Aristotle’s texts were considered authoritative for the remainder of antiquity. (See Sorabji 1990.) Aristotle’s text, near the beginning of the *Topics* (1.5), is from his definitions of terms. Just above (101a25), he has distinguished four components that determine every proposition or problem: a proposition may be about the definition of something (ὅρος), about its particular but nonessential characteristic (ἴδιον), about its genus or class (γένος), and about its accidental attribute (συμβεβηκός). Here he begins his sequential definitions of these components. Alexander’s commentary on the passage, which is copious (his forty-second page discusses the third page in Bekker’s Aristotle), refers to the distinctions Aristotle has drawn, showing how the Aristotelian formulation for a ὅρος maintains the differences from other propositions (those that state a nonessential characteristic or make a classification under genus), whereas rival views fail to do this.

Importance of the Testimonium

This text supports the authenticity of t. 151A and situates Antisthenes’ definition of λόγος in two important contexts, as a background to Aristotle’s definition of ὅρος and as a precedent for some of the Stoics. (Both connections could be Hellenistic constructions: see Brancacci 1990:222–26.) Alexander takes it for granted that Antisthenes was attempting to define “definition,” not some broader kind of λόγος.

Notes

(1) **τοῦτο δηλοῖ**: Although Aristotle uses the term σημαίνειν instead of the older δηλοῦν (see t. 151A notes), Alexander treats them as equivalent.

τῷ ἦν τὸ εἶναι πρόσκειται: Alexander will claim that the addition of “to be” as a reinforcement for the simple copulative “was” is Aristotle’s critical contribution to the previously existing formulation by Antisthenes. This addition ensures that the definition links the thing with its essence, not with any predicate it might hold truly or properly. The second case is not an identity statement but a true predication.

(2) **εἰ γὰρ τὸ ἦν τὸ ἔστι σημαίνει**: Alexander establishes this equivalence earlier in his text (p. 42.1–8). Alexander seems not to know or care about the disjunction τὸ τί ἦν ἢ ἔστι in Antisthenes’ formulation for λόγος (t. 151A). He might know Antisthenes’ formulation through its Stoic reception. Compare his exposition in t. 152B and 153B, where he seems to have fuller knowledge of Antisthenes.

τὸ προκειμένον πᾶγμα οὐ ἀποδίδεται: What Alexander takes as a simple fact, the reference of the ὅρος to an already given πᾶγμα, might not be so simple for Antisthenes: see t. 152B.4, 152C.6. In one version of the gainsaying paradox in t. 153B.2–5, however, there is a fixed foregiven πᾶγμα.

τῶν ἐν τῷ “τί ἐστι” κατηγορουμένων τοῦ προκειμένου: This must refer to propositions in all ten of Aristotle’s categories. On the possibility that ποῖός ἐστι is Antisthenes’ favored substitution for τί ἐστιν, see t. 150A.4.

ἔχων τι: On the use of τι for “sense,” compare t. 187.4, 153B.4–5. It seems that Alexander must mean “having some truth,” not “having some sense.” This seems to be a broader criterion for “definition” than the Stoics (to be mentioned in §3) would hold. Brancacci 1990:224–25 argues that this passage by Alexander is disputing primarily Stoic definition under Chrysippus, whose trademark is to list each “proper quality” (ἰδία ποιότης) of the definiendum instead of using the form of genus and differentiae favored by the Platonists. Antisthenes, like the Stoics, rejected definition by genus and differentiae, but he also did not advocate for a heap-like aggregation of proper qualities, no one of which alone captures essence. Thus, according to Brancacci, the target of Alexander’s attack is not Antisthenes himself but only the Stoic reception of Antisthenes’ non-Platonic approach to definition. However, this very loose criterion ἔχων τι, which makes no appeal to the ἰδία ποιότης, suggests that Alexander might indeed make reference to Antisthenes separately from the Stoics.

κατηγορεῖται τῶν εἰδῶν τὰ γένη: This is an additional use of the copulative “is” beyond Aristotle’s ten categories, the assignment of a universal form into its class.

ὁ ἐν τῷ γένει ἄρα τὸ εἶδος τιθεῖς: In t. 149A, Antisthenes is said to hold that both εἶδη and γένη are constructs of thought. Here, either that is irrelevant, with definitions being similar whether εἶδη and γένη are real or constructed, or the “form” under consideration is an individual form, the form of an individual thing in Aristotle’s immanent sense, whose reality Antisthenes probably did not contest.

(3) οὐκ ἄρα αὐταρκες τὸ “ἦν”: Alexander uses the adjective αὐταρκες in a similarly analytical sense twenty-one times in his commentary on the *Topics* and often in his commentary on the *Analytics* and elsewhere: this is normal vocabulary. Even so, he could be taking the opportunity to exploit the terminology for the Cynic and Stoic virtue of αὐτάρκεια.

εἶτα δὲ καὶ τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς τινες: Alexander studied under two Stoic teachers before becoming a Peripatetic. These Stoics who share a fault with Antisthenes, by defining “definition” so that it does not distinguish between essential identity statements and other kinds of predication, might be all those who preceded Antipater of Tarsus (died c. 130/29 BCE), who revised the Stoic account of definition beyond what Chrysippus had proposed two generations earlier. Possibly some later Stoics continued to follow Chrysippus rather than Antipater. Alexander treats Antipater’s definition of “definition” next in his discussion (p. 42.27–43.8 = Long and Sedley fr. 32E = fr. 228 SVF II.75) and claims that it is no improvement, however, over that of Chrysippus. (Neither Stoic is named by Alexander, but the same definitions of “definition” are attributed to Antipater and Chrysippus at Diog. Laert. 7.60.) Alexander finds Aristotle’s definition to be superior to both the older and younger Stoic attempts. (See discussion of Antipater’s and Chrysippus’ accounts of definition in Long and Sedley 1987 v.1:194.)

152–56. Antisthenes’ Denial of Gainsaying and False Statement

152A. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Δ.29 1024b26–34 (Jaeger)

= 47A DC

λόγος δὲ ψευδὴς ὁ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, ἢ ψευδής, διὸ πᾶς λόγος ψευδὴς ἐτέρου ἢ οὐ ἐστὶν ἀληθής, οἷον ὁ τοῦ κύκλου ψευδὴς τριγώνου. ἐκάστου δὲ λόγος ἔστι μὲν ὡς εἰς ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἔστι δ’ ὡς πολλοί, ἐπεὶ ταῦτό πως αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτὸ πεπονθός, οἷον Σωκράτης καὶ Σωκράτης μουσικός. ὁ δὲ ψευδὴς λόγος οὐθενός ἐστιν ἀπλῶς λόγος· διὸ Ἀντισθένης ᾤετο εὐήθως μὴ ἐν ἀξιώσει λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ, ἐν ἐφ’ ἐνός· ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, σχεδὸν δὲ μὴδὲ ψεύδεσθαι. ἔστι δ’ ἕκαστον λέγειν οὐ μόνον τῷ αὐτοῦ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ

τῷ ἑτέρου, ψευδῶς μὲν καὶ παντελῶς, ἔστι δ' ὡς καὶ ἀληθῶς, ὥσπερ τὰ
ὁκτῶ διπλάσια τῷ τῆς δυνάδος λόγῳ.

utrum ἢ an ἢ dubitat Al^p | οὐθενός ἐστιν ἀπλῶς λόγος codd. :
λόγος om. Al^c | ἔν ἐφ' ἐνός codd. : fort. ἐνὶ ἐφ' ἐνός

And a false account is an account of things that are not, by virtue of which it is false, and for this reason every account is false of a thing other than that of which it is true. For example, the account of the circle is false of the triangle. And for each thing there is in a sense one account, that of the “what it was to be,” but in a sense many, since the thing itself and the thing qualified are in a certain way the same: for example, Socrates and musical Socrates. But the false account is the account, in the absolute sense, of nothing. For this reason Antisthenes was thinking in a silly fashion when he deemed nothing to be said [validly] except by its proper account, one for one. From these [tenets] it resulted that it is not possible to gainsay, and scarcely even to speak falsehood. But it is possible to say each thing not only by its own account but also by that of another thing, falsely for sure, but it is possible to do so also truthfully, just as one can say that eight is double by [speaking] the account of two.

Context of Preservation

This passage is the second section of a three-part definition of “false” in Aristotle’s philosophical lexicon, the fifth book (Δ) of the modern *Metaphysics*. Aristotle distinguishes three applications for “false”: the false thing (πρᾶγμα), the false account (λόγος), and the false person (ἄνθρωπος). This treatment is odd, as the commentators note (e.g., Asclepius in CAG v.6 p. 352.19–25, previous to t. 152C): normally for Aristotle (e.g., *De interp.* 16a9–16; *Cat.* 21a10), “false” is applied to linguistic terms and assesses the relationship between a subject and a predicate as it is measured against the way things really are. “Falsity” does not normally pertain to a thing in itself or an account in itself, in isolation from the other. Also, Plato’s Socrates (*Crat.* 385b7–8) assigns the descriptions “true” and “false” to agreement between what is said and how things are. In *Pl. Rep.* 2 382a1–383a5, however, Socrates, speaking of theology, does distinguish between “falsity” in word (ἐν λόγῳ) and “falsity” in deed (ἐν ἔργῳ). Aristotle’s discussion of “false things” in the first division of Δ.29 (1024b16–26) covers first (1024b17–21) what seems to be falsity in his more normal sense, as elucidated by the examples “the diameter is commensurable,” which is always false, or “you are sitting,” which is presently false, and then goes on (1024b21–24) to highlight dreams and other nonrepresentational images as another sort of “false things,” because they can

cause apprehension of what does not exist or of what is not such as it appears to be, that is, those things that produce “appearance” (φαντασίαν, 1024b24). Because incorrect correspondences between accounts and states of affairs have already been treated in the first division (1024b17–21), one might expect the discussion of “false account” in the second division to treat something else. As it turns out, Aristotle’s discussion of the “false account” also begins from the match or mismatch between accounts and referents or things (1024b26–28). But the second section then moves to a second point that might be parallel to the dreams and illusions, that is, the notion of an absolutely false account, not an account applied to the wrong object, but an “account, in the absolute sense, of nothing.” This seems to be the only kind of false account Antisthenes recognizes, although he might consider it noise or nothing rather than a “false account,” whereas for Aristotle, falsity is mismatch between any account and its referent. On the differences between Antisthenes and Aristotle reflected in this passage, see further Wolff 1999.

Importance of the Testimonium

This passage has served as the foundation for reconstructions of Antisthenes’ views on language, logic, and epistemology in many studies (e.g., Gillespie 1913, 1914; Festugière 1932; Burnyeat 1990:164–73; see Giannantoni 1990 v.4:377–80). The position Antisthenes is thought to hold can be called the “theory of unique enunciation” (Kalouche 1999:12). Such studies normally emphasize that Antisthenes’ views were built around some type of positivist, foundational individuation or atomism. This passage is also the basic evidence for the possibility that Antisthenes used *oikeios logos* as his own technical term. (See Brancacci 1990, 2001.) Most reconstructions that do not start from this passage begin from the other Aristotelian evidence, *Met.* 1034b4–32 (t. 150A), and an emphasis on individuating at the basic level can be found there also, especially if Plato’s *Theaetetus* is used to support interpretation. But the whole of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* is about the nature of basic individuals, and he assesses Antisthenes’ views within the framework of his study. It seems clear that Antisthenes shared interest in individuality, especially that of the person (see esp. t. 82, also t. 53–54). Individuation in thought is important in the line of communication from speaker to audience member in a mass setting (t. 187.11–12). But the kind of analysis into fundamental parts that scholars attribute to Antisthenes on the basis of Aristotle’s two testimonia is not matched in any other reports of his views. Most of Antisthenes’ written works did not dwell on individuation, and they used language in natural ways, not as an atomized code.

The testimonium as excerpted here retains two sentences omitted in most modern treatments, although not excluded from relevance to Antisthenes

by the late antique commentators (t. 152B–D). First, modern treatments tend to overlook Aristotle's reference to the purely false account, that is, an "account, in the absolute sense, of nothing," which Ross (followed by Jaeger and subsequent editors) punctuated in parentheses as an aside. They assume that Antisthenes' views address the most basic *logoi* in their relation to either the names of given definienda or the definienda themselves, not the most basic identifying formulas in relation to whatever could exist, something versus nothing; that is, Aristotle's point that the circle has one primary *logos* true of it and it alone is taken as the model for Antisthenes' theory of a one-to-one correspondence between every linguistic thing and its object. The alternative, that the theory might have been devised to include or even favor cases where the definiendum is not given in advance but is instead implied by the *logos* insofar as this *logos* is meaningful and true (by some criterion other than this kind of matching), should also be considered, both because Aristotle's inferential conjunction διό connects Antisthenes' point closely with the sentence about absolute falsity and because the late antique commentators' expositions of the οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν paradox imply that a problem about absolute falsity motivated Antisthenes' paradox. Second, most scholarly treatments omit Aristotle's concluding numerical example, which indicates a difference between the way Aristotle and Antisthenes saw the relationship between numbers and their verbal accounts.

Notes

λόγος: This term cannot mean "definition," because one of Aristotle's main points is that there are multiple *logoi* for every one thing, beyond the account of the essence, such as the *logoi* of Socrates and musical Socrates, both of which hold for the ontologically unique Socrates. λόγος must have a broader meaning, but still with the precise, technical sense appropriate to philosophical knowledge: "formulation" (Festugière 1932) or "account" (Ross 1924) or "formula" (Gillespie 1913). (See also t. 151A.) Although the discussion is about the *logos* and the possibility or impossibility of the false *logos*, no example of an Aristotelian or Academic *logos* is given in the passage, unless in the final case of eight. (The ancient commentators add examples.) In Antisthenes' view, it seems that the locutions "Socrates" and "musical Socrates" themselves count as *logoi*, that is, two different *logoi* for two different things. (See, differently, Denyer 1991:28, who proposes that "rational animal" would be the *logos* of Socrates. This dispute, over whether *logos* is being sought for the real individual Socrates or for the linguistic term "Socrates," goes back to Thomas Aquinas: see Brancacci 1990:242 n.33 and Romeyer Dherbey 1991:174–76. Because Aristotle's whole passage is structured in terms of λόγος and πᾶγμα, I agree with Romeyer Dherbey in his argument that the

real individual Socrates, not the word “Socrates,” is meant as the basis for *logos* here.) Although names are simply not *logoî*, names could be abbreviations or placeholders for the *logoî* that are implied, especially if stating a precise, unified, and sufficiently illuminating *logos* is impossible in any other way, as it would be for the individual Socrates. (See also Rankin 1986:40–42.)

ἐκάστου: The noun implied behind “each” is articulated neither here nor elsewhere in the passage: the “thing” that is the object of λόγος is called, sequentially, ἑτέρου, ἐκάστου, ταυτό, αὐτό, οὐθένος, μηθέν, ἐνός, ἑκαστον, αὐτοῦ, and ἑτέρου. Since Aristotle’s treatment of falsity is divided into sections on the false πρᾶγμα (thing), the false λόγος (account), and the false ἄνθρωπος (person), we should assume that the elided noun is πρᾶγμα. It is nevertheless notable that Aristotle offers no noun throughout the section. Examples are given: the circle, the square, Socrates, musical Socrates, the eight, and the two; and whatever these “things” have in common must be the kind of “thing” Antisthenes’ theory addressed. It may be significant that all are unique individuals, not kinds of thing, such as a horse or a human. In the speech of Ajax, where the pairing of λόγος and πρᾶγμα is preserved in Antisthenes’ own formulation (t. 54.1), the “things” in dispute are actions in the Trojan War, the literal nominalization of τὰ πεπραγμένα, which are also called “deeds,” ἔργα (§1, 7). On the forensic origin of the eventually ontological term πρᾶγμα, see Hadot 1980 (citing older scholarship): in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, as Hadot shows, πρᾶγμα had a strong rhetorical sense, to name the object of speech that grounded its truth, whatever the scale of the speech (from word to proposition to narrative) and whatever the kind of thing the speech might be about (from tangible object to concept to event). This “thing,” by Hadot’s account, seems to be continuous with the Stoic concept of the λεκτόν, or “thing said,” because the terms πρᾶγμα and λεκτόν are equivalent in reports of the Stoic definition of the proposition (Hadot 1980:314, citing Gellius 16.8.1 and Diog. Laert. 7.65). For the Stoics, the λεκτόν is an intermediate level between the speech itself, which is material, and the referent of the speech, which is also material. At the same time, the sense of πρᾶγμα as the simple, foregiven, external object of speech is clearly established in Plato’s *Cratylus* (e.g., 420c2, 432c6), where the pair ὄνομα-πρᾶγμα is at the heart of the discussion of names; in *Theaetetus* (e.g., 177e1); and in the *Sophist* (e.g., 244d3), although that text, like Aristotle’s present text, uses pronouns or the formulations “what is” (τὸ ὄν) or “one” (ἓν) in passages where πρᾶγμα seems to be implied. In Aristotle’s *Categories*, the basic pairing is λόγος-πρᾶγμα. Although this very objective sense of πρᾶγμα was becoming standard in the time Antisthenes was working, it is nevertheless plausible that, in the wake of Gorgias and the Eleatics and without deference to Plato and Aristotle, Antisthenes conceived of πρᾶγμα in a sense that fits into the rhetorical tradition that Hadot sketches. First,

it is plausible that he understood the term in its etymological sense as the substantive hypostasized, as it were, from a course of events: this is its sense in Ajax' speech, and there is no other usage in Antisthenes' surviving remains other than in the discussion of the οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν paradox. Second, if the core case of the πρᾶγμα for Antisthenes is a construction in forensic language abstracted from the course of human events, it is plausible that this subsists as the object of language in a manner different from the determinate external referent of the language, namely, what happened in a material sense: that is, it might subsist in the mind. By this understanding, Antisthenes' πρᾶγμα could be continuous with the Stoic λεκτόν, at a level between the linguistic utterance and the material object. The ancient commentators imply that Antisthenes' general term for the grounding of correct λόγος, when he used one, was indeed πρᾶγμα, but there is variation. Alexander (t. 152B.2) initially supplies τὸ ὄν as the object implied in Antisthenes' paradox (ἐκαστον τῶν ὄντων); when he comes to discussion of the οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν paradox (t. 152B.3–4), he uses the formulations περὶ τοῦ πράγματος and περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος. In his other discussion (t. 153B.2–5), he refers five times to τὸν λόγον τοῦ πράγματος. Asclepius supplies ἐπὶ τινος εἶδους in his initial discussion (t. 152C.1), then uses αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα (§ 4) and κατὰ διαφόρων πραγμάτων and περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος (§ 6). His second discussion (t. 152D.2) uses ἡ οὐσία alongside ἐκάστου τοῦ πράγματος. Aristotle's neglect to use any substantive whatsoever in this passage suggests that Antisthenes' view of the object of λόγος was either unclear or not on Aristotle's own standard. λόγος ἔστι μὲν ὡς εἰς ὃ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι, ἔστι δ' ὡς πολλοί: Aristotle proceeds from his preliminary point—that every λόγος can be false, when it is misapplied to something other than its proper referent—to the question of unique correspondence between the λόγος and the thing, first by considering multiple λόγοι for one thing and next by considering, very briefly, the λόγος about nothing. The passage does not consider the single λόγος with multiple objects. (Possibly Antisthenes' discussions in t. 187.3–4 and 189 are related to this point.) Aristotle's view is that each thing has a unique primary λόγος, its essential or definitional λόγος (ὁ τοῦ τί ἦν εἶναι), but the same thing also has many other true accounts. As for Antisthenes, in *Met.* H.3 1043b25 (t. 150A.4), it is the definition of essence that the Antistheneans declare impossible (οὐκ ἔστι τὸ τί ἐστιν ὀρίσασθαι), whereas at least some qualitative statements are possible (ποιον μὲν τί ἐστιν ἐνδέχεται [ἀποδείξαι *vel sim.*]); for the equivalence between Antisthenes' τὸ τί ἐστιν and Aristotle's τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, see t. 151A–B. In t. 151B, Antisthenes' conception of λόγος is said to capture true statements in all the categories, not just essence. On the basis of t. 150A and 151B, then, one might expect the λόγος Antisthenes recognizes to have more resemblance to Aristotle's

second, larger class in the present passage (the range of many λόγοι that give various true accounts of a thing through reference to its qualities) than the first (the singular λόγος of substance alone). In conflict with this expectation, however, a one-to-one relationship will hold somehow. The solution to this conflict must be in the nature of the “one,” on either or both sides of the “one to one,” that Antisthenes recognizes: plausibly, each is particular to the fullest degree. (Not all interpretations follow this logic: contrast Brancacci 1990, interpreting t. 150A to allow ontological definition [228–40, esp. 233] and understanding t. 151B to be uninformative, directed primarily against the later Stoics who have developed Antisthenes’ interest in defining through proper quality [224–26].)

ἐπεὶ ταὐτό πως αὐτὸ καὶ αὐτὸ πεπονθός: Aristotle refers to his doctrine in the *Categories*, whereby entities in the category of substance are ontologically prior to qualities. A substance and a substance plus a quality are the same substance, and this identity of substance counts as identity. Aristotle qualifies here with πως in acknowledgment that there could be puzzles about how these entities are identical. In *Met.* Γ.2 1004b1–2, he says that it is the job of the philosopher to inquire whether Socrates and Socrates seated are the same thing; in *Met.* E.2 1026b15–21, however, he says that it is for the Sophist to ask whether Coriscus and musical Coriscus are the same thing, since the accidental unity is obvious. (See also t. 158.) Aristotle’s overall position in the present passage upholds the doctrine of the *Categories*, that accidental quality is not a difference that matters in the correct account, or *logos*, of the entity. But Antisthenes could plausibly take the position Aristotle assigns to the Sophists. Such a position need not be equivalent to “sophistry” in all the senses that Plato and Aristotle attribute; it amounts merely to denial of Aristotle’s doctrine of Substance as a kind of being prior to quality.

οἶον Σωκράτης καὶ Σωκράτης μουσικός: The example of Socrates versus Socrates qualified is used often by Aristotle, especially in *Met.* Δ. By Aristotle’s account, musical Socrates is an accidental unity of substance plus a quality and is the same ontological being as Socrates. *Met.* Z.4 and Z.5 establish, in detail, the secondary status of non-substantial properties; see also *Topics* 103a30–39, where Aristotle explains that the description “the musical thing” can refer successfully to Socrates and will be more effective in some rhetorical circumstances but that Socrates is the same whether or not he is musical. Here Aristotle implies that his imagined opponent (Antisthenes has not yet been mentioned) disagrees and holds that there are two different objects, Socrates and musical Socrates, for the two accounts. The predicate μουσικός is used also by Plato as a merely logical example: see, e.g., *Phaed.* 105d16; *Gorg.* 460b3. But in some passages Plato seems to claim μουσικός as a special attribute of the philosopher, perhaps as part of his quest to

usurp the authority of the wise poets of Greek tradition. (See esp. Pl. *Phaedr.* 248d2.) If Antisthenes in particular held this predicate, in its more traditional sense, to be essential to wisdom or Socraticism, Plato's texts might show subtle competition with Antisthenes, through subordination of "musical" to "philosophical" in the logical or technical sense (see *Rep.* 2 376e8–377a6 and *Phaedr.* 268d6–e5; the term ἄμουσος might be even more important in this possible polemic: compare, e.g., *Soph.* 259e2 and *Rep.* 1 349e4); compare Antisthenes' book title Περὶ μουσικῆς (t. 41A title 8.1). Aristotle's passage so far addresses distinct λόγοι and allegedly distinct entities of a limited kind: musical Socrates differs from Socrates by an additive principle, as the combination of Socrates plus musicality. The passage does not address apparently synonymous expressions with parallel structure, such as good Socrates versus just Socrates, or apparently contradictory expressions, such as musical Socrates versus unmusical Socrates, both of which would need to be considered in any thorough reconstruction of Antisthenes' views and paradoxes. The numerical example Aristotle gives at the end of the passage, two names for the number eight, might provide a case of apparent synonyms, whose equivalence Antisthenes denies. An apparently contradictory pair of expressions must fall under the οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν paradox, on which Aristotle gives no detail in this (or any) passage.

ὁ δὲ ψευδὴς λόγος οὐθενός ἐστιν ἀπλῶς λόγος: Whereas every λόγος can be false, when it is misapplied to something other than its referent, Aristotle here recognizes also the λόγος that is false in its own right, by some internal criterion, and this false λόγος, as distinguished from the false πρᾶγμα treated previously (1024b17–26), must be the main topic of the passage. The adverb ἀπλῶς designates a new mode for being false, in distinction from relative falsity, ἢ ψευδής, which designates the mode in which the λόγος of the circle is false when applied to the triangle. The ancient commentators assume that Antisthenes' conception of οικείος λόγος is motivated by a problem with this absolutely false λόγος (t. 152B.1, 152C.5–6, 152D.3). However, since Ross' edition of the *Metaphysics*, the sentence has been treated as parenthetical. Under this interpretation, Antisthenes' position is primarily opposed to the possibility of multiple λόγοι for one thing, not motivated by the problems implied by the absolutely false λόγος. To be a λόγος pertaining ἀπλῶς in the positive sense is to be the proper, unqualified, primary account (of something), without attributes or qualifications. Excluded is reference to something else, including, presumably, reference in what one could call a relative or negative sense, such as the account of the non-triangle when applied to the circle. Such an account would be correctly applied to the circle insofar as a circle is not a triangle, but the account would not be an account pertaining ἀπλῶς (adverbial, "simply") to the circle. Aristotle's approved

definitions do contain references to other things, but these have a particular relationship with the definiendum, in themselves (καθ' αὐτά) and not by accident (συμβεβηκότα) (*Post. An.* 1.4 73a34–b5; see Gill 2010:114). The λόγος applying ἀπλῶς is, then, the account of its object basically and directly. The absolutely false λόγος, by distinction from the λόγος falsely applied, has nothing that corresponds to it basically and directly as its object.

What could qualify as such an absolutely false λόγος? There might be two types. One might be the account of the goat-stag or hippocentaur, a so-called nominal definition, where a meaningful locution is supplied although, in fact, no natural thing corresponds (*De interp.* 16a16–18; see Modrak 2001:19–27 and 2010:265–66). Ammonius' example “the feet of Ida” (t. 152C.7) might be an illustration of this type. Possibly the account of unmusical Socrates, if it were to be uttered, would be parallel, as a possible mental fabrication of something that does not really exist. Some thinkers might banish such an account of nothing from the realm of λόγος from the start, putting it in a different realm of speaking, and arguably (by the measure of t. 151A) Antisthenes would be among them. (There would be further complications to this view, however, such as figurative language that must be decoded before one reaches the real meaning of the locution, as in t. 191.) But Aristotle's definition of λόγος in *De interp.* 16b26 as φωνή σημαντική (meaningful voice) accommodates a λόγος of the goat-stag. Considering that Aristotle has included fabrications like the sketch and the dream as false things in his previous section (1024b23), because they generate an appearance of what is not as it appears to be, false accounts might have a parallel status. The second type of absolutely false λόγος is what the commentator Ammonius discusses at greater length (t. 152C.2), a λόγος that looks like a definition by genus and differentiae but includes contradicting differentiae. Whatever the absolutely pertaining false λόγος might turn out to be, then, this sentence matters to the passage. If one retains this sentence as part of the passage, without parentheses, Aristotle's positive claim that there can be a λόγος with no object is an important point of disagreement with Antisthenes. Perhaps this absolutely false λόγος is the kind that even Antisthenes would have called false, if he came to terms with Aristotle, but more likely he denied that it is λόγος. The case of the triangle that is identified by a sincere speaker through the λόγος of the circle would probably fall under Antisthenes' οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν paradox and not be a real case of falsity for him.

μηθὲν ἀξιῶν λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ: This careful formulation could include polemical exaggeration, contemptuous reduction, or both. In his action of “deeming valid” (ἀξιῶν), Antisthenes seems to be giving a prescription for how one should speak, not a description of how people do or can speak. The modal verb δεῖ recorded by Stobaeus in t. 174 can be

compared, and see t. 152B.3 notes for more parallels. This might imply that Antisthenes is speaking of discourse in a special setting, such as the setting of teaching or philosophical debate. It seems that Antisthenes is precisely not saying that nothing *can* be said except by its own account. It is also obvious that in the preserved remnants of his texts Antisthenes does refer to a single object through many locutions: for example, Odysseus' πολυτροπία "becomes" (through correct interpretation) μονοτροπία (t. 187 § 11), and Antisthenes' own virtue is his wealth, or πλοῦτος, in the soul (t. 82). In the most significant realm, the realm of virtue, Antisthenes seems to equate evaluative terms such as "fine" and "good" (see t. 134b note), although this might be a special kind of language for him.

τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ: Among scholars of Antisthenes, the phrase οἰκείος λόγος is usually understood as Antisthenes' own term (Brancacci 1990:227–62, esp. 242). The independently attested contrasts with ξενικός (t. 134(t)) and ἀλλότριος (t. 34E, 152B.2) might verify its origin with Antisthenes. Alternatively, Aristotle himself could be using the term here as the equivalent of "proper name" (κύριον ὄνομα), whose opposite is ἀλλότριον ὄνομα (see Rankin 1974:317 n.8; t. 152B.2 note) or, in *Poet.* 1458a22, ξενικὸν ὄνομα. If this is Antisthenes' trademark term, its occurrence in Socrates' dream in *Theaet.* 202a6–7 would have to be Plato's deliberate clue to Antisthenes' relevance there. (See Brancacci 2001; but see the warning of Burnyeat [1990:166] that no reference Plato might make to Antisthenes can be equated with a faithful report about Antisthenes' doctrines.) The term occurs also in the Homeric scholia in a context where Antisthenes could be the source (t. 192B; see Brancacci 1990:261 n.62).

ἐν ἑφ' ἐνός: This principle of one-to-one correspondence supports Antisthenes' paradox οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, as Aristotle states it and as the commentators explain in more detail (t. 152B.3–4, 152C.6, 153B.2–4). It is not immediately clear which elements stand in this one-to-one relation, however. (See previous note on ἐκάστου.) Aristotle seems to have simplified Antisthenes' account, which is explained most fully by Alexander of Aphrodisias in t. 153B.1 and 153B.3. An act of speaking requires three elements: it needs the particular utterance of a speaker, the particular object of the speaker's intended reference, and the general meaning (often conceived of as an object) activated by the speaker's articulate utterance. T. 153B.1 shows most clearly that Antisthenes recognizes these three elements or levels. T. 155 shows most clearly that Antisthenes' critics also recognize these three levels, and it suggests that they explained Antisthenes' error by claiming that he failed to distinguish the three levels correctly. The only possible explanation for Antisthenes' paradox does appeal to a problem (or trick) regarding these three levels: see further discussion under t. 152B and

153B. For the present passage, it is important to allow that the report from Aristotle must be compressed and allusive. Since ἔν is grammatically neuter but λόγος is masculine, the phrase as printed cannot stand for “one *logos* to one thing” but must mean more vaguely “one for one.” (An elided masculine accusative form, ἔν<α> <λόγον> ἐφ’ ἑνός <πράγματος>, is possible, if the whole phrase is adverbial, parallel to the dative τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ: but the verb λέγεσθαι is passive, and its accusative subject is the πρᾶγμα, not the verbal expression. Also possible is a dative term, where that term, rather than the whole phrase, is in apposition to τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ: that is, ἐν<ι> <λόγῳ> ἐφ’ ἑνός <πράγματος>. The dative iota should not have been elided, although a textual corruption is plausible. No editor has recorded a manuscript variant, proposed an emendation, or punctuated as the masculine form ἔν’ ἐφ’ ἑνός.) As the text stands, τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ is adverbial, and ἔν ἐφ’ ἑνός (or ἐν<α>’ ἐφ’ ἑνός) is a second, parallel adverbial phrase. In t. 152B.3, Alexander uses a masculine form εἰς and includes the noun λόγος when he cites the principle: εἰς γὰρ ὁ περὶ ἑνός λόγος. Even as this seems to make more sense (see note there), there may be ways to account for Aristotle’s neuter ἔν, especially since it matches a similar statement of principle in t.187.6: ἔν γὰρ τὸ ἐκάστῳ οἰκεῖον. The “one-to-one” relationship might be not between λόγος and πρᾶγμα on Aristotle’s terms but between one term or name (ὄνομα) and one thing, one thought (νόημα) and one thing, or one unspecified minimal individual unit of meaning (e.g., a semantic στοιχεῖον or ἄτομον) and one unspecified minimal individual unit of being.

The first possibility, a relationship between one name and one thing, is not mentioned by Aristotle anywhere in this context, but ps.-Alexander understood the simple name as the obvious alternative to the “long account” in t. 150A (see t. 150B.2 note); and Asclepius, in his comment on the present passage (t. 152C.2–5), assumes that the minimal units of meaning in question are such items as the terms Aristotle uses in biological accounts by genus and differentiae, which are common Greek names. The second possibility, a relationship between one thought and one thing, might correspond with the linguistic capacity of the wise man to represent his thought, νόημα, as described in t. 187.6, where a similar phrase, ἔν γὰρ τὸ ἐκάστῳ οἰκεῖον, occurs. In that context, the one-to-one relationship pertains to the one verbal representation of a thought that is most appropriate to each member of the audience. If this is the force of the ἔν in the present passage, there is a puzzling difference between the one-to-one relationship Antisthenes asserts here and the one-to-many relationship Antisthenes asserts between the thought of the wise speaker and the many rhetorical representations this speaker is able to produce, each one appropriate for a different strand in the audience. (See also t. 187.6 notes.) The singular version must be the one the speaker would

address to himself. The third possibility, that the neuter gender is used as a default for reference to unspecified minimal individuals, such as στοιχεῖα, whatever these turn out to be, is plausible from the parallel in t. 187.10–11, where a neuter form is used although the presumed noun is τρόπος τοῦ λόγου or possibly τροπία τοῦ λόγου, and from Aristotle's omission throughout this passage of the term πρᾶγμα. Moreover, Plato and Aristotle frequently use letters, sounds, numbers, and numerical individuals, all neuter in gender, as examples of minimal elements in their discussions of meaning. (See t. 150A.1 notes.) No matter which alternative is best, it is critical to understand that Aristotle is eliding a longer argument and that we cannot assume simply that ἐν ἑφ' ἐνός reports a theory whereby one definition or uniquely correct statement was the only proper mode of reference to or speech about each one foregiven external thing of reference, as some modern reconstructions of Antisthenes' views hold. Some reconstructions go further and make the one-to-one relationship run in both directions: not only does each individual thing have one account, but each account can be attached to only one thing. (Compare, e.g., Taylor and Lee 2011: "Similarly Antisthenes held that each thing has its own proper definition or description, which cannot be applied to anything else." The upshot of such a view is that there are no reiterable accounts, which means Antisthenes cannot use language at all.) Such a theory is indeed "stronger and stranger than anything we have met before" (Burnyeat 1990:167), and it conflicts with testimonia about Antisthenes that are hard to discard, such as his interest in the fictions of Homer and especially the character Odysseus πολύτροπος, as well as Antisthenes' reputation for writing too much and saying too little (Timon's accusation in t. 41B).

ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, σχεδὸν δὲ μὴδὲ ψεύδεσθαι: The ancient commentators (t. 152B, 152C, 153B) try to explain the connections among the three claims Aristotle attributes to Antisthenes: (1) the one-to-one relationship from object to account, (2) the impossibility of gainsaying, and (3) the "scarce" possibility of false speaking. Aristotle's language might imply that the latter two claims are his own inferences from the basic theory of *oikeios logos* and that Antisthenes did not aim to assert or prove these in themselves. But Isocrates lists exactly these theses in reverse order (t. 156), and the latter two theses are important in their own right: the second thesis is what Antisthenes is famous for (t. 153A), and the third is what earns this discussion its place in this entry on "false" in the philosophical lexicon. Possibly Antisthenes' original discussion was framed in terms of "truth," not "falsity" (see t. 41A title 6.1), and possibly "truth" was so inclusive that "falsity" in discourse, at the level of individual acts of naming and statement, was left with no clear space. Antisthenes surely allowed for what Aristotle calls, in his third section, the "false man," that is, the one who intentionally lies

(see t. 188A-2.3 and 188B.1, where the word ψεύδεσθαι is used). He probably also recognized “false things,” that is, illusions—like the visions in dreams (see t. 164)—or goddesses (see t. 123). He adamantly allows for “bad” beliefs (t. 87, 172), but these might be rated as “true” (i.e., real) sooner than “false” (i.e., not real), because they exist and have causal powers.

ὥσπερ τὰ ὀκτὼ διπλάσια τῷ τῆς δυνάδος λόγῳ: Because this is an example Aristotle brings forward against Antisthenes’ position, it should be relevant to Antisthenes’ views, whether or not Antisthenes ever argued about the definitions or accounts of numbers. Aristotle’s strategy here seems similar to one he uses at *Met.* 987a24–27 to counter the old Pythagorean approach to definition of being: if the double is the same as two, Aristotle says, then “many things will be one,” since all even numbers will be the same as two. The Pythagoreans were not arguing about the accounts of numbers in terms of each other but were equating concepts such as justice with the smallest number in which the core characteristic in the concept occurred. Justice was four, the first number where the two factors were equal, that is, the first square number. By this approach, many concepts could be four or seven. (See Huffman 2005:492–93.) Aristotle translates their mistake into an example with only numerical elements. Here the problem Aristotle sees for Antisthenes seems to be the opposite, that Antisthenes posits too many beings, as if double were two exclusively, on some irreducible level, and could not also be part of eight, which has its own integrity. In t. 187.11–12, Antisthenes makes the apparently converse claim, that one and many are the same (Antisthenes’ other statements about number seem always to be “sophistic” or clever in their refusal to be truly mathematical: see t. 54.9, 54.11, 90B), but these are instantiated numbers, so to speak, counted things, and not numbers by themselves. If one may then assume from the present passage, despite t. 187.11–12, that Antisthenes would deny the equivalence, as formulations for the same thing, of eight and twice four, this implies that “eight” and “twice four” are about different things or have different referents, perhaps because numbers are not heaps of units but have internal integrity (as they might have in the geometrical shapes used to represent numbers in various Platonic passages, such as *Meno* 82b–85b and *Theaet.* 147e). Such analysis of a number into its factors is a model for definition also in Plato’s *Republic* (337b1–4), brought up by Thrasymachus to illustrate the kind of tautological, analytic definition he finds typically Socratic and unacceptable. In *Theaet.* 204b10–c6, the number six is specified in various ways (it is counted out and named as twice three, thrice two, four plus two, and three plus two plus one), and the interlocutors agree that “in the case of each locution” (ἐφ’ ἐκάστης λέξεως), the locution represented the six—that is, the whole being—equivalently. These indications in Plato might suggest that the definitions or accounts of numbers

were used in arguments (within the Academy or between the Academy and its rivals) about the nature of unique verbal formulas and definition.

**152B. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Metaphysics"*
1024b26 CAG 1 p. 434.25–435.24 (Hayduck)**

= 47B DC

(1) εἰπὼν δὲ ταῦτα αἰτιᾶται Ἀντισθένην εὐήθως λέγοντα περὶ μηδενὸς ἄλλου λέγεσθαι τίνα λόγον ἢ περὶ ἐκείνου οὐ οἰκεῖός ἐστι, παρακρουσθέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ τὸν ψευδῆ λόγον μηδενὸς ἀπλῶς εἶναι λόγον· οὐ γὰρ εἰ μὴ ἀπλῶς ἐστι μηδὲ κυρίως, ἤδη καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν. (2) ᾤετο δὲ ὁ Ἀντισθένης ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων λέγεσθαι τῷ οἰκεῖῳ λόγῳ μόνῳ καὶ ἓνα ἐκάστου λόγον εἶναι· τὸν γὰρ οἰκεῖον· τὸν δὲ τι σημαίνοντα καὶ μὴ ὄντα τούτου περὶ οὗ λέγεται εἶναι, ἀλλότριον γε ὄντα αὐτοῦ, < . . . >. ἐξ ὧν καὶ συνάγειν ἐπειράτο ὅτι μὴ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν· (3) τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀντιλέγοντας περὶ τίνος διάφορα λέγειν ὀφείλιν, μὴ δύνασθαι δὲ περὶ αὐτοῦ διαφόρους τοὺς λόγους φέρεσθαι τῷ ἓνα τὸν οἰκεῖον ἐκάστου εἶναι· ἓνα γὰρ ἑνὸς εἶναι καὶ τὸν λέγοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν μόνον, ὥστε εἰ μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος τοῦ αὐτοῦ λέγοιεν, τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν λέγοιεν ἀλλήλοις (εἷς γὰρ ὁ περὶ ἑνὸς λόγος), λέγοντες δὲ ταῦτα οὐκ ἂν ἀντιλέγοιεν ἀλλήλοις. (4) εἰ δὲ διαφέροντα λέγοιεν, οὐκέτι λέξειεν αὐτοὺς περὶ ταύτου τῷ εἶναι ἓνα τὸν λόγον τὸν περὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, τοὺς δὲ ἀντιλέγοντας ὀφείλιν περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ λέγειν. (5) καὶ οὕτως συνῆγε τὸ μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν, σχεδὸν δὲ μηδὲ ψεύδεσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ οἶόν τε εἶναι περὶ τίνος ἄλλον πλην τὸν ἰδίον τε καὶ οἰκεῖον εἰπεῖν λόγον. (6) ὅτι εὐήθης ὁ λόγος οὗτος, δείκνυσιν ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν ἕκαστον οὐ μόνον τῷ αὐτοῦ καὶ οἰκεῖῳ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἑτέρου, ψευδῶς μὲν καὶ ῥᾶστα καὶ πολλαχῶς καὶ ἐκ τοῦ προχείρου, οἷον ἂν τῷ κύκλου τις λόγῳ κατὰ τοῦ τριγώνου χρῆσται ἢ τῷ τοῦ ἵππου κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. ὁ γὰρ λόγος ὁ λέγων τὸν ἵππον εἶναι “ζῶον πεζὸν δίπουν” ἔστι μὲν λόγος, ἐπ’ οὐδένοιο δὲ ἀληθής· οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχει τὸν ἀνθρωπινὸν ὑποκειμένον, οὐδὲ περὶ τοῦ ἵππου περὶ οὗ λέγεται· εἰ δὲ λεγόμενος περὶ τούτου μὴ ἔστιν ἀληθής, δηλὸν ὡς ψευδῆς ἂν εἴη περὶ τοῦ ἵππου.

(1) οἰκεῖος M : οἰκεῖως A S (2) lacunam posui, fort. ἀλλότριον λόγον (3) φέρεσθαι A : λέγεσθαι M et γρ. A in mrg. | ὥστε M : ὡς A (5) μηδὲ M S : μὴ A (6) τῷ αὐτοῦ et τῷ ἑτέρου Bonitz (cum S): τῷ αὐτῷ et τῷ ἑτέρῳ A | μηδε ἀρχὴν Bonitz : μὴ τόνδε ἀρχὴν A

(1) After saying these things, he [Aristotle] censures Antisthenes for claiming in silly fashion that an account is said of nothing other than

that of which it is proper, having been misled by the point that the false account is the account, in the absolute sense, of nothing. For it is not the case that, if it is not the account in the absolute sense or properly, it is immediately not [an account]. (2) But Antisthenes believed that each of the things that exist is said by its own account only and that of each [thing] there is one account: for this is its proper account, whereas an account indicating something but not being of that [thing] about which it is said to be, being indeed alien to it, <is an alien account>. From these [tenets] he tried to derive the conclusion that it is not possible to gainsay. (3) For those speaking in opposition about something ought to speak different things, but it is impossible to bring different accounts about the thing, by the principle that one account is proper of each thing. For there is one account of one thing, and the person speaking about it speaks it only, with the result that, if speakers were speaking about the same thing, they would say the same things as each other (for the account about one thing is one), and in saying these things they would not gainsay each other. (4) But if they should say different things, they will no longer be speaking about the same thing, by the principle that the account about the thing itself is one, and those speaking in opposition ought to speak about the same thing. (5) And in this way he derived the conclusion that it is not possible to gainsay, and scarcely even to speak falsehood, because it is not possible to speak another account about something apart from the peculiar and proper account. (6) He [Aristotle] shows that this argument is silly from the fact that one can say each thing not only by its own and proper account but also by the account of something else, falsely and quite easily and variously and readily, for example, if someone should use the account of a circle in predication of the triangle or the account of a horse in predication of the human. For the account saying that the horse is the “two-footed terrestrial animal” is an account, but one true of nothing, neither of the human, since it does not even have the human as a subject in the first place, nor about the horse, about which it is said. And if, when said about this [horse given as subject], it is not true, it is clear that it would be false about the horse [taken universally].

Context of Preservation

This section of the *Metaphysics* commentary was written by the third-century Alexander of Aphrodisias, author of t. 151B and 153B, not the ps.-Alexander of t. 150B. The present excerpt includes one sentence beyond the passage in SSR (a puzzling but potentially important sentence) but omits the end of Alexander’s treatment of Aristotle’s passage in t. 152A, which continues

to p. 436.11. At this point in the commentary, which treats Aristotle's uncharacteristic division of "falsity" into the false "thing" and the false "account," two of the five major manuscripts of Alexander (L and F) omit Alexander's discussion and replace it with the version given by Asclepius (= t. 152C): see p. 431 Hayduck.

Importance of the Testimonium

This discussion links Antisthenes' paradoxical views on λόγος to motivations connected with the denial of absolute falsity, which Alexander addresses at the end of the passage (§6). (Compare t. 152C.7.) §3–4 offer an exposition by cases of Antisthenes' thesis οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν that appears, in parallel with t. 152C.6 and 153B.2–4, to be both informative and independent of Aristotle and Plato and so possibly dependent on sources descending from Antisthenes' own account. (Denyer 1991:28 holds that the commentators took Plato's *Euthydemus* as their source, but the vocabulary, especially in the present version and t. 152C, is substantially different.) This exposition by cases, like that in t. 152C.6, has a two-case structure and could be called a dilemma; t. 153B.2–4, like Pl. *Euthydemus* 285e9–286b6, has a three-case structure and could be called a trilemma. It is odd that the present exposition by Alexander differs in both vocabulary and structure from that in t. 153B.2–4, which is also by Alexander. Either he worked closely from sources in both cases and did not see the parallel, or he came up with a different reduction of Antisthenes' account in each case; t. 153B.2–4 could be a quotation. §6 offers an example of a λόγος that fails to be either true or false by Antisthenes' account but would be false by Aristotle's account.

Notes

(1) Ἀντισθένην εὐήθως λέγοντα: Alexander has eliminated any implication that Antisthenes was giving a prescription, not a description, and he reports a description. Prescriptive language appears in the exposition of the paradox, §3–4.

περὶ μηδενὸς ἄλλου λέγεσθαι τίνα λόγον ἢ περὶ ἐκείνου οὐ οἰκεῖός ἐστι: The object of the preposition περὶ is the object of reference for the λόγος. (In §2 and more clearly in t. 153B.1 and 153B.4, Alexander gives a more complicated articulation, with two levels of object for *logos*.) The object is named only through pronouns so far (compare t. 152A comment on ἐκάστου), although it will eventually be called a being (τὸ ὄν, §2) and a thing (τὸ πρᾶγμα, §3–4). It is not said whether this object is sensible or intelligible, particular or general, given or not given a priori. Probably the object, whatever it is, is immediately present to the speaker, a thing he or she incorrigibly experiences and whose *logos* he or she articulates in seamless continuity with this presence and

experience. (See Kalouche 1999:23–27 for a similar account; compare Ajax’ demands in t. 53.1.) The assumption that the object is an objectively given, present object, such as a triangle or a horse, emerges clearly in §6, Alexander’s refutation of Antisthenes’ position on Aristotle’s terms; this could, then, be an assumption hostile to the thesis.

παρακρουσθέντα: Alexander links Antisthenes’ error directly to the point that the absolutely “false *logos*” has no object at all. In protesting that Antisthenes misunderstood this point, Alexander holds to Aristotle’s position that a *logos* that is the primary *logos* for nothing is still a *logos*, that is, a false *logos*. This will be uncontroversial under some assumptions (see §6) but is false under other assumptions. Either or both of two assumptions seem to divide Aristotle and Antisthenes. First, if *logos* is isolated from the start to a core type of true statements, such as the type in t. 151A (those that show what something was or is), or to definitions successfully structured by genus and differentiae, such as those that provide all the examples in the commentators’ detailed discussions (compare t. 150B.2–5, the current §6, t. 152C.3–5), then *logos* is true by definition, and a “false” *logos* is not *logos* at all. Second, the nature and presence of the object of *logos* is more rigorously predetermined by Aristotle than by Antisthenes, whose account allows the object to change. See further discussion in §2 and 6.

(2) **ᾧετο δὲ ὁ Ἀντισθένης ἕκαστον τῶν ὄντων λέγεσθαι τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ μόνῳ καὶ ἓνα ἑκάστου λόγον εἶναι:** Alexander begins with a sympathetic exposition of the views that underlie Antisthenes’ paradox, as he does in t. 153B.1–4. In this formulation, extralinguistic reality is primary over *logos*, which maps reality in a one-to-one way. This relationship of priority appears to contrast with t. 160, where names are said to be the standard for measuring reality. If the relationship approaches identity in Antisthenes’ view, either object or word could be considered prior to the other, especially if the question of individuation—that is, deciding what counts as “each thing”—is controversial. (See Hadot 1980: esp. 309–12, on the rhetorical conception of the individual *πᾶγμα* in the pre-Aristotelian period.) Alternatively, there could be an important difference between λόγος and ὀνόματα (the term in t. 160) or between the advanced wise man who uses λόγος and the beginner who starts from the ὀνόματα. See t. 160 notes.

τὸν δὲ τι σημαίνοντα καὶ μὴ ὄντα τούτου περὶ οὗ λέγεται εἶναι, ἀλλότριόν γε ὄντα αὐτοῦ: Three points are important: the double valency of the verb σημαίνειν (indicate), the opposition identified as οἰκεῖος versus ἀλλότριος, and a textual problem. They are discussed sequentially. On the first point, the agent of σημαίνειν here is the λόγος itself, not its human user. This is a new usage of the verb in Plato’s period (*Crat.* 393a6–7, 420a5, 437a4, 437b1–3), in departure from earlier Greek usage, where only animate beings can “indicate.”

(Medical discourse, where symptoms regularly “indicate,” as in Hipp. *Prog.* 3, might be an important precedent; see also t. 151A note on δηλών.) The older usage is often absolute, with no object (see Brancacci 1990:56 n.24). T. 187.4 offers a parallel to the present, newer usage, where language on its own indicates “something.” In t. 153B.1 and 191, the usage is traditional, and the human user indicates through the medium of (διὰ) language. Here, as in t. 153B.1, there are two levels of object in the activity of indicating (which do not correspond exactly in formulation because of the different agents for σημαίνειν). First, there is a level of meaning or semantic content (the τι, or “something,” here; in t. 153B.1, the semantic power in language has a grammatically instrumental position in the sentence, “through what they say”). This could be continuous with the later Stoic λεκτόν (see Hadot 1980:313–16). Second, there is a level of reference (τούτου περὶ οὗ λέγεται here; in t. 153B.1, it is “that about which they speak”). This double object shows Antisthenes’ awareness that language has power both to carry meaning in general and to assign meaning to a particular object and that it works in a given instance by using both powers. Thus, the diagnosis that Proclus, in his commentary on *Crat.* 385b2–5 (t. 155), offers for the fallacy—that a speaker does not simply speak “a something” but says something about something—does not refute Antisthenes’ paradox in a simple way: Antisthenes has accounted for this double valency in language, if idiosyncratically. The two positions might differ over the priority of one object to the other and over which object is thought to fail first when an account is not ideal (see §6); or the difference might pertain to some peculiar view Antisthenes held on the nature of universals, such as one needs to underlie any notion of semantic content. On the second point, the use of ἀλλότριον in opposition to οἰκεῖον in this passage might seem to verify the terminological status of οἰκεῖος λόγος for Antisthenes. Alternatively, Alexander could be generating from Aristotle the terminology he needs to explain the paradox. But there is no clear stimulus for this opposition in Aristotle’s text, and the opposition οἰκεῖον versus ἀλλότριον in Aristotle is usually ethical. Only occasionally (e.g., *Poet.* 1457b32; *Rhet.* 1376b26; *EE* 1217a8–10) does the opposition pertain to names. Finally, there is a textual problem: the sentence lacks a predicate and must be emended or supplemented. Hayduck cites a sixteenth-century Latin translation (by Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda and published in Paris in 1536) as follows: *Nam quae aliquid significat, nec est eius, eam eius de quo dicitur esse dici, cum ipsi sit aliena, de quo dicitur, ab ipso esse alienam* ([my translation:] For the [signifying expression] that signifies something, but is not of it, <he said that> this is said to be of the thing about which it is said; when it would be alien to that thing about which it is said, <he said that> it is an alien [signifying expression] from that thing). Since this is a loose translation of

the Greek that we have, it might be of no value; but it suggests that ἀλλότριον was originally used twice at the end of the sentence, perhaps in the phrase ἀλλότριον λόγον (which is tentatively assumed in the translation). If Antisthenes did have a concept of the ἀλλότριος λόγος, this could be related, not without polemic and rivalry, to Plato's concept of ἀλλοδοξία (*Theaet.* 189b12) and the misled perceivers who are called ἀλλοτριονομοῦντες (*Theaet.* 195a7).

ἐξ ὧν καὶ συνάγειν ἐπειράτο ὅτι μὴ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν: This derivation of the paradox from the doctrine of οἰκεῖος λόγος follows Aristotle.

(3) τοὺς . . . ἀντιλέγοντας περὶ τίνος διάφορα λέγειν ὀφείλιν: Here begins the analysis by scenario of the alleged phenomenon of gainsaying, which Alexander adds beyond Aristotle's text. The term ὀφείλιν is prescriptive: compare δεῖν and ὀφείλιν in t. 153B and μὴ δεῖν ἀντιλέγειν in t. 155, as well as δεῖ in t. 174. The "proof" of the paradox through an allegedly exhaustive set of possible scenarios, as it appears in all the detailed evidence, could imply that the paradox does not depend on a single principle but has different explanations in different cases. This might support an overall negative goal for the paradox: Antisthenes might have wanted not to make a serious claim about gainsaying in itself but only to use its puzzles to counter a certain style of discourse, such as discourse that presumes to find the truth through argument only, without evidence or teaching. (For the importance of evidence in settling a debate, see t. 103B and 159; for teaching, see t. 174.) He probably did not renounce the elenctic method, the famous method of Socrates, since Xenophon seems to put this method at the center of his characterization in his *Symposium* (see t. 78, 101A, 185, 186, esp. 83). Probably Antisthenes resisted not all argument but the Academic definition of biological beings in particular or the method of definition of nature by division through genus and differentiae.

διάφορα λέγειν . . . διαφόρους τοὺς λόγους φέρεσθαι: It is an odd coincidence that Alexander uses the term διάφορα (neuter plural adjective) to characterize the nonidentical accounts offered by the opposed speakers, when the Academic definitions at issue were constructed with the διαφορά (feminine singular), *differentia*. The impression of wordplay is reinforced by repetition of the adjective in two forms and then use of the cognate verb. Asclepius (t. 152C.6) uses τὰ οὐ σύμφωνα in reference to the nonidentical accounts but also uses διαφόρων πραγμάτων to refer to the nonidentical referents. Possibly Antisthenes, in his own text, used a pun on the Academic διαφοραί. The unexpected verb φέρεσθαι, cognate with διάφορα (regularized in one manuscript to λέγεσθαι and corrected by a second hand in another), would fit with an extended wordplay. The same verb, again in the middle voice, is used in Ammonius' account of the paradox (t. 152C.6).

ἐνα γὰρ ἐνὸς εἶναι: If this formulation is cited from Antisthenes, it suggests that his full phrase was εἰς λόγος [preposition] ἐνὸς πράγματος. Thus, either Aristotle, in his phrase ἐν ἑφ' ἐνός, has deliberately replaced the masculine εἰς with the neuter ἐν, showing his disagreement with Antisthenes' use of the term λόγος, or there has been textual corruption and Aristotle did use a masculine form (see t. 152A note). It is notable that Antisthenes, if this is his own phrase, conflates the two objects of λόγος (see previous note on τὸν δέ τι σημαίνοντα) into one object and uses no preposition. Either this is a deliberate trick or sophistry in his argument, as Proclus diagnoses it in t. 155, or the general semantic, or intensional, object of the speech is the obviously dominant object in Antisthenes' view of speech, with obvious precedence over any extensional referent. (See next note.)

τὸν λέγοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν μόνον: The object of the speech is determined by the speaking, intensionally. The user of speech necessarily projects or generates this particular object through his speaking. This is Antisthenes' version of the speech event. A simple resistance is available: the object in the scenario of speaking should be presumed as fixed a priori for both speakers, and giving the account of that object should be their common assignment. This objection is implied when Alexander rejects the paradox (§6); Asclepius makes a similar move in his refutation (t. 152C.7). But the sympathetic exposition of the paradox omits it: in the present version, the deviating speaker in the second scenario is not called to account for a mistake about any a priori object but is said to speak about something else; in the version of Asclepius, two *pragmata* appear (t. 152C.6). Because the paradox does not anticipate this objection and also cannot escape it, we must ask how it is plausible that the object given a priori is so unimportant in Antisthenes' intended version of the paradox.

One possibility is that the paradox was developed foremost for ethical questions, in the tradition of Socratic inquiries into the virtues. Plato's Socrates (as well as Xenophon's) routinely seeks definitions of the virtue itself, independent from individual instances; indeed, Socrates assumes that only in knowledge of such universals can one recognize and reliably label the individual instances. Whether Antisthenes renounced the possibility of definitions for such entities (as t. 150A.4 might say) or achieved them (as held by the reconstruction in Brancacci 1990:119–46), he seems to have thought that mental certainty about virtue was available, and he seems to have judged individual cases with such certainty (e.g., t. 141–43, 195). Nevertheless, correctness and error in sincere individual moral judgments might have appeared hard to verify in an immediate way, especially if the events under evaluation had occurred in the past and were present only in memory. This difficulty seems to hold in the case for which we have the most

evidence, the debate between Ajax and Odysseus over the morality of acts in the Trojan War and the evaluation of the players (t. 53–54). Although the pair of speeches could be entirely separable from the precise propositions that concern Aristotle, it invites classification as an instance of the gainsaying paradox because Ajax says οὐδ' ἀντιλέγειν ἔξεστι (53.7). If this classification is appropriate, the principle that the sincerely generated λόγος represents, reveals, and communicates the πρᾶγμα might have been intended to complicate philosophical inquiry rather than settle it. Antisthenes' intention in citing this principle as an approach to moral questions might have been to show that moral questions cannot be reduced to individual objective propositions or isolated from the whole ethical character of the persons concerned, the whole context of their acts, and the whole moral vocabulary of the speakers who are judging. Hence the science of ethics does not follow a model like that in Aristotle's *Analytics*, but ethics is a different kind of knowledge or wisdom, involving whole personalities and stories.

A second possibility is that the primary cases of Antisthenes' scenarios of disagreement are revealed instead in the main example in t. 152A, Socrates, and in a key example in t. 152C.7, the soul. If so, then the thing whose account is at stake, a dead person, cannot be pointed out in the rhetorical situation, nor is objective evidence for its present condition available. Even the claim for Socrates' postmortem existence cannot be verified or falsified. This might be the least compelling interpretation of Antisthenes' changing referent, as we might call it, but it fits with the discussion of Plato's *Phaedo* and with the Kyras story (t. 84), if that belongs to Antisthenes. Aristotle seems to allude to a problem about Socrates' postmortem existence at *Met.* 991a25–27.

A third possibility is that Antisthenes' interest in Homer is relevant, and the events and persons in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* that he evaluated existed in a discursive situation empty of all referents except those implied by the speech itself. Antisthenes' scenarios for debate could be based on questions such as whether Homer's Odysseus was good or bad (t. 187) or whether his Agamemnon was a good king (t. 186). Only Homer's words generate these characters, at least in modern times, and questions about their ethical qualities are circular with how Homer portrays their ethical qualities in his words. For Antisthenes' recognition that Homer's characters had a special mode of created existence, see t. 54.14. For his recognition that Homer, like his characters, is a speaker who "indicates," see t. 192.

A fourth possibility is that all speaking, because it occurs in a different mode from its objects (Gorgias, *On Not Being* 980a20–b8 ps.-Arist. MXG = §21–22 Buchheim), is a partial account or shaping of the object: an intensional interface is then always between the speaker's awareness of an object and the object itself. Such an interpretation might follow from the phrase τρόποι δὲ λόγων αἱ ποιαὶ πλάσεις in t. 187.5 (see notes there).

These possible motivations for the paradox assume that Antisthenes' thought was unified and that the paradox governs situations beyond debates about definition. If the context for the paradox was only debates about definition, it seems Antisthenes' intentions were only negative or skeptical.

ὥστε εἰ μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος τοῦ αὐτοῦ λέγοιεν, τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν λέγοιεν ἀλλήλοις: This is the first of two scenarios for possible gainsaying. In all versions, the first scenario features speakers who say the same things and thereby do not gainsay each other (see t. 152C.6, 153B.3). This version is the only one to provide a reason for the agreement: if the speakers are in fact speaking *about* the same thing, they will necessarily say the same things. A causal path seems to be implied from *pragma* to *logos*, which renders both speakers infallible in saying the *logos* of the *pragma*. It is notable that a neuter plural word for the locution is used in both scenarios of the present version, whereas the *pragma* is singular. A singular *logos* is then mentioned in the account of what the speaker accomplished. This could imply that Antisthenes referred to the plural sounds each person produced in making a coordinated statement. In Asclepius' term τὰ σύμφωνα (t. 152C.6), the implication of voiced sounds is stronger.

(4) εἰ δὲ διαφέροντα λέγοιεν: This is the second of two scenarios. That the adversaries say different things necessarily implies that they are not speaking about the same thing. That the thing they say is still prior to and causative of the account and that the account is still a report of the thing evident to the speaker can be assumed from the language of the first scenario. Neither the term *logos* nor the term *pragma* is used for the differing speakers, but these terms appear only in the general principle, that there is one *logos* for "the *pragma* itself." (In Asclepius' version, at t. 152C.6, both of the differing speakers speak about *pragmata*, and both seem to produce *logos*.) Therefore, it is ambiguous whether this scenario involves one speaker who is correct about the presumed *pragma* and one who is not speaking about that, or whether both speakers are speaking about other things, different from the *pragma* "itself" whose *logos* seems to be required. If both possibilities are covered, this second scenario represents both of the scenarios distinguished in t. 153B.3–4. οὐκέτι λέξειν αὐτοὺς περὶ ταύτου: Again, the object of the speech cannot be detached from the speech itself. The intensional object takes priority over the extensional, so much so that the extensional object is omitted from the story. An assumption that the speakers are nearly eyewitnesses to the thing whose account they are giving might account for the omission.

(5) σχεδὸν δὲ μὴδὲ ψεύδεσθαι διὰ τὸ μὴ οἶόν τε εἶναι περὶ τίνος ἄλλον πλὴν τὸν ἰδίον τε καὶ οἰκείον εἰπεῖν λόγον: Alexander refers Antisthenes' near denial of speaking falsehood to the same principle that rules out gainsaying, the impossibility of mistaken statement "about something."

(6) ἐκ τοῦ λέγειν ἕκαστον οὐ μόνον τῷ αὐτοῦ καὶ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἑτέρου: Alexander rejects the paradoxes and diagnoses the problem, reciting Aristotle. Alexander assumes that the objective reference is a priori and that the speaker's task is to use words to account for that thing. The sudden appearance of the human and the horse in the discussion, as well as the sudden reversal over which, the horse or the human, is supposed to be the foregiven subject of the *logos*, might imply an original scenario in which the speakers were presented with two things and given the task of accounting for one in distinction from the other as well as absolutely.

τῷ τοῦ ἵππου κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου: The human is supposed to receive the reference and the description, but the speaker uses the *logos* of the horse. This example, added beyond Aristotle's examples in the original discussion, might share an origin with the examples of the horse and the human in t. 149. (See also the passages in Plato where these examples are used, referenced at t. 149A notes.) In t. 150B.2–4, as in t. 150A.2–4, the single example discussed is the human; in t. 152C.2–5, the examples are the human, the angel, and Socrates. ὁ γὰρ λόγος ὁ λέγων τὸν ἵππον εἶναι “ζῶον πεζὸν δίπουν” ἔστι μὲν λόγος, ἐπ’ οὐδένοιο δὲ ἀληθής: Expanding on the previous example, but apparently reversing the intended referent from human to horse and the uttered *logos* from horse to human, Alexander now tries to show that there is false *logos* and that there can be a *logos* that is *logos* of nothing. The *logos* stated is false of every horse because the horse is four-footed (e.g., Arist. GA 732b17). But it would be true of the human: the “two-footed terrestrial animal” is Aristotle's standard definition of the human in the *Analytics* and *Topics* (which he refines in *Met.* Z.12). According to the theory of *oikeios logos*, Antisthenes should say that the *logos* uttered is true of the human, even though the human is not the intended referent of the statement. The *logos* is “true of nothing” only when one assumes that the particular object given a priori as the ὑποκείμενον must be the referent and otherwise there is none.

οὔτε γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐπεὶ μηδὲ ἀρχὴν ἔχει τὸν ἀνθρώπων ὑποκείμενον: That the individual presented was a horse was not previously mentioned, and no description of Antisthenes' paradox informs us about a *pragma* given a priori. This might imply that the paradox would lose its punch and seem silly if the situation were described so fully. The adverbial expression μηδὲ ἀρχήν, “not even basically,” appears again in t. 153B.3 (as οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχήν) and so might be Antisthenes' own locution for a radical failure of an account even to address in any respect its alleged object. The language could be Alexander's.

εἰ δὲ λεγόμενος περὶ τοῦτου μὴ ἔστιν ἀληθής, δῆλον ὡς ψευδής ἂν εἴη περὶ τοῦ ἵππου: This final statement is obscure, but possibly Alexander is reasoning about the particular versus universal horse as object for the inaccurate *logos*. If

so, he assumes that the particular intended referent, the horse, is the basis for the universal horse against which the account must be measured. Antisthenes, by contrast, seems to hold that the universal thing referred to by an account will be the proper object of that account—in this case, the human—and that the particular intended referent is irrelevant to this determination. Alexander appears to give this treatment of the sound *logos* falsely applied in order to counter Antisthenes' standard point and make his own case that he has given an example of false *logos*, which is simultaneously a *logos* of nothing. Possibly the obscurity in this final section reflects Alexander's reduction of a full text by Antisthenes on the paradox.

152C. Asclepius, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Metaphysics"* 1024b26 CAG 6.2 p. 353.1–29 (Hayduck)

(1) ταῦτα εἰρηκῶς περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐφεξῆς λέγει καὶ περὶ τῶν λόγων, καὶ φησιν ὅτι ὁ ἐπὶ τινος εἵδους ἀληθὴς λόγος πάντως ἐπὶ ἄλλου ψευδής, οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ κύκλου ἀληθὴς ἐστὶν ὁ λόγος ὁ λέγων “σχῆμα ἐπίπεδον ὑπὸ μιᾶς γραμμῆς περιεχόμενον”, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα εἴρηται περὶ αὐτοῦ· οὗτος τοίνυν ὁ λόγος ἐπὶ ἄλλων παντελῶς ψευδής ἐστίν· οὔτε γὰρ ἀληθὴς ἐπὶ τριγώνου ἐστὶν ἢ ἐπὶ τετραγώνου, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. (2) ὁ μέντοι γε ψευδὴς λόγος οὐ πάντως καὶ ἐπὶ ἄλλων ψευδὴς ὑπάρχει. οἷον λέγω ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος “ζῷον” ἐστὶ “τετράπουν ἄπουν”· οὗτος ὁ λόγος καὶ ἐπὶ ἀνθρώπου ψευδὴς ὑπάρχει καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων, ἵνα τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο ἔχη καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον σὺν αὐτῷ ὁ λόγος οὗτος. (3) ἐὰν μέντοι γε εἴπω ὅτι “ζῷον λογικὸν ἀθάνατον”, ἐπὶ μὲν ἀνθρώπου ψευδὴς, φησὶν, ὑπάρχει, ἐπὶ δὲ ἀγγέλου οὐκ ἔστι ψεῦδος. (4) τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ δύναται εἶναι ἀληθὲς καὶ μοναχῶς λεγόμενον καὶ πολλαχῶς, ἐπειδὴ καὶ οὕτως ἔχει φύσεως αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα. ἐὰν γὰρ εἴπω μοναχῶς ὅτι “Σωκράτης”, ἀληθὲς λέγω· πάλιν δὲ καὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα συμπλέξας τῇ οὐσίᾳ οὕτως εἴπω, οὐδὲν ἦττον ἀληθὲς λέγω, οἷον “Σωκράτης μουσικὸς φαλακρός”. (5) ὁ μέντοι γε ψευδὴς λόγος οὐδενός ἐστιν ἀπλῶς λόγος, ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ τετράποδος καὶ ἄποδος εἰρήκαμεν. (6) διὸ Ἀντισθένης οὐ καλῶς ἐπειράτο δεικνύειν ὅτι οὐ δυνατόν ἐστιν ἀντιλέγειν, λέγων οὕτως ὅτι “ἢ σύμφωνα ἑαυτοῖς διαλέγονται ἢ οὐ σύμφωνα· ἀλλ’ εἰ μὲν σύμφωνα, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν (αὐτὸ γὰρ τοῦτο συμφωνοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις)· εἰ δὲ μὴ σύμφωνα λέγουσι, κατὰ διαφορῶν πραγμάτων φέρονται, ὥστε οὐδ’ οὕτως ἀντιλέγουσιν, εἴ γε μηδὲ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος τὸν λόγον ποιοῦνται.” (7) ταῦτα δὲ ἔλεγεν ὁ Ἀντισθένης ὑπολαμβάνων ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι· καὶ ὁ ψευδόμενος γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φέρεται καὶ ὁ ἀληθεύων ὅτι ἀθάνατός ἐστιν ἢ ψυχὴ· ὥστε ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν. ἔστιν οὐ<ν ἐν λόγῳ

καὶ παντελῶς ψεῦδος καὶ μερικόν.> παντελῶς μὲν οὖν ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ λέγοντος θνητὴν εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐπὶ τι δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ λέγοντος “πόδας ἶδης” (κατὰ ἀναλογίαν γὰρ εἴρηται, ἥ ὅτι τὰ ὀκτὼ διπλάσια τῶν τεσσάρων ὑπάρχουσιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν δύο ἐστὶ τὸ διπλάσιον.

(1) post ψευδῆς primum add. οὐ πάντως δὲ ὁ ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος ψευδῆς καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ψευδῆς ὑπάρχει Alex. cod. L (2) τετράπουν ἄπουν codd. plur. : τετράπουν ἢ ἄπουν Alex. cod. L (4) δὲ Hayduck : γὰρ codd. (5) καὶ ἄποδος om. D (7) post ἔστιν οὐ desunt XIX litterae A, XIV B : lacuna expletur ex Alex. cod. L

(1) After saying this about the [false] things, he [Aristotle] immediately speaks also about the [false] accounts, and he says that the account true for one form is fully false for another. For example, for the circle the true account is the one saying “a plane-figure shape contained by one line,” and however much else is said about it. Now this account is fully false for other things. For it is not true for a triangle or for a tetragon, and likewise also for the other things. (2) However, the false account is not fully false also for other things. For example, let me say that the human is a “four-footed, footless animal.” This account holds false both for a human and for all other things, if this account is to contain this whole [object of the account] and the human with it. (3) But if, on the other hand, I should say that the human is a “rational, immortal animal,” it holds false for a human, he [Ammonius] says, but for an angel it is not false. (4) And the same [thing] can be true when said both in a single way and in a plural way, since the thing itself is also like this from nature. For if I should say in a single way that this is “Socrates,” I speak something true. But again if I weave in the accidental attributes with his being and speak in that way, no less do I speak something true, for example, “Socrates musical and bald.” (5) But the false account is the account, simply, of nothing, as we have said of the human and the four-footed and the footless. (6) Wherefore Antisthenes attempted incorrectly to show that it is not possible to gainsay, speaking thus: “They converse either in like voice to one another or not in like voice. But if [they speak] in like voice, it is not possible that they gainsay (for they are in harmony with each other in this very respect). But if they do not speak in like voice, they refer [their words] to different things, with the result that neither here do they gainsay, if in fact they are not even making their speech about the same thing.” (7) Antisthenes said these things in the assumption of what is not the case. For both the one saying falsely and the one saying truly that the soul is immortal refer to the same thing. So it is possible

to gainsay. So there is in speech both the possibility of the fully false and the partially [false]. Fully [false], on the one hand, as in the case of the one saying “the soul is mortal”; and in some respect [false], on the other hand, as in the case of the one saying “the feet of Ida” [*Il.* 20.59] (for this is said by analogy), or that “eight is double of four.” For double is from two.

Context of Preservation

Asclepius of Tralles recorded oral commentary on books A–Z of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* by his teacher Ammonius son of Hermias (440–521/517 CE), who taught in the Neo-Platonist school in Alexandria in the later fifth and early sixth centuries CE. Ammonius (see also t. 149A) was a pupil of Proclus in Athens (see t. 155) and the teacher of Simplicius in Alexandria (t. 149B), as well as Asclepius, Olympiodorus (t. 199), and Philoponus (who mentions Antisthenes only in passing, at t. 22C).

Importance of the Testimonium

This explication of Antisthenes’ paradox, which is analyzed through a two-case scenario in §6, adds significant sense to Aristotle’s mention of the “simply” (ἀπλῶς) false by positing a difference between the “fully” (παντελῶς) false account and the “in some respect” (ἐπὶ τι) false account (§7): the “in some respect” false account, illustrated through a metaphor from Homer (“the feet of Ida”), is like a fiction of fabrication of the mind from pieces in language that are not false in themselves but, when combined with each other, produce falsity with respect to something or, in fact, everything in the set of things in the objective world. (One might compare the goat-stag and hippocentaur of t. 149A, a passage also from Ammonius.) The explication is Neo-Platonic and might have no authority concerning the historical Antisthenes. But it also explains a possible sense of the “simply false” in Aristotle’s discussion of the false account, as well as Antisthenes’ relevance to this discussion of the false. Alexander’s account of the “*logos* of nothing” in t. 152B.6 reduces this to misapplication.

Notes

(1) ὁ ἐπὶ τινος εἶδους ἀληθὲς λόγος: The term εἶδος (form), which is replacing the term πρᾶγμα that appears in the report of Antisthenes’ paradox elsewhere (§6 and t. 152B.3–4, 152D.4, 153B.2–5, 156; but see next note for a possible difference between εἶδος and πρᾶγμα), suggests that the primary correlate of a verbal account would be conceptual or noetic, not a particular material object (as the hostile critics of t. 149 imply). It also suggests a fully determinate or objective situation for a scenario of alleged gainsaying

(such as is described in §6): a λόγος that has an objective noetic correlate is absolutely false when applied to any other thing. Aristotle's examples from geometry, repeated by Ammonius, imply the same, but Aristotle does not use the term εἶδος. Both the term εἶδος and the geometrical example might imply a Platonist discussion. Whether Ammonius supplied the Platonism here or restored the original context of a debate among the Socratics, in which Antisthenes himself used the term εἶδος, is unknown. If εἶδος is Antisthenes' term, this would be unique evidence (possibly matched in t. 150B.6), and it would have to be reconciled with the account in t. 149A, also by Ammonius, by which Antisthenes considers εἶδη to be mental fabrications. There could be a difference between a particular, immanent form and a universal form.

πάντως ἐπὶ ἄλλου ψευδής / ἐπὶ ἄλλων παντελῶς ψευδής: πάντως and παντελῶς here will be contrasted with οὐ πάντως in the next section and ἐπὶ τι in §7. These terms, like εἶδος, are added beyond Aristotle's text. As Asclepius implies in §5, they must address the same contrast Aristotle makes between his basic false λόγος, which is a real and potentially true λόγος falsely applied, and his simply (ἀπλῶς) false λόγος, which he does not illustrate but which must be something like an internally incoherent or self-contradictory λόγος that can have no referent whatsoever. Ammonius here calls "fully" false the λόγος that is definitely different from its intended referent, such as the λόγος of the circle when said of the triangle. The "not absolutely," or partly, false λόγος will be what Aristotle calls "simply" or internally false; Ammonius will imply that it can be fictional. A codex of Alexander of Aphrodisias' commentary on the passage (L, one of two manuscript copies that report Asclepius'/Ammonias' discussion in the place of Alexander's) adds an interesting expansion in this introductory summary of the whole discussion: whereas a λόγος for a definite εἶδος is "fully" false of a different εἶδος, the same characterization does not apply to a λόγος versus its various possible object πράγματα. Rather, a λόγος that is false of one πράγμα (apparently the intended πράγμα, that is, "the same πράγμα") is *not* fully false also of other πράγματα (οὐ πάντως δὲ ὁ ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος ψευδής καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ψευδής ὑπάρχει). Apparently this λόγος has some indefinite or indeterminate status, neither true nor false; or plausibly it is either true or false, depending on whether there is a sincere mind that decided, in sincerity, to name some πράγμα through this λόγος. It is possible that by citing from Antisthenes' paradox, the writer of codex L, who could be an intelligent thinker in the Neo-Platonic tradition (someone who recognized extra value in Asclepius' exegesis over Alexander's and apparently tried to explicate still further), is aligning the difference between πάντως ψευδής and οὐ πάντως ψευδής with the difference between reference to an εἶδος and a πράγμα.

(2) ὁ μέντοι γε ψευδής λόγος οὐ πάντως καὶ ἐπὶ ἄλλων ψευδής ὑπάρχει:

This is the real, problematic topic of Aristotle's discussion, the type of false λόγος whose falsity does not depend only on misapplication. Ammonius calls its falsity οὐ πάντως, which is a confusing substitution for Aristotle's ἀπλῶς, but the point must be that this is a λόγος that lacks any absolute standard for truth (and might not, then, really be a λόγος by Antisthenes' standard in t. 151A). (There could also be a textual problem or excessive abbreviation here.) Antisthenes, who has not yet been introduced into the discussion, would presumably distinguish between the false account about to be mentioned, one with internal self-contradiction, and the false account attributed to him in §7, which uses a metaphor and is false of the real world but possible for a fictive world. Here, perhaps, Ammonius offers the clearest possible example of an account with no referent, the furthest contrast from the true account.

ὁ ἄνθρωπος “ζῶν ἐστὶ τετράπουν ἄπουν”: Ammonius' example is an Academic λόγος in the correct form—the genus plus the differentiae of the species—but the two differentiae, “four-footed” and “footless,” contradict each other. Each happens also to be false of the human, but each would be part of a λόγος that is true when applied to a different thing, if they did not occur together. It is possible that the contradiction Ammonius intends is quite specific, a contradiction between the first differentia, “footless,” and the second, “four-footed.” In Aristotle's scheme, all animals are divided primarily into three classes, the footed (often translated “terrestrial”) (τὸ πεζόν), the winged (τὸ πτηνόν), and the aquatic (τὸ ἔνυδρον) (Top. Z.6 143b1–2). The second differentia, which could be species form (that is, if it is the last differentia), is meaningful within and restricted by the first differentia. That is, only terrestrial animals can be four-footed. The term “footless” does not occur in Aristotle. But it could be intended to capture the non-terrestrial animals all together, notably the aquatic, and in that case the conflict between “four-footed” and “footless” amounts to the use of a second differentia outside its proper domain, the domain of footed or terrestrial beings. (The fact that the second differentia appears first in Ammonius' expression would have to be attributed to carelessness.) Because the example “the feet of Mt. Ida” comes up below (§7), it is worth considering that Antisthenes really did question Aristotle's hierarchy of differentiae. The anecdote about the plucked chicken (see t. 150A.) fits also with this conjecture.

ἵνα τὸ ὅλον τοῦτο ἔχη καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον σὺν αὐτῷ: This is a new description of the relationship between the λόγος and its object(s): it must “hold” or “contain” its object(s). This can be connected with the etymology of “definition,” which is a “boundary” (ὄρος).

(3) ζῶν λογικὸν ἀθάνατον: This λόγος also consists in the genus plus two differentiae, but, by contrast with the previous, these differentiae do not conflict. The second differentia is false of the human, but the definition in sum

is true of something else, the angel. Ammonius does not ask here whether every logically possible λόγος necessarily has a real correlate. He thinks angels, which he mentions thirteen times in his commentary on Porphyry's introduction to Aristotle's *Categories*, are real, although they are bodiless realities (CAG v. 4.3 p. 19.1 Busse). But he apparently does not think the feet of Ida (§7) are real.

(4) καὶ μοναχῶς λεγόμενον καὶ πολλαχῶς: Ammonius turns to Aristotle's next point, that it is possible to speak of something through referring formulations of various length and complexity, that is, with different quantities of elements. Aristotle's example, "musical Socrates," adds to the proper name what Aristotle considers an accidental attribute.

τὰ συμβεβηκότα συμπλέξας τῇ οὐσίᾳ: The verb recalls Plato's language at *Theaet.* 202b4–5 (ὀνομάτων συμπλοκή) and *Soph.* 259e5 (τὴν ἀλλήλων τῶν εἰδῶν συμπλοκὴν) for complex referring expressions. Porphyry is clearly an intermediary, who uses the term συμπλέξας of binding together accidents (τὰ συμβεβηκότα) in his commentary, by question and answer, on Aristotle's *Categories* (CAG v. 4.1 p.74.1–4 Busse): φέρε οὖν ἐμοῦ καὶ σοὶ λέγοντος σύνθεσιν τινα ὀνομάτων σύλλεγε τοὺς συμφώνους λόγους τοῖς ῥηθεῖσιν ὀνόμασι συμπλέξας (Come, now, when I tell you a certain combination of names, you put together the accounts fitting to the names said, weaving them together). The text may be corrupt (see Strange 1992:56), but these terms appear together. The image ὀνομάτων συμπλοκή has at times been assigned to Antisthenes (e.g., Dümmler 1881:51–54).

Σωκράτης μουσικὸς φαλακρός: Ammonius repeats Aristotle's example of musical Socrates, adding a second accident. This presumably shows that there are innumerable combinations of substance and accidents that are *logoi* of one thing.

(5) ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ τετράποδος καὶ ἄποδος εἰρήκαμεν:

Ammonius resumes his earlier discussion of full and partial falsity, equating his partial falsity with Aristotle's falsity pertaining ἀπλῶς. He has explained the difference already, and here he introduces Antisthenes' paradox as another point under partial falsity.

(6) ἢ σύμφωνα ἑαυτοῖς . . . ἢ οὐ σύμφωνα: Ammonius' exposition of Antisthenes' paradox distinguishes two scenarios, as in Alexander's exposition in t. 152B.3–4, agreement versus disagreement between two speakers. (In t. 153B.2–4, there are three scenarios, which compare the words of the speakers not to each other directly but to the respective πράγμα of which each speaks.) Here Ammonius uses vocabulary unique in the evidence for Antisthenes, the adjective σύμφωνα and the verb συμφωνοῦσιν, and he appears to be quoting. (Alexander's equivalents in t. 152B.3–4 are τὰ αὐτὰ for σύμφωνα and διάφορα for οὐ σύμφωνα.) Because Ammonius is so persistent with this vocabulary

and uses the same term for both the positive and negative cases (rather than using a negative word, such as διάφορα or ἄλλα), it seems that σύμφωνα might have been Antisthenes' own term. It is not typical of Ammonius, who uses it only here, or of Porphyry, who uses it only once in his dialogue on the *Categories* (CAG v. 4.1 p.74.3 Busse, in the passage cited above, §4) and most frequently in his treatise on Ptolemy's harmonics, in a musical sense. It is, however, common in Plato, who uses it often in the metaphorical sense, for "agreement." Compare esp. *Rep.* 2 380c4, a discussion about theological contradictions in poetry, where Plato seems to make fun of the word by using three σύμ- compounds: ". . . ὥς οὔτε ὅσια ἂν λεγόμενα εἰ λέγοιτο, οὔτε σύμφορα ἡμῖν οὔτε σύμφωνα αὐτὰ αὐτοῖς," "Σύμψηφός σοί εἰμι," ἔφη, "τοῦτου τοῦ νόμου" (Socrates: "[These things/statements in poems must be banned from our city] as things said neither as holy, if they should be said, nor as beneficial [σύμφορα] for us nor as like-sounding [σύμφωνα] themselves to themselves." "I am like-voting [Σύμψηφός] with you," he [Adeimantus] said, "for that law.") If the word in Asclepius' text is from Antisthenes, he might have intended it in its literal as well as metaphorical sense, with a focus on the identity of sound in the spoken voices of the two speakers, that is, the external, physical medium of language. If the voices agree, there is no measure available to assess disagreement in the minds, nor is there impetus to investigate this; a fortiori, the speakers do not gainsay each other.

διαλέγονται: This term also is unique in the evidence for Antisthenes' paradox, although it is privileged elsewhere in Antisthenes' remains: compare his book titles *Περὶ τοῦ διαλέγεσθαι ἀντιλογικός* (t. 41A title 6.2) and *Περὶ διαλέκτου* (t. 41A title 6.4), and see t. 187.6. The οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν paradox might have been discussed under either or both of these titles. Alexander's discussions of the paradox use only the simple term λέγειν. Since διαλέγεσθαι is used here in the scenario of agreeing speakers but not in the scenario of disagreeing speakers, it could be an indication that true "conversation," which is probably the mode for teaching (see t. 174) as well as other genuine communication, takes place in a situation where there is basic agreement on the terms of discussion.

εἰ δὲ μὴ σύμφωνα λέγουσι, κατὰ διαφόρων πραγμάτων φέρονται: As in all accounts of the paradox, the utterances of the speakers seem to contain or determine their own references, which is partly a function of the language itself, once it has been uttered. (See full discussion at t. 152B.3 note on τὸν λέγοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν μόνον.) The first verb here takes the speaking persons as its agent, but the middle voice of the second verb seems to imply indirect agency, and one might translate literally: "if they speak sounds not alike, they cause these to refer to different things." Alexander's formulation in 152B.3 is similar: διαφόρους τοὺς λόγους φέρεσθαι. Plato (*Rep.* 5 478b7),

by contrast, uses the active form of φέρω for intensional reference: οὐχ ὁ δοξάζων ἐπὶ τι φέρει τὴν δόξαν; (Does not the person who believes refer his belief to something?).

(7) καὶ ὁ ψευδόμενος γὰρ κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φέρεται καὶ ὁ ἀληθεύων ὅτι ἀθάνατός ἐστιν ἢ ψυχὴ: Ammonius' counterexample aims to reduce the dispute to its simplest form: the soul is either mortal or it is not; one speaker in a definite, polarized debate on this proposition must speak truly, and one must speak falsely. The force of the objection is on the restriction of both speakers to the same subject of reference, κατὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, an assumption that Antisthenes consistently denies. (See discussion above on t. 152B.3.) It seems that Antisthenes must equate the predication claim "is immortal" with an additional part of the referring formulation, holding that "immortal soul" is one referring phrase and that "mortal soul" is another: one speaker might speak the account of a thing, and the other might speak the account of something else, which might "exist" only in the way the footless quadruped or the feet of Ida exist, in thought. When this subject is "the soul" in particular and when its qualification or *differentia* (as Antisthenes might see it) is "immortal," further complications arise, pertaining to the mysterious nature of the example (which Ammonius might have found in Antisthenes). Clearly the word "soul" makes reference to a shared conception, but the intrinsic nature of the human soul was unclear to Socrates, as it seems from Plato's *Phaedo*, and probably to Antisthenes, who was said to be present for that discussion (see also the sequence of titles 7.5–11 at t. 41A). Moreover, some souls might differ from others in certain qualities, including their mortality or immortality. Finally, evidence that could settle the question one way or the other, such as Antisthenes seems to prefer (see t. 103A, 159A–C), is unavailable. So Antisthenes might answer this particular challenge by replying that whether the soul is mortal or immortal is a question fully determined by the real meaning of the word "soul," and one quality will necessarily be appropriate to it, whereas the other will generate a self-contradicting formula that is no λόγος but only noise. But there would be no criterion available for distinguishing which account is which.

ἐπὶ τι δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τοῦ λέγοντος "πόδας Ἴδης" (κατὰ ἀναλογίαν γὰρ εἴρηται): The "partly" or "in some respect" false *logos* is illustrated by two examples, of which the first, a metaphor from *Il.* 20.59, seems appropriate to Antisthenes as Homer critic and might have some connection to his own text. It might be more than a coincidence that feet were important in the false *logos* of §2. The same Homeric metaphor appears as an example of analogy in Demetrius, *On Style* §79, but it is not mentioned by Aristotle; Demetrius cites it in demonstration of the point that not all metaphors are reciprocal, a violation of Aristotle's principle (*Rhet.* 1407a14–15). This could imply a background

debate about how far metaphors can stray from realism, and it is not impossible that Antisthenes was a contributor to such a debate.

ἢ ὅτι τὰ ὀκτὼ διπλάσια τῶν τεσσάρων ὑπάρχουσιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν δύο ἐστὶ τὸ διπλάσιον: Ammonius seems to take Antisthenes' implied position in t. 152A rather than Aristotle's, in holding that double the four is "partly false" as a *logos* of eight, because it is an analogical formulation, properly the *logos* of two.

152D. Asclepius, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Metaphysics"* CAG 6.2 p. 356.14–29 (Hayduck)

(1) λόγος δὲ ἐστὶ ψευδὴς ὁ τῶν μὴ ὄντων, καθὼς ψευδὴς ὑπάρχει· εἰ γὰρ ἀναιρεῖ τὸ μὴ ὄν, οὐκ ἔστι ψευδὴς, διὸ προσέθηκε τὸ "καθὼς ψευδὴς ὑπάρχει." ὅθεν πᾶς λόγος ψευδὴς ἑτέρου παρ' ἐκεῖνο, ἐφ' οὗ καὶ ἀληθὴς ἐστίν, οἷον ὁ τοῦ κύκλου ἀληθὴς λόγος ψευδὴς γίνεται ἐπὶ τριγώνου. (2) ἐκάστου δὲ πράγματος λόγος ἔστιν ὡς εἷς ἐστὶν ὁ ὀριστικὸς αὐτοῦ λόγος, ἔστι δ' ὡς πολλοί, ἐπεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ καὶ ἡ οὐσία ἅμα τοῖς συμβεβηκόσιν, ὅπερ ἐκάλεσε πεπονθός, οἷον "Σωκράτης" καὶ "Σωκράτης μουσικός." (3) ὁ δὲ ψευδὴς λόγος οὐδενός ἐστὶν ἀπλῶς λόγος· διὸ καὶ Ἀντισθένης, φησὶν, ἀνοήτως ὑπελάμβανε μὴτὲν ἀξίῳ λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκείῳ λόγῳ ἔν ἐφ' ἑνός· ἐξ ὧν συνέβαινε μὴ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν κατ' αὐτόν, σχεδὸν δὲ μὴδὲ ψεύδεσθαι, εἴ γε ψεῦδος ὑπάρχει ὅπου ἀντιλογία· θάτερον γὰρ ἀνάγκη ἐστὶν ἀληθεύειν. (4) ἔστι δὲ ἕκαστον λέγειν περὶ τίνος οὐ μόνον τῷ αὐτοῦ λόγῳ, τουτέστιν ἀληθῶς περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῷ ἑτέρου, ψευδῶς μὲν καὶ παντελῶς, ἔστι δὲ ὡς καὶ ἀληθῶς, ὥσπερ τὰ ὀκτὼ διπλάσια ὑπάρχουσι τῷ τῆς δυνάδος λόγῳ. τὰ μὲν οὖν οὕτως λέγονται ψευδῇ.

(1) καθὼς ψευδὴς ex Arist. : καθὼς ψευδὲς codd. | ὅθεν ὁ πᾶς codd. : ὁ del. Hayduck | παρ' ἐκεῖνο Hayduck : παρ' ἐκεῖνον A : παρ' ἐκείνου D (2) ἔστιν ὡς . . . πολλοί om. D | ὡς εἷς ex Arist. : ὅτι εἷς codd. | ὀριστικὸς Hayduck : κριτικὸς codd. | ἐπεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ex Arist. : ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ codd. | post ἐπεὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐστὶ fort. αὐτὴ ἡ οὐσία excidisse propon. Hayduck (4) ἐν τῷ αὐτοῦ λόγῳ codd. : ἐν del. Hayduck

(1) And false account is the account of things that are not so, in which respect it is false. For if he [Aristotle] takes away negative existence, there is no false, and for this reason he added the "in which respect it is false." For this reason every account is false of something other, beyond that thing for which it is true. For example, the true account of the circle becomes false for the triangle. (2) And for each thing there is an account in a sense singular, its defining account, but in a sense various, since the substance along with its accidental attributes is the same

thing, what he [Aristotle] called “qualified,” for example, “Socrates” and “musical Socrates.” (3) But the false account is the account, simply, of nothing. For this reason also Antisthenes, he [Aristotle] says, was making unintelligent assumptions when he held the opinion that nothing ought to be said except by its proper account, one for one. From these views it resulted that it is not possible to gainsay, according to him, and barely even to speak falsely, if, that is, falsehood exists where there is gainsaying. For it is necessary that one of the two speakers speaks truly. (4) And it is possible for each speaker to speak about something not only by its account, that is, truly about the thing, but also by the account of another thing, falsely indeed, and entirely so; and it is also possible to speak like this truly, just as eight is double by the account of two. So statements made like this are said to be false.

Context of Preservation

The transmitted text of Asclepius gives two sequential commentaries for entries 26–29 in Aristotle’s lexicon, including ψεύδος. This text is, then, a variant for t. 152C. Since these are lecture notes, the texts could come from two versions of the lecture.

Importance of the Testimonium

This text adds little to Aristotle in t. 152A or the fuller commentaries of t. 152B and 152C, but it is included for its confirmation of textual details, such as the neuter form ἐν ἐφ’ ἐνός (§3) and the explicit formulation ἐκάστου δὲ πράγματος (§2).

153A. Aristotle, *Topics* A.11 104b19–21 (Ross)

= 47C DC

θέσις δέ ἐστιν ὑπόληψις παράδοξος τῶν γνωρίμων τινὸς κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν, οἷον ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν, καθάπερ ἔφη Ἀντισθένης, ἢ ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται, καθ’ Ἡράκλειτον, ἢ ὅτι ἐν τὸ ὄν, καθάπερ Μελισσός φησιν (τὸ γὰρ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐναντία ταῖς δόξαις ἀποφνηαμένου φροντίζειν εὐηθες).

ἐν τὸ ὄν codd. pl. : ἐν τὸ πᾶν C¹ | καθάπερ codd. pl. : ὥσπερ C |
ἐναντία ταῖς δόξαις om. C

A thesis is a counterintuitive judgment of one of the figures well-known in philosophy, for example, that it is not possible to gainsay, according to what Antisthenes said, or that everything is in motion, according to Heraclitus, or that what is is one, according to what

Melissus says (for it is silly to pay attention to any chance person making proclamations in opposition to common beliefs).

Context of Preservation

This is from Aristotle's set of definitions of types of statement at the beginning of the *Topics*. (See t. 151B.) Related to "thesis" are "proposition" (πρότασις), a statement that is generally accepted, and "problem" (πρόβλημα), a statement not generally accepted. "Thesis" is a sub-type of "problem."

Importance of the Testimonium

This shows that Antisthenes' thesis was prominent for Aristotle. To judge from the parallels, the thesis represents Antisthenes, and Antisthenes represents the thesis. This implies that Aristotle did not attribute it to Protagoras or Prodicus. (See t. 154.) Aristotle also classifies Antisthenes as a "well-known" philosopher, although he elsewhere calls Antisthenes' reasoning "silly" (ῥετο εὐήθως, t. 152A) and refers to Antisthenes and his associates as "uneducated" (οἱ οὕτως ἀπαιδευτοί, t. 150A). In his *Rhetoric* (t. 51A) and *Politics* (t. 68) also, Aristotle seems to refer to Antisthenes as a positive authority.

Notes

ἀποφνημαμένον: This term connotes rhetorical display, as though the "paradox" is essentially provocative. In *De interp.* 17a2–3, Aristotle defines ἀποφαντικός λόγος more neutrally as a meaningful voice that makes a positive or negative assertion, but the verb and its participles often imply assertions that are especially bold or ungrounded. He refers early in his own major works to, for example, "those who have pronounced about truth" (τῶν περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀποφνημαμένων, *Met.* 993b17) and "those who have pronounced about the best government" (τῶν ἀποφνημαμένων περὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς ἀρίστης, *Pol.* 1260b23; again at 1273b27). Both of these topics form titles in Antisthenes' catalog. In both these texts, Aristotle acknowledges Antisthenes briefly (t. 68, 150A, 152A).

φροντίζειν: Aristotle respects the function of the paradox to stimulate thinking, as long as the speaker has previous authority. Here Antisthenes deserves his audience. In t. 150A and 152A, Aristotle's respect for Antisthenes is less clear.

153B. Alexander of Aphrodisias, *Commentary on Aristotle's "Topics"* CAG 2.2 p. 79.7–29 (Wallies)

(1) ἀναιρῶν γὰρ Ἀντισθένης τὸ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν ἔλεγε δεῖν μὲν τοὺς περὶ τίνος λέγοντας ἐκεῖνο λέγειν καὶ σημαίνειν δι' ὧν λέγουσι τὸ περὶ

οὐ λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀφείλιν λέγειν. (2) ταῦτα προλαμβάνων ἔλεγεν· οἱ ἀντιλέγειν δοκοῦντες ἀλλήλοις περὶ τίνος ἦτοι ἀμφοτέροι λέγοντες τὸν τοῦ πράγματος λόγον ἀντιλέγουσιν ἢ οὐδέτερος ἢ ὁ μὲν λέγων ὁ δὲ οὐ λέγων· (3) ἀλλ' οὕτε, εἰ ἀμφοτέροι λέγοιεν τὸν τοῦ πράγματος λόγον, ἀντιλέγοιεν ἄν (ταῦτα γὰρ ἄν λέγοιεν), εἴ τε μηδέτερος τὸν τοῦ πράγματος λέγει λόγον, οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἄν τι λέγοιεν περὶ τούτου· οἱ δὲ μὴ λέγοντες περὶ αὐτοῦ τούτου οὐδ' ἄν ἀντιλέγοιεν περὶ αὐτοῦ· (4) εἰ δ' ὁ μὲν λέγοι ὁ δὲ μὴ, οὐδ' οὕτως ἄν ἀντιλέγοιεν· ὁ γὰρ μὴ λέγων τὸν τοῦ πράγματος λόγον οὐδ' ὅλως ἄν τι λέγοι περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκείνου ὃ σημαίνει δι' ὧν λέγει· οὕτως δὲ οὐδ' ἄν ἀντιλέγοι περὶ αὐτοῦ. τούτων δὲ οὕτως ἐχόντων οὐδ' ἄν ἀντιλέγειν εἴη. (5) ψεῦδος δὲ λαμβάνει τὸ τοὺς μὴ λέγοντας τὸν τοῦ πράγματος λόγον ἢ τὸν μὴ λέγοντα μὴδ' ὅλως ἄν τι λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ· οὐ γάρ, εἴ τις μὴ ἀληθῆ λέγει, οὗτος οὐδὲ λέγει περὶ τίνος. ἔστι δὲ λέγειν περὶ τίνος καὶ ψευδῆ λέγοντα (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄν εἴη τὸ ψεύδεσθαι ὅλως, εἰ μόνος εἴη λέγων περὶ τίνος ὁ τάληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγων), εἴ γε πᾶς μὲν ὁ ψευδόμενος περὶ τίνος λέγων περὶ τίνος ψεύδεται. (6) εἰ δὲ ἔστι ψεύδεσθαι, εἴη ἄν καὶ ἀντιλέγειν τινὰ ψευδόμενον· καθόλου γὰρ τὸ ἀντιλέγειν ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὰ ἀντικείμενα λέγειν. οὐ δυνατόν δὲ τοὺς τὰ ἀντικείμενα περὶ ταῦτοῦ λέγοντας ἀληθεύειν ἀμφοτέρους. οὐ τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς δὲ καὶ λόγοις αὐτῶν χρῆσθαι λέγει, ἀλλὰ ταῖς δόξαις ψιλαῖς.

(1) γὰρ a A B P : μὲν γὰρ D | καὶ prius om. A | περὶ οὗ a A D P : περὶ ὧν B | τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας D : τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας ἀλλήλοις a A B P | ὀφείλιν a A D P : ὀφείλει B (2) ἀντιλέγουσιν a B D P : ἀντιλέγειν A | οὐδέτερος a A P et B² : οὐδέτεροι D et fort. B¹ | (3) εἰ a B D P : οἱ A : post εἰ ras. D | λέγοιεν prius a A B P : λέγοντες D | ταῦτα a D P : ταῦτα A B | εἴ τε μηδέτερος a A D P : εἴ γε μηδετέρως B | λόγον a B D P : λόγους A | ἄν τι λέγοιεν Wallies : ἀντιλέγοιεν a B D P : ἀντιλέγειν A : ἄν λέγοιεν Brandis | ἄν ultimum om. A (4) λέγοι a P : λέγει B D : abbr. A | ὅλως a A B P : οὕτως D | ἄν τι λέγοι Brandis : ἀντιλέγοι a D P : ἀντιλέγει B : abbr. A | περὶ ἐκείνου a B D P : ἀπ' ἐκείνου A | 22 verba οὕτως . . . τοῦ init. pag. om. P | ἄν paenult. om. D (5) ἄν τι λέγειν Wallies : ἀντιλέγειν codd. | λέγει περὶ τίνος A D P : περὶ τίνος λέγει a B | ἔστι δὲ D : εἰ δὲ ἔστι A : εἴτε ἔστι B : εἰ ἔστι P : εἴ γε ἔστι a | τάληθῆ a B D P : τάληθῶς A (6) τὸ (bis) et τοῦ om. A | verba post ἐστὶ om. P | τὰ ἀντικείμενα alterum ante λέγοντας transpos. A | ταῦτοῦ D P : τοῦ αὐτοῦ a A B | λέγει a D P : λέγειν A B

(1) For in demolishing the thesis that gainsaying exists, Antisthenes said that people speaking about something must say that thing and

signify through what they say the thing about which they speak, and also that people gainsaying ought to speak about the same thing. (2) Assuming these views, he said: those who appear to gainsay each other about something either gainsay in both saying the account of the thing, or neither, or one saying it and one not. (3) However, if both should say the account of the thing, they would not gainsay (for they would say the same thing), and if neither should say the account of the thing, they would not even say anything about it in the first place: and those not speaking about that thing would also not gainsay about it, (4) and if one speaks it and the other does not, neither in this way would they gainsay: for the one not speaking the account of the thing would not in any way at all say anything about it, but about that which he signifies through what he says: and thus he would not gainsay about it. And with this being the situation, it would not be possible to gainsay. (5) But the fault comes in the claim that those not saying the account of the thing, or the one not saying the account of the thing, would not in any way say anything about it. For it is not the case that, if someone does not say true things, he also does not speak about something. But it is possible to speak about something also when saying false things (for otherwise there would be no false speaking in general, if the only person speaking about something should be the one who speaks the truth about it), if indeed every false speaker, when speaking about something, speaks falsehood about something. (6) And if it is possible to speak falsehood, it would be possible also to gainsay someone speaking falsehood. For in general gainsaying is saying the opposite about the same thing. And it is not possible that those speaking opposite things about the same thing are both speaking the truth. But he [Antisthenes] says they do not use syllogisms and accounts of these [terms occurring in syllogisms], but bare opinions.

Context of Preservation

This is Alexander's exposition of *Topics* 104b19 (t. 153A). In his listing of the examples of paradox (p. 79.2–7, before the start of the text printed here), Alexander recasts the list of paradoxes Aristotle presents: his statement of Heraclitus' thesis is different; he names Parmenides and Zeno, rather than Melissus, as authors of two Eleatic paradoxes; he adds Chrysippus' thesis that health is not good, as a fifth thesis. He changes the order, and by placing Antisthenes last, he introduces extended discussion of Antisthenes' paradox only. His listing of the theses a few pages earlier (p. 70.14–25), in explication of Aristotle's definition of "dialectical proposition" at *Topics* 104a8–11, is also changed from Aristotle, and Alexander's two lists differ slightly from each

other. This suggests that Alexander has considered the theses himself, and his discussion of *Topics* 104a8–11 implies that he has thought carefully about why some propositions about commonplace subject matter count as paradoxes, not simply propositions.

Importance of the Testimonium

Alexander's exposition is the fullest extant account of Antisthenes' thesis (superior to t. 152B–D; but the accounts are complementary and all potentially informative), and it offers several important insights. Most important, it shows that Antisthenes distinguished between sense (λέγειν τι / σημαίνειν τι), medium of statement (σημαίνειν διὰ τινων), and reference (λέγειν περί τινος). Even as the vocabulary is not distinguished, the constructions of the objects are distinguished; and for every utterance, there are two levels of object, the use of a linguistic medium and the reference to a particular object, which together constitute what is said in a linguistic formulation. Assuming that Alexander transmits Antisthenes' own close account of what happens during an utterance, this distinction of two levels of object means that criticisms of a similar thesis in Plato's *Euthydemus* that trade on a confusion between sense and reference are parodies or misunderstandings. See t. 154–55. In addition, this text differs from t. 152B–D in explaining how the disputants fail to agree about one thing, not how they fail to agree about different things. Third, this text shows more clearly than other evidence that the objective measure of truth is the match between λόγος and πράγμα, the account and the thing (the terms are used just as in *Euthyd.* 286a4–b6), even though there is no full explanation of what this means. λόγος must be an ideal or perfect representation of the πράγμα, but it seems not necessarily to be the speech of any particular individual present to the scenario, since the λόγος of the πράγμα in one case is different from what any speaker says. Either Antisthenes implies that this λόγος of the πράγμα would be spoken by the ideal speaker, if one were present, or he implies some impersonal totality of truth immanent in λόγος itself, regardless of whether any individual uses it (such as Heraclitus might imply by his “common logos” [DK 22B3] and such as Stoicism might entail). In the latter case, it remains unclear how this λόγος is related to ordinary language, full as it is of deceptions and mistakes. (See t. 123.)

Notes

(1) δειν: This term appears also in t. 174, where gainsaying is distinguished from teaching. It connotes not a logical necessity but obligatory conditions that must be fulfilled if an interpersonal activity is to take place. Compare t. 152B.3, 155.

τοὺς περὶ τίνος λέγοντας ἐκεῖνο λέγειν καὶ σημαίνειν δι' ὧν λέγουσι τὸ περὶ οὗ λέγουσιν: The speakers use language, or λέγουσι, on two levels. They use a semantic medium (δι' ὧν λέγουσι), and they speak of or about an object external to the semantic medium (περὶ οὗ λέγουσιν). Together, these levels of their act in speaking constitute the direct indication of a thing (σημαίνειν . . . τὸ . . .), which is the same as saying that thing (ἐκεῖνο λέγειν). Alexander is spelling out Antisthenes' special analysis of the speaking event that distinguishes the use of a semantic medium from reference to anything in particular.

τοὺς ἀντιλέγοντας περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὀφείλιν λέγειν: The requirement that the speakers must speak about the same thing is necessary for a diagnosis of gainsaying, according to this preliminary discussion, but in the scenarios that follow, it will not be assumed that the speakers will try to speak about the same thing. See t. 152B.3 note. In §5, Alexander, like all the commentators, will appeal to a fixed foregiven objective referent.

(2) ταῦτα προλαμβάνων ἔλεγεν: Alexander represents Antisthenes' account (before he rebuts it in his own voice at §5), and this could be a quotation. The particle ἦτοι suggests quotation from a casual discussion.

(3) εἴ τε μηδέτερος τὸν τοῦ πράγματος λέγει λόγον: The second scenario, where both speakers fail to give the λόγος of the πράγμα, is unique in the late antique commentators but appears in Pl. *Euthyd.* 286a7–b2. On the importance of this description for Antisthenes' view of truth, see general note above.

οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχήν: See t. 152B.6 note. The failing speakers here are said not to speak about something else and “not even in the first place” to speak about the intended object. Possibly what they speak is nonsense or noise.

ἄν τι λέγοιεν: This word division by Wallies and Brandis (in three places in the text) must be correct: the particle ἄν is needed with optative mood, just as it appears regularly elsewhere in the passage. The manuscripts' “error” is only a mistaken word division. It is not impossible, however, that Antisthenes was making a play on words between τι λέγοιεν and ἀντιλέγοιεν. (Compare t. 171.)

(4) ὁ γὰρ μὴ λέγων τὸν τοῦ πράγματος λόγον οὐδ' ὅλως ἄν τι λέγοι περὶ αὐτοῦ, ἀλλὰ περὶ ἐκείνου ὃ σημαίνει δι' ὧν λέγει: In this third scenario, the failing speaker does speak about something else and does not utter nonsense. This difference between the failing speaker in this scenario and those in the second scenario might be a matter of partial reporting, or Antisthenes might have written separately about disagreeing speakers who are all misinformed (in which case there is no truth or sense to be sought) and disagreeing speakers who have varying true accounts of varying real objects. The first situation could be true of a fully corrupted community: compare Pl. *Phaedr.* 260b1–d1.

(5) **ψεῦδος δὲ λαμβάνει**: Alexander diagnoses Antisthenes' error by pointing out that the speakers are presumed to speak about a given πράγμα and that they speak true or false things about that object. As in the parallel cases, the Aristotelian tradition assumes that an extensional reference overrides the intensional reference of an utterance.

(6) **οὐ τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς δὲ καὶ λόγοις αὐτῶν χρῆσθαι λέγει**: Aristotle's account of Socrates' role in the development of philosophy is that he sought to “syllogize” about ethics and hence concerned himself with definitions, for “the beginning of syllogisms is the ‘what is it’ [question]” (συλλογίζεσθαι γὰρ ἐξίηται, ἀρχὴ δὲ τῶν συλλογισμῶν τὸ τί ἐστίν, *Met.* M.4 1078b24–25). Syllogisms are, in turn, the foundation of Aristotelian science or ἐπιστήμη, such as he defines in the *Analytics*. Hence Alexander seems to be distinguishing Antisthenes' most basic assumptions from those of Aristotle and possibly also Aristotle's Socrates. Either Antisthenes really did deviate from Socrates on this fundamental Socratic point, or Aristotle is presenting a Platonized image of Socrates, supplying a more definite account where Socrates remained tentative.

ἀλλὰ ταῖς δόξαις ψιλαῖς: The phrase “naked opinions” is important in the accounts of Antisthenes' rejection of Plato's Forms (see t. 149A). It must mean that the speakers in these scenarios of gainsaying are using terms of language as based in their “opinions,” or individual minds, and that there is no other basis for them. In particular, there is no pre-established common basis of terms.

**153C. Elias, *Commentary on Aristotle's “Categories”* CAG 18.1
p. 108.21–27 (Busse)**

αἵρεσίς ἐστι ἀνδρῶν ἀστείων δόξα πρὸς μὲν ἑαυτοὺς συμφωνούντων πρὸς δὲ ἄλλους διαφωνούντων. καὶ καλῶς εἶπεν “ἀνδρῶν” καὶ οὐκ “ἀνδρός”. ἐνὸς γὰρ ἀνδρὸς δόξα αἵρεσιν οὐ ποιεῖ· θέσις γὰρ τότε γίνεται, ὡς ἡ Ἡρακλείτου ὅτι πάντα κινεῖται, ἡ Παρμενίδου ὅτι ἐν τῷ ὄν καὶ ἀκίνητον, ἡ Ἀντισθένης ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν· θέσις γάρ ἐστι παράδοξος ὑπόληψις ἐνὸς τῶν κατὰ φιλοσοφίαν γνω-
ρίμων.

μὲν om. b | δὲ ἄλλους P b : ἄλλους δὲ KH | καὶ primum om. Kb |
εἶπεν codd. : fort. εἶπον Busse | ἡ Παρμενίδου K | ἡ Ἀντισθένης K

A school of philosophy is the belief system of worthy men in agreement with each other but in distinction from others. And he did well to say “men” and not “man.” For the belief of one man does not create a school of philosophy. In that case, a thesis comes about, like the one of Heraclitus, that everything is in motion, or

the one of Parmenides, that what is is one and unmoved, or the one of Antisthenes, that it is not possible to gainsay. For a thesis is a counterintuitive judgment of one of the well-known figures in philosophy.

Context of Preservation

Elias begins his introduction to the philosophy of Aristotle with ten preliminary questions, of which the first is why it is called “Peripatetic.” This topic requires the definition of philosophical school. He incorporates Aristotle’s definition of “thesis,” with examples, from the *Topics* (t. 153A)

Importance of the Testimonium

This suggests that Antisthenes was considered a solitary thinker, without associates or a school, by Elias and some strand in the tradition, on the basis of Aristotle’s treatment. Yet Elias also calls Antisthenes “founder” of the Cynic school, just pages later (t. 22B).

Notes

αἵρεσις: On the Hellenistic dispute over whether Cynicism was a “school” or “sect” at all, see t. 135A.

καλῶς εἶπεν: It is not clear whose definition of philosophical school, in opposition to speakers of an outrageous thesis, Elias is quoting; it could be from Proclus, whose responsibility for the ten preliminary questions was cited above (p. 107.24 Busse), or it could be his own. Busse, in suggesting emendation to a first-person verb, implies that this could be Elias’ own definition.

154. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 9.53 (Marcovich)

= 48 DC

καὶ τὸν Ἀντισθένην λόγον τὸν πειρώμενον ἀποδεικνύειν ὡς οὐκ ἔστι ἀντιλέγειν οὗτος πρῶτος διείλεκται, καθά φησι Πλάτων ἐν Εὐθυδήμῳ.
πειρώμενον P F D : πειρόμενον B

And the account of Antisthenes, the one attempting to demonstrate that it is not possible to gainsay, this man [Protagoras] first argued, according to what Plato says in *Euthydemus*.

Context of Preservation

This is from Diogenes’ life of Protagoras, which is aligned into a history of the Italic philosophy, all of which shares a bent for skepticism.

Importance of the Testimonium

This is the most explicit evidence for association of Plato's literary image of "those around Protagoras" (*Euthyd.* 286c2) with Antisthenes. Diogenes understands the οὐκ ἔστι ἀντιλέγειν paradox primarily as Antisthenes', and he implies that the attribution to Protagoras is a minor tradition, represented by one text of Plato. Diogenes reflects either external knowledge about an actual alignment Plato intended between Antisthenes and Protagoras or a Hellenistic tradition that has created this alignment. Burnyeat 1970:116 recognizes in this passage "reasonably careful, perhaps Peripatetic, investigation" that might date before the mid-third century BCE. On Antisthenes and Protagoras, see also t. 41A title 6.1, 148, 38B. A testimonium in Didymus (*Commentary on Ecclesiastes*: see Binder and Liesenborghs 1976; Mayhew 2011:153–59) attributes the thesis to Prodicus. If this testimonium about Prodicus is accurate, it shows that Prodicus and Antisthenes shared a similar thesis. Since Prodicus was senior, he would have posed the thesis first, and Antisthenes would have borrowed it. Such an account would not, however, square with t. 153A.

Notes

καθὰ φησι Πλάτων ἐν Εὐθυδήμῳ: The paradoxical thesis οὐκ εἶναι ἀντιλέγειν in *Euthyd.* 285e2 is the first in a series of puzzles from the sophistic brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus. The thesis, it is implied, leads to further implausible theses: the impossibility of speaking false things (ψευδῇ λέγειν οὐκ ἔστι, 286c6), the nonexistence of ignorance (οὐδ' ἄρα ἀμαθία οὐδ' ἀμαθεῖς ἄνθρωποι, 286d6), the impossibility of refutation (οὐκ ἔστιν [ἐξελέγξαι], 286e2–4), and the impossibility of error in action (οὐδ' ἐξαμαρτάνειν ἔστιν, 287a2). No speaker solves these paradoxes in this text. Rather, Plato seems to show, through the increasing absurdity of the paradoxes and through Dionysodorus' increasing disinterest in the truth of his claims and increasing repetition of the eristic challenge to "refute" his claims, that they are simply incoherent. Lee 2005:72–76 doubts that the opening thesis, οὐκ ἔστι ἀντιλέγειν, can be attributed to the historical Protagoras: this strengthens the possibility that Plato has "the followers" foremost in mind. The exposition of the paradox at 286a4–b6 is closely comparable with Antisthenes' paradox, especially the version in t. 153B.2–4. As for the additional theses, only the second one, against false statement, can be associated with Antisthenes: this is similar to but more absolute than the position attributed to him by Aristotle (t. 152A). Compare also Isocrates (t. 156). No source for Antisthenes mentions the further theses, which diverge ever further from his attested positions. Clearly ignorance and practical error

exist prominently for Antisthenes. (See t. 87, 134a–p, in addition to the more complicated treatment in t. 53.3 and 54.5–7.) It is possible that the connection Antisthenes seems to make between error and pleasure (see esp. t. 123; more generally, t. 124–29) could have as a corollary the infallibility of “pure” rationality—that is, rationality in separation from all irrational pleasure—and that this position invites the treatment of various theses against error in *Euthydemus*, where Plato could be writing a parody. Refutation also seems to be among Antisthenes’ goals (t. 101), although the testimonia suggest that Antisthenes executed refutations by presenting evidence rather than argument (t. 103A, 159), and his attempted refutations by argument might have been failures (t. 83 and notes).

155. Proclus, *Commentary on Plato’s “Cratylus”* 37 (Pasquali)

= 49 DC

ὅτι Ἀντισθένης ἔλεγεν μὴ δεῖν ἀντιλέγειν· πᾶς γάρ, φησί, λόγος ἀληθεύει· ὁ γὰρ λέγων τι λέγει· ὁ δέ τι λέγων τὸ ὄν λέγει· ὁ δὲ τὸ ὄν λέγων ἀληθεύει· ῥητέον οὖν πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι ἔστιν καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος καὶ οὐδὲν κωλύει τὸν τὸ ὄν λέγοντα ψεῦδος λέγειν· καὶ ἔτι ὁ λέγων περὶ τίνος λέγει, καὶ οὐχὶ τι λέγει.

ἔτι codd. plur. : ἔστι A

[Plato writes this] because Antisthenes said it is not right to gainsay. For every account, he says, asserts the truth. For the speaker speaks something. And one who speaks something speaks what is. And one who speaks what is asserts the truth. In reply to him, then, it must be said that there is also false statement, and nothing prevents the person speaking what is from speaking a falsehood. And, further, that a speaker speaks about something, and he does not speak the something.

Context of Preservation

This is Proclus’ exegesis of *Crat.* 385b2–5, the opening of the discussion about the correctness of names, where Socrates establishes that a λόγος can be either true or false, according to its correspondence with what is, and then traces this quality of λόγος to the “truth” and “falsity” of its parts, which are agreed to be names. (The authenticity of the passage has been disputed. Schofield 1972 argues that it has been displaced from an original position later in *Cratylus*. The 1995 OCT edition by Nicoll and Duke marks it as dubious. Ademollo 2011:49–72 defends its traditional place in the text.)

Importance of the Testimonium

Proclus' association between the argument in *Cratylus* and Antisthenes' thesis against gainsaying has plausibility. It is unclear what authority Proclus has for this association. But Proclus was teacher of Ammonius (Asclepius' authority in t. 152C–D), who provides detailed exposition of Antisthenes' thesis, and he quotes Antisthenes twice in his commentary on Plato's *Alcibiades* (t. 93, 199A), once from *Heracles* and once from an unknown text. It is plausible that, working in Athens, he had access to at least some of Antisthenes' texts.

Notes

μη δεῖν ἀντιλέγειν: The prescriptive language (“it is not right to gainsay,” by contrast with the more frequent “it is not possible to gainsay”) has a parallel in t. 174 and in Alexander's account of the basic underlying rules for debate (t. 152B.3, 153B.1).

πᾶς γάρ, φησί, λόγος ἀληθεύει: This is the conclusion of Antisthenes' argument, according to Proclus, who goes on to distinguish three steps that lead to this conclusion. Aristotle (t. 152A) draws a similar line of implication from Antisthenes' thesis against gainsaying to the thesis that there is no false statement (or, according to Aristotle, “almost” no false statement). But Proclus makes no mention of the doctrine of οἰκεῖος λόγος, which according to Aristotle is primary. Isocrates, apparently aligning the same three theses as Aristotle but not commenting on their logical relationship (t. 156), also lists the claim against false speaking first.

ὁ γὰρ λέγων τι λέγει: A semantic object, τι, seems important in several testimonia: see esp. t. 151B, 187.4. This account of Antisthenes' image of the speaking activity fails to mention the extensional object, the περί τινος, of the speech, which Proclus brings up below as his refutation of the argument. (Contrast the three-part analysis of speech attributed to Antisthenes in t. 153B.1.) Possible explanations for this neglect of the extensional referent in Antisthenes' view of speaking are presented at t. 152B.3 note on τὸν λέγοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ λέγειν μόνον.

ὁ δέ τι λέγων τὸ ὄν λέγει: It is unclear that Antisthenes would simply endorse this statement: compare t. 188B.1, where Calypso tells a lie out of self-interest. Either Proclus is supplying a standard argument (from, e.g., *Euthyd.* 283e7–284a8) without independent knowledge of Antisthenes, or Antisthenes made such an argument in a dialectical context or sophistic mode. Possibly this discussion pertains only to sincere speakers.

ὁ λέγων περί τινος λέγει, καὶ οὐχὶ τί λέγει: Antisthenes recognizes this difference, according to Alexander in t. 152B.2 and 153B.1. But Alexander also looks to this problem of the referent when he diagnoses Antisthenes' error (t. 153B.5).

156. Isocrates, *Helen* 1 (Mandilaras)

(1) εἰσὶ τινες οἱ μέγα φρονούσιν, ἣν ὑπόθεσιν ἄτοπον καὶ παράδοξον ποιησάμενοι περὶ ταύτης ἀνεκτῶς εἰπεῖν δυνηθῶσιν· καὶ καταγεγραμμάσιν οἱ μὲν οὐ φάσκοντες οἷόν τ' εἶναι ψευδῇ λέγειν οὐδ' ἀντιλέγειν οὐδὲ δύο λόγῳ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἀντειπεῖν, οἱ δὲ διεξιόντες ὡς ἀνδρεία καὶ σοφία καὶ δικαιοσύνη ταυτὸν ἐστὶν καὶ φύσει μὲν οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἔχομεν, μία δ' ἐπιστήμη καθ' ἀπάντων ἐστίν, ἄλλοι δὲ περὶ τὰς ἔριδας διατρίβοντες τὰς οὐδὲν μὲν ὠφελοῦσας, πράγματα δὲ παρέχειν τοῖς πλησιάζουσιν δυναμένας.

λέγειν codd. : λόγον E² | δύο Γ Λ Ε : δύο Θ Mandilaras |
διατρίβοντες Γ Ε : διατρίβουσι Λ Θ vulg.

(1) There are some who think they have done a lot, if they posit a strange and counterintuitive hypothesis and then are able to speak about it in a tolerable way. And some have grown old claiming that it is not possible either to say false things or to gainsay them, or to oppose two accounts about the same things; and others [have grown old] going on about the proposition that bravery and wisdom and justice are the same, and that we have none of them by nature, but there is one science covering them all; and others [have grown old] spending their time on disputes that yield no benefit, but have the power to provide challenges for their disciples.

Context of Preservation

This is the opening paragraph of *Helen*, normally dated to the 380s, after *Against the Sophists* (see t. 170) and before the *Panegyricus* (see t. 55). See also t. 66, from *Helen*. Isocrates claims that these modes of enacting wisdom and delivering education are revisions from the old sophists before going on to oppose his own new program of education.

Importance of the Testimonium

As in all testimonia from Isocrates (also t. 55, 66, 170), his targets are not named. If we accept the old assumption (see Patzer 1970:234–45) that the first group is Antisthenes and his disciples, the second is Plato and his, and the third is an indefinite group of eristic thinkers, whether Euclides and the Megarians or figures who resemble the Euthydemus and Dionysodorus characters in Plato's *Euthydemus*, then the passage is important for placing Antisthenes first and for distinguishing him for logical theses whereas Plato is attributed with ethical theses. This might show that Antisthenes was the most professionally advanced rival of Isocrates at the time of writing; it might show that Plato developed his thinking about language and logic after Antisthenes

did. (See Patzer 1970:243–45, who seems to assume that ethics is more basic than logic.) Alternatively, it could be that all three groups of thinkers should be aligned with older Socraticism in general and that Plato is not a direct target at all (so Eucken 1983:45–47 and Zajonz 2002:86–87). In that case, Antisthenes could be implicated by all three of the protests, even though Isocrates implies that he has in mind three separate groups.

Notes

ὑπόθεσιν ἄτοπον καὶ παράδοξον: Isocrates' language is similar to that of Aristotle, when he notes Antisthenes for his ὑπόληψις παράδοξος (counterintuitive notion) οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν (It is impossible to gainsay) in the *Topics* (t. 153A).

περὶ ταύτης ἀνεκτῶς εἰπεῖν: According to anecdote, Plato accused Antisthenes of being unable to speak on the topic οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν (t. 148).

καταγεγηράκασιν: Technically all three groups of rivals are said to grow old doing what they do, and the first group is not distinguished for this. The word has, nevertheless, traditionally been understood as a reference to Antisthenes, who has “grown old” while playing the same tunes, making no progress in his wisdom or educational program. (Support for this interpretation was traditionally found in Plato's alleged reference to Antisthenes among “the late learners among the old men,” τῶν γερόντων τοῖς ὀψιμαθέσι, at *Soph.* 251b5–c2.) If Isocrates does refer mainly to Socratics, Antisthenes and Euclides would have been the aging figures at the date of publication, c. 385: Antisthenes would have been about sixty, Euclides about sixty-five. Plato would have been in his mid-forties, close in age to Isocrates himself; Aristippus, who apparently did not teach in Athens, would have been in his mid-fifties; and Aeschines would be about Plato's age, in his mid-forties.

οὐ . . . οἷόν τ' εἶναι ψευδῇ λέγειν: This thesis and the two that follow are attributed to Antisthenes by Aristotle in *Met.* 1024b32–34 (t. 152A), where they are presented as interrelated. Aristotle qualifies the thesis against falsity, saying that it is “nearly” (σχεδόν) impossible to speak false things.

οὐδ' ἀντιλέγειν: To “gainsay” is successfully to erase, override, or refute one statement by positing another. See comments on t. 148 and 152–55.

δύο λόγῳ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν πραγμάτων ἀντειπεῖν: Aristotle uses the term οἰκεῖος λόγος (proper account) for the one-to-one relationship Antisthenes claims between a λόγος and its πρᾶγμα. The use of the same terms λόγος and πρᾶγμα here (and in Ajax' speech, t. 53.1, as well as in the exegeses of Antisthenes' paradox in t. 153B.2–5 and, less prominently, 152B3–4 and 152C4–6) suggests that these were important terms for Antisthenes and, probably, that Isocrates is using them, like ἀντιλέγειν, to mark a particular

reference to Antisthenes. The *πᾶγμα* need not be a material object, but it can be, for example, an event (as in Ajax' speech, t. 53.1) or a number (t. 152A, where it is, however, not clear that this is Antisthenes' own example). The verb *ἀντειπεῖν* is normally constructed with one speech as its internal object, not two, as here: possibly the term *ἀντειπεῖν* is an error for the simple *εἰπεῖν* (so Zajonz 2002:86), or possibly Isocrates is still thinking of Antisthenes' paradox, which always opposes two speeches.

ἀνδρεία καὶ σοφία καὶ δικαιοσύνη ταῦτόν ἐστιν: The thesis that all the virtues are one and are equivalent to a certain kind of knowledge is defended in Pl. *Lach.* 198d–199e and *Protagoras* 349b–360e, and the thesis that virtues are knowledge is attributed to Socrates by Aristotle (*EE* 1216b6–8). There are clues that Antisthenes also upheld the unity of the virtues as moral knowledge: his Odysseus character suggests to Ajax that bravery is wisdom, not physical strength (t. 54.13); see also t. 103, 192A. However, t. 78 seems to distinguish bravery and wisdom from justice.

φύσει . . . οὐδὲν αὐτῶν ἔχομεν: See t. 41A titles 2.1 and 7.8, for the possibility that Antisthenes thought that the inborn *φύσις* of a human was like that of animals and that education was required for this *φύσις* to become like that of the god.

περὶ τὰς ἔριδας διατρίβοντες: Isocrates seems to think of all the Socratics as “eristics.” In the opening of *Against the Sophists*, this characteristic is linked closely with those who “speak about truth,” possibly Antisthenes in particular (see notes on t. 170 and 41A title 6.1). In the close of the *Panegyricus* (t. 55), just after a probable reference to Antisthenes' attack against him, Isocrates makes the same complaint about verbal strife for its own sake. “Eristic” teachers and performers are of concern also to Plato (*Euthydemus*) and Aristotle (*Sophistical Refutations*), who are more precise than Isocrates in characterizing what counts as arguments for their own sake, but it is not necessary that these are all the same eristics.

157A. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* A.3 72b5–7 (Ross)

ἐνίοις μὲν οὖν διὰ τὸ δεῖν τὰ πρῶτα ἐπίστασθαι οὐ δοκεῖ ἐπιστήμη εἶναι, τοῖς δὲ εἶναι μὲν, πάντων μέντοι ἀπόδειξις εἶναι· ὣν οὐδέτερον οὐτ' ἀληθὲς οὐτ' ἀναγκαῖον.

ἐπίστασθαι τὰ πρῶτα C | ἐπιστήμην n | ἀποδείξεις A B C n

Now some people think that there is no knowledge, because one must know the primitive elements, and others think that there is knowledge, but that there is demonstration for everything. Neither of these positions is either true or necessary.

Context of Preservation

The two books of the *Posterior Analytics* discuss the structure of a demonstrative science, one that reasons from first principles to further conclusions. This passage is from the preliminary material, in which Aristotle defines his topic against claims that are either misguided or external to his concerns.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes is not named here, but he must have held developed views on the topic of belief and its relationship to knowledge, on which he wrote a four-part work (t. 41A title 7.4). If Antisthenes is relevant to Plato's *Theaetetus*, he must have been still of concern to Aristotle in this text, which addresses, in several ways, the problems of *Theaetetus*. Even if he was not of concern to Plato, his lengthy text on knowledge should have qualified him for a reckoning by Aristotle. Probably Antisthenes was not a skeptic, among Aristotle's first class of bad thinkers (ἐνίοις μὲν), but he might have held a coherence theory or "circular" theory of knowledge, as Aristotle, later in the text (72b15–18), goes on to characterize the second position he identifies here (τοῖς δέ). Both these classes of thinker are opposed to those who advocate for demonstrative sciences, bodies of knowledge derived systematically through steps from foundations that have certainty. Scholars are divided on the question whether Antisthenes held a foundational theory of knowledge himself: the main evidence for this question is in Aristotle's *Metaphysics* (t. 150A, 152A). If he did, the present passage has no relevance to Antisthenes. If he did not, Aristotle's complaints about circular and coherent knowledge, advocated by the second class of thinkers he renounces, could be directed partly or even largely against him. Isocrates and similar "rhetorical" thinkers, if there were others who held serious views on these questions in their advocacy for "belief" (δόξα) over "knowledge" (ἐπιστήμη) (e.g., *Against the Sophists* 8), would be possible opponents in the first class.

Notes

τὰ πρῶτα: These primitive elements would be equivalent to the unknowable or indefinable στοιχεῖα in t. 150A.5 or in "Socrates' dream" in *Theaet.* 201d8–202a2. In Aristotle's view of demonstrative science, these are probably the axioms and hypotheses.

ἀπόδειξις: See t. 13A, 157C note.

157B. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Γ3 1005b2–4 (Jaeger)

ὅσα δ' ἐγχειροῦσι τῶν λεγόντων τινὲς περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας ὃν τρόπον δεῖ ἀποδέχεσθαι, δι' ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν τοῦτο δρῶσιν. δεῖ γὰρ περὶ τούτων ἥκειν προεπισταμένους ἀλλὰ μὴ ἀκούοντας ζητεῖν.

As for certain people of those who speak about truth, in what mode it should be accepted, however much they attempt [to say], they do this through lack of education in logic. For they should arrive [at the study of ontology] with previous knowledge about these things [in logic] and not investigate while they are learning.

Context of Preservation

This is from Aristotle's discussion of the unity of the subject matter of metaphysics or first philosophy and its sharing of the common axioms that cannot be proven. This subject matter is substance or being, which is no different for the mathematician, the natural physicist, or the dialectician. Aristotle argues that none of these experts can interrogate the axioms of truth itself, which belong to logic, a field that must be mastered before first philosophy. (There is a slight controversy over the exact context of these two sentences. Alexander of Aphrodisias wished to postpone them, and hence Jaeger wonders whether this is an afterthought by Aristotle, added later into the text. Most editors see no problem.)

Importance of the Testimonium

There is no certain reference to Antisthenes here. Maier 1896–1900 v.2 proposed the connection, and Ross 1924 v.1:263 tentatively endorses it. If this is a reference to Antisthenes, it indicates that his text *Truth* (t. 41A title 6.1) explored modes of apprehension and suggests that Antisthenes there confused logic with the study of ontology, in Aristotle's view.

Notes

περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας: See t. 41A title 6.1 and t. 170, where the topic “on truth” might be connected with Antisthenes in particular. The expression τῶν λεγόντων τινὲς περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας suggests that Aristotle has definite speakers in mind, possibly a subset of those who write on nature, whom he has just discussed, or possibly a third class of dialectical thinker, next to the mathematician and physicist. Protagoras, too, wrote under the title “Truth,” but Aristotle's use of present-tense verbs implies opponents more contemporary. (Even Antisthenes is hardly contemporary, unless Aristotle wrote this book in the 360s, soon after Plato's *Theaetetus*, while Antisthenes was still living. Alternatively, Aristotle could be referring to Antisthenes'

writings as though they are contemporary, even if Antisthenes has died. In t. 150A and 152A, he uses the past tense. Brancacci 1990:26–27 rejects reference to Antisthenes in the present testimonium on the basis of the present-tense verbs.) If these thinkers who wish to examine truth are supposed to be a subclass of the writers “on nature” whom Aristotle has just discussed, that could also be a reason to recognize Antisthenes, whose titles “on nature” are classified by the cataloger in the section on logic and epistemology (t. 41A titles 7.8–9) and might have been aporetic. In addition, a question from “nature,” whether or not the soul is mortal, is used as an example in later discussion of Antisthenes’ thesis against gainsaying (t. 152C.7).

ὄν τρόπον: The term *τρόπος* in the abstract sense “way” or “mode” is a dead metaphor in Plato and Aristotle, and it is used frequently in Aristotle to indicate “way” of meaning. But this does not exclude the possibility that Antisthenes helped to give it such an importance (see t. 187.4). Aristotle could be signaling a reference through his use of this vocabulary. The term *τρόπος* also plays a key role in the discussion of truth and speaking in Plato’s *Euthydemus* (284c8), where the thesis against gainsaying is discussed.

δεῖ ἀποδέχεσθαι: If Antisthenes rejected a foundationalist account of truth (see t. 157A), he would have needed to establish other criteria for knowledge, given that he insisted so firmly on the superiority of those with knowledge (t. 72A) and the importance of dividing good men from bad (t. 71, 73).

δι’ ἀπαιδευσίαν τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν: The *Analytics* set out the nature of deductive syllogisms and deductive science. The characterization “uneducated” is applied to Antisthenes and his followers in t. 150A.4 (see notes there).

157C. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Γ4 1005b35–1006a9 (Jaeger)

εἰσὶ δὲ τινες οἱ, καθάπερ εἵπομεν, αὐτοὶ τε ἐνδέχεσθαι φασὶ τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ ὑπολαμβάνειν οὕτως. χρώνται δὲ τῷ λόγῳ τούτῳ πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν περὶ φύσεως. ἡμεῖς δὲ νῦν εἰλήφαμεν ὡς ἀδυνάτου ὄντος ἅμα εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι, καὶ διὰ τούτου ἐδείξαμεν ὅτι βεβαιότατη αὕτη τῶν ἀρχῶν πασῶν. ἀξιούσι δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδεικνύειν τινὲς δι’ ἀπαιδευσίαν. ἔστι γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία τὸ μὴ γιγνώσκειν τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν καὶ τίνων οὐ δεῖ· ὅλως μὲν γὰρ ἀπάντων ἀδύνατον ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι (εἰς ἄπειρον γὰρ ἂν βαδίζοι, ὥστε μὴδ’ οὕτως εἶναι ἀπόδειξιν).

αὐτοὶ τε A^b E J Al¹: om. Lat. et non interpretatur Alexander

There are some people, as we have said, who claim that they themselves both allow that the same thing both is and is not and accept [in their system of beliefs] likewise. And also many of those [writing] about nature use this account. But we have now assumed that it is impossible for something at the same time to be and not to be, and through

this assumption we have demonstrated that this is the firmest of all principles. But some, on account of their lack of education, demand a demonstration also for this. For it is a lack of education to fail to recognize for what one should seek a demonstration and for what one should not. For it is impossible that there be a demonstration for everything in general. The search would go on to infinity, so that not even so would there be demonstration.

Context of Preservation

This introduces Aristotle's extended defense of the principle of non-contradiction.

Importance of the Testimonium

There is no certain reference to Antisthenes here, but this is the development of the debate mentioned in t. 157B. The opponent seems to be the same as the opponent in t. 157A, who rejects a foundationalist theory of knowledge. These fragments are mutually reinforcing: if any of them refers to Antisthenes, then plausibly they all do.

Notes

αὐτοί τε ἐνδέχασθαι φασι τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι: This assertion that some people hold that one individual thinker, indeed even themselves, can accept both sides of a contradiction is different from Antisthenes' paradox as attested, that gainsaying is impossible between two individuals, each of whom has his own incorrigible account of what is (at least, at a given time). As for agreeing with himself, this was apparently the goal of philosophy for Antisthenes, which he apparently achieved (t. 100A), just as it was crucially important to Socrates. If Aristotle is thinking of Antisthenes, he could be responding to finer points in Antisthenes' views that are not preserved otherwise and to Antisthenes' thought that agreeing with oneself was a highly difficult achievement. If Aristotle did not put up with any plurality in ways or degrees of knowing, he could have equated Antisthenes' actual position with the one he is refuting here.

ἀξιούσι δὴ καὶ τοῦτο ἀποδεικνύναι: Aristotle uses the participle ἀξιῶν of Antisthenes in t. 152A. A fondness for "demonstration" is typical of Socrates, and the term comes up repeatedly in Xenophon's *Symposium* (see t. 13A). See also t. 22B, 159A.

ἔστι γὰρ ἀπαιδευσία τὸ μὴ γινώσκειν τίνων δεῖ ζητεῖν ἀπόδειξιν: This definition of lack of education agrees with the stupidity attributed to the advocates of circular knowledge in t. 157A.

158. Aristotle, *Sophistical Refutations* 17 175b15–18 (Ross)

εἰ δέ τις ὑπολήψεται τὸν κατὰ ὁμωνυμίαν ἔλεγχον εἶναι, τρόπον τινὰ
οὐκ ἔσται διαφυγεῖν τὸ ἐλέγχεσθαι τὸν ἀποκρινόμενον· ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν
ὁρατῶν ἀναγκαῖον ὃ ἔφησεν ἀποφῆσαι ὄνομα καὶ ὃ ἀπέφησε φῆσαι.
κατὰ ὁμωνυμίαν codd. plur. : κατὰ τὴν ὁμωνυμίαν D u | ἔλεγχον
codd. plur. : ἔλεγχον <ἐλεγχον> Ross sequ. cod. MP

But if someone shall allow the [refutation] by homonymy to be
refutation, in a certain way it will not be possible for the respondent to
escape being refuted. For in the case of visible referents it is necessary
to renounce the name he has said and to say the one he has renounced.

Context of Preservation

Aristotle gives principles for how answers should be devised in debates with
contentious persons.

Importance of the Testimonium

There is no certain reference to Antisthenes here. Giannantoni includes the
passage because Zeller 1888:293 n.1 and Usener 1856:9 cite it in relationship
to t. 152A. The example Aristotle brings to bear immediately next, “musical
Coriscus,” has a connection to the example of “musical Socrates” in t. 152A,
and the apparent distinction of Coriscus into two persons, this one musical
and that one unmusical (175b19–27), could be related to the ἐν ἑφ’ ἐνός
principle and the οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν thesis. (See also Denyer 1991:30, who
does not cite this passage but reads t. 152A to imply the distinction of Socrates
into multiple persons.) If so, this is unique evidence for the way Antisthenes
would conceive of the multiple “objects” generated from contradictory
statements.

Notes

ἐπὶ γὰρ τῶν ὁρατῶν: Aristotle points out that a distinction between “this
Coriscus” and “that Coriscus” as two different referents for the conflicting
accounts “musical Coriscus” and “unmusical Coriscus” is not a reliable
defense in debate, since the candidate for reference can reasonably be isolated
to the one visible Coriscus.

159A. Elias, *Commentary on Aristototle’s “Categories”* CAG 18.1 p. 109.18–
22 (Busse)

= 160 DC

καί ποτε πάλιν τῷ αὐτῷ συνηγορῶν διδασκάλῳ ἀκίνητον λέγοντι
τὸ ὄν, διὰ πέντε ἐπιχειρημάτων κατασκευάζει ὅτι ἀκίνητον τὸ ὄν· οἷς
ἀντειπεῖν μὴ δυνηθεῖς Ἀντισθένης ὁ Κυνικὸς ἀναστὰς ἐβάδισε, νομίσας
ἰσχυροτέραν εἶναι πάσης τῆς διὰ λόγων ἀντιλογίας τὴν διὰ τῆς
ἐνεργείας ἀπόδειξιν.

ἀντειπεῖν H K b : ἀντιπεῖν P | πάσης H b : πᾶσαν K P | τῆς
ἐνεργείας H K P : τῶν ἔργων b

And on another occasion, agreeing with the same teacher
[Parmenides] in his claim that being is motionless, he [Zeno of Elea]
established through five proofs that being is motionless. Antisthenes
the Cynic, being unable to gainsay them, stood up and walked,
believing that a demonstration through action was stronger than any
sort of refutation through arguments.

Context of Preservation

Elias' anecdote is part of a digression on the reason for the name of the Stoic school. (For Elias' discussion of the names of sects, see also t. 22B, t. 153C.) He distinguishes Zeno of Elea from his proper topic, the Stoic founder Zeno of Citium, then indulges in a set of anecdotes about the former, which show how the first Zeno also was "dialectical," if in a special way.

Importance of the Testimonium

In giving this long digression from the topic, Elias might preserve a clue that Timon of Phlius was the ultimate source for this surely fictional anecdote about Antisthenes and the Eleatics. Elias' digression about Zeno the Eleatic is motivated by a quotation from Timon (fr. 45 diMarco), and the whole set of anecdotes fits with the theme that Zeno was "double tongued" (ἀμφοτερόγλωσσος) because his behavior was different from his thoughts or intentions. Timon might even have invented the anecdote about Antisthenes by fitting Aristotle's three "paradoxes" from the *Topics* (t. 153A) into an efficient story. See, further, discussion on t. 159C.

Notes

οἷς ἀντειπεῖν μὴ δυνηθεῖς Ἀντισθένης ὁ Κυνικὸς ἀναστὰς ἐβάδισε: A similar anecdote, reporting a performative alternative to a statement in words, is earlier attributed to Cratylus the Heraclitean by Aristotle (*Met.* Γ 1010a12–13): ὃς τὸ τελευταῖον οὐθὲν ᾤετο δεῖν λέγειν ἀλλὰ τὸν δάκτυλον ἐκίνει μόνον (who in the end thought he should say nothing but only moved his finger). This anecdote could have inspired duplications. Cratylus' anecdote is like Antisthenes' in its presumption of change but is much more radical in

its commitment: Cratylus confirms Aristotle's claim that linguistic meaning cannot be stable unless something in the world is unchanging or determinate; since Heracliteans such as Cratylus insist that radical flux persists, even they must agree that language cannot. In the present anecdote, however, Antisthenes is simply proving that change exists. His "Heracliteanism," if he permits this identification, insisted not on radical flux but on some flux. He could have thought there were various rates of flux, allowing relative flux and relative stability, or that some things change and other things do not.

τὴν διὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἀπόδειξιν: As in t. 22B, Elias (or his source) seems to associate demonstration especially with the Cynics.

159B. Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism* 3.10.66 (Mutschman-Mau)

διὸ καὶ τῶν κυνικῶν τις ἐρωτηθεὶς <τὸν> κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως λόγον
οὐδὲν ἀπεκρίνατο, ἀνέστη δὲ καὶ ἐβάδισεν, ἔργῳ καὶ διὰ τῆς ἐναργείας
παριστάς, ὅτι ὑπαρκτὴ ἐστὶν ἡ κίνησις.
ὁ ἀντισθένης in mg. G | <τὸν> add. Mutschman et Mau ex 2.244 |
ἐναργείας sic : vel ἐνεργείας

For this reason also one of the Cynics, when asked about the argument against motion, answered nothing, but stood up and walked, presenting in deed and through vividness that motion exists.

159C. Sextus Empiricus, *Against the Professors* 10.68 (Mutschman)

ὅθεν καὶ τῶν παλαιῶν τις Κυνικῶν τοὺς κατὰ τῆς κινήσεως
ἐρωτώμενος λόγους ἀπεκρίνατο μὲν οὐδὲ ἓν, ἀναστὰς δὲ περιεπάτει,
δι' αὐτῆς τῆς ἐναργείας τὴν ἄνοιαν τοῦ σοφιστοῦ ὀνειδίζων.
ἐναργείας sic : vel ἐνεργείας | ἄνοιαν N : διάνοιαν L E ζ

For this reason also one of the ancient Cynics, when asked about the arguments against motion, answered not a thing, but stood up and walked around, putting to shame the folly of the wise man through the vividness itself.

Context of Preservation

Sextus uses the same material in two contexts, to argue that neither perception nor reason is a reliable mode for knowledge of physics, since they support conflicting conclusions.

Importance of the Testimonium

Whether or not the anecdote is historically true, it illustrates a possible mode of teaching or proof when argument fails to persuade. Compare t. 103B.

The same anecdote is attributed to Diogenes of Sinope by Diogenes Laertius (6.68) and Simplicius (*Commentary on Aristotle's "Physics"* p. 1012.22–26). A meeting between Antisthenes and Zeno is chronologically possible; one between Diogenes and Zeno is impossible. Sextus writes in the Skeptical tradition that might have fabricated the anecdote. (See t. 159A.)

Notes

διὰ τῆς ἐναργείας: The difference in vocabulary from Elias' διὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας is an error in transmission, but it also demonstrates the different purposes to which the anecdote was put. Elias' "activity" must be the original term, used in Aristotelian doctrine to distinguish "potential" powers from their activity: this distinction was part of Aristotle's own strategy against Eleatic monism. Sextus' "vividness" could be appropriate to the Skeptic's concerns, showing that perception and reason consistently contradict each other.

159D. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 9.15 Marcovich)

(not in SSR)

πλείστοι τέ εἰσιν ὅσοι ἐξήγνται αὐτοῦ τὸ σύγγραμμα· καὶ γὰρ Ἀντισθένης καὶ Ἡρακλείδης ὁ Ποντικός Κλεάνθης τε [ὁ ποντικός] καὶ Σφαῖρος ὁ Στωικός, πρὸς δὲ Πausanίας ὁ κληθεὶς Ἡρακλειτιστής, Νικομήδης τε καὶ Διονύσιος. τῶν δὲ γραμματικῶν Διόδοτος, ὃς οὐ φησι περὶ φύσεως εἶναι τὸ σύγγραμμα, ἀλλὰ περὶ πολιτείας, τὰ δὲ περὶ φύσεως ἐν παραδείγματος εἶδει κεῖσθαι.

ἐξήγνται P F D et B² : ἐξήγντο B¹ | Ἡρακλείδης codd. plur. : Ἡρακλίδης B | ὁ ποντικός secundum del. Bake | Ἡρακλειτιστής P F : Ἡρακλείτης τῆς B : Ἡρακλείδης D | Νικομήδης : νικομίδης B : νικομηδεῖς D | εἶδει B P D : ἤδη F

And there are very many who have interpreted his [Heraclitus'] text: these are Antisthenes and Heraclides of Pontus, and Cleanthes and Sphaerus the Stoic, and in addition Pausanias, the one called Heraclitist, and Nicomedes and Dionysius, and of the grammarians Diodotus, who says the text is not about nature, but about the constitution, and the statements about nature are there in the form of a paradigm.

Importance of the Testimonium

This passage pertains to the distinction, or identity, between Antisthenes the Socratic and Antisthenes the Heraclitean. In 6.19 of his *Lives* (t. 38A), Diogenes distinguishes Antisthenes the Socratic from three others of the same name: Antisthenes the Heraclitean, Antisthenes of Ephesus, and the historian

Antisthenes of Rhodes. The statement is usually accepted (a list of nineteenth-century authorities is in Patzer 1970:162 n.54; Giannantoni 1990 v.4:197 calls it a waste of time to doubt the distinctions), and Diels' fragments of the pre-Socratics identifies this Antisthenes the Heraclitean as an individual thinker (DK 66). However, Schleiermacher, in his edition of Plato (1804–34 v.2: p. 19, v.3.2: p. 5; trans. Dobson 1836:202 and esp. 239–40), set out the thesis that Antisthenes was one of the “Heracliteans” attacked by Plato in *Theaetetus* and *Cratylus*. Simplicius also seems to have known such a tradition: see t. 149B-1 on *Theaet.* 179e3–183c3. In *Theaetetus* itself, such suspicions could be confirmed: see 180d3–7, where latter-day Heracliteans are said to demonstrate their points simply, so that even shoemakers can understand (on shoemakers, see t. 207C). See also t. 122G, 151A. The possibility that the distinction is false should at least be considered without prejudice.

Diogenes' distinction would have to be explained as a “correction” of the tradition about Antisthenes the Socratic. There is evidence that Stoics “corrected” their tradition (t. 137A), and one possibility is correction by a Stoic concerned about the skepticism toward *logos* implied by Aristotle's comments on the Heracliteans' doctrine of radical flux in *Met.* Γ (esp. 1010a1–14). Up to the time of Sphaerus (c. 285–210), a third-generation Stoic and a pupil of Cleanthes, Heraclitus seems to have been part of the Stoic tradition (Diog. Laert. 7.178). Possibly the new Stoic orthodoxy under Chrysippus removed Heraclitus. Alternatively, Diogenes' sentence in 6.19 might have been expanded late in the tradition (ms. F is at odds with the others at this point). If Diogenes' distinction can be explained, it remains unclear which titles in Antisthenes' catalog could correspond to a written exegesis of Heraclitus. If the *Aletheia* (t. 41A title 6.1) addressed Heraclitus, perhaps by opposing him to Parmenides, who used this term prominently, this would be consistent with Plato's conjunction of Heraclitus and Protagoras in his *Theaetetus*. See also t. 164, 171, 174.

Heraclitus, meanwhile, leaves tracks of influence in the traditions of both the early Stoics (see Long [1975]1996: esp. 39 n.14) and the Cynics (Malherbe 1978; Kindstrand 1984), and it is plausible that Antisthenes played a role in these traditions.

Notes

ἐξηγῶνται αὐτοῦ τὸ σύγγραμμα: This expression implies written exposition of a written text, not simply interpretation. Antisthenes entitled a work Περὶ ἐξηγητῶν (title 8.2) and could have been a pioneer in textual exegesis as a form of philosophy, such as Plato seems to scorn (in texts such as *Theaetetus*), although he might have composed his own dialogues for the purpose of generating exegesis (see the *Laws*).

Ἡρακλείδης . . . Κλεάνθης τε . . . καὶ Σφαῖρος; If the names are in chronological order, as it appears, the Antisthenes in question was the first exegete and preceded Heraclides of Pontus. (Diels also has this understanding.) Diogenes' source for this early part of the list might be either Sphaerus himself, who wrote a five-part text on Heraclitus (Diog. Laert. 7.178), or a reception of Sphaerus' list. White 2004 catalogs the passage as fr. 51 of the Peripatetic Hieronymus of Rhodes, who is named as Diogenes' source for the information that follows in 9.16.

On Education

testimonia 160–175

160. Epictetus, *Discourses* 1.17.10–12 (Schenkl)

= 38 DC

“καὶ τὰ λογικὰ ἄκαρπά ἐστι.” καὶ περὶ τοῦτο μὲν ὀψόμεθα. εἰ δ’ οὖν καὶ τοῦτο δοίη τις, ἐκεῖνο ἀπαρκεῖ ὅτι τῶν ἄλλων ἐστὶ διακριτικὰ καὶ ἐπισκεπτικὰ καὶ ὥς ἂν τις εἴποι μετρητικὰ καὶ στατικά. τίς λέγει ταῦτα; μόνος Χρύσιππος καὶ Ζήνων καὶ Κλεάνθης; Ἀντισθένης δ’ οὐ λέγει; καὶ τίς ἐστὶν ὁ γεγραφώς ὅτι ἀρχὴ παιδείσεως ἡ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις; Σωκράτης δ’ οὐ λέγει; καὶ περὶ τίνος γράφει Ξενοφῶν ὅτι ἤρχετο ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψεως, τί σημαίνει ἕκαστον;

στατικά codd. plur. : τατικά s | μόνος aut μόνως S :
μῶν ὡς S_c : μῶν οὐ Elter

“Also logic is fruitless.” We will see about this, too. But even if someone should concede this, the previous point is enough, that for other things logic is the tool for distinctions and examinations and, so to speak, taking measures and weights. Who says this? Only Chrysippus and Zeno and Cleanthes? Doesn’t Antisthenes say it? And who is it who has written that the examination of names is the beginning of education? Doesn’t Socrates say it? And about whom does Xenophon write that he began from the examination of names, what each one signifies?

Context of Preservation

Epictetus’ discourse is on the thesis “that logic is necessary,” and his main task is to explain why the Stoics put logic first in their curriculum, before ethics and physics.

Importance of the Testimonium

This testimonium supports the idea that Antisthenes considered names fundamental and the basic units of τὰ λογικά, which holds a logical (not rhetorical) sense in Epictetus’ full discourse. Epictetus knows and

values Chrysippus, whose writings seem to constitute the pinnacle of the philosophical curriculum (Long 2002:44–46), and he understands Antisthenes’ and Socrates’ positions to be precursors to those. The passage seems to imply that Antisthenes considered names primary, in some sense, over reality: they provide the scale of measure for physics and ethics, not vice versa. This arguably “nominalist” view can be interpreted in a way different from the Sophistic nominalism that Plato opposes: the primacy of language refers to the order available for a human being to know or learn about what is, not to the order of being in itself.

Notes

διακριτικά: This term refers to a key function of language in Plato’s texts, for example, in *Crat.* 388c1: Ὅνομα ἄρα διδασκαλικόν τί ἐστιν ὄργανον καὶ διακριτικὸν τῆς οὐσίας ὥσπερ κερκὶς ὑφάσματος (So a name is a kind of teaching tool and for distinction of being, just as a shuttle is a tool of a woven web). A similar view in Antisthenes seems to be implied by Ajax’ concluding tirade to the jury, where the verb κρίνω and the prefix δια- are emphasized, albeit without direct connection to names (t. 53.7–9: see discussion there).

ἐπισκεπτικά: This term does not occur as such in Plato but has cognates that he uses in his frequent calls for examination of a topic (e.g., ἐπισκεπτέον περὶ ἐκείνων τῶν ὀνομάτων, *Crat.* 424a7; ἐπισκεπτέον τὴν τε τραγωδίαν καὶ τὸν ἡγεμόνα αὐτῆς Ὅμηρον, *Rep.* 10 598d7). It is repeated in Epictetus’ quotation that follows (ἐπίσκηψις), apparently from Antisthenes’ book.

μετρητικά καὶ στατικά: Discussion of knowledge in Antisthenes’ period uses these terms to indicate the fundamental criterion. The Hippocratic writer in *On Ancient Medicine* 9.3 states μέτρον δὲ οὐδὲ ἀριθμὸν οὔτε σταθμὸν ἄλλον, πρὸς ὃ ἀναφέρων εἴση τὸ ἀκριβές, οὐκ ἂν εὐροίης ἄλλ’ ἢ τοῦ σώματος τὴν αἴσθησιν (You would find no other measure, neither number nor weight, toward which you will refer in order to know the exact [best treatment], than the perception of the body) (see Schiefsky 2005:185–207). In *Rep.* 10 602d6–e2, Plato appeals to “the logical part in the soul” (τοῦ λογιστικοῦ . . . τοῦ ἐν ψυχῇ) as the location for “measuring and counting and weighing” (τὸ μετρεῖν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν καὶ ιστάναι), which are “most welcome assistants” (βοήθειαι χαριέσταται) against the illusions of painters and poets. Protagoras’ thesis “man is the measure of all things” (πάντων χρημάτων ἀνθρώπων μέτρον εἶναι) attributed this authority to each individual human. Aristotle, when contrasting Protagoras’ views with his own views on the priority between knowledge (not language) and reality, states tentatively that knowledge is “measured” by the known more nearly than vice versa: μετροῦνται <sc. ἐπιστήμη καὶ αἴσθησις> μᾶλλον ἢ μετροῦσιν (they [knowledge and perception] are measured sooner than they measure) (*Met.* I.1 1053a33; also

I.6 1057a11–12). This implies that there is a controversy to be recognized, even for Aristotle.

Ἀντισθένης: Because Epictetus refers the procedure of Socrates transmitted in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* to Socrates, not to Xenophon, it seems that Antisthenes must have made the statement cited in his own voice and must not have attributed it to Socrates.

ἀρχὴ παιδεύσεως ἢ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπίσκεψις: This statement is attributed to Antisthenes as though it is a quotation: it might be taken from the text listed first in the seventh *tomos* (t. 41A title 7.1), *Περὶ παιδείας ἢ περὶ ὀνομάτων* (*On education* or *On names*), in five books or parts; it might even be the opening sentence (see Brancacci 1990:119–29). Socrates' procedure, as portrayed by Plato and Xenophon, is to start each particular inquiry with an examination of the relevant term or terms. For Socrates, this need not imply that some general philosophy of names or language is the first step in philosophy as a whole (as it is for, e.g., Galen: see Morison 2008:118–23 and n.6). In the case of Antisthenes, the phrase ἀρχὴ παιδεύσεως does seem to imply a general step in education as a whole, and the arrangement of titles in the seventh *tomos* of the book catalog also implies a general sequence and perhaps a necessity to understand the general nature of names before one can go further in learning about questions, answers, knowledge, belief, and so on. Finally, if Plato's *Cratylus* has any intertextual relationship with Antisthenes, this, too, implies that Antisthenes had a general approach to the study of names.

ἦρχετο ἀπὸ τῆς τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπισκέψεως, τί σημαίνει ἕκαστον: Amid extant Socratic literature, the principle Epictetus attributes to Socrates is most closely comparable to Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.1: “For Socrates believed that those who know what each thing among what exists is would be able to explain it also to others. But those who do not know, he said, it would be no wonder if they were baffled themselves and baffled others as well. For these reasons he never ceased examining with his associates what each thing among what exists is. It would be a large task to go through how he defined everything, but in as many cases as I think I shall make clear the manner of his investigation, that many I shall tell” (Σωκράτης γὰρ τοὺς μὲν εἰδότας τί ἕκαστον εἶη τῶν ὄντων ἐνόμιζε καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἂν ἐξηγεῖσθαι δύνασθαι· τοὺς δὲ μὴ εἰδότας οὐδὲν ἔφη θαυμαστὸν εἶναι αὐτοὺς τε σφάλλεσθαι καὶ ἄλλους σφάλλειν· ὧν ἕνεκα σκοπῶν σὺν τοῖς συνοῦσι, τί ἕκαστον εἶη τῶν ὄντων, οὐδέ ποτ' ἔληγε. πάντα μὲν οὖν ἢ διωρίζετο πολὺ ἔργον ἂν εἶη διεξελεῖν· ἐν ὅσοις δὲ τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπισκέψεως δηλώσειν οἶμαι, τοσαῦτα λέξω). Although Xenophon refers to definition (διωρίζετο), he speaks of an investigation of not names (τῶν ὀνομάτων) but what exists, or things (τῶν ὄντων). He also does not use the term “signify” (σημαίνει). But other formulations are close to Epictetus, τί . . . ἕκαστον and τὸν τρόπον τῆς ἐπισκέψεως. The phrase ἢ τῶν ὀνομάτων

ἐπίσκεψις is common to Epictetus' citations of both Antisthenes and Socrates. Epictetus might be citing not *Mem.* 4.6.1 but a similar text. If Epictetus' comparison of "Socrates" and Antisthenes is accurate, this could be because Xenophon used Antisthenes' language for describing Socrates' educational procedure. This possibility might authorize us to look further in Xenophon, especially the fourth book, for reflections of Antisthenes' accounts of Socratic dialectic (so Brancacci 1990:129–46).

161. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.103 (Marcovich)

= 66 DC

παραιτοῦνται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα. γράμματα γοῦν μὴ
μανθάνειν ἔφασκεν ὁ Ἀντισθένης <τοὺς σοφοὺς> ἢ σώφρονας
γενομένους, ἵνα μὴ διαστρέφοντο τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις.

<τοὺς σοφοὺς> Marcovich | ἢ σώφρονας B P F : τοὺς σώφρονας
Frobenius et edd. | γενομένους P F : γεναμένους B

And they renounce also the liberal arts curriculum. Indeed Antisthenes used to say that those who are wise or sound in mind should not learn letters, lest they be distracted by other people's thoughts.

Context of Preservation

This is an excerpt from Diogenes Laertius' summary of common doctrines of the Cynics (t. 135A). It shares in the probably Stoic coloring of Diogenes' whole Cynic doxography (t. 134).

Importance of the Testimonium

The negative view of literacy conflicts with the ample surviving evidence for Antisthenes as a reader and writer. It supports the image of the Cynics as opponents of culture in its elevating functions as well as its deceiving functions (as asserted in Sayre 1948). Diogenes Laertius is explaining how Cynicism is a "shortcut" to virtue and does not appear to have derogatory intentions. On the shortcut, see t. 136A-F.

Notes

παραιτοῦνται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐγκύκλια μαθήματα: This is a rejection of the standard educational curriculum preparatory to study of philosophy. In Diogenes Laertius' time and perhaps since Antisthenes' time, which saw the founding of Isocrates' rhetorical school and Plato's Academy, the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία, as it was more normally called, was the general secondary education leading up to philosophy and would probably have included grammar,

rhetoric, dialectic, geometry, arithmetic, astronomy, and music (Marrou 1956:177). (But Diogenes Laertius distinguishes geometry and music as a second kind of education that the Cynics reject: see t. 135A.104) Most philosophical schools, especially the Old and Middle Academy and the Stoa, endorsed this preparation, but the Cynics’ “shortcut” to virtue had no need for such a curriculum, as their philosophy was held to be accessible directly. (The Epicureans also rejected the traditional preparatory curriculum.) This position would distinguish them from the younger Stoics, who advocated, since the time of Chrysippus, for the ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία (Diog. Laert. 7.129), although Zeno had rejected it (Diog. Laert. 7.32).

γράμματα . . . μὴ μανθάνειν: Antisthenes does advocate for the examination of names, and this was clearly important: see t. 160, t. 41A title 7.1. His own studies of Homer (t. 187–92) seem to constitute a level well beyond “learning letters.” The advice given here might be specific for those who are already wise, not those needing education. It might address “learning letters” in a rote way, without critical comprehension, as Niceratus might have done in the case of Homer (t. 185A). In addition, Dio Chrysostom, *Oration* 13.17 (t. 208), rebukes those γράμματα μανθάνοντες ὑπὸ τῶν γονέων (learning letters from their parents) but not using this education to run their city more mindfully and better (σωφρονέστερον καὶ ἄμεινον). This education fails because it is not serving virtue. In the same text (*Or.* 13.21), the mythical Palamedes implicitly rejects the “letters” (γράμματα) he invented, because they have been used, politically, against him. If Antisthenes is in the background to this text, Dio could preserve a fuller explanation for Antisthenes’ renunciation of traditional education, which was not a renunciation of his own brand of education in letters.

<τοὺς σοφοὺς> ἢ σώφρονας: The manuscripts preserve only the second trait, “sound in mind” or “temperate,” which seems inappropriate to the goal of reading. Marcovich’s emendation is plausible and loyal to the transmitted text, which includes the conjunction ἢ.

γενόμενους: The aorist tense of the verb implies that those who should not learn letters are wise or sound of mind in a timeless sense, not striving to become so (which would be future tense, as in t. 163), in the process of becoming so (which would be present tense), or having achieved this virtue over time (which would be perfect tense). It could be, then, that the advice is addressed to those born or created wise or sound in mind and that the statement was provocative or sarcastic in its original context. Such people, in Antisthenes’ view, need no education, but they also might not exist. Diogenes Laertius is unaware of any sarcastic meaning here.

ἵνα μὴ διαστρέφονται: On the term διαστροφή, used in Stoic discussions of loss of virtue (*SVF* fr. 228–36 III.53–56), see Grilli 1963; Giannantoni 1990

v.4:392. The idea that reading can corrupt the soul might be compared with Plato's concerns about the mimesis of inferior types in *Rep.* 3 394e1–398b8. τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις: The opposition between τὰ οἰκεῖα, “one's own,” and τὰ ἀλλότρια, “those of another,” is evident also in t. 34F, in the οἰκεῖος λόγος terminology (t. 152A–B, possibly 192B), and, by implication, in the speech of Odysseus (t. 54). For the argument that this opposition is a core Antisthenes' teaching, see Brancacci 1990. On its importance in Socratic teaching, see Rappe 2000.

162. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.31.33 (Wachsmuth)

= 172 DC

Ἀντισθένης ὁ Σωκρατικὸς φιλόσοφος ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τίνος, ποῖος στέφανος κάλλιστός ἐστιν, εἶπεν, “ὁ ἀπὸ παιδείας.”

Antisthenes the Socratic philosopher, when asked by someone what kind of crown is the finest, said, “The one from education.”

Context of Preservation

Stobaeus' lengthy chapter is titled “On Guidance and Education” (Περὶ ἀγωγῆς καὶ παιδείας). The text presented by Wachsmuth is supplied from a Florentine florilegium presumed to represent the content of §31 in Stobaeus' mostly lost second book. Four of 130 entries are from Antisthenes (also t. 87C, 163A, 173A), and about half are from the early Socratics. Had more of Stobaeus' *Eclogae* survived, it is plausible that Antisthenes would have been well represented. On the *Eclogae* and *Florilegium* of Stobaeus, see Searby 2011.

Importance of the Testimonium

This is a typical reversal of meaning by Antisthenes, most clearly seen in his reinterpretation of “wealth” as “poverty” in t. 82. Here, the questioner seeks to know which of the Greek athletic festivals was the most prestigious, and Antisthenes, in resonance with a long Greek tradition (compare Xenophanes in DK 21B2), replies that education of the intellect is more valuable than athletic victory.

Notes

ποῖος στέφανος κάλλιστός: Crowns were given for victories at the athletic games, and the Olympic crown would be the finest. The city of Athens also awarded golden crowns for public service. Antisthenes could be rejecting either or both of these types of crown. On the anecdotes about Diogenes of Sinope at the Olympics, where he puts his own “humanity” ahead of whatever

virtue the athletes have, see Goulet-Cazé 1986:20–21; Emeljanow 1967:19 (on the letters of ps.-Diogenes). See also t. 197.

163A. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.31.68 (Wachsmuth)

= 64 DC

Ἀντισθένης· δεῖ τοὺς μέλλοντας ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας γενήσεσθαι τὸ μὲν
σῶμα γυμνασίοις ἀσκεῖν, τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν παιδεύσει.
παιδεύσει Meineke : παιδεύσεσιν Halm : παιδεύειν L : λόγοις
Decleva Caizzi ex ostr. (163B)

From Antisthenes: Those who are going to become good men must exercise their body with gymnastics and their soul with education.

Context of Preservation

On Stobaeus' ch. 2.31, see t. 162.

Importance of the Testimonium

The parallel double training of body and soul has many attestations in late fifth-century and early fourth-century Athenian literature: for discussions of parallels, see Henrichs 1969:48–53; Slings 1999:112–13. Antisthenes' formulation seems to be more or less equivalent to that of Isocrates (esp. *To Demonicus* §6, 9, 12) and to what Plato presents, in the third book of the *Republic*, as the traditional Athenian way, before his own innovations; Xenophon also portrays Socrates setting training of the body against training of the soul, toward bravery (*Mem.* 3.9.1). To distinguish Antisthenes from these contemporaries requires close interpretation of the formulations preserved, which the text as transmitted might not bear. It remains unclear whether Stobaeus' text should be emended in light of the parallel on the ostrakon (t. 163B), or whether both are partial preservations: where Stobaeus' text reads παιδεύσει, that preserved in the ostrakon reads λόγοις.

Notes

τὸ μὲν σῶμα γυμνασίοις ἀσκεῖν: There is no classical-period evidence that Antisthenes advocated athletic training, unless in his daily walks from the Piraeus (t. 12A). Athletic training in Antisthenes' time was typical of Spartans and somewhat scorned by the intellectual elite in Athens (Xen. *Mem.* 3.5.15); of course, the Spartan practice might have been a reason for Antisthenes to support it. (See t. 7.) T. 162 seems to advocate for “education,” presumably intellectual, against athletics. Xenophon's interest in physical training and *enkrateia* and his attribution of this interest to Socrates (*Mem.* 1.6.7, 3.8.4,

3.12.1–8, 4.7.9; see also Huss 1999 [“The Dancing Socrates”]:390–91) could be inspired by Antisthenes (as argued by Joël [1893:313–545]), but it could reflect his own military experience and pro-Spartan sentiment.

τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν παιδεύσει (A) (or λόγοις, B): The term λόγοις in the ostrakon (t. 163B) is more appealing, in its symmetry with γυμνασίοις, than παιδεύσει (or whatever is the best form) in Stobaeus, but it is not clear that παιδεύσει must be wrong for the reason that it is not unique to soul but applicable to body and soul alike (as Henrichs 1969:46–47 argues): perhaps the original said τὴν δὲ ψυχὴν λόγοις παιδεύειν, but the *apophthegma* sounded better in shortened form. What could be at stake is the degree of analogy between body and soul and its direction, as well as the question whether there is a particular craft for ἄσκησις of the soul through arguments or words or only a less particular παιδεύσις. The term ἄσκεῖν would imply an experiential and possibly irrational training of the soul, in close parallel to athletic training. Plato (*Rep.* 2 376e2–3) offers a similar parallel expression for the traditional system of education (παιδεία) that has been discovered by the Greeks over time: ἡ μὲν ἐπὶ σώμασι γυμναστική, ἡ δ’ ἐπὶ ψυχῇ μουσική. Isocrates (*To Demonicus* §12) uses a similar formulation for an education he endorses: τὰ μὲν γὰρ σώματα τοῖς συμμέτροις πόνοις, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ τοῖς σπουδαίοις λόγοις αὐξεσθαι πέφυκεν. In Plato’s *Republic*, this citation of tradition is the preamble to the new kind of education Plato proposes for the guardians. If the difference in the phrasing attributed to Antisthenes in the *apophthegma* is authentic, Antisthenes’ innovation was to replace μουσική with λόγοι. When it comes to education through Homer (Plato’s topic in the *Republic* as well as Antisthenes’ likely curriculum: see t. 185–92), this might indicate a heightening of rationality or critical awareness in “training” with poetry. Plato, too, immediately paraphrases μουσική as λόγοι (2 376e8), but this could be polemical, since his further discussion treats shortcomings in use of Homer’s myths for education and so clears the ground for his own new proposals. In Plato’s account, education of the soul should precede education of the body, which the soul can then supervise (3 403d8–e2). Neither aspect of this early education should lose its balance against the other, lest the pupil become “hard” through too much gymnastics or “soft” through too much music (3 410d1–2). If Antisthenes endorsed a hierarchy between education of the body and education of the soul, he probably would have put the soul first, like Plato (see Höistad 1948:41–44). But it is also plausible that education of the body, through training involving hardships chosen purposefully, was a model for education of the soul and so was prior in this way. The present evidence does not seem to address the discipline of the body toward asceticism in order to create leisure for exercise of the soul in philosophy, as discussed in Xen. *Mem.* 1.5.4–5, which Brancacci 1993 argues should be attributed to Antisthenes: such an argument would have to come from t. 82.

163B. Ostrakon from Oxyrhynchus, Cologne inv. no. O4 (Henrichs)

ὁ μὲν γεωργὸς τὴν γῆν, ὁ δὲ φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν ἐξημεροῖ. δεῖ τοὺς
μέλλοντας ἀγαθοὺς ἄνδρας γίνεσθαι τὸ μὲν σῶμα γυμνασίοις ἀσκεῖν,
<τὴν> δὲ ψυχὴν λόγοις.

ἐξσιμεροι Ostr. : corr. Henrichs | γεινσθαι Ostr. | γυμναιοις Ostr. |
ἄσκεν Ostr. | <τὴν> Henrichs

The farmer tames the land, and the philosopher, [human] nature. And those who are going to become good men must exercise their body with gymnastics and their soul with discourses.

Context of Preservation

The ostrakon (= 18 1T CPF), from about the late second century CE, shows that this saying was part of real education in Roman Egypt. The many errors of spelling indicate that the writer was a beginning student. The ostrakon combines two anonymous gnomes that are reported separately in other gnomological collections. (On the second, see Wachsmuth 1882: no. 41.) Both Henrichs and Decleva Caizzi endorse the parallel between the second gnome and Stobaeus' excerpt from Antisthenes and tentatively attribute the first gnome also to Antisthenes.

Notes

ὁ μὲν γεωργὸς τὴν γῆν: An analogy between teachers of humans and farmers of plants is asserted by Protagoras in the long explanatory speech attributed to him in Pl. *Theaet.* 167b5–7: πολλοῦ δέω βατράχους λέγειν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν σώματα ἰατροὺς λέγω, κατὰ δὲ φυτὰ γεωργοὺς (I am far from talking about frogs, but I mean doctors for [treating] bodies and farmers for [treating] plants). The analogy is not exactly the same, but, in consideration of other connections between Antisthenes and *Theaetetus* (see t. 41A title 6.1, 149B, 82 introductory note), there could be a relationship. The parallel between farming and education is widespread (compare, e.g., Plutarch at the opening of *On the Education of Children*).

164. *Gnomologium Vaticanum* no. 3 (Sternbach)

= 68 DC

ὁ αὐτὸς εἶπε τοὺς ἀπαιδεύτους ἐνύπνια ἐγρηγορότα.

The same man [Antisthenes] said that uneducated people are dreams awoken.

Context of Preservation

On the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, see t. 5.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes appears to put a twist on a traditional proverb, that hope is like a dream (*Gnom. Vat. no. 375*). A similar simile, comparing the unenlightened to sleepers, is found in Heraclitus (DK 22B1, 73).

Notes

ἐνύπνια ἐγρηγορότα: Anacreon allegedly said that “hopes are the dreams of those who have been awakened” (αἱ ἐλπίδες ἐγρηγορότων ἐνύπνιά εἰσιν, *Gnom. Vat. no. 375*), and this association between hope and dreams has a long tradition from Pindar to John Chrysostom (Sternbach 1963:143–44). Antisthenes’ formulation is different, comparing people themselves to dreams. If the text is correct, he could be playing off the more traditional saying by questioning the ontological status of people themselves, not just their thoughts.

165. Galen, *Protrepticus* 6 (Kaibel)

καλῶς οὖν καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης καὶ ὁ Διογένης, ὁ μὲν χρυσᾶ πρόβατα
καλῶν τοὺς πλουσίους καὶ ἀπαιδεύτους, ὁ δὲ ταῖς ἐπὶ τῶν κρημνῶν
συκαῖς ἀπεικάζων αὐτοὺς. ἐκείνων τε γὰρ τὸν καρπὸν οὐκ ἀνθρώπους
ἀλλὰ κόρακας ἢ κολοιοὺς ἐσθίειν, τούτων τε τὰ χρήματα μηδὲν μὲν
ὄφελος εἶναι τοῖς ἀστείοις, δαπανᾶσθαι δ’ ὑπὸ τῶν κολάκων.

Ἀντισθένης Kaibel : Δημοσθένης A

So Antisthenes and Diogenes said it well, the first by calling the rich and uneducated “golden sheep,” and the second by likening them to fig trees on the cliffs. For the fruit of fig trees is eaten not by humans but by crows or jackdaws, and the money of the rich and uneducated has no advantage for refined people but is consumed by flatterers.

Context of Preservation

Galen frames the opening of his *Protrepticus* as a comparison between τέχνη (craft) and τύχη (luck) as guide for life and happiness. In the present paragraph, he asserts that money is a form of τύχη, to be rejected. Antisthenes (whose name is supplied by emendation) and Diogenes are the only authorities cited here, but Aristippus, Socrates, Plato, and Hippocrates, among others, are cited in surrounding sections. The text is known from its Aldine first edition of 1525, whose manuscript source has been lost: see, further, Boudon 2000:46–71.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes' comparison, if it can be attributed, should be referred to the world of the Sophists and their customers, also the subject of discussion in t. 208 (where the τέχνη versus τύχη opposition is implied at §25); see also t. 13A, 63, 78.

Notes

καὶ ὁ Ἀντισθένης καὶ ὁ Διογένης: Kaibel's emendation for the Aldine reading καὶ ὁ Δημοσθένης καὶ ὁ Διογένης is likely because of the protreptic context and its Socratic tradition, the likely pairing of Antisthenes with Diogenes, and the Cynic flavor of the images, which are otherwise attributed to Socrates, Antisthenes, Diogenes of Sinope, and Crates. *Gnom. Vat.* no. 206 and ps.-Maximus credit Demosthenes with the pun on κόλακες and κόρακες, from the second image, but these sources could reflect the same confused reception of Antisthenes' name as the present case. Moreover, it seems best not to resort to reading chiasmus in the passage, when the second image is clearly cited from Diogenes (see next note). Boudon 2000:19–21 argues for a return to the Aldine reading.

ὁ μὲν χρυσᾷ πρόβατα: Some interpretations assume that there is a chiasmus here, whereby the first image is from Diogenes and the second from Antisthenes. But the second is attributed in developed form to Diogenes (see next note), and the pun on κόλακες and κόρακες (see t. 131) can be common Cynic material. The text implies clearly that the first image is from Antisthenes and the second from Diogenes. Other *apophthegmata* of Antisthenes use imagery of nurtured professional teachers (t. 63) and metal symbolizing wealth (t. 169).

ταῖς ἐπὶ τῶν κρημνῶν συκαῖς: This saying is attributed to Diogenes of Sinope in Diog. Laert. 6.60 (SSR VB 321), and an expanded version appears in Stob. 4.31.48 (SSR VB 242). The version in Stobaeus incorporates the point here attributed separately to Antisthenes. Cynic sayings were passed down in tradition, and attribution to individual Cynics is not always important.

μηδὲν μὲν ὄφελος εἶναι τοῖς ἀστείοις: The term ἀστεῖοι for ethically "good" people appears nowhere in Diogenes Laertius' account of Antisthenes, but it appears in t. 106 (see note there), and it is central to a facetious syllogism attributed to Diogenes of Sinope (Diog. Laert. 6.72).

166. *Gnomologium Vaticanum* no. 6 (Sternbach)

= 183 DC

[= Stob. 3.46 Meineke (= *Excerpta e ms. Florentino Ioannis Damasceni* II.13.135, not in Wachsmuth-Hense's Stobaeus); Maxim. 17.38 p. 320 Philipps;

Gnom. Vindob. no. 97; *Anton.* 1.1.26; *Gnom. Basil.* no. 29; *Gnom. cod. Pal.* 122 f. 128v no. 4]

ὁ αὐτὸς πυνθανομένου του τυράννου, τί δήποτε οὐχ οἱ πλούσιοι πρὸς τοὺς σοφοὺς ἀπίαςιν, ἀλλ' ἀνάπαλιν, εἶπεν· “Ὅτι οἱ σοφοὶ μὲν ἴσασιν ὦν ἐστὶν αὐτοῖς χρεῖα πρὸς τὸν βίον, οἱ δ' οὐκ ἴσασιν, ἐπεὶ μᾶλλον χρημάτων ἢ σοφίας ἐπεμελοῦντο.”

πυνθανομένου του τυράννου R. Janko per litt. : πυνθανομένου τοῦ τυράννου Sternbach : ἐρωτηθεὶς *gnom. alia* | χρημάτων ἢ σοφίας *Gnom. Vindob.* : σοφίας ἢ χρημάτων *cod. et gnom. alia* | ἐπεμελοῦντο *cod. et gnom. plur.* : ἐπεμελοῖντο *Gnom. Vindob.* : ἐπιμελοῦντο *Gnom. cod. Pal.* 122

The same man [Antisthenes], when a tyrant asked him why rich men do not go in quest of wise men, but the opposite, he said, “Because wise men know what they need for life, but rich men do not know, since they have concerned themselves more for money than for wisdom.”

Context of Preservation

On the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, see t. 5. A similar *apophthegma* is attributed to Aristippus, to whom it is more appropriate according to later lore (Diog. Laert. 2.69). The sentiment is also attributed to Simonides (Arist. *Rhet.* 1391a8) and to Socrates in the *gnomologia* (Sternbach 1963:7 ad loc.) and seems to come from a pre-Cynic phase of the story pattern of contest between the ruler and the wise man.

Importance of the Testimonium

This testimonium seems to conflict with other anecdotes presenting Aristippus courting the Sicilian tyrant while the Cynic washes vegetables (t. 33B; SSR IVA 44–48). Xenophon (t. 13A) might indicate, if it is not a joke, that Antisthenes was a matchmaker between wealthy men such as Callias who needed wisdom and wise men such as Prodicus who needed money. Antisthenes' version of self-sufficiency might guarantee that he, as wise man, never needs the rich man; but Diogenes of Sinope presses the issue with his provocative begging (Diog. Laert. 6.67).

Notes

ἐπεὶ μᾶλλον χρημάτων ἢ σοφίας ἐπεμελοῦντο: This unnecessary completion of the explanation, which is lacking in early versions, might be a late addition to the *apophthegma* (so Sternbach).

167. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.6 (Marcovich)

= 98, 186 DC

[= Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 108.3–4 (first part only) Walz]

τοιαῦτ' ἔφη δεῖν ἐφόδια ποιεῖσθαι ἃ καὶ ναυαγήσαντι συγκολυμβήσει.
ὄνειδιζόμενός ποτ' ἐπὶ τῷ πονηροῖς συγγενέσθαι, “Καὶ οἱ ἱατροί,” φησί,
“μετὰ τῶν νοσοῦντων εἰσίν, ἀλλ' οὐ πυρέττουσιν.”

ἔφη om. et φησὶ post ποιεῖσθαι F | ναυαγήσαντι codd. plur. :
ναυαγήσαντα F | τῷ codd. plur. : τὸ B | οἱ om. F

He [Antisthenes] said one should pack as cargo things that will also swim with one after a shipwreck. Reproached once for keeping company with the wretched, he says, “Also doctors are among the sick, but they do not catch a fever.”

Context of Preservation

These *chreiai* are listed by Diogenes among the last third of his series. (See details at t. 3.) Both are attributed also to Aristippus: the first in Galen, *Protrepticus* 5; the second in *Gnom. Vat.* no. 37.

Importance of the Testimonium

The overlap between Antisthenes and Aristippus is typical of the transmission of *chreiai*: see also t. 166. On the surprisingly slight evidence for tension between Antisthenes and Aristippus, see t. 33.

Notes

καὶ οἱ ἱατροί: On the doctor as image for the philosopher, see t. 53.4, 124A, 169, 187.9. On its prominence in Cynicism, see Kindstrand 1976:31.

168. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.5 (Marcovich)

= 188 DC

[= Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 107.18–20 Walz]

γνωρίμου ποτὲ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀποδυρομένου ὡς εἶη τὰ ὑπομνήματα
ἀπολωλεκώς, “Ἔδει γάρ,” ἔφη, “ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς
χαρτίοις καταγράφειν.”

ἀπολωλεκώς B P Φ et Arsen. : ἀπολέσας F | post ψυχῇ rasura 2
litt. in B | τοῖς χαρτίοις F : τοῖς χάρταις P Φ : ταῖς χάρταις B et Arsen. |
καταγράφειν codd. plur. : γράφειν F

When an associate once lamented to him that he had lost his notes, he said, “You should have written them down in your soul and not in your papers.”

Context of Preservation

This *apophthegma* occurs near the middle of Diogenes' set: see t. 3C for the ordering.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes is attributed with an attitude toward writing not unlike that in Pl. *Phaedr.* 274c5–275b2. This could be indication that Antisthenes' own practice in writing, like Plato's, was not foremost a record of his thought but had other purposes.

Notes

ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὰ καὶ μὴ ἐν τοῖς χαρτίοις: Possibly this is parallel to the location of justice not in the wallet but in the soul (t. 83.2) and to the location of wealth not in the house but in the souls (t. 82.34). Ajax' need for the location of invulnerability not in his shield but in himself (t. 54.7) could also be parallel. In each case, some item of equipment is liable to become confused with the capacities of the self.

169. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.4 (Marcovich)

= 184, 185 DC

[= Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 107.14–15 Walz]

ἐρωτώμενος διὰ τί ὀλίγους ἔχει μαθητάς, ἔφη ὅτι “Ἀργυρέα αὐτοὺς ἐκβάλλω ῥάβδῳ.” ἐρωτηθεὶς διὰ τί πικρῶς τοῖς μαθηταῖς ἐπιπλήττει, “Καὶ οἱ ἱατροὶ,” φησί, “τοῖς κάμνουσιν.”

ἀργυρέα F P : ἀργυραία B P¹ Q | οἱ ἱατροὶ B φ : ἱατροὶ P F

When asked why he had few disciples, he said, “I strike them off with my silver wand.” When asked why he rebuked his pupils harshly, “Also doctors,” he says, “do the same with the sick.”

Context of Preservation

These are the ninth and tenth of the twenty-seven *apophthegmata* Diogenes reports. (See t. 3C.) Arsenius' florilegium includes the first but omits the second.

Importance of the Testimonium

This is the best surviving evidence for the nature of Antisthenes' teaching, how he viewed pupils and whether he was paid. (See also t. 34C, 170.)

Notes

ὀλίγους . . . μαθητάς: The anecdote assumes that Antisthenes had pupils for his Socratic teaching, as he allegedly had for his rhetorical teaching (t. 12). For the existence of followers or pupils of Antisthenes, see also t. 34C, 150A.4, 171. The presumption of the question is that he should have a sustaining volume of pupils and, therefore, that he is trying to teach in some kind of institutional way, although not necessarily in a fixed location. Presumably the critical mass would be needed for his economic support. It is possible, too, that the anecdote has no historical basis but was created in the later Hellenistic period on the assumption that every thinker and teacher is part of a formal scholastic succession.

ἀργυρέα: This might imply that Antisthenes demanded silver (a normal word for “money”) in exchange for his teaching and that his fee was too high (so, originally, Usener 1856, 1880: see Patzer 1970:240 n.137 for the widespread acceptance of this position in the nineteenth century). Partly supporting this interpretation might be the *apophthegma* attributed to Bion of Borysthenes (F78 Kindstrand). Bion said that there are three kinds of student according to Hesiod: the golden, who pays and learns; the silver, who pays and does not learn; and the bronze, who learns but does not pay. If this scheme is implied, Antisthenes demands his fees even if the students do not learn, and he loses his students because they learn nothing.

ῥάβδος: The wand must designate the teacher’s authority and possibly also magical powers. The word occurs in a book title (t. 41A title 9.2), where it probably refers to the wand of Hermes or the wand of Circe. In Athenian law, a suppliant for exemption from a harsh law appears before the assembly with a “staff of supplication” (ἰκετηρία ῥάβδος). The Cynic’s staff is normally called a βακτηρία.

πικρῶς . . . ἐπιπλήττει: This is apparently part of Antisthenes’ didactic technique, to judge from the comparison to doctors. (Compare Epictetus 2.22, where he tells his pupils they should expect to depart from philosophy instruction in pain, as from a doctor’s office.) Perhaps he inflicts *ponos*, as an athletic trainer would inflict painful drills and exercises. This *ponos* might be both emotional and intellectual. On doctors, see t. 167.

170. Isocrates, *Against the Sophists* 1–6 (Mandilaras)

(1) εἰ πάντες ἤθελον οἱ παιδεύειν ἐπιχειροῦντες ἀληθῆ λέγειν καὶ μὴ μείζους ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ὑποσχέσεις ὧν ἔμελλον ἐπιτελεῖν, οὐδέποτ’ ἂν κακῶς ἤκουον ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν· νῦν δ’ οἱ τολμῶντες λίαν ἀπερισκέπτως ἀλαζονεύεσθαι πεποιήκασιν ὥστε δοκεῖν ἄμεινον βουλευέσθαι τοὺς ῥαθυμεῖν αἰρουμένους τῶν περὶ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν

διατριβόντων. τίς γὰρ οὐκ ἂν μισήσειεν ἅμα καὶ καταφρονήσει
 πρῶτον μὲν τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας διατριβόντων, οἱ προσποιούνται μὲν
 τὴν ἀλήθειαν ζητεῖν, εὐθὺς δ' ἐν ἀρχῇ τῶν ἐπαγγελμάτων ψευδῇ λέγειν
 ἐπιχειροῦσιν; (2) οἶμαι γὰρ ἅπασιν εἶναι φανερόν ὅτι τὰ μέλλοντα
 προοιγνώσκουν οὐ τῆς ἡμετέρας φύσεώς ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ τοσοῦτον
 ἀπέχονεν ταύτης τῆς φρονήσεως, ὥσθ' Ὅμηρος ὁ μεγίστην ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ
 δόξαν εἰληφώς καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς πεποίηκεν ἔστιν ὅτε βουλευομένους
 ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν, οὐ τὴν ἐκείνων γνώμην εἰδώς, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἐνδείξασθαι
 βουλόμενος ὅτι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν τούτῳ τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν. (3)
 οὗτοι τοίνυν εἰς τοῦτο τόλμης ἐληλύθασιν, ὥστε πειρώνται πείθειν
 τοὺς νεωτέρους ὡς, ἦν αὐτοῖς πλησιάζωσιν, ἃ τε πρακτέον ἐστὶν
 εἴσονται καὶ διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης εὐδαίμονες γενήσονται. καὶ
 τηλικούτων ἀγαθῶν αὐτοὺς διδασκάλους καὶ κυρίους καταστήσαντες,
 οὐκ αἰσχύνονται τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας μνᾶς ὑπὲρ τούτων αἰτοῦντες. (4)
 ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν τι τῶν ἄλλων κτημάτων πολλοστοῦ μέρους τῆς ἀξίας
 ἐπώλουν, οὐκ ἂν ἡμφισβήτησαν ὡς εὖ φρονοῦντες τυγχάνουσι,
 σύμπασαν δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὕτως ὀλίγου τιμῶντες,
 ὡς νοῦν ἔχοντες διδασκαλοὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀξιοῦσι γίγνεσθαι. καὶ
 λέγουσι μὲν ὡς οὐδὲν δέονται χρήματων, ἀργυρίδιον καὶ χρυσίδιον
 τὸν πλοῦτον ἀποκαλοῦντες, μικροῦ δὲ κέρδους ὀρεγόμενοι μόνον
 οὐκ ἀθανάτους ὑπισχνοῦνται τοὺς συνόντας ποιήσιν. (5) ὁ δὲ
 πάντων καταγελαστότατον, ὅτι παρὰ μὲν ὧν δεῖ λαβεῖν αὐτοὺς,
 τούτοις μὲν ἀπιστοῦσιν οἷς μέλλουσιν τὴν δικαιοσύνην παραδώσειν,
 ὧν δ' οὐδεπώποτε διδάσκαλοι γεγόνασιν, παρὰ τούτοις τὰ παρὰ τῶν
 μαθητῶν μεσεγγυοῦνται, πρὸς μὲν τὴν ἀσφάλειαν εὖ βουλευόμενοι,
 τῷ δ' ἐπαγγέλμασιν τὰναντία πράττοντες. (6) τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλο
 τι παιδεύοντας προσήκει διακριβοῦσθαι περὶ τῶν διαφερόντων,
 οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει τοὺς περὶ ἕτερα δεινοὺς γενομένους μὴ χρηστοὺς
 εἶναι περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια· τοὺς δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην
 ἐνεργαζομένους πῶς οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστι μὴ τοῖς μαθηταῖς μάλιστα
 πιστεύειν; οὐ γὰρ δὴ που περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ὄντες καλοὶ κάγαθοι καὶ
 δίκαιοι περὶ τούτους ἐξαμαρτήσονται, δι' οὓς τοιοῦτοι γεγόνασιν.

(1) οὐδέποτ' ἂν 96 : οὐκ ἂν codd. | φιλοσοφίαν codd. vulg. :
 σοφίαν Θ 96 (2) μεγίστην Γ² Λ Ε vulg. : μέγιστος Γ | ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ δόξαν
 εἰληφώς (σχών Ε) Γ Ε : δόξαν ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ σχών Λ Θ vulg. | ὑπὲρ Γ Ε :
 περὶ Λ Θ vulg. | αὐτῶν vulg. : αὐτῶν codd. : ἐαυτῶν Orion | ἐν Γ Ε : ἐν
 τι Λ Θ vulg. (3) πλησιάζωσιν Γ Ε : πλησιάσωσιν Λ Θ vulg. | καὶ διὰ . . .
 γενήσονται om. Γ Α : add Γ⁵ et Λ² | τῆς αὐτῆς Ε : ταύτης τῆς codd. |
 αὐτοὺς edd. : αὐτοὺς Γ Ε : om. Λ vulg. | σφᾶς αὐτοὺς post κυρίους add.
 Λ vulg. | τρεῖς ἢ τέτταρας Γ Ε : τέτταρας ἢ πέντε Λ Θ vulg. (4) οὐκ
 om. Γ : add. Γ² | τιμῶντες Γ Ε : πωλοῦντες Λ Θ vulg. | τοὺς συνόντας

ποιήσιν Γ Ε : ποιήσιν τοὺς αὐτοῖς (αὐτοῖς vulg.) συνόντας Λ vulg.

(5) λαβεῖν Γ Ε : λαμβάνειν Λ Θ vulg. | μεσεγγυοῦνται Γ Ε Λ *Suda* : μεσεγγυῶνται Λ² vulg. : μεσεγγύονται Photius (6) περὶ om. Γ : add. Γ² | ἐνεργαζομένους Γ Ε : ἐργαζομένους Λ Θ vulg. | μὴ τοῖς Γ Δ : μὴ οὐ τοῖς Γ³ Λ Ε Θ Δ² vulg. | μάλιστα Γ Ε : μάλλον Λ Θ vulg.

(1) If all those undertaking to teach were willing to speak the truth, and not to make promises in excess of what they were going to achieve, they would never have bad reputations among the private citizens. But as it is, those who dare to brag with too little thoughtfulness have made the situation such that people who choose to devote their minds to idleness appear to deliberate better than those who spend their time in philosophy. For who would not both hate and scorn to the utmost those who spend their time in disputation, who pretend to seek the truth, but right away in the beginning of their proclamations undertake to speak falsehoods? (2) For I believe it is clear to all that foreknowledge of the future is not proper to our nature: rather, we fall so far short of this intelligence that Homer, who has achieved the highest reputation for wisdom, portrayed even the gods at times deliberating about the future. It is not that Homer knew their mind, but he wanted to show us that this is one of the things impossible for humans. (3) But these men have advanced to this stage of boldness, that they try to persuade the youth that, if they study with them, they will know what to do, and through the same knowledge they will become happy. And after setting themselves up as teachers and masters of such great goods, they take no shame in asking three or four minae in exchange. (4) If they were selling any other possession for such a remote fraction of its value, they would not argue that they are acting in good sense, but when they value the entirety of virtue and happiness at so little, they claim they can be sensible teachers of other people. And they say that they have no use of money, calling wealth “mere silver” and “mere gold,” but in striving for a small profit they promise to make their pupils all but immortal. (5) And what is most ridiculous of all is that they distrust those from whom they have to take this profit, the ones to whom they are about to impart knowledge of justice, but as depositors for the money from their pupils, they use persons whose teachers they have never been. They make good decisions regarding security, but they do the opposite from their claims. (6) For it is fitting that people who teach some other subject be minutely precise about their interests at stake, since nothing prevents those who have become clever in another field from being less than honorable in their

contracts. But those who have inculcated virtue and self-restraint, how is it not nonsense that they do not trust their pupils most of all? For I do not suppose that people who are fine and good and just with respect to others will go wrong with respect to those through whose efforts they became this way.

Context of Preservation

This is the opening of *Against the Sophists*, which Isocrates (by his own account, in *Antidosis* 193) published at the time he opened his rhetorical school, in the late 390s, perhaps in 393.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes is named neither here nor at any point in Isocrates' corpus, although we know there was a rivalry between them (see t. 41A titles 1.5–6, 55). His presence in this text has been supposed since Usener (1856, 1880) and Ueberweg (1861, 1868), on the basis of resonances with book titles in Antisthenes' sixth and seventh *tomoi*, other overlaps with Antisthenes' interests and teachings, and Antisthenes' unique status as a Socratic who might have been running a school already in the 390s in Athens and who probably wrote against Isocrates in that period. The Academy of Plato was not yet open; Euclides, if he was teaching, was in Megara; Aeschines, if he was teaching, was charging higher fees. If this reasoning is correct, the text is the core evidence for Antisthenes' career as a prominent teacher in the 390s and offers evidence for key terms and ideas recognizable in relationship to Antisthenes by the Athenian reading public. If it is incorrect, we have no evidence about Antisthenes' teaching apart from anecdotes in Diogenes Laertius (t. 169, 34C). Possibly Isocrates refers to the whole Socratic circle, including Plato and the Megarians, as he apparently does in *Helen*, where he separates his opponents into three groups (t. 156). See Eucken 1983:18–27; Giannantoni 1990 v.4:271–73.

Notes

(1) ἀληθῆ λέγειν: Antisthenes wrote a text entitled *Truth* (see t. 41A title 6.1), which could be the text in which he proclaimed or argued in support of his thesis οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν (it is not possible to gainsay). See t. 152B–D, 153B–C, 41A titles 6.1–4.

μείζους . . . ὑποσχέσεις: Isocrates also accuses the rival in the last sentences of the *Panegyricus*, who is plausibly Antisthenes, of making great promises but wasting time on trivial things (t. 55).

κακῶς ἤκουον: Antisthenes welcomes bad reputation (from a base audience) in t. 86, 89–90.

τῶν περὶ τὰς ἔριδας διατριβόντων: This is Isocrates' characterization of one class of his opponents in *Helen* (t. 156) and, in different terms, of his opponent in the *Panegyricus* (t. 55). The term ἔρις is not frequent elsewhere in Isocrates' writings, and it seems reserved for the rival "philosophers." Two of Antisthenes' book titles in the catalog have ἐριστικός as a second title (titles 7.2 and 7.10), and a third, which seems closest to the topic of the οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν thesis, has the characterization ἀντιλογικός (title 6.2). If Antisthenes, like Plato in *Protagoras*, drew a sharp distinction between what he termed "eristic" and what he termed "antilogic," then Isocrates is subtly attacking a core point in Antisthenes' position by the way he describes it. Alternatively, the "eristic" speaker might have been directly discussed or analyzed by Antisthenes, and Isocrates might be taking him to task not for being eristic himself but for wasting time trying to explain how and why other people are eristic.

οἱ προσποιῶνται . . . τὴν ἀλήθειαν ζητεῖν, εὐθὺς δ' . . . ψευδῆ λέγειν ἐπιχειροῦσιν: If Isocrates is referring to Antisthenes' argument about gainsaying, as it runs in t. 152–53, he is again subtly accusing him of a performative self-contradiction, speaking false things within his very argument that speaking false things never occurs.

(2) τὰ μέλλοντα προγινώσκειν: There is no solid evidence that Antisthenes tied his brand of education to knowledge of the future, and this claim might be a commonplace. But the speeches by Ajax and Odysseus (t. 53–54) both depend on conjectures about the future, and Ajax seems to be wrong both in his conclusions and in his epistemic attitude of certainty, whereas Odysseus seems to be correct in both ways: meanwhile, the future is verifiable for the external audience, who knows the myth. See also t. 18, 83.

ὥσθ' Ὅμηρος ὁ μεγίστην ἐπὶ σοφίᾳ δόξαν εἰληφώς: Isocrates mentions Homer only eight times: plausibly he alludes here to Antisthenes' known interests, taking the opportunity again to imply self-refutation.

(3) ἅ τε πρακτέον ἐστὶν εἴσονται: The teachers Isocrates attacks promise that they can teach students to deliberate correctly about the future.

διὰ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐπιστήμης εὐδαίμονες γενήσονται: See t. 134c, where happiness is also the goal of teaching. See t. 136B, 136D.

τρῆς ἢ τέτταρας μνάς . . . αἰτοῦντες: This is a low fee, on Isocrates' terms. It is plausible as the scale of fee Antisthenes might have charged: see t. 94B.

(4) ἀργυρίδιον καὶ χρυσίδιον τὸν πλοῦτον ἀποκαλοῦντες: For the verb ἀποκαλέω, compare t. 54.3.

μόνον οὐκ ἀθανάτους ὑπισχνοῦνται τοὺς συνόντας ποιήσιν: In t. 176, Antisthenes seems to promise immortality as the goal of an ethical life. In t. 173, he suggests that philosophy is preparation for living with the gods. In t. 96, his Prometheus is said to have told Heracles that he should learn "things more elevated than humans."

(5) τούτοις μὲν ἀπιστοῦσιν οἷς μέλλουσιν τὴν δικαιοσύνην παραδώσειν:
Compare t. 83, where the reciprocity between teachers of justice and their students is discussed (with humor). See also t. 172, 34C.
καλοὶ κάγαθοὶ καὶ δίκαιοι: See t. 172a.

171. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.3 (Marcovich)

= 187 DC

[= Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 107.7–10 Walz]

πρὸς τε τὸ Ποντικὸν μεράκιον μέλλον φοιτᾶν αὐτῷ καὶ πυθόμενον
τίνων αὐτῷ δεῖ, φησί “Βιβλαρίου καινοῦ καὶ γραφείου καινοῦ καὶ
πινακιδίου καινοῦ,” τὸν νοῦν παρεμφαίνων.

To the youth from Pontus who was about to join him as a pupil and was asking what he needed, he said, “A new booklet and a new pencil and a new writing tablet” [i.e., “a booklet and a mind and a pencil and a mind and a writing tablet and a mind”], emphasizing the syllable “mind.”

Context of Preservation

This *chreia* appears in the earliest doctrinal section of Diogenes’ life of Antisthenes. (See t. 3.) Similar *chreiai* are attributed to Isocrates (Theon, *On the Chreia* p. 100.16–21) and Stilpo (Diog. Laert. 2.118). It is plausible that the original should be attributed to Antisthenes. Stilpo’s *chreia* is addressed to Crates of Thebes, who was Stilpo’s pupil before he became a Cynic, and it refers to his need for a new cloak: the very use of the pun might be a reference to Crates’ desertion to the tradition of Antisthenes. Isocrates’ *chreia* refers only to the pencil and the writing tablet, not the booklet, which might suggest that it is a reduction of an original. Isocrates is a frequently recurring speaker in the tradition represented by Theon’s *Progymnasmata*, whereas Antisthenes is not. In the gnomological tradition, there was a tendency to transfer wise sayings to the most well-known authorities (Kindstrand 1986).

Importance of the Testimonium

If this is authentic, it demonstrates Antisthenes’ interest in wordplay and possibly the materiality of language, that is, its reducibility to the sounds from which it is constituted. On this issue, see t. 150A.1 notes; compare t. 192B.

Notes

τὸ Ποντικὸν μεράκιον: This is presumably Diogenes of Sinope, unless Antisthenes had other pupils from the area of Pontus. (They come in a group in t. 21; compare t. 136B, 172.)

Βιβλαρίον: This is a diminutive form of βιβλος, “book,” attested otherwise only later than Antisthenes. Aristophanes uses the similar term βιβλιδάριον (*Frogs* 756), and so the form here is plausibly original to Antisthenes. Diminutives are frequent in the Cynic fragments (e.g., in Bion of Borysthenes), possibly in reflection of the spoken language (Kindstrand 1976:27).

τὸν νοῦν παρεμφαίνων: Diogenes analyzes Antisthenes’ pun, the play between καινοῦ (new) and καὶ νοῦ (and a mind). Heraclitus was famous for a similar pun between ξυνός (“common,” glossed as κοινῶ, which itself differs in just one letter from Antisthenes’ καινοῦ) and ξὺν νόῳ (with the mind) (DK 22B2, 114). It is not impossible that Antisthenes is making a play on Heraclitus’ words as well as his own. On the possibility that Antisthenes was an exegete of Heraclitus, see t. 159D.

172. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.8–9 (Marcovich)

= 175, 179, 189, 190 DC

[= Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 108.12–20 (a and d) Walz]

(a) ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ, καθά φησι Φαινίας ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῶν Σωκρατικῶν, τί ποιῶν καλὸς κάγαθός ἔσσοιτο, ἔφη, “Εἰ τὰ κακὰ ἃ ἔχεις ὅτι φευκτά ἐστὶ μάθοις παρὰ τῶν εἰδόντων.” (b) πρὸς τὸν ἐπαινοῦντα τρυφήν, “Ἐχθρῶν παῖδες,” ἔφη, “τρυφήσειαν.” (c) Πρὸς τὸ παρασχηματίζον αὐτὸ τῷ πλάσῃ μειράκιον, “Εἰπέ μοι,” φησὶν, “εἰ φωνὴν λάβοι ὁ χαλκός, ἐπὶ τίνι ἂν <οἶε> σεμνυνθῆναι;” τοῦ δ’ εἰπόντος, “Ἐπὶ κάλλει,” “Οὐκ αἰσχρὴ οὖν,” ἔφη, “τὰ ὅμοια γεγηθὼς ἀψύχῃ;” (d) Ποντικοῦ νεανίσκου πολυωρήσειν αὐτὸν ἐπαγγελλομένου, εἰ τὸ πλοῖον ἀφίκοιτο τῶν ταρίχων, λαβὼν αὐτὸν καὶ θύλακον κενὸν πρὸς ἀλφιτόπωλιν ἦκε καὶ σαξάμενος ἀπήει· τῆς δὲ αἰτούσης τὸ διάφορον, “Ὁ νεανίσκος,” ἔφη, “δώσει ἔαν τὸ πλοῖον αὐτοῦ τῶν ταρίχων ἀφίκηται.”

(a) ὑπὸ τοῦ P⁵ et Menagius : ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ B P¹ F (c) αὐτὸ Scaliger et Casaubon : αὐτοῦ B P F | <οἶε> Casaubon (d) αὐτὸν B P F Φ et Arsenius : αὐτοῦ W et Cobet | κενὸν B² F et Arsenius : καινὸν P B¹ Φ

(a) When asked by someone, according to what Phantias says in his *On the Socratics*, what he should do to become fine and good, he [Antisthenes] said, “If you should learn that the bad things that you possess are to be disposed of, from those who know [sc. you will become fine and good].” (b) To someone praising luxury, he said, “May the children of my enemies live in luxury.” (c) To the youth who was posing for the sculptor, he said, “Tell me, if the bronze should take a voice, for what do you think it would be proud?” And when the youth

said, “For its beauty,” he said, “Then aren’t you ashamed of delighting in the same things as an inanimate object?” (d) When a youth from Pontus was promising to take care of [paying] him if his boat of salted fish should arrive, he took him and an empty sack and went to the flour seller, filled the sack, and was leaving. When she asked for the payment, he said, “The young man will pay you if his boat of salted fish arrives.”

Context of Preservation

This is a series of four *apophthegmata* and anecdotes from the section of Diogenes’ life of Antisthenes that seems to be set in Athens (6.7–10). SSR reprints (b) as t. 114.

Importance of the Testimonium

The *apophthegma* and anecdote on beauty (a and c) illustrate Antisthenes’ distinction between the aesthetic beauty appropriate to inanimate objects and the kind of fineness appropriate to the human being.

Notes

(a) Φαινίας ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῶν Σωκρατικῶν: Phanias of Eresus, a member of the Peripatetic school under Theophrastus, is the earliest biographical source Diogenes Laertius cites for Antisthenes. Phanias wrote about the lives of the Socratics, among other topics. This Peripatetic interest in lives of philosophers, shared by Dicaearchus and Aristoxenus, apparently launched the tradition in which Diogenes Laertius writes. (See Mejer 1978.)

καλὸς κάγαθός: This is an expression for true virtue here, as well as elsewhere in the testimonia on Antisthenes, and seems not to mean “fine and good” in a merely social or conventional sense. See t. 78, 14A, 134b note, 41A titles 3.1 and 3.4; compare t. 208.28. The present anecdote (c), however, shows beauty or κάλλος as conceived in the conventional sense. See also t. 57A–B, 61.

τὰ κακὰ . . . ὅτι φευκτά ἐστι μάθοις: A similar idea is in t. 87A–B.

παρὰ τῶν εἰδότην: The knowledge might be that from experience. The prepositional phrase seems to imply the deliberate imparting of knowledge through instruction or advice, not the learner’s acquisition of knowledge from observation.

(b) πρὸς τὸν ἐπαινοῦντα τρυφήν: See also t. 115. That Antisthenes curses the children of his enemies, not his enemies, might imply something about inheritance.

(c) τὰ ὅμοια γεγηθὼς ἀψύχῳ: The anecdote seems to imply that the virtues by which a thing should be measured are appropriate to it. Whereas it is fitting to a statue, a being without a soul, to be beautiful in an aesthetic sense, it is

fitting to an ensouled human to be fine in another sense. Contrast the use of καλὸς καγαθός in the *apophthegma* (a).

(d) Ποντικοῦ νεανίσκου: The youth is presumably Diogenes of Sinope. See t. 171.

δώσει ἂν τὸ πλοῖον αὐτοῦ τῶν ταρίχων ἀφίκηται: Salted fish, being a commodity with real usefulness and not merely symbolic exchange value, but being also preserved and, thus, suitable for storage, is a kind of currency for the Cynics: see also t. 6, 100B. Here there is a joke also on teaching as a commodity. The youth blows off the necessity for paying his teacher, since the good has been delivered and cannot be taken back; but Antisthenes asserts that purchasing flour is just the same.

173A. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.31.76 (Wachsmuth)

= 173 DC

Ἀντισθένης ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος, τί διδάξει τὸν υἱόν, εἶπεν, “Εἰ μὲν θεοῖς μέλλει συμβιοῦν, φιλόσοφον, εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις, ῥήτορα.”

τί codd. : τίς L. Koenen per litt.

Antisthenes, when asked by someone what he would teach his son, said, “If he is going to live with gods, [to be] a philosopher, but if with men, [to be] a rhetor.”

173B. *Gnomologium Vaticanum* no. 7 (Sternbach)

ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς ὑπὸ τινος, τί τὸν υἱόν διδάξει, εἶπεν, “Εἰ μὲν θεοῖς αὐτὸν συμβιοῦν ἐθέλοις, φιλόσοφον· εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις, ῥήτορα.”

The same man [Antisthenes], when asked by someone what he would teach his son, said, “If you would want him to live with gods, [to be] a philosopher: but if with men, [to be] a rhetor.”

Context of Preservation

On Stobaeus’ ch. 2.31, see t. 162. On the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*, see t. 5. The *apophthegma* is assigned to Demosthenes in the *Florilegium Monacense*.

Importance of the Testimonium

Here philosophy and rhetoric are opposed in one sense but the same thing in another, distinguished by the quality of the colleagues with whom the educated man will associate. The opposition might have a parallel in Pl. *Phaedr.* 274a1–5. Compare also Prometheus’ exhortation to Heracles in t. 96, where the *Phaedrus* passage seems also relevant.

Notes

Εἰ μὲν θεοὶς αὐτὸν συμβιοῦν ἐθέλοις, φιλόσοφον: The many gods might be imaginary constructions according to Antisthenes (see t. 179), and the one true god might not use language (see t. 180, where the sense is not quite this but possibly continuous).

εἰ δὲ ἀνθρώποις, ῥήτορα: The order of presentation seems likely to run toward climax rather than deflation, by which criterion Antisthenes recommends a rhetorical education over a philosophical one. The saying could be paraphrased, however, and the interpretation from structure cannot be pressed.

174. Stobaeus, *Anthology* 2.2.15 (Wachsmuth)

= 65 DC

Ἀντισθένους· οὐκ ἀντιλέγοντα δεῖ τὸν ἀντιλέγοντα παύειν, ἀλλὰ διδάσκειν· οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸν μαινόμενον ἀντιμαινόμενος τις ἰᾶται.
 διδάσκειν codd. : διδάσκοντα Meineke

From Antisthenes: One must not stop someone who is gainsaying by gainsaying, but teach him; for neither does one cure a madman by going mad back at him.

Context of Preservation

Stobaeus' ch. 2.2, "On Dialectic" (Περὶ διαλεκτικῆς), is divided into two parts: seven statements in favor of dialectic (2.2.1–7) and eighteen statements opposed (2.2.8–25). In favor are three citations from Plato (*Rep.* 6 533c8–d7, 534e2–535a1; *Phaedr.* 265c9–266c1), one from Archytas, and three from Iamblichus. Opposed are cited poets, Stoics, and the founders of each (skeptical) phase of the Academy: Carneades, Arcesilaus, and Plato himself (*Soph.* 231a6–8; *Phaed.* 92d). Antisthenes is in the second group.

Importance of the Testimonium

This is the best evidence for the idea that Antisthenes understood ἀντιλέγειν as an interpersonal behavior of communication, not just a claim in the mode of language representative about truth. A parallel is in the speech of Ajax (t. 53.7): there the social situation is hostile, and here it is friendly. The classification of Antisthenes among the anti-dialecticians suggests that, even though some of his book titles (t. 41A titles 6.2, 6.5, 7.3) treat this subject, his views probably included the aporetic and the probative in addition to or even rather than the positive. Few of the thinkers included by Stobaeus in this section are outside the field of serious philosophy: Euripides (2.2.8–9), Euenus

(2.2.10), and Theocritus (2.2.19) are the only authorities included who did not become famous as philosophers.

Notes

οὐκ . . . δεῖ: Whereas Antisthenes says in other texts that gainsaying is not possible (οὐκ ἔστι ἀντιλέγειν), here he says that it is not appropriate, if the point is to cure an interlocutor of false beliefs. The variation in wording could be a fault in the transmission, but the analogy to medicine underlines the same point. This might show what Antisthenes really meant by his more outrageous paradox. The *apophthegma* has a resemblance to the explanation of the “man is the measure” doctrine attributed to Protagoras in Pl. *Theaet.* 166a–168c and particularly to his statement (167a5–7) that ὁ μὲν ἱατρὸς φαρμάκοις μεταβάλλει, ὁ δὲ σοφιστὴς λόγοις. ἐπεὶ οὐ τί γε ψευδῆ δοξάζοντά τις τινα ὕστερον ἀληθῆ ἐποίησε δοξάζειν (The doctor changes [bad perceptions] by drugs, the sophist by accounts. For never did someone cause a person believing false things to later believe true ones). For another connection between Antisthenes’ remains and this speech of Protagoras, see t. 163B.

τὸν ἀντιλέγοντα: On Antisthenes’ famous paradox on gainsaying, see t. 148, 152–56, 41A title 6.4.

διδάσκειν: The importance and possibility of teaching is emphasized also in t. 150A.4.

τὸν μαινόμενον ἀντιμαινόμενος: The madman, a figure for the uneducated or unphilosophical, appears in t. 192A. Heraclitus (DK 22B5) uses a similar image of ridiculous reciprocity in objection to ritual cleansing of religious contamination: blood purification is like trying to wash away mud by becoming muddy (οἷον εἴ τις εἰς πηλὸν ἐμβὰς πηλῷ ἀνονίζοιτο), and this response itself resembles madness (μαίνεσθαι δ’ ἂν δοκοῖη).

ἰᾶται: The doctor, a figure used broadly by Plato and Xenophon for the expert in a craft, or *techne*, appears in t. 53.4, 124A, 167, 169, and 187.9. See also t. 208.18.

175. Papyri Fiorentini no. 113 col. II.26–36 (Comparetti-Vitelli)

= 192 DC

φασὶ δὲ καὶ Ἄν |²⁷ τισ[θένη] μειρακίου τινὸς ἑρᾶν | καὶ τινὰς
 βουλομένους θη-|ρεύειν αὐτὸ ἐπὶ δεῖπνον, παρα |³⁰ τιθέναι λοπάδας
 ἰχθύων καὶ | δὴ εἰπεῖν τινὰς πρὸς Ἀντισθέ-| ν[η διότ]ι παρενημεροῦσιν
 αὐ | τ[ὸν οἱ ἄ] ντερασταί. “καὶ μά[λ]α,” | [ἔφη, “θαλ]αττοκρατοῦμαι
 δὴ· |³⁵ [ἀλλὰ γ]ὰρ ὁ μὲν ἀξιοῖ αὐτ’ αἰτεῖν, | [ἐγὼ δ’ ἀπέ]χεσθαι τῶν
 τ[οιούτων.” | [c.7].[.]αθη λο [c.7 | c.10].λιν οἰχ[

26–27 *paragraphos* | 32–33 suppl. Wilamowitz per literas ad Vitelli : Ἀντισθέ| ν[η: “εἰσὶν παρ’ εὐήμεροῦσιν αὐτ[οῖς ed. princ. : Ἀντισθέ| ν[η: “νῦν παρευήμεροῦσιν αὐτ[ικα Crönert : Ἀντισθέ| ν[η: “νῦν δ] ἡ παρευήμεροῦσιν αὐτ[ῶ Gallo | 34 suppl. Guido : [ἔφη, “οὐ θαλ] αττοκρατοῦμαι edd. priores, sed οὐ spatio non admittitur | θαλ] αττοκρατοῦμαι vid. Guido : θα]λαττοκρατοῦμαι alii | δη vid. Guido : δητ alii | 35 suppl. Guido : ἐγώ· εἰ γ]άρ ed. princ. : δῆπον· εἰ γ]άρ Crönert | ἀξιοῖ ed. princ. et alii : ἄξιος Crönert | αὐτ’ Guido : [τα] ὕτ’ ed. princ. et alii | 36 suppl. ed. princ. [ἐγώ]’ ἀπέ]χεσθαι Crönert | chriam cum τοιοῦτων terminari credunt plerique : sed 36–37 sic suppl. Crönert: αὔριον δ’ ἂν παρ]αθῇ λο[πάδας ἄλλος τις οὐκ ἂν π]άλιν οἷχ[οιτο μετὰ τούτου;”

They say that also Antisthenes was in love with a certain young man, and some others who wanted to court him by inviting him for dinner set out some plates of fish, and then some of them told Antisthenes why his rivals in love were surpassing him in success. “Yes indeed,” he said, “I am defeated at sea. But he thinks it is good to ask for them, whereas I think it is good to stay away from such things.”

Context of Preservation

This text on papyrus (= 18 2T CPF), datable from handwriting to the second century CE, preserves a framing discussion about the failure of method in various realms to cause an effect any more reliably than chance or the actions of laypersons. Persuasion, similarly, has no method. (Hence the text has been called a “Diatribе on Persuasion”: Crönert 1908 and Körte 1920 compare the overall flavor to Teles.) Two anecdotes follow about the unsuccessful attempts of Socrates and Antisthenes to gain influence with younger men. In the first, briefer anecdote about Socrates, someone asks why he was unable to improve Alcibiades despite spending so much time with him. Socrates replies, “Whatever I might teach him by day, others undo by night.” Only the second of the four columns of writing evident on this papyrus fragment is legible. Editions of the text have been published in D. Comparetti and G. Vitelli, *Papiri Greco-Egizii*, vol. 2 (Milan, 1911), 19–26; W. Crönert, *Literarisches Zentralblatt* 59 (1908): 1201; A. Körte, *Archiv für Papyrusforschung* 6 (1920): 238–39 ; I. Gallo, *Frammenti Biographi da Papiri*, vol. 2 (Rome, 1980), 227–35; and A. Guido, *Corpus dei Papiri Filosofici Greci e Latini*, vol. 1.1 (Florence, 1989), 238–40.

Importance of the Testimonium

This is the only surviving evidence for Antisthenes’ endorsement of pederasty (contrast t. 142), although the writer might be making a joke of Antisthenes’

claims about celibate philosophical ἔρως, as he seems to be doing in the case of Socrates. See t. 14A.

Notes

λοπάδας ἰχθύων: The plates of fish are apparently supposed to count as an enticement for the desired youth that Antisthenes cannot counter. Possibly he does not eat fish or spend money for fish but prefers a Cynic, vegetarian diet (Comparetti 1911:23), though Cynics do trade in fish (see t. 172d, 100B). Possibly the fish are especially attractive to Athenians (Comparetti 1911:22), but Antisthenes endeavors to attract companions by his words, not by baser pleasures.

θαλαττοκρατοῦμαι: Editors before Guido have understood this verb in the middle voice (“I rule the sea” or “I fish the sea”), but negated. Guido (1989:239) argues that there is no space on the papyrus for the negation οὐ; that the only other attested usage of a non-active form (in an Old Comic fragment from Demetrius, *PCG* V fr. 2) is passive, not middle; and that a sharp admission of defeat is appropriate to the apophthegmatic form and to the context after Socrates’ anecdote, although it is mitigated in the rest of the reply. Decleva Caizzi 1966:128 notes that there must be a polemical allusive joke in this term, lost on us. Guido proposes a reference to the Spartans’ defeat of Athenian sea power (deriving this apparently from the parallel in Demetrius, which refers to the Spartans’ escape from the Athenian thalassocracy) and hence an implication that Antisthenes admits to being defeated by the Athenians, who like fish, but with the added note that he works in a different mode than they do. Guido locates the main force of the anecdote (which editors have thought should be dated to the fourth century BCE) in this “Cynic” theme of pro-Spartan and anti-Athenian sentiment.

αὐτ’ αἰτεῖν: It must be the fish or plates of fish that the youth asks for, although neither noun is neuter.

ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν τοιούτων: Antisthenes renounces the fish, and this is more important than getting the boy, especially one so easily seduced by fish. Antisthenes’ confession to the failure of his persuasion (θαλαττοκρατοῦμαι) is lightened by his diagnosis of the boy’s inferior character. In this sense, the anecdote is not hostile to Antisthenes, only skeptical about philosophical modes of persuasion. (The same could be said for the anecdote about Socrates.) Crönert extends Antisthenes’ reply to a second sentence, which he largely conjectures: “But tomorrow, if someone else should put out a plate (of fish), wouldn’t he go off again with that man?” This makes the boy fickle and shows that persuasion by fish is no more reliable as a method than persuasion by words.

Nature, Eschatology, and Theology

testimonia 176–84

176. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.5 (Marcovich)

= 75 DC

[= Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 107.21–22 Walz]

τοὺς βουλομένους ἀθανάτους εἶναι ἔφη δεῖν εὐσεβῶς καὶ δικαίως ζῆν.
ζῆν post δικαίως F : ζῆν ante εὐσεβῶς B P Φ et Arsenius

Those who wish to be immortal, he said, must live piously and justly.

Context of Preservation

This appears sixteenth in a series of twenty-seven *apophthegmata* that Diogenes lists at 6.3–7: see t. 3. The three *apophthegmata* on death reported by Diogenes (t. 176–78) are not adjacent but are separated by other topics.

Importance of the Testimonium

This is, on the face of it, the most straightforward evidence for Antisthenes' views on the topic of immortality, but it seems to be greatly simplified. See also t. 173, 96, 170, 188.

Notes

τοὺς βουλομένους ἀθανάτους εἶναι: Becoming deathless is the object of wish and hence of choices and calculations. In Homer, humans are mortal, gods are deathless, and to be deathless is thus to be a god. In Antisthenes, aspirations to both deathlessness and divine likeness are attested dimly, but they may not be the same thing. A difference is likely if Antisthenes is serious in thinking that there is one god (t. 179), to which comparisons are impossible (t. 181): mortals who have no death or who survive their death as individuals would be something other than the one god. Becoming deathless is somewhat better attested than divine likeness. Antisthenes' account of Odysseus' wisdom in rejecting Circe's offer of immortality (t. 188A-2.3) might have included the

points that deathlessness can be granted only by Zeus and that this is not achieved easily (t. 188A-1.4: see notes there). Isocrates' anonymous attack on the Socratics in *Against the Sophists* (t. 170) charges that his opponent promises "all but" deathlessness. In possible reflection of Antisthenes' figure of Cyrus the Great, the Cyrus of Dio Chrysostom and Onesicritus achieves advanced old age and immortality through fame (Höistad 1948:89–91). This case is not supernatural. Antisthenes implies also that humans might transcend their humanity and become like gods, but this state is not called "deathlessness" and could be a state of human life. In t. 96, his Prometheus is said to have told Heracles that he should learn "things more elevated than humans" (*quae hominibus sublimiora sunt*) in order to become a "perfect man" (*perfectus vir*). In t. 173, Antisthenes suggests that philosophy is preparation for living with the gods, but when this should happen is not said. In *Theaet.* 176b1, Plato's Socrates says that assimilation to god (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ) is a goal of the philosopher, and this idea endures throughout antiquity. εὐσεβῶς καὶ δικαίως ζῆν: The implication is that a pious and just life will earn immortality as its reward. (See t. 92A.) In a different account, the Cynic lives like a god in life, because gods need nothing (Diog. Laert. 6.105, attributed to Diogenes of Sinope; Xenophon attributes the statement to Socrates at *Mem.* 1.6.10). Plato's eschatological myths (e.g., *Phaed.* 108–14), which probably reflect Orphic and Pythagorean beliefs, seem to imply that living as a god not only is its own reward but secures for the soul eternal existence without a body. Diogenes Laertius' present report implies neither the Cynic view nor the Orphic view necessarily, only the simpler view that ethical life has the reward of an afterlife.

177. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.5 (Marcovich)

= 164 DC

[= Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 107.16–17 Walz]

Ἐρωτηθεὶς τί μακαριώτερον ἐν ἀνθρώποις, ἔφη, "Εὐτυχοῦντα ἀποθανεῖν."

μακαριώτερον B P F Φ et Arsenius : μακαριώτατον Sternbach ad
Gnom. Vat. 21 (Anacharsis)

When asked what was very blessed among humans, he said, "To die having fared well."

Context of Preservation

This appears thirteenth in a series of twenty-seven *apophthegmata* that Diogenes lists at 6.3–7: see t. 3.

Importance of the Testimonium

This *apophthegma* seems to address the human *telos* (goal) in pre-Hellenistic terms, perhaps in connection with the traditional Greek and Homeric dilemma over the superior life: whether it is better to live long and fare well, like Odysseus, or to live gloriously but die young, like Achilles or like the brothers Cleobis and Biton in Herod. 1.31. In either case, happiness cannot be judged before death (Herod. 1.32; Arist. *NE* 1.9 1100a4–9). The parallels, a saying of Anacharsis in *Gnom. Vat.* 21 and a saying of Aesop (quoted below), imply that a young person's death is the topic: its "difficulty" as much as "blessedness" is at issue. To judge from the anecdotes about his own death (t. 37), as well as t. 178, Antisthenes seems to favor the model of Odysseus over that of Achilles. But the present answer as transmitted makes no reference to length of life and addresses only its quality, perhaps in a circular tautology.

Notes

μακαριώτερον: A similar maxim, using superlatives, is attributed to Aesop in Plutarch (*Life of Pelopidas* 34.5, cited by Sternbach): οὐ γὰρ, ὡς Αἴσωπος ἔφασκε, χαλεπώτατός ἐστιν ὁ τῶν εὐτυχούντων θάνατος, ἀλλὰ μακαριώτατος (For it is not true, as Aesop used to say, that the death of those faring well is the most difficult kind, but the most blessed). The adjective μακάριος is more objective than εὐδαίμων (happy), standard in Hellenistic ethics, and seems also to connote divine favor sooner than a self-generated state. εὐδαιμονία is the goal of living in Aristotle's ethics and all post-Socratic ethical philosophy, although its content varies from school to school. See t. 134c.

εὐτυχοῦντα: This word, too, indicates good luck sooner than ethical achievement. If it, too, is related to the term εὐδαίμων, the whole statement is nearly a tautology.

178. Diogenes Laertius, *Lives of the Eminent Philosophers* 6.4 (Marcovich)

= 162 DC

[= Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 107.11–13 Walz]

μνούμενός ποτε τὰ Ὀρφικά, τοῦ ἱερέως εἰπόντος ὅτι οἱ ταῦτα
μνούμενοι πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐν ᾧδου μετίσχουσι, "Τί οὖν," ἔφη, "οὐκ
ἀποθνήσκεις;"

ἀγαθῶν ἐν ᾧδου B P φ et Arsenius : ἐν ᾧδου ἀγαθῶν F |
ἀποθνήσκεις codd. plur. : ἀποθνήσκεις B

He was once being initiated in the Orphic mysteries, and the priest said that people initiated in those rites have a share of many good things in the underworld. "So," he said, "why don't you die?"

Context of Preservation

This appears seventh in a series of twenty-seven *apophthegmata* that Diogenes lists at 6.3–7: see t. 3.

Importance of the Testimonium

This anecdote illustrates Antisthenes' skepticism for institutionalized religion, which he seems to share with the later Cynics. (See Goulet-Cazé 1996a.)

Notes

πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐν ᾗδου: Antisthenes wrote under the title Περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾗδου (*On things in the underworld*), which is listed in the catalog after the titles *On Dying* and *On Life and Death*. See t. 41A title 7.7 note.

“Τί οὖν οὐκ ἀποθνήσκεις;”: This question is put to Socrates in ps.-Pl. *Axiochus* 366b2–3, after Socrates has begun his consolation on death. Socrates there credits Prodicus for the material in his consolation, from a presentation made in the house of Callias. On Prodicus and Antisthenes, see t. 13A.62.

179A. Philodemus, PHerc 1428 fr. 21 col. 7a.3–8 from *On Piety* (Gomperz p. 72)

= 39A DC

... π]αρ' Ἀντισ-
θένει δ' ἐν μὲν [τ]ῷ
5 φυσικῷ λέγεται τὸ
κατὰ νόμον εἶναι
πολλοὺς θεοὺς, κα-
τὰ δὲ φύσιν ἓν[α].

In Antisthenes, in the *Physical [Discourse]*, it is said that by custom there are many gods, but by nature one.

Context of Preservation

This is the complete legible text on a small scrap from the second part of Philodemus' *On Piety* (according to the reconstruction of Obbink 1996:81–82), where Philodemus criticizes views on the topic of the gods and piety held by famous thinkers other than Epicurus. Gomperz reports traces of ἐπιστάμενος (knowing) on line 2.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes' theology seems to continue a tradition of philosophical monotheism also attested for Xenophanes (DK 21B14–16), Heraclitus (DK

22B32, 67), Plato (*Tim.* 28b–29a), and, in some sense, Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.4, 4.3: but these discussions of divine providence refer to divinity as both singular and plural). Joël (1893–1901 v.2:380) argues, from a comparison of Xen. *Mem.* 4.3 and Dio Chrysostom 3.73–82, that Antisthenes’ god might have been the sun, Helios (and Maier [1913:65 n. 2] endorses). On the Greek tradition of “rational theology” generally, not necessarily monotheist, see Broadie 1999. Monotheism seems to be carried forward by the Cynics amid their rejection of conventional religion. (See Bosman 2008.)

Notes

ἐν . . . [τ]ῷ φυσικῷ: This title, which does not appear in this form in Antisthenes’ catalog, is probably a different version of Περί φύσεως α’ β’ (title 7.8) or Ἐρώτημα περὶ φύσεως α’, ἐρώτημα περὶ φύσεως β’ (title 7.9): see t. 41A notes. Pease 1955:238 proposes that the elided noun is “man” and that the full title might be “The Natural Philosopher.” In this case, imagining the “natural philosopher” participating in an “inquiry about nature,” one could still identify the book cited as title 7.8 or 7.9.

κατὰ νόμον: This presumably refers to custom in society. (For the range in Antisthenes’ use of νόμος, see t. 141A.) The plurality of gods generated through custom could be individuation of divinity within the beliefs of one society (as in the Greek pantheon) or the sum of customs across many societies (such as the Greek versus Phrygian gods: see t. 182). Available evidence (t. 123, 179B, 190) points more to the first option.

κατὰ . . . φύσιν: “Nature” might be merely the alternative to “culture” and might mean nothing more than “the norm of truth” as opposed to “the customary norms” (in parallel to the opposition between τοὺς κειμένους νόμους and τὸν τῆς ἀρετῆς in t. 134g). Alternatively, “nature” might have a positive meaning in itself, referring to a unified divinity immanent in biological nature or a divine cosmic nature. There is no further evidence for this second view, but such a view of “nature” seems appropriate to this passage, which is cited from a text entitled *Physical* (or *Natural*) (*Discourse*).

179B. Philodemus, PHerc 1077 col. 19.15–23 from *On Piety* (Obbink lines 533–41)

(not in SSR)

. . . κα[ι γὰρ

παραγραμμίζ[ουσι

535 τὰ τ[ῶ]ν θεῶν [ὀνόμα-

τα, [κα]θάπερ Ἀν[τισ-

θέ[νης] τὸ κοινό[τατον
 ὑποτ<ε>ίνων ἀν[αφέρει
 τὰ κατὰ μέρος [τῇ] θε
 540 σει καὶ διὰ τι[νος ἀπά-
 της ἔτι πρότ[ερον]

κα[ὶ γὰρ] παραγραμμιζ[ουσι Obbink : κα[ὶ] ὑτὸς] παραγραμμιζ[ει
 Usener | τ[ῶ]ν Gomperz : fort. π[ερ]ὶ Obbink | ὄνόμα]τα Obbink :
 δόγμα]τα Anon. A in libro Gomperzi : πράγμα]τα Philippson | [κα]
 θάπερ Gomperz | Ἄν[τισ]θέ[νης] Anon. A | κοινό[τατον Obbink :
 κοινὸ[ν Gomperz | ὑποτ<ε>ίνων R. Janko : ὑποτίνων Anon. A. : ὑπό
 τινων Gomperz : ὑπ' ἐκ<ε>ίνων Philippson | ἀν[αφέρει Holford-
 Stevens : ἀν[αιρεῖ Obbink | τῇ θε]σει Obbink : πεῖ]σει Philippson :
 fort. συνέ]σει vel αἰρέ]σει Obbink | τι[νος ἀπά]της Philippson : δι' ὅτ ι
 [Σωκρά]της Anon. A | ἔτι πρότ[ερον Gomperz | post της interpunxit
 Gomperz

For they also make punning alterations in the names of the gods, just as Antisthenes, when he proposes the most universal [name of god], refers the particular ones to custom and [says the particular ones were created] through some error still earlier.

Context of Preservation

According to Obbink's reconstruction (1996:81–82, 349), this passage is from the first section of *On Piety*, where Philodemus defended Epicurus against charges that he was an atheist. Here Philodemus cites from the twelfth book of Epicurus' *On Nature*, showing that Epicurus attacked others for atheism and implying that he would not have done so if he were an atheist himself.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes could be associated with atheists and with those who appealed to linguistic explanations for popular belief in the gods. On Epicurus' apparent knowledge and use of Antisthenes' *Physical (Discourse)*, see t. 184.

Notes

παραγραμμιζ[ουσι]: The subject of this verb is the three fifth-century thinkers named at lines 524–26—Prodicus, Diagoras, and Critias—who have just been called madmen for “removing the divine from existing things.” They are accused here of “respelling in a deviant way” the names of the gods: this must mean they reduce the proper names of the gods to common words, whose ordinary meanings account for the piety people feel toward what they believe are gods. Plato's *Cratylus* contains many examples of this practice, as do later

allegorizing texts, such as that of Cornutus. See Obbink 1996:352–56 on the figures listed here, 349–64 on the whole present passage.

[κα]θάπερ Ἀν[τισ]θέ[νης]: That Antisthenes is compared with these figures but not named among them probably means that his theology could not be called flatly atheist. His skepticism against the popular gods might have been radical enough that Epicurus saw little difference (so Obbink), but it is significant that he is treated separately. His statement that Aphrodite was a “sickness” that people in their delusion call a god (t. 123) is based on no obvious homophone, although there may have been puns in the original passage. (See t. 123A notes.) Evidence survives for Antisthenes’ punning on humans’ proper names: Aspasia (t. 143), Plato (t. 147, 148), Isocrates and Lysias (t. 41A title 1.5), and possibly Helen (t. 54.2). Apart from t. 123, the best evidence for Antisthenes’ divine allegorizing is in t. 192 (Athena) and 197 (Dionysus), and neither case appeals to the name of the divinity. Therefore, this testimonium from Epicurus stands as the major evidence for attribution of punning on divine names to Antisthenes.

τὸ κοινὸ[τάτον] ὑποτ<ε>ίνων: Antisthenes “suggests as an underlying truth” a “most common name” for all divinity. The verbal prefix ὑπο- might have the same force that it has in ὑπόνοια, the “underlying meaning” in Homer (t. 185) (Obbink 1996:360). If Antisthenes had a Greek proper name for the one god of nature, it might have been Δία, accusative for Zeus (a potent god in t. 188), who runs “through” everything according to the allegorizing interpretation in Plato’s *Cratylus*: but the most direct surviving evidence refers to the one god as θεός, a common noun, without giving a proper name (t. 179, 180).

ἀν[αφέρει] τὰ κατὰ μέρος [τῇ θε]σει: τὰ κατὰ μέρος are the parts of divinity, the individualized gods of the Greek pantheon. [τῇ θε]σει (if this is the correct reading) could refer either to a definite, intentional legislation of names by a socially powerful player (perhaps even the vote of the Athenians: compare t. 72), or it could refer to an indefinite, culturally based “transposition” in pronunciation and spelling in the course of time, in the history of culture (so Obbink).

καὶ διὰ τι[νος ἀπά]της: This seems to refer to a second stage in or a second alternative origin for the false names of the many gods. The deception could be either a deception of the powerless by the powerful or the common self-deception of most people.

ἔτι πρότ[ερον]: This adverb seems to be attached to the current sentence, not the next, because it helps to articulate two stages in the errors of common language about the gods. Gomperz assigned it to the next sentence, where its function is difficult.

180A. Cicero, *On the Nature of the Gods* 1.13.32 (Ax)

= 39B DC

atque etiam Antisthenes in eo libro, qui physicus inscribitur, popularis deos multos, naturalem unum esse dicens tollit vim et naturam deorum.

And also Antisthenes, in that book that is entitled *Physical [Discourse]*, in saying that the gods in popular belief are many, but the god in nature is one, removes the force and nature of the gods.

Context of Preservation

The Epicurean speaker Velleius challenges the Stoic Balbus with the claim that philosophers' views of divinity have been different from those in conventional religion, contradictory among themselves, and, in the cases of Plato and Xenophon cited immediately before, self-contradictory. Cicero seems to make close use of an external source, shared with Philodemus. (See Pease 1955:39–43; Dyck 2003:99.) As in t. 179A, this report of Antisthenes' view of divinity is transmitted through an Epicurean filter. However, it is not obvious whether this filter has obscured the evidence for Antisthenes or that Velleius' expansion was invented by Cicero: Epicurus himself might have attributed importance to Antisthenes' text *Physical (Discourse)*, amid his primary production of Epicurean doctrine. (See the fragmentary t. 184.)

Notes

popularis deos multos, naturalem unum: As in Philodemus, the opposition is apparently between popular, “exoteric” religion and true, “esoteric” religion (Pease 1955:238).

tollit vim et naturam deorum: Velleius seems to accuse Antisthenes of a self-contradiction, just as he does for Plato and Xenophon: Antisthenes' divinity is “natural,” whereas his doctrine abolishes divine nature (Dyck 2003:100). This accusation seems to be added beyond the statement in Philodemus, consistently with the more polemical tones throughout the speech. On *vis* and *natura* as core attributes of divinity for Cicero, see Pease 1921:40; furthermore, these seem to be among Cicero's standard terms for “reality” in opposition to names (e.g., *De oratore* 3.111–14). Velleius levels similar criticism against the gods of Democritus, Speusippus, and Zeno of Citium. (On his apparent strategy, see Dyck 2003:107.) Out of context, the plural *deorum* might seem to imply that only the many popular gods lose their force and nature under Antisthenes' doctrine, whereas the one true god might retain force and nature. However, the title of Cicero's text refers to the *natura deorum*, and the plural

term probably refers to divinity in itself. If so, Antisthenes (like Democritus, Speusippus, and Zeno) seems to destroy the force and nature of divinity, perhaps by removing the divine from any clear active role in the world. T. 181 could support this interpretation in part (see notes there). T. 188A–C, however, shows that at least within the world of Homeric poetry, Zeus (and Zeus alone) has power. Velleius' statement, if it is accurate about Antisthenes' theology, would apparently rule out identification of Antisthenes' god with the sun, Joël's hypothesis. (See introductory note on t. 179A.)

180B. Minucius Felix, *Octavius* 19.7 (Kytzler)

= 39C DC

Xenophanem notum est omne infinitum cum mente deum tradere, et Antisthenem populares deos multos, sed naturalem unum praecipuum.

We know that Xenophanes hands down that the whole universe with the mind [is] god, and Antisthenes, that the gods of popular belief are many, but the god of nature is one and foremost.

Context of Preservation

Minucius Felix, one of the earliest Christian apologists writing in Latin (c.150–270 CE), wrote his *Octavius* in the form of a dialogue between a pagan and a Christian. This passage is from the Christian's speech, which asserts that pagan philosophers agreed with the Christians in their monotheism. The source is clearly Cicero (t. 180A); but in giving Antisthenes' god a positive, proto-Christian bent, Minucius has omitted the critique embedded in the account of Cicero's Epicurean speaker Velleius (so also Ingremeu 1982:298, on t. 180D from Lactantius).

180C. Lactantius, *Divine Institutes* 1.5.18 (Heck-Wlosok)

= 39D DC

Antisthenes multos quidem esse populares deos, unum tamen naturalem, id est summae totius artificem.

id est om. M W

Antisthenes said that there are indeed many gods in popular belief, but one in nature, that is, the creator of the whole highest [realm].

Context of Preservation

The passage is from a catalog of pagan philosophers who were monotheists and hence said to be proto-Christian. Lactantius' source seems to be Minucius (t. 180B) or Cicero directly (t. 180A).

Notes

summae totius artificem: This is the only preserved claim that Antisthenes posited a divine creator. In general, Lactantius has paraphrased his sources to bring out his own understanding, and, in consideration of this tendency, this characterization of Antisthenes' god is probably assimilation to the Christian God rather than new evidence. Brancacci (1985–86, 1997) attributes to Antisthenes a beneficent divine creator, on the basis of Xen. *Mem.* 1.4 and 4.3, for which he thinks Antisthenes is a source.

180D. Lactantius, *On the Anger of God* 11.14 (Ingremeau)

= 39E DC

Antisthenes autem in physico unum esse naturalem deum dixit, quamvis gentes et urbes suos habeant populares deos.

Antisthenes, however, in the *Physical [Discourse]* said that the god in nature is one, although the nations and the cities have their own gods in popular belief.

Context of Preservation

The speaker describes the monotheism of earlier pagan philosophers. The source is probably Minucius Felix (t. 180B) or Cicero directly (t. 180A).

Notes

gentes et urbes suos habeant: This is apparently Lactantius' interpretation of his source's *populares*. For the possibilities, see t. 179A, 180A.

181A. Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus* 6.71.2 (Marcovich)

= 40A DC

Ἀντισθένης μὲν γὰρ οὐ Κυνικὸν δὴ τοῦτο ἐνενόησεν, Σωκράτους δὲ ἅτε γνώριμος “Θεὸν οὐδενὶ εἰκέναι” φησὶν· “διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκόνοσιν δύναται.”

Antisthenes, for his part, did not have this thought because it was Cynic, but because he was a friend of Socrates he says, “The god resembles nothing, and therefore no one is able to know him from an image.”

Context of Preservation

Clement discusses correct ideas of divinity among the pagan philosophers. Antisthenes is cited after a long discussion of Plato and before a citation from Xenophon, who is compared to the Hebrew prophets.

Importance of the Testimonium

The four versions of this testimonium are unique evidence for Antisthenes' theology. Antisthenes removes the god from the world of sense perception (t. 181D), he might remove it from the realm of language (see notes below), and he makes apprehension problematic altogether. These are negative statements, and one is left to conjecture whether Antisthenes made positive theological statements also. The Zeus of the *Odyssey* might have some relationship to the real god (t. 188A).

Notes

οὐ Κυνικὸν δὴ τοῦτο ἐνενόησεν: Clement seems to know the Cynics as hostile to religion. Theodoret (t. 181D) sees no conflict.

θεὸν οὐδενὶ ὁικέναι: The tradition assimilates Antisthenes' statement to Isaiah 40.25, "To whom will you liken me?" (The parallel is clearest in t. 181B–C.)

αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκότος: Antisthenes and the Socratics may have used "likenesses" as real tools for learning: names and nicknames of things seem to indicate what they are like. (Compare t. 150A.4; see t. 50A with further references.) This statement that the single real god can be compared to nothing might be related to the god's highly separate status, possibly outside of language. Such a status would be fundamentally different from that of the many gods of δόξα or νόμος, who might be generated exactly through language. (See t. 123A, 179B and references).

181B. Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies* 5.14 108.4 (Stählin-Früchtel-Treu)

= 40B DC

ὁ τε Σωκρατικὸς Ἀντισθένης, παραφράζων τὴν προφητικὴν ἐκείνην φωνὴν "Τίνι με ὁμοιώσατε; λέγει κύριος," <θεὸν> οὐδενὶ ὁικέναι φησί· διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκότος δύναται.

<θεὸν> suppl. edd. e *Protreptico*

But the Socratic Antisthenes, restating that prophetic voice, "'To whom have you likened me?' says the Lord," says that the god resembles nothing, and therefore no one is able to know him from an image.

Context of Preservation

Clement classifies correspondences between Hebrew theological tenets and statements in the Greek philosophers. As in the *Protrepticus* (t. 181A), Antisthenes is cited between Plato and Xenophon.

181C. Eusebius, *Preparation for Demonstration of the Gospel* 13.13.35 (Mras)

= 40C DC

Ὁ τε Σωκρατικὸς Ἀντισθένης παραφράζων τὴν προφητικὴν ἐκείνην γραφὴν· “Τίνι με ὁμοιώσατε;” λέγει κύριος,” θεὸν οὐδενὶ ὁικέναι φησί, διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκόνοσ δύνатаι.

But the Socratic Antisthenes, restating that prophetic text, “‘To whom have you likened me?’ says the Lord,” says that the god resembles nothing, and therefore no one is able to know him from an image.

Context of Preservation

Eusebius’ ch. 13.13 is cited verbatim from Clement in the *Miscellanies*. The previous chapter, 13.12, a similar collection of cases showing that Greek philosophy arose from Hebrew, is cited from the Peripatetic Aristobulus of Paneas (c. 160 BCE), from a book addressed to a Ptolemy. This combination of sources might show that Antisthenes was added late into an Alexandrian tradition founded by Aristobulus. More than three centuries separate Aristobulus and Clement.

181D. Theodoret, *Cure of Greek Maladies* 1.75 (Canivet)

= 40D DC

καὶ Ἀντισθένης δέ, ὁ Σωκράτους μὲν φοιτητής, τὴν δὲ Κυνικῆς αἰρέσεως ἡγησάμενος, περὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ τῶν ὅλων βοᾷ· “Ἀπὸ εἰκόνοσ οὐ γινώριζεται, ὀφθαλμῷ οὐχ ὁράται, οὐδενὶ ὁικε· διόπερ αὐτὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκμαθεῖν ἐξ εἰκόνοσ δύνатаι.”

ὀφθαλμῷ codd. plur. : ὀφθαλμοῖς S

And also Antisthenes, the disciple of Socrates, and the founder of the Cynic school, shouts out about the God of all things: “From a likeness he is not known, by the eye he is not seen, and he resembles nothing. Therefore no one is able to know him from an image.”

Context of Preservation

Theodoret’s first book is titled “On Faith,” and he argues that faith is the only available mode for knowing God.

Importance of the Testimonium

Theodoret cites a longer statement from Antisthenes than Clement and Eusebius and might quote him. His succeeding citation of Xenophon is,

however, the same loose paraphrase of *Mem.* 4.3.14 that appears in Clement and Stob. 2.1.33, posed by all three as a quotation.

Notes

Ἀπὸ εἰκόνοσ οὐ γνωρίζεται, ὀφθαλμῷ οὐχ ὁράται, οὐδενὶ ἔοικε: If the uselessness of the eye justifies the first statement, then “likeness” seems to be a visible likeness, such as a statue. This does not mean that divine names and other constructions in speech cannot also be “likenesses”: in Pl. *Crat.* 424c6–425b4, for example, words have likeness to their referents (which include divine beings) and are molded, letter by letter, to match these.

182. Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus* 7.75.3 (Marcovich)

= 161 DC

τοιούτοι γὰρ οἱ μητραγύρται. ὅθεν εἰκότως ὁ Ἀντισθένης ἔλεγεν αὐτοῖς μεταιτοῦσιν:

οὐ <τοι> τρέφω <μά>την <γε> μητέρα τῶν θεῶν,
ἦν οἱ θεοὶ τρέφουσιν.

<τοι> Marcovich | : <μά>την Marcovich : τὴν P¹ | <γε> Marcovich

For such are the priests of Cybele. For this reason Antisthenes spoke appropriately to them when they were begging: “I, you see, do not nurture in vain the mother of the gods, but the gods nurture her.”

Context of Preservation

Clement cites pagan poets who, as he claims, wrote correctly about divinity. Menander is cited before and after Antisthenes, and Homer and Euripides are cited in the close context.

Importance of the Testimonium

Because Clement’s section is on poets, Marcovich’s restoration of an iambic trimeter must be roughly correct. Antisthenes must be giving a “correction” or parody of a verse from an Athenian poet, as he does in t. 195. But it is interesting that Clement classifies Antisthenes with the poets. This could, then, be evidence for a recognized mixed style of writing by Antisthenes, verses combined with prose. See also Radermacher 1892 on t. 53 and 54.

Notes

μητέρα τῶν θεῶν: On the Athenian cult of the Mother of the Gods, a cult probably introduced in Athens at the end of the fifth century, see Shear 1995:171–78. According to Philochorus (as cited by Philodemus, *On Piety* p.

23 Gomperz), Empedocles (DK 31A33) and Sophocles (fr. 269a51 Radt) made memorable pronouncements about the “Mother of the Gods”; she is also in Euripides (Shear 1995:173). Antisthenes might have parodied either of the tragedians. The famous Sophocles passage is from a choral passage, not in trimeter. See also t. 1A.

τρέφω: In t. 63, this verb seems to serve as a low-register or even obscene word for financial support. The point must be related to Antisthenes’ opposition to institutionalized religion (t. 178).

183. Origen, *Against Celsus* 7.7 (Marcovich)

τοιούτους γὰρ καὶ ὁ λόγος αἰρεῖ δεῖν εἶναι τοὺς τοῦ ἐπὶ πᾶσι Θεοῦ
προφήτας, οἵτινες παῖγνιον ἀπέφηναν τὴν Ἀντισθένης καὶ Κράτητος
καὶ Διογένης εὐτονίαν.

αἰρεῖ M : ἐρεῖ A

The Word chooses that the prophets of the God for all peoples must be of this kind, who revealed the vigor of Antisthenes and Crates and Diogenes to be child’s play.

Context of Preservation

In his seventh book of *Against Celsus*, Origen sets out to refute Celsus’ claim that the Hebrew prophets were nothing extraordinary, no different from Greek oracles or popular prophesizers. In the present paragraph, he explains that the Hebrew prophets had traits of the wise man in their way of life.

Notes

εὐτονία: Origen has just said that the lives of the prophets had special qualities: difficulty of imitation, special vigor, freedom, and an undaunted attitude toward death and danger. All this is probably summed up in the single quality εὐτονία (vigor) attributed to the Cynics. (See t. 136E.) Origen cites his three early Cynics in an unconventional order. Compare t. 139B.

184. Philodemus, PHerc 1005, from *In Reply to the <Sophists?>* tab. 3 fr. 110 (Angeli)

.]. IA . . . [. . .
—]EIN·ΠΟ[. . .
—] ETEI[. . .
—] ΠΕΡ[. . .
5 —] PEK[. . .
—].ΑΣΥΝ[. . .

-].δ' αὐτο.[..
 ---]αὐτῶν[. . .
 ---] KEN ΑΛΛ[. . .
 10 ---].ΣΕΩΣ·Ε[. . .
 ---τοῦ] γὰρ Φυ[σικοῦ τοῦ Ἀν]τισθένους
 [—προσέτ]αξα ἀπόγρα-
 [φον—ύ]μῖν φέρε ι[ν
 15 ---].ΤΑΤΑΙ.[. . .
 ---]ΤΑ ΤΑΔ[. . .
 ---] ΙΑ Ν[. . .

2 post EIN spatium 7–9 ita restituit Sbordone : ἐ]κ δ' αὐτῶ[ν | τοῖς
 ἐχθροῖς] αὐτῶν ἐ-|πιδεδράμη]κεν 9–11 ita restituit Sbordone : ἀλλά |
 γ' ἔσται γεραι]ός ἕως εὖ μά-|θη τινα τῶν] περ [ι] φύ[σ] εω[ς 10 post
 ΩΣ spatium 12–16 ita restituit Sbordone : καὶ περὶ Ἀν]τισθένους |
 λόγον συντ]άξα<ς> ἀπόγρα-|φον θέλει ἡμ]ῖν φέρειν, | ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἐπί]
 σταται λέ-| [γεῖν 14 vel ἡμῖν Angeli

. . . of the *Physical (Discourse)* of Antisthenes . . . I have attached a
 copy . . . to bring to you.

[Translation of Sbordone's supplemented text (1947): “[dissenting]
 from them, he has run over to their enemies, but he will be an old
 man before he really understands anything about nature. And he has
 assembled a discourse about Antisthenes and he wants to bring us a
 copy, since he does not understand how to say . . .”]

Context of Preservation

This is a complete physical fragment from PHerc 1005, a text by Philodemus
 that attacks latter-day Epicureans for disloyalty to the school. The fragment's
 position in the original text cannot be known, but both physical evidence
 and content support Angeli's conjecture that it is part of a letter by Epicurus,
 preserved in three fragments (109–11), that cites a range of texts by older
 philosophers on topics of nature and logic.

Importance of the Testimonium

One of the parties to Philodemus' concerns (possibly Epicurus himself)
 has made a copy of Antisthenes' *Physical (Discourse)* and is proposing to
 disseminate the copy to someone else, perhaps a group of disciples who live
 away from Athens. If Angeli's interpretation of the fragment is correct, this
 is the first clear evidence for an Epicurean reception of Antisthenes and the
 earliest reference to the reproduction and circulation of his writings. That

Epicurus(?) forwards a copy of the text, rather than stating or attacking what it says, might imply that the text in itself has a high value. This need not imply that Epicurus(?) endorsed the text: but his list (fr. 109–11) includes also texts by Anaxagoras and Democritus (with whom his own thought had affinities), Aristotle's *Analytics* and *On Nature*, and titles by Aristippus and Speusippus. All these texts might have close relevance to Epicurus' own thought, even if in rivalry.

Sbordone's very different text and interpretation understands the reference as part of Philodemus' attack on the author of the copy, possibly a Stoic, who disseminates a text about Antisthenes' views on nature because he cannot understand them. Clearly Sbordone has exceeded the evidence, but it is also clear that there are alternatives to Angeli's interpretation.

Notes

Φυ[σικοῦ τοῦ Ἄν] τισθένους: The title is cited in the same form in t. 179A and (in Latin) 180A and 180D.

προσέτ]αξα ἀπόγρα[φον—ύ]μῖν: The next fragment in Angeli's reconstruction (fr. 111) begins with the reading —πρ]οσέ[τ]αξα [—]ON ύμῖν (I have attached [something] for you). This supports the possibility that both fragments are from the same text, a cover letter from Epicurus stating that certain texts are attached.

Studies of Homer

*testimonia 185–197*185A. Xenophon, *Symposium* 3.5–6 (Marchant)

= 61 DC

(5) “Ἀλλὰ σὺ αὖ,” ἔφη, “λέγε, ὦ Νικήρατε, ἐπὶ ποίᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ μέγα φρονεῖς.” καὶ ὃς εἶπεν· “Ὁ πατὴρ ὁ ἐπιμελούμενος ὅπως ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς γενοίμην ἠνάγκασέ με πάντα τὰ Ὀμήρου ἔπη μαθεῖν· καὶ νῦν δυναίμην ἂν Ἰλιάδα ὅλην καὶ Ὀδύσσειαν ἀπὸ στόματος εἰπεῖν.” (6) “Ἐκεῖνο δ’,” ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης, “λέληθέ σε, ὅτι καὶ οἱ ῥαψωδοὶ πάντες ἐπίστανται ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη;” “Καὶ πῶς ἂν,” ἔφη, “λελήθοι ἀκροώμενόν γε αὐτῶν ὀλίγου ἂν ἐκάστην ἡμέραν;” “Οἶσθά τι οὖν ἔθνος,” ἔφη, “ἡλιθιώτερον ῥαψωδῶν;” “Οὐ μὰ τὸν Δί’,” ἔφη ὁ Νικήρατος, “οὐκ οὐκ ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ.” “Δῆλον γάρ,” ἔφη ὁ Σωκράτης, “ὅτι τὰς ὑπονοίας οὐκ ἐπίστανται. σὺ δὲ Στησιμβρότῳ τε καὶ Ἀναξιμάνδρῳ καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς πολὺ δέδωκας ἀργύριον, ὥστε οὐδέν σε πολλοῦ ἀξίων λέληθε.”

(6) ἡλιθιώτερόν γε G | δοκεῖ codd. : δοκῶ Cobet

(5) “But you, then, Niceratus,” he [Callias] said, “tell us which kind of knowledge you are proud of.” And he said, “My father, who took care that I become a good man, forced me to learn all the verses of Homer. And now I could recite the whole *Iliad* and *Odyssey* by heart.” (6) “And has this escaped your notice,” said Antisthenes, “that also all the rhapsodes know these verses?” “And how would it escape my notice,” he said, “when I listen to them a little bit every day?” “So do you know any tribe more silly than the rhapsodes?” he said. “No, by Zeus,” Niceratus said, “it surely does not seem so to me.” “For it is clear,” said Socrates, “that they do not know the underlying meanings. But you have paid a lot of money to Stesimbrotus and Anaximander and many others, so that none of the points worth a lot has escaped your notice.”

Context of Preservation

This is from the central section of Xenophon's *Symposium*, where the guests at Callias' dinner party speak in two cycles, first stating which of their talents, possessions, or other assets is worth the most and then justifying their choices. (See t. 13A.) Niceratus is identified at the opening of the text (*Sym.* 1.2) as one of the non-Socratic guests, together with Callias the host, Autolycus the honorand, and Autolycus' father, Lycon. Whereas Socrates usually takes the role of interrogator with his disciples in attendance, Antisthenes is the interrogator for both Niceratus and Callias; and the other two non-Socratics, Autolycus and Lycon, give no real speeches (although Antisthenes is the one who invites Lycon to participate, at 3.12). Niceratus is the second speaker, after Callias, to identify his greatest asset. (See t. 78, 83.)

Importance of the Testimonium

This clearest surviving statement of Antisthenes' claim to know more about Homer than the words in his verses is the clearest evidence for his claim to a particular brand of interpretation or criticism, better than that of his rivals. Insofar as Socrates is sarcastic in his intervention, it might show that Socrates was skeptical of Antisthenes' ability to read the meaning in Homer.

Notes

ἐπὶ ποίᾳ ἐπιστήμῃ: The assumption that Niceratus' greatest asset is some type of knowledge is carried over from Socrates' introduction of this party activity: all the guests are to "demonstrate their own wisdom" (ἐπιδείξειν τὴν αὐτοῦ σοφίαν, 3.3), as Callias promised he would do when he invited Socrates to the party (1.6). ἐπιστήμη is the highest kind of wisdom or knowledge: compare t. 13A and 78, where craft, τέχνη, (probably less rigorous) is at stake. This assumption is dropped as the discussion continues, and later speakers answer the question "What are you very proud of?" (ἐπὶ τίνι μέγα φρονεῖς;). The knowledge of both Callias (in t. 78) and Niceratus seems to be presented as advanced, specialist knowledge that competes with Socraticism but from outside its boundaries, that is, "sophistic" knowledge.

ὁ πατήρ: Niceratus' father is the wealthy Nicias, who was to perish in Sicily in 413, a decade after the dramatic setting of 422, as general of the Sicilian Expedition. On the general ironies in Xenophon's setting of the *Symposium* and his choice of characters, see Huss 1999 ("The Dancing Socrates"). The irony in this scene is complex, and it need not have a single target. Primarily, irony is directed at traditional Athenian educational practices, which Antisthenes opposes. The irony also directed by Socrates (and Xenophon) against Antisthenes in this exchange is secondary to this exposure of the deficiencies in the non-Socratic paths to knowledge. See also t. 83.

ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης: Presumably Xenophon uses Antisthenes as the cross-examiner of Niceratus because Antisthenes as Homerist sets his own expertise above both the rhapsodes and the rival critics: he wrote a text titled *On the Interpreters* (Περὶ τῶν ἐξηγητῶν, t. 41A title 8.2).

καὶ οἱ ῥαψῳδοὶ πάντες: Similar criticism of rhapsodes, that they know only the words, appears in Xen. *Mem.* 4.2.10. In Pl. *Ion* 530b10–d3, Socrates implies that the rhapsodes are responsible for knowing more than the words; in Pl. *Apol.* 22a8–c6, Socrates is disappointed that the poets themselves do not understand what they are saying. For the possibility that Plato has Antisthenes in mind in some of these passages, see Kahn 1996:101–24, esp. 123; Müller 1998. Such an argument was made originally in Dümmler 1882:29. Antisthenes might also have been known to Xenophon as a teacher in Athens who lacks pupils (see t. 34C), for which reason he is ready to test the pupils of other teachers. Niceratus could be a potential pupil (see t. 82 end).

ὁ Σωκράτης: On the relationship between Socrates and Antisthenes as Xenophon portrays it in the *Symposium*, see t. 13A, 14A.

τὰς ὑπονοίας οὐκ ἐπίστανται: Socrates implies, probably with irony, that Niceratus knows the underlying meanings, and he seems to defend Niceratus against the attack Antisthenes is preparing to make. The irony could be directed against Niceratus, Antisthenes, or both. Xenophon's Socrates, unlike Plato's, is generally optimistic about the value of reading Homer (*Mem.* 1.2.57–58; compare 1.6.14); therefore, the tension in this scene implies that Antisthenes exceeded Xenophon's Socrates in his claims about Homer's wisdom and about his own expertise in finding it. It is likely that Antisthenes, like Niceratus and his teachers, claimed to know Homer's fuller meanings, and the teachers named might be his direct rivals in this field. (See following notes.) Since Dümmler's account (1882:16–39) of a fundamental antagonism between Antisthenes and Plato on the value of Homer, scholars have filled out the implications of Socrates' irony against Antisthenes from Pl. *Rep.* 378d5–8, where Socrates refuses to allow Homer's poetic theomachies into the city even on the assumption that they are composed allegorically, because the youth are unable to understand the code: καὶ θεομαχίας ὅσας Ὅμηρος πεποίηκεν οὐ παραδεκτέον εἰς τὴν πόλιν, οὐτ' ἐν ὑπονοίαις πεποιημένας οὔτε ἄνευ ὑπονοιών. ὁ γὰρ νέος οὐχ οἷός τε κρίνειν ὅτι τε ὑπόνοια καὶ ὁ μὴ (And the theomachies that Homer composed must not be admitted into the city, neither if they are created in underlying meanings nor without underlying meanings. For the young man is not able to judge what is an underlying meaning and what is not). Plato's Socrates generally (e.g., *Ion* 530b10–d3) speaks of the διάνοια (thought) in poetry, not the ὑπόνοια (underlying meaning). According to Plutarch (*How the Young Should Study Poetry* 19e–f), ὑπόνοια was the older equivalent term for what was called,

in his day, ἀλληγορία, “saying other.” Hence arose the scholarly debate over Antisthenes’ “allegorism.” (See Giannantoni 1990 v.4:338 with catalog of the discussion, n.41; Tate 1930:5–7. Richardson 1975:77–81 usefully clarifies the many possible senses for “allegorism”; see also Huss 1999b:189–90 and t. 194 notes.) But there is no clear evidence elsewhere that Antisthenes detected “underlying” meanings in the sense of secret doctrines: the surviving language for his recognition of a speaker’s full meaning or true meaning implies, rather, that these meanings were “on top of” the words of a text, not “under” them. (Consider ἐπισημαίνεται in t. 188B. If the term ἐπίνοια in t. 149A and 149C is from Antisthenes, it implies the meaning added to a linguistic term in the mind of a speaker or listener; its parallel to ὑπόνοια is striking, and possibly the present text implies a contrast between the ἐπίνοια taught by Antisthenes and the ὑπόνοια taught by others.) It seems that Xenophon’s Socrates, like Plato’s, rejects the claim that under-meanings (or over-meanings) in Homer can be definitely known, especially if one claims to know every possible valuable meaning in the poetry, so that “nothing” escapes his notice (οὐδέν σε πολλοῦ ἀξίων λέληθε). Plato’s character Ion makes similar ultimate claims, that no one who has ever lived has understood Homer’s thought so well (*Ion* 530d2–3). Plato’s character Phaedrus seems to expect the same exhaustive coverage from the excellent rhetorical speaker (*Phaedr.* 235b1–4). This must be ironic.

Στησιμβρότω: Stesimbrotus of Thasos (*FGrHist* 107; Lanata 1963:240–43) is listed with Antisthenes in a set of four critics who offered rival interpretations of *Il.* 11.636 (t. 191); he is also named with two others (Metrodorus of Lampsacus and Glaucón, the latter of whom is also in t. 191) as the rivals of Ion the rhapsode (*Ion* 530d1). This nexus of names shared among these texts might show that Plato intended *Ion*, at least partly, as a polemic against Antisthenes’ claim to have a craft or science (τέχνη) for interpreting Homer (Müller 1998). Surviving evidence for Stesimbrotus shows that his criticism could be called rationalist and historicist (Richardson 1975:71–74); he also seems to have reinterpreted the names of the gods by small alterations in sound (107 F 13, of Dionysus) and might have been interested in theological allegory. Theological allegory of the time (c. 420s BCE, Xenophon’s dramatic date) is represented also in Aristophanes’ *Clouds*, Plato’s *Cratylus*, and the anonymous critic of the Derveni papyrus. (See Janko 1997.) On this last issue, compare t. 179B.

Ἀναξιμάνδρω: Anaximander might be Anaximander the younger of Miletus (*FGrHist* 9), the author of an *Explanation of Pythagorean Symbola*, according to the *Suda* (Richardson 1975:74–76). If this identification is correct, his brand of criticism might have been “allegorical” in the fullest sense, a quest to find Pythagorean doctrine in Homer. We know nothing securely about

Xenophon's Anaximander, and the name does not reappear in the tradition of ancient Homeric criticism. It remains unclear whether Stesimbrotus and Anaximander are supposed to count as two examples of a single type of criticism or whether they are supposed to represent different types.

καὶ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς: Stesimbrotus and Anaximander might have been selected as representatives of certain types of criticism, but the open-ended list covers all possibilities.

185B. Arsenius, *Violetum* p. 109.8–10 (Walz)

= 176 DC (not in SSR)

ὁ αὐτὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς ποῖα δεῖ μανθάνειν τῶν Ὀμήρου ἔφη·
 “Ὅτι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι κακὸν τάγαθόν τε τέτυκται.”

The same man [Antisthenes], when asked what sort of verses from
 Homer he should learn, said,
 “What has been happening in your house, both good and bad.”

[*Od.* 4.392]

Context of Preservation

This sentence appears in Arsenius' listing of Antisthenes' famous sayings, but not in the modern text of Diogenes Laertius, which Arsenius otherwise follows sequentially and almost verbatim. Diogenes Laertius attributes citation of the verse, without the leading question, to both Diogenes of Sinope (6.103) and Socrates (2. 21). In Arsenius, the *apophthegma* appears amid the “doxography” of Antisthenes (t. 134), between statements 134(n) and 134(o). Arsenius could have created this *apophthegma* by transferring the Homeric quotation from Antisthenes' teacher or pupil to Antisthenes; or Arsenius might have received a text of Diogenes different from ours. Arsenius adds the formulation “the same man said” to the beginning of each maxim in his book, in the (post-Pythagorean) style found, for example, in the *Gnomologium Vaticanum*.

Importance of the Testimonium

This quotation, when cited elsewhere, counts as an appropriation of Homer in the service of Socratic ethics. The same quotation is attributed to Socrates (Diog. Laert. 2.21; Sex. Emp. *Adv. math.* 7.21.4; Mus. Ruf. 3.24), to Aristippus (ps.-Plutarch, *Miscellanies* = fr. 179 Sandbach), and to Diogenes of Sinope (Diog. Laert. 6.103): in these cases, its point is to promote ethical inquiry according to the Delphic maxim “Know yourself” (γνῶθι σεαυτόν) and to

reject physics. Themistius (33.5.9) attributes the quotation to Socrates and its fulfillment to “the genuine chorus of Socrates” (ὁ γνήσιος Σωκράτους χορός), whose members he lists as Cebes, Phaedo, Aristippus, and Aeschines. The same sense is appropriate for Antisthenes.

Notes

ποῖα δεῖ μανθάνειν: In t. 185A, Antisthenes seems to say that it is important not to learn the verses of Homer but to learn to interpret them. The answer here might uphold that view, in saying that a person’s own condition is the criterion for selecting verses in Homer for memorizing. Yet this very message is said in one Homeric verse, so perhaps this is the verse to learn. On the house as a metaphor for the self, see t. 82, 124. Antisthenes is said to cite Homer in reply to a question also elsewhere in the tradition, although such anecdotes might be apocryphal. (See t. 6; see also t. 22B.)

Ὅτι τοι ἐν μεγάροισι: In Homer, the words are spoken by the sea goddess Eidothea to Menelaus, in reference to the abilities of her father, Proteus, to tell Menelaus how to get home and what he will find there. Antisthenes wrote a text titled *On Proteus* (t. 41A title 9.5). Crates of Thebes wrote a parody against the Megarian Stilpo, in which ἐν μεγάροισι refers to the city Megara (Diog. Laert. 2.118). It is possible, then, that this verse was knowingly reused in the Cynic tradition, as well as among the Socratics cited by Themistius and others.

186. Xenophon, *Symposium* 4.6 (Marchant)

= 62 DC

ἐκ τούτου δὲ ὁ Νικήρατος, “Ἀκούοιτ’ ἄν,” ἔφη, “καὶ ἐμοῦ ἃ ἔσεσθε βελτίονες, ἂν ἐμοὶ συνῆτε. ἴστε γὰρ δήπου ὅτι Ὅμηρος ὁ σοφώτατος πεποίηκε σχεδὸν περὶ πάντων τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. ὅστις ἂν οὖν ὑμῶν βούληται ἢ οἰκονομικός ἢ δημηγορικός ἢ στρατηγικός γενέσθαι ἢ ὅμοιος Ἀχιλλεῖ ἢ Αἴαντι ἢ Νέστορι ἢ Ὀδυσσεῖ, ἐμὲ θεραπευέτω. ἐγὼ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντα ἐπίσταμαι.” “Ἡ καὶ βασιλεύειν,” ἔφη ὁ Ἀντισθένης, “ἐπίστασαι, ὅτι οἶσθα ἐπαινέσαντα αὐτὸν τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ὡς βασιλεὺς τε εἶη ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ’ αἰχμητής;”

Ὅμηρος codd. plur. : ὁ Ὅμηρος F

At this juncture Niceratus said, “Please hear also from me how you shall be better, if you associate with me. Surely you know that Homer the wisest [poet] composed about almost all human affairs. Whoever of you, then, wishes to become a household manager or a public speaker or a general, or like Achilles or Ajax or Nestor or Odysseus, let him

attend to me. For I know all these things.” “And do you know also how to rule as a king,” said Antisthenes, “because you know that Homer praised Agamemnon, that ‘he was a good king and a mighty spearman’ [*Il.* 3.179]?”

Context of Preservation

This is from the second round of the speech making at Callias’ dinner party. (See t. 13A, 185A.) Niceratus justifies the value of his knowledge of Homer.

Importance of the Testimonium

This exchange adds detail to the image of Antisthenes’ interest in Homer, especially if Xenophon alludes to Antisthenes’ own writings on Homer in his choice of material. (On the overlaps, see notes below.) It suggests that Antisthenes held views on the use of Homer’s human characters as models, whether for roles in the city, as here, or for ethics more generally, as in t. 187 (and throughout t. 188–92). But understanding the verses might be necessary at a previous level. Most of the material from Antisthenes’ criticism preserved in the Homeric scholia is about human characters, not about gods. T. 192 is the exception; see also t. 123 and 179B, which come from unknown contexts, not necessarily literary or Homeric.

Notes

ὁμοῖος Ἀχιλλεῖ ἢ Αἴαντι ἢ Νέστορι ἢ Ὀδυσσεῖ: These options for the model hero in Homer are the same as those mentioned in t. 187, where they can be classified as two “simple” warrior heroes and two heroes of speech. Agamemnon appears there, too, as a fifth hero, but he is treated as a member of the political setting, not as a candidate for virtue. These are clearly the heroes of the *Iliad*, not the *Odyssey*, although the titles in the book catalog suggest that Antisthenes is more interested in the *Odyssey* overall. A list of the same four heroes is also in Aristotle’s *Topics* (117b24), where it is cited as a familiar pairing of two heroes of war and two heroes of oratory. Aristotle’s list is usually assumed to represent Athenian culture broadly, but it could come from Socratic literature. Antisthenes’ treatment of the heroes might step away from the Sophistic tradition of comparing models represented in this opening statement (Brancacci 1990:55). His Ajax and Odysseus speeches (t. 53–54) represent alternative models of virtue, but it is the full representations in the speeches, not simple labels, that convey these models; and the faults of each character are also conveyed. In other surviving evidence (t. 187–92), Antisthenes calls Odysseus and Athena “wise” and calls Polyphemus “unjust,” but he always analyzes particular speeches or actions, not “characters” in general. In t. 187 and 189, he seeks to understand what Homer really means by the evaluative epithets he uses.

βασιλεύειν: Kingship is a central concept for both Antisthenes and the later Cynics: see t. 41A title 5.1, 53.4, 86; Höistad 1948:22–102.

‘βασιλεύς τε εἴη ἀγαθὸς κρατερός τ’ αἰχμητής’: When Antisthenes cites *Il.* 3.179, he cites from a speech of Helen. As he has recently said (t. 185A), however, being able to repeat Homer’s words is different from understanding the meanings. Here, Antisthenes says, Homer praises Agamemnon; but it is Helen, not Homer, who speaks. Since Antisthenes is elsewhere attentive to the different meanings intended in the voices of different characters (t. 189), he might be testing Niceratus for recognition of this issue. Niceratus simply agrees to “Homer’s” evaluation, however, and goes on to cite *Il.* 23.335–37 (from Nestor’s instructions to his son Antilochus on how to take a turn on the racecourse) as positive instruction for chariot racing and *Il.* 11.630 (where a captive woman serves “onion as a garnish on the drink” to the men in Nestor’s tent) as a positive instruction for pleasant drinking. The citation of *Il.* 11.630 might be another clue that Xenophon alludes to Antisthenes’ writings: Antisthenes’ interpretation of *Il.* 11.636 survives (t. 191). Both of these passages are also mentioned by Plato’s Socrates in *Ion* (537a8–b5, 538c2–3), which implies either that Xenophon is using *Ion* as his source or that the texts have a common source. If Xenophon were using *Ion*, one might expect him to have picked up some of the points Plato’s Socrates raises about different kinds of knowledge. Moreover, Xenophon’s text of *Il.* 23.335–37 is different from Plato’s, and both are different from the medieval manuscripts: see also Richardson 1975:66 n.2. Therefore, a common source seems more likely than the originality of *Ion*, and the most plausible common source might be Antisthenes. Overall in this exchange, it seems that Antisthenes fails to influence Niceratus’ approach to Homer. Compare t. 83A on his failure with Callias.

187. Scholia at *Odyssey* 1.1 and *Iliad* 9.305, attributed to Porphyry (Pontani p. 7.5–9.39)

= 51 DC

(1) Πορφυρίου· πολύτροπον· οὐκ ἐπαινεῖν φησιν Ἀντισθένης Ὅμηρον τὸν Ὀδυσσεά μᾶλλον ἢ ψέγειν, λέγοντα αὐτὸν “πολύτροπον”. (2) οὐκ οὖν τὸν Ἀχιλλέα καὶ τὸν Αἴαντα πολυτρόπους πεποικέναι, ἀλλ’ ἀπλοῦς καὶ γεννάδας· οὐδὲ τὸν Νέστορα τὸν σοφὸν οὐ μὰ Δία δόλιον καὶ παλίμβολον τὸ ἦθος ἀλλ’ ἀπλῶς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι συνόντα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι καὶ εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον, εἴ τι ἀγαθὸν εἶχε, συμβουλευόντα καὶ οὐχ ἀποκρυπτόμενον, (3) καὶ τοσοῦτον ἀπέιχε τοῦ τὸν τοιοῦτον τρόπον ἀποδέχεσθαι ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς, ὥς ἐχθρὸν ἠγεῖσθαι ὁμοίως τῷ θανάτῳ ἐκείνου,

“ὅς χ’ ἕτερον μὲν κεύθει ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ βάζει.”

(4) λύων οὖν ὁ Ἀντισθένης φησί· τί οὖν; ἄρα γε πονηρὸς ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς ὅτι “πολύτροπος” ἐρρέθη; καὶ μὴν, διότι σοφός, οὕτως αὐτὸν προείρηκε. μήποτε οὖν “τρόπος” τὸ μὲν τι σημαίνει τὸ ἦθος, τὸ δέ τι σημαίνει τὴν τοῦ λόγου χρῆσιν· (5) “εὐτροπος” γὰρ ἀνὴρ ὁ τὸ ἦθος ἔχων εἰς τὸ εὖ τετραμμένον· “τρόποι” δὲ λόγων αἱ ποιαὶ πλάσεις; καὶ χρῆται τῷ “τρόπῳ” καὶ ἐπὶ φωνῆς καὶ ἐπὶ μελῶν ἐξαλλαγῆς ὡς ἐπὶ τῆς ἀηδόνης·

“ἦ τε θαμὰ τρωπῶσα χέει πολυηχέα φωνήν.”

(6) εἰ δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ δεινοὶ εἰσι διαλέγεσθαι, καὶ ἐπίστανται τὸ αὐτὸ νόημα κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους λέγειν· ἐπιστάμενοι δὲ πολλοὺς τρόπους λόγων περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ πολύτροποι ἂν εἶεν. εἰ δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ εἰσι, διὰ τοῦτό φησι τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα σοφὸν ὄντα πολύτροπον εἶναι, ὅτι δὴ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἠπίστατο πολλοῖς τρόποις συνεῖναι. (7) οὕτω καὶ Πυθαγόρας λέγεται πρὸς παῖδας ἀξιώθεις ποιήσασθαι λόγους διαθεῖναι πρὸς αὐτοὺς λόγους παιδικούς καὶ πρὸς γυναῖκας γυναιξιν ἀρμοδίους καὶ πρὸς ἄρχοντας ἀρχοντικούς καὶ πρὸς ἐφήβους ἐφηβικούς. (8) τὸν γὰρ ἐκάστοις πρόσφορον τρόπον τῆς σοφίας ἐξευρίσκειν, ἀμαθίας δὲ εἶναι τὸ πρὸς τοὺς ἀνομοίως ἔχοντας τῷ τοῦ λόγου χρῆσθαι μονοτρόπῳ. (9) ἔχειν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὴν ἱατρικὴν ἐν τῇ τῆς τέχνης κατορθώσει, ἡσκηκυῖαν τῆς θεραπείας τὸ πολύτροπον διὰ τὴν τῶν θεραπευομένων ποικίλην σύστασιν. (10) “τρόπος” μὲν οὖν τὸ παλίμβολον τὸ τοῦ ἦθους, τὸ πολυμετάβολον καὶ ἄστατον. (11) λόγου δὲ “πολυτροπία” καὶ χρῆσις ποικίλη λόγου εἰς ποικίλας ἀκοὰς μονοτροπία γίνεται. ἔν γὰρ τὸ ἐκάστω οἰκεῖον. (12) διὸ καὶ τὸ ἀρμόδιον ἐκάστω τὴν ποικιλίαν τοῦ λόγου εἰς ἓν συναγείρει, τὸν ἐκάστω πρόσφορον. τὸ δ’ αὖ μονοειδὲς ἀνάρμοστον ὃν πρὸς ἀκοὰς διαφόρους πολύτροπον ποιεῖ τὸν ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀπόβλητον ὡς αὐτοῖς ἀπόβλητον λόγον.

lectiones in F et Le e MacPhail 2007 cepi (1) Πορφυρίου F Le : om. H M Q R | ἀπορία praefixerunt Q R : idem in marg. M¹ : om. H F Le (2) Ἀχιλλέα codd. : Ἀγαμέμνονα conl. Schrader | ἀπλοῦς F H M Q R : ἀπλῶς Le | οὐδὲ F Le M Q R : ἡδὲ H | τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι F Le H : τῷ τε Ἀγαμέμνονι M Q R | εἶχε F Le M Q R : εἶχον H | ἀποκρυπτόμενον F Le H R : ἀποκρινόμενον Q et fort. M (in rasura) : ὑποκρινόμενον conl. Buttmann (3) καὶ H M : om. F Le Q R | τοῦ τὸν τοιοῦτον τρόπον Schrader : τοῦτον τοιοῦτον τρόπον F Le H : ὄντα add. H supra lin. : τοιοῦτον τρόπον M Q R : τοῦ τὸν τοιουτότροπον conl. Ludwig | κεύθει codd. : κεύθη Polak ex Homero | βάζει H (varia lectio in

Homeri textu) : εἶπη cett. (4) λύων F Le H R : λέγων Q M : ante λύων add. λύσις H : λύσις in marg. M | ἐρρέθη F Le H : ἐκλήθη M Q R | μῆν F Le H : μή M Q R | αὐτὸν προεῖρηκε F Le M Q R : αὐτὸν προσεῖρηκε Buttman : πρὸς αὐτὸν εἶρηκεν H | τρόπος F Le H R : ὁ τρόπος M Q | τὸ μέν τι codd. plur. : τὸ μέντοι Le | τὸ δέ τι codd. plur. : τὸ δὴ τι H | τὴν τοῦ om. Le M Q R (5) ἀνὴρ H : om. cett. | τρόποι δὲ λόγων H : τρόπου δὲ λόγου Q : τρόποι δὲ λόγου F Le M R . τρόπου δὲ λόγων Ludwich | αἱ ποιαὶ πλάσεις Buttman : αἵτιοι αἱ πλάσεις codd. : αἵτιοι αἱ πολλαὶ χρήσεις Luzzatto | καὶ χρῆται H : κέχρηται cett. | ὥς H : καὶ ὡς F L E : καὶ M Q R | τρωπῶσα F : τροπῶσα H M Q R : τραποῦσα Le | πολυηχέα φωνήν H M R : πολυοχέα φωνήν Q : μελιηδέα γῆρυν αἰοιδὴν F Le (6) καὶ ἐπίστανται codd. : ἐπίστανται καὶ Buttman fort. recte | τρόπους λέγειν F Le H : λέγειν τρόπους M Q R | τοῦ αὐτοῦ F Le H : αὐτοῦ M Q R | πολύτροποι ἂν εἶεν F M Q R : πολύτροποι ἂν ἦεν H : πολλοὶ τροποὶ ἂν εἶεν Le | εἰ δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ H : εἰ δὲ σοφοὶ Le M R : οἱ δὲ σοφοὶ F Q | ἀγαθοὶ codd. : <ἀνθρώποις ὁμιλεῖν> ἀγαθοὶ add. Schrader | δὴ codd. plur. : διὰ H (7) ἄρχοντας H M Q R : τοὺς ἄρχοντας F Le | ἐφήβους codd. plur. : ἐφήβεις H (8) ἐκάστοις F Le H : ἐκάστης M Q R | τῆς σοφίας ἐξευρίσκειν F Le H M : τῆς σοφίας ἐξευρίσκειν σοφίας ἐστίν Q | τὸ γὰρ ἐκάστοις πρόσφορον τρόπον ἐξευρίσκειν σοφίας εἶναι coni. Ludwich | ἀμαθίας δὲ εἶναι codd. plur. : ἀμαθίας δὲ H | ἀνομοίως ἔχοντας τῷ τοῦ λόγου χρῆσθαι μονοτρόπῳ H : ἀνομοίους ἐντυγχάνοντα τοῦ λόγου τὸ μονότροπον cett. (9) ἔχειν codd. plur. : ἔχει Le | ἡσκηκίαν Polak : ἡσκηκίας codd. | ποικίλῃν F Le H M : ποικιλίας QR | lacunam post σύστασιν pos. Schrader (10) τὸ τοῦ codd. : τοῦτο τοῦ Ludwich | καὶ ἄστατον Le : om. cett. (11) μονοτροπία codd. : μονοτροπία coni. Schrader (12) τὸν ἐκάστῳ πρόσφορον F Le : τὸν ἐκάστου πρόσφορον H M : τὸ ἐκάστῳ πρόσφορον coni. Dindorf | ὃν om H : τὸν Q R | τὸν ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀπόβλητον codd. : τὸν <ἄλλως> ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀπόβλητον coni. Schrader

(1) From Porphyry: “*polytropic*”: Antisthenes says that Homer does not praise Odysseus more than he blames him in calling him “polytropic.”

(2) Indeed, he has not made Achilles and Ajax polytropic, but simple and noble. Nor, by Zeus, has he portrayed Nestor, the wise man, as tricky and reversible in his character, but interacting simply with Agamemnon and all the others and giving counsel to the army, if he had something good, and not hiding it away. (3) And Achilles is so far from accepting this sort of behavior that he considers that man hateful like death

“who hides one thing in his heart and speaks another.” [*Il.* 9.313]

(4) Solving this crux, Antisthenes says: So what of it? Is Odysseus then *wicked* because he is called “*polytropic*”? On the contrary, it because he is *wise* that he [Homer] has proclaimed him so. Perhaps, then, “*tropos*” signifies in one respect the character, and in another respect the use of account. (5) For the person having his character oriented to the good is a well-oriented [*eutropos*] man. And “tropes” of accounts are the various formations. And he [Homer] uses the “trope” for the change of both sound and songs, as in the case of the nightingale:

“and she, often changing, pours forth her many-toned voice.”

[*Od.* 19.521]

(6) If, then, the wise men are clever in discourse, they also know how to speak the same thought in many ways: and, knowing many ways of accounts about the same thing, they would be *polytropic*. And if the wise are also good, for this reason he [Homer] says that Odysseus, being wise, is *polytropic*, because he of course knew how to converse with people in many ways. (7) In this way also Pythagoras, when invited to compose a speech for boys, is said to have set out for them boyish speeches, and for women speeches harmonious with women, and for rulers speeches of the ruler, and for ephebes speeches of the ephebe. (8) For to search out the version appropriate to each [is] characteristic of wisdom, [he, Antisthenes, said] whereas it is characteristic of stupidity to use one way of account toward those who are disharmoniously disposed. (9) And medicine, too, [he, Antisthenes, said] has this trait in the successful performance of its art, when it has practiced multiplicity [*the polytropic*] of treatment because of the varied constitution of its patients. (10) “*Tropos*,” then, [is] reversibility said of the character, the characteristic of being much-changing and unstable. (11) And multiplicity [*polytropia*] of account and variegated use of account toward variegated hearings becomes simplicity [*monotropia*]. For what is proper to each is one. (12) For this reason, too, what is harmonious for each gathers the variegation of account into one thing, the appropriate account for each. Uniformity, conversely, being unharmonious to diverse audience members, makes the account multiplex [*polytropic*], since it is prone to rejection by many on the grounds that for them it is fit for rejection.

Context of Preservation

This passage, which probably preserves terms, phrases, and argument that can be attributed to Antisthenes, has been transmitted in several stages from Antisthenes to the scholia. Let us trace backward.

In the Homeric manuscripts: The *Odyssey* manuscripts that include this scholium—H, M, Q, R, and Z—represent a large portion of the surviving tradition of scholia on the *Odyssey*. For Ludwich (1890:3), mss. H (Harleianus graecus 5674, twelfth or thirteenth century), M (Venetus Marcianus 613, thirteenth century), and Q (Ambrosianus Q 88 supp., fifteenth century) stand as the three best manuscripts for *Odyssey* scholia. R (Laurentianus 57.32, fifteenth century) is of lesser importance, providing some variations from Q, with which it apparently shares a source, Z (Vaticanus Pal. Gr. 7, fourteenth century). The present passage is lacking in the scholia to mss. T and Vd 133, which include other Antisthenean passages transmitted through Porphyry (see on t. 188). In the *Iliad* tradition, the passage occurs in two of the four *Iliad* manuscripts with excerpts from Porphyry among their scholia, F (Escorialensis 509, Homeric text eleventh century, with scholia in a later hand) and Le (Leidensis Vossianus Graecus 64, fifteenth century): see t. 191. (MacPhail 2007 includes this passage at p. 272–77, but it is not in MacPhail 2011.) MacPhail 2011:6–8 distinguishes two types of transmission from Porphyry to the scholia, full excerpts and short epitomes. We have the full excerpt in this fragment and the epitome form elsewhere (with t. 189 as a case of its own kind, apparently preserving different, parallel epitomes; t. 188B might also be an excerpt). Even so, the style of all such excerpts (collected for the *Iliad* by MacPhail) differs in some ways from that of Porphyry's twenty ζητήματα preserved directly in Vaticanus 305 (published by Sodano 1970): for example, the first-person statements that occur frequently in Vaticanus 305 have been converted to a third-person voice in the scholia. So even the “excerpts” have been adapted from Porphyry's original text, which could account for the absence of some of Porphyry's typical markers of citation in this passage, noted by Luzzatto (1996:289–90). The seven versions are in remarkable agreement (contrast t. 188 and 189), with no difference between an *Iliad* version and an *Odyssey* version (except in one case, in §5, where a verse from the *Odyssey* is incorrectly cited in the *Iliad* manuscripts), and it is clear that the scholiasts used the same intermediate source. The manuscript that deviates most from the others and seems sometimes to preserve the better readings, H, shares no peculiar traits with the *Iliad* tradition, whereas the other *Odyssey* manuscripts often agree with the *Iliad* tradition against H. Yet despite the nearly univocal version of Porphyry's passage in the scholia, there was a stage in the *Odyssey* reception where Porphyry's name was lost and minor rubrics were added (ἀπορία in mss. Q, R, and M; λύσις in H and M).

In Porphyry: The first book of the *Homeric Questions*, ζητήματα ὁμηρικά, of the Neo-Platonist Porphyry (234–c. 301 CE), preserved in Vaticanus 305, shows that Porphyry wrote in the form of literary conversations on Homer imagined with his friend Anatolius, into which he injected both short and

long quotations from older Homeric criticism. His overriding principle was that “Homer elucidates Homer,” and the critics he cites are sometimes loyal to the same principle but sometimes defy it, by reading, for example, Attic senses into Homeric vocabulary or assuming that Homer makes errors. Porphyry did not follow any perceptible order of arrangement and often referred to various Homeric passages within one discussion. Thus we should imagine not a form like a commentary, which began at *Od.* 1.1 and proceeded through the poem, but a freer discussion, such as we see in Plato’s *Hippias Minor* or in Aulus Gellius’ *Attic Nights* (Sodano 1970:xv; MacPhail 2007:iii). Porphyry also answers his Homeric questions in his own voice, citing older authorities for support: this raises questions about the continuity of this passage in the scholia and its attribution in full to Antisthenes (pressed in Luzzatto 1996:282–91, 342–57). The epithet *πολύτροπος* occurs only twice in the *Odyssey* (1.1, 10.330) and not at all in the *Iliad*, so it seems that Porphyry’s discussion was motivated basically by the first verse of the *Odyssey*, where the manuscripts more often assign it. But the social situation imagined in the discussion is the Greek army at Troy, that is, the world of the *Iliad*, and the citation of *Il.* 9.313 explains its preservation in the *Iliad* scholia.

Before Porphyry: The rubric of problem and solution (*ἀπορία* and *λύσις*) evident in this passage and also elsewhere in the remains of Porphyry’s Homeric problems suggests a Peripatetic background. (Ch. 25 of Aristotle’s *Poetics* discusses types of *πρόβλημα* and *λύσις*.) The common assumption is that Porphyry received much of his material through the now lost *Homeric Problems* of Aristotle, whom he often cites, and that he also imitated their style of problem and solution. (Porphyry comments quite often on his place in the history of Homeric questions: see on *Il.* 9.682–83 and esp. 10.252–53; MacPhail 2011:156–57, 170–71.) For Antisthenes, a Peripatetic transmission is widely apparent: in t. 190 and especially in t. 191, his solution to a problem is juxtaposed with solutions of nearly contemporary critics, including Aristotle. In t. 188 and 189, Aristotle’s opinion, or a Peripatetic discussion, is more indiscriminately mixed with that of Antisthenes. The current passage, however, has not been condensed to epitome in the manner of t. 190 and 191 and so plausibly preserves the skeleton of Antisthenes’ own extended argument, if sometimes paraphrased by Porphyry. Comparison to the Peripatetics is absent, by contrast with most of the material transmitted by Porphyry: the only plausible Peripatetic intervention is the citation of Pythagoras’ exemplum in §7 (see notes), but more likely this originates with Antisthenes or Porphyry. Antisthenes’ writings on the Homeric poems were probably known to the Alexandrian critics, who offer a parallel reception for the issues addressed in t. 189. The Alexandrians were important among Porphyry’s sources as well. But there is no sign that they are in the background

to this discussion of πολύτροπος. It is possible, in this case, that Porphyry used Antisthenes' text without mediation.

Antisthenes' text: The title of Antisthenes' original text can only be conjectured. It is most likely one of the Homeric titles in the eighth and ninth *tomoi*, since the passage was transmitted as an interpretation of Homer. However, Patzer 1970:164–90 proposes that it is a fragment from the first title in the catalog, *On Diction or On Characters* (t. 41A title 1.1), which, as he claims on the basis of this passage, was a Socratic dialogue (see §12 notes). Brancacci 1990:52 and 1996 posits *On Discussion* (title 6.4). Luzzatto 1996:299 revises a proposal of Schrader 1880:387 for *On the Odyssey* (title 9.1), based on its programmatic position as first title in its τόμος and its apparent popularity to the time of Phrynicus (t. 50). The setting at Troy presumed in the passage makes it possible to ask whether a text on the *Iliad*, rather than the *Odyssey*, was the source: the other fragments on Odysseus are about his virtue as displayed in the *Odyssey* plot (t. 188, 190). A text on Homer as a poet (title 8.3) is another possibility. A scholarly tradition (Schrader 1890:175; Rostagni 1922:3; Decleva Caizzi 1966:105; Patzer 1970:167; Brancacci 1990:46; LévyStone 2005) holds that Antisthenes' original text was a dialogue, like Plato's *Hippias Minor*. The main argument for a dialogue form has been the presence of conversational particles in the text (see notes to §2 and 4). All of these can be matched elsewhere in Porphyry, whose *Homeric Questions* were imagined dialogues, so it is not certain that they survive from Antisthenes. The parallel with *Hippias Minor* and the structure of problem and solution, both of which are attributed to Antisthenes, remain good reasons to guess that Antisthenes' text was a dialogue.

Importance of the Testimonium

This text shows, more clearly than other evidence (with the possible exception of t. 189), how Antisthenes used texts of Homer, apparently as a tool for mental exercise and a source of ethical truth. In addition, this text can be connected with t. 54 to fill out Antisthenes' conception of the character Odysseus, who is here the wise rhetor and probably approaches the wise man simply speaking, that is, the philosopher. (For a distinction between the identities of rhetor and philosopher, see t. 173. Goulet-Cazé 1992 [“L'Ajx et l'Ulysse”]:19 objects that the πολύτροπος epithet, which provides the basis for the present discussion, is absent from t. 53 and 54. But this might be a strategy: see comments on t. 53–54.) It provides our best evidence for an Antisthenean argument (§6). It preserves relics of a syllogism, imprecise as it is, in the style of Plato's Socratic dialogues. It provides the clearest and most detailed surviving case of intertextuality with Plato, through overlaps with *Hippias Minor* (§1–4, 6). Whether these are independent, parallel texts

reflecting a common cultural setting (as argued in Luzzatto 1996:291–99; see also Rostagni 1922:151; Giannantoni 1990 v.4:344; LévyStone 2005: esp. n.74) or whether they have a polemical or other meaningful connection (as asserted in Dümmler 1882:31–35; see also Pohlenz 1913:57–59; Wilamowitz 1920:136; Decleva Caizzi 1966:105; Müller 1975:187 n.1; Brancacci 1990:49–53) has not been established, but factors such as the gratuitous presence of Nestor in Plato and the seniority of Antisthenes support the likelihood of Antisthenes' temporal priority (see Patzer 1970:176; Kahn 1996:121–23), and I find it hard to doubt that Plato is responding to Antisthenes in *Hippias Minor*. If we accept the end of the fragment as the thought, if not necessarily the diction, of Antisthenes, it shows a sophisticated view of rhetorical action, as well as a clever facility with (or even delight in) generating paradox in the realm of numbers and individuation. In its positive evaluation of Odysseus as a philosophical hero, this text is consistent with the rest of Antisthenes' literary remains (t. 188, 190, 54): see Höistad 1948:94–102; Stanford 1954:96–100; LévyStone 2005; Montiglio 2011:20–24.

Notes

(1) οὐκ ἐπαινεῖν φησιν Ἀντισθένης Ὅμηρον τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα μᾶλλον ἢ ψέγειν: The phrasing is euphemistic for “blames rather than praises” and states the accusation against the virtue of Homer's Odysseus (Patzer 1970:171–72). Porphyry (or a previous summarizer) is apparently attributing to Antisthenes, as author of the text, all the statements in the text, which include both negative and positive interpretations of Odysseus' epithet. Since the passage will favor the positive interpretation overall, which is also attributed to “Antisthenes,” and since Antisthenes elsewhere seems to defend Odysseus and his wisdom at all costs (see esp. t. 188, 190), it seems most likely that the accusation was made by a character in Antisthenes' text (like the Hippias figure in Plato's *Hippias Minor*), not in Antisthenes' own voice. This accusation is rejected in the “solution,” or *lusis*, that follows. This opening line does not, then, indicate Antisthenes' own judgment that Homer was morally indifferent to his Odysseus character and Antisthenes' redirection of evaluation to a rhetorical sphere, an amoral sphere in which Odysseus *is* praised (as is claimed in a tradition deriving from Rostagni 1922:155; see also Decleva Caizzi 1966:105; Brancacci 1990:47–8 n.10; Brancacci 1996:375–78). Rather, it reports the allegation against Odysseus leveled by the accusing voice in a dialogue, which the summarizer attributes to Antisthenes. This accuser could have been the historical Hippias, if the debate in Plato's *Hippias Minor* represents historical truth; the defender could then have been Socrates. However, there is no real evidence for the identity of either of Antisthenes' speakers. The Socratic writers seem to have played some kind of game by

substituting characters in their writings: Plato is supposed to have replaced Aeschines with Crito in his *Crito* (Diog. Laert. 2.60); Xenophon's *Oeconomicus* uses Critobulus where Aeschines' *Aspasia* (possibly the earlier text) uses Xenophon himself; and see notes on t. 13A for the possibility that Xenophon replaced Alcibiades with Antisthenes in his *Symposium*. See also t. 72B. If this was a standard form of allusion or competition among the Socratic writers, it is plausible that Antisthenes participated.

λέγοντα αὐτὸν “πολύτροπον”: Homeric poetry calls Odysseus πολύτροπος only twice, at *Od.* 1.1 and 10.330, but commonly uses five other epithets formed with πολυ- as the first element. (See t. 54.14 notes.) The negative moral evaluation of πολύτροπος is not attested before this text and *Hippias Minor*, and it does not survive elsewhere in the tradition. It is plausibly traced to Hippias himself, who seems to have been interested in the comparative value of the adjectives attributed to the various Homeric heroes (as in Pl. *Hipp. Min.* 364c4–7). The *Homeric Lexicon* of Apollonius Sophista has no entry for πολύτροπος (contrast the epithets in t. 189), and neither Cornutus nor Heraclitus discusses it. The *Odyssey* scholia more broadly, including Eustathius, include only the favorable, rhetorical interpretation, as though transmitting Antisthenes' conclusion; the emperor Julian refers to Odysseus as “the rhetor from Ithaca attempting polytropically to persuade Achilles toward a change of heart” (ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῆς Ἰθάκης ῥήτωρ πολυτρόπως πείθειν ἐπιχειρῶν πρὸς διαλλαγὰς Ἀχιλλέα, *Or.* 1.21; see also Montiglio 2011:20–24). Both the accusation and the defense make claims that evaluative adjectives have equivalents, which can therefore be substituted for one another in the course of developing an argument. Both sides also survey the application of the adjectives to various entities. These tactics seem to be telling of a Socratic background. Over the course of the discussion, πολύτροπος will be variously applied to the hero, to his ἦθος (which is his unified inner disposition, possibly his soul), to his individual acts of behavior (closest to the etymology of τρόπος) in both linguistic and non-linguistic modes, and, by implication at least, to the song of the nightingale.

(2) τὸν Ἀχιλλέα καὶ τὸν Αἴαντα . . . ἀπλοῦς καὶ γεννάδας: This pair of adjectives, exemplified by two heroes, represents the first of two traits said to be opposite to πολύτροπος, in an initial opposition between the hero of ruse and the hero of warfare. “Simplicity” is associated with Ajax in older versions of the Judgment of the Arms: in Aeschylus (ἀπλὰ γάρ ἐστι τῆς ἀληθείας ἔπη, “for simple are the words of the truth,” fr. 176 TGrF, presumably part of or in reference to Ajax' speech) and in Pindar (εἴη μὴ ποτέ μοι τοιοῦτον ἦθος, / Ζεῦ πάτερ, ἀλλὰ κελεύθοις / ἀπλόαις ζωᾷς ἐφαπτοίμαν, “May this sort of tendency never be mine, father Zeus, but may I hold to the simple paths of life,” *Nem.* 8.35–36). The association with γεννάδας seems also to be Aeschylean, though

his use in reference to Trojan heroes is not attested: at *Pl. Rep.* 2 361b6–8, the “simple and noble man” (ἄνδρα ἀπλοῦν καὶ γενναῖον) is equated with the man who “wants not to seem but to be just,” and the latter clause is quoted from Aeschylus’ *Seven against Thebes* 592–94. There it characterizes Amphiarauus, on whom Antisthenes wrote in *Περὶ Ἀμφιαράου* (t. 41A title 9.9), where he might have been an emblem for lack of conceit: see Decleva Caizzi 1980:58–59. An opposition between πολύτροπος (or ποικίλος, discussed below) and ἀπλοῦς becomes a rhetorical commonplace (first in *Ar. Rhet.* 3.16 1416b25) that survives into imperial discussions of aesthetics (e.g., ps.-Plutarch, *Essay on the Life and Poetry of Homer* 218, noted in Dümmler 1882:22), possibly by the indirect influence of this passage or the line of thinking it represents. The basic opposition is between the hero of intelligence, in whose behavior being and seeming could be disunited, and the hero of force and action, in whose behavior there is no interface of presentation, but being and seeming are the same, just as in all versions of the Judgement of the Arms (including t. 53–54). **πεποιηκέναι**: Clear statements that the particular agent Homer “made” or “created” the characters and episodes in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are frequent in Plato (e.g., *Hipp. Min.* 364c5; *Gorg.* 525d7; *Phaed.* 94d6–7; *Rep.* 4 441c1). This articulation might have been intended to counter the possible alternative view that the characters just circulate generally in a world of myth or culture, such as, for example, Gorgias might imply (*Encomium of Helen* §2–3, even if this is a joke). See also t. 54.14.

τὸν Νέστορα τὸν σοφόν: This is the second trait said to be opposite to πολύτροπος, and the figure of the warrior hero drops from the picture at this stage, never to reappear. (In Plato’s *Hippias Minor*, by contrast, the comparison between Odysseus and Achilles is sustained through the text, albeit as a comparison of rhetorical competence. Antisthenes’ Ajax and Odysseus speeches, t. 53–54, also sustain this comparison, and there, too, rhetorical style is of primary interest, even for ethics.) Under consideration from here to the end of the passage is two ways to be a speaker, the “simple” way of Nestor, which is transparent and full, and the other way of Odysseus, which is deceptive and changeable.

οὐ μὰ Δία: This is the first of three phrases noted by Rostagni (1922:153) as markers of an original dialogue Porphyry has summarized. However, Porphyry himself used the dialogue form, and each of Rostagni’s phrases is paralleled in the relics of Porphyry’s Homeric works. This phrase is in his interpretations preserved for *Il.* 8.328–29 and 24.92 (Schrader). It is still possible that the phrase survives from Antisthenes.

δόλιον καὶ παλίμβολον τὸ ἥθος: Odysseus’ “tricky and reversible” way of speaking is immediately ethical also, according to the accuser. It is clear how δόλιον should be considered a dubious ethical quality in a speaker:

the audience is not permitted to fully share the speaker's thought, but the speaker offers only words that manipulate the audience to believe what the speaker wishes. (This is the standard suspicion of "clever speakers" in classical Athens and in all times.) This leaves the speaker with enormous power over the audience, including the power to betray their interests in favor of his own. The defender will not defend this sense of πολύτροπος "deceptive," but will ignore the possibility that the speaker betrays the audience's interests and will interpret selective or targeted communication even to "friends" as useful and good execution of this cleverness, a virtue. The accuser's second equivalent for πολύτροπος, "reversible in his [ethical] character," makes different assumptions, and the defender will address and reinterpret this meaning. The accuser seems to assume that there is a seamless interface between a person's rhetorical behavior and his inner character or soul and that his speech represents his real self. An unstable or fickle (and possibly "plural") inner self is, just in itself, ethical depravity. For example, it shows a lack of true knowledge and commitment, as other Socratic texts emphasize. Parmenides had said that the "path of all [the unknowing humans] is turning back on itself" (πάντων δὲ παλίντροπος ἐστὶ κέλευθος, DK 28B6.5–7): this is not directly a statement that such souls are plural but that fault is under discussion in his passage. The defender will eliminate this interpretation for Odysseus but will accept and retain the accuser's ideal of inner ethical unity. (This comes in §10–11, where the continuity in the argument is difficult. But no interpretation seems simpler than assuming we have an abridgment of an original where there were clear connections.)

ἀπλῶς τῷ Ἀγαμέμνονι συνόντα καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασι: Associating "simply" with the commander in chief and the associate leaders in the army ("all" of them) is equated with fullness and transparency of communication. Every good idea is shared, apparently even with the ordinary army as well as its leaders (καὶ εἰς τὸ στρατόπεδον, εἴ τι ἀγαθὸν εἶχε, συμβουλευόντα καὶ οὐχ ἀποκρυπτόμενον). This allows everyone to participate equally in whatever decision is at stake according to Nestor. Nestor's verbal behavior is like the warrior hero's behavior in action: there is no interface to complicate what he "does" versus what he seems to do, but his action is simply and objectively there for all. The absolute language (ἅπασι, εἴ τι ἀγαθόν) is striking. Antisthenes' original might have thrown doubt on the possibility that any normal human speaker could have such an infallible conception of reality in his mind, as well as such an infallible ability to articulate his conception, that this full communication was possible or that claiming it was important. For example, he could have shared Gorgias' contention that *logos* is powerful because knowing the present is as difficult as remembering the past and predicting the future (*Encomium of Helen* §11). Compare the similarly absolute phrase οὐδέν σε πολλοῦ ἀξίων λέληθε in t. 185, which is probably

sarcastic. Yet Socrates is said by Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.6.14) to share all his good thoughts directly with his friends: “If I have anything good, I teach it” (ἐάν τι ἔχω ἀγαθόν, διδάσκω).

(3) τοσοῦτον ἀπέιχε τοῦ τὸν τοιοῦτον τρόπον ἀποδέχεσθαι ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς: The accuser clarifies the charge against Odysseus by citing from Achilles’ speech in the embassy scene of *Il.* 9, quoting 9.313 and paraphrasing 9.312 (ἐχθρόν . . . ὁμοίως τῷ θανάτῳ for Homer’s ἐχθρὸς . . . ὁμῶς Αἰδαο πύλησιν). As Plato’s Hippias character seems to notice, when he cites at greater length from the same passage (9.308–10 and 312–14 at *Hipp. Min.* 365a1–b2), the Achilles in the Homeric scene is literally speaking not about Odysseus but about his own responsibility to speak his mind openly to an audience that includes Odysseus. Whatever the source of the new interpretation by which Achilles alludes to Odysseus, the quotation in this passage serves only as support for the accusation and for its ethical severity. In *Hippias Minor*, by contrast, the fact that Achilles also “lies” becomes central in the argument. This should not count as a reason to believe that Antisthenes’ discussion is derived from Plato’s. To the contrary, Plato might have seen an opportunity to play with Antisthenes’ material, including his peculiar view of “falsity” (see t. 152A, 156), and so added the extra lines to the quotation, which are necessary as motivation for the eventual charge against Achilles.

“ὅς χ’ ἕτερον μὲν κεύθει ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ βάζει”: Ms. H’s alternative reading βάζει (which appears in some of the Homeric manuscripts) for the other manuscripts’ εἶπη should be preferred because it is the *lectio difficilior* and because both verbs are then in the indicative form (versus the subjunctive in Homer and Plato).

(4) λύων οὖν ὁ Ἀντισθένης φησί: The verb λύων, related to the technical term λύσις first attested in Aristotle (*Poet.* 1460b6–1461b25), is probably part of the rubric added by Porphyry or a previous summarizer of Antisthenes’ text. This λύσις is not labeled by type. Perhaps it could be a λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως under the Peripatetic scheme; but it is not clear, in what follows, that there is a simplified semantic resolution of ambiguity of the kind the Peripatetics sought. Compare the more complicated rubric of “solution” in t. 189, where two types are named, and see esp. t. 189D.2. In t. 191, the problem is named. τί οὖν: This is another residue of dialogue form. The expression is highly common in Porphyry’s commentary by question and answer on Aristotle’s *Categories*, which has a kind of dialogue form, as well as in the *Homeric Questions*, both in Schrader’s collected passages and in the Vatican codex. This frequency in Porphyry does not rule out Antisthenes as the source.

ἀρά γε πονηρός: The defender is clearly concerned with ethical evaluation. In Pl. *Gorg.* 456c6–457c2, πονηρός is the quality Gorgias denies to rhetoric (457a2–3). Rhetoric has no value in itself, he says, but can be justly or unjustly

used. Rostagni 1922:155–56 uses the passage to argue that Antisthenes evaluates the rhetorician's skill as Gorgias did, amorally. But this is to agree with Plato that rhetoric and philosophy can be separated. Plausibly Plato wrote *Gorgias* exactly to refute Antisthenes' assumption that rhetoric has moral value through its continuity with wisdom. The question is hard to negotiate, but it cannot be answered a priori in Rostagni's manner.

καὶ μὴν, διότι σοφός, οὕτως αὐτὸν προσεῖρηκε: A variation in the text, μὴ in most of the *Odyssey* manuscripts versus μὴν in the *Iliad* manuscripts, comes down to a difference of tone. If we read μὴ (with Schrader and Radermacher 1951), we have an extension of the previous question: "Is it not because he is wise that he called him thus?" If we read μὴν (with Dindorf, Ludwich, Pontani, and MacPhail), we have a strong assertion: "Indeed because he is wise he has called him thus." A rhetorical question, with μὴ, is possible in a dialogue that attempted to persuade the interlocutor, but the strong assertion is overall more appropriate, since this is the point to be defended. σοφός is to be understood as unequivocally positive in ethical value, the opposite of πονηρός. This sense for σοφός is consistent with Socratic usage and traditional Greek usage.

μήποτε οὖν: If we punctuate this clause as an indicative statement (with Ludwich, Schrader, Radermacher, Pontani, and MacPhail), rather than another question (with Dindorf), then these particles express a tentative flavor, as in a proposal after an implied verb of warning: "(Let us be careful/take into consideration) lest perhaps then . . ." If we punctuate as a question, the particles are negative and mark a question expecting a positive answer. The particles, which are also in Rostagni's list of dialogical residues, could be from Porphyry (they survive once in question 10 in the Vatican codex and once otherwise in Porphyry's corpus). The combination is attested mainly in later Greek (Galen, Herodian, Apollonius Dyscolus, and Aspasius), but the similar μή που and μή πως are Homeric, so it is plausible that Antisthenes wrote μήποτε οὖν.

"τρόπος" τὸ μὲν τι σημαίνει τὸ ἥθος, τὸ δέ τι σημαίνει τὴν τοῦ λόγου χρῆσιν: "Antisthenes" the defender here takes several steps (some unstated in the text) in his reevaluation of πολῦτροπος. Although Porphyry, too, is interested in the meanings of Homeric words in nearly every inquiry and frequently investigates multiple possibilities before selecting one, the method followed here seems distinctive and is closely matched in a second case, t. 189. First, the defender separates the compound epithet into its two parts, πολυ- and τρόπος, which are the most basic units of the word that are meaningful and iterable in different formations in the language. (Some evidence suggests that Antisthenes might have thought that sounds and letters were the smallest units of iterable meaning, as in the views parodied

by Plato in *Cratylus*. See discussion under t. 150A.1. This other evidence is, in all cases, less clear than the evidence here and in t. 189, where Antisthenes recognizes what today might be called morphological units, of one or two syllables, as the most basic semantic level. It seems plausible, at the same time, that Antisthenes, in the footsteps of Gorgias, might have tried to push the question of just what the most basic semantic level is and might have used half-serious jokes, paradoxes, and outrageous claims to do so.) Second, the defender focuses on one of these units, *τρόπος*, as more basic, although the logic of priority between the two parts of a compound word will shift from example to example. The “syntax” of compound Greek adjectives is itself flexible: whereas the second element normally dominates the meaning, and the first element qualifies the second, the opposite may also hold, and some words can change their sense in this way, depending on the context and the noun described. Poets such as Aeschylus exploit this ambiguity. Since the three cases of epithets under examination here and in t. 189 are compound adjectives and since each examination shows some “syntactical” reevaluation of some kind, Antisthenes might have selected them to explore this type of ambiguity. Porphyry himself discusses many compound epithets, as did the Alexandrian critics, perhaps because they perceived the same difficulty. But typical of most Alexandrian discussions is a single resolution; here, as in t. 189, we see retention of the complexity. (On the debate whether Antisthenes is trying to resolve ambiguity here or exploit it, see further discussion below.) Third, the defender distinguishes two senses for the word *τρόπος*. (A third, possibly parallel sense is added in §5. The non-parallel language need not imply that the musical interpretation of *τρόπος* is of a secondary kind, since the text has undergone so many stages of reception and compression.) Finally, he demonstrates how this word *τρόπος*, in each of its senses, combines with a second unit to form a more complex word, using citations both from Homer and from the discourse of his contemporary world. No principles are offered for how one should select the correct sense or senses for the original compound word after completing this exercise. Either Antisthenes had no such principles, or they have been lost in transmission. We might presume that the tradition has preserved the most explicit indications of procedure that were ever there and that Antisthenes’ “method” stopped short of stating how the critic decides which option of sense to prefer. Possibly this was a matter for intuition, knowledge of parallels, and “good reading” (the sort of thing Plato criticizes in *Ion* 542a1–6 as the “divine gift” rather than technique). Critical to both the interpretation of this passage and the elucidation of his Homeric method overall—that is, its attitude toward ambiguity—is the question whether Antisthenes will drop one of the senses of *τρόπος*, the ethical sense, in order to replace it with another, the rhetorical sense, or

whether he means to maintain both senses throughout the discussion. A comparison with the treatment of the epithets *ὑπερφιάλους* and *ἀθεμίστους* in t. 189 supports the possibility that he maintains both senses, rationalizing ambiguity by explaining each level but not dismissing either meaning. The end of the present text (§9–10) also supports this interpretation: there the ethical sense remains active for Odysseus' audience, who are like a doctor's patients, although not for himself. Also relevant to Antisthenes' overall recognition of an ethical level in *τρόπος* are t. 53–54, where Ajax seems to imply that Odysseus is *πολύτροπος* and therefore bad in his ethical behavior (*εἰ μὲν ἦν μοι πρὸς ἄνδρα ὁμοιότροπον*, 53.5) and where Odysseus, arguing for his own ethical virtue, declines to claim the adjective *πολύτροπος* but accepts many other *πολυ-* epithets (54.14).

τὸ μὲν τι σημαίνει: The verb *σημαίνει* (indicates) takes as its subject of agency not a human speaker but an item from the lexicon, the word *τρόπος*. As the further discussion shows, this *τρόπος* is not quoted from any particular text or usage but is meant on the general level of the Greek language. (See Brancacci 1990:57 n.25 for classical Athenian parallels to the senses Antisthenes will distinguish.) This usage of *σημαίνει* is not traditional but is first attested, for linguistic signs, in Plato's *Cratylus*: see Brancacci 1990:56; t. 152B.2 note. (The Derveni papyrus has been taken to predicate *σημαίνει* of a lexical item: *δῆλοι δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖσδε τοῖς ἔπεσιν ὅτι ἀγαθὴν σημαίνει*, col. 26, where the lexical subject understood of *σημαίνει* would be *ἑᾶς*; the translations of both Laks and Most 1997:22 and Janko 2001:31 understand so. But it is more likely that the subject of both clauses is Orpheus: "He reveals also in these words that he indicates good [in saying *ἑᾶς*].") This clause is exceptional for placing the sense of one term, rather than a fact, as object, but the grammatical subject remains traditional. Elsewhere in the papyrus, when a linguistic term is equated to its meaning, the relationship is indicated merely with the copula: see, e.g., col. 23, with Janko 2001:30 n.173, where Janko explains that in his translation, "means," renders the Greek word *ἐστί*. Elsewhere throughout the text, the verb *σημαίνει* takes Orpheus the poet as grammatical subject. The Hippocratic corpus does use the verb *σημαίνει* regularly with a sign as grammatical subject; but the signs are bodily symptoms, not linguistic terms.) This usage is common in Aristotle and was fully common by Porphyry's time. Here one can assume that the sentence represents Antisthenes' usage, because in his paradox against gainsaying also (t. 152B.2, 153B.4), linguistic items take precedence over speakers in the role of "indicating." Parallel syntax for *σημαίνει* appears in t. 152B.2: even if Alexander of Aphrodisias formulated that sentence, the idea that the semantic medium, not only the speaker, signifies is critical to the point Antisthenes makes. In t. 160, Socrates is said to start his investigation from names, what each signifies (*τί σημαίνει ἕκαστον*).

The other instances of σημαίνει in Antisthenes' literary remains (in t. 153B.1, 153B.4, and 191 and in the compounded middle form ἐπεσημήνατο in t. 188B) imply a human agent and so use the verb in a more traditional sense. τὸ ἥθος: Thimme 1935 traces the evolution of the ethical sense for τρόπος. (The fifth-century comic poet Epicharmus gives the ethical τρόπος a fully reified sense, equating it with an inhabiting spirit: ὁ τρόπος ἀνθρώποισι δαίμων ἀγαθός, οἷς δὲ καὶ κακός, fr. 266 K-A; Heraclitus offers a nearly parallel statement at DK 22B119, with ἥθος in the position of τρόπος.) Etymologically, the word comes from τρέπω, "I turn," and so there must be a behavioral basis, a tendency toward particular actions, that underlies this reified ethical sense (Thimme 1935:6). The assumption that πολὺτρόπος necessarily implies ethical condemnation must depend on the reified sense, and Antisthenes' conclusion in §11, that what Odysseus really has is μονοτροπία, also seems to endorse this view (unless a τροπία is different from a τρόπος and unless *having* a disposition is different from *being* a certain kind of character: further discussion follows). But in order to reexamine the word, Antisthenes will appeal to the etymology in τρέπω and consider particular actions taken individually.

τὴν τοῦ λόγου χρῆσιν: Evidence for Antisthenes frequently refers to "use" of one or another resource: see t. 41A titles 7.2 (names), 9.7 (wine), 34E (mental impressions), 197 (again wine); see also t. 18 (in a different but probably related sense, association with other people), 208.16. The present passage (including §8–11: see notes below) offers the most extended evidence for its meaning in Antisthenes' thought. Its importance in Socratic thought generally is clear from, for example, Pl. *Euthyd.* 280c–281b and *Meno* 88a3–5, where it has definite ethical force, and Xen. *Oec.* 1.7–17, where ethical force should be understood, if in a more conventional flavor than Plato's (see Pomeroy 1994:218–20). Resources such as health, strength, beauty, and wealth (the list in *Meno*) are not goods in themselves but become good when put to good use. The idea could be a traditional commonplace: compare the wisdom of Prodicus on the value of wealth cited in ps.-Pl. *Eryxias* 397e. This Socratic background does not imply that χρῆσις for Antisthenes also must have ethical force, but its connection in this passage with the wise man and his knowledge certainly invites this interpretation, as does the general prominence of the term in his literary remains. In t. 34E, χρῆσις φαντασιῶν (the use of mental impressions) is the very core of the ethical self. Hence the division of two senses for τρόπος does not simply distinguish the ethical from the non-ethical; to judge from the examples to follow, it distinguishes ethical behavior in general from ethical behavior in language. Antisthenes may even be directing his audience away from looking for a reified inner constitution that is a τρόπος, since the ethical usage in his illustration will take its force from

the *external* aim or target of a man's behavior. The etymology of τρόπος, even in its evolving similarity to ἦθος through fifth-century literature, depends on events (changes) and their directions (Thimme 1935).

τοῦ λόγου: It is controversial whether λόγος as used in this entire passage is the same technical term defined in t. 151A and used by Aristotle in t. 152A. The present translation “account” assumes that this is the same technical term. (Here, since a general capacity is at stake, the translation “use of language” would also be accurate.) As the notes to t. 151A indicate, the meaning of λόγος there might be extended to cover its uses in the present text as well as t. 53 and 54. The translation “speeches” for λόγους in §7 is appropriate for the implied setting of political discourse, but the translation “accounts” could work there as well. In those cases, the λόγοι would be long accounts of matters relatively abstract and complicated. Notes below on §6 address the comparison to t. 152A.

(5) “εὖτροπος” γὰρ ἀνὴρ ὁ τὸ ἦθος ἔχων εἰς τὸ εὖ τετραμμένον: Antisthenes considers the meaning of the compound term εὖτροπος, presumably because it is parallel in form to πολύτροπος, by offering a syntactically organized sentence in place of the asyntactical compound term; that is, the noun-adjective phrase εὖτροπος ἀνὴρ has three elements—something good, something turning, and the man—but it is unclear which elements qualify which and in what way. For example, the man might be thought to possess “good turning” inside his soul; but instead, under the explanation offered, he is said to have a soul turned toward a good (goal). (The sentence Antisthenes constructs is linguistically forced. In particular, εἰς τὸ εὖ is unparalleled in extant Greek, except when an infinitive is added and εὖ remains an adverb. Possibly this is Antisthenes’ paraphrase for the more natural εἰς τὸ ἀγαθὸν τετραμμένον. Possibly he avoids reifying adjectives, especially ones like “the good”: on his possible avoidance of substantive adjectives for core ethical terms, see the book titles in the third *tomos*, t. 41A and notes.) This reinterpretation through syntax anticipates the parallel syntactical reevaluation Antisthenes will eventually give for the πολύτροπος man, where, as it will turn out, the turns are not many inside his soul (except when τρόπος is taken in a linguistic sense) but are many in his outward focus or behavior toward the many hearers that constitute his audience. The term εὖτροπος is not a Homeric example: Homer uses no compound terms with τροπ- apart from verbs and πολύτροπος itself. (This is reason to be confident that the example is from Antisthenes, since using a non-Homeric example would not suit Porphyry, who normally upholds the Alexandrian principle that only Homeric words are relevant for assessing Homer.) It is, rather, taken from philosophical discourse. Democritus has a virtue he calls εὖτροπία: κτηνέων μὲν εὐγένεια ἢ τοῦ σκίηνος εὐσθένεια, ἀνθρώπων δὲ ἢ τοῦ ἠθους εὖτροπία

(For the flocks good birth is the strength of the body, but for humans it is the good turn of the character) (DK 68B57, from the possibly inauthentic “Gnomes of Democritus”). This might illustrate the default sense against which Antisthenes is working, an inner “well-inclined disposition” of the soul. In Aristotle, the virtue of εὐτροπία is related to linguistic behavior and is used of the man who is appropriately witty, or ready to tell jokes at just the right time: οἱ δὲ ἐμμελῶς παίζοντες εὐτράπελοι προσαγορεύονται, οἷον εὐτροποὶ (Those who joke gracefully are called ready witted, or versatile) (*NE* 1128a9–10); Aristotle goes on to say that the “character” (ἦθος), like the body, is judged by its “motions” (κίνησεις, *NE* 1128a10–12). Antisthenes’ sense for εὐτροπος seems to overlap with that of Democritus, in being generally ethical rather than linguistic, but also with Aristotle’s, in emphasizing the particular act. The notion that there is an external target that gives the ἦθος its virtue is different from either of these precedents and may anticipate the argument Antisthenes will make that the πολύτροπος man is the man oriented toward the πολλούς, the many.

“τρόποι” δὲ λόγων αἱ ποιαὶ πλάσεις: (On the textual problem, see end of note.) This metaphor for language assimilates it to sculpting: πλάσσω is properly used for “molding” in the medium of clay or wax. In *Rep.* 9 (588b10–e3), Plato’s Socrates uses the metaphor for the representation of a personality in language, which is said to be “easier to sculpt” than wax (εὐπλαστότερον κηροῦ); and in *Theaet.*, Socrates recalls his image of memory as a wax tablet as a kind of “sculpted model” (πλάσμα, 197d6; κηρίνοις πλάσμασι, 200b8) the interlocutors have constructed. Gorgias uses the metaphor with the implication that the resulting verbal formulation is false: ὅσοι δὲ ὅσους περὶ ὅσων καὶ ἔπεισαν καὶ πείθουσι δὲ ψευδῇ λόγον πλάσαντες (*Encomium of Helen* §11). In later discussions of artful rhetoric, the phrase ποιαὶ πλάσεις is related to the figures or σχήματα of speech (ps.-Long., *On the Sublime* 8.1; ps.-Plutarch, *On the Life of Homer* 39: both are cited in Decleva Caizzi 1966:106). If this is the correct reading of the text, we have an important link in the history of rhetorical aesthetics, from the assumption that sculpting is deceitful, or a copy, to the assumption that it is the mode for every rhetorical representation of thought in speech. The “turns of accounts” are this medium’s various moldings of all the thoughts the medium can represent (as the continuation of the idea in §6 makes clear). The text is, however, Buttman’s emendation for the reading of most manuscripts, τρόποι δὲ λόγων αἵτιοι αἱ πλάσεις, which cannot be translated naturally. (MacPhail 2007:274–75 retains the transmitted text and translates, “formations [that are] responsible for speech [are] *tropoi*,” which comes to almost the same meaning as Buttman’s text, only without the explicit adjective ποιαὶ for qualitative variation. But the genitive λόγων must be an objective genitive with τρόποι,

both because of the placement of δέ and because of the parallel to τὴν τοῦ λόγου χρῆσιν above.) Ms. Q apparently emended differently in order to yield sense: in place of the nominative τρόποι, it has the genitive τρόπου, yielding in translation “formations are responsible for the turn of account.” Brancacci 1996:389–91 favors this reading, which was also adapted by Ludwich, because it introduces a gap between the “moldings” and the “turns” rather than equating them. But the continuity in the text seems to call for the nominative form τρόποι, which is the topic of the discussion. Luzzatto 1996:327–32 would emend more radically, to τρόποι δὲ λόγου αἵτιοι αἱ πολλαὶ χρήσεις (but the effective/responsible turns of account are its many uses). There is clearly no paleographical advantage in this alternative: Buttmann’s change assumed only a different word division and a misreading of π as τι. Luzzatto objects, rather, to the sharp turn in thought marked by the text’s move from numerical plurality to qualitative variety. But our text is compressed and reduced, and abrupt turns can be tolerated. This is also circular reasoning, which removes a major point in the passage and so justifies separating the end of the fragment from Antisthenes. (See also the objections of Brancacci 1996 passim.) Although Buttmann’s ποίαι is not secure, πλάσεις is the more important term and is as secure as any other word in the text.

χρήται τῷ “τρόπῳ”: This seems to be a primitive formulation for quoting a word rather than using it. τρόπῳ is written in its inflected case, as though it is being used in the sentence, not in the nominative, indicating that it is being cited or mentioned. Normally in the Homeric scholia, where commonly a word or phrase is cited rather than used, only the article is inflected to fit its sentence, whereas the quotation keeps its form from the original passage or takes in its primary, uninflected form. This may, then, remain from Antisthenes’ own language.

“ἦ τε θαμὰ τρωπῶσα χέει πολυηχέα φωνήν”: The verse shows a combination in Homer of the morphemes τροπ- and πολυ where the meaning is purely aesthetic or sound-based, like the variegated sound in voice, which is “many” from tone to tone. The *Odyssey* scholia agree with the modern text of Homer at *Od.* 19.521 (except for the metrically impossible misspelling of τρωπῶσα as τροπῶσα, which, however, makes the comparison to τρόπος closer). But the *Iliad* scholia offer a variant reading for πολυηχέα φωνήν, namely, μελιδέα γῆρυν αἰοιδήν (honey-sweet voice/song), where the unmetrical “song” must be a gloss for “voice.” This variant destroys half of the point in citing the verse, by removing the reference to “many.” If this variant is loyal to Porphyry, who, in a typical ancient manner, misremembered the text by recombining words used elsewhere in Homer (as suggested in MacPhail 2007:275; see Porson as cited in Dindorf 1855:10), then either he lost track of the argument he was reporting, or the argument was originally more

complicated than the surviving version. A further variant on the Homeric phrase, reported by Aelian (*On the Nature of Animals* 5.38, cited in MacPhail 2007:274), adds intriguing information to the bigger picture, possibly indicating that the parallel between words and music was developed more fully in the material Porphyry used than the preserved scholium shows. After citing *Od.* 19.518–521 in its now standard form to illustrate the behavior of the nightingale, Aelian reports a variant for the text, this one putting a clear artistic significance in the πολυ- unit of the adjective: ἤδη μέντοι τινὲς καὶ “πολυδευκέα φωνήν” γράφουσι τὴν ποικίλως μεμιμημένην, ὡς τὴν ἀδευκέα τὴν μηδ’ ὅλως ἐς μίμησιν παρατραπεῖσαν (Here, however, some write “much similar voice,” that is, one that has imitated with variety, just as the “un-similar” voice is one turned not at all toward imitation). The meaning of the adjective δευκής is disputed in ancient lexica: according to Hesychius, the neuter form means either “bright” (λαμπρόν) or “similar” (ὅμοιον), and Aelian’s reference to the imitating power of the πολυδευκής voice and the absence of this power in the ἀδευκής voice implies the second meaning, “similar.” But a gloss for πολυδευκής meaning “very sweet” is attested in the scholia to Nicander 625. Janko 1987 argues that this is the Indo-European and Homeric meaning. If πολυδευκής were Antisthenes’ reading, this would explain the “honey-sweet song” introduced by Porphyry (or the excerptor). In the scholium, the ideas of “variety” (ποικίλως) and “likeness” (δευκής under the meaning ὅμοιον) and their role in optimal communication are developed eventually (§ 8–12). The suggestion of the morpheme τροπ- in Aelian’s participle παρατραπεῖσαν, meanwhile, could reflect the same analysis of πολύτροπος preserved in the scholium. Possibly Aelian, too, is citing indirectly from Antisthenes, some two generations before Porphyry, through a Peripatetic or Alexandrian source. The idea of mimesis (imitation), fundamental in Aelian, is not attested clearly in Antisthenes’ literary remains, although it is critical in Plato’s aversion to immoral poetry in the *Republic*, where unity of character is at stake. But see t. 44C, where Julian uses μιμούμενος in his recommendation for imitating Antisthenes’ style of myth composition, and t. 197, where Aelius Aristides could be quoting an Antisthenian character’s exhortation to imitate behavior. If the passage from Aelian offers evidence for Antisthenes, it would support attributing to Antisthenes a more nuanced view of mimesis than Julian does, in relationship to a complexity in the sounds of language. Many interpreters strive to discount a “musical” sense to Antisthenes’ view of rhetoric and so view the reference to *Od.* 19.521 as an intrusion or digression (Luzzatto 1996 is explicit; Brancacci 1990:57 and n.25 assigns the musical sense to Antisthenes but does not include this sense when interpreting the passage). For a positive reading of the musical association, see Caizzi 1964:78–80, comparing Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 1.5–12. There the great speaker is compared to the flute

player; but in addressing the true king, he uses not words of one mode (μὴ ἕνα τρόπον ἡρμοσμένους) but words that are simultaneously “vigorous and gentle, warlike and peaceful, lawful and truly kingly.”

(6) εἰ δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ δεινοὶ εἰσι διαλέγεσθαι: This argument has the form of a syllogism, not a logically tight one such as Aristotle classifies in the *Prior Analytics*, but the type of syllogism often used by Plato’s Socrates, who seeks to equate the reference of various terms, not assert their identical meaning. (On the difference, see Penner 1973; compare Annas 1985:120.) The terms are (A) “wise,” (B) “clever at discourse,” (C) “polytropic,” and (D) “good.” If A is B and if B is C, then A is C. If A is also D, then (according to the implication of the argument, which is not brought out in the preserved text) C is D; that is, polytropic speakers are good, as well as wise and clever. The fallacy in the logical reasoning, a confusion of parts of classes with whole classes, is of no concern here; rather, we see a form of argument not otherwise attested for Antisthenes but plausible through his Socratic heritage and apparently parallel to a section in Plato’s *Hippias Minor* (365d6–366a1). Plato’s Socrates uses mutual equivalences among the terms δυνατοί, πολύτροποι, φρόνιμοι, ἐπιστάμενοι, and σοφοί to persuade Hippias that Homer’s πολύτροποι does not mean “false.” The term δεινοί does not figure in Plato’s version, but it seems to be represented by δυνατοί.

ἐπίστανται τὸ αὐτὸ νόημα κατὰ πολλοὺς τρόπους λέγειν: This is a capacity to paraphrase, apparently from occasion to occasion and audience to audience (as the following comparison to Pythagoras, in §7, implies). More intriguing would be a capacity to speak on many levels within one and the same utterance, by using sounds of speech with polyvalent reference or meaning or both, such as we see attested in Antisthenes’ puns and *apophthegmata* (t. 106, 143A, 147, 171) and such as Antisthenes seems to attribute to Homer’s text, in a quite serious way, in t. 189. Such an interpretation here goes beyond the text, which tells us only that the wise rhetor has knowledge consisting in the ability to cast the same thought in many ways. The statement that there are many linguistic versions of the same thought conflicts with dominant interpretations of the “one-to-one” relationship posited in the doctrine of the *oikeios logos* (t. 152A). If the wise rhetor under discussion here represents the wise man in the full Socratic sense, whose νόημα is representative of the truth, and so has a perfect grasp of the πράγματα behind his λόγος, Antisthenes cannot consistently endorse this wise man’s power for paraphrasing his thought and also assert a one-to-one principle between λόγος and πᾶγμα that denies the possibility of paraphrase (i.e., the “theory of unique enunciation”: see t. 152A; Kalouche 1999:12). One solution is to distinguish a kind of scientific talk, as discussed in t. 152A, from rhetorical talk here and to suppose that rhetorical talk is either (1) complex in some irreducible way, such that whatever may be true about the basic units of

λόγος, complete speeches have some other relationship to complex thoughts and things, or (2) didactic and inherently condescending, not communication of truth but translation of the truth into a version comprehensible to inferiors (Brancacci 1990 argues for the latter). Alternatively, it is possible that the impossibility of paraphrase implied in t. 152A might address something other than the relationship between externalized speech and the truth in the mind, which is the relationship in the present text. This second option should be interrogated further, because the accounts of Antisthenes' paradox against gainsaying seem not to isolate scientific talk from ordinary communication in the semantic system of Greek, that is, rhetorical talk. The paradox against gainsaying is applied to scientific talk—namely, Academic definitions—in one set of explications (t. 152B–D); in another explication, definitions are not mentioned, and the utterances of the conflicting speakers are treated merely as semantic, or meaningful, voice (see esp. t. 153B.1–4). Although some of the speakers in the scenarios in t. 152B–D and 153B fail to utter the λόγος of the πράγμα, this failure does not prohibit them from saying something, and what they say is governed by an automatic relationship between the sounds they utter and the meaning of the sounds. Also in this case, some one-to-one relationship seems to hold between the linguistic markers and their meanings in Greek, which is different from the relationship that holds between given objects and their unique correct apprehension in the mind and enunciation in the voice of the speaker. The second kind of relationship could, indeed, be called the linguistic excellence of the ideal speaker and so could be subsumed under the rhetorical interpretation. If we accept the contribution of these testimonia to our picture of Antisthenes' paradox, Aristotle's comments on the one-to-one relationship in t. 152A appear to be a partial account of Antisthenes' views, one that suits Aristotle's purpose in that passage, not a total representation. Indeed, Antisthenes wrote at least nine texts in this domain, possibly as much as Plato (in *Cratylus*, *Theaetetus*, and the *Sophist*). §4–5 of the present passage might give a sample of Antisthenes' reasoning in its own right. There is indeed plurality of meaning in the pieces of language, that is, multiple senses for morphemes and multiple "syntax" for compounded phrases. But these are, at any particular time (i.e., without account of the future), determinately many, not indeterminately many, and they can be listed. The task of the ideal reader is to discern them all—a task for which knowledge of canonical literature seems to be important—and then to recognize the one, unified thing said on any occasion by any speaker, from the utterance itself and without the opportunity to interrogate. This would be the position held by both the reader of Homer's text who encounters it several centuries after Homer's death, in §1–5, and the individual in the mass audience of the excellent rhetor, §7–12 (whose listening skills are admittedly not emphasized

in this account). The skill of the excellent rhetor is also to know all the turns of words (or perhaps just “many” of them, at some sufficient quantity) and then to use this knowledge to articulate any thought (including a new thought: compare Antisthenes’ emphasis on the new in t. 171) to any audience of any size, any gender, any age, and any social status, on any occasion. Brancacci’s interpretation of Antisthenes’ picture of the reader in this passage (1990:59) is similar to the present interpretation, but he calls this a preliminary stage in the wise man’s education, not a picture that can be generalized completely, and he goes on to attribute to Antisthenes a fully definitive approach to terms and knowledge, in a proto-Aristotelian style. Decleva Caizzi 1966:106 also denies inconsistency between the present passage and t. 152B: “far from contradicting the *οικεῖος λόγος* that Antisthenes has laid out in the logical context, the *many ways* are the indispensable instrument for bringing to unity the multiplicity of things.” But it is not multiplicity of any kind that the rhetor is unifying in this passage, and he is not doing so for his own mental clarity. Rather, he is unifying the thoughts in the minds of the members of his audience.

εἰ δὲ οἱ σοφοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ εἰσι: Schrader conjectured a missing phrase, <ἀνθρώποις ὁμιλεῖν>, that would restrict the rhetor’s goodness to a rhetorical sphere and block it from a fully ethical sense (citing possible resonances of the discussion in Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 71.3 and Julian, *Or.* 1 12d). This conflicts with the speaker’s insistence that Odysseus was “wise” (σοφός), which, at the opening of the fragment, stands for the quality of being ethically good in opposition to “base” (πονηρός), as well as the ethical implications in “use” (χρῆσις).

πολλοῖς τρόποις συνεῖναι: The use of *τρόποις* here refers not necessarily to use of language but loosely to social manner or behavior. However, the Socratic mode of keeping company tends to be verbal, and the term *συνεῖναι* is common in reference to Socratic association (see t. 13A.57, 84B, 110).

(7) **οὕτω καὶ Πυθαγόρας λέγεται:** This section, more than any other part of the scholium, has been suspected of interpolation or authorship by Porphyry. Linguistically, it stands apart, in some ways, from its context, but otherwise there seems no reason to separate it. There are five arguments to divorce this passage from Antisthenes. (Argument 1) Nineteenth-century scholarship (including Schrader 1890:2, with fuller report in Luzzatto 1996:334 n.163) points to a parallel description of Pythagoras in Porphyry’s *Life of Pythagoras* (§18), where he cites the Peripatetic Dicaearchus as his source. Also Iamblichus’ *Life of Pythagoras* (§50) uses a similar anecdote. On this account, Porphyry would have added the comparison to Pythagoras, in whom he was personally interested. (Reply to 1) On the parallel itself, which is clear, see the following note. But the parallel is not enough to eliminate Antisthenes from

transmission of the material: Dicaearchus could have used him as a source, or they could have used a common source. (Rostagni 1922:180–85 posits parallel receptions.) (Argument 2) The linguistic composition of this section does not fit its context. The vocabulary in this section is suddenly different from what preceded. The only overlapping term is λόγους, which is used in the sense “speeches,” not “linguistic account,” as above. The verbs for speaking are not διαλέγεσθαι and συνεῖναι, conceptions associated with Socratic dialogue, but ποιήσασθαι and διατείνειν, conceptions associated with composition of speeches, that is, products (Luzzatto 1996:343). The syntax changes: the sentence seems to be reported as an anonymous anecdote (λέγεται), after a previous sentence depending on φησί, which was clearly a report from Antisthenes; and the indirect discourse from Antisthenes is apparently resumed in §8–9, where the statement of general principle is followed by the analogy of the doctor (though there are uncertainties in the manuscripts at the point of transition). The phrase οὕτως καί is typical of Porphyry for introducing a new authority into his *Homeric Questions* (see parallels at *Il.* 10.252–3, 12.10, 12.258, cited in Luzzatto 1996:344–45). (Reply to 2) These problems can be explained as consequences of transmission. In using the apparently impersonal λέγεται to continue representing what Antisthenes said, Porphyry could be merely changing tone or reflecting a change of tone in the original text. Even the presence of οὕτως καί, if it is Porphyry’s voice, need not imply that the information in the sentence was provided by Porphyry: he could be providing his own articulation at a point where he abridges the text, for example. A more careful transition in the original text between the discussion of the expert in private Socratic discourse and the expert political leader of crowds could have been lost. On textual problems in §8–9, which could imply that the scholium did not resume the indirect speech of Antisthenes after §6 but continued in direct discourse to the end, see comments below on §8–9. (Argument 3) The meaning of the Pythagorean exemplum does not fit with the surrounding argument. Patzer 1970:180 finds a historical example unsuitable to the otherwise abstract context. Luzzatto 1996:343–46 finds a change implied in the basic sense of “polytropic”: the plurality in the rhetor’s use of *logos* suddenly becomes a plurality in the audience. This new sense of “polytropic” is, however, continuous with the end of the passage, §8–12: indeed, this continuity with the end of the passage shows that all of it should be attributed to Porphyry rather than to Antisthenes, according to Luzzatto. (Reply to 3) We have no basis to say how Antisthenes used historical exempla. The change in the sense of “polytropic” is plausible when the topic is rhetoric and central to the point the basic author wishes to make. He analyzes three senses for “tropos” in §4–5, and the distinction made there is reflected in the shift here. Moreover, Antisthenes

could be displaying his own rhetorical skill in activating all the senses of a word at one time. In *Hippias Minor*, Plato attacks equivocation in the terms τρόπος and πολυτροπία (Mulhern 1968), in what could be a response to Antisthenes' strategy here. The strategy is a trick or fallacy, as Plato seems to imply, only if we assume that language should be non-equivocal. When the orator addresses a mixed crowd, the ability to activate multiple meanings from the same utterance is a useful skill. In addition, entertaining and exercising the reader could be a good reason to equivocate, intentionally and skillfully. (Argument 4) The Pythagorean exemplum does not match with other evidence for Antisthenes' thought, where Pythagoras is never mentioned. Plato's own attention to Pythagoras is usually thought to come late in his career, after he went to Sicily and after his "Socratic" period. Praise of the speaker who is adept before crowds conflicts in particular with t. 69. (Reply to 4) This, too, is an argument from silence. Caizzi 1964:96 and 1966:122 cites the evidence for direct and indirect influences of Pythagoreanism on Antisthenes: shared interest in Heracles (t. 92–99), the moral centrality of πόνος (t. 85, 113, 134f) and ἄσκησις (t. 163; §9 below), and interest in music (t. 41A title 8.1, t. 101A–B, §5 above). There may also be assimilation between Antisthenes and the fourth-century Pythagorean Diodorus of Aspendus in Athenian stereotypes (see t. 22A). See note below on §8, on the antithesis σοφίας/ἄμαθιας. (Argument 5) Porphyry had reason to add this section. Patzer and Luzzatto refer to Porphyry's independent interest in Pythagoras. The topic of rhetorical skill stimulates Porphyry to add the exemplum of Pythagoras. (Reply to 5) Pythagoras is not a Homeric character or known as a Homeric critic, and the standard of relevance Porphyry uses elsewhere for adding material into his *Homeric Questions* is its bearing on the Homeric passage under discussion. Since Pythagoras takes the text in a new direction, adding authority to the conception of the philosophical rhetor rather than to any interpretation of Homer, it seems more likely that Pythagoras is here because he was present in Porphyry's preexisting material than that Porphyry chose to add him. Scholarship opposed to Antisthenean provenance includes Schrader 1890:2; Delatte 1922:39; Buffière 1956:368; Radermacher 1951:122; DiBenedetto 1966:213 n.1; Patzer 1970:180–82; Luzzatto 1996:342–46. Scholarship in favor includes Rostagni 1922:180–85; Détienne 1962:55; Decleva Caizzi 1966:105; Burkert 1972:115 n.38. Giannantoni (1990 v.4:337) inclines toward rejecting the section but prints it in the fragment because he is not fully convinced.

πρὸς παῖδας . . . πρὸς αὐτοὺς λόγους παιδικοὺς καὶ πρὸς γυναῖκας γυναῖξιν ἁρμοδίους καὶ πρὸς ἄρχοντας ἀρχοντικοὺς καὶ πρὸς ἐφήβους ἐφηβικούς:
The list of four audiences in this text suggests parties who are "other" to the adult male speaker: in the first pair, other members of a family or household;

in the second pair, members of the city stationed higher and lower than the adult male citizen speaker. A similar idea of the compound audience, in more generic terms, can be found in early Platonic texts without connection to Pythagoras. In *Gorg.* 502d5–7 (cited in White 2001:211 n.38), rhetorical “flattery” is addressed “to such a populace as one of boys mixed with women and men, both slave and free” (πρὸς δῆμον τοιοῦτον οἶον παίδων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, καὶ δούλων καὶ ἐλευθέρων). In *Ion* 540b (cited in Richardson 1975:80), the rhapsode claims that his knowledge of Homer makes him a good speaker: he knows “what is appropriate to say to a man and what to a woman, and what to a slave and what to a free man, and what to the ruled and what to the ruler” (ἃ πρέπει . . . ἀνδρὶ εἰπεῖν καὶ ὅποια γυναικί, καὶ ὅποια δούλῳ καὶ ὅποια ἐλευθέρῳ, καὶ ὅποια ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ὅποια ἄρχοντι). §18 of Porphyry’s *Life of Pythagoras* reports, from Dicaearchus, that after Pythagoras arrived in Croton, “he so [well] managed their city that, after he had persuaded the council of elders in the right direction by discoursing many fine things, he next crafted youth-appropriate advice for the young men, having been asked to do so by the elders, and after that for the children as they assembled from the schoolhouses: and then for the women also a meeting of women was arranged for him” (οὕτως διαθεῖναι τὴν Κροτωνιατῶν πόλιν ὥστ’ ἐπεὶ τὸ τῶν γερόντων ἀρχεῖον ἐψυχαγώγησεν πολλὰ καὶ καλὰ διαλεχθεὶς, τοῖς νέοις πάλιν ἡβητικὰς ἐποιήσατο παραινέσεις ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχόντων κελευσθεὶς· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοῖς παισὶν ἐκ τῶν διδασκαλείων ἀθροοὺς συνελθοῦσιν· εἶτα ταῖς γυναιξὶ καὶ γυναικῶν σύλλογος αὐτῷ κατεσκευάσθη). The four groups in the *Life of Pythagoras* are the same as in the scholium, if in a different order; particularly telling is the common detail that Pythagoras was “bid” (κελευσθεὶς) or “asked” (ἄξιωθεὶς) to address the parts of the city. But the sentence in the scholium is unlike that in the *Life of Pythagoras*, which lacks both the symmetry and the antithetical and redundant polyptotonic style, reminiscent of Gorgias, in πρὸς γυναῖκας γυναῖξιν ἀρμοδίους and so on (for Antisthenes’ Gorgianic associations, see t. 11B, 67). The different order in the scholium destroys the narrative of Pythagoras’ entry into Croton, since he speaks first to parties who do not have political functions and then to parties who do. A certain priority on family members over fellow citizens might, however, be appropriate to Antisthenes (see t. 189). The terms used for the Pythagorean youth and the speeches appropriate to them, νέοι and ἡβητικὰς, which are the only terms that vary from those in the scholion, seem intentionally to omit the “ephebes” (which Croton would not have had before its organization), as though Dicaearchus were adapting a preexisting story that had ephebes: the adjective ἡβητικὰς is attested otherwise only twice (in Xenophon) but could have been inspired by Antisthenes’ term ἐφηβικούς, similar in sound. Just as Porphyry cites from a source in the *Life of Pythagoras*,

so, too, he evidently does in this fragment. In Dio Chrysostom, *Or.* 71.3 (cited in Weber 1887:227–28), Odysseus' rhetorical skill is described directly in terms of varied audiences: σχεδὸν δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρος Ὀδυσσέα πεποίηκεν οὐ μόνον γνώμη διαφέροντα καὶ τῷ δύνασθαι περὶ πραγμάτων βουλευέσθαι καὶ λέγειν δεινότατον ἔν τε πλήθει καὶ πρὸς ὀλίγους καὶ πρὸς ἕνα, καὶ νῆ Δία γε ἔν ἐκκλησίᾳ τε καὶ παρὰ πότον καὶ εἰ τύχοι μετὰ τινος βαδίζων ὁδόν, καὶ πρὸς βασιλέα καὶ πρὸς ἰδιώτην, καὶ πρὸς ἐλεύθερον καὶ πρὸς δοῦλον, καὶ αὐτὸν ἔνδοξον ὄντα καὶ βασιλέα καὶ αὖ πάλιν ἀγνοούμενον καὶ πτωχόν, καὶ πρὸς ἄνδρα τε ὁμοίως καὶ γυναῖκα καὶ κόρην . . . ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀπάντων ἔμπειρον (And Homer has made Odysseus not only outstanding in judgment and in ability to deliberate about affairs and most awesome in speaking, in a crowd and to few and to one interlocutor, and, by Zeus, in assembly and over drinking and if he happens upon someone as he is going his way, both to a king and to a private citizen, both to a free man and to a slave, both while he himself was well known and a king and again when he was unknown and a beggar, both to a man and in the same way to a woman and a maiden, . . . but also [he made him] experienced in almost all the following kinds of things [hand crafts]). Although the groupings and polar oppositions in Dio are appropriate to the *Odyssey* rather than to the real civic setting suggested in the scholium, this parallel shows that the kind of political rhetorical facility Pythagoras is given was also attributed to Odysseus in a text that Dio read. Caizzi 1964:78–80 compares also Dio, *Or.* 1.5. (On Dio's knowledge of Antisthenes, see t. 194, 86C, 208. See also Weber 1887; Brancacci 1992, 2000.)

(8) τὸν γὰρ ἐκάστοις πρόσφορον τρόπον: The principle of correct opportunity (ὁ καιρός) is sketched here, although the term is not used (and appears nowhere in Antisthenes' literary remains). The connection between rhetorical skill and medical technique, which is made in the following section, is common to Gorgias (*Encomium of Helen* §14) and possibly to Pythagoreanism (if Iamblichus' *Life of Pythagoras* is a reliable source: a tradition is asserted in Rostagni 1922:162–68); but the language used is also Hippocratic, and Antisthenes could be responsible for developing the parallel himself. Plato's *Phaedrus* also uses it, possibly with polemical intent. There are textual problems here, which can be resolved in several ways, as long as the parallel antithesis is preserved between the genitives of characteristic, τῆς σοφίας and ἀμαθίας, and the infinitives of which each is predicated (ἐξευρίσκειν and χρῆσθαι). Both clauses must have a stated or implied copulative as the main verb, which should also be parallel in construction, either a finite form, continuing the finite construction begun in the sentence about Pythagoras, or an infinitive, subordinated to an elided "Antisthenes said," in line with the ends of §6 and 9. The manuscripts give an infinitive εἶναι in the second clause, except for H, which elides, and an elision in the first,

except for Q, which gives the finite ἐστίν. Ludwig saw the need to express εἶναι in the first clause, lest the whole thing be misconstrued (and three of the *Odyssey* manuscripts did misconstrue). The text here stays as close as possible to the manuscripts and clarifies with punctuation; but a finite version of §7–8 is plausible. Rostagni (1922) acknowledged older arguments that the finite verbs in the Pythagoras exemplum might show an intrusion into the text (see argument 2 in §7 note). But the complex transmission precludes us from such confident analysis. §8–12 must, in themselves, be continuous: τὸν γὰρ ἐκάστοις πρόσφορον τρόπον in §8 is answered by τὸν ἐκάστῳ πρόσφορον in §12; τῷ τοῦ λόγου . . . μονοτρόπῳ in §8 is answered by μονοτροπία in §11. The phrase “Antisthenes said” was not construed consistently through the passage even when it was written out: in §4, it introduces direct speech; in §6, indirect speech.

τῆς σοφίας . . . ἀμαθίας: This antithesis might be associated with the Pythagoreans (so Rostagni 1922:160), but it is also important for Antisthenes and the Socratics. Antisthenes’ Odysseus uses it in his speech against Ajax, where the “unity” and “uniformity” of character of the two disputants is also at stake. See t. 54.13, t. 53.5 note on ὁμοιότροπος, t. 53.9 and 54.1 notes on μόνος. In Plato, see, e.g., *Apol.* 22e3; *Euthyph.* 2c6–7; *Lach.* 194d2; *Protag.* 360d2; *Euthyd.* 281e5–6; *Theaet.* 170b6. In the pseudo-Platonic corpus, see *Amatores* 139a7–8; *Theages* 123d3; *On Justice* 375c5–7. In Xenophon, see *Mem.* 4.2.22. Possibly the Socratics adopted this opposition from the Pythagoreans, but it is deeply absorbed in Socratic literature.

τῷ τοῦ λόγου . . . μονοτρόπῳ: Against the “stupidity” attributed here to unity of rhetorical mode, one might contrast the style of poetry recommended by Plato’s Socrates in *Rep.* 3 (397b4–398b4), where unity of style is required to preserve unity of mind. Plato’s terms are the κεκραμένος (mixed) versus ἄκρατος (unmixed) styles of speech. In *Phaedrus* (277b5–6), “complex and fully styled speeches” (ποικίλους . . . καὶ παναρμονίους . . . λόγους) are needed by the rhetor who wants to address a “complex soul” (ποικίλη μὲν . . . ψυχῇ): for the positive value Plato attaches to such rhetoric, see Rowe 2009:142–43; Yunis 2011:80.

(9) **ἔχειν δὲ τοῦτο καὶ τὴν ἱατρικὴν ἐν τῇ τῆς τέχνης κατορθώσει:** On the analogy between philosophy and the craft or science (τέχνη) of medicine in the Socratic period, see Holmes 2010:207–27; Reeve 2000. The use of the analogy here implies that Odysseus’ skill, like that of Pythagoras, is like philosophy and that making public speeches is a craft or science, like medicine, part of philosophy. In *Gorg.* 448c2–463c7, Plato argues at length that rhetoric is no craft, for which medicine is the primary model, but “flattery.” The present passage makes the opposite implication.

ἡσκηκίαν τῆς θεραπείας τὸ πολύτροπον: The Hippocratic author of *On*

Regimen in Acute Diseases (3.2 Joly) uses the phrase τὰς πολυτροπίας τὰς ἐν ἐκάστη τῶν νούσων (the variations in each of the diseases) to attribute a certain competence to predecessors in his field; the twenty-second letter of ps.-Hippocrates to his son refers to the πολυτροπία in how bones and limbs are arranged (or can be injured) and advises him to learn geometry so that it will sharpen his mind toward proper therapy. Neither text says directly that medical therapy itself has a polytropic quality. But adaptability and the power to recognize treatment appropriate to the problem are implied as part of the doctor's skill throughout the Hippocratic corpus. The statement on method in *On Ancient Medicine* §9.1–3, cited in the next note, is an example. In Themistius' text *On Virtue*, (known only through a Syriac translation), philosophy is said to use multiple treatments for varied ailments, just as doctors use not one but multiple treatments for varied bodies (§23). We know that Antisthenes was among Themistius' sources (see t. 96).

διὰ τὴν τῶν θεραπευομένων ποικίλην σύστασιν: The adjective ποικίλος (variegated) is common in the Hippocratic corpus: terms built on the stem of ποικίλος can describe variety in symptoms (*Epid.* 1.8), variety in the rhetoric of accounts (*Morb. sac.* 1), and, closely parallel to the scholium, variety in the doctor's skills and tasks (*On Ancient Medicine* 9.3: διότι πολλὸν ποικιλώτερα τε καὶ διὰ πλέονος ἀκριβείας ἐστί, "For this reason [the medical tasks] are much more varied and needful of more precision": see, further, Schiefsky 2005:192–93). The author of this text considers the use of a singular form of therapy for everyone entirely unskilled (§6). The adjective is also well established in Homer for describing artwork, and Odysseus carries the epithet ποικιλομήτης, "of varied counsel," which occurs seven times. An opposition between ἀπλοῦς (simple) and ποικίλος is active in Plato, Aeschylus, and aesthetic discourse until the second century CE (see §2 note). The Pythagoreans reportedly distrusted ποικιλία (Aristoxenus fr. 33 Wehrli). (10) "τρόπος" μὲν οὖν τὸ παλίμβολον τὸ τοῦ ἥθους, τὸ πολυμετάβολον καὶ ἄστατον: The ethical sense of *tropos* is resumed here, and the accuser's negative evaluation of this ethical sense (§2) is repeated in τὸ παλίμβολον, the meaning of which is now explained. But the morpheme *poly-* has been dropped. So it is now the *tropos* itself, without being the manifold type, that has a negative ethical evaluation. Yet the "manifold" quality of this ethical *tropos* is represented in the description πολυμετάβολον. At this stage in the discussion, every ethical *tropos* has become fickle and unstable, and the compound term *polytropia* is reserved only for rhetorical competence. But the ethical problem evoked in the first place is still lurking. Rhetorical *polytropia* (like medical *polytropia*) might turn out to be the cure for ethical bad character: more doctors are needed in the more advanced and more corrupted city of luxury in Pl. *Rep.* 2 373d1–2. (This interpretation is speculative, beyond what appears in the preserved text.)

(11) λόγου δὲ πολυτροπία καὶ χρῆσις ποικίλη λόγου εἰς ποικίλας ἀκοάς: The second meaning of *polytropos* mentioned in §4 and explained in §6 is recalled, in basically the same terms. But what was the quality *polytropos* in the form of an adjective has become a reified competence, *polytropia*, in the form of a noun. The adjective *ποικίλη* is probably new, even if it was implied in a phrase such as αἱ ποιαὶ πλάσεις and was probably introduced as an equivalent for *polytropos* through the medical analogy (§9).

πολυτροπία . . . μονοτροπία γίνεται: In identifying one with many so bluntly, Antisthenes is delivering a provocative paradox. An opposition between one and many is central to Greek thought since at least Heraclitus and Parmenides. (See Stokes 1971 esp. p. 86.) For Plato's Socrates, one and many tend to be opposed, especially in the pursuit of universal meanings, and according to Aristotle, the Platonists used a "one over many" argument for the existence of Forms. The theory of Forms is not clearly at issue in this passage, unless it is related to the unity of *ethos* or soul that seems to be denied in §10 or to the "uniformity" that is said to cause unsuccessful speech in §12. If he is not referring to Plato directly, Antisthenes could be referring to debate between monists (or Eleatics) and pluralists of the day, suggesting that their questions are wrongheaded, since judging a thing to be either one or many depends on just what is being counted. The identity of one and many (literally, one and all) is asserted also by Heraclitus (ἐκ πάντων ἓν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα, DK 22B10).

ἓν γὰρ τὸ ἐκάστω οἰκεῖον: The language is similar to a statement attributed to Antisthenes by Aristotle (t. 152A), μηθὲν ἀξίων λέγεσθαι πλὴν τῷ οἰκεῖῳ λόγῳ, ἓν ἐφ' ἑνός. The sense here is different, but the echo still seems to be a sign of Antisthenes' authorship: compare Ajax' use of the maxim οὐδ' ἀντιλέγειν ἔξεστι (t. 53.7), which does not match the logical sense it bears in the Peripatetic expositions of the paradox (t. 152–53). Here the two items put into perfect match are each receptive mind in the audience and the casting of account that appropriately delivers the rhetor's message to it.

(12) τὸ ἀρμόδιον ἐκάστω τὴν ποικιλίαν τοῦ λόγου εἰς ἓν συναγείρει, τὸν ἐκάστω πρόσφορον: The tactic of speaking to each interlocutor on his own terms, or through his own beliefs, is attributed to Odysseus also by Socrates in Xen. *Mem.* 4.6.15 (Decleva Caizzi 1966:107): ἔφη δὲ καὶ Ὅμηρον τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ ἀναθεῖναι τὸ ἀσφαλὲς ῥήτορα εἶναι, ὥς ἱκανὸν αὐτὸν ὄντα διὰ τῶν δοκούντων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἄγειν τοὺς λόγους (And he [Socrates] said that also Homer had attributed to Odysseus the quality of being an infallible speaker, since he was capable of conducting discourses through the opinions people held). There are manuscript variations and editorial variations in the cases and genders of the items that comprise this closing statement. It seems best to keep the two clauses in §12 closely parallel, in agreement

with mss. F and Le (and against Dindorf's emendation from τὸν ἐκάστω πρόσφορον to τὸ ἐκάστω πρόσφορον, which all editors have accepted). In both clauses, the grammatical subject is a quality, expressed as a substantive neuter adjective, "what is harmonious for each" in the good scenario versus "uniformity, being unharmonious to diverse audience members" in the bad scenario. This is a quality in the rhetor's capacity for speech and skill set. The product in each scenario is a type of *logos*, a masculine noun, which is also redescribed in terms of its numerical status; the noun *logos* is elided in the first clause and stated in the second. This is the account that is actually performed and externalized, the rhetor's product. In the first clause, the "account appropriate for each" is transformed into one thing, ἓν, in the neuter gender because this is an abstract discussion. (The masculine form ἓνα would admittedly be better for this interpretation, but it seems best overall to keep the manuscripts' reading.) In the second clause, the "speech prone to rejection by many on the grounds that for them it is fit for rejection" is created, by the orator's lack of skill, to be something *polytropic*, a bad outcome parallel to ἓν, expressed in a form that must be masculine in agreement with *logos*. There are no substantive adjectives attested elsewhere in Antisthenes' more direct literary remains, none in the speeches (t. 53–54) and none in the book catalog (t. 41A). Apparently the substantive adjectives in this text are particular individual things, not general or universal things, and this approach could be consistent with Antisthenes' thinking overall.

τὸ δ' αὖ μονοειδὲς ἀνάρμοστον ὃν πρὸς ἀκοᾶς διαφόρους πολύτροπον ποιεῖ τὸν . . . λόγον: The phrase τὸ μονοειδὲς surely has philosophical roots. (For Porphyry the Neo-Platonist, one would expect such a quality to be positive, which should be good reason not to attribute the end of this passage to his authorship.) The word is not attested for Parmenides, but Empedocles allegedly used this description for the cosmic sphere (DK 31A32, from Aetius). In Pl. *Sym.* 211b2, Socrates explains true beauty as αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ μεθ' αὐτοῦ μονοειδὲς αἰεὶ ὄν (always being uniform, itself in itself with itself). Antisthenes is not elevating multiplicity over uniformity. Unity is still the highest good. Rather, he is showing that unity from one point of view is necessarily multiplicity from another and perhaps that unity is not what it seems to be.

τὸν ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀπόβλητον ὡς αὐτοῖς ἀπόβλητον λόγον: The adjective ἀπόβλητον appears in a negated form in t. 135 (said of virtue). The word becomes a Stoic attribute—or not—of virtue by the third century BCE (Diog. Laert. 7.127 attests to a debate between Cleanthes and Chrysippus). But previously it is a Homeric word that occurs just twice in the *Iliad*, once in a rhetorical use (οὐ τοι ἀπόβλητον ἔπος ἔσσεται, ὅττι κεν εἴπω, "The word that I speak shall not be cast aside lightly," *Il.* 2.361, said by Nestor to the Achaean

troops who, having failed Agamemnon's test of endurance, are fleeing the war) and once in a more general behavioral use (οὐ τοι ἀπόβλητ' ἐστὶ θεῶν ἐρικυδέα δῶρα / ὅσά κεν αὐτοὶ δῶσιν, ἐκὼν δ' οὐκ ἄν τις ἔλοιτο, "You see, the splendid gifts of the gods, as many as they give, are not to be cast aside lightly, yet one would not willingly accept them," *Il.* 3.65–66, said by Paris to Hector of his beauty, the gift of Aphrodite, after Hector has scolded him). Socrates cites Nestor's verse at Pl. *Phaedr.* 260a5. Otherwise, should this text be quoted from Antisthenes, this is the first extant reuse of the term. A term borrowed from Homer would be fitting to this discussion, and the sense is close to Nestor's. It is not impossible that Porphyry supplies the term, since one of his *Homeric Questions* addresses this very word in *Il.* 3.65 (MacPhail 2011:72–73) while another cites 2.361 (MacPhail 2011:160–61, on *Il.* 10.67–69); he uses the term himself twice elsewhere, once for resistance to a statement (*Letter to Anebones* 2.6b). But this is low usage for the extensive surviving text of Porphyry, and attribution to Antisthenes seems more likely, considering its double use here in this carefully formulated argument as well as its appearance in t. 135. See also Patzer 1970:185; Brancacci 1996:405 n. 92.

188. Scholia at *Odyssey* 23.337, 5.211, 7.257, and 9.33, attributed to Porphyry (Schrader p. 68.23–70.16)

= 52A, 52B DC

Context of Preservation

These scholia are preserved in three manuscripts (according to Schrader; Dindorf's report for t. 188A-2 includes two additional manuscripts) at four passages in the *Odyssey*, all of them accounts of Odysseus' declining Calypso's offer of immortality. Schrader links them because of their overlap; DiBenedetto 1966:223–28 provides supporting argument; Giannantoni 1990 v.4:337 endorses DiBenedetto. The manuscripts for Schrader are H (Harleianus graecus 5674, twelfth or thirteenth century), Vd (Vindobonensis codex phil. Gr. 133, thirteenth century), and T (Hamburgensis 56, thirteenth or fourteenth century). Dindorf, who prints only t. 188A-2 and 188B, reports 188A-2.1–3 in Q (Ambrosianus Q 88 supp., fifteenth century) and the closely related R (Laurentianus 57.32, fifteenth century). H, Vd, and T, with the addition of M (Venetus Marcianus 613, thirteenth century), are the same manuscripts that contain the material in t. 189. By contrast, t. 187 is transmitted differently (H, M, Q, R, Z). One of the passages (t. 188A-1) indicates a source in Porphyry. The juxtaposition of solutions by Aristotle and Antisthenes (here asserted not in any individual fragment but in the assembly) is common to t. 189–91. All of the *Odyssey* scholia (as well as some

of the *Iliad* scholia) seem to have been preserved through Porphyry, who probably found the juxtaposition of Antisthenes and Aristotle in his sources. See further discussion of transmission through Porphyry under t. 187.

Importance of the Testimonia

This set of scholia demonstrates especially well a style of criticism based in ethical realism of the Homeric characters. The interpretation puts considerable weight on the moral virtue of the speaker, including his knowledge and his goals, and on his adaptation to his rhetorical situation, and it defends the virtue of Odysseus in all these senses. In these features, it resembles t. 187 and 189–90, all of which show, in addition, a more particular interpretive methodology than is evident here. If the discussion of immortality in t. 188A can be attributed to Antisthenes (on the strength of the continuity of the whole interpretation and correspondences to other testimonia), this would substantially extend the evidence on this topic. Schrader (ad loc.) deems it Neo-Platonic, and DiBenedetto (1966:226 n.2) calls it Christian.

188A-1. Scholium in *Odyssey* codex Vd f. 145b at *Odyssey* 23.337 (Schrader p. 68.23–69.16)

“ἀλλὰ τοῦ οὐ ποτε θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἔπειθεν”

(1) διὰ τί Ὀδυσσεὺς τῆς Καλυψοῦς διδούσης αὐτῷ τὴν ἀθανασίαν οὐκ ἐδέξατο; (2) Ἀριστοτέλης μὲν οὖν πρὸς τοὺς Φαίακάς φησι ταῦτα λέγειν Ὀδυσσεά, ἵνα σεμνότερος φαίνηται καὶ μᾶλλον ἄλ-λων> σπουδάσαι <πάντων τὸν νόστον> συνέφερε γὰρ αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸ θάττον ἀποσταλῆναι. (3) ἔπειτα ἔοικεν οὐ τῷ μὴ πεισθῆναι λέγειν μὴ λαβεῖν τὴν τοιαύτην δωρεάν, ἀλλὰ μὴ πιστεῦσαι αὐτῇ τοιαῦτα λεγούσῃ· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἔφασκε ποιήσειν, ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἐπίστευσεν, οὐχὶ πιστεύων παρητήτο. (4) εἶη δ’ ἂν καὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ ἀθανασία οὐχ ἦν τοιαῦται δαίμονες χαρίζαιντ’ ἂν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Διὸς ἂν εἶη καὶ τῶν ἔργων, ἃ μὲν πέφυκεν ἀπαθανατίζειν· τοιαῦτα δ’ ἂν εἶη ἀπὸ ἀρετῆς. (5) παραιτούμενος δὲ τοὺς οἰκείους καὶ τὴν εἰς οἶκον ἐπάνοδον δι’ ἐπαγγελίαν ἀθανασίας ἀπώλεσεν ἂν τὴν ἀρετὴν· σὺν αὐτῇ δὲ καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀθανασίαν καὶ τὴν πρὸς θεοὺς ἄνοδον ἀπώλεσεν ἂν. (6) διδάσκει οὖν ὅτι <διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων οὐκ ἂν τις ἐνδύοιτο τὰ ἐναντία>, ὥς οὔτε δι’ ἀποστερήσεως λάβοι ἂν δικαιοσύνην οὔτε ἂν διὰ μάχης σωφροσύνην οὔτε διὰ τοῦ φιλεῖν τὸν τῇδε βίον θνητὸν ὄντα καὶ ἐπικηρον <τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀθανασίας, οὔσης ἀνδρὸς> τὰ καθήκοντα καὶ τῶν <ἔργων τὰ τοιαῦτα φιλοῦντος ἃ καθήρειεν> ἂν τὴν ψυχὴν, . . . α τοῖς θεοῖς γίνεται πάντα . . . <ἐ>τυχεν ἀλλὰ τοῦ τέλους.

Πορφυρ *supra scholium* (2) μᾶλλον ἄλλων . . . συνέφερε *corr.*
 et *supp.* Schrader e *schol.* T ad *Od.* 7.257 (3) πιστεύων παρηγείτο
 Schrader : πιστεύων . . . ρηγείτο *cod.* (4) τοιαῦται δαίμονες χαρίζαιντ'
 ἄν Schrader : τοιαῦτα . . . αἰμονες χαρίζαιντο *cod.*, om. ἄν | τῶν ἔργων,
 ἃ μὲν πέφυκεν Schrader : τῶν ἔργω. μὲν πέφυκεν *cod.* (5) ἐπαγγελίαν
 Schrader : ἐπ' ἀγγελίαν *cod.* (6) διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων οὐκ ἄν τις ἐνδύοιτο
 τὰ ἐναντία Schrader : ἀπ . . . σεν ἄν ἐν . . . το τὰ ἐν. *cod.* | δικαιοσύνην
 Schrader : δι..ιοσύνην *cod.* | διὰ τοῦ φιλεῖν τὸν τῆδε βίον Schrader :
 διὰ τὸ φιλεῖν τῶν τῆδε β. *cod.* | τὸ τέλος τῆς ἀθανασίας, οὔσης ἀνδρός
 Schrader : post τό 21 *litt.* *avuls.*, tum ασίας οὐ . . . α . . . ς *cod.* | τῶν
 ἔργων τὰ τοιαῦτα φιλοῦντος ἃ καθήρειεν Schrader : post τῶν 22 *litt.*
avuls., tum νήρειεν *cod.* | post ψυχὴν et post πάντα 23 *litt.* *avuls.* |
supra γίνεται *script.* σθαι | <ἐ>τυχεν *supplevi* | post τέλους 21 *litt.*
avuls., tum α . . . ὕχεν

“But she never persuaded the heart in his breast. ”

[*Od.* 23.337]

(1) Why did Odysseus, when Calypso offered him immortality, not accept it? (2) Aristotle, on the one hand, says that Odysseus says this to the Phaeacians so that he might seem more worthy of respect and be eager for his homecoming more than all else. For it was expedient for him toward being sent off more quickly. (3) Next, it seems that he said he would not take such a gift not because he was not persuaded, but because he did not trust her when she said this sort of thing. She was claiming she would act, but he did not believe her, and because he did not believe her, he declined. (4) And the immortality of the wise man would be not the one that such quasi-divine figures grant, but it would be [an immortality] of Zeus and of deeds, which by nature bestow immortality. And these would be the ones from virtue. (5) But if he had dismissed his own household members and his way back home because of a promise of immortality, he would have lost his virtue. And with that, he would have lost the immortality of his soul and his way up to the gods. (6) So he [Homer] teaches that one would not enter into opposites through opposites, just as one would not get justice through robbery or self-control through fighting or the goal of immortality through loving the life here, when one is mortal and perishable, and immortality is for the man who loves things appropriate to him and those of his deeds that would purify his soul, . . . all comes to belong to the gods . . . he got, but the goal.

Notes

(2) *πρὸς τοὺς Φαίακας*: Aristotle's solution implies that Odysseus said not what he thought but what his audience needed to hear if he were to achieve his goal with them. This is consistent with the image of Odysseus in Athenian tragedy and the Palamedes myth, that he is an opportunist. He is not immoral (see the ethical clarification in t. 188A-3.2), but he is an individualist sooner than a builder or member of community, as he is in t. 187 and 54. (See Stanford 1954:90–117.) Possibly Antisthenes used the same interpretation here. (See t. 127.)

(3) *ἔπειτα*: The adverb indicates a second solution, but no author is named. The solution is the same as that attributed to Antisthenes in t. 188A-2 and 188B.

οὐ τῷ μὴ πεισθῆναι . . . , ἀλλὰ μὴ πιστεῦσαι αὐτῇ: The differentiation of two states of belief for Odysseus is like the tactic attributed to Aristotle in t. 190. On the lover's inability to be convincing, compare t. 132.

(4) *εἴη δ' ἂν καὶ τοῦ σοφοῦ ἀθανασία οὐχ ἦν τοιαῦται δαίμονες χαρίσαιντ' ἂν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Διὸς ἂν εἴη καὶ τῶν ἔργων*: In t. 188C, Odysseus' knowledge that Calypso's offer is unlikely to be valid is one of the reasons he is not persuaded. Compared to t. 188A-2, the idea here about how immortality is achieved is less clearly assigned to Odysseus' knowledge and listening skill and more plausibly an augmentation of the original text. The description of true immortalization is also more detailed here than in t. 188A-2 (though some of the detail was composed by Schrader). But the core ideas, that only Zeus bestows immortality and that only deeds earn immortality, are common to both passages. On the importance of deeds, compare t. 134d. Since Heracles, in some versions of his myth, earns immortality through deeds and by the award of Zeus, it is plausible that Antisthenes could have assimilated the heroes and attributed such thoughts to Odysseus. See esp. Xen. *Sym.* 8.29, from Socrates' speech on *eros*, where Zeus is said to make immortal those mortals "whose good souls he loves," and Heracles and the Dioscuri are the named examples. (On possible assimilation of Odysseus and Heracles, see also t. 197.) See also Montiglio 2011:34–36.

τοιαῦτα δ' ἂν εἴη ἀπὸ ἀρετῆς: The connection between virtue and immortality is a philosophical commonplace (see t. 176); but t. 176 is attributed to Antisthenes.

(5) *παραιτούμενος δὲ τοὺς οἰκείους*: The literal reference is to Odysseus' household members and family, but the opposition between "one's own" (τὰ οἰκεῖα) and "things of another" (τὰ ἀλλότρια) in a more general sense might be relevant also. It is characteristic of the wise man to know what is "his own" and to act in accord with this knowledge. (See t. 34E.)

(6) οὔτε δι' ἀποστερήσεως λάβοι ἂν δικαιοσύνην: The first example of contraries is appropriate to a late fifth-century or early fourth-century context: see *Dissoi logoi* 3.7. In t. 78, Antisthenes tells Callias that “justice is mixed with injustice not even in a single respect.” (The principle might have been more difficult to defend in reference to Odysseus. Ajax accuses Odysseus of temple robbery [t. 53.3, 53.6], and Odysseus defends himself by characterizing it as a recovery [t. 54.3].)

οὔτε ἂν διὰ μάχης σωφροσύνην: A clear antithesis between fighting and self-control is harder to document in Antisthenes' time, and it could be Stoic. Plutarch, in three passages from his *Lives*, seems to imply an opposition (*Lyc.* 17.2; *Phil.* 7.3; *C. Gracch.* 14.5).

οὔτε διὰ τοῦ φιλεῖν τὸν τῇδε βίον θνητὸν ὄντα καὶ ἐπικηρον: Antisthenes is accused of just this fault in traditional anecdotes. See t. 37. Possibly his critics jumped on any chance to show his hypocrisy, as in the case of t. 15.

188A-2. Scholia in *Odyssey* codices H f. 43a and T p. 104 at *Odyssey* 7.257 (Schrader p. 69 notes + p. 68 notes; compare Dindorf v.1 p. 347.13–22)

= 52B DC

“ἡ δὲ ἔφασκε

θήσειν ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀγήραον ἥματα πάντα.”

(1) καὶ διὰ τί μὴ βεβούληται; (2) ἔοικε διὰ τοῦ “οὔ ποτ’ ἔπειθε” δηλοῦν οὐ τὸ μὴ θέλει γενέσθαι ἀθάνατος, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ πιστεῦσαι αὐτῇ τοιαῦτα λεγούσῃ. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἔφασκε ποιήσειν, ὁ δὲ οὐκ ἐπίστευεν, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ πιστεῦων παρητεῖτο. ἦδει γὰρ ὡς σοφὸς ὅτι ἀθανασίαν οὐχ αἰ τοιαῦται δαίμονες χαρίσαιντο ἄν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ Διὸς ἂν εἴη καὶ τῶν ἔργων, ἃ πέφυκεν ἀπαθανατίζειν. (3) Ἀντισθένης δὲ φησιν ὅτι τοὺς ἐρώντας ἦδει ψευδομένους τὰς ὑποσχέσεις· τοῦτο γὰρ ποιεῖν οὐκ ἐδύνατο δίχα Διός. (4) ταῦτα γὰρ οὕτως ἐνδείκνυται ὅτι πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων προτέθεικε τὸν νόστον, ἵνα μᾶλλον ὑπακούσῃ Ἀλκίνοος.

(1) διὰ τί H : διὰ τί τοῦτο T (2) ἔοικε διὰ τοῦ H : ἔοικε δὲ διὰ τὰς T | δηλοῦν Schrader : δηλον ὅτι codd. | ἃ πέφυκεν H : ἀπέφυγεν T (3) φησιν H : φασι T | ἐρώντας H : ἔρωτος T | ἦδει Schrader : ἦδη T : εἰδῶς H | ἐδύνατο H : ἐδύναντο T (4) ταῦτα . . . Ἀλκίνοος om. H | ταῦτα Schrader : τὰ T | προτέθεικε Preller : προστέθεικε

“And she said she would
make me immortal and ageless for all time.”

[*Od.* 7.256–57]

(1) And why has he not wanted this? (2) He [Odysseus] seems to show through the phrase “she never persuaded” [*Od.* 7.258] not that he did not want to become immortal, but that he did not believe her when she said this sort of thing. For she was claiming she would act, but he did not believe her, and because he did not believe, he declined. For he knew, since he was wise, that immortality is not what quasi-divine figures would grant, but it would be from Zeus and from deeds, which bestow immortality by nature. (3) And Antisthenes says that he [Odysseus] knew that those in love speak falsely in their promises: for she was not able to do this without Zeus. (4) And [in saying] these things this way, he shows that he has given his homecoming priority over everything, so that Alcinous might listen better.

Notes

(1) **διὰ τί μὴ βεβούληται**: This passage is a different reduction of the source behind t. 188A-1. Both start with the problem. Whereas only Aristotle’s name is used in A-1, only Antisthenes’ name is used here.

(2) **ἔοικε διὰ τοῦ “οὔποτ’ ἔπειθε” δηλοῦν**: In *Od.* 7.241–97, Odysseus is reporting his adventures to the Phaeacians, and so it is Odysseus as speaker who “reveals” through his use of the words οὔποτ’ ἔπειθε that it was skepticism, not lack of desire, that caused him to reject the offer. When the event is represented directly in *Od.* 5.203–24, Homer as narrator makes no such statement. Indeed it is always Odysseus who reports his denial in this way (also at 9.33 and 23.337). The term “reveal” could come from Antisthenes: one can compare t. 151A as well as the careful description of speaking behavior in t. 188B.2.

οὐ τὸ μὴ θέλειν . . . , ἀλλὰ τὸ μὴ πιστεῦσαι αὐτῇ: The language is nearly the same in t. 188A-1’s second interpretation, at §3.

ἦδει γὰρ ὡς σοφός: In t. 188B, Antisthenes attributes knowledge to Odysseus because he is wise generally (εἰδέναι σοφὸν ὄντα τὸν Ὀδυσσεά).

(3) **Ἀντισθένης δέ φησιν**: The wording implies that the epitomizer is introducing a new critic. But the explanation for Odysseus’ skepticism in §3 (τοῦτο γὰρ ποιεῖν οὐκ ἐδύνατο δίχα Διός) and the explanation in §2 (ἀθανασίαν οὐχ αἰ τοιαῦται δαίμονες χάρισσαντο ἄν) must be parts of the same explanation. They are combined in t. 188A-1.4. The processes of reduction and transmission can explain how the views of the same critic can be represented in different ways at two points in the same passage, without the epitomizer’s sensitivity to the structure of problem and solution. (See also DiBenedetto 1966:213.) Compare t. 189A-1. The role of “Antisthenes” as both

accuser and defender in t. 187 can also be compared.

(4) πάντων τῶν πραγμάτων προτέθεικε τὸν νόστον: This interpretation is credited to Aristotle in t. 188A-1.2, but Antisthenes might have used it also. See t. 127.

188A-3. Scholium in *Odyssey* codex T p. 127 at *Odyssey* 9.33 (Schrader p. 69 notes)

“ἀλλ’ ἐμὸν οὐ ποτε θυμὸν ἐνὶ στήθεσσιν ἔπειθεν.”

(1) ἴσως μὲν κατ’ ἄλλον λογισμόν οὐκ ἐπείθετο ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς εἰδὼς τοὺς ἐρῶντας πάντα μὲν ὑπισχνουμένους, τὸ δὲ τῆς ἀθανασίας ὡς ἀδύνατον ἀνθρώπῳ δοῦναι· (2) πρὸς μέντοι τοὺς Φαίακας οὐχ ὡς ἀπιστῶν λέγει, ἀλλ’ ὡς καὶ ἀθανασίας καταφρονήσας πόθῳ τῆς πατρίδος· τοῦτο γὰρ εἶχεν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἥθους σύστασιν.

(2) ἀπιστῶν Polak : ἄπιστον cod. | τοῦ ἥθους [τῆς πατρίδος] σύστασιν cod. : corr. Polak

“But she never persuaded the heart in my breast.”

[*Od.* 9.33]

(1) Perhaps by another line of reasoning Odysseus was not persuaded, since he knew that those in love make all sorts of promises, but the promise of immortality was impossible to give to a human. (2) To the Phaeacians, however, he does not speak as though he does not believe her, but as though he despises immortality because of his desire for his homeland. For this [desire] contained the consistency of his character.

Notes

(1) ἴσως μὲν κατ’ ἄλλον λογισμόν: This is Antisthenes’ interpretation. The term “other” may indicate that this interpretation is alternative or secondary, perhaps to the obvious meaning of the text. There is no record of any third famous interpretation of the verse, beyond those of Aristotle and Antisthenes. (2) πρὸς μέντοι τοὺς Φαίακας: This is the interpretation attributed to Aristotle in t. 188A-1.2. Both interpretations can be true together. τοῦτο γὰρ εἶχεν αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἥθους σύστασιν: This version adds moral enhancement to the rhetorical solution.

188B. Scholium in *Odyssey* codex Vd f. 2a at *Odyssey* 5.211 (Schrader p. 69.17–70.16; compare Dindorf v.1 p. 263.12–29)

= 52A DC

“οὐ μὲν θην κείνης γε χερείων εὖχομαι εἶναι”

(1) Ἀντισθένης φησὶν εἰδέναι σοφὸν ὄντα τὸν Ὀδυσσεά, ὅτι οἱ ἐρώντες πολλὰ ψεύδονται καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα παραγγέλλονται. (2) ἐπισημαίνεται δὲ καὶ <τὴν αἰτίαν>, τὴν παραίτησιν δι’ ἣν πεποιήται τῆς θεοῦ. ἐκείνης μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ σώματος εὐμορφία καὶ μεγέθει μεγαλαυχούσης καὶ τὰ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν προκρινούσης τῆς Πηνελόπης, συγχωρήσας μὲν τοῦτο καὶ τῷ ἀδῆλῳ εἶξας—ἄδελον μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ, εἰ “ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀγήρων”—ἐπεσημάνετο ὅτι τὴν γαμετὴν ζητεῖ διὰ τὸ εἶναι περίφρονα, ὥς κάκεινης ἂν ἀμελήσας, εἰ τῷ σώματι καὶ μόνῳ τῷ κάλλει κεκόσμητο. (3) τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μνηστῆρας εἰρηκέναι πολλάκις, λέγοντας· “οὐδ’ ἐπὶ ἄλλας ἐρχόμεθα, ἅς ἐπικικέες ὀπιούμεν ἐστὶν ἐκάστῳ, ταύτης δὲ ἔνεκα τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐπιδικαζόμεθα.” < . . . > (4) τὰ δὲ τῆς Καλυψοῦς ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα· “οὐ μὲν ἐγὼ κείνης χερείων εὖχομαι εἶναι, οὐ δέμας οὐδὲ φυὴν, οὐδὲ ἔοικε θνητὰς ἀθανάτησι δέμας ἐρίζειν καὶ εἶδος,” τὰ σωματικὰ μόνον παραβαλλούσης· τοῦ δὲ Ὀδυσσέως· “οἶδα καὶ αὐτὸς πάντα μάλ’ οὐνεκα σείο περίφρων Πηνελόπεια εἶδος ἀκιδνοτέρη μέγεθός τ’ εἰς ἅντα ιδέσθαι· ἡ μὲν γὰρ βροτὸς ἐστὶ, σὺ δ’ ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀγήρων,” τὸ γὰρ “περίφρων Πηνελόπεια” ἔμφασιν ἔχει τῆς κατὰ ὄρεξιν προκρίσεως.

(1) παραγγέλλονται legit Schrader : ἐπαγγέλλονται Dindorf

(2) <τὴν αἰτίαν> ins. Schrader : ἐπισημ. δὲ καὶ τὴν παραίτησιν ἣν πεποιήται τῆς θεοῦ Polak | post πεποιήται interpunxit Schrader | ἐπεσημάνετο Schrader : ἐπισημάνασθαι cod. | κεκόσμητο o ex ai in cod. corr. (an vice versa?) (3) πολλάκις secl. Schrader | lacunam post ἐπιδικαζόμεθα notavit Schrader (4) verba τὰ δὲ τῆς Καλυψοῦς . . . προκρίσεως secl. Schrader

“Indeed I boast to be no worse than she..”

[Od. 5.211]

(1) Antisthenes says that Odysseus, being wise, knows that those in love lie a lot and promise impossible things. (2) And he indicates also the reason for which he has made his refusal of the goddess. For when she boasted about her beauty and size of body, and judged her own endowments above those of Penelope, he conceded this and yielded to something unclear—for it was unclear to him, whether she was “deathless and ageless” [Od. 5.218]—but he indicated that he sought his wife because she is circumspect, as if he would have failed to care about even her, if she were ornamented in body and beauty only. (3) Also the suitors have said this many times, when they say: “We do not go after other women, whom it is appropriate for each to marry, but

we lay claim to this one because of her virtue” [*Od.* 2.206–7]. (4) And the words of Calypso are like this: “Indeed I boast to be no worse than she, either in body or in stature, nor does it seem that mortals compete with the immortals in body and form” [*Od.* 5.211–13], comparing only qualities of the body. And [the words] of Odysseus: “I also know very well myself that circumspect Penelope is inferior to you in appearance and size, to see her face to face. For she is a mortal, but you are immortal and ageless” [*Od.* 5.215–18]. The phrase “circumspect Penelope” has the appearance of a preference in respect to desire.

Notes

(1) Ἀντισθένης φησίν: This scholium, from a transmission other than that of t. 188A-1–3, omits Aristotle’s interpretation. There is no reason why the whole interpretation cannot be attributed to Antisthenes.

τὰ ἀδύνατα παραγγέλλονται: This scholium does not develop the idea that Calypso’s promise of immortality is impossible, like the versions in t. 188A-1–3. But the promise of immortality must be Calypso’s primary lie and her primary “impossible” promise. (Perhaps the statement of her own immortality is another lie: see §2.) This passage focuses instead on how Odysseus’ words show that his choice of Penelope has a positive grounding.

(2) ἐπισημαίνεται δὲ καὶ <τὴν αἰτίαν>: Odysseus as speaker “indicates” a meaning he does not literally state, as Homer does in t. 191.

ἐπὶ σώματος εὐμορφία καὶ μεγέθει μεγαλαυχούσης: One might assume from Socraticism in general that Antisthenes prefers virtues of soul over virtues of body; see t. 14A. Compare also t. 57, 61, 198, 199.

συγχωρήσας μὲν τοῦτο καὶ τῷ ἀδήλῳ εἶξας: On the literal level of Odysseus’ statement in verses 216–17, he concedes that Calypso is better than Penelope. On the literal level in verse 218, he concedes to a fact that he does not really know. (It is possible that Antisthenes understands all the divine beings in Homer as rhetorical figures for something else, by an “allegorical” interpretation: see t. 194, 197, 123. Odysseus, too, is skeptical about Calypso’s divine status.)

ἐπεσημήνατο ὅτι τὴν γαμετὴν ζητεῖ διὰ τὸ εἶναι περίφρων: The description περίφρων Πηνελόπεια in verse 216 makes the indication, by implication and not literally: according to the explanation in §4, this phrase shows his special attachment, from desire, to his wife. The phrase is not what Odysseus primarily *says* in his statement, which is primarily a concession to Calypso. The description of Penelope is incidental to his main statement. But the good reader can tell what Odysseus is indicating. Modern critics, applying the Parry-Lord theory of oral composition, might read περίφρων as a mere epithet, which contributes no meaning to the statement.

κακείνης ἂν ἀμελήσας, εἰ τῷ σώματι καὶ μόνῳ τῷ κάλλει κεκόσμητο: περίφρων is a mind-based description. Compare the use of the participle κεκοσμημένον in t. 61.

(3) τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τοὺς μνηστῆρας εἰρηκέναι πολλάκις: Porphyry's *Homeric Questions* are rich with comparisons to other Homeric passages, and so it is not necessary that Antisthenes is the critic who made this comparison. But it seems clear from t. 187 (insofar as that passage is more likely to be a continuous report from Antisthenes) that Antisthenes did compare passages. Since the citation refers to virtue (ἔνεκα τῆς ἀρετῆς), it is plausible that this comes from the discussion of περίφρων. The suitors speak the quoted lines only once (hence Schrader deleted “often”), but the same kind of statement is made at, for example, 18.245–49. The suitors themselves are called outstanding in “virtue” (4.629, 21.187) but this “virtue” is clearly different from the ethical virtue the Socratics pursued: hence Antisthenes might have investigated the “contradiction” in how Homer characterized them, in a style similar to t. 189. Statements about the suitors are used there, too, as comparanda for statements about and by the Cyclopes.

(4) τὰ σωματικά μόνον παραβαλλούσης: Twice Penelope refers to her own virtue, and when she does, she lists ἀρετή before εἶδος and δέμας (ἦ τοι μὲν ἐμὴν ἀρετὴν εἶδος τε δέμας τε ὤλεσαν ἀθάνατοι, “Indeed my excellence and form and body the immortals ruined,” 18.251–52, 19.124–25). In her boast, Calypso uses only δέμας and εἶδος. The match of these other two terms with Penelope's statement might show up Calypso's omission of ἀρετή.

τὸ γὰρ “περίφρων Πηνελόπεια” ἔμφασιν ἔχει τῆς κατὰ ὄρεξιν προκρίσεως: ὄρεξις must have a positive sense, related to mental desire more than erotic drive, as in the opening sentence of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*: Πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει (All humans desire to know by nature). The verb appears in Antisthenes' speech on the wealth of his soul at t. 82.42. See also t. 170.

189. Scholia at *Odyssey* 9.106–7, 127, 275, and 411, attributed to Porphyry (Schrader p. 86–89)

= 53 DC

Context of Preservation

These scholia are preserved in four manuscripts at four passages (not all at each passage) in the Polyphemus episode of *Od.* 9. As in the case of t. 188, the assembly was made by Schrader (1890) (on the basis of suggestions in Dümmler 1882:21–22), justified by DiBenedetto (1966:208–23), and accepted by Giannantoni (1990 v.4:337); Buffière (1956:359–62), independently of Schrader and using only ms. T, came to the similar conclusion that the whole

interpretation of the epithets based on a difference between the Cyclopes' piety and Polyphemus' impiety (t. 189A-1, 189C-1, 189D) should be attributed to Antisthenes. Although only one part of one passage attributes the interpretation to Antisthenes (t. 189A-1.4), the overlaps among the passages, including especially the citation within single passages of the same verses that supply the lemmata for other passages (see t.189A-2.3 notes), makes it very likely that they are parts of the same discussion, almost surely descended through Porphyry. Porphyry's name is attested for none of these passages, but the style and content are appropriate for him, and the manuscripts concerned preserve material from Porphyry. Mss. H (Harleianus graecus 5674, twelfth or thirteenth century) and M (Venetus Marcianus 613, thirteenth century) both contain the Odysseus *polytropos* scholium (t. 187). Vd (Vindobonensis codex phil. Gr. 133, thirteenth century) and T (Hamburgensis 56, thirteenth or fourteenth century), in addition to H, include the scholium on Odysseus' refusal of Calypso's offer of immortality (t. 188). T, together with H and Q (Ambrosianus Q 88 supp., fifteenth century), contains a second scholium from *Od.* 9 (t. 190), which could have come from the same source in Antisthenes as t. 189 (see t. 189C-1). On the transmission through Porphyry generally, see t. 187.

Before reaching Porphyry, Antisthenes' interpretation probably passed through a Peripatetic and Alexandrian reception. The embedded debate about the goodness of public laws or constitution for a city-state (especially in t.189A-1 and 189A-4, but also visible in 189B-1–2) suggests a discussion between a "Cynic" position and the Peripatetics. Residues of the key point in the overall interpretation—that the epithets have two meanings, which vary depending on who is described and who is speaking—are in Apollonius Sophista's *Homeric Lexicon* 12.20 (Bekker), and other residues are in Eustathius' commentary on the *Odyssey* (p. 325–35 Stallbaum). Apollonius' text could suggest a substantial Alexandrian contribution to the discussion (as Dyck 1993:15–16 proposes), and there seems to be an Alexandrian stamp in the transmission of some material here (especially t. 189A-2–3 and 189B-1, from mss. H and Vd: Carnuth 1869 assigns t. 189A-2 to Aristonicus of Alexandria). But the clever solutions offered, together with their methods, seem more appropriate to Antisthenes than to Aristarchus, who, like Aristotle, sought to explain and simplify Homer's text rather than complicate it. The assumptions about virtue are appropriate to a Socratic source, while those about minimal political institutions are appropriate to a proto-Cynic source. The passages from ms. T (t. 189A-1, 189C-1, and 189D), which preserve unique language and details, show no definite sign of the Alexandrians and resemble t. 188B in style. In any case, the other manuscripts show that Antisthenes' interpretation was received in Alexandria, and it was apparently

through the Alexandrians that it reached Porphyry. A different interpretation of the theological contradictions, plausibly motivated or enabled by Antisthenes' approach to impiety, is in Clement of Alexandria, *Miscellanies* 5.14.116 (see Buffière 1956:361 n.86; t. 189A-1.4 note).

Importance of the Testimonium

If Schrader's assembly of passages is correct and if Antisthenes is behind the whole interpretation, this set of scholia shows a distinctive approach to ambiguity in Homer, one that resolves ambiguity through distinctions between speakers and their references but retains complexity within single passages of text (see discussion under t. 189A-1.4, 189D.2–3). We see a combination of two types of Peripatetic (or Alexandrian) solution to a Homeric problem: a "solution from the diction" (λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως) and a "solution from the character" (λύσις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου). Probably Antisthenes would not have distinguished these approaches as two types of solution but would have included both of them as components in his basic practice, to evaluate ethical characters from what they say. The texts also offer unique evidence for Antisthenes' views on psychology, especially religious attitudes, and on political forms, if we can attribute them to him. (This remains speculative, but someone generated the ideas, and other candidates are not obvious.) In the character of Polyphemus (t. 189C-2, 189D), we see a close connection between how a (deficient) person speaks and how he "knows" (or perceives) his peculiar "reality." Since Polyphemus' special deficiency is explained, this subjectivism need not conflict with the objectivism we might expect from a Socratic. The wise man's "knowledge" is superior to that of Polyphemus.

189A-1. Scholium in *Odyssey* codex T p.129 at *Odyssey* 9.106 (Schrader p. 86.14–87.10)

= 53 DC

Κυκλώπων δ' ἐς γαίαν ὑπερφιάλων ἀθεμίστων

(1) πῶς ὑπερφιάλους καὶ ἀθεμίστους καὶ παρανόμους εἰπὼν τοὺς Κύκλωπας ἄφθονα παρὰ θεῶν αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν <φησί> τὰ ἀγαθὰ; (2) ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι ὑπερφιάλους μὲν διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ σώματος, (3) ἀθεμίστους δὲ τοὺς μὴ νόμῳ χρωμένους ἐγγράφῳ διὰ τὸ ἕκαστον τῶν ιδίων ἄρχειν. "θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχου," ὅπερ εὐνομίας σημεῖον. (4) Ἀντισθένης δὲ φησιν {ὅτι} μόνον τὸν Πολύφημον εἶναι ἄδικον· καὶ γὰρ ὄντως τοῦ Διὸς ὑπερόπτης ἐστίν· οὐκοῦν οἱ λοιποὶ δίκαιοι· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ καὶ τὴν γῆν αὐτοῖς τὰ πάντα

ἀναδιδόναι αὐτομάτως· καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐργάζεσθαι αὐτὴν δίκαιον ἔργον ἐστίν. (5) ἀλλ' ἔμπροσθεν εἶπε βιαίους· “οἱ σφεας σινέσκοντο, <βίηφι δὲ φέρτεροι ἦσαν>” ὥσπερ καὶ τοὺς Γίγαντας· “ὅσπερ ὑπερθύμοισι Πιγάντεσιν βασίλευε.” ὥστε καὶ τοὺς Φαίακας βλαπτομένους ὑπ' αὐτῶν μεταναστῆναι.

(1) ὑπάρχειν <φησί> Schrader : ὑπάρχει cod. (3) νόμῳ . . . ἐγγράφῳ cod. : νόμοις . . . ἐγγράφοις conj. Dindorf | ἕκαστον τῶν ἰδίων ἄρχειν Polak: ἕκαστον ἴδιον ἄρχειν cod. | εὐνομίας cod. : ἀνομίας Preller et Schrader (4) {ὅτι} delevi | καὶ γὰρ ὄντως Schrader : καὶ γὰρ οὗτος τοῦ Διὸς ὑπερόπτης ἐστίν Preller : καὶ γὰρ ὅπως τοῦ διὸς εἵποντος ἐστίν cod. | καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐργάζεσθαι Preller : καὶ τὸν μὴ ἄξεσθαι cod. (5) εἶπε βιαίους Dindorf : βιαίως βιαίους cod. | <βίηφι . . . ἦσαν> suppl. Schrader | ὥσπερ . . . βασίλευε secl. Schrader | ὥστε Polak : ὥσπερ cod. | ἐγένετο δὲ διὰ τὸ ἀνόμοιον τῆς πολιτείας add. Schrader in fine e cod. M

“And into the land of the Cyclopes, outrageous and lawless”

[*Od.* 9.106]

(1) How, after calling the Cyclopes outrageous and lawless and violent, does he [the poet] say [nevertheless] that good things belong to them, unenvied, from the gods? (2) It must be said that they are called “outrageous” [ὑπερφιάλους] on account of their preeminence [ὑπεροχήν] of the body, (3) and that those peoples who do not use a written law code are called “lawless” [ἀθεμίστους] because each person rules his own things: indeed, “each lays ordinances for his children and wife” [*Od.* 9.114–15], which is itself a sign of good governance. (4) And Antisthenes says that only Polyphemus is unjust: for he is truly a disdainer of Zeus: the rest, then, are just: for because of this also the earth produces everything for them spontaneously: not to work the earth is a just deed. (5) But previously he called them violent: “who kept injuring them, for they were greater in force” [*Od.* 6.6], just as [he called] the Giants [outrageous] also: “who ruled the outrageous Giants” [*Od.* 7.59], so that even the Phaeacians moved away because they were being harmed by them.

Notes

(1) πῶς . . . καὶ παρανόμους εἰπών: The accuser’s voice begins the discussion, as in t. 189B-1 and 189D, as well as 187, 188A1–2, and 190–91. The adjective παρανόμους might have been used by Antisthenes against Alcibiades: see t. 141A. Acting against the laws is different from having no laws (being ἀνόμους: see §3).

<φησί>: This scholium, like t. 189A-2–3, uses no name for the speaker of these epithets, who is literally Odysseus, speaker of nearly all of books 9–12

of the *Odyssey*. “The poet” is mentioned in t. 189B-1, 189C-2.2, 189C-3, and 189D.3. This could mean Homer, through reduction of all narrative voice to Homer’s; alternatively, it is not inconsistent with reference to Odysseus. T. 189D.3, perhaps referring to the problem, says “the poet or the same [speaker] in the poet.”

ἄφθονα παρὰ θεῶν . . . τὰ ἀγαθὰ: The literary problem is not labeled in this version, but the epithets appear difficult to reconcile with divine blessing and Golden Age conditions. (Elsewhere the problem is classified: in t. 189A-3, the poet has implied divine favor inappropriately, and in t. 189D, he appears to have contradicted himself.)

(2) ὑπερφιάλους μὲν διὰ τὴν ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ σώματος: The solution comes from understanding the epithets’ meaning properly. The first epithet is reinterpreted, using an etymological principle, to yield a positive sense. The second part of the word should be understood (it seems) as a container (ὄχη, from the verb ἔχω), just as the φιάλη is a container for food or wine; the “excessive” factor in ὑπερ-φιάλους should, then, be referred to body, which, by implication, eliminates the soul, the location of truly moral depravity. As Dümmler noticed (1882:21), an etymology attributed to Aristotle by a scholiast on *Il.* 2.169 may be related: ὑπερφιάλος γὰρ ὁ ὑπερβάλλον τῇ ἀμετρίᾳ τὸ μέτρον τῆς φιάλης (For outrageous is the one exceeding by his lack of due measure the measure of the bowl). The etymology for φιάλους implied in t. 189A-2 is different, and there could have been multiple etymologies and meanings for the term discussed in the original text. Because the division of a compound word into its parts and the reconsideration of its meaning in terms of these parts is the same tactic used in t. 187 and because the essence of this solution, that most of the Cyclopes are good, is the same as that credited explicitly to Antisthenes in §4, it seems that this first part of the passage, too, should be attributed to him (see also DiBenedetto 1966:213).

(3) ἀθεμίστους δὲ τοὺς μὴ νόμῳ χρωμένους ἐγγράφῳ: Whereas the accuser expects “lawless” to mean “unjust” (as t. 189A-2 makes clear), the defender shows that absence of written law is good. According to Apollonius Sophista 12.21–23, it was the first-century Alexandrian critic Heliodorus, following the principles of Aristarchus, who defended the Cyclopes by pointing out that their “lawless” quality referred to legislation in common rather than law absolutely: ὁ γοῦν Ἡλίδωρος Ἀρισταρχείως μεταφράζων φησί, καθὸ οὐ κοινοὶς χρῶνται νόμοις. Dyck (1993:16) claims this as Heliodorus’ single contribution to the traditional discussion of the epithets, which can be traced to Antisthenes. But there are two differences between what Heliodorus says and what this scholium says (by contrast with the versions in t. 189A-2–3 and Eusebius), and this scholium seems to preserve older usage. First, the scholium refers to “written law” in the singular rather than “laws” in the plural. The plural would be more accurate of real Greek statutes, but the

singular matches the usage in Antisthenes' book titles, t. 41A titles 3.3–4, as well as Aristotle's citation in t. 68 and Plato's numerous statements in, for example, *Gorgias* about "law," "nature," and the "law of nature" (e.g., 483e3, 489b6). Second, the description "common laws," in Heliodorus' version, captures the social sense required in the argument. But to call this "written law" rather than "common law" resonates with the culture of the classical Athenian democracy, since the city-states did post their laws publicly and since some of the laws were newly inscribed at the restoration of the democracy in 403.

διὰ τὸ ἕκαστον τῶν ἰδίων ἄρχειν: The principle that each should rule his own is important in several texts of Plato (e.g., *Rep.* 4 433a8) and fits with Antisthenes' ideology (e.g., t. 100). The opposition between οἰκεῖος and ἀλλότριος seems to operate in his ethics as well as in his logic (t. 34E): see also Brancacci 1990:260–62; Rappe 2000. This is a statement of an ideal situation. The idea comes up again in t. 189B-1 and 189 C-1.

“θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἢ δ’ ἀλόχου”: This Homeric passage, *Od.* 9.114–15, is cited twice also by Aristotle, at the beginning of the *Politics* (1252b22) and at the end of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, in the transition to the *Politics* (NE 1180a31); a longer excerpt, *Od.* 9.112–15, is cited by Plato at *Laws* 680b–c. Hence it is plausible to ask how Plato's and Aristotle's evaluation of the Cyclopes' private life can be compared with the evaluation in this scholium. (See Dümmler 1882:22, on Aristotle only.) For Plato, the Cyclopes represent the first stage in the invention of politics or *politeia*, the "autocracy" (δυναστεία, 680b2), which seems to develop naturally into constitutions of larger scale. For Aristotle, the Cyclopes exemplify primitive civilization, in the time of scattered settlement and before the rise of the city-state. On Peripatetic terms, this is the absence of *politeia*, that is, bad government. As cited here, Homer's line has the opposite force: the critic is resolving the objection by showing that both epithets have positive meanings. See, further, §5, where the accuser lodges a second question apparently trying to expose the Cyclopes as lawless in the negative sense. The evidence does not allow us to prove that the Peripatetics debated with Antisthenes on the value of the Cyclopes' household-based government, but such a debate would explain the residues we have.

ὅπερ εὐνομίας σημείον: The manuscript reading, εὐνομίας (good government), supports the statement just made, that family-based government is good government. The Cyclopes are therefore good. Preller's emendation to ἀνομίας (lawlessness), a plausible correction paleographically (in light of manuscripts' frequent confusion between εὐ- and ἀ-), makes the word more clearly parallel with ἀθέμιστοι. Because this is the voice of the defender, ἀνομία, in this context, would have to amount to neutral, not

negative, judgment about the νόμοι, by contrast with the παρανόμους accused against the Cyclopes at the beginning of this scholium and the παρανομία accused in t. 189B-1.

(4) Ἀντισθένης δέ φησιν: The delayed mention of Antisthenes in §4, as though he is a second critic, can be attributed to transmission (as in t. 188A-2.3). Although it is clear (esp. in t. 189A-3 and 189B-1) that this debate had many players, the particular approach to compound adjectives in §2 resembles the approach in t. 187. Antisthenes' strategy recognized here, to distinguish one meaning for the epithets in application to Polyphemos and another for the Cyclopes, is attributed by Apollonius Sophista to Aristarchus (12.23–29). But Apollonius' further statement that "this whole topic is from the problems" (12.29–30) suggests that he did not consider Aristarchus the original author of this solution. This introduction of two meanings and two references for the epithets, which occur together in a single Homeric utterance, is a remarkable statement about Homer's ambiguity. (Contrast the ideals of Aristotle and most of the ancient critical tradition, which sought the one meaning of the text: see Stanford 1939:12–24, esp. 20; Dyck 1987:123. Haslam 1994:35–43 discusses "polysemantic" lexicography, but the materials that survive suggest that multiple meanings were found in words, not in their individual uses in texts.) Antisthenes the critic can handle the ambiguity by resolving the single text into two determinate things said. But the fact that the utterance contains this ambiguity requiring this interpretation may point to a fundamental fact about poetic speech or possibly all speech. Without the help of Antisthenes' resolution, which is not obvious, the reader could draw a false conclusion about what Homer meant. Even worse, without Antisthenes' help, the reader might never know that the naive understanding of Homer is false. In this sense, Antisthenes' exercises in explaining ambiguity could be useful.

καὶ γὰρ ὄντως τοῦ Διὸς ὑπερόπτης ἐστίν: *Od.* 1.70 calls Polyphemos ἀντίθεον Πολύφημον (his first mention in the poem) and distinguishes him from the other Cyclopes. (Scholia preserved at *Od.* 1.70 may come from the same discussion as the present texts: see p. 89:20–90.2 Schrader.) Whereas the piety of the Cyclopes concerns their belief in the plural gods, Polyphemos is said to be a disbeliever in Zeus only (*Od.* 9.275). (This difference occupies Clement at *Miscellanies* 5.14.116.) The following sentence recognizes "the earth" as the source of the blessings, without taking a stand on whether the gods are one or many. We have no evidence for how Antisthenes handled Demeter, whose divinity was allegorized in the Sophistic period, but "the mother of the gods" appears in t. 182.

καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐργάζεσθαι αὐτὴν δίκαιον ἔργον ἐστίν: This has the ring of a paradox, that not to work is itself just work. (ἐργάζεσθαι is an emendation for transmitted ἄζεσθαι, "revere": by that reading, "Also not to revere the

earth is a just deed.”) Compare Socrates’ exposition of Hesiod, *WD* 311 as recalled in *Xen. Mem.* 1.2.56–57, where he reads the text to say “no work is a disgrace,” in place of its more natural meaning, “work is no disgrace” (see also Wolfsdorf 2008 [“Hesiod and Others”]:1–3). This admiration of the Cyclopes may conflict with Antisthenes’ normal praise of toil (t. 85, 113, 134f), which is closer to the view Socrates finds in Hesiod. Perhaps toil is needed only in the real world, where people are not blessed automatically but have to earn their divine favor (see t. 188A; this is the idea of the Golden Age in Hesiod, *WD* 90–91).

(5) ἀλλ’ ἐμπροσθεν εἶπε βιαίους: This is a second stage in the discussion, an objection raised against the solution Antisthenes has offered. The accuser cites another passage in the *Odyssey* (6.4–10), where, when it is a matter of foreign affairs rather than self-government, the Cyclopes were called “violent,” consistently with the negative meaning of the first epithet ὑπερφιάλους, and where the Phaeacians had to move away. The defender’s explanation as preserved here seems to address this first epithet by appealing to yet another place in the *Odyssey*: see next note. But in the version preserved in t. 189A–4 and Eustathius, the defender does not address the first epithet at all but appeals instead to a difference in *politeia* as a neutral fact that explains the decision of these societies to part as neighbors. Since the defense addresses the second epithet, the accuser probably did also, and he probably expected to prove that the second epithet, like the first, must be negative. This would have been consistent with a Peripatetic accuser.

ὥσπερ καὶ τοὺς Γίγαντας· “ὅσπερ ὑπερθύμοισι Γιγάντεσσιν βασίλευε”: This second quotation must have been introduced by the defense. Apparently he pointed out that also the Phaeacians were descended from “violent” stock: *Od.* 7.59 describes Eurymedon, who was grandfather to the Phaeacians. (See DiBenedetto 1966:218–19.) This violence cannot explain the end of the neighbors’ relationship, because it was a shared trait.

189A-2. Scholium in *Odyssey* codex H f.52b at *Odyssey* 9.106 (Schrader p. 87.11–23)

(1) “ὑπερφιάλων” τῶν μεγαλοφῶν τῷ σώματι· τῶν δισήμων γὰρ ἡ λέξις. “ἀθεμίστων” δὲ τῶν νόμοις μὴ κεχρημένων· φησὶ γὰρ “θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος παίδων ἢ δ’ ἀλόχων.” (2) εἰ γὰρ ἦν “ἀθεμίστων” ἀντὶ τοῦ “ἀδίκων,” πῶς λέγει· “οἳ ῥα θεοῖσι πεποιθότες”; (3) εἰ δ’ εἴποι τις· “Καὶ πῶς ὁ Πολύφημός φησιν· οὐ <γὰρ> ‘Κύκλωπες Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο ἀλέγουσιν’;” (4) σκοπεῖτω τὸ πρόσωπον, ὅτι Πολυφήμου ἐστὶ τοῦ ὠμοφάγου καὶ θηριώδους. (5) καὶ Ἡσίοδος·

ἰχθύσι μὲν καὶ θηροῖ καὶ οἰωνοῖσι πετεινοῖς
ἔσθειν ἀλλήλους, ἐπεὶ οὐ δίκη ἐστὶν ἐν αὐτοῖς,
ἀνθρώποις δὲ δέδωκε δίκην.

(6) ὥστε Πολύφημον μόνον λέγει ὑπερήφανον καὶ ἄδικον, τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς πάντας Κύκλωπας εὖσεβεῖς καὶ δικαίους καὶ “πεποιθότας τοῖς θεοῖς,” ὅθεν καὶ ἀνῆκεν αὐτοῖς αὐτομάτως ἡ γῆ τοὺς καρπούς.

(3) εἴποι Schrader e Vd : εἴπη cod. | <γὰρ> ex Homero

(1) ὑπερφιάλων means having huge growth in the body—for the term is one of those of two meanings—and ἀθεμίστων means those who have made no use of laws: for he [the poet] says, “and each lays ordinances for his children and wives” [*Od.* 9.114–5]. (2) And if ἀθεμίστων were standing for ἀδίκων, how can he say “who, simply obedient to the gods” [*Od.* 9.107]? (3) If somebody should say, “And how does Polyphemos speak? Doesn’t he say, ‘Cyclopes are heedless of aegis-bearing Zeus?’” [*Od.* 9.275], (4) let this person inspect the persona, that it is that of Polyphemos, the raw-meat-eating and beastlike one. (5) Recall Hesiod [*WD* 277 ff.]:

It is for fish and wild beasts and feathered birds
to eat one another, since there is no justice among them,
but to men he gave justice.

(6) Thus he calls only Polyphemos arrogant and unjust, but all the other Cyclopes [he implies are] pious and just and “obedient to the gods” [*Od.* 9.107], wherefore also the earth produces its fruits for them spontaneously.

Notes

(1) τῶν μεγαλοφυῶν τῷ σώματι: The etymological calque for ὑπερ-φιάλων is clearer here than in t. 189A-1: ὑπερ- is equivalent to μεγαλο-, and -φιάλων is equivalent to -φυῶν, that is, φυή or φύσις, “nature.” (See DiBenedetto 1966:210.) Explicit reference to the body, τὸ σῶμα, is common with t. 189A-1: this presumably excludes the soul, where true depravity resides.

τῶν δισημῶν γὰρ ἡ λέξις: δισημος may come from the Alexandrian terminology of Aristarchus’ tradition, with the sense “ambiguous”: see Lehrs 1865:146 on Aristarchus’ concern with the ambiguity of ὑπερφιάλος overall (as we know it from Apollonius Sophista). Because of the term δισημος, Carnuth 1869 assigns this entire scholium to the fragments of Aristonicus of Alexandria, the scholar of the Augustan period who wrote *On the Critical Signs*, of the Aristarchan editions of Homer. δισημος is not attested in Aristarchus’ critical vocabulary, but Eustathius (e.g., *Od.* v.1 p. 326.14 on the

present passage, v.2 p. 188.19 on 19.28) clearly understands the meaning as “ambiguous.” Otherwise, the term δίσημος is used in music for measures of time, to designate two time units. A sense “compound,” or “made from two sense units,” would be consistent with this musical usage. In the context of this scholium, both senses are fitting, since the critic dissects the term’s ambiguous meaning by also dissecting the units of the compound. It is worth noting that the notion that the epithets carry two meanings simultaneously, positive for the Cyclopes and negative for Polyphemus, is not present in this passage until §6. In §1–5, the discussion proceeds as though the poet really means the positive meanings in verse 106.

(2) εἰ γὰρ ἦν “ἀθεμίστων” ἀντὶ τοῦ “ἀδίκων”: Being unjust and being impious are assumed to be the same. Compare t. 176, where the virtues piety and justice are joined.

(3) εἰ δ’ εἴποι τις: This is the imagined second strike of the accuser, possibly implying that the original discussion was in dialogue form. Verse 9.275 is supposed to contradict the positive interpretation of the epithets.

‘Κύκλωπες Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο ἀλέγουσιν’: This quotation is part of a consistent nexus among the scholia passages joined by Schrader. A compelling reason to attribute these passages to a single original (DiBenedetto 1966:210–11) is the fact that scholia on 9.106–7 (in the present ms. H and also in ms. Vd = t. 189A-3) cite verse 9.275, while scholia on 9.275 (in ms. Vd = t. 189C-3 and ms. M = t. 189C-4) cite 9.107, along with 9.411, and a scholium on 9.411 (in ms. T = t. 189D) cites both 9.106–7 and 9.257. In addition, the reference to 9.275 presents a contradiction against the positive interpretation of 9.106–7, and then reference to 9.411 presents a contradiction against the global interpretation of 9.275; this second contradiction is resolved through a solution similar to the one that clarified 9.106–7 in the first place. Such an unfolding discussion came probably not from a simple “Homeric problem” (such as t. 191) but from an extended text or dialogue on the epithets and virtue of Polyphemus and the Cyclopes, such as Antisthenes’ *Cyclops* (title 9.6) or *On the Use of Wine* or *On Drunkenness* or *On the Cyclops* (title 9.6).

(4) σκοπεῖτω τὸ πρόσωπον, ὅτι Πολυφήμευ ἐστὶ: Polyphemus’ words should be discounted, according to the defender. A “solution from the persona” (λύσις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου) is standard in Porphyry’s *Homeric Questions*. On Antisthenes’ use of the solution from the persona and on its apparent differences from Porphyry, see t. 189D.2 notes.

(5) καὶ Ἡσίοδος: Hesiod is cited (only in this version: the version in t. 189A-3 departs here) to back up the savagery of Polyphemus, to show that eating raw animals coincides with lacking justice. It is unclear whether Antisthenes would have cited Hesiod to support an argument about Homer or whether the parallel comes from a later critic. In support of Antisthenes’ authorship are both his apparent interest in a range of poets (see t. 41A title 8.1 notes)

and parallels in Socratic literature for interpreting Hesiod (Wolfsdorf 2008 [“Hesiod and Others”]; Boys-Stones and Haubold 2010). Against is the apparently special status of Homer in the book catalog.

(6) Πολύφημον μόνον λέγει ὑπερήφανον καὶ ἄδικον: ὑπερήφανον seems to stand for the first epithet, ὑπερφίαλος, and ἄδικον for the second, ἀθεμίστος. These are the bad senses, said by the poet in *Od.* 9.106 in reference to Polyphemos only. The epithet ὑπερφίαλος occurs nowhere else in book 9, and ἀθεμίστος occurs only in 9.189 and 9. 428, in the longer form ἀθεμίστιος, where it describes Polyphemos’ knowledge. See t. 189C-2.3, 189D.4.

τοὺς δὲ λοιποὺς πάντας Κύκλωπας εὐσεβεῖς καὶ δίκαιους καὶ “πεποιθότας τοῖς θεοῖς”: The second epithet, ἀθεμίστων, is paraphrased as δίκαιους, and apparently all three adjectives are paraphrases for the same epithet, whereas ὑπερφιάλους has been dropped. Since the unfolding discussion focuses increasingly on piety and impiety, it could be that the original text, too, was interested mainly in the second epithet.

ἀνῆκεν αὐτοῖς αὐτομάτως ἡ γῆ τοὺς καρπούς: The evidence of divine blessing of the Cyclopes is stated more in Hesiod’s terms (καρπὸν in *WD* 117, αὐτομάτη in *WD* 118) than in Homer’s.

189A-3. Scholium in *Odyssey* codex Vd f. 25b at *Odyssey* 9.106 (Schrader p. 87.11–88.8)

(1) “ὑπερφιάλων” μεγαλοφυῶν τῷ σώματι· (2) “ἀθεμίστων” δὲ τῶν νόμοις μὴ κεχρημένων· εἰ γὰρ ἦν ἀθεμίστων ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀδίκων, πῶς λέγει ἐκεῖνο· “οἱ ῥα θεοῖσι πεποιθότες”; (3) εἰ δ’ εἴποι τις· “Καὶ πῶς ὁ Πολύφημός φησὶ; οὐ γὰρ ‘Κύκλωπες Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο ἀλέγουσιν’;” (4) σκοπεῖτω τὸ πρόσωπον, ὅτι Πολυφήμου ἐστὶ τοῦ ὠμοφάγου καὶ θηριώδους.

(5) <“ὑπερφιάλων”> “ἀθεμίστων.” οὐ φασὶ συμφερόντως εἰρῆσθαι τοῦτο· τὸ γὰρ τοῖς ἀθεμίστοις, ὡς αὐτὸς λέγει, τοιαῦτα ἐκ θεῶν δεδωρῆσθαι ἀκούειν ἀσύμφορον. (6) λύεται δὲ τῇ λέξει· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερφίαλον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ κρείττονος τάττεται. οὐ γὰρ οἱ μνηστήρες καθ’ ἑαυτῶν ἔλεγον <ἄν>· “οὐκ ἀγαπᾷς ὃ ἐκκλος ὑπερφιάλοισι μεθ’ ἡμῖν δαίνυσαι”; (7) τὸ δὲ ἀθεμιστον τὸ μὴ κοινῶς τοῖς θεσμοῖς χρῆσθαι φασιν, ὡς τὸ

τοῖσι δ’ οὐτ’ ἀγοραὶ βουλευφόροι οὔτε θέμιστες,
ἀλλ’ οἱ γ’ ὑψηλῶν ὀρέων ναίουσι κάρηνα
ἐν σπέσσι γλαφυροῖσι, θεμιστεύει δὲ ἕκαστος
παίδων ἢ δ’ ἀλόχων·

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ χρῶνται τῇ θέμιδι δηλοῖ, πλὴν οὐ κοινῇ.

(5) <“ὑπερφιάλων”> add. Schrader (6) <ἄν>· add. Schrader (7)
κοινῇ Schrader : κοινή cod.

(1) ὑπερφιάλων means their huge growth in the body, (2) and ἄθεμιστων means those who have made no use of laws. For if ἄθεμιστων were standing for ἀδίκων, how can he say this: “who, simply trusting the gods” [*Od.* 9.107]? (3) If somebody should say, “And how does Polyphemus speak? Doesn’t he say, ‘Cyclopes are heedless of aegis-bearing Zeus?’” [*Od.* 9.275], (4) let this person inspect the persona, that it is that of Polyphemus, the raw-meat-eating and beastlike one.

(5) ὑπερφιάλων and ἄθεμιστων. They [the accusing critics] say that this is not said expediently: for to hear that such things have been given to lawless people from the gods, as he says himself, is inexpedient. (6) And it is solved by the terminology: For ὑπερφιάλων is assigned also in reference to the great and more powerful: for the suitors would not have said against themselves: “Aren’t you well pleased that you feast in quiet among us the great ones” [*Od.* 21.289]? (7) And they [the defending critics] say that ἄθεμιστον means not to use the ordinances in common, as in this passage:

And for them there are no marketplaces supporting meetings, or
ordinances,
but they inhabit the peaks of the highest mountains
in hollow caves, and each lays ordinances
for his children and his wives.

[*Od.* 9.112–15]

It shows that they do use ordinance, just not in common.

Notes

(1–4) The beginning of the passage is almost identical to t. 189A-2.

(5) οὗ φασι συμφερόντως εἰρῆσθαι τοῦτο: The scholium in ms. Vd adds a second version of the simple problem and solution of the epithets, duplicating §1–4 but without the addition of a secondary contradiction, as in t. 189A-2.3 and 189A-3.3. (This could imply that §1–4 have a different source.) An Alexandrian transmission is likely. οὗ φασι indicates a broad traditional discussion, not just a debate between two parties. (The verb is repeated in §7, for the defenders.) The accusation, that the poet’s words are not said “expediently,” is not in Aristotle’s list of accusations at *Poet.* 1621b22–25. It occurs several times in Porphyry, where it seems to indicate impiety by the poet (e.g., *Il.* 6.234, 20.67–75), and it can be defended “from the diction,” which includes “allegory” in the case of *Il.* 20.67–75, the problem famously solved by Theagenes of Rhegium. The present solution from the diction identifies various meanings within Homer and then accepts the appropriate

meaning for the passage at hand and does not resemble the method of Theagenes.

(6) λύεται δὲ τῇ λέξει: A “solution from the diction” (λύσις ἐκ τῆς λέξεως) is a technical strategy of the Homeric defenders, used here in place of a “solution from the persona,” as in t. 189A-2.4 (and §4 here). The problem being solved is, however, also different from the problem in t. 189A-2.4. Here the original problem, arising from *Od.* 9.106–7, is addressed, whereas a second problem, a new contradiction, has arisen in t. 189A-2.4, from the solution proposed to the first problem. On the two types of solution, their Peripatetic background, and their relationship in this interpretation of the Cyclopes, see t. 189D.2–3 notes.

τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπερφιάλον καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ μεγάλου καὶ κρείττονος τάττεται: The positive sense of the epithet in *Od.* 21.289 was defended by Aristarchus (see Russo et al. 1992:179), and this version of the solution could come from his tradition. But t. 188 shows interest in the quality of the suitors, and possibly this version also descends from Antisthenes.

(7) τὸ δὲ ἀθέμιστον τὸ μὴ κοινῶς τοῖς θεσμοῖς χρῆσθαι φασιν: The wording here is closer to that of Heliodorus in Apollonius Sophista 12.22 (οὐ κοινοῖς χρῶνται νόμοις) than in any other fragment, although it is not exactly the same. The quotation of *Od.* 9.114–15 is shared with t. 189A-1.3, here in a longer form.

189A-4. Scholium in *Odyssey* codex M p. 104a at *Odyssey* 9.106 (Schrader p. 86 notes)

Κυκλώπων δ' ἐς γαῖαν ὑπερφιάλων ἀθεμιστων

δίκαιοι οὗτοι πλὴν τοῦ Πολυφήμου. ὅθεν τὸ μὲν ὑπερφιάλων
νῦν μεγάλων, τὸ δὲ ἀθέμιστων μὴ ἐχόντων χρεῖαν νόμων διὰ τὸ
“θεμιστεύειν ἕκαστον παίδων ἢ δ' ἀλόχων.” πῶς δὲ ἡδίκουν τοὺς
Φαίακας καὶ ἐλύπουν δίκαιοι ὄντες; διὰ τὸ ἀνόμοιον τῆς πολιτείας.

“And into the land of the Cyclopes, outrageous and lawless”

[*Od.* 9.106]

They were just except for Polyphemus. For this reason [we should understand] the term ὑπερφιάλων here as “large” and the term ἀθέμιστων as “not having the need of laws,” because “each lays ordinances for his children and wives” [*Od.* 9.114–15]. But how did they act unjustly against the Phaeacians and cause them grief, if they were just? Because of the dissimilarity of their constitution.

Notes

δίκαιοι οὔτοι: The Cyclopes are positively just, as in t. 189A-2.6.

μὴ ἔχοντων χρείαν νόμων: In this compressed epitome of the discussion, the “laws” are not common laws or written laws, but the Cyclopes have no need (or use) of laws whatsoever.

πῶς δὲ ἡδίκουν τοὺς Φαίακας καὶ ἐλύπουν δίκαιοι ὄντες: This is a secondary problem, arising from the solution to the first, the same one that appears in t. 189A-1.5 (through reference to *Od.* 6.6).

διὰ τὸ ἀνόμοιον τῆς πολιτείας: The second charge is answered by the defender differently from in t. 189A-1.5. Eustathius (p. 326.3–5 Stallbaum) seems to preserve a fuller version of this explanation, that the two societies were simply different: εἰ δὲ δίκαιοι ὄντες ἐλύπουν τοὺς Φαίακας ἦν ὅτε γειτῶντας ὡς προγέγραπται, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο διὰ τὸ τῆς πολιτείας φασὶν ἀνόμοιον ἐγίνετο. Φαίακες μὲν γὰρ ἐκοινώνουν ἀλλήλοις εἴτε ἀριστοκρατίας νόμῳ εἴτε καὶ δημοκρατικῶς. οἱ δὲ Κύκλωπες οὐ τοιοῦτοι (And if while being just there was a time when they [the Cyclopes] harmed the Phaeacians who were their neighbors, as it is earlier written, they [the defending critics] say this happened because of the dissimilarity of their constitution. For the Phaeacians had community with each other, whether by the norm of aristocracy or whether even democratically, but the Cyclopes were not of this sort). The categories of aristocracy and democracy, which might not be fully distinguishable for the Phaeacians, fit with the Peripatetics’ categories of constitution (Arist. *Pol.* 1289a26–38). See t. 68.

189B-1. Scholium in *Odyssey* codex Vd f. 26a at *Odyssey* 9.127 (Schrader p. 88.9–17)

“οὐδ’ ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν”

(1) ἀδικίαν καὶ παρανομίαν ἐγκαλεῖ τοῖς Κύκλωψιν ἐντεῦθεν ὁ ποιητής, ὡς μὴ προνοούμενοις ἀλλήλων. (2) ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐμφαίνει, ὅτι διὰ τὴν ἄγαν δικαιοσύνην καὶ τὸ μὴ πλεονεκτεῖσθαι παρ’ ἀλλήλων ἢ ἄλλως ἀδικεῖσθαι οὐδὲ ἐδέοντο τῆς ἀλλήλων προνοίας. ὅτι δὲ οὕτως ἔχει δηλὸν ἐκ τοῦ Πολυφήμου· τούτου γὰρ κράξαντος συνήλθον ἅπαντες. (3) τινὲς δὲ τὸ “οὐκ ἀλέγουσιν ἀλλήλων” οὕτω φασίν· οὐ φροντίζουσιν ἀλλήλων ὅσον ἔνεκεν ὑποταγῆς· ἕκαστος γὰρ αὐτοκράτωρ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχ ὑποτάσσεται τῷ ἐτέρῳ.

“Nor do they care about each other.”

[*Od.* 9.115]

(1) Here the poet accuses the Cyclopes of injustice and lawlessness, since they do not have forethought for each other. (2) But rather it shows that through excessive justice and not meddling with each other or otherwise being unjust they also did not need forethought of each other. That matters are so is clear from Polyphemus: for when he screamed, they all came together [*Od.* 9.401]. (3) But some [defending critics] say that the phrase “they do not care about each other” [*Od.* 9. 127] means this: they do not think about each other insofar as it concerns subordination: for each is master of himself and is not subordinated to another.

Notes

(1) ἀδικίαν καὶ παρανομίαν ἐγκαλεῖ . . . ὁ ποιητής: This is the adversary’s charge, that Homer accuses the Cyclopes. The idea that the poet accuses his characters, rather than that the critics accuse the poet, is shared with t. 187; compare also t. 54.13. This could be a pre-Aristotelian approach. Technically Odysseus, not Homer, is the speaker of *Od.* 9.127, but perhaps this is consistent with reference to “the poet.” See also t. 189C-2.2, 189C-3, 189D.3.

(2) ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐμφαίνει, ὅτι διὰ τὴν ἄγαν δικαιοσύνην: This is the defense, that the Cyclopes have not only justice but excessive justice.

τὸ μὴ πλεονεκτεῖσθαι παρ’ ἀλλήλων ἢ ἄλλως ἀδικεῖσθαι: Seeking to “get more” through social competition, or greed, is an Athenian vice, according to social critics of the fifth and fourth centuries. See, e.g., *Pl. Rep.* 1 349b8–350c2; Balot 2001.

οὐδὲ ἐδέοντο τῆς ἀλλήλων προνοίας: Plato’s interlocutors in *Rep.* 2 369b7–373d2 design their imaginary city from the mutual needs of the citizens, because no one is self-sufficient, or αὐτάρκης. The ideal exemplified by the Cyclopes is the opposite.

(3) τινὲς δὲ . . . φασίν: As in t. 189A-3.5–7, this is a sign of long transmission of the discussion.

ὅσον ἔνεκεν ὑποταγῆς: The noun ὑποταγή in the sense of political subordination is not attested before the Augustan period (Dionysius of Halicarnassus 3.66), although Polybius uses the participle οἱ ὑποταττόμενοι (3.13.8 and elsewhere) for political subjects. Epicurus and the Stoics seem to have used the participle as a technical term for logical subordination (Diog. Laert. 10.37 in Epicurus’ *Letter to Herodotus*; Stob. 2.60.9 on the Stoics’ divisions of virtue). In particular, the term is not used by Plato, Isocrates, Xenophon, or Aristotle. Either this is language from Hellenistic discussion, or Antisthenes was innovating in his political vocabulary, though the background does not survive. The cognate ὑποτάσσεται is used in the next clause, as though to explain the expression ὅσον ἔνεκεν ὑποταγῆς.

ἕκαστος γὰρ αὐτοκράτωρ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχ ὑποτάσσεται τῷ ἑτέρῳ: αὐτοκράτωρ is a plausible term for Antisthenes to have used: it is used seven times by Plato in genuine works, four times by Isocrates, seven times by Xenophon, and nine times in Aristotle's corpus (in the *Rhetoric*, the *Politics*, and the *Constitution of the Athenians*).

189B-2. Scholia in *Odyssey* codices H p. 52b and M at *Odyssey* 9.115 (Schrader p. 88 notes)

“οὐδ’ ἀλλήλων ἀλέγουσιν”

οὐ φροντίζουσιν ἀλλήλων ὅσον ἔνεκεν ὑποταγῆς. ἕκαστος γὰρ αὐτοκράτωρ ἐστὶ καὶ οὐχ ὑποτάσσεται τῷ ἑτέρῳ. ἐπεὶ τοι τοῦ Πολυφήμου κρᾶζοντος ἦλθον πάντες.

ὅσον H : om. M | ἔνεκεν H : εἵνεκα M | ἐπεὶ . . . πάντες om. M

“Nor do they care about each other.”

[*Od.* 9.115]

They do not think about each other insofar as it concerns subordination. For each is master of himself and is not subordinated to another. Since indeed when Polyphemus was screaming, they all came.

189C-1. Scholium in *Odyssey* codex T p. 130 at *Odyssey* 9.107 (Schrader p. 88.18–23)

. . . μόνος γὰρ ἄδικος ὁ Πολύφημος· “ἀπάνευθεν γὰρ ὦν ἀθεμίστια ἦδη” καὶ “οἶος ποιμαίνεσκε,” τῶν δ’ ἄλλων “ἕκαστος θεμιστεύει παίδων ἢ δ’ ἀλόχων”· ὅθεν οὐδὲ τὸ σπήλαιον ἀνοίξαντες πολυπραγμονοῦσι, τί πέπονθεν. καὶ μαντείαις χρῶνται καὶ θεοὺς νομίζουσι· “ἀλλὰ σύ γ’ εὔχεο πατρὶ Ποσειδάωνι ἄνακτι.”

verba praeaeunta non intelligenda om. Schrader | ὅθεν οὐδὲ

Schrader : ὅθεν εἰ δὲ cod.

. . . For only Polyphemus is unjust: for “being apart, he knew unlawful things” [*Od.* 9.189] and “he would pasture his flocks alone” [*Od.* 9.188], but of the others, “each lays ordinances for his children and wives” [*Od.* 9.114–15]. For this reason they do not even open the door of the cave and meddle into what happened to him. And they use prophecy [*Od.* 9.510], and they believe in the gods: “But you should pray to your father, the lord Poseidon” [*Od.* 9.412].

Notes

μόνος γὰρ ἄδικος ὁ Πολύφημος: The critic says nearly the same in t. 189A-2.6. The citation of 9.188–89 is common to t. 189C-2 and 189D, where it is explained more fully.

ὅθεν οὐδὲ τὸ σπήλαιον ἀνοίξαντες πολυπραγμονοῦσι: The vice of meddling, πολυπραγμοσύνη, is associated with greed, πλεονεξία, in Athenian political discourse. See, e.g., *Pl. Rep.* 4 433a8–b1 (Socrates speaking): Καὶ μὴν ὅτι γε τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πολυπραγμονεῖν δικαιοσύνη ἐστί, καὶ τοῦτο ἄλλων τε πολλῶν ἀκηκόαμεν καὶ αὐτοὶ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν (And furthermore, that justice is doing one's own things and not meddling, also this we have heard from many others and ourselves have said many times). In t. 189B-1–2, the Cyclopes' response to Polyphemos is said to be the beginning of their community: here the critic refers to their failure really to help, in *Od.* 9.401–13.

εὖχεο πατρὶ Ποσειδάωνι ἄνακτι: See t. 190. This might be a clue that the comments in t. 189 and 190 came from the same original discussion.

189C-2. Scholium in *Odyssey* codex Vd f. 28a at *Odyssey* 9.275 (Schrader p. 88–89 notes)

“οὐ γὰρ Κύκλωπες Διὸς αἰγιόχου ἀλέγουσιν”

(1) ἀσεβῆς ὢν ὁ Πολύφημος διαβάλλει καὶ τοὺς λοιπούς. ὅτι γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐκ ἦσαν ἄθεοι, παρίστησιν ὁ ποιητὴς λέγων· “νοῦσον δ’ οὐ πως ἔστι Διὸς μεγάλου ἀλέασθαι.” (2) τὸ μέντοι μὴ ὁμογνώμονα εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις τὸν Πολύφημον παρίσταται ἀπὸ τοῦ τὸν ποιητὴν λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ· “ἐποίμεινεν ἀπόπροθεν οὐδὲ μετ’ ἄλλους πωλεῖτο, ἀλλ’ ἀπάνευθεν ἑὼν ἀθεμίστια ἦδει.” (3) οὕτως οὖν περὶ θεῶν ἀθεμίστια εἰδὼς ἠγεῖτο καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους Κύκλωπας τὰ αὐτὰ δοξάζειν αὐτῷ. τοὺς δὲ συμβεβήκει βελτίους ἐκείνου τὴν φύσιν ὄντας μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ γινώσκειν ἐκείνῳ· περὶ γὰρ τούτων ἔφη· “οἳ ῥα θεοῖσι πεποιθότες ἀθανάτοισιν.”

(2) λέγειν Schrader : λέγει cod. | ἀθεμίστια ἦδει *Od.* 9.189:
ἀθεμίστια ἦδει cod.

“For the Cyclopes do not care about Zeus the aegis bearer.”

[*Od.* 9.275]

(1) Being impious, Polyphemos slanders also the rest. For that they were not atheists, the poet shows when he says, “It is in no way possible to avoid a sickness from great Zeus” [*Od.* 9.411]. (2) Moreover, that Polyphemos is not like-minded with the others is shown by the fact that the poet says about him: “He would tend his flocks in isolation,

nor did he come and go among the others, but being far away he knew unlawful things" [*Od.* 9.188–89]. (3) So knowing in this way unlawful things about the gods, he thought that also the other Cyclopes believed the same things as himself. But it has turned out that they, being better than he in their nature, do not recognize the same things as he does: for about them he [the poet] says, "who, having trusted the immortal gods . . ." [*Od.* 9.107].

Notes

(2) *μη ὁμογνώμονα εἶναι τοῖς ἄλλοις*: The same phrase is used in t. 189D.4, and the same Homeric quotation follows.

(3) *οὕτως οὖν . . . ἀθεμίστια εἰδὼς . . . ἡγεῖτο . . . τοὺς ἄλλους τὰ αὐτὰ δοξάζειν αὐτῷ*: The adverbial *οὕτως* is oddly joined with *εἰδὼς*; by philosophical standards, knowing should not occur in certain ways; rather, whether or not there is knowledge should be an all-or-nothing matter. Moreover, in this passage, the epistemological verbs *εἰδὼς* (knowing) and *δοξάζειν* (to believe) have almost the same value, both indicating subjectively authorized certainty. The critic seems to accept the Homeric sense of the verb "know," which is subjective. The difference between the two verbs is related to the higher degree of certainty in which the subject holds his own beliefs versus the beliefs of others. Within his own mind, Polyphemus "knows," but other minds, he can expect, will "believe." (Admittedly, these beliefs of others would not seem false from Polyphemus' point of view, since they are like his own: the difference in vocabulary might have been in the voice of the critic, originally.) The verb *ἡγεῖτο* is also epistemological, on a second level. This is Polyphemus' attitude about the beliefs of others, which, as he may be aware, he is unable to "know." The vocabulary here might be inconsequential, but the same three terms are present in the speeches of Ajax and Odysseus (t. 53–54), where the same distinctions seem to be operating.

τοὺς δὲ συμβεβήκει βελτίους ἐκείνου τὴν φύσιν ὄντας: Parallel language is in t. 189D.5. It is not said what *φύσις* is or why the other Cyclopes are better than Polyphemus in *φύσις*. Since their *φύσις* of body is implied in t. 189A-2.1 to be irrelevant to their value, here they probably have *φύσις* of mind or soul that includes piety. The term *φύσις* might imply that this is an innate quality, but we do not know whether Antisthenes thought *φύσις* can be changed or developed through education or experience (see t. 41A discussion of the third *tomos*). The idea that the other Cyclopes "turned out" not to believe the same as Polyphemus did, being better in nature than he, might imply that their nature was not inborn but developed through their experience. Alternatively, they may have "turned out" to believe different things within the poem, through its developing exposition between verses 275 and 411.

189C-3. Scholium in *Odyssey* codex M f. 107b at *Odyssey* 9.275 (Schrader p. 88–90 notes)

“οὐ γὰρ Κύκλωπες Διὸς αἰγιόχου ἀλέγουσιν”

ἀσεβῆς ὢν ὁ Πολύφημος διαβάλλει καὶ τοὺς λοιπούς, ὅτι γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι οὐκ ἦσαν ἄθεοι, παρίστησιν ὁ ποιητὴς λέγων· “νοῦσον δ’ οὐ πως ἔστι Διὸς μεγάλου ἀλέασθαι.” αὐτὸς δὲ διὰ τοῦ ἑαυτοῦ λόγου πάντας ποιεῖ ἀσεβεῖς, λέγων· “οὐ γὰρ Κύκλωπες Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο ἀλέγουσιν.”

“For the Cyclopes do not care about Zeus the aegis bearer.”

[*Od.* 9.275]

Being impious, Polyphemus slanders also the rest. For that they were not atheists, the poet shows when he says, “It is in no way possible to avoid a sickness from great Zeus” [*Od.* 9.411]. He himself [Polyphemus] through his own account makes them all impious, when he says, “for the Cyclopes do not care about Zeus the aegis bearer” [*Od.* 9.275].

189C-4. Scholium in *Odyssey* codex H f. 54b at *Odyssey* 9.275 p. 88 notes (Schrader)

“οὐ γὰρ Κύκλωπες Διὸς αἰγιόχου ἀλέγουσιν”

τὸ ἴδιον ἀμάρτημα ἑαυτοῦ ὁ Πολύφημος κοινὸν ποιεῖται· ὅτι γὰρ οἱ ἄλλοι Κύκλωπες οὐκ ἦσαν ἄθεοι, φησί· “νοῦσον δ’ οὐ πως ἔστι Διὸς μεγάλου ἀλέασθαι.”

“For the Cyclopes do not care about Zeus the aegis bearer”

[*Od.* 9.275]

Polyphemus makes his own particular error a common one. For [in support of the fact] that the other Cyclopes were not atheists, he [the poet] says, “It is in no way possible to avoid a sickness from great Zeus” [*Od.* 9.411].

189D. Scholium in *Odyssey* codex T p. 137 at *Odyssey* 9.411 (Schrader p. 88.24–89.19)

“νοῦσόν γ’ οὐ πως ἔστι Διὸς μεγάλου ἀλέασθαι,
ἀλλὰ σύ γ’ εὖχεο πατρὶ Ποσειδάωνι ἄνακτι.”

(1) πῶς τοῦ Κύκλωπος προειπόντος· “οὐ γὰρ Κύκλωπες Διὸς αἰγιόχοιο ἀλέγουσιν, οὐδὲ θεῶν μακάρων, ἐπεὶ πολὺ φέρτεροι εἰμεν,” πάλιν

ἐποίησε τοὺς Κύκλωπας λέγοντας· “νοῦσον δ’ οὐ πως ἔστι Διὸς
μεγάλου ἀλέασθαι, ἀλλὰ σύ γ’ εὖχεο πατρὶ Ποσειδάωνι”; ἐναντίωμα
γὰρ φαίνεται, μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγοντος· τὸ γὰρ μὴ
προσέχειν τοῖς θεοῖς κρειττόνων ἂν εἴη εἰκότως, τὸ δὲ προσέχειν ἄλιν
ἡττόνων. (2) λύεται δὲ ἄλιν ἐκ προσώπου τῶν λεγόντων. ὅτι μὲν γὰρ
οἱ Κύκλωπες εἰσι πολλοὶ φέρτεροι τῶν θεῶν, ὁ Πολύφημος εἴρηκε πρὸς
τὸν Ὀδυσσεά, ὅτι δὲ οἱ Κύκλωπες τῶν θεῶν εἰσι κρείττους, τῶν ἄλλων
οὐδεὶς εἴρηκεν. (3) εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁ ποιητὴς ταῦτα εἴρηκεν ἢ <ὁ> αὐτὸς
παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ, ἐναντία ἦν. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος ἐστὶν ὁ λέγων,
σκεπτέον τίνι περιέθηκε τοὺς ἀφρονεστέρους λόγους. (4) δηλὸν δὲ ὅτι
τῷ Πολυφῆμῳ, ὃς οὐχ ὁμογνώμων ἦν τοῖς ἄλλοις οὐδ’ ἐν τῇ περὶ θεῶν
δόξῃ ὠμολόγει· “ἐποιαίνετο γάρ,” ὥς φησιν ὁ ποιητὴς, “ἀπόπροθεν
οὐδὲ μετ’ ἄλλους πωλεῖτο, ἀλλ’ ἀπάνευθεν ἐὼν ἀθεμίστια ἦδει.” (5)
αὐτὸς οὖν καὶ περὶ θεῶν τὰ ἀθεμίστια εἰδὼς ἡγεῖτο καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους
Κύκλωπας τὰ αὐτὰ δοξάζειν αὐτῷ, τοὺς <δὲ> συμβεβήκει βελτίους
ἐκείνου τὴν φύσιν ὄντας μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ γινώσκειν ἐκείνῳ· περὶ γὰρ
τούτων ἔφη ὁ ποιητὴς· “οἱ ῥα θεοῖσι πεποιθότες ἀθανάτοισιν.”

(1) εἰκότως, τὸ δὲ προσέχειν Preller : εἰκότως τότε προσέχειν cod.

(2) τῶν ἄλλων οὐδεὶς Schrader : καὶ ἄλλων οὐδεὶς cod. (3) <ὁ> add.

Schrader (4) ὁμογνώμων prima littera e correctione (5) ἀθεμίστια
lectio incerta | <δὲ> add. Schrader e schol. Vd (189C-1)

“It is in no way possible to avoid a sickness from great Zeus,
but you should pray to your father, the lord Poseidon.”

[*Od.* 9.411-12]

(1) How, when the Cyclops has previously said, “For Cyclopes do not pay heed to Zeus the aegis-bearer, nor the blessed gods, since we are much more powerful” [*Od.* 9.275-76], did the poet later portray the Cyclopes saying: “It is not in any way possible to avoid a disease from the great Zeus, but you, pray to your father, the lord Poseidon” [*Od.* 9.411-12]? For it seems to be a contradiction, when he is not saying the same things about the same things: for not to attend to the gods would likely be characteristic of greater beings, whereas to attend to them would likely be characteristic of lesser beings. (2) The problem is again solved from the persona of the speakers. That the Cyclopes are much greater than the gods, Polyphemus has said to Odysseus, but that the Cyclopes are more powerful than the gods, nobody of the others has said. (3) If, then, the poet said these things, or the same [speaker] in the poet, they would be opposites. But since the one speaking is different in each case, it must be considered to whom he assigned the rather senseless words. (4) And it is clear that he assigned them to

Polyphemus, who was not of like mind with the others, nor was he in agreement in his belief about the gods: for “he tended his flocks,” as the poet says, “in isolation, nor did he come and go among the others, but being far away he knew unlawful things” [*Od.* 9.188–89]. (5) So, recognizing himself the lawless things even about the gods, he thought that also the other Cyclopes believed the same things as he, but it turned out that they, being better in their nature than he, did not recognize the same things as he: for about them the poet said: “who, having trusted the immortal gods . . .” [*Od.* 9.107].

Notes

(1) ἐναντίωμα γὰρ φαίνεται, μὴ τὰ αὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν λέγοντος: The accuser presents the technical problem of contradiction. “Contradiction” is already the name of a critic’s problem in Aristotle’s *Poetics* (1461a31–34, 1461b23), where the resolution seems to be lexical: the critic should analyze “in how many ways this <word> might be meaningful in the statement” (ποσάχως ἂν σημῆναι τοῦτο ἐν τῷ εἰρημένῳ, 1461b32–33). This contradiction is the third in the discussion as preserved: the original problem in t. 189A-1 (and 189A-2–3) is a contradiction (not named as such) within 9.106–7: the answer to the first contradiction generates a second, between 9.107 and 9.275–76, raised and answered in t. 189A-2.3–4; that answer generates a third, between 9.275–76 and 9.411–12, raised and answered here. The topic of all three contradictions is the same, the piety of the Cyclopes, but different verses, giving the statements of different speakers, constitute the three instances.

τὸ γὰρ μὴ προσέχειν τοῖς θεοῖς κρείττονων . . . τὸ δὲ προσέχειν πάλιν ἥττονων: The contradiction is phrased precisely as mutually contradictory statements in a mathematical sense: the Cyclopes must claim to be either greater or lesser than the gods, and there is no other possibility.

(2) λύεται δὲ πάλιν ἐκ προσώπου τῶν λεγόντων: This is a second application of the solution from the persona, as the adverb πάλιν shows. It was used in t. 189A-2 to solve the second contradiction. The “solution from the persona” is not named as such in ch. 25 of Aristotle’s *Poetics*, but a related tactic seems to be implied twice: at 1461a4–9, the identity of the speaking character is part of a larger framework to be considered before applying moral evaluation to speeches or deeds; at 1461b15–18, apparent contradictions can be resolved by distinguishing various factors—the reference and the manner of the things said—so that the poet does not speak against what he says himself. Although the text at 1461b18 may be corrupt, with a sentence perhaps missing (see Lucas 1968:249), it seems unlikely that Aristotle would have resolved an apparent contradiction by differentiating the speakers: throughout ch. 25, it

is always the poet who speaks, and he has a consistent message, which can be found. Porphyry, for his part, reports that the solution from the persona is a kind of *lusi* “adduced by many” for the problem at hand (see §3 note); in his own voice, however, he dismisses this technique and instead distinguishes different occasions for the activity (MacPhail 2011:118), giving the text a consistent meaning as though it were said in one voice. Antisthenes seems to side with the many critics Porphyry dismisses, using the solution from the persona as a final solution for the problem of contradiction. He reads the *Odyssey* as though it were a dramatic dialogue.

ὅτι μὲν γὰρ οἱ Κύκλωπες εἰσι πολὺν φέρτεροι τῶν θεῶν . . . ὅτι δὲ οἱ Κύκλωπες τῶν θεῶν εἰσι κρείττους: In the discussion as preserved, it is clear that πολὺν φέρτεροι τῶν θεῶν and τῶν θεῶν . . . κρείττους are understood synonymously. It is plausible that a fuller version of the discussion investigated the difference, or equivalence, between being “greater” and being “more powerful” than the gods.

ὁ Πολύφημος εἶρηκε πρὸς τὸν Ὀδυσσεά: The person addressed, not only the person speaking, can explain a partial or skewed (i.e., intentionally false) element in what the speaker says. Aristotle would presumably agree with this (see t. 188A-1), although the person addressed is not a dimension introduced to resolve any problem in *Poet.* 25.

(3) **εἰ μὲν οὖν ὁ ποιητὴς ταῦτα εἶρηκεν ἢ <ὁ> αὐτὸς παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ, ἐναντία ᾗν:** This is the same principle Porphyry explains quite fully when he addresses the problem in *Il.* 6.275, an apparent contradiction over the soldier’s proper use of wine (MacPhail 2011:116–19): οὐδὲν δὲ θαυμαστὸν εἰ παρὰ τῷ ποιητῇ ἐναντία λέγεται ὑπὸ διαφόρων φωνῶν. ὅσα μὲν γὰρ ἔφη αὐτὸς ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ ἐξ ἰδίου προσώπου, ταῦτα δεῖ ἀκόλουθα εἶναι καὶ μὴ ἐναντία ἀλλήλοις· ὅσα δὲ προσώποις περιτίθῃσιν, οὐκ αὐτοῦ εἰσιν ἀλλὰ τῶν λεγόντων νοεῖται, ὅθεν καὶ ἐπιδέχεται πολλάκις διαφωνίαν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τούτοις. (And it is nothing remarkable if opposite things are said in the poet by different voices. But whatever he himself said from himself, from his special persona, these must be consistent and not in opposition to each other. For this reason [the poem] admits disagreement very often, as also in these lines.) Porphyry’s careful explanation, as though this were an unfamiliar idea, is consistent with his statement soon below that a different approach is better: ἄμεινον δὲ ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο λέγειν καὶ δεικνύειν, ἐκάτερον τῶν εἰρημένων ἔχεσθαι λόγου καὶ μὴ εἶναι ἐναντία τὰ περὶ τοῦ οἴνου λεγόμενα, ἐὰν σκοπῇ τις, ὅτι ἐπὶ παντὸς πράγματος ὁ καιρὸς καὶ τὸ μέτρον πολὺ διαλλάττει (But a better approach is to say and demonstrate this, that each of the statements depends on a reason, and the things said about the wine are not opposed, if one considers that for each thing the occasion and the measure vary greatly). This implies that the phrasing in the present passage could be Porphyry’s, but the application of the

principle to solve the problem is likely to be from Antisthenes. The distinction between the poet and “the same one in the poet” might refer explicitly to the fact that the character Odysseus is narrating *Od.* 9.

ἐπεὶ δὲ ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος ἐστὶν ὁ λέγων, σκεπτέον τίνι περιέθηκε τοὺς ἀφρονεστέρους λόγους: The phrasing could come from Antisthenes: the odd phrase ἄλλος καὶ ἄλλος is attested once in the Aristotelian *Problems* (888b24); once each in Plutarch, Galen, Herodian, and Aelius Aristides; three times in Themistius; and otherwise only in later writers. (It has been argued to me in private correspondence that Schrader did not punctuate correctly and that there should be a comma after the first ἄλλος and a full stop after ὁ λέγων. The translation would then be “But since it was another [who spoke these words], also it is another who speaks. One must consider to whom he [the poet] assigned the rather senseless words.” This must be incorrect, for several reasons. Foremost, the first two clauses then say nothing. In the passage (§1), there are two parties whose speeches have been considered, and the critic has just asked whether these speakers are the same. They are not: they are different, not jointly from the poet and from “the same speaker in the poet,” but from each other.) In this case of the third contradiction, the two speakers are Polyphemus (in 9.275–76) and the other Cyclopes (in 9.411–12). If one assumes this explanation should cover also the second contradiction (in t. 189A-2), one can distinguish the poet (in 106–7) from Polyphemus (in 9.275–76). Indeed “the poet” seems to be put on a level with his characters by the principle stated in the previous note. But when one goes back to the original contradiction (in t. 189A-1), there is no such distinction to be made, for the speaker of both conflicting verses, 9.106–7, is the poet. Therefore, the solution from the persona does not resolve that contradiction, and indeed the solution, when it was labeled (in t. 189A-3.6), was called a solution from the diction. But the solution from the diction as applied in t. 189A-3.6–7 is not the same solution Antisthenes uses in t. 189A-1.4. In t. 189A-3.6–7, the critics cite Homeric parallels that support the positive sense for each epithet, and they designate these as the sense active in 9.106–7. This is consistent with Aristotle’s recommendation in *Poet.* 1461a32–35, that the critic should consider “in how many ways [the word] could have meaning in the statement, like this or like this, in order that he might best adopt [one]” (ὥς μάλιστ’ ἂν τις ὑπολάβοι): the fact that the meaning is one is not said here, but when solutions from the diction are illustrated in *Poet.* 1461a9–21, the solution is always one. Antisthenes, by contrast, claims that Homer’s epithets have two senses each and implies that both are active simultaneously in 9.106–7: the first epithet does not occur elsewhere in book 9 (see t. 189A-1.6). (His basis for claiming these senses is presumably the analysis of compounds and etymology we see in t. 189A-1.1–3 and 189A-2.1, as well as in t. 187.4–5,

not the mere citation of parallel passages we see in t. 189A-3.6–7. That the negative senses are not supported through analysis and etymology is either an accident of transmission or an omission of the obvious, since the accuser already sees the negative senses.) Although Antisthenes does not split Homer's persona in 9.106 into two voices, there is a sense in which the compound statement that Homer makes there is like the two voices that are resolved in the other contradictions of the discussion.

σκεπτέον τίνι περιέθηκε τοὺς ἀφρονεστέρους λόγους: This language is close to t. 189A-2.4.

(4) **οὐχ ὁμογνώμων ἦν τοῖς ἄλλοις:** See the parallel in t. 189C-2.2. This is the exegete's explanation for Polyphemus' impiety: he is not like-minded with the others in general, and so he disagrees in this case also.

ἀπάνευθεν ἐὼν ἀθεμίστια ᾔδει: Living apart is apparently Homer's explanation for Polyphemus' "knowledge" of unjust things. The term ἀθεμίστια is nearly the same as the Cyclopes' second epithet ἀθεμίστων, and at least one manuscript (Vd = t. 189C-2) transmits a spelling here that agrees with the epithet rather than with Homer's text: Schrader reports the reading here in T as "uncertain."

(5) **καὶ περὶ θεῶν τὰ ἀθεμίστια εἰδώς:** Homer does not say that the ἀθεμίστια are theological: this is the critic's conclusion. It is unclear whether Antisthenes would endorse the implication that knowledge of the divine is caused by community. His own lifestyle (t. 82) seems to renounce community, and he also seems to renounce conventional religion (t. 178, 182), but not theology (t. 179, 180). Either he thought the correct religious community was something like the Socratic circle, or he did not endorse Homer's explanation of Polyphemus but had another, such as the explanation from φύσις that follows. On the three epistemological attitudes in this sentence (εἰδώς, ἡγεῖτο, δοξάζειν), see t. 189C-2.3.

βελτίους ἐκείνου τὴν φύσιν ὄντας: See comment on t. 189C-2.3.

190. Scholium at *Odyssey* 9.525 (Schrader p. 94.26–95.4; compare Dindorf v.2 p. 440.26–441.6)

= 54 DC

“ὥς οὐκ ὀφθαλμόν γ' ἰήσεται οὐδ' Ἐνοσίχθων.”

διὰ τί ὁ Ὀδυσσεὺς πρὸς τὸν κύκλωπα οὕτως ἀνοήτως εἰς τὸν Ποσειδῶνα ὠλιγόρησεν τῷ λόγῳ εἰπών· “ὥς οὐκ ὀφθαλμόν γ' ἰήσεται οὐδ' Ἐνοσίχθων;” Ἀντισθένης μὲν φησι διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι ὅτι οὐκ ἦν ἱατρὸς ὁ Ποσειδῶν ἀλλ' ὁ Ἀπόλλων. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ οὐχ ὅτι οὐ δυνήσεται, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐ βουλήσεται, διὰ τὴν πονηρίαν τοῦ Κύκλωπος.

πρὸς τὸν κύκλωπα T : om. H Q | τῷ λόγῳ T : om. H Q | διὰ τὸ
 εἰδέναι H : διατί εἰδέναι T | βουλήσεται T : βουληθήσεται H | διὰ τὴν
 πονηρίαν T : διὰ τὴν πορείαν H |

“That not even the Earthshaker will heal your eye.”

[*Od.* 9.525]

Why did Odysseus so foolishly insult Poseidon by his statement to the Cyclops, in saying “that not even the Earthshaker will heal your eye”? Antisthenes, first, says it was because he knows that Poseidon was not a doctor, but Apollo was. But Aristotle says [that Odysseus implied] not that he would be unable, but that he would not want to, because of the depravity of the Cyclops.

Context of Preservation

This scholium is preserved fully in mss. T, H, and Q (Q is reported by Dindorf and not Schrader) and in a generalized, anonymous form in ms. M (see descriptions of the manuscripts under t. 187 and 188). In *Dialogues of the Sea Gods* 2.4, Lucian presents his character Poseidon giving Antisthenes’ explanation. The manuscripts make no attribution to Porphyry, but Porphyry’s role in transmission might be conjectured from the juxtaposed solutions of Antisthenes and Aristotle and the identity of the manuscripts. It is possible that Antisthenes’ material comes originally from the same source as t. 189C-1.

Importance of the Testimonium

The interpretation shows the lengths to which Antisthenes went to defend the virtue of Odysseus. The *Odyssey*, in the voice of Zeus (1.68–75), says that Odysseus made a critical error and gained Poseidon’s wrath by harming his son; one can assume the taunt contributed to this wrath. This interpretation of the event in *Od.* 9 is central to the plot of the *Odyssey*.

Notes

διὰ τὸ εἰδέναι: The knowledge of characters is key also in t. 188A2.3, 189C-2.3, and 189D.5. Here, as in the case of Polyphemus in t. 189C-2 and 189D, Odysseus’ knowledge of the divine may be relative to his position as a character in the story, or within the society that worships these gods: it seems that Antisthenes himself should deny the divinity of the various Olympians, except for Zeus, and especially their differentiation into special realms, such as a god of the sea who is different from a god of healing (see t. 179–80).

οὐκ ἦν ἱατρὸς ὁ Ποσειδῶν ἀλλ’ ὁ Ἀπόλλων: Odysseus’ apparently impious utterance might fail to make any statement at all, on the terms of t. 153B.3 (οὐδὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἄν τι λέγοιεν περὶ αὐτοῦ; compare t. 152B.6). If Poseidon

the healer is the referent implied in the sentence “not even the Earthshaker will heal your eye,” and if there is no such being as Poseidon the healer, then the statement might fail to say anything at all. Odysseus’ intelligence would be hard to reconcile with this kind of error, if it were really an error. Rather, Odysseus’ statement must be intentionally misleading, to taunt or scare his interlocutor. This is the clearest case in the evidence for defensive intentions in Antisthenes’ criticism of Homer and his hero Odysseus.

Ἀριστοτέλης δέ: Whereas Antisthenes reinterprets the human attitude, Aristotle (fr. 174 Rose) reinterprets the divine attitude, as indicated in Odysseus’ ambiguous words.

191. Scholium at *Iliad* 11.637, attributed to Porphyry (MacPhail p. 186–88)

= 55 DC

“ἄλλος μὲν μογέων ἀποκινήσασκε τραπέζης,
πλεῖον ἐόν, Νέστωρ δ’ ὁ γέρων ἀμογητὶ ἄειρεν.”

διὰ τί πεποίηκε μόνον τὸν Νέστορα αἶροντα τὸ ἔκπομα; οὐ γὰρ εἰκὸς ῥᾶον αἶρειν νεωτέρων. Στησίμβροτος μὲν οὖν φησιν, ἵνα δοκεῖ εἰκότως πολλὰ ἔτη βεβιωκέναι· εἰ γὰρ παράμονος ἡ ἰσχὺς καὶ οὐχ ὑπὸ γήρωος μεμάρανται, καὶ τὰ τῆς ζωῆς εὐλογον εἶναι παραπλήσια. Ἀντισθένης δέ· οὐ περὶ τῆς κατὰ χεῖρα βαρύτητος λέγει, ἀλλ’ ὅτι οὐκ ἐμεθύσκετο σημαίνει· ἀλλ’ ἔφερε ῥαδίως τὸν οἶνον. Γλαύκων δὲ ὅτι κατὰ διάμετρον ἐλάμβανε τὰ ὦτα, ἐκ μέσου δὲ πᾶν εὐφορον. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ τὸ “Νέστωρ ὁ γέρων” ἀπὸ κοινοῦ ἔφη δεῖν ἀκούειν ἐπὶ τοῦ “ἄλλος,” ἵν’ ἢ “ἄλλος μὲν γέρων μογέων ἀποκινήσασκε τραπέζης, Νέστωρ δ’ ὁ γέρων ἀμογητὶ ἄειρεν”· πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς καθ’ ἡλικίαν ὁμοίους γενέσθαι τὴν σύγκρισιν.

διὰ τί . . . νεωτέρων om. B | νεωτέρων Schrader : νεωτέρον F Le |
καὶ Στησίμβροτος μὲν οὖν F Le : καὶ om. MacPhail : Στησίμβροτος δὲ B
| Ἀντισθένης Spitzer : Ἀντιφάνης codd. | Ἀντισθένης . . . οἶνον om. B |
Γλαύκων Heitz : Γλαῦκος codd.

“Another man would have moved it from the table with difficulty,
since it was full, but the old man Nestor was lifting it easily.”

[*Il.* 11.636–37]

Why has he portrayed only Nestor raising the drinking cup? For it is not plausible that he lifts it more easily than younger men. Stesimbrotos says [that Homer writes in this way] so that he [sc. Nestor] might appear plausibly to have lived many years: for if his strength is still with him and is not defeated by old age, it stands to

reason that matters of his life span are similar. But Antisthenes says that he [sc. Homer] does not speak about the heaviness in the hand, but he signals that he [sc. Nestor] did not become drunk: rather, he carried his wine easily. And Glaucon says that he [sc. Nestor] grasped the handles along the diameter, and everything is easily lifted from the center. And Aristotle said that it is necessary to understand “Nestor the old man” in conjunction with “another,” so that the reading would be “another old man would raise it from the table with effort, but Nestor the old man lifted it effortlessly”: for the comparison is to those alike in age.

Context of Preservation

The passage is preserved in scholia in a second hand added to one *Iliad* manuscript, F (Escorialensis 509, eleventh century), and in the scholia in another *Iliad* manuscript, Le (Leidensis Vossianus Graecus 64, fifteenth century). Both manuscripts also preserve the Odysseus *polytropos* explication (t. 187). A third manuscript, B (Venetus Graecus 821, eleventh century), preserves part of the passage, also in a later hand, but omits the sentence about Antisthenes, as well as another sentence. The scholiasts of mss. F and Le cite Porphyry as source. Because the passage records four solutions to the same Homeric problem and because Aristotle’s opinion is the last, this is the best evidence available that Porphyry’s source for Antisthenes was the lost Aristotelian *Homeric Problems* or a similar text by one of his associates, such as Dicaearchus or Heraclides Ponticus. As far as we can tell, the solutions are in chronological order.

Importance of the Testimonium

This passage demonstrates Antisthenes’ rivalry with and differences from other contemporary interpreters of Homer, suggests an aspect of his exegetical method, and suggests that he translated Homer’s meaning into principles from Socraticism.

Notes

μόνον τὸν Νέστορα αἶροντα τὸ ἔκπομα: Athenaeus (*Wise Men at Dinner* 488a–492e) documents a rich tradition of exegesis on Homer’s account of Nestor’s cup descending from the Alexandrian pupils of Aristarchus.

οὐ γὰρ εἰκός: The problem of implausibility is part of the system of problems and solutions that Aristotle discusses in ch. 25 of the *Poetics*, which might summarize a longer treatment in his lost *Homeric Problems*. Implausibility is apparently a subclass of the charge of “irrational” (ὡς ἄλογα, 1461b23; compare 1461b13–15). The problem in this passage might have been founded

not only in probabilities from real life but in Nestor's difficulties with lifting heavy objects elsewhere in the *Iliad* (11.668–69, 23.627–28).

Στησίμβροτος: This critic appears as one of Antisthenes' rivals in Xenophon's *Symposium* and as one of Ion's rivals in *Ion* 530d1. (See discussion of his identity at t. 185A.) Glaucon, too, appears in *Ion*. The independent survival of Stesimbrotus' name in this series in the scholia suggests that there is historical truth behind the rivalry suggested by Xenophon. Therefore, it is reasonable to look for a competitive relationship between his interpretation of Nestor's strength and that of Antisthenes. The term ἰσχύς, "strength," occurs nowhere in Homer but is contributed by Stesimbrotus; it is, meanwhile, an important term for Antisthenes. Nestor has physical strength of body, Stesimbrotus says, and it is exaggerated in the poetry (maybe through poetic license) to support the more important point that Nestor has lived for more years than most people.

οὐ περὶ τῆς κατὰ χεῖρα βαρύτητος λέγει, ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐμεθύσκετο σημαίνει· ἀλλ' ἔφερε ῥαδίως τὸν οἶνον: The force of Antisthenes' reinterpretation over that of Stesimbrotus is to deny the literal meaning of Homer's words ἀμογητὶ ἄειπεν and to replace this with a different meaning, that Nestor was "carrying easily" (ἔφερε ῥαδίως) the wine, not the heavy cup, because he had "strength" of mind, not of body or hand. For Antisthenes' recognition of "strength" in mind rather than body, see t. 54.13, 134c, 41A titles 4.2 and 10.2. There is also evidence for "weight" of mind rather than the kind of physical weight felt in the hand: see t. 106. The scene at the end of Plato's *Symposium* (223b–d) shows Socrates able to drink all night and still conduct his normal routine the next day (Pépin 1993:7). This is probably not a core meaning of the "Socratic strength" Antisthenes calls for in t. 134c, but the *Symposium* scene implies that Socrates' immunity from drunkenness is related to his ethical superiority. This summary does not preserve a justification or method for Antisthenes' rather aggressive reinterpretation (by contrast with t. 187 and 189, where relics of a method are preserved), nor do we know that he treated Homer as speaker in the same way he would treat a character who speaks in the poems. When the term ἐπισημαίνεται is used of Odysseus in t. 188B.2, there is a sign in the text, the gratuitous adjective περίφρων, that effects the indicating, on a level beyond what Odysseus is literally saying to Calypso. Here we do not learn exactly which oddity the critic is interpreting: perhaps the occurrence of the imperfect tense of the verb ἄειπεν, when one might expect an aorist for a simple action, indicates that the poet really speaks of an enduring situation rather than an act. To judge from the detailed explanations in t. 187–89, we can assume that the original text explained the solution better than this epitome. The two actions by the poet, λέγει versus σημαίνει, need not be an exclusively opposed distinction (as Pépin 1993 argues, pointing to a parallel

in Heraclitus' statement about the Delphic oracle, at DK 22B93). Rather, to judge from t. 153B1, a speaker must indicate (σημαίνει) that about which he speaks through what he says (λέγει). It is the speaker's job to use the semantic medium correctly, and σημαίνει is a more precise word for part of the action rendered more fully by λέγει. What is negated in the first clause here is the referent, that about which Homer speaks: he speaks not *περὶ τῆς κατὰ χεῖρα βαρύτητος* but *περὶ τῆς κατὰ νοῦν βαρύτητος*, indicating immunity to drunkenness. Since the conclusion of Antisthenes' interpretation is so catching in its own right, the epitomizer had no need to expound intricacies such as which word or words in Homer's utterance were the key indicating ones.

Γλαύκων: This Glaucon is likely to be the same critic mentioned by Plato at *Ion* 530d1 and by Aristotle at *Poet.* 1461b1. See Lanata 1963:271–81. His interpretation here seems to follow from that of Antisthenes because it assumes from the start that Nestor's "strength" is mental, not bodily. He moves from the ethical strength of *enkrateia* to intellectual strength, a skill in geometrical reasoning.

Ἀριστοτέλης: Aristotle's interpretation seems to be independent of this series and to make a new start by addressing the linguistic medium, Homer's text, rather than its meaning. He assumes (implausibly) that the text elides a word and removes the problem of improbability by restoring this word. Porphyry might have agreed with Aristotle against the series of increasingly more radical solutions proposed by the other three, but it seems clear from Athenaeus that the Alexandrian tradition was more interested, like Antisthenes, in how much wine Nestor could hold.

192A. Scholium at *Iliad* 15.123 (Erbse)

= 56 DC

ἐνθά κ' ἔτι μείζων τε καὶ ἀργαλεώτερος ἄλλος
 παρ Διὸς ἀθανάτοισι χόλος καὶ μῆνις ἐτύχθη,
 εἰ μὴ Ἀθήνη πᾶσι περιδείσασα θεοῖσιν
 ὦρτο διὲκ προθύρου, λίπε δὲ θρόνον ἐνθα θάασσε,
 τοῦ δ' ἀπὸ μὲν κεφαλῆς κόρυθ' εἴλετο καὶ σάκος ὤμων,
 ἔγχος δ' ἔστησε στιβαρῆς ἀπὸ χειρὸς ἐλοῦσα
 χάλκεον· ἥ δ' ἐπέεσσι καθάπτετο θοῦρον Ἄρηα·
 “μαινόμενε φρένας ἧλὲ διέφθορας· ἦ νύ τοι αὖτως
 οὐατ' ἀκουέμεν ἐστί, νόος δ' ἀπόλωλε καὶ αἰδώς.”

πᾶσι <περι>δείσασα: ἀντὶ τοῦ “πάντων.” εἰκότως δὲ ὡς δεδοικυῖα τὸν πατέρα καὶ ἥδη πεπαιδευμένη μὴ ἐναντιοῦσθαι, περὶ τῶν μελλόντων ἢ Γλαυκῶπις φροντίζει. ἐκ τούτου καὶ Ἀντισθένης φησίν, ὡς εἴ τι πράττει

ὁ σοφός, κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖ, ὡς καὶ ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ τριχῶς νουθετεῖ
τὸν Ἄρην.

εἰκότως . . . ἐναντιοῦσθαι b (BCE³E⁴) T et Li | περὶ . . . φροντίζει b
(BCE³E⁴) et Li : “ὄφρ’ εἰδῆ γλαυκῶπις” (Θ 406) T | ἐκ τούτου . . . τὸν
Ἄρην Li : om. cett.

Then another anger and rage, still greater and more difficult,
would have struck from Zeus against the immortals,
if Athena, fearing for all the gods, had not
come out from the doorway, and left the throne where she was sitting,
and taken his helmet from his head and his shield from his shoulders,
and stopped his bronze spear, taking it from his sturdy hand.
And she addressed the battle-hungry Ares with words:
“You mad man, deranged in your wits, you are ruined. In vain you have
ears to hear, and your mind has perished and your shame.”

[*Il.* 15.121–29]

“Fearing for all”: for “fearing about all.” Probably because she fears
her father and has already been taught not to oppose him, the bright-
eyed one takes thought about things to come. From this [verse] also
Antisthenes says that if the wise man does anything, he is active
according to all of virtue, just as Athena, too, warns Ares in three ways.

Context of Preservation

The first sentence of the passage appears throughout the bT tradition. The
second sentence about Antisthenes is preserved only in the Leipzig codex
Graecus 32 (fourteenth century), which contains, amid its exegetical scholia,
excerpts from Porphyry and from another scholar (MacPhail 2011:9: the
name is Σεναχηρ(ε)ῖμ). Because Porphyry is so important in the transmission
of Antisthenes’ other Homeric interpretations, it seems likely that he is the
source for this one also.

Importance of the Testimonium

This passage has been used in discussions of Antisthenes’ view of virtue, on
whether he holds a “unity of virtue” thesis such as that described in Plato’s
Protagoras (330–34, 349–50) and possibly implied in t. 134c. It is also relevant
to his possibly “allegorical” interpretation of Homer’s gods.

Notes

ἐκ τούτου καὶ Ἀντισθένης: Commentators have debated whether the
reference “from this” means the Homeric verse or the previous comment
(Tate 1930:6 n.7). If Antisthenes is thought to be extending the previous

interpretation, the reference to unified virtue could be part of a Stoic reception of the verses, apologizing for Athena's apparently unbecoming fear. But Antisthenes' interpretation does not seem to address Athena's fear, and the separate transmission of the two sentences implies that they are independent. The Li writer or his source probably marked a fresh reference to Homer's text with the phrase ἐκ τούτου. Tate 1930:6 n.7 cites a parallel from the scholia on *Il.* 24.526, where Epicurus is said to derive a statement about the gods "from this." MacPhail 2007:17 notes scholiasts' use of εἰς to connect passages from Porphyry to particular passages in the Homeric text. This could imply that Antisthenes used the text to ground a preconceived doctrine, as he appears to do in t. 191, rather than interpreting the text in its own right. But the fuller evidence of t. 54 and 187–89 also suggests that he was a careful reader.

ὁ σοφός: The main *comparandum* for the wise man seems to be Athena, since she is subject of the next clause. But it is possible that Ares' lack of wisdom is also of interest as a contrast to the wise man: Ares may be warned because he fails to act as a wise man but instead acts as a madman (μαινόμενος), which, in Stoic vocabulary, covers everyone who is not wise. (See, e.g., Stob. 2.7.5b13 and Alex. Aph. *De fato* p. 199.19–20 [CAG 2.2 ed. Bruns]; Xen. *Mem.* 1.1.16 opposes τί σωφροσύνη, τί μάνια as some of Socrates' questions.)

κατὰ πᾶσαν ἀρετὴν ἐνεργεῖ: This seems to appeal to a doctrine that virtue for the wise man is single and unified, a Stoic and possibly Socratic thesis. (Zeller 1922⁵ v.2.1:312 n.5 characterizes it as intellectual virtue, knowledge.) The term ἐνεργεῖ, "be in action" or "operate," seems to refer to activating one's resources of self. In the Stoic fragments, however, its occurrences refer sooner to irrational activity than to rational (Alex. Aph. *De fato* p. 205.28 [CAG 2.2 ed. Bruns]; Galen quoting Chrysippus, *De plac. Hipp. et Plat.* 4.6.6). This implies that, whatever "all of virtue" means, this virtue is not both Stoic and exclusively rational.

ὥς καὶ ἡ Ἀθηνᾶ τριχῶς νουθετεῖ τὸν Ἄρην: The reference of the word "in three ways" seems to be the key to the meaning of the whole statement. There are several possibilities. First: Athena's protest against Ares' behavior has three parts: he has failed to use his ears, his mind, and his sense of decorum. By this interpretation, Athena is holding Ares to the standard of the wise man and finding him to be the opposite, a madman. ὁ σοφός, then, would refer to Athena, but "according to all of virtue" or "in three ways" would refer not to her own action but to the ideal way of acting that she implies in her scolding of Ares. Being active according to all of virtue would have three levels: the physical level of sense perception (hearing), the mental level of understanding (mind), and the ethical-emotional level of sensing the kind of behavior appropriate to the situation. Its entirety would be not the unity or identity of bravery, wisdom, temperance, and justice, the cardinal virtues

whose relationship was debated in the Stoic period (see, e.g., Cic. *De off.* 2.35), but the successful operation of these three vertical levels, so to speak, in one moment of behavior. (On Stoic virtue as vertical in this way, see Striker 1983.) A second possibility is that Athena introduces her protest against Ares with three insults, at verse 128. Porphyry is cited (at verse 128 in ms. T) for commenting on the way Athena's address to Ares should be punctuated: one should not feel a break between φρένας ἤλὲ and διέφθορας (translating "deranged in your wits, you are ruined") but should take them together so that the mental aspect of destruction is clear (translating "you are ruined in your wits, you deranged one"). He then assigns her scolding in verse 129 to these words: having ears in vain supplements μαινόμενε, and lacking mind and shame supplements φρένας and ἤλὲ. This yields a similar view to the first option for the way three aspects constitute a whole, in Ares, who should be wise but is not. That this interpretation is cited from Porphyry supports the possibility that this was the kind of discussion to which Antisthenes contributed. A third possibility is that Athena's actions in approaching Ares can be divided into three parts, by various ways. This would be the only way to understand "the whole of virtue" in reference to Athena as the wise one. She stands, she strips his weapons, and she speaks. When she strips his weapons, this takes three stages. Athena has the traditional epithet τριτογένεια, "born from Triton," for which Democritus (DK 68B2), understanding Athena as the personification of intelligence, φρόνησις, gave the innovative etymology "triple by nature," specifying the three aspects of her virtue as calculating well, speaking well, and doing what one should. Possibly such a three-part analysis of Athena the character or of her action in these verses was already in circulation and became the target of Antisthenes' use of the term τριχῶς. T. 192B, if it is really from Antisthenes, implies a more clearly "allegorical" interpretation of Athena and rates her directly as "the intelligent one" (ὁ φρόνιμος).

192B. Scholium on *Odyssey* 1.96 (Pontani p. 67.99–103)

(not in SSR)

ὡς εἰποῦς' ὑπὸ ποσσὶν ἐδήσατο καλὰ πέδιλα,
 ἀμβρόσια χρύσεια, τὰ μιν φέρον ἡμὲν ἐφ' ὕγρην
 ἥδ' ἐπ' ἀπείρονα γαῖαν ἅμα πνοιῇσ' ἀνέμοιο.
 εἶλετο δ' ἄλκιμον ἔγχος, ἀκαχμένον ὀξεῖ χαλκῷ,
 βριθὺ μέγα στιβαρόν, τῷ δάμνησι στίχας ἀνδρῶν
 ἥρώων, τοῖσιν τε κοτέσσεται ὀβριμοπάτρη.

καλὰ πέδιλα] τὸ λέγειν τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν καλὰ πέδιλα φορεῖν οὐκ ἄλλο
 δηλοῖ ἢ ὅτι τῆς φρονήσεως αἱ ἐνεργητικαὶ δυνάμεις στιβαραὶ καὶ

ἄλκιμοί εἰσι. τὸ δὲ ἐπέχειν ἔγχος ἐν ᾧτινι δαμάζει τοὺς ἥρωας τὸ
πληκτικὸν ὑποσημαίνει τῆς φρονήσεως. ὁ γὰρ φρόνιμος διὰ τοῦ
οἰκείου λόγου πλῆττει τὸν ἀτακτοῦντα. τὸ δὲ τὴν Ἀθηνᾶν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ
κατελθεῖν οὐκ ἄλλο αἰνίττεται ἢ ὅτι ἡ φρόνησις ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ κατέρχεται.

τὸ πληκτικὸν ὑποσημαίνει E : ὑποσημαίνει τὸ πληκτικὸν D J | ὅτι ἡ
φρόνησις D E : ὅτι καὶ ἡ φρόνησις J

After saying this, she bound her beautiful sandals on her feet.
divine and golden, which carried her both across the water
and across the dry land with the breaths of the wind.
And she took up her sturdy sword, edged with sharp bronze,
heavy, large and sturdy, with which she tames the ranks of heroes,
those at whom she is angered, the goddess of mighty father.

[Od. 1.96–101]

“beautiful sandals”: To say that Athena wears beautiful sandals shows
nothing other than that the active powers of intelligence are sturdy and
stout. And to hold a sword by which she masters the heroes suggests
the striking power of intelligence. For the intelligent man strikes the
rebellious one through his proper discourse. And that Athena comes
down from the heaven hints at nothing other than that intelligence
comes down from the mind.

Context of Preservation

This scholion is preserved in a set of manuscripts totally separate from
those that preserve interpretations attributed by name to Antisthenes: D
(Par. Gr. 2403, thirteenth or fourteenth century), E (Ambr. E 89 supp.,
early fourteenth century), and J (Vat. Gr. 1320, fourteenth or fifteenth
century). Whether or not Antisthenes is the source of this interpretation,
it was transmitted in a tradition separate from Porphyry. Eustathius knows
allegorical interpretations of Athena’s sandals (in *Od.* 1395.13) and shield (in
Od. 1395.28).

Importance of the Testimonium

A source in Antisthenes’ works is conjectured in Lulofs 1900:54 and Brancacci
1990:261 n.62 on the basis of the ethical allegory of Athena’s equipment and
its particular terms.

Notes

αἱ ἐνεργητικαὶ δυνάμεις: The verb “activate” is in Antisthenes’ interpretation
of Athena or Ares in t. 192A.

ὑποσημαίνει: Compare the use of σημαίνει in t. 153A and 191. Compare the

term ὑπόνοια in t. 185. If this is Antisthenes' word, it shows an interesting difference from the more commonly attested ἐπισημαίνομαι (used with a personal subject). This would be the only attested use by Antisthenes of the ὑπο- prefix.

διὰ τοῦ οἰκείου λόγου: οἰκεῖος λόγος might be a technical term for Antisthenes: see t. 152A; Brancacci 1990:260–62.

πλήττει: Antisthenes, as would-be teacher, is said to strike his pupils in t. 169.

αἰνίττεται: This term has no parallel in Antisthenes' literary remains, but it is a standard term for indicating that a poet or writer has intentionally planted a cryptic message, which requires allegorizing interpretation (Struck 2004:21–76).

ἐκ τοῦ νοῦ: This is an allegorizing etymology for ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, reinforced by the verb “comes down.” Compare Antisthenes' playfulness with καινοῦ in t. 171. Scholia in the same manuscripts (D,E, and J) at Il. 1.101 explain that Athena is called ὀβριμοπάτρη because νοῦς is the father of φρόνησις (Dindorf 1855 ad loc.).

193. Scholium on *Iliad* 23.65 (in codices A, T, and b) (Erbse)

= 57 DC

ἦλθε δ' ἐπὶ ψυχῇ Πατροκλῆος δειλοῖο
πάντ' αὐτῷ μέγεθος τε καὶ ὄμματα κάλ' ἔϊκυῖα
καὶ φωνήν, καὶ τοῖα περὶ χροῖ εἴματα ἔστο·

έντεῦθεν Ἀντισθένης ὁμοσχήμονας φησὶ τὰς ψυχὰς τοῖς περιέχουσι
σώμασιν. Χρύσιππος δὲ μετὰ τὸν χωρισμὸν τοῦ σώματός φησιν αὐτὰς
σφαιροειδεῖς γενέσθαι.

σώμασιν T : σώμασιν εἶναι A | Χρύσιππος δὲ . . . A T om. b | γεν. T :
γενέσθαι δογματίζει A

And up came the soul of wretched Patroclus,
Resembling him fully in stature and the beautiful eyes
And voice, and it wore similar clothing on its flesh.

[Il. 23.65–67]

From here Antisthenes says that souls are alike in shape to the bodies that surround them. But Chrysippus says that after the separation from the body they become spherical.

Context of Preservation

The passage in the scholia was probably transmitted through a doxographical source, to judge from the adjacent interpretation attributed to Chrysippus.

Importance of the Testimonium

This testimonium has been drawn into debates begun in the nineteenth century about Antisthenes' views on materialism of the soul, immortality of the soul and physiognomy. See historical discussion in Brancacci 2003:268 n.29 and his own argument, pp. 268–70. The scholiast's source might have been a general doxography on the nature of the soul after death, which was brought to the reading of Homer by a medieval scholar, or an ancient text might have already linked these views to Homer, insofar as he recognized the same truth. Antisthenes' titles on the *Iliad* in the eighth *tomos* present no obvious candidate for the source of this discussion. Possibly the original text was about eschatology, for example, *On Things in the Underworld* (t. 41A title 7.7). In *Republic* 3 (386d4–5, 387a2–3), Plato cites lines close in context (*Il.* 23.100–104, where Patroclus' soul departs back to Hades) among examples of bad teaching on the nature of death, needful of censure because they cause fear. If Antisthenes used the lines here as Homeric accounts of the truth, this could explain Plato's choice.

Notes

ἐντεῦθεν: The adverb implies that Antisthenes supported his view of the truth from the Homeric passage. Chrysippus' view, however, responds to that of Antisthenes, not that of Homer (because Patroclus' ghost cannot be recognized individually if all souls are spherical). This setting is a reason to conjecture that the Stoics represented Antisthenes' interpretation of Homer as doctrine about nature.

ὁμοσχῆμων: The verb ὁμοσχημονέω appears in testimonia about the Atomists' materialist theories (DK 67A10, Leucippus, on creation of stars; 68A128, Democritus, on hearing) and indicates affinity of a phenomenal object to its matter, which, on the atomic level, has various possible shapes. This might be evidence for the materialism of soul for Antisthenes (Brancacci 2003:268–70, citing older advocates). However, we do not know whether Antisthenes thought Homer's account of Patroclus' ghost was literally true, or whether he thought Homer was speaking in the terms of “belief” appropriate to poetry (see t. 194). In addition, we do not know whether Antisthenes counts Patroclus as representative of any dead person, or whether he held a difference between the souls of dead philosophers versus non-philosophers: in Plato's *Phaedo*, the soul of the non-philosopher remains bound up with matter after separation at death, wherefore it is also visible like a shade, which presumably keeps the shape of its former body (81c4–d4). The reception in the scholia seems to take Antisthenes to be endorsing Homer as mouthpiece for the truth about the physical state of all disembodied souls.

τοῖς περιέχουσι σώμασιν: The word περιέχουσι, too, supports continuity of kind between body and soul. In Pre-Socratic cosmologists, material substances such as the air and mind are said to embrace the earth in this way (DK 13B2, Anaximenes; 59B2 and B14, Anaxagoras). This account seems to rule out one of the arguments for the immortality of the soul given in Plato's *Phaedo*, the so-called argument from affinity, in which the body and the soul are fundamentally different in kind. It also shows Antisthenes' deviation from contemporary attempts to locate the soul in a certain part of the body, by implying that it has the same extension as the body. This could be a return to a Homeric view (Brancacci 2003:269–70), but the parallel in *Phaedo* (81c4–d4) suggests that such a view was discussed among the Socratics.

σφαιροειδεῖς: On Chrysippus' view of the soul's shape after death, see Pohlenz 1948. A spherical shape for the disembodied soul of the philosopher is suggested also in Plato's *Phaedo* (67c8, 70a7, 80e5), in different language (συνηθροισμένη αὐτὴ εἰς ἑαυτήν).

194. Dio Chrysostom, *On Homer* 53 (de Budé)

= 58 DC

ὁ δὲ Ζήνων οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ Ὀμήρου ψέγει, ἅμα διηγούμενος καὶ διδάσκων ὅτι τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγραφεν, ὅπως μὴ φαίνεται αὐτὸς αὐτῷ μαχόμενος ἔν τισι δοκοῦσιν ἐναντίως εἰρῆσθαι. ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος Ἀντισθένους ἐστὶ πρότερον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν δόξη, τὰ δὲ ἀληθεῖα εἴρηται τῷ ποιητῇ. ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἐξεργάσατο αὐτόν, ὁ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν ἐπὶ μέρους ἐδήλωσεν. ἔτι δὲ καὶ Περσαῖος ὁ τοῦ Ζήνωνος κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν γέγραφε καὶ ἄλλοι πλείους.

τῶν om. M B U¹ | τοῦ: del. Wilamowitz | ψέγει Emperius : λέγει codd.
| ἅμα Jacobs : ἀλλὰ codd. | ὁ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον U : οὐδὲ καθ' ἕκαστον P H
B M | κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν Geelius : κατ' αὐτὴν U¹ : κατὰ τὴν cett.

Zeno blames none of the verses of Homer, but in the course of setting them out in detail he teaches that Homer has written some according to opinion and others according to truth, in order that he not appear to be contradicting himself in certain verses that seem to be said in opposition to each other. This principle is previously from Antisthenes, that some things have been said by the poet in opinion and some in truth. But he did not work it out, whereas he [Zeno] showed it according to each of the parts. And further also Persaeus pupil of Zeno has written according to the same hypothesis, and many others.

Context of Preservation

Dio introduces a tradition of reading Homer with a defensive strategy against those who attack him. In the previous context (§2–3), Plato attacks Homer, who is defended by unnamed physical allegorists.

Importance of the Testimonium

This passage has formed the basis for interpretations of Antisthenes as an “allegorist” (see, further, t. 185 note on τὰς ὑπονοίας; Dümmler 1882; Höistad 1951; Tate 1953; Laurenti 1962; Detienne 1962:48; Schäublin 1977; Hillgruber 1989; Pépin 1993). Elsewhere (*Or.* 55), Dio transmits information about a Socratic interest in Homer that is not otherwise preserved; hence he may have had direct knowledge of Antisthenes’ Homeric exegesis (Weber 1887). The Stoic history outlined in this passage could be the construction of Dio, or it could have come from an older source. The immediate passage offers no indication of the topics addressed in the Stoic and proto-Stoic interpretive tradition, but Dio’s discourse overall focuses on theological statement and ethical statement, the categories Plato attacks at *Rep.* 2 377d–392c. Proposing that the tradition documented here informs also Philo of Alexandria, who puts it to theological purpose, Pépin (1993) implies that the whole tradition is theological in its main concerns.

Notes

ὁ δὲ Ζήνων οὐδὲν τῶν τοῦ Ὀμήρου ψέγει: (= fr. 274 SVF I.63) The implied neuter substantive with οὐδὲν τῶν must be ἐπῶν, which Dio has used above, in τὴν ἡδονὴν καὶ χάριν τὴν τῶν ἐπῶν in §2. (The partitive conception is contained also in ἕνι τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ λεγομένων in §1, although ὑπό would not fit the syntax of this abbreviated reference.) Zeno must have addressed distinct parts of Homer’s poetic work (the *Iliad*, the *Odyssey*, and the *Margites* are mentioned in the previous sentence), not different levels of meaning transmitted by an individual passage. This idea is resumed in the language τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν, said to be Antisthenes’ principle. τὰ μὲν κατὰ δόξαν τὰ δὲ κατὰ ἀλήθειαν γέγραφε: The opposition between δόξα and ἀλήθεια resonates foremost with Parmenides (DK 28B1.29–30), who distinguished absolutely between these two “paths” of human cognition. Surely a similar absolute distinction is operating here. But the difference is inherent in Homer’s composition, not distinguished through the skill of the interpreter (as Pépin 1993 emphasizes). Of course, this implies that Homer composed with intentions about how he should be understood. Moreover, interpreters under this principle would claim to be revealing the craft of the primary composer, not performing their own craft. By contrast, Plato

implies in *Ion* that the rhapsode catches a creative energy (like the power of magnetism in a magnet) from the poet he interprets. Dio's language seems to be insistent on this point, that the distinction was part of Homer's craft and is not supplied by the interpreter: in subsequent sentences, he repeats also εἰρησθαι and εἴρηται τῷ ποιητῇ.

ὅπως μὴ φαίνεται αὐτὸς αὐτῷ μαχόμενος ἔν τισι δοκοῦσιν ἐναντίως εἰρησθαι: Here there may be a more aggressive intervention by the exegete Zeno, because he had an overall purpose in interpreting according to his principle, resolving apparent contradictions in Homer. But this is a purpose that responds to the poem, which has an internal inconsistency. The word φαίνεται and the phrase ἔν τισι δοκοῦσιν leave space for subjective judgment on this score, but there is grounding for a non-circular interpretive method. **αὐτὸς αὐτῷ μαχόμενος:** The figuring of Homer's inconsistency as a battle with himself is mirrored in the critic's accusation in t. 189.

ἐναντίως εἰρησθαι: The allegation of "speaking in opposite manner" is closer (than the battle imagery) to the world of logic and occurs again in Antisthenes' paradox against gainsaying (t. 152B, 153B). Antisthenes applies the principle to Homer in t. 189.

ὁ δὲ λόγος οὗτος Ἀντισθένης ἐστὶ πρότερον, ὅτι τὰ μὲν δόξα, τὰ δὲ ἀληθεία εἴρηται τῷ ποιητῇ: Zeno's "principle" is attributed to Antisthenes, though his purpose not necessarily. To judge from Antisthenes' interest in gainsaying and contradiction, however, and his practice in interpreting Homer as documented by the extant evidence, Antisthenes probably did have the same purpose as Zeno, reconciling apparent self-contradictions. T. 189 may show that apparent self-contradiction can be resolved by distinguishing Homer's own voice from that of his characters, and this could be the force of Antisthenes' distinction between δόξα and ἀλήθεια: that characters speak from partial perspective, in belief, whereas Homer speaks from full perspective, in truth. There is no other evidence for exactly this antithesis between δόξα and ἀλήθεια Antisthenes' literary remains, but κατὰ νόμον and κατὰ φύσιν are opposed in t. 179A, and δόξα and ἐπιστήμη are apparently opposed (though they might also be compared) in a book title (t. 41A title 7.4). Some interpretations of Antisthenes read the opposition here between δόξα and ἀλήθεια in a global way, as a marker of the difference between the philosopher and the folk, and equivalent to the oppositions in t. 179A and the book title.

ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἐξεργάσατο αὐτόν: Mueller 1860:51 understands this to mean that Antisthenes did not write systematic commentaries but only picked out passages that supported his interests.

ἔτι δὲ καὶ Περσαῖος ὁ τοῦ Ζήνωνος κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ὑπόθεσιν γέγραφε: Dio discerns a whole Stoic tradition in using this principle, which may have

taken a route different from the orthodox succession through Cleanthes and Chrysippus. Persaeus was contemporary with Cleanthes, who became the scholarch in the second generation. In t. 195, Cleanthes is aligned with Antisthenes. In t. 135, Aristo of Chios, yet another member of the second generation, is aligned with Antisthenes.

195. Plutarch, *How a Young Man Should Read Poetry* 12 33c (Paton)

= 60 DC

ὅθεν οὐδ' αἱ παραδιορθώσεις φαύλως ἔχουσιν αἷς καὶ Κλεάνθης
ἐχρήσατο καὶ Ἀντισθένης, ὁ μὲν εὖ μάλα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους
θορυβήσαντας ἰδὼν ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ πρὸς τὸ
τί δ' αἰσχρόν, ἦν μὴ τοῖς χρωμένοις δοκῇ;
παραβαλὼν εὐθύς,
αἰσχρόν τό γ' αἰσχρόν, κἄν δοκῇ κἄν μὴ δοκῇ.

τοὺς Ἀθηναίους θορυβήσαντας ἰδὼν Paton : θορυβήσαντας ἰδὼν
codd. : τῶν Ἀθηναίων θορυβησάντων codd. | θεάτρῳ M : θεάτρῳ πρὸς
τὸ c | ἦν μὴ . . . δοκῇ Γ : εἰ μὴ . . . δοκεῖ O

For this reason the corrections that Cleanthes and Antisthenes practiced are not bad. Antisthenes saw the Athenians crying out in the theater against the verse, “What is foul, unless it appears foul to those involved?” [Euripides, from *Aeolus*]. Right away he tossed back the line “The foul is foul, both if it appears [so] and if it does not.”

Context of Preservation

Plutarch opens a new point in his discussion, the possibility that the philosophically wise audience or reader can correct the poets. See Hunter and Russell 2011.

Importance of the Testimonium

Like t. 194, this passage aligns Antisthenes into a Stoic tradition of literary criticism. See also t. 105 and 137A (where Antisthenes is the object of Stoic reading rather than a predecessor).

Notes

αἱ παραδιορθώσεις: This term indicates corrections written into the margins of a text. (See Nussbaum 1993:132–33.) The anecdote implies that Antisthenes delivered his response live in the theater (παραβαλὼν εὐθύς), not in writing. The anecdote is probably fictitious, and Antisthenes probably commented

in writing, for example, as a parody in a text on an ethical topic, probably not in an exegesis of Euripides. Cleanthes or another Stoic could have used Antisthenes' line as a *paradiorthosis* in their own text of Euripides.

τί δ' αἰσχρόν, ἢν μὴ τοῖς χρωμένοις δοκῇ: The line is from Euripides' *Aeolus* (fr. 19 TGrF) and is also parodied in Aristophanes' *Frogs* (1475). The topic is the incest of Aeolus' children: his sons married his daughters (*Od.* 10.5–7). See t. 141B, where Antisthenes is again cited in reference to the incest of Aeolus' children.

αἰσχρόν τό γ' αἰσχρόν, κἂν δοκῇ κἂν μὴ δοκῇ: This is a statement of essentialist ethical value, said against the ethical relativism apparently endorsed in Euripides' verse. Antisthenes is consistently opposed to incest: see t. 141. This position is either inherited from Greek culture (as opposed to Persian) or related to his interest in eugenics: see t. 58. On the different approach Antisthenes' character Odysseus takes to acts of temple robbing and corporal punishment, where ethical evaluation of the individuated act must take into consideration the nexus of causes and consequences, see t. 53–54 and notes.

196. Scholium on Aristophanes, *Women at the Thesmophoria* 21b (Regtuit)

= 59 DC

οἷόν γε πού 'στιν αἱ σοφαὶ ξυνουσίαι.

καὶ διὰ τούτου φαίνεται ὑπονοῶν Εὐριπίδου εἶναι τὸ
σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσία.

ἔστι δὲ Σοφοκλέους ἐξ Αἰάντος Λοκροῦ. ἐνταῦθα μέντοι ὑπονοεῖ
μόνον, ἐν δὲ τοῖς Ἡρωσιν ἄντικρυς ἀποφαίνεται. καὶ Ἀντισθένης
καὶ Πλάτων Εὐριπίδου αὐτὸ <εἶναι> ἡγοῦνται, οὐκ ἔχω εἰπεῖν ὅ τι
παθόντες. ἔοικε δὲ ἦτοι πεπλανημένος συνεξαπατῆσαι τοὺς ἄλλους ἢ,
ὥσπερ ὑπονοοῦσι τινες, σύμπτωσις <γενέσθαι> τῷ τε Σοφοκλεῖ καὶ τῷ
Εὐριπίδῃ, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ ἄλλων τινῶν. τὸ μέντοι δρᾶμα ἐν ᾧ Εὐριπίδης
ταῦτα εἶπεν, οὐ σφύζεται.

<εἶναι> add. Bekker | παθόντες Burges, Bekker : παρόντες R | ἦτοι
πεπλανημένος ἢ συνεξαπατῆσαι R : ἢ alt. transp. Schneider | σύμπτωσις
Dindorf : σύμπτωσεις R | <γενέσθαι> add. Schneider

What a thing is consorting with brilliant men.

[Aristophanes, *Thesmo.* 21 (Kinsman speaking)]

Through this [statement] he [Aristophanes] is clear in his suggestion that the verse is from Euripides: “Tyrants are wise by association with the wise.” But it is from Sophocles, from *Locrian Ajax*. Here, however, he only suggests [this attribution], whereas in the *Heroes* he declares

it straight out. Both Antisthenes and Plato think this verse is from Euripides, but I cannot say what influenced them. It seems that either he [Aristophanes] made a mistake and deceived the others, or, as some suspect, there was a coincidence between Sophocles and Euripides, as also in other cases. But the play in which Euripides said this is not preserved.

Context of Preservation

In the prologue of Aristophanes' *Thesmophoriazusae*, Euripides and his kinsman banter as they approach the house of Agathon. Here the kinsman reacts to Euripides' instruction on physics. The scholia to *Thesmophoriazusae* are transmitted in the single manuscript that transmits the play, Ravennas 429 (R, written c. 950). The present scholium (= fr. 14 TGrF) is an expansion, apparently in a second hand, of a simpler version that does not refer to Antisthenes and Plato.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes' and Plato's common citation of a verse from tragedy suggests that the citing texts—*Rep.* 9, *Theages*, and an unknown text by Antisthenes—could have an intertextual relationship.

Notes

καὶ Ἀντισθένης καὶ Πλάτων: Plato (*Rep.* 9 568a8–b1; *Theages* 125b5–d6) attributes the verse to Euripides. Antisthenes' work is lost, but his speech on his wealth in Xenophon's *Symposium* (t. 82.36) shares terms with *Rep.* 9 (575b6). Possibly there was an intertextual relationship between *Rep.* 9 and some text by Antisthenes, such as the *Protreptics*, which seems to be one of Xenophon's sources in the *Symposium*. If the scholiast is correct that the attribution to Euripides is an error, the common error is argument for interdependence.

σύμπτωσις <γενέσθαι> τῷ τε Σοφοκλεῖ καὶ τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ: Possibly Sophocles and Euripides used the same phrase. The thought is similar to that in verses from Theognis (35–36) repeatedly cited in Socratic literature. (See t. 103B.) See Austin and Olson 2004:58–59 for cases of coincidence between verses in Sophocles and Euripides.

197. Aelius Aristides, *Oration* 49.30–33 (= *Sacred Tales* 3.30–33) (Keil)

= 41 DC

(30) βιβλίον τι τῶν σπουδαίων ἔδοξα ἀναγινώσκειν, οὗ τὰ μὲν καθ' ἕκαστον, πάλιν γὰρ τὸν αὐτὸν ἐρῶ λόγον, οὐκ ἂν ἔχοιμι εἰπεῖν. πῶς γὰρ τοσοῦτόν γε ὕστερον, ἄλλως τε καὶ τῆς ἀπογραφῆς τὸ τῇ

μνήμη προσέχειν ἀφελομένης; (31) ἀλλὰ πρὸς τῷ τέλει τοῦ βιβλίου τοιαῦδε μάλιστα ἐνῆν—ἦν δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τινος τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν λεγόμενα—“ταῦτα δὴ πάντα ὁ θεὸς συλλογισάμενος καὶ ὁρῶν τὸ ρεῦμα ἄρδην φερόμενον προσέταξεν ὕδωρ πίνειν, οἶνου δὲ ἀπέχεσθαι, εἴ τι δέεται νικῆσαι· ‘ἂ δὴ καὶ σοί,’ ἔφη, ‘ἔξεστι μιμησαμένῳ στεφανοῦσθαι ἢ συστεφανοῦσθαι.” ἐνταῦθα ἔληγεν. εἴθ’ ὑπεγέγραπτο τοῦ λόγου δὴ τοῦπίγραμμα, “φιλοστέφανος” ἢ “φιλησιστέφανος.” (32) ὅσον μὲν οὖν τινα χρόνον διήνεγκα τὴν ὑδροποσίαν, οὐδὲ τοῦτο ἔχω λέγειν· ὅτι δ’ εὐκόλως τε καὶ ῥαδίως αἰεὶ πως πρότερον δυσχεραίνων τὸ ὕδωρ καὶ ναυτιῶν. ὡς δὲ καὶ τοῦτο ἐλελειτούργητο, τοῦ μὲν ὕδατος ἀφίησί με, οἶνου δὲ ἔταξε μέτρον, καὶ ἦν γε τὸ ῥῆμα “ἡμίνα βασιλική”· γνῶριμον δὴ πού ὅτι ἔφραζεν ἡμικοτύλιον. ἐχρώμην τούτῳ καὶ οὕτως ἤρκει ὡς οὐκ ἤρκει πρότερον τὸ διπλάσιον, ἔστι δ’ ὅτε καὶ φειδομένῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεδιέναι μὴ ἐπιλείπῃ περιῆν. οὐ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἐποιοῦμην ἐξαίρετον εἰς τὴν ὑστεραίαν, ἀλλ’ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔδει τῷ μέτρῳ στέργειν. ἐπεὶ δὲ καὶ ταύτην εἶχε τὴν πείραν, ἀφίησιν ἤδη πίνειν πρὸς ἐξουσίαν, οὕτωςί πως χαριεντισάμενος, ὅτι μάταιοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶεν ὅσοι τῶν ἱκανῶν εὐποροῦντες μὴ τολμῶσιν ἐλευθέρως χρῆσθαι. (33) καὶ τὸ βιβλίον αὐτὸ ἐδόκει εἶναι Ἀντισθένους περὶ χρήσεως· ἔφερεν δὲ εἰς οἶνον, καὶ Διονύσου προσῆν τινα σύμβολα. οὕτω δ’ οὖν ὑπὸ τῆς συνηθείας διεκείμην, ὥστε καὶ ἐφέντος τοῦ θεοῦ μικρόν τι παρήλλαττον πίνων τοῦ μέτρου. καὶ τινα ἐπόθουν τρόπον τὴν ταμείαν τὴν τότε.

(30) ἂν ἔχοιμι T S² : ἀνέχομαι A S¹ D (31) εἴθ’ ὑπεγέγραπτο : εἴθ’ ἐπεγέγραπτο T addito ē sup. π : εἴθ’ ἐπεγέγραπτο S² (32) μὴ ἐπιλείπῃ Canter : μὴ ἔτι λείπῃ O : μὴ μέ τι λυπῇ Keil

(30) I seemed to be reading one of the serious books, from which all of the details—for again I will tell the same story—I would not be able to tell. For how could I, after such a long time, especially when my text has taken away [my ability] to supply my memory? (31) But toward the end of the book things of this sort were mostly in it—and they were as if spoken about one of the competitors—“So all these things the god considered, and seeing that the stream was running in full, he ordered [him] to drink water, and to abstain from wine, if he wanted at all to have victory. ‘And it is possible for you,’ he said, ‘to imitate this and win the crown or a share in the crown.’” There it stopped. Then there had been written under the account the epigraph “Lover of the crown” or “In love with the crown.” (32) For how much time I endured the water drinking, also this am I unable to say. But [I can say] that I endured it calmly and easily, although previously I always somehow disliked water and got sickened by it. And when also this service had

been paid, he [Asclepius] took me off water and ordered a portion of wine, and the term was “kingly half portion”: it is recognizable, of course, that he meant a half-cup measure. I consumed this, and it was sufficient to such a degree that double the amount previously had not been sufficient: and there were times when it was even left over, since I was sparing out of fear that it might run out. However, I did not set this aside for the next day, but it was necessary to be content anew with the portion [for that day]. And when he had also this proof, he allowed [me] next to drink to indulgence, joking in the following kind of way, that foolish are the people who are wealthy in sufficient things but do not dare to use them liberally. (33) And the book itself seemed to be Antisthenes’ *On Use*. It told about wine, and there were some symbols of Dionysus present. And therefore I was so disposed from my habit that, even when the god permitted, I would depart [only] a small bit from drinking my portion, and in a certain way I longed for the stewardship of that time.

Context of Preservation

This passage appears near the end of Aristides’ third book of *Sacred Tales*, a set of narratives recording his experiences and dreams while in communication with the healing god Asclepius, dated to 144–55 CE. See Petsalis-Diomidis 2010: esp. 267–69 on Aristides’ practice of evoking healing advice in his dreams from the authority of ancient books. Antisthenes’ portrait was present on the “covered way” of second-century Pergamum that led from the city to the precinct of Asclepius, the setting of Aristides’ *Sacred Tales*. (See Petsalis-Diomidis 2010:174–79.)

Importance of the Testimonium

This cryptic passage seems to quote from a text of Antisthenes (although it is not impossible that Aristides fabricates the quotation). It seems to give evidence for speaking gods in his texts, for “symbols” in his texts, for subtitles, and possibly for a frame dialogue. A setting at the athletic games, common in stories about Diogenes of Sinope (SSR VB 449), is otherwise not attested for Antisthenes, although it could be implied in t. 106. The text is not like anything else surviving from Antisthenes (and hence Decleva Caizzi 1966:101 hesitates in attributing it). If Aristides’ illness and dreaming state have left their mark on this account, these can hardly be stripped away. Although Aristides cites the title as *On Use* (usually identified with t. 41A title 9.7), the content can be associated with Antisthenes’ *Protreptics* (title 2.4), which had a sympotic setting (t. 64C–D) and a mixed style (t. 11) and could have included inset mythical episodes.

Notes

(30) βιβλίον τι τῶν σπουδαίων: Although Antisthenes' writing sometimes might have been witty (to judge from t. 54 and 187; compare also the *apophthegmata* in, e.g., t. 57, 70, 72, 75, 131, 168, and 171), the topic here, abstinence from wine, could have called for earnest treatment (see t. 191, 64). Contrast also Timon's judgment that Antisthenes was a "trifler" (φλέδων, t. 41B). An association with the character Eryximachus in Plato's *Symposium* might not be idle: having stated that drunkenness is "bad for humans" (176d1–2), Eryximachus proposes (quoting Phaedrus) that the company should make speeches on Eros because praises of far lesser beings have been made: "indeed I myself have in the past encountered a certain book of a wise man, in which there were [kinds of?] salt carrying marvelous praise toward their usefulness" (ἀλλ' ἔγωγε ἤδη τινὶ ἐνέτυχον βιβλίῳ ἀνδρὸς σοφοῦ, ἐν ᾧ ἐνήσαν ἅλεις ἔπαινον θαυμάσιον ἔχοντες πρὸς ὠφελίαν, 177b4–6). This praise of salt, which is coupled with bumblebees in Isocrates (*Helen* §12), is often attributed to Polycrates (Dover 1980:88). But see t. 66.

τῆς ἀπογραφῆς τὸ τῇ μνήμῃ προσέχειν ἀφελομένης: In *Sacred Tales*, Aristides sustains the proposition that he wrote down three hundred thousand lines about his experiences in a book that he has lost but tries to reproduce (*Sacred Tales* 2.1–4). This extension might be a joke on the Socratics' warnings that writing compromises the memory, which Antisthenes (t. 168) seems to share with Plato (*Phaedr.* 275a).

(31) ἦν δὲ ὡς ἐπὶ τινος τῶν ἀγωνιστῶν: The "competitors" are probably contestants at an athletic festival (possibly a symbolic one: see t. 162), since they are aiming to win a crown. If Antisthenes' text was *On Use of Wine* or *On Drunkenness* or *On the Cyclops* (t. 41A title 9.7), as Aristides' citation of a title in §33 has normally been understood, and if this text was fully about the *Odyssey*, as the position of that title in the catalog suggests, the competition could have been related to the Phaeacian games in *Od.* 8.186–98, and the victor could have been Odysseus. In a different mythical context, Heracles would be a plausible recipient of this divine instruction about gaining victory (compare t. 96). Antisthenes might have made Odysseus and Heracles parallel in some ways (compare t. 188). In Plato's *Phaedrus*, Socrates compares philosophical love and its afterlife to winning the true Olympian wrestling matches (*Phaedr.* 256b4–7), and this imagery might support a serious symbolic meaning for the athletic contest in Antisthenes' writings also.

ὁ θεός: The god giving orders within the reported story could be Zeus, insofar as he is Antisthenes' preferred Olympian (see t. 188). But his identity is not clear. The god giving orders to Aristides in the external story (§32) is Asclepius. The symbols of Dionysus present in the reported story (§33)

probably do not imply that Dionysus is the god speaking, since Dionysus should be more suited to encourage wine drinking.

εἴ τι δέεται νικήσαι: Antisthenes has a book title referring to victory (t. 41A title 3.8). Xenophon's character Antisthenes in *Mem.* 3.4 (t. 72B) is an expert on victory. The verb δέεται might refer to an objective need or deficiency rather than a subjective desire of the contestant (see t. 82.38). The force of this verb here is hard to judge, because the context is so slight.

‘ἂ δὴ καὶ σοί’ ἔφη, ‘ἔξεστι μιμησαμένῳ . . .’: There are two possibilities for the speaker of these words. Either the god mentioned is instructing his advisee to imitate some behavior not identified, presumably the good drinking practice of someone else; or, more likely, a second speaker on another level, such as in a framing dialogue, is telling a second advisee to imitate the actions of the hero in the embedded story. The ideal behavior is presumably to drink water instead of wine. If this is a dialogue frame around a mythical episode, the closing frame is very short. (Aristides' suggests that the end is abrupt.) On Antisthenes' characters as models for mimesis, see t. 44C.

στεφανοῦσθαι ἢ συστεφανοῦσθαι: The distinction is odd, and Aristides probably did not generate it idly but might be quoting Antisthenes' text. Sharing the crown might apply to a victor who is joining a group of victors, perhaps the philosophically select, rather than being the first. But he is also earning his crown in his own right, and hence the simple verb is appropriate. In t. 200, Socrates seems to decline sharing the “prize” (γέρας) that belongs to Alcibiades, yet the interlocutor insists that Socrates granted an opportunity and so implicitly retains a share of the honor. The contest for the armor in t. 53–54 is also relevant to the question whether a victor must be alone, or whether victory can be shared: Ajax and Odysseus might hold different positions. In Xenophon's *Hiero* 7.9, the tyrant's dream is that his people will “crown [him] because of shared virtue and benefaction” (καὶ στεφανῶσι κοινῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ εὐεργεσίας ἔνεκα). See also t. 12B note on συμμαθηταί.

τοῦπίγγραμμα, φιλοστέφανος ἢ φιλησιστέφανος: “Lover of the crown” or “In love with the crown” (φιλησιστέφανος is attested otherwise only in a fragment from Pindar's paeans, fr. 52a) could be a subtitle for the extract from Περὶ χρήσεως that Aristides is citing (so Brancacci 2003:265); alternatively, it could be a title for one of the *Protrepics*, which more certainly had parts (see t. 41A title 2.5). An ancient practice of giving subtitles to parts of works is paralleled for Homer's poems (which had named episodes, e.g., the Τειχοσκοπία, or “View from the Wall”), but not otherwise. Therefore, if Antisthenes' texts had subtitles, the most likely explanation for their origin would be his own hand. Aristides' citation of two alternative forms for the subtitle could be related to his pretense of a bad memory.

(32) “**ἡμίνα βασιλική**”· γνώριμον δὴ που ὅτι ἔφραζεν ἡμικοτύλιον: The term “kingly half portion” is not otherwise attested, and it is plausibly Antisthenes’ term, in reference to the kingly life led by the man who controls his appetites (see t. 82 §37–41). A “half cup” (ἡμικοτύλιον) is a standard of measure, used mostly by medical writers, sometimes for wine. The full cup as a standard of measure (κοτύλη) is particularly Athenian usage (Athenaeus 478f): according to the grammarians, the Italian or Sicilian equivalent would be ἡμίνα (Athenaeus 479a–b). If this equivalence holds here, the “kingly half portion” is only half of the unqualified Sicilian “half portion,” since the former is equal to a half cotyle and the latter to a full cotyle. If Antisthenes adopted a Sicilian term and added the description “kingly,” this could be a case of his reversal of normal meanings (compare “wealth” in t. 81A and 82), and he could be referring critically or playfully to the Sicilian tyrants of the early fourth century. (See t. 82.36 notes.) For other ideologically loaded names for drinking cups in Antisthenes, see t. 64–65.

οὕτως ἥρκει ὡς οὐκ ἥρκει πρότερον τὸ διπλάσιον: Compare the language in Antisthenes’ description of his complete satisfaction from moderate consumption in t. 82.37–41, esp. στρωμνὴν γε μὴν οὕτως ἀρκοῦσαν ἔχω ὥστ’ ἔργον μέγ’ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνεγείραι (§38).

ἔστι δ’ ὅτε καὶ φειδομένῳ ὑπὸ τοῦ δεδιέναι μὴ ἐπιλείπη περιήν: Fear of running out of resources is probably not appropriate to the wise or kingly man, but it could be appropriate to someone still making progress. If Aristides is tracing a pattern of progress in acquiring self-control, or *enkrateia*, that he found in a text by Antisthenes, this is unique evidence for these intermediate phases in the transformation. There is a textual problem in the verb ἐπιλείπη, but this conjecture makes most sense of the story, especially the next sentence, about how a day’s excess is handled. Keil’s alternative, that Aristides fears he will be harmed by too much wine, is not motivated in the text. Even the speaking god makes no reference to harm from wine.

ὅτι μάταιοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων εἶεν ὅσοι τῶν ἱκανῶν εὐποροῦντες μὴ τολμῶσιν ἐλευθέρως χρῆσθαι: Aristides has learned wisdom, in respect to wine, similar to that which Antisthenes seems to know more generally in t. 82. Compare §38–41, where Antisthenes’ sufficient resources are described as excess, and §43, where Antisthenes claims that his frugal lifestyle makes him generous with the wealth of his soul, toward external parties: ἄξιον δ’ ἐννοῆσαι ὡς καὶ ἐλευθερίους ὁ τοιοῦτος πλοῦτος παρέχεται. Aristides’ use of his (material) resources remains private, for himself, more like the image in §38–41.

(33) **Ἀντισθένης περὶ χρήσεως**: The citation of Antisthenes’ title here, although the quotation ended several lines earlier, implies that the intervening narrative about Aristides’ own treatment is related to Antisthenes’ advice and inspiration. Declava Caizzi and Giannantoni elide §32. Antisthenes’

title is usually understood to be *Περὶ οἴνου χρήσεως ἢ Περὶ μέθης ἢ Περὶ τοῦ Κύκλωπος* (t. 41A title 9.7), but the form *Περὶ χρήσεως* admits other possibilities, for example, the *Protrepics*, if we allow deviation from the catalog. Aristippus is also credited with titles formed on the term *χρεία* and with titles referring to wine (Diog. Laert. 2.84); but the supernatural and allegorical elements in the story seem even less fitting to Aristippus than to Antisthenes.

Διονύσου . . . τινα σύμβολα: If the texts contained “symbols” of Dionysus, he was probably not present as a character in the text. It is odd that Aristides mentions these “symbols” in his summary statement, so they must have been prominent. The “symbols” of Dionysus could be implements for drinking wine: Porphyry’s allegorical interpretation in *On the Cave of the Nymphs* (§13) calls mixing bowls and wine jugs the “symbols of Dionysus.” Or possibly they were wine or grapes.

τὴν ταμείαν τὴν τότε: Aristides must refer to the ancient days of Antisthenes or the mythical times of his characters. Antisthenes is proud of his own “stewardship” in t. 82.41 (ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς ταμιεύομαι).

Alcibiades and the Politicians

testimonia 198–204

198. Athenaeus, *Wise Men at Dinner* XII 534c (Kaibel)

= 30 DC

διὸ καὶ Ἀντισθένης ὁ Σωκρατικὸς ὡς δὴ αὐτὸς αὐτόπτης γεγρονῶς τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου ἰσχυρὸν αὐτὸν καὶ ἀνδρώδη καὶ ἀπαίδευτον καὶ τολμηρὸν καὶ ὠραῖον ἐφ' ἡλικίας <πάσης> γενέσθαι φησίν.

ὡς δὴ Gaiser : ὡς ἂν A E | ἀπαίδευτον A C E : εὐπαίδευτον
Dalechamp | πάσης add. Gaiser e Plut., *Alc.* 3

For this reason also Antisthenes the Socratic, speaking of course as one who saw Alcibiades himself, says he was strong and masculine and badly educated and daring and beautiful at every time of his manhood.

Context of Preservation

Athenaeus' twelfth book is in the authorial voice, not a conversation among dinner guests as occur elsewhere in his work. The topic is pleasure, for which the life of Alcibiades provides one illustration. (T. 144 on Pericles and Aspasia, probably not from Antisthenes, appears earlier in the same context.) Satyrus (c. 200 BCE), cited by Athenaeus as the first main source on Alcibiades, was an author of biographies frequently mentioned by Diogenes Laertius as well as Athenaeus, including a biography of Antisthenes himself (see t. 12C). The citation of Antisthenes is probably retained by Athenaeus within his citation of Satyrus, and if so, Satyrus used Antisthenes as one of his sources on Alcibiades.

Importance of the Testimonium

This evaluation of Alcibiades might have implications for Antisthenes' account of Socrates' relationship with him. Antisthenes seems to say that Alcibiades' virtue (and vice) did not change over the course of his mature life. By contrast, Xenophon explains, in *Mem.* 1.2.24 (see t. 103C), that Alcibiades had ethical

virtue while he associated with Socrates but then lost it, because of his non-ethical virtues, when he left Socrates. In the text as printed, Antisthenes seems to imply that Alcibiades was never educated and so presumably never ethically good, that is, even during whatever period he associated with Socrates. This would be different from the position of Aeschines and Plato, as well as Xenophon, who all apologize for Socrates' failure with Alcibiades, and it would be closer to the position of Isocrates (*On the Team of Horses*; *Busiris* §5), who denies that Socrates taught him. The adjectives describing Alcibiades' non-ethical virtues are mild and even ambiguously positive, by comparison with those that Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.1.12) attributes to Socrates' accuser: τῶν ἐν τῇ δημοκρατίᾳ πάντων ἀκρατέστατός τε καὶ ὑβριστότατος (the least self-controlled and the most arrogantly violent of all those in the democracy). Possibly Antisthenes wrote about Alcibiades very early in the tradition, before the accuser (probably Polycrates) had associated him with Critias and the Thirty Tyrants or used him to accuse Socrates. For a plausible chronology of the Alcibiades debate in the works of Xenophon and Plato, see Stokes 2012.

Notes

ὥς δὴ αὐτὸς αὐτόπτης γεγονώς: The lives of Antisthenes (born c. 445) and Alcibiades (born c. 450) were almost contemporary. Kahn (1994:89 n.9 and 1996:33) takes the term αὐτόπτης as evidence that Antisthenes, like Xenophon, presented himself as a character in his own dialogues. But the words are probably Satyrus' authentication of his source, through external knowledge that the men were contemporaries.

ἰσχυρόν: "Strength" is closely related to ethics for Antisthenes: see t. 134c on Socratic strength and t. 41A titles 4.2 and 10.2 on Heracles' strength. But in t. 54.13, Odysseus uses the term as a pre-ethical power, which Ajax, in his error, equates with wisdom and bravery. A common interpretation of t. 134c is that Socratic strength is the final part of ethical happiness; but it could be that strength is inborn, and even Socrates' strength would be pre-ethical without the virtue to which it is added. In the case of Heracles, a pre-ethical strength might enable him to endure in his effort to become ethical (see t. 96). Here, strength is ambiguous, as is the next term, and Antisthenes' negative opinion only becomes clear with the surprising ἀπαιδεύτον and the strongly negative τολμηρόν. If Alcibiades' uneducated quality is what prevents him from being ethical, his strength was a necessary, though far from sufficient, component in his potential but unattained ethical disposition. In t. 68, Antisthenes seems to have a sympathetic attitude toward the Alcibiades-like character; and Odysseus himself can also be compared to Alcibiades (see t. 54, 187).

ἀνδρώδῃ: This word shares an etymology with ἀνδρεία, "courage," but

designates masculinity in particular. Courage is presumably part of ethical virtue for Antisthenes (see t. 41A titles 2.4 and 3.2, 54.13, 77A-B; compare t. 78, where it seems to be separable), and masculinity is related to courage on the battlefield. Possibly the term is chosen for its unclear overlap with the ethical virtue. Diogenes Laertius credits Antisthenes with inspiring the “most manly” tradition of the Stoa (τῆς ἀνδρωδεστάτης Στωικῆς): see t. 22A.

ἀπαίδετον: The list of attributes so far is at least cautiously positive, and the surrounding context cited from Satyrus is praising of Alcibiades’ beauty and popularity. Antisthenes might have planted the negative attribute ἀπαίδετον here in the list for its scathing irony and impact. (Compare *Busiris* §5, where Isocrates scolds Polycrates for considering Alcibiades a “pupil,” μαθητής, of Socrates, when most had not even perceived him as “educated,” παιδευόμενος.) Other accounts of Alcibiades’ education with Socrates depict it as successful, if temporarily, and it seems insulting to Socrates’ mission to declare Alcibiades “uneducated.” According to these accounts of the other Socratics, Alcibiades’ failings occurred after his departure from Socrates’ influence. Antisthenes seems to endorse the incorruptibility of education (t. 99), and Xenophon uses exactly the case of Alcibiades to make his point that virtue can be lost (*Mem.* 1.2.19; see t. 103C). Perhaps Antisthenes held, consistently, that virtue cannot be lost but that Alcibiades never gained true virtue, although he had plenty of pre-philosophical assets and could have attained virtue.

τολμηρόν: This is the most negative quality in the list and might be unambiguous: compare Thuc. 3.82.4; Pl. *Lach.* 197a4; t. 16, 53.3–4. But see also t. 103B, where it is complimentary.

ῥαῖον: This is the most positive quality in the list, but it is an external virtue, of the body. See t. 199B, where it is repeated. See t. 93, where it is a quality of the beloved that attracts a worthy (philosophical) lover and where Proclus associates the figure of the beloved with Alcibiades.

ἐφ’ ἡλικίας <πάσης>: This refers to the “whole” period (with Gaiser’s conjecture) of Alcibiades’ prime maturity as an adult. Emphasizing the full span of Alcibiades’ adulthood, without change, seems necessary to the point. It could be only the last adjective, ῥαῖον, that is governed by this temporal span. It could be ambiguous just which qualities Alcibiades retained through his life, especially if the whole description is ambiguous.

199A. Proclus, *Commentary on Plato’s “Alcibiades”* 114.14–18 (Westerink)

= 32A DC

ὅτι δ’ αὖ μέγας ὁ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἐγένετο καὶ καλός, δηλοῖ μὲν καὶ τὸ κοινὸν αὐτὸν ἐρώμενον καλεῖσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἀπάσης, δηλοῖ δὲ ὁ

Ἀντισθένης εἰπὼν ὡς “εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς, οὐκ ἄρα ἦν ὄντως καλός,” δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὸ τοὺς Ἑρμᾶς πλάττεσθαι κατὰ τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ.

And that Alcibiades was tall and beautiful is clear from the fact that he was called the common beloved of all of Greece, and it is clear from Antisthenes, when he says, “If Achilles was not such a man, he was not really beautiful after all,” and it is clear from the fact that the statues of Hermes were fashioned according to his image.

Context of Preservation

Proclus is explicating Pl. *Alc.* 104a4–c6, the second half of Socrates’ opening speech to Alcibiades, particularly 104a4–5, where Socrates confronts Alcibiades with believing himself to be κάλλιστός τε καὶ μέγιστος. Proclus cites this material in support. An earlier passage from Proclus’ commentary is t. 93. Satyrus could be the source for all three statements about Alcibiades preserved here (E. R. Dodds, *Gnomon* [1955]:167, on the basis of Athenaeus, t. 198).

199B. Olympiodorus, *Commentary on Plato’s “Alcibiades I”* p. 28.18–25 (Westerink)

= 32B DC

ὅτι γὰρ καλὸς ἦν τῷ σώματι δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ κοινὸν ἐρώμενον αὐτὸν λέγεσθαι τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἐκ τοῦ τοὺς Ἑρμᾶς Ἀθήνησι κατ’ εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν αὐτοῦ γράφεσθαι, ἐκ τοῦ τὸν Κυνικὸν Ἀντισθένην λέγειν περὶ αὐτοῦ, “εἰ μὴ τοιοῦτος ἦν ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς, οὐκ ἦν ὠραῖος.” περὶ οὗ φησὶν ὁ ποιητὴς βουλόμενος τὸν Νιρέα εἰς κάλλος ἐπαινέσαι

Νιρέυς, ὃς κάλλιστος ἀνὴρ ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἦλθεν
τῶν ἄλλων Δαναῶν μετ’ ἀμύμονα Πηλεΐωνα.

For that he [Alcibiades] was beautiful in body is clear from the fact that he was called the common beloved of all of Greece, from the fact that at Athens the statues of Hermes were painted [*sic*] according to his image and likeness, and from the fact that the Cynic Antisthenes said about him, “If Achilles was not such a man, he was not beautiful.” And about Achilles, the poet [Homer] says, when he wants to praise Nireus for beauty,

Nireus, who went to Ilium as the most beautiful man
Of all other Danaans, after the blameless son of Peleus.

[*Il.* 2.673–74]

Context of Preservation

Olympiodorus (who appears to use Proclus as his source) presents the same three facts about Alcibiades in a different order to explain Socrates' observation that Alcibiades has scorned many lovers (Pl. *Alc.* 103b2–4). Olympiodorus next explains that Socrates loves Alcibiades because he scorns other lovers, then explains Alcibiades' scorn. Proclus' interpretation in t. 93 is more nuanced.

Importance of the Testimonia

This confirms other evidence for Antisthenes' praise of Alcibiades' external virtue. A note in the margin of Olympiodorus refers to “the story of Antisthenes about the beauty of Alcibiades” (τὸν λόγον Ἀντισθένους περὶ τοῦ κάλλους Ἀλκιβιάδου), which could be the text titled *Alcibiades* (t. 41A, title 10.6), or a sub-story within the *Cyrus* (t. 41A, title 4.1), or one of the ethical texts in the third *tomos*. There is no evidence for Antisthenes' ethical evaluation of Achilles, except that the former praised the latter for enduring what was necessary for a good education, possibly in a text on Heracles (t. 95; see also t. 68).

Notes

ὅτι δ' αὖ μέγας . . . καὶ καλός (A) / ὅτι γὰρ καλὸς ἦν τῷ σώματι (B):

Plato's text refers to both size and beauty (κάλλιστός τε καὶ μέγιστος), and Antisthenes' comparison of Alcibiades to Achilles might suggest large size in addition to beauty.

οὐκ ἄρα ἦν ὄντως καλός (A) / οὐκ ἦν ὠραῖος (B): The different adjectives show that the citation from Antisthenes is not a verbatim quotation. But Olympiodorus' ὠραῖος is also in t. 198 and 93.

τὸ τοὺς Ἑρμᾶς πλάττεσθαι κατὰ τὸ εἶδος αὐτοῦ (A): The report that the Athenians used the image of Alcibiades for their statues of Hermes appears also in Clement, *Protreptikos* 4.5.3 and Aristaeneus, *Epistle* 1.11 (sixth century CE). Satyrus had other sources, beyond Antisthenes, for the life of Alcibiades. This point might have been invented as part of a defense against Alcibiades' role in the mutilation of the herms before the Sicilian Expedition (Thuc. 6.28). Olympiodorus' verb γράφεσθαι seems to be a misinterpretation of Proclus. Νηρέυς, ὃς κάλλιστος (B): Olympiodorus cites Homer often and probably added this quotation himself.

200. Athenaeus, *Wise Men at Dinner* V 216b–c (Kaibel)

= 33 DC

καὶ Ἀντισθένης δ' ὁ Σωκρατικὸς περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τὰ αὐτὰ τῷ Πλάτῳ ἰστορεῖ. “οὐκ ἔστιν δ' ἔτυμος ὁ λόγος οὗτος,” χαρίζεται

γὰρ καὶ ὁ κύων οὗτος πολλὰ τῷ Σωκράτει· ὅθεν οὐδετέρῳ αὐτῶν
 δεῖ πιστεύειν σκοπὸν ἔχοντας Θουκυδίδην. ὁ γὰρ Ἀντισθένης καὶ
 προσεπάγει τῇ ψευδογραφίᾳ λέγων οὕτως· “ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀκούομεν καὶ
 τῇ πρὸς Βοιωτοὺς μάχῃ τὰ ἀριστεία σε λαβεῖν.”—‘εὐφήμει, ὦ ξένε·
 Ἀλκιβιάδου τὸ γέρας, οὐκ ἐμόν.’—‘σοῦ γε δόντος, ὡς ἡμεῖς ἀκούομεν.”

Also Antisthenes the Socratic relates the same things as Plato about the prize for valor. “But this story is not true” [Stesichorus, *PMG* 192.1]. For also this Dog pays favor on many occasions to Socrates. And so one should trust neither of them, if one uses Thucydides as a standard. For Antisthenes also goes further in his misrepresentation when he says, “We hear that you won the prize for valor also in the battle against the Boeotians.” “Hush, stranger. The prize was Alcibiades’, not mine.” “But you gave it to him, as we hear.”

Context of Preservation

This passage (as well as t. 141A, 142, 147, 203–4) is in a speech by the banqueter Masurius, a jurist and poet hostile toward philosophers. Herodicus “the Cratetean” of Babylon, author of *In Reply to the Lover of Socrates*, is cited as the source for part of the speech (215f) and has been assumed to be the source for all of it (Düring 1941). Here Masurius accuses the Socratics of lying about Socrates’ military campaigns: the stories taken as a set (which includes Plato’s *Apol.* 28e, *Lach.* 181a–b, and *Sym.* 221a) are mutually inconsistent, as well as inconsistent with Thucydides.

Importance of the Testimonium

Herodicus seems to preserve a verbatim quotation from Antisthenes’ dialogue, which was probably *Alcibiades* (t. 41 title 10.6). If so, it shows a simple, unframed “mime” structure, which could be typical pre-Platonic technique (Kahn 1994:89, 1996:19). It also shows Socrates as speaker (see t. 3B).

Notes

περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων . . . ἱστορεῖ: As Herodicus charges, the stories about Socrates’ three military adventures (at Potidaea, Amphipolis, and Delium in Boeotia) could be fictions, created in the Socratic literature (Dittmar 1912; Gigon 1947). The present passage is evidence that Antisthenes generated at least one narrative about Socrates’ campaign at Delium in Boeotia and that he, too, told the story preserved in Plato’s *Symposium*, that Socrates passed to Alcibiades a prize for valor that he had earned himself. (See also t. 202, probably from the same story.) Various possibilities for the title of Antisthenes’ text have been presented (Hirzel 1895 I.190 argues for *Archelaus*,

Dittmar 1912:84 for *Alcibiades*; possible also is *On Courage*). Düring 1941:44 goes further and proposes that Antisthenes' story was the same one preserved in Cic. *De div.* 1.54, Plut. *De gen.* 581e, and the first Socratic epistle, in which Socrates' *daimonion* gives him the positive advice that enables him to escape danger.

“οὐκ ἔστιν δ' ἔτυμος ὁ λόγος οὗτος”: Stesichorus, *PMG* 192.1, quoted also by Plato at *Phaedr.* 243a8 and 244a3. This is Herodicus' voice, recanting the traditional stories. However, since Herodicus did not tell the traditional stories, it is possible to ask whether Herodicus is mimicking a statement made in the literature on Socrates' military campaigns, reinforcing his point that this contained conflicts and self-corrections.

ὁ κύων οὗτος: If this was Herodicus' description of Antisthenes and not Athenaeus' description, it might be part of the debate in late Hellenistic Pergamum about the roots of Cynicism and its relationship to Stoicism. (See t. 138A.)

σκοπὸν ἔχοντας Θουκυδίδην: Appeal to Thucydides as the standard is Herodicus' strategy for contesting the historicity of the Socratic literature: see Düring 1941.

εὐφήμει, ὦ ξένε: Socrates' interlocutor is not Alcibiades, and he appears to be aggressive with Socrates. He is a “foreigner,” maybe a visiting diplomat or sophist who appeared in a dialogue. He has gained his information about Socrates at second hand (ὡς ἡμεῖς ἀκούομεν). This character could have been an antagonist for Socrates in the main part of a dialogue, like Anytus in Plato's *Meno* (who is, however, Athenian); or the exchange could have been part of a frame that motivates the speakers to reconsider the event where the prize was awarded, like Echecrates in Plato's *Phaedo*.

201. Plutarch, *Life of Alcibiades* 1.3 p. 192a (Ziegler)

=31 DC

Ἀλκιβιάδου δὲ καὶ τίτην, γένος Λάκαιναν, Ἀμύκλαν ὄνομα, καὶ Ζώπυρον παιδαγωγὸν ἴσμεν, ὧν τὸ μὲν Ἀντισθένης, τὸ δὲ Πλάτων ἱστόρηκε.

We know also that Alcibiades' nurse was of Laconian race and named Amycla, and his tutor was Zopyrus: Antisthenes gives testimony to the first and Plato to the second.

Context of Preservation

This is part of Plutarch's early exposition of Alcibiades' birth and education.

Importance of the Testimonium

Antisthenes was interested in the ethnicity of Alcibiades' nurse. Possibly he discussed Alcibiades' education beginning in infancy. Possibly he was interested in the non-Athenian influences on Alcibiades or in non-Athenian maternal figures. (See t. 1–3, esp. 3A–B.)

202. Plutarch, *Life of Alcibiades* 7.5 p. 194f–195a (Ziegler)

ἐγίνετο μὲν οὖν τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ λόγῳ Σωκράτους τὸ ἀριστεῖον· ἐπεὶ δ' οἱ στρατηγοὶ διὰ τὸ ἀξίωμα τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ σπουδάζοντες ἐφαίνοντο περιθεῖναι τὴν δόξαν, ὁ Σωκράτης βουλόμενος αὔξεσθαι τὸ φιλότιμον ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς αὐτοῦ πρῶτος ἐμαρτύρει καὶ παρεκάλει στεφανοῦν ἐκείνον καὶ διδόναι τὴν πανοπλίαν.

It was, by the fairest account, the prize of Socrates. But when the generals were clearly eager on account of his rank to award the honor to Alcibiades, Socrates, wishing to enhance his ambition in fine matters, was first to testify and bid them to crown him and award him the armor.

Context of Preservation

Plutarch's chronological narrative addresses Alcibiades' military career.

Importance of the Testimonium

This story is attributed by Giannantoni to Antisthenes by association with t. 200, plausibly. See also Pl. *Sym.* 220e5–7.

βουλόμενος αὔξεσθαι τὸ φιλότιμον ἐν τοῖς καλοῖς αὐτοῦ: Socrates is given credit in this narrative for fostering Alcibiades' ambitions, as part of his effort to teach him. Although presented innocently, this act is laced with irony, in light of Alcibiades' later career. If this description of the episode can be attributed to Antisthenes, it suggests that, far from sparing Socrates responsibility for Alcibiades, Antisthenes might have blamed him. See t. 198.

203. Athenaeus, *Wise Men at Dinner* V 220d (Kaibel)

= 42 DC

ὁ δ' Ἀρχέλαος Γοργίου τοῦ ῥήτορος [καταδρομὴν περιέχει].

And his [Antisthenes'] text *Archelaus* [contains abuse] of Gorgias the rhetor.

Context of Preservation

This sentence is part of a paragraph delivered by the banqueter Masurius, a jurist and poet hostile toward philosophers (see t. 200). The sentence follows immediately on t. 204, which supplies the predicate καταδρομήν περιέχει. T. 141A (on Alcibiades) appears immediately before t. 204, and t. 142 (on Pericles and Aspasia) and 147A (on Plato) immediately follow the present passage.

Importance of the Testimonium

This is the only surviving information on the content of *Archelaus* and the only literal testimony that Antisthenes rejected Gorgias in at least some ways. It offers a basis for a relationship between Antisthenes' *Archelaus* or *On Kingship* and Plato's *Gorgias*, in which Archelaus (tyrant of the Macedonians in 413–399 BCE) is considered as a case of an unjust man who is happy (470d–471d). Decleva Caizzi (1966:101) thinks Antisthenes' *Archelaus* was not closely comparable with Plato's *Gorgias* but was focused entirely on the difference between the king and the tyrant; in other words, Antisthenes' text was probably earlier, and Plato's was probably allusive obliquely, not in its direct points. See t. 208, 41A title 10.7.

204. Athenaeus, *Wise Men at Dinner* V 220d (Kaibel)

= 43 DC

ὁ δὲ Πολιτικός αὐτοῦ διάλογος ἀπάντων καταδρομήν περιέχει τῶν Ἀθήνησιν δημαγωγῶν.

And his dialogue the *Politicus* contains abuse of all the demagogues in Athens.

Context of Preservation

See t. 203.

Importance of the Testimonium

Politicus is otherwise unknown as a title and must be an alternative third title (see t. 41A introductory comment) for a dialogue named differently in the catalog. Decleva Caizzi (1966:101), following others (see Susemihl 1887:210 n.14) looks to *On Law* or *On the Constitution* (title 3.3). *Menexenus* or *On ruling* (t. 41A title 10.5) is possible, since its title suggests it was a dialogue. Athenaeus gives the titles *Archelaus* and *Aspasia* in the same sentence (t. 203, 142) and refers to “the second of his texts titled *Cyrus*” in the immediate context (t. 141A).

Notes

ἀπάντων . . . τῶν Ἀθήνησιν δημαγωγῶν: There is no surviving evidence for the identity of these “demagogues,” such as whether they include Pericles and his associates. (For hostility toward Pericles, see t. 142–43.)

205. = t. 41C

Imperial Imitations

testimonia 206–208

206. Letters of the Socratics, no. 8 (Köhler)

Ἀντισθένης Ἀριστίπῳ.

Οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ φιλοσόφου τὸ παρὰ τυράννοις ἀνδράσιν εἶναι καὶ
 Σικελικαῖς προσανέχειν τραπέζαις, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ
 <εἶναι> καὶ αὐτάρκων ἐφίεσθαι. σὺ δ' οἶει ταύτην εἶναι πλεονεξίαν
 τοῦ σπουδαίου, τὸ δύνασθαι κτᾶσθαι χρήματα μὲν πολλά, τοὺς δὲ
 δυνατωτάτους ἔχειν φίλους. οὔτε γὰρ τὰ χρήματα ἀναγκαῖά ἐστιν,
 οὔτ', εἰ ἀναγκαῖα ἦν, οὔτω ποριζόμενα καλὰ· οὔτε φίλοι γένοιντο ἂν οἱ
 πολλοὶ ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες, καὶ ταῦτα τύραννοι. ὥστε σοι συμβουλευσάμ'
 ἂν ἀπιέναι Συρακουσῶν τε καὶ Σικελίας. εἰ δ', ὥς φασί τινες, ἡδονὴν
 θαυμάζεις καὶ τούτων ἀντέχει ὧν μὴ προσήκει τοὺς φρονίμους
 ἀνθρώπους, ἅπιθι εἰς Ἀντίκυραν καὶ ὠφελήσει σε ὁ ἐλλέβορος ποθείς
 πολὺς· κρείσσω γάρ ἐστιν οὗτος τοῦ παρὰ Διονυσίου οἴνου. ἐκεῖνος
 μὲν γὰρ μανίαν ποιεῖ πολλήν, οὗτος δὲ ἀποπαύει. ὁπόσον οὖν ὑγείᾳ τε
 καὶ φρόνησιν νόσου τε καὶ ἀφροσύνης διαφέρει, τοσοῦτον ἂν καὶ σὺ
 διενέγκαις πρὸς τὰ νῦν σοι ὄντα. ἔρρωσο.

cod. Par. 1760 habet epistulam inter epist. Platonis | τοῦ
 φιλοσόφου P : τοῦτο φιλοσόφου G : τοῦτο φιλοσοφεῖν V et Allatius
 | εἶναι ante ἀνδράσιν Par. 1760 | Σικελικαῖς edd. : Σικελιωτικαῖς P G
 | καὶ αὐτάρκων Orelli : τῶν αὐτάρκων P G | <εἶναι> add. Sykutris
 | γὰρ codd. : om. Allatius : γὰρ τὰ Hercher | οὔτω ποριζόμενα
 καλὰ P G : οὔτως πορίζεσθαι καλόν Par. 1760 | Συρακουσῶν edd.
 : Συρρακουσῶν P G | εἰ δ', ὥς φασί . . . P G V : εἰδὼς ὥς φασί τινες
 ἡδονὴν σε θαυμάζειν, καὶ ὅτι λέγεις ταύτης ἀντέχεσθαι τοὺς φρονίμους
 ἀνθρώπους (finis epistulae) Par. 1760 | ἐλλέβορος ποθείς πολὺς·
 κρείττων γάρ Olearius : ἐλλέβορος ποθείς· πολὺ P G | πολλήν P G :
 πολλοῖς Par. 1760 | τοσοῦτον G : τοῦτον P | διενέγκαις edd. : διενέγκης
 G : διενέγκη(αι)ς P | ἔρρωσο : εὖ ἴσθι Par. 1760 et Vind. Gr. 82

Antisthenes to Aristippus.

This is not proper to a philosopher, to be among tyrants and to put one's dependence on the dining tables of Sicily. Proper to a philosopher is, rather, to be in one's native land and to aim at sufficient things. But you think this is the advantage of the good man, to be able to acquire a lot of money and to have the most powerful men as friends. But neither is money necessary, nor, if it were necessary, would it be good when it is earned in this way. Nor could the great mass of people become one's friends, since they are ignorant, and least of all tyrants. For these reasons I would advise you to come back from Syracuse and Sicily. And if, as people say, you marvel at pleasure and you cling to things that it is unbecoming of intelligent men to cling to, go back to Anticyra, and the hellebore will help you, if you drink a good dose. For this is more potent than the wine at Dionysius' court. That creates much madness, but this cures it. And to whatever degree health and intelligence differs from disease and folly, to that degree also would you improve relative to your present situation. Farewell.

Context of Preservation

This is the first of the twenty-six letters of the Socratics, as they are ordered in the first printed edition, which made small changes from the manuscripts. (See, further, Sykutris 1931:43–47.) The letters of the Socratics were composed probably between the time of Plutarch and Themistius, c. 200 CE, about two to three centuries later than the seven letters of Socrates with which they are transmitted. Plausibly they were written by a single author, who was interested in biographical topics and composed the series of interconnected letters in a “novelistic” fashion. The main sources for this set of letters seem to be older collections of letters, especially the Platonic letters; possibly the extant letters of Diogenes and Crates (which can be dated to the first century BCE); and a handbook of philosophy similar to that of Diogenes Laertius but containing different information.

Importance of the Testimonium

This letter shows that issues of wealth, luxury, self-sufficiency, and standards for friendship (all Cynic themes) were believed, by the author, to separate Antisthenes and Aristippus. The author of the Socratic letters is otherwise concerned to present Socraticism as a unified movement, close to Cynicism, and this tension is the only one evident. The particular tension with Aristippus is plausible (see t. 33), although early evidence for it is scant (chiefly t. 122A).

Notes

τὸ ἐν τῇ ἰδίᾳ <εἶναι> καὶ αὐτάρκων ἐφίεσθαι: Remaining home, in one's own city, is, in fact, atypical of the philosophers and Sophists of the fifth century; also, Plato and Aristotle travel abroad to instruct persons with major political power. Only Socrates stayed home, and even he, in the opening of the *Sophist* (216c5–6), uses the trait “wandering through the cities” (citing *Od.* 17.485–87) as a characteristic of philosophers and Sophists. “Aiming for self-sufficient things” might, in this context, refer to the financial compensation of the philosopher, who will garner less revenue if he stays home.

πλεονεξίαν τοῦ σπουδαίου: πλεονεξία is a derogatory term among the Socratics (see t. 189B–1), but here it seems to be Aristippus' conception of a goal in the good life.

οὔτε γὰρ τὰ χρήματα ἀναγκαῖα: Antisthenes emphasizes his freedom from money in t. 82.

οὔτ', εἰ ἀναγκαῖα ἦν, οὔτω ποριζόμενα καλά: Although Cynic shamelessness could imply that no means is too sordid for reaching a desirable end (so, e.g., Ajax seems to accuse Odysseus in t. 53.5), Antisthenes is here imagined to put limits on the kinds of associations one can make in the quest for good things.

οὔτε φίλοι γένοιντο ἂν οἱ πολλοὶ ἀμαθεῖς ὄντες: Friends must be “the good” (οἱ σπουδαῖοι, t. 134l), and the good are the wise (t. 102, 134, 187). On the extensional equivalence of these central evaluative terms, see t. 134b and s–t notes.

τύραννοι: In t. 82.36, Antisthenes calls “tyrants” those who are wealthy in money but unable to satisfy their desires.

ἡδονὴν θαυμάζεις: Antisthenes seems to agree that life should have pleasure (t. 82.38–44; compare t. 123–27); however, pleasure should be not pursued as a goal but accepted as a bonus accompanying things good on another basis.

Ἀντίκυραν: This Greek town on the south coast of Boeotia was known in antiquity for its production of hellebore (which carried the alternative name ἀντικυρία, according to the *Suda*, and ἀντικυρικόν, according to Hesychius). The association is clear in Horace, *Sat.* 2.3.83.

ὁ ἐλλέβορος ποθεῖς πολὺς: For hellebore as a cure for love of pleasure according to Antisthenes, see t. 123A–B. Aristippus needs a large dose; no quantity is mentioned in t. 123. (Köhler accepts the manuscript reading here, which places πολὺ in the following clause. But Olearius' emendation makes better sense of both the participle ποθεῖς and the placement of γὰρ in the new clause.)

μανίαν ποιεῖ: Possibly wine creates madness during the time one is intoxicated, or possibly the madness is the ongoing desire for or addiction to wine, if drinking wine has become an irrational pleasure (i.e., one so

permanent that it needs the hellebore by the terms of t. 123). Although Antisthenes is said elsewhere to prefer madness over pleasure (t. 122), we see here that they are also interrelated.

ὑγίειά τε καὶ φρόνησις νόσου τε καὶ ἀφροσύνης: Antisthenes uses terminology of health and sickness in t. 54.13 (Odysseus of Ajax) and 123A-B (the disease of Aphrodite). In both contexts, this moral disease is connected implicitly with intelligence (φρόνησις), although the term closest to ἀφροσύνη is “ignorance” (ἀμαθία in t. 54.13, ἄγνοια in t. 123A).

207A. Letters of the Socratics, no. 11 (Köhler)

Ἀρίστιππος Αἰσχίνῃ.

... ταῦτα δὲ Ἀντισθέней μὴ λέξης, εἰ σέσωκα τοὺς φίλους· οὐ γὰρ αὐτῶ ἀρέσκει τυράννοις φίλοις χρῆσθαι, ἀλλὰ τῶς ἀλφιτοπώλας καὶ τῶς καπήλως ἀναζητεῖν, οἵτινες δικαίως τὰ ἄλφιστα καὶ τὸν οἶνον πωλοῦσιν ἐν Ἀθήναις καὶ τὰς ἐξωμίδας μισθοῦσι τὰς παχείας, ὅποτεν οἱ σκίρωνες πνέωντι, καὶ τὸν Σίμωνα θεραπεύειν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι χρῆμα.

λέξης codd. plur. : λέξ(ει)ης P | τῶς ἀλφιτ. V : τοὺς ἀλφιτ. P G |
τῶς καπήλως V : τοὺς καπήλους P G | πωλοῦσιν codd. plur. : ποιοῦσιν
P | σκίρωνες edd. : σκίρρωνες P G | πνέωντι V : πνέωσι G : πνέωσι
(πνέοντι) P | τοῦτο γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι χρῆμα P G : τούτω γὰρ οὐκ ἔτι
χρῶμαι P ad marg.

Aristippus to Aeschines.

... But do not tell these things to Antisthenes, that I have saved your friends. For it does not please him to associate with tyrants as friends, but to seek out the barley merchants and the tavern keepers, who sell their barley and wine with justice in Athens and rent out the thick vests, whenever the winds blow in from the Skirian rocks, and to take care of Simon. For this is no concern [for him].

Context of Preservation

See t. 206. An opening statement, about the Locrian youths Aristippus saved, has been omitted.

Importance of the Testimonium

This passage, with the next two, suggests a regular association between Antisthenes and Simon “the shoemaker” at the time of the composition of the epistles. Simon is listed as a Socratic disciple and writer at Diog. Laert. 2.124, where he is said to be the first who wrote Socratic dialogues. His reality has been doubted and also reaffirmed (see Hock 1976; Sellars 2003). Whether or not he was real, he was certainly a character in Socratic literature. Phaedo

is credited with the title *Simon* (Diog. Laert. 2.10), and Antisthenes, on the strength of present evidence (including all the passages under t. 207), could be a candidate for authorship of another dialogue about Simon. There is no mention of Simon (or shoemakers or craftsmen of any kind) elsewhere in the evidence for Antisthenes' writings; sly remarks in Plato could be considered (for example, *Theaet.* 180d3–7, noted under t. 159D).

Notes

σέσωκα τοὺς φίλους: Aristippus used his influence with the tyrant Dionysius to have innocent Locrian youths (allies of Syracuse, with whom Dionysius was said to have relations both friendly and hostile) released from prison. The letter has a definite setting in 361 BCE, when Aristippus and Plato were both in Syracuse (Köhler 1928:103).

τῶς καπῆλως: Antisthenes wrote about (female) tavern keepers in his *Physiognomonicus* (t. 62). On the possibility that he wrote more about taverns, see t. 51A notes. The Doric forms in this letter and no. 13 are supposed to be true to Aristippus: according to Diogenes Laertius (2.83), Aristippus wrote some of his texts in Attic and some in Doric. Some manuscripts have Atticized the forms, but ms. P, in giving both alternatives, shows that the Doric was original.

ἀναζητεῖν: According to anecdote, both Socrates (Plut., *On Contentment* 470e–f) and Diogenes of Sinope (Teles, *On Self-Sufficiency* p. 12.8–13.13 Hense) led an associate around Athens, to the stalls of barley merchants and others, to demonstrate that life in Athens was cheap, not expensive. This anecdote seems to inform this letter (Sykutris 1933:51). The chief opposition in this anecdote, cheap versus expensive (πολυτελής/εὐτελής), might have been a theme of Antisthenes, to judge from a line in his speech on wealth (t. 82.41): οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς τὰ τίμια ὠνοῦμαι (πολυτελῆ γὰρ γίγνεται).

καὶ τὰς ἐξωμίδας μισθοῦσι τὰς παχείας: Xen. *Mem.* 2.7 features Socrates teaching his friend Aristarchus how to make an income by putting the female members of his household to work. At 2.7.5, he points out that they know how to make bread from barley and how to construct many types of garments, including the rarely mentioned ἐξωμίδες. The writer of the epistle might have used Xenophon as his source, or both writers might depend on a common original by Antisthenes. Compare Antisthenes' "thick garments" (παχεῖαι ἐφυστρίδες) in t. 82.38. The "thick" vests in the letter, which the merchants do not sell but merely rent out at times of need, are a joke against Cynic self-sufficiency. Just as Diogenes of Sinope needs his barrel for shelter only in the winter, so Antisthenes would have no constant need to own a thick vest.

τὸν Σίμωνα θεραπεύειν: Antisthenes pays homage to the shoemaker perhaps by attending discussions that take place in his shop and so endorsing his

intellectual importance (see t. 207C.1). This could be where Antisthenes was said to spend his time after Socrates was gone.

207B. Letters of the Socratics, no. 12 (Köhler)

Σίμων Ἀριστίππῳ.

Ἀκούω σε τωθάζειν ἡμᾶς τῆς σοφίας παρὰ Διονυσίῳ. ἐγὼ δὲ ὁμολογῶ εἶναι σκυτοτόμος καὶ ἐργάζεσθαι τοιαῦτα, καὶ ἔτοιμος, εἰ δέοι, σκύτη τέμνειν αὐτὸν πάλιν εἰς νουθεσίαν ἀνθρώπων ἀφρόνων καὶ οὕτω μετὰ πολλῆς χλιδῆς οἰομένων ζῆν παρὰ τὴν Σωκράτους βουλήν. ἔσται δὲ ὁ σωφρονιστὴς τῶν ἀφρόνων ὑμῶν παιδιῶν Ἀντισθένης· γράφεις γὰρ αὐτῷ κωμωδῶν ἡμῶν τὰς διατριβάς. ἀλλὰ τούτων μὲν, ὦ θεία φρήν, ἄλλῃ πεπαίχθω πρὸς σέ μοι. μέμνησο μέντοι λιμοῦ καὶ δίψης· ταῦτα γὰρ δύναται μεγάλα τοῖς σωφροσύνῃν διώκουσιν.

praescripta om. P | τωθάζειν Stanley : θαυμάζειν P G | ἔτοιμος Hercher : ὁμοίως P G | δέοι G : δέη P | παιδιῶν Koenius : παίδων P G : ὑμῶν τῶν ἀφρόνων παίδων Orelli | καὶ post ἄλλῃ P G : del. Hercher | λιμοῦ Stob. 3.17.10 : ἀεί μου P G, P ad marg. γρ ἀεί σου

Simon to Aristippus.

I hear that you mock me for my wisdom at Dionysius' court. I admit that I am a leather cutter and I do this kind of work, and I am ready, should it be necessary, to cut whips again for warning unintelligent men who believe they live by the counsel of Socrates, when they live with such great insolence. And Antisthenes will be the ethical superintendent for your foolish jokes. For you write to him making fun of my ways of life. Let this be enough of my jokes to you, my divine wit. But remember hunger and thirst, for these have great powers for those pursuing self-control.

Context of Preservation

See t. 206. This is a complete letter.

Notes

τωθάζειν ἡμᾶς τῆς σοφίας: Simon's "wisdom" is a craft literally, shoe making, not a craft in the ethics of living (which Socrates calls, metaphorically, a "craft" as well as a type of "wisdom"). Whatever other disadvantages of low social status Simon has overcome through his philosophy, he does not have the economic resources to enable a full range of ethical choices, as do Dionysius and Aristippus. The verb is correctly emended from θαυμάζειν: only a synonym for κωμωδεῖν makes sense of Aristippus' reply in letter no. 13.
νουθεσίαν ἀνθρώπων ἀφρόνων: This is a description of the Cynic mission

and might characterize Odysseus' message to Ajax (t. 54).

ἔσται δὲ ὁ σωφρονιστὴς . . . Ἀντισθένης: Other letters in this genre (esp. Diogenes, *Letter* 29) threaten to send Antisthenes to Syracuse to be a teacher there in true Socratic ethics.

μέμνησο μέντοι λιμοῦ καὶ δίψης: Although the threats about whips and Antisthenes' supervision were jokes, Aristippus should take note of the ascetic lesson.

207C. Letters of the Socratics, no. 13 (Köhler)

Ἀρίστιππος Σίμωνι.

(1) Οὐκ ἐγὼ σε κωμῶδῶ, ἀλλὰ Φαίδων, λέγων γεγονέναι σε κρείσσω καὶ σοφώτερον Προδίκῳ τῷ Κεῖῳ, ὃς ἔφα ἀπελέγξαι σε αὐτὸν περὶ τὸ ἐγκώμιον τὸ εἰς τὸν Ἡρακλέα γενόμενον αὐτῷ. θαυμάζω μέντοι σε καὶ ἐπαινῶ, εἰ σκυτικὸς ὢν σοφίας ἐμπλησθεὶς καὶ πάλα μὲν Σωκράταν ἔπειthes καὶ τῶς καλλίστως τῶν νέων καὶ εὐγενεστάτως παρὰ σὲ καθεύεσθαι, οἷον Ἀλκιβιάδαν τε τὸν Κλεινίου καὶ Φαῖδρον τὸν Μυρρινούσιον καὶ Εὐθύδαμον <τὸν Διοκλέους καὶ Χαρμίδην> τὸν Γλαύκωνος καὶ τῶν τὰ κοινὰ πραττόντων Ἐπικράτεα τὸν Σακεσφόρον καὶ Εὐρυπτόλεμον καὶ τῶς ἄλλως, ὥς εἰ καὶ Περικλεῖ γε τῷ Ξανθίπῳ μὴ αἰ στρατηγίαι ἦσαν καὶ ὁ πόλεμος τότε, κἂν οὗτος οἶμαι ἦν παρὰ σέ. καὶ νῦν ἴσμεν ὁποῖος εἶ. Ἀντισθένας γὰρ παρὰ σὲ φοιτᾷ. δύνῃ δὲ καὶ ἐν Συρακούσαις φιλοσοφεῖν· οἱ γὰρ ἱμάντες τίμιοι εἰσι καὶ τὰ σκύτη. (2) καὶ οὐκ οἶσθα, ὥς ἐγὼ μὲν τῶν ὑποδημάτων χρώμενος παρ' ἕκαστα τὰν τέχνην σου θαυμασίαν τινὰ ποιῶ, Ἀντισθένας δὲ γυμνοποδῶν τί γὰρ ἄλλο πράττει ἢ σοὶ ἀργίαν καὶ ἀμισθίαν εἰσάγει, πείθων τῶς νέως καὶ ἅπαντας Ἀθηναίως γυμνοποδεῖν; σκόπει οὖν ὁπόσον σοὶ ἐγὼ φίλος ὁ ῥαστώναν καὶ τὰν ἀδονὰν ἀποδεχόμενος. σὺ δὲ ὁμολογῶν εὐλόγως ἐρωτᾷν Πρόδικον, τὸ ἀκόλουθον οὐκ ἔγνωσ ἐπὶ σαυτοῦ· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἐμὲ μὲν ἐθαύμαζες, τῶς δὲ ἔχοντας βαθεῖς τῶς πώγωνας καὶ τῶς σκίπωνας ἐγέλασας τὰς ἀλαζονείας, ῥυπῶντάς τε καὶ φθειριῶντας καὶ ὄνυχας ὥσπερ τὰ θηρία μακρῶς περικειμένως καὶ ἐναντίας σου τὰς τέχνας ὑποτιθεμένως ὑποθήκας.

praescripta om. P | Προδίκῳ τῷ Κεῖῳ Hercher : Προδίκῳ τῷ

Κίῳ Allatius : Προδίκου(ω) τοῦ(τω) Κώ(ι)ου P : Προδίκου τοῦ

Κώου G | ἔφα V : ἔφη(α) P : ἔφη G | ἀπελέγξαι P G : ἀπολέξει P

in marg. | Σωκράταν V: Σωκράτην P G | τῶς καλλίστως τῶν νέων

Allatius : τοῦ(ω)ς καλλίστου(ω)ς νέου(ω)ς P et ad marg. τῶν νέων

: τοὺς καλλίστους νέους G | εὐγενεστάτως V : εὐγενεστατου(ω)ς P

: εὐγενεστάτους G : et sic alia verba Dorice scripta | Μυρρινούσιον

codd. plur. : μῆρυν. G | <τὸν Διοκλέους καὶ Χαρμίδην> add.

Wilamowitz e Pl. Sym. 222b | Γλαύκωνος Hercher : Γλῦκωνος P G |

Συρακούσαις edd. : Συρρακούσαις P G

Aristippus to Simon.

- (1) It is not I who mocks you, but Phaedo, when he says that you are more excellent and wiser than Prodicus of Ceos. And he [Phaedo] said you refuted him [Prodicus] about the *Encomium*, the one he has for Heracles. I am impressed with you, actually, and I praise you, since although you are a shoemaker you are filled with wisdom, and in past times you used to persuade Socrates and the finest and most wellborn of our youth to sit down in your shop, such as Alcibiades son of Clinias and Phaedrus the Myrrhinean and Euthydemus son of Diocles, and Charmides son of Glaucon, and, among those in public affairs, Epicrates the Shield-bearer and Euryptolemus and the rest, since if Pericles son of Xanthippus had not been involved with his generalships and the war in those days, I think even he would have been in your shop. And now we know what sort of man you are. For Antisthenes is your frequent visitor. But you can also practice philosophy in Syracuse. For leather reins are valued [here], and also leather straps.
- (2) And don't you know that I use shoes everyday and rate your craft as an impressive one, but Antisthenes, who goes barefoot, what does he accomplish other than to bring you laziness and unemployment, by persuading the youths and all Athenians to go barefoot? Consider, then, to what extent I am your friend, who welcome resting time and pleasure. But you, in agreeing that you question Prodicus with good reason, have not recognized the consequence for yourself. For if you did, you would be impressed with me, but those sporting the long beards and staffs you would laugh at for their false pretensions, since they are dirty and have lice and wear their fingernails long like the beasts and give advice contrary to your craft.

Importance of the Testimonium

This letter implies a polemical relationship between Socratic literature and values, on the one hand, and Prodicus' story of Heracles at the crossroads (preserved in Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.21–33), on the other.

Notes

Φαίδων, λέγων: The writer of the letter is probably referring to the dialogue *Simon* by Phaedo. Some information about the contents of this lost dialogue can possibly be inferred from the present letter. (See, further, Döring 1997, citing older literature.)

γεγονέναι σε κρείσσω καὶ σοφώτερον Προδίκῳ τῷ Κεῖῳ: Phaedo's dialogue seems to have presented Simon and Prodicus disputing Prodicus' display piece, the "Choice of Heracles," which we know from Xen. *Mem.* 2.1.21–33 but which also had an independent circulation. (See Mayhew 2011:196–201.)

ἀπελέγξει σε αὐτόν: Phaedo apparently presented Prodicus admitting that Simon had refuted him concerning the education of Heracles. That this story was used competitively may be suggested also in Xen. *Mem.* 2.1, where Socrates retells the story as part of an argument to Aristippus, and Aristippus is apparently unable to refute him, but stands refuted himself (as implied in *Mem.* 3.8). The point in this letter might be that Prodicus presented the acquisition of virtue as an activity exclusively for aristocrats, whereas Phaedo showed that a poor man could also acquire it (so Wilamowitz and von Fritz, as cited in Döring 1997).

πάλαι μὲν . . . τότε . . . καὶ νῦν: A contrast is set up between the rather distant past, when Pericles was alive (before 429), and “now,” which is presumably a time after the death of Socrates, when Antisthenes is left to represent him. Aristippus is in Syracuse, so the post-Socratic succession in Athens is somewhat settled (c. 395–390?). Antisthenes’ association with Simon is supposed to indicate what Simon is like (ὅποιός ἐστι), and the implication is that Simon has changed and been corrupted. No longer are there high-level political discussions in the shop, but Simon is concerned only with economic self-sufficiency, his new goal in philosophy.

τίμιοι: Compare t. 82.41, where Antisthenes rejects shopping for “valued things” in the marketplace (οὐκ ἐκ τῆς ἀγορᾶς τὰ τίμια ὠνούμαι: πολυτελὴ γὰρ γίγνεται), and the similar language in t. 207A.

ῥυπώντας τε καὶ φθειριώντας: Compare t. 115.

208. Dio of Prusa, *Oration* 13.14–28, *In Athens, On Exile* (de Budé)

(14) ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς τε ἄλλους ἅπαντας καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτον ἑμαυτὸν καταμεμφόμενος ἐνίστε ὑπὸ ἀπορίας ἀνῆγον ἐπὶ τινα λόγον ἀρχαῖον, λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τινος Σωκράτους, ὃν οὐδέποτε ἐκεῖνος ἐπαύσατο λέγων, πανταχοῦ τε καὶ πρὸς ἅπαντας βοῶν καὶ διατεινόμενος ἐν ταῖς παλαίστραις καὶ ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐργαστηρίων καὶ κατ’ ἀγοράν, ὥσπερ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς θεός, ὡς ἔφη τις. (15) οὐ μέντοι προσεποιούμην ἐμὸν εἶναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ’ οὐπὲρ ἦν, καὶ ἡξίου, ἂν ἄρα μὴ δύνωμαι ἀπομνημονεύσαι ἀκριβῶς ἀπάντων τῶν ῥημάτων μηδὲ ὅλης τῆς διανοίας, ἀλλὰ πλεον ἢ ἔλαττον εἶπω τι, συγγνώμην ἔχειν, μηδὲ ὅτι ταῦτα λέγω ἃ τυγχάνει πολλοῖς ἔτεσι πρότερον εἰρημένα, διὰ τοῦτο ἦττον προσέχειν τὸν νοῦν. ἴσως γὰρ ἂν, ἔφην, οὕτως μάλιστα ὠφεληθείητε. οὐ γὰρ δὴ γε εἰκός ἐστι τοὺς παλαιούς λόγους ὥσπερ φάρμακα διαπνεύσαντας ἀπολωλεκέναι τὴν δύναμιν. (16) ἐκεῖνος γὰρ ὅπότε ἴδοι πλείονας ἀνθρώπους ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ, σχετλιάζων καὶ ἐπιτιμῶν ἐβόα πάνυ ἀνδρείως τε καὶ ἀνυποστόλως, “Ποῖ φέρεσθε, ὠνθρωποι, καὶ ἀγνοεῖτε μηδὲν τῶν

δεόντων πράττοντες, χρημάτων μὲν ἐπιμελούμενοι καὶ πορίζοντες πάντα τρόπον, ὅπως αὐτοὶ τε ἄφθονα ἔξετε καὶ τοῖς παισὶν ἔτι πλείω παραδώσετε, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν παίδων καὶ πρότερον ὑμῶν τῶν πατέρων ἡμελήκατε ὁμοίως ἅπαντες, οὐδεμίαν εὐρόντες οὔτε παιδευσιν οὔτε ἄσκησιν ἱκανὴν οὐδὲ ὠφέλιμον ἀνθρώποις, ἦν παιδευθέντες δυνήσεσθε τοῖς χρήμασι χρῆσθαι ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως, ἀλλὰ μὴ βλαβερῶς καὶ ἀδίκως, καὶ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς [ἐπιζημίως], ὃ σπουδαιότερον [ἡγεῖσθαι] τῶν χρημάτων, καὶ υἱοῖς καὶ θυγατράσι καὶ γυναιξὶ καὶ ἀδελφοῖς καὶ φίλοις, κάκεῖνοι ὑμῖν. (17) ἀλλ' ἢ κιθαρίζειν καὶ παλαίειν καὶ γράμματα μανθάνοντες ὑπὸ τῶν γονέων καὶ τοὺς υἱοὺς διδάσκοντες οἴεσθε σωφρονέστερον καὶ ἄμεινον οἰκῆσειν τὴν πόλιν; καίτοι εἴ τις συναγαγὼν τοὺς τε κιθαριστὰς καὶ τοὺς παιδοτρίβας καὶ τοὺς γραμματιστὰς τοὺς ἄριστα ἐπισταμένους ἕκαστα τούτων πόλιν κατοικίσειεν ἐξ αὐτῶν ἢ καὶ ἔθνος, καθάπερ ὑμεῖς ποτε τὴν Ἰωνίαν, ποία τις ἂν ὑμῖν δοκεῖ γενέσθαι πόλις καὶ τίνα οἰκεῖσθαι τρόπον; οὐ πολὺ κάκιον καὶ αἰσχίον τῆς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καπῆλων πόλεως, ὅπου πάντες κάπηλοι κατοικοῦσιν, ὁμοίως μὲν ἄνδρες, ὁμοίως δὲ γυναῖκες; οὐ πολὺ γελοιότερον οἰκήσουσιν οὗτοι, οὓς λέγω τοὺς τῶν ὑμετέρων παίδων διδασκάλους, οἱ παιδοτρίβαι καὶ κιθαρισταὶ καὶ γραμματισταί, προσλαβόντες τοὺς τε ῥαψωδοὺς καὶ τοὺς ὑποκριτάς; (18) καὶ γὰρ δὴ ὅσα μανθάνουσιν οἱ ἄνθρωποι, τούτου ἕνεκα μανθάνουσιν ὅπως, ἐπειδὴν ἡ χρεια ἐνστῇ πρὸς ἦν ἐμάνθανεν ἕκαστος, ποιῇ τὸ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην, οἷον ὁ μὲν κυβερνήτης ὅταν εἰς τὴν ναῦν ἐμβῇ, τῷ πηδαλίῳ κατευθύνων· διὰ τοῦτο γὰρ ἐμάνθανε κυβερνᾶν· ὁ δὲ ἱατρός ἐπειδὴν παραλάβῃ τὸν κάμνοντα, τοῖς φαρμάκοις καὶ τοῖς περὶ τὴν διαίταν ἰώμενος, οὗ ἕνεκα ἐκτήσατο τὴν ἐμπειρίαν. (19) οὐκοῦν καὶ ὑμεῖς,” ἔφη, “ἐπειδὴν δέη τι βουλευέσθαι περὶ τῆς πόλεως, συνελθόντες εἰς τὴν ἐκκλησίαν, οἱ μὲν ὑμῶν κιθαρίζουσιν ἀναστάντες, οἱ δὲ τινες παλαίετε, ἄλλοι δὲ ἀναγιγνώσκετε τῶν Ὀμήρου τι λαβόντες ἢ τῶν Ἡσιόδου· ταῦτα γὰρ ἄμεινον ἴστε ἐτέρων, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτων οἴεσθε ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ δυνήσεσθαι τὰ τε κοινὰ πράττειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὰ ἴδια, καὶ νῦν ἐπὶ ταύταις ταῖς ἐλπίσιν οἰκεῖτε τὴν πόλιν καὶ τοὺς νείας παρασκευάζετε ὥς δυνατοὺς ἐσομένους χρῆσθαι τοῖς τε αὐτῶν καὶ τοῖς δημοσίοις πράγμασιν, οἳ ἂν ἱκανῶς κιθαρίσωσι Ἑλλάδα περσέπολιν δεινὰν” ἢ τῷ ποδὶ βῶσι πρὸς τὴν λύραν· ὅπως δὲ γνῶσεσθε τὰ συμφέροντα ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς καὶ τῇ πατρίδι καὶ νομίμως καὶ δικαίως μεθ' ὁμονοίας πολιτεύσεσθε καὶ οἰκήσετε, μὴ ἀδικῶν ἄλλος ἄλλον μηδὲ ἐπιβουλεύων, τοῦτο δὲ οὐδέποτε ἐμάθετε οὐδὲ ἐμέλυσεν ὑμῖν πώποτε οὐδὲ νῦν ἔτι φροντίζετε. (20) καίτοι τραγωδοὺς ἐκάστοτε ὁρᾶτε τοῖς Διονυσίοις καὶ ἐλεεῖτε τὰ ἀτυχήματα τῶν ἐν ταῖς τραγωδίαις ἀνθρώπων· ἀλλ' ὅμως οὐδέποτε ἐνεθυμήητε ὅτι

οὐ περὶ τοὺς ἀγραμμάτους οὐδὲ περὶ τοὺς ἀπάδοντας οὐδὲ τοὺς οὐκ εἰδότας παλαίειν γίγνεται τὰ κακὰ ταῦτα, οὐδὲ ὅτι πένης τις ἔστιν, οὐδεὶς ἔνεκα τούτου τραγωδίαν ἐδίδαξεν. τούναντίον γὰρ περὶ τοὺς Ἀτρείας καὶ τοὺς Ἀγαμέμνονας καὶ τοὺς Οἰδίποδας ἴδοι τις ἂν πάσας τὰς τραγωδίας, οἱ πλεῖστα ἐκέκτηντο χρήματα χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργύρου καὶ γῆς καὶ βοσκημάτων· καὶ δὴ τῷ δυστυχεστάτῳ αὐτῶν γενέσθαι φασὶ χρυσοῦν πρόβατον. (21) καὶ μὴν ὁ Θάμυρις γε εὖ μάλα ἐπιστάμενος κιθαρίζειν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰς τὰς Μούσας ἐρίζων περὶ τῆς ἁρμονίας, ἐτυφλώθη διὰ τοῦτο καὶ προσέτι ἀπέμαθε τὴν κιθαριστικὴν· καὶ τὸν Παλαμῆδην οὐδὲν ὦνησεν αὐτὸν εὐρόντα τὰ γράμματα πρὸς τὸ μὴ ἀδίκως ὑπὸ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν τῶν ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ παιδευθέντων καταλευσθέντα ἀποθανεῖν· ἀλλ’ ἔως μὲν ἦσαν ἀγράμματοι καὶ ἀμαθεῖς τούτου τοῦ μαθήματος, ζῆν αὐτὸν εἶων· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοὺς τε ἄλλους ἐδίδαξε γράμματα καὶ τοὺς Ἀτρείδας δῆλον ὅτι πρῶτους, καὶ μετὰ τῶν γραμμάτων τοὺς φρυκτοὺς ὅπως χρὴ ἀνέχειν καὶ ἀριθμεῖν τὸ πλῆθος, ἐπεὶ πρότερον οὐκ ᾔδесαν οὐδὲ καλῶς ἀριθμῆσαι τὸν ὄχλον, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιμένες τὰ πρόβατα, τηνικαῦτα σοφώτεροι γενόμενοι καὶ ἀμείνους ἀπέκτειναν αὐτόν. (22) εἰ δέ γε,” ἔφη, “τοὺς ῥήτορας οἰεσθε ἱκανοὺς εἶναι πρὸς τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ τὴν ἐκείνων τέχνην ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν, θαυμάζω ὅτι οὐ καὶ δικάζειν ἐκείνοις ἐπετρέψατε ὑπὲρ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλ’ ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς, καὶ ὅπως οὐκ, εἰ δικαιοτάτους καὶ ἀρίστους ὑπειλήφατε, καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἐκείνοις ἐπετρέψατε διαχειρίζειν. ὅμοιον γὰρ ἂν ποιήσατε ὥσπερ εἰ κυβερνήτας καὶ ναάρχους τῶν τριήρων ἀποδείξατε τοὺς τριηρίτας ἢ τοὺς κελευστάς.” (23) εἰ δὲ δὴ τις λέγοι τῶν πολιτικῶν τε καὶ ῥητόρων πρὸς αὐτὸν ὅτι “Ταῦτη μέντοι τῇ παιδεύσει χρώμενοι Ἀθηναῖοι Περσῶν ἐπιστρατευσάντων τοσαύταις μυριάσιν ἐπὶ τὴν πόλιν δις ἐφεξῆς καὶ τὴν ἄλλην Ἑλλάδα, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον δύναμιν καὶ στρατηγούς ἀποστείλαντος τοῦ βασιλέως, ὕστερον δὲ αὐτοῦ Ξέρξου παραγενομένου μετὰ παντὸς τοῦ πλήθους τοῦ κατὰ τὴν Ἀσίαν, ἅπαντας τούτους ἐνίκησαν καὶ πανταχοῦ περιῆσαν αὐτῶν καὶ τῷ βουλευέσθαι καὶ τῷ μάχεσθαι. καίτοι πῶς ἂν ἠδύναντο περιεῖναι τηλικαύτης παρασκευῆς καὶ τοσοῦτου πλήθους μὴ διαφέροντες κατ’ ἀρετὴν; ἢ πῶς ἂν ἀρετῇ διέφερον μὴ τῆς ἀρίστης παιδείας τυγχάνοντες, ἀλλὰ φαύλης καὶ ἀνωφελοῦς;” (24) πρὸς τὸν τοιαῦτα εἰπόντα ἔλεγεν ὅτι “Οὐδὲ ἐκείνοι ἤλθον παιδεῖαν οὐδεμίαν παιδευθέντες οὐδὲ ἐπιστάμενοι βουλευέσθαι περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ τοξεύειν τε καὶ ἱππεύειν καὶ θηρᾶν μεμελετηκότες, καὶ τὸ γυμνοῦσθαι τὸ σῶμα αἰσχιστον αὐτοῖς ἐδόκει καὶ τὸ πτύειν ἐν τῷ φανερωῖ· ταῦτα δὲ αὐτοὺς οὐδὲν ἔμελλεν ὀνήσειν· ὥστε οὐδ’ ἦν στρατηγὸς ἐκείνων οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ βασιλεὺς, ἀλλὰ μυριάδες ἀνθρώπων ἀμύθητοι πάντων ἀφρόνων καὶ κακοδαιμόνων. εἷς δὲ τις ἐν αὐτοῖς

ὑπῆρχεν ὀρθὴν ἔχων τιάραν καὶ ἐπὶ θρόνου χρυσοῦ καθίζων, ὅφ' οὗ πάντες ὥσπερ ὑπὸ δαίμονος ἡλαύνοντο πρὸς βίαν, οἱ μὲν εἰς τὴν θάλατταν, οἱ δὲ κατὰ τῶν ὀρών, καὶ μαστιγούμενοι καὶ δεδιότες καὶ ὠθούμενοι καὶ τρέμοντες ἠναγκάζοντο ἀποθνήσκειν. (25) ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ δύο ἀνθρώπων παλαίειν οὐκ εἰδότε παλαίοιεν, ὃ γε ἕτερος καταβάλῃ ἂν ἐνίετε τὸν ἕτερον, οὐ δι' ἐμπειρίαν, ἀλλὰ διὰ τινὰ τύχην, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ δις ἐφεξῆς ὁ αὐτός, οὕτως καὶ Ἀθηναίους Πέρσαι συμβαλόντες, τοτὲ μὲν Ἀθηναῖοι περιῆσαν, τοτὲ δὲ Πέρσαι, ὥσπερ ὕστερον, ὅτε καὶ τὰ τεῖχη τῆς πόλεως κατέβαλον μετὰ Λακεδαιμονίων πολεμοῦντες. (26) ἐπεὶ ἔχοις ἂν μοι εἰπεῖν εἰ τότε Ἀθηναῖοι ἀμουςότεροι καὶ ἀγραμματούτεροι γεγόνεσαν; ἔπειτα αὖθις ἐπὶ Κόνωνος, ὅτε ἐνίκησαν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τῇ περὶ Κνίδον, ἅμεινον ἐπάλαιον καὶ ἥδον;” οὕτως οὖν ἀπέφαιεν αὐτοὺς οὐδεμιᾶς παιδείας χρηστῆς τυγχάνοντας. τοῦτο δὲ οὐ μόνον Ἀθηναίους, ἀλλὰ καὶ σχεδὸν τι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ πρότερον καὶ νῦν συμβέβηκεν. (27) “Καὶ μὴν τό γε ἀπαιδευτον εἶναι καὶ μηδὲν ἐπισταμένως ὦν χρηὴ μηδὲ ἰκανῶς παρεσκευασμένον πρὸς τὸν βίον ζῆν τε καὶ πράττειν ἐπιχειρεῖν οὕτως μεγάλα πράγματα μηδὲ αὐτοὺς ἐκείνους ἀρέσκειν· τοὺς γὰρ ἀμαθεῖς καὶ ἀπαιδεύτους ψέγειν αὐτοὺς ὡς οὐ δυναμένους ζῆν ὀρθῶς· εἶναι δὲ ἀμαθεῖς οὐχὶ τοὺς ὑφαίνειν ἢ σκυτοτομεῖν μὴ ἐπισταμένους οὐδὲ τοὺς ὀρχεῖσθαι οὐκ εἰδότας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντας ἃ ἔστιν εἰδόμενα καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι.” (28) καὶ οὕτως δὴ παρεκάλει πρὸς τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ προσέχειν αὐτῷ τὸν νοῦν καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν· ἥδει γὰρ ὅτι τοῦτο ζητοῦντες οὐδὲν ἄλλο ποιήσουσιν ἢ φιλοσοφήσουσι. τὸ γὰρ ζητεῖν καὶ φιλοτιμεῖσθαι ὅπως τις ἔσται καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς οὐκ ἄλλο τι εἶναι ἢ τὸ φιλοσοφεῖν. οὐ μέντοι πολλάκις οὕτως ὠνόμαζεν, ἀλλὰ μόνον ζητεῖν ἐκέλευεν ὅπως ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ ἔσονται.

(14) καταμεμφόμενος ἐνίετε Reiske : καταμεμφόμενος ἦν· ἐνίετε δὲ P vel ἐνίετε δὲ καὶ e corr. : καταμεμφόμενος· ἐνίετε δὲ U B M | ἀνῆγον P et Arnim : ἦα U B et de Budé : ἦγαγε M | Σωκράτους del. Weil : vel Σωκρατικοῦ quaerit Janko per litt. | ἐπὶ τῶν ἐργαστηρίων καὶ κατ' ἀγοράν Cobet : ἐπὶ τῶν δικαστηρίων καὶ κατ' ἀγοράν U B : ἐπὶ τῷ δικαστηρίῳ κατ' ἀγοράν M P (15) ὥσπερ φάρμακα P : ὥσπερ φάρμακα παλαιὰ U B M (16) Ποῖ φέρεσθε, ὠνθρωποι, καὶ ἀγνοεῖτε U B M : ἄνθρωποι ἀγνοεῖτε P (16) ἔξετε Geel : ἔχητε P : ἔχετε U B M | δυνήσεσθε Arnim : δυνήσονται codd. | ἐπιζημίως secl. Arnim | ἡγεῖσθαι secl. Arnim | τῶν χρημάτων U B M : τῶν χρημάτων ἐχρῆν P | καὶ υἱοῖς Reiske : καὶ τοῖς υἱοῖς codd. | κάκεῖνοι ὑμῖν U B M : κάκεῖνους ὑμῖν P (17) ἀλλ' ἢ καθαρίζειν Jacobs : ἀλλὰ οἱ καθαρίζειν codd. | κατοικήσειεν B M : κατοικήσιν U | ποῖα τις ἂν ὑμῖν δοκεῖ γενέσθαι πόλις U B M : ποῖαν τις ἂν ὑμῖν δοκῇ γενέσθαι πόλιν P | ὁμοίως δὲ

γυναῖκες U B M : ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ γυναῖκες P (18) κατευθύνων Reiske
 : κατευθύνῃ codd. | ἰώμενος U B M : ἰώμενος θεραπεύῃ P (19) τὰ
 τε κοινὰ πράττειν Dindorf : τὰ τε κοινὰ πράξιν codd. | περσέπολιν
 δεινὰν M : περσέπολιν Ἀθηνᾶν U B : περσέπτολιν δεινὰν θεὸν P (20)
 οὐδὲ ὅτι πένης τίς ἐστιν, οὐδεις ἔνεκα τούτου τραγωδίαν ἐδίδαξεν
 U B M : οὐδὲ πένης ἔστιν οὐδεις οὐ ἔνεκα τραγωδίαν τις ἐδίδαξεν P
 (22) οὐκ, εἰ δικαιοτάτους T : οὐ δικαιοτάτους codd. plur. | ποιήσατε
 Emperius : ποιή σῃτε P : ποιήσετε U B M | ἀποδείξατε Emperius :
 ἀποδείξῃτε U B M : ἀποδείξετε P | τριηρίτας Reiske : τριηλάτας M P :
 τριηρήτας U B (23) εἰ δὲ δὴ τις λέγοι Pflugk : εἰ δὲ τις δὴ τι λέγοι U B
 M : εἰ δὲ τις λέγοιτο P (24) τὸ πτύειν P : τὸ ποιεῖν M : τὸ ὀπύειν U B |
 εἰς δὲ τις T in mrg. et Reiske : εἰ δὲ τις U B M (26) εἰ τότε Casaubon et
 edd. rec. : εἴ ποτε codd. | τοῦτο δὲ . . . συμβέβηκεν secl. Cobet et sequ.
 edd. plur. (27) ἐπισταμένως codd. et sequ. Verrengia : ἐπιστάμενον ed.
 Ven. et sequ. edd. plur. (28) καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν secl. Emperius

(14) Blaming these and similar things against everyone else, but most
 and foremost against myself, sometimes out of despair I would refer
 back to a certain ancient discourse, spoken by a certain Socrates, which
 that man never stopped speaking, shouting it everywhere and to
 everyone, exerting his voice in the wrestling schools and in the Lyceum
 and at the workshops and across the marketplace, like a god from the
 machine, as someone said. (15) I did not, however, pretend that the
 discourse was mine, but his whose it was, and I thought I would be
 indulged if I said something more or less, even if I could not of course
 recall perfectly every word or the whole line of thought; nor did I think
 that, because I said things that happen to have been said many years
 ago, for that reason [people] would pay less attention. “For perhaps,” I
 used to say, “in this way you will most be benefited.” It is not, of course,
 likely for ancient discourses to have lost their power by dispersing in
 vapor, like drugs. (16) For he, whenever he saw a group of people in
 the same place, in indignation and with scolding he used to shout in a
 very manly and unrestrained way, “Where are you going, oh humans?
 Meanwhile you are ignorant, doing nothing of what you should, caring
 for money and acquiring it in any way, so that you will have it in plenty
 and bequest to your children even more, while for your children
 themselves, and before them for you their fathers, you all likewise have
 paid no attention, and you have discovered no [plan of] education or
 training sufficient or helpful to humans, in which you could be
 educated to become able to use your money rightfully and justly, rather
 than harmfully and unjustly, and deal with yourselves [rightfully and

justly rather than] with penalty, which you should have considered a more serious matter than money, and [deal rightfully with] your sons and daughters and wives and brothers and friends, and they [could be able to deal with] you [rightfully]. (17) Or do you think that by learning to play the lyre and wrestle, and learning your letters from your progenitors, and teaching all this to your sons, you will manage the city with sounder mind and better? Indeed, if someone should bring together the lyre players and the wrestling trainers and the grammar teachers, the ones most knowledgeable in each of these fields, and should found a city from them, or even a national tribe, just as you once did in Ionia, what sort of city do you think would come about, and in what way would it be managed? Would it be not much worse and baser than the city of retailers in Egypt, where all live as retailers, in like manner the men and in like manner the women? Not much more ridiculously will these manage [the city], who I say are the teachers of your children, the wrestling trainers and lyre players and grammar teachers, taking on [as their partners] the rhapsodes and actors. (18) Indeed whatever humans learn, they learn it for this reason, so that, whenever the need is at hand toward which each did his learning, he can do the [activity] according to his craft: for example, the pilot, whenever he embarks on a ship, by guiding it straight with the rudder: for this is the reason he learned to be a pilot; and the doctor, whenever he encounters a sick man, treating him with drugs and the matters concerning diet, which is the reason he acquired his expertise. (19) So then also you,” he said, “whenever there is need for something to be deliberated concerning the city, you come together into the assembly, and some of you rise up and play the lyre, while others wrestle, and others read, taking up something from the works of Homer or from those of Hesiod. For you know these better than other [texts], and you think that from these you will become good men and able to perform public business correctly, as well as private, and on these hopes you manage your city and you prepare your sons as though they will become able to deal with their own affairs and the people’s affairs, if they can competently perform on the lyre ‘the awesome Pallas destroyer of cities’ or prance with their foot to the lyre. But that you know what is advantageous to yourselves and to your fatherland, and that you govern and manage the city and household lawfully and justly with mental accord, while no person causes injustice to or plots against another, this you have never learned, nor have you ever taken concern for it, nor even now do you think about it. (20) And indeed you watch the tragic actors every year at the City Dionysia, and you pity the

misfortunes of the humans in the tragedies. But nevertheless you have never considered that these bad events happen not to those ignorant of letters or those without song or those not knowing how to wrestle; nor because someone is a poor man, nobody has produced a tragedy because of this. To the contrary, someone could observe that all the tragedies happen around the Atreuses and the Agamemnons and the Oedipuses, who have acquired the greatest resources of gold and silver and land and fattened livestock: and indeed the most unfortunate of them, they say, had a golden cow. (21) Moreover, Thamyris, who knew exceptionally well how to play the lyre and competed with the Muses themselves in making melody, was blinded for this and in addition lost his knowledge of lyre playing. And it did Palamedes no good to have invented letters, in consideration of his unjust death by stoning at the hands of the Achaeans he had educated: as long as they were without letters and unlearned in this field, they let him live; but when he had taught everyone letters and foremost the sons of Atreus, and along with letters taught them about torches, how it was right to raise them up and count the multitude, since previously they did not know even how to count the crowd well, in the way shepherds count their flocks, then, when they had become wiser and better, they killed him. (22) And if, then," he [a certain Socrates] said, "you think the orators are competent for deliberating, and their craft can make men good, I am amazed that you do not turn it over to them also to deliver judgment about your affairs, but you [allocate this job] to yourselves, and [I am amazed] that, if you assume them to be the most just and the best [men], you have not also turned over to them your money to manage. For you would be doing the same kind of thing as you would if you should designate as pilots and admirals of the triremes the rowers or the boatswains." (23) And perhaps some one of the politicians and orators should say to him [a certain Socrates], "While the Athenians were using this form of education, the Persians attacked the city twice in a row with their countless multitudes, the first time when the king deployed his power and his generals, and later when Xerxes himself participated with the whole throng from across Asia, and they [the Athenians] conquered all of these [invaders] and prevailed over them on all fronts, both in deliberation and in warfare. And how could they have been able to prevail over such a great outfit and such a great multitude if they were not outstanding in virtue? Or how would they have been outstanding in virtue if they had met not with the best education, but a poor and useless one?" (24) To someone saying these

sorts of things, he [a certain Socrates] would say, “Neither did the Persians come with an education of any kind, or with knowledge of how to deliberate about their affairs, but having taken concern for shooting bows and riding horses and hunting, and it seemed highly shameful to them to be naked in body and to spit in the open: but all this was in no way going to help them. As a result, they had no general or king, but untold tens of thousands of human beings, all mindless and unfortunate. And one certain human was in charge among them, wearing an upright tiara and sitting on a golden throne, and by him all were driven with force as if by a divine being, some into the sea, others down the mountains, and, whipped and fearful and shoved and trembling, they were forced to die. (25) It was, then, just as if two human beings who did not know how to wrestle were wrestling, and each would at times throw down the other, not through experienced skill, but through some good luck, and the same contestant would often throw down the other also twice in a row: in this way also, when the Persians attacked the Athenians, sometimes the Athenians prevailed, and at other times the Persians, as they did later, when they [the Persians] even took down the walls of the city, making war in alliance with the Lacedaemonians. (26) Because would you be able to tell me whether the Athenians had by then become less well versed in the Muses and in letters? Then again, in the time of Conon, when they were victorious in the naval battle at Cnidus, were they wrestling and singing better?” In this way he [a certain Socrates] revealed them [the Athenians] to have met with no good education. And this has happened not only to the Athenians, but also to almost all humans both formerly and now. (27) “And indeed to be uneducated, and to try to live and achieve such great feats without having been sufficiently prepared, and with knowledge in nothing of what is necessary, does not please even these men themselves. For the ignorant and the uneducated scold them, as ones unable to live correctly. And uneducated are not those who do not know how to weave or cut shoe leather, nor those who do not know how to dance, but those who fail to know what makes it possible, by knowing, to be a fine and good man.” (28) And so in this way he exhorted toward caring about and paying attention to oneself and doing philosophy. For he knew that in seeking this, people will do nothing other than perform philosophy. For to seek and to aspire toward how one will be fine and good is nothing other than doing philosophy. However, he did not often call it by this name, but he only bid [his audience] to seek how they would be good men.

Context of Preservation

Dio's thirteenth oration, entitled, in the manuscripts, *In Athens on Exile* (ἐν Ἀθήναις περὶ φυγῆς), is putatively a discourse to the Athenians on good education, also using Rome and the Romans as the implied site and audience (§29–37, after the present excerpt). Embedded in the oration is an “ancient discourse of some Socrates” (§14–28), which Dio claims to have recited when he was asked to perform in a city as a philosopher. Dümmler (1882:8–11, 1889:1–17) and von Arnim (1898:256–60) argued that this “ancient discourse” is cited from Antisthenes, on which basis it was excerpted and included by Giannantoni in SSR as VA 208. On textual matters and for a different close commentary, see Verrengia 2000. On Dio's whole text, see Moles 2005.

Importance of the Testimonium

If Dio's “ancient discourse” could be attributed to Antisthenes, it would nearly double the quantity of directly preserved prose surviving from him and would confirm his use of the haranguing diatribe style (also evident in parts of Odysseus' speech, t. 54). It is unlikely that Dio reproduces his Socratic source verbatim from any source, but plausible that there is a significant measure of borrowed phrasing recast in Dio's speech. Identification of Antisthenes as the main source is controversial, and close comparison to both Antisthenes' extant literary remains and Dio's own whole corpus is needed. The present notes aim to achieve this first goal. Others scholars have recently attempted the second (e.g., Verrengia 2000); but this project is complicated by the possibility that Dio knew Antisthenes deeply (see Weber 1887; Hoistad 1948:17; Caizzi 1964; Brancacci 1992, 2000). In §26, Dio refers to the battle of Cnidus fought in 394 BCE, and in §30, he says that the Macedonian king Archelaus invited Socrates to his court so that he could hear discourses of this sort. From these references, Dümmler (1882:8–11) argued that Antisthenes' *Archelaus* (t. 41A title 10.7) was the source for the Socratic discourse Dio recites. Meanwhile, Dio's “ancient discourse” is also closely comparable to the speech of Socrates parodied in the Platonic *Clitophon* 407b1–e2, which seems to have been well known, to judge from other apparent echoes in Plutarch, Epictetus, Lucian and Themistius (see Verrengia 2000:89 and details below in notes on §16), and Pl. *Apol.* 29d7–e2. Von Arnim (1898:256–60) argued that *Clitophon* and Dio's “ancient discourse” shared a common lost source, one of the *Protreptics* of Antisthenes (t. 41A title 2.4), and scholars on Antisthenes have generally accepted this thesis, which is the basis for its inclusion by Giannantoni as VA 208 in SSR. (See Decleva Caizzi 1966:92–93; Giannantoni 1990 v.4:350–53; Brancacci 1992:3310 n.3, 2000:251–52; Joël 1887 v.1:417–18, 481–84.) The thesis has been generally rejected among scholars of Plato and

Dio. (See Slings 1999:94–96; Verrengia 2000:88–89, 146; Moles 2005:115–16—all with further bibliography.) The main counter-argument is that Dio has himself expanded kernels from *Clitophon* by adding freely from his own knowledge and thoughts (Wegehaupt 1896:56–64; Slings 1999:96). The following notes aim to assess all parts of the speech, not just the overlaps with *Clitophon* in §14–17 (which are carefully tabulated in Moles 2005:115–16), for their correspondences to the known output of Antisthenes. Particularly comparable are t. 16 with §20 (noted in Dümmler 1889) and phrases and ideas in the extant speeches of Ajax and Odysseus, t. 53–54, with §22, 25, and 27.

Notes

(14) καὶ μάλιστα καὶ πρῶτον ἑμαυτὸν καταμεμφόμενος: Dio blames himself for being unequipped to answer the questions about virtue put to him by those he meets, since they expect, from his unkempt appearance, that he is a philosopher.

ὑπό τινας Σωκράτους: Compare t. 86C, where Dio cites a maxim of Antisthenes and attributes it to “someone” (τις). “Some Socrates” seems to be an odd expression for the familiar Platonic character Socrates, and it seems to activate thoughts of a literary character Socrates different from Plato’s; alternatively, it might imply that someone spoke out as though he were a Socrates, although he was not. Diogenes of Sinope should be the most famous mimic of Socrates (see Diog. Laert. 6.54), but possibly Antisthenes also portrayed Socrates-like speakers in his writings. Weil’s proposal to delete the name could be plausible if we think an editor supplied it after recognizing the parallel to *Clitophon*; but that recognition should have yielded “Socrates,” not “some Socrates.” The expression in the accusative case, σωκράτη τινά, is used by Plato (*Apol.* 19c3) to refer to the Socrates character in Aristophanes’ *Clouds* and also by Libanius (*Letter* 1158) in reference to a contemporary figure, maybe imagined.

ὥσπερ ἀπὸ μηχανῆς θεός, ὡς ἔφη τις: At *Clit.* 407b1, the hostile interlocutor Clitophon accuses Socrates of repeatedly “singing” (or “chanting”: ὕμνοις) “like a god on a tragic machine” (ὥσπερ ἐπὶ μηχανῆς τραγικῆς θεός ὕμνοις λέγων). Dio’s τις, then, could be Plato’s Clitophon (Slings 1999:94 documents Dio’s habit of citing Plato’s internal characters in this way). This need not confirm that *Clitophon* is also the major source for Dio’s whole “ancient discourse.” Rather, Dio could be playfully acknowledging that some, as represented by Plato’s character Clitophon, found Socrates’ protreptic irritating; it could even be a clue that Dio knows of the intertextuality between *Clitophon* and the separate Socratic discourse he is about to use. Dio, unlike the author of *Clitophon*, goes on generally to endorse this Socratic protreptic.

It is also possible that either Antisthenes or a character in his text is the τις here, although there is no evidence for this. T. 197.31 offers a parallel for a divine voice giving moral instruction, and compare Prometheus to Heracles in t. 96. Epictetus 3.22.26 compares Socrates to someone speaking from the tragic stage when he delivers his ποι φέρεσθε speech, although there is no reference to a god. The Epictetus passage suggests that the figure of Socrates as speaker of protreptic diatribe is a Cynic one (Decleva Caizzi 1966:92).

(15) οὐ μέντοι προσεποιούμην ἕμὸν εἶναι τὸν λόγον, ἀλλ' οὐπὲρ ἦν: Dio says that he somehow indicated himself as speaker only performing the *logos*, not speaking his thoughts in his own voice or persona. The next part of the sentence tempers this idea, by indicating that the speech is at least partly his, since his memory of the original was not perfect. On the complex persona Dio forges for himself throughout the discourse, see Moles 2005.

ἂν ἄρα μὴ δύνῃμαι ἀπομνημονεύσαι ἀκριβῶς: Xenophon, when he quotes Prodicus' "Choice of Heracles" in *Mem.* 2.1.21–34, makes similar apologies for his imperfect memory (2.1.21) and loss of the original words, although he claims to retain the thought (2.1.34). Both Xenophon and Dio interrupt the cited discourse to add "he said" (or sim.: *Mem.* 2.1.29; §22, 24, 26), and both also slip into a voice that seems proper to the original, not adapted to the new context (*Mem.* 2.1.30; §23 and 26 in the present text, although excision has been proposed at §26). The apologies for bad memory seem to indicate that the text takes liberties with the original, but this could be some kind of feint, and it has been argued that Xenophon is really quoting Prodicus verbatim (Sansone 2004).

(16) "Ποῖ φέρεσθε, ὦνθρωποι . . .": This speech opens similarly to Socrates' speech in Pl. *Clit.* 407b1.

τοῖς χρήμασι χρῆσθαι ὀρθῶς καὶ δικαίως: On the value of χρήσις in Antisthenes' thought, see t. 187.4. *Clit.* 407b3–4 is parallel.

(17) ἀλλ' ἡ κιθαρίζειν καὶ παλαίειν καὶ γράμματα μανθάνοντες: Antisthenes is on record for scorning excessive learning in flute playing (t. 102). There is no evidence on lyre playing. Wrestling seems to appear as a positive image for dialectical skill (t. 3C; compare t. 106), and his views on real sport might be negative (t. 162; but see also t. 197). In t. 163, he seems to advocate symmetrical education of body and mind. In t. 161, he explicitly recommends against "learning letters," and the source for this dogma might be a context such as the present, since Antisthenes was, of course, accomplished in "letters" at a high level.

τῆς ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καπήλων πόλεως: In t. 62, Antisthenes apparently compares the Athenian sophists to "retailers." There seem to be sexual innuendos in t. 62 and in the related t. 63, which is cited by Athenaeus from "the *Protreptics*." There is no evidence that Antisthenes had a special interest in Egypt.

ὁμοίως μὲν ἄνδρες, ὁμοίως δὲ γυναῖκες: Antisthenes reportedly held that the virtue of a man and a woman is the same (t. 134v). Here there is symmetry in vice rather than virtue, and it seems to be implied that men and women should not behave in the same way. The retailers in t. 62 are women who prepare prostitutes for the market.

οἱ παιδοτρίβαι καὶ κιθαρισταὶ καὶ γραμματισταί, προσλαβόντες τοὺς τε ῥαψωδοὺς καὶ τοὺς ὑποκριτάς: The second city of luxury in Pl. *Rep.* 2 can be compared: there, too, the actors newly emerge.

(18) οἷον ὁ μὲν κυβερνήτης . . . ὁ δὲ ἱατρός: These paradigms for the expert are common in Socratic literature but particularly occur in t. 53–54. In Ajax' speech, the doctor is a paradigm for the expert who would not delegate his responsibility to diagnose diseases (t. 53.4): see §22 for a similar objection about delegation in this speech. In Odysseus' speech, the pilot is a paradigm for the leader in war (t. 54.8). In t. 187.9, the excellent rhetor (possibly Odysseus) is compared to a doctor for his ability to speak wisdom appropriately to each member of the audience. See also t. 174.

οὐ ἔνεκα ἐκτήσατο τὴν ἐμπειρίαν: Calling the doctor's competence "experience" (ἐμπειρία) rather than "craft" (τέχνη), the term used of the helmsman, is consistent with Hippocratic usage, with Pl. *Gorg.* 463b4, and Arist. *Met.* A. Plato's use is derogatory, and Aristotle, while granting medical experience a place in his hierarchy of "wisdom," puts practical or experiential knowledge toward the bottom, next above the perceptual knowledge held by animals. Here, as in the Hippocratic literature and unlike its usage in Plato and Aristotle, the word seems to be entirely positive. See also §25, where it occurs again of the wrestlers in opposition to τύχη, so replacing τέχνη in the conventional wordplay. On words for knowledge, skill, and craft more generally, see t. 78 notes.

(19) ἄλλοι δὲ ἀναγινώσκετε τῶν Ὅμηρου τι λαβόντες ἢ τῶν Ἡσιόδου: One might expect Antisthenes the Homerist to endorse the quest for ethical and political knowledge in Homer. But he might have contested the conventional way of reading Homer and Hesiod for their wisdom. See t. 185–86.

Antisthenes' attention to Hesiod is unclear: see t. 189A-2.

ἀπὸ τούτων οἴεσθε ἄνδρες ἀγαθοὶ ἔσεσθαι καὶ δυνήσεσθαι τὰ τε κοινὰ πράττειν ὀρθῶς καὶ τὰ ἴδια: On the education of sons from poetry, see t. 186. The quest to manage city and household with justice is fundamental to the conversation overall in Xenophon's *Symposium* (e.g., t. 13A.64), and also to Socratic philosophy (e.g., *Meno*).

μεθ' ὁμονοίας: For Antisthenes' attention to ὁμονοία, see t. 69 and references there.

Ἰππάρχα περσέπολιν δεινάν: This is a quotation from Aristophanes, *Clouds* 967, which, in turn, is said by the scholiasts to be a quotation of Lamprocles,

a fifth-century Athenian lyric poet (fr. 1 Page, *PMG* p. 379–80); the phrase is also in Stesichorus. The reading in ms. P, which adds θεὸν after δεινὰν, would seem to be a direct quotation of Lamprocles, because this word is part of Lamprocles fr. 1b but does not appear in Aristophanes. This would imply that Dio either knew Lamprocles or had a source that quoted Lamprocles, not Aristophanes.

(20) οὐδὲ ὅτι πένης τίς ἐστιν, οὐδεὶς ἔνεκα τούτου τραγωδίαν ἐδίδαξεν:

Compare t. 16. This comparison was the basis of Dümmler's argument (1889:3) that the metaphor of the world as a stage should be attributed to Antisthenes.

(22) τοὺς ῥήτορας . . . ἱκανοὺς εἶναι πρὸς τὸ βουλευέσθαι καὶ τὴν ἐκείνων τέχνην ἄνδρας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν: Compare the speech of Ajax to Odysseus (t. 53.1, 7–9) and the description of the wise rhetor in Homer (t. 187.2, 6).

(23) εἰ δὲ ἤ τις λέγοι τῶν πολιτικῶν τε καὶ ῥητόρων πρὸς αὐτόν: Dio breaks from his Socratic monologue to cite Socrates' interlocutor. This could be a sign that Dio is summarizing a text that was originally a dialogue. Of course, it is likely enough that Dio added this break himself, to vary the style and draw the audience into the illusion of observing Socrates in debate.

(25) ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ δύο ἀνθρώπων παλαίειν οὐκ εἰδότε παλαίοιεν: This hypothetical scenario can be compared with Odysseus' question to Ajax in t. 54.11, how his personal feats would be matched against an opposition of two men (a dual form is used there for the verb). It might also be comparable with a scenario in the οὐκ ἔστιν ἀντιλέγειν paradox, where two speakers ignorant of the λόγος of the πρᾶγμα are engaged in a debate: neither really succeeds, and if one should win the debate, it would be as if by accident, not by skill or knowledge (t. 153B.3).

(26) ἐπεὶ ἔχοις ἄν μοι εἰπεῖν εἰ τότε Ἀθηναῖοι ἀμουσώτεροι καὶ ἀγραμματώτεροι γεγόνεσαν: Compare the quality μουσικός that seems essential to Socrates in t. 152A.

ἔπειτα αὐθις ἐπὶ Κόνωνος, ὅτε ἐνίκησαν τῇ ναυμαχίᾳ τῇ περὶ Κνίδον:

Dümmler argued that this reference to Conon and Cnidus, anachronistic for the historical Socrates who died five years before the battle of 394, marked the original discourse Dio used as a product of the late 390s BCE, soon after the battle. However, the language seems to reminisce about "the time of Conon." Conon died about two years after the battle. Xenophon and Theopompus both wrote historical narratives of the battle, and Isocrates recalled it in his *Evagoras* of c. 370. Dümmler's argument for a very close temporal sequence between the battle and the text seems, then, unsound. It is plausible that the reminiscing tone could have been taken by Antisthenes writing in the 370s, but the removal of this tight dating criterion admits other possibilities, even Diogenes of Sinope.

τοῦτο δὲ οὐ μόνον Ἀθηναίοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ σχεδὸν τι πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ πρότερον καὶ νῦν συμβέβηκεν: Cobet bracketed this sentence because he found it unfitting to either the voice of Socrates or the voice of Dio, both more optimistic about human achievement, and deviating from the context. But it can be explained in the voice of Dio. Since Dio is performing his protreptic diatribe, he might be free to come across as more pessimistic and scolding than he otherwise would, taking this tone from his source. The dire pessimism about almost all human beings who have ever lived is not attested in the literary remains of Antisthenes, but it can be compared to the voice of Ajax in t. 53 and also to various *apophthegmata*, such as t. 72A. A similar tone is also in Stob. 4.29c.53, which is arguably from Antisthenes (see t. 41A title 2.5). For a survey of all humans according to their time of existence, compare t. 18.

(27) ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἀγνοοῦντας ἃ ἔστιν εἰδόμενα καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν ἄνδρα εἶναι: The syntax here connotes a certain circularity or tautology regarding what it is advantageous to know. It is advantageous to know the things by which, by virtue of knowing them, one is fine and good. There is no external explanation for what these things are. To be “fine and good” seems to be Antisthenes’ goal: see t. 78 note on Εἰ καλοκάγαθία and further references there. This is not an anti-Socratic, conventionalist formulation, as critics sometimes assume; rather, we are expected to revise our view of what “fine and good” really means. See also t. 134s, 172a.

*Concordance of Decleva Caizzi's Antisthenis Fragmenta
(Milan: Cisalpino, 1966) with this edition*

Decleva Caizzi	Prince		
1	41A	23	99, 135A
2	41B	24A	92A
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10	50	31	201
11	48	32A	199A
12	45	32B	199B
13	84A	33	200
14	53	34	142
15	54	35	143A
16	62	36	148
17	63	37A	147A
18A	64A	37B	147B
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18C	64B	39A	179A
18D	64A	39B	180A
19	85	39C	180B
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Decleva Caizzi	Prince		
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42	203	76	134p
43	204	77	109
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45	151A	80	134e
46	151B	81	134j
47A	152A	82	129
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47C	153A	84A	131A
48	154	84B	131B
49	155	85	90A
50A	149B-1	86	104A
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52A	188B	90	107
52B	188A-2	91	106
53	189A-1	92	108
54	190	93	125
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56	192A	95	134f
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58	194	97A	111A
59	196	97B	111B
60	195	98	167
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62	186	100	68
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64	163A	102	70C
65	174	103	71A
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67	105	105	76
68	164	106	69
69	134a-b	107	13A
70	134c-d	108A	122A
71	134n-o	108B	122D
72	134r	108C	122C
73	134s-t	108D	122F

Decleva Caizzi	Prince		
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108F	122F	135B	22A
109A	109A	136A	22A
109B	109B	136B	23
110	127A	136C	22C
111A	117B	136D	—
111B	70C	137	26
111C	117A	138A	34C-1
112A	124A	138B	34C-2
112B	124B	138C	34C-3
113	126	138D	34B
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115	58	138F	—
116	59	139	34A
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118	34E	141	35A
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120	83A	143	37C
121	65	144	36
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Decleva Caizzi	Prince		
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173	173A	188	168
174	87B	189	172c
175	172a	190	172d
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177	100A	192	175
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Index of Greek and Latin Words

This index includes words and proper names used in Antisthenes' extant texts, significant in Antisthenes' ancient reception, and plausibly significant in Antisthenes' lost texts, as they occur in the testimonia of this edition. At its core are the words occurring in the *Ajax* and *Odysseus* speeches (t. 53 and 54), as indexed previously by Goulet-Cazé 1992:32–36, except that pronouns, prepositions, and particles are here largely omitted. Words presented as quotations of Antisthenes, words used to describe Antisthenes or his actions, and words recurring in multiple testimonia are especially targeted. The conjectural passages (see introduction, p. 4) are included minimally, where key terms overlap with the core evidence. References are by page number, with testimonium number in parentheses; when the reading is an editorial conjecture, the parentheses are square. Words are listed in their primary lexical forms. Cognate words are often clustered. Latin words are listed with the Greek words from which they have been translated, when this is clear, and separately at the end in remaining cases.

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